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GROUP 2: PARENS PATRIAE August 31, 2019

I. Group Members

1. Dumalaog, Catherine
2. Ragiles, Princess Joy
3. Caringal, Jen
4. Villamor, Jose Lorenzo
5. Panti, Angelo Brian
6. Foja, Kristine Valerie
7. Yamashita, Jira

II. Doctrine of Parens Patriae: Explanation

In the justice legal system for juveniles, parens patriae is a doctrine that allows the
state to step in and serve as a guardian for children, the mentally ill, the incompetent, the
elderly, or disabled persons who are unable to care for themselves.

Cases stated in item III elaborate the significance of the doctrine, and demonstrate
how the state stepped in and acted as the “Parens Patriae” in protecting the incapacitated.

III. Related Cases

Case Digest

1. Cabanas v Pilapil (G.R L-25843)

a. Facts:

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child, Millian Pilapil,
to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child
is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco
Pilapil. Florentino died when the child was only ten (10) years old, hence,
Francisco took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the
mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of
the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s trustee.
Francisco affirmed the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a
private contract, its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties
and intended beneficiaries.

b. Issue:
Does the State have the authority to interfere with the terms of the
insurance policy by virtue of parens patriae? Yes
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c. Ruling:

The uncle, Francisco Pilapil, should not be the trustee. It should be the
mother, Melchora Cabanas as she is the immediate relative of the minor child
and, it is presumed that a mother shows more care towards the child than an
uncle.
The appealed decision adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an
agent of the State, acts as parens patriae and is expected to make a decision
which will prioritize the minor’s best interest. As such, the judiciary cannot
remain insensible to the validity of the petitioner’s plea. “The State shall
strengthen the family as a basic social institution”. The Constitution, moreover,
dictates that it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened. As such, the
decision of the lower courts, entitling the mother as the trustee, is affirmed.

2. Government of Philippine Island vs. El Monte De Piedad (G.R. No. L-9959)

a. Facts:

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippine in June 3, 1863.

Spain paid $365,703 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of
those damaged by an earthquake. This was later distributed leaving a balance
of $365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an
institution under the control of the church, the Philippine Government
directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in four (4) installments
with following dates, February 15, March 12, April 14 and June 2, 1883 and still
in possession of Monte de Piedad. As a result, on May 3, 1912 various petitions
were filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed
for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay with
interest. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted
already and contended that the present Philippine Government cannot file suit
on the ground that the obligation of the former was wiped out when there was
a change of sovereignty.

b. Issue:

Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action

(complaint against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money
of the intended beneficiaries)? Yes.

c. Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case
as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature
or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all
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charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over

the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

3. People of the Philippines vs. Tamayo (G.R. 86162)

a. Facts
Raymundo Fabia charged the accused Virgilio Tamayo, together with
Arturo Garcia alias “Zoro” and Rodrigo Imbuido alias “Isong” for raping his
daughter “Rosario Fabia” and by reason of which she became insane.
Presenting their witnesses, the prosecution said that the accused made
Rosario board the tricycle with them, had carnal knowledge of her, brought
her to the house of Tamayo’s uncle, then was finally brought to her parents'
home. Rosario was not acting normally, and since then, her mental illness
continued although from time to time, she would experience lucid intervals
and return to her normal self, till one day, she finally divulged to her father the
outrage done to her. Tamayo denies having had carnal knowledge of Rosario
and claims that a different set of events transpired that day. The trial court
believed the prosecution's theory and convicted appellant Tamayo of the
crime charged. The appellant then assailed that the trial court erred in
upholding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses considering that the
testimonies of the four prosecution witnesses were inconsistent on the date
Rosario regained her sanity.

b. Issue

Whether Rosario’s testimony should be considered credible even with

the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.

c. Ruling

The Supreme Court said that it was proper for the courts to lend
credence to the testimonies of victims who are of tender years, such as 18-
year old Rosario in this case, regarding their versions of what transpired, since
the State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect
themselves.
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Annexes. Case Readings

Case 1.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a
minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute
centers as to who of them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate
Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted,
the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must have taken into
account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an
unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and pay
greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are no
circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if the language of
the law were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the
State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in
the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the mother
to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. " 1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had
a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time
the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The
deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her
minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child
is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify
his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to
deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil
Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father
or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." 3 The latter states: "The property
which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title,
belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority
and whose company he lives; ...4
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds
belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her
mother. The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this
property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the
plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to
possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law,
is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file
an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein
to the total amount of P5,000.00."5
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It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions
can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather
clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory
norms are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not one of interpretation but of application. 6 So it must
be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant7 to blunt the
force of legal commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the
conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in
consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law
of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full measure of concern for the
offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added circumstance that the child stays with the
mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of
the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust
imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting
on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El
derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria
potestad y de la presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con mas cariño y solicitude que los
padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia
doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a
la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros,
con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis adelante." 8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to
the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a
pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did
occur here, that family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with
the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different
if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly
the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity
of her plea. In a recent case,9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a
royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more,
there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic
social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened,
it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Decision, Record on Appeal, 24.
2 Cf. Ibid, 24-25.
3 Article 320 of the Civil Code (1950).
4 Article 321 of the Civil Code (1950).
5 Decision, Record on Appeal, 27.
6 Cf. People vs. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Central
Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla
v. City of Pasