CIVIL LIBERTIES V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY – CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (INTENT, CONSTI CONSTRUED

AS A WHOLE)

Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 284.

Executive Order 284 provides

That a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions

It also provides that if a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department holds more positions than two, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank.

Lastly, it provides that in order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284. Petitioners argue that EO 284 violates Article 7, Section 13 of the Constitution

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.

Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII,
the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a
Member of the Cabinet under Article 7, Section 3 paragraph 2 or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article 8, Sec. 8 paragraph 1.

Respondents argue that Section 13 of Article 7 admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article 9-B, which reads

Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.

Respondents contend that the exception mentioned in Article 7 is found in Article 9. They maintain that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as
the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

The issue is whose interpretation of the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” is correct?

And whether Executive Order 284 is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court ruled yes the EO is unconstitutional.

Intent of the framers: provide enrichment

Marcos’ presidency wife, members of Cabinet held multiple offices

Well-established is the rule in constitutional construction that no provision in the Constitution shall be construed separately
from the rest. No constitutional provision shall be construed alone. All provisions bearing the same subject shall be brought into
view and be interpreted as to effectuate the greater purpose of the constitution.

On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.

wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation.21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of
the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)
and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8
(1), Article VIII.
GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (4 REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, POLITICAL QUESTION)
After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the Philippines, the government decided in to
pursue a policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No. 8180 or the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of1996."
However, R.A. No. 8180 met strong opposition and the Supreme Court struck down the law as invalid because the three key
provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result;
R.A. No. 8180's provisions on tariff differential, inventory requirements, and predatory pricing inhibited fair competition,
encouraged monopolistic power, and interfered with the free... interaction of market forces.
Congress later enacted R.A. No. 8479 excluded the invalid provisions found in the first law
Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia sought to declare the new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated
Article 12, Section 19 of the Constitution, which reads
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed.
Garcia argues that RA 8479 prescribed the period for removal of price control on gasoline and other finished petroleum
products and set the time for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry.
Garcia explains that implementing full deregulation and removing price control at a time when the market is still dominated and
controlled by an oligopoly would be contrary to public interest, as it would only provide an opportunity for the Big 3, CALTEX,
SHELL, and PETRON to engage in price-fixing and overpricing.
R.A. No. 8479 is "glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people," and thus asked the Court to declare the provision
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held no. The case involves a political question.

Under the doctrine of political question, Courts shall be discouraged to rule over questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.

Requisites of judicial review Actual case or controversy, legal standing, earliest possible opportunity, the issue of
constitutionality shall be the very lis mota of the case

Because the case involves a political question, the first requisite is not satisfied.

Garcia’s insistence that by adopting a policy of full deregulation through the removal of price controls at a time when an
oligopoly still exists, R.A. No. 8479 contravenes the Constitutional provision of regulating or prohibiting monopolies

The Court explains that the constitutional provision does not declare an outright prohibition of monopolies. It simply allows the
State to act "when public interest so requires"; even then, no outright prohibition is mandated, as the State may choose to
regulate rather than to prohibit.

Garcia failed to answer three important questions

Whether or not an oligopoly exists

What does the public interest require with respect to the existing oligopoly

What does the State require in the exercise of its discretion with respect to the existing oligopoly

The last two questions are political questions and are outside the scope of judicial review since they are not justiciable do not
constitute an actual controversy.

What Garcia raises as an issue is the wisdom of immediately and fully deregulating the oil industry. Such question relates to
wisdom of the timing and manner of the deregulation.
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION (DIRECT INJURY TEST, TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE)

After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) creating the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC).
The PTC was tasked to conduct fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public
officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and thereafter submit its findings and to
the Office of the President, the Congress, and the Ombudsman.
Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1-- the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed
Petitioners argue that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office to
appropriate funds--it does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress
EO No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers because the PTC assumes the power of Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

THE PTC THREATENS THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR HAVING THE SAME FUNCTIONS--the Truth Commission
does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). The PTC it is simply a fact-
finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

The OSG also questioned the legal standing of the petitioners

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

Legal standing—legislative legal standing

Legislators have standing

Biraogo has no standing

Direct injury test—he must show that he has personal and substantial interest that he has sustained direct injury as a result

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the
equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly
constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
SALONGA V. PANO (MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE, SYMBOLIC FUNCTION)

A prima facie case is a cause of action or defense that is sufficiently established by a party's evidence to justify a verdict in
his or her favor, provided such evidence is not rebutted by the other party.

Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he had been implicated, along with
other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in a series of bombings in Metro Manila.

He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations because Salonga’s House was used as a
contact point and because Salonga’s remarks during the party of Raul Daza in the United States about the likelihood of a
violent uprising in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted by then President Marcos.

When Salonga was arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him.

His counsel was not even allowed to talk to him until the Supreme Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing
that his lawyers be permitted to speak to him.

Only four months of detention was Salonga informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him.

Salonga moved to dismiss the complaint but it was denied.

The respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been
established against the forty persons accused.

Salonga files a petition, questioning the resolution of the judge.

Salonga argues that no prima facie case has been established to justify the filing of information against him.

The Court ruled that the case is moot and academic

The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed

SYMBOLIC FUNCTION
ABS-CBN V COMELEC (MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE, SYMBOLIC FUNCTION)

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing COMELEC en banc Resolution No. 98-
1419 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body

“RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.”

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon “information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group)
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the
x x x vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcast] immediately.” The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as
the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to
cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant
thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been
held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.

ISSUE:

Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case?

RULING:

No.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on
the people’s fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic
feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the
issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it “also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.” Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being
invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls
and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Petitioner Restituto Ynot transmitted 6 carabaos in a boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A

Such Executive Order prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos.

Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of said Executive Order shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit (carabao).

Marcos amends E.O. 626 with E.O. 626-A, prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age.

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the Executive Order.

Petitioner argues that the EO imposes a penalty without according the carabao or carabeef owner the right to be heard before a competent court.
It is therefore an improper exercise of legislative power by the President.

Trial Court sustained the confiscation of carabaos and declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority

Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the ruling of the Trial Court.

JUDICIAL POWER SHALL BE EXERCISED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS WELL AS THE STATUTORY COURTS

EO WAS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose.

The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of
a permit adequately works to conserve those still fit for farm work or breeding, and to prevent their depletion. While EO 626-A
has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter
of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the EO is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS (CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY, SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS)

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the
bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
FRANCISCO V. HOR

The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachmen rules approved by the 11th Congress.

The House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund.

Former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., and seven other Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes.

The complaint was endorsed by the House of Representatives and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in
accordance with Article 11, Section 3, par. 2 of the Consitution, which reads

A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within 3 session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss said
complaint for being insufficient in substance.

More than four months thereafter, a second complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against the Chif Justice, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated earlier.

The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement or Impeachment signed by at least 1/3
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Various petitions were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, most of which contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional because it violates the provision of Article 11, Section 5 of the
Constitution that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.

Respondents contended that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is a co-equal branch of the government, from the performance of its mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases.

The words of the constitution should be given their literal meaning, except when technical terms are employed

The words of the constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers

The Constitution shall be interpreted as a whole

Initiate” of course is understood in its ordinary meaning, to commence, or set going.

It means “to perform or facilitate the first action,”

The Court delved into the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The
framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

DAVID V. ARROYO
 In 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country.

The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the anniversary; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA.

The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner David, a professor newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

Thereafter, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of Presidential
Proclamation 1017 and General Order No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against
representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA who have been suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion.

In March, President Arroyo issued a Presidential Proclamation, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased
to exist.

Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issues:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members
during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?

Ruling:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part
of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires andunconstitutional. The
Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation,
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is
only partly unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of
prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting
from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if
there is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and
conditions under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law
would be observed.

Respondents argue that the case is already moot and academic because Arroyo had already declared that the national
emergency has ceased to exist.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,26so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.29

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are
the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it
confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."30

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; 32 third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 33and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.34
GARCIA V. DRILON

Petitioner Jesus Garcia appears to have inflicted violence against private respondent. Petitioner admitted having an affair with
a bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded
private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also beat up their daughter whom he blaimed
for squealing on him.

All these abuses prompted respondent to despair causing her to attempt suicide by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to
the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined. He even told his mother-in-law that
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair.

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to RA 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO ordered petitioner to remove all his belongings in the conjugal dwelling and leave the premises.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions of the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the said TPO and extended
the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer,
the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an exercise in futility

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”

R.A. 9262 defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman
has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Petitioner argued that RA 9262 is unconstitutional because the protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and,
thus, the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer
to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect its personal service.

Petitioner also explained that his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC is because the Family
Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."
 Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.

Family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.

Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the
Philippines’ compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs
its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms
both in law and in practice.

CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive document
for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence
of extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of
rights and respect for human dignity.

2. Philippine’s obligation as state-party to CEDAW

The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement for the improvement of their
position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of
discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis
that women have suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of
their biological sex.

The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting gender
equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made
in the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential.

RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which are often
reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has
or had a sexual or dating relationship.
3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the Achievement of Governmental
Objectives

Historical Perspective:
 A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form of
violence, were facts of life,
 Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code: all "assumed patriarchy as
natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male superiority."
 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological assumption that: husband and wife were ‘one
body’ before God; thus "they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the husband," a concept that
evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
 Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are expected to take on the dominant roles
both in the community and in the family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women –
power, which must necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men control
women to retain such power.
 In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they
were treated as property.
 The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his
property right over her.
 Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated
structure of society.
 English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
 However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands
to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives
with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence committed against
women in the Philippines.
 In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases involving violence
against women were filed under RA 9262.
 From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different categories of violence committed against
women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing trend from 2004 to 2012,
 The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable
victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to
anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.

4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural differences

The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and men prescribe that they be
treated differently under particular conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the
disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned from
the following recommendations of the CEDAWCommittee:
 The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment
to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken into
account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address
such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming
under representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men and women.
 Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These results may be quantitative and/or
qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying
 the same income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying freedom from
violence.

The government’s commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her life are parallel to that of a
man, requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is
guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is
committed to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive equality nor
be empowered.

5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution

The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake ameliorative action that
would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the
government to combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."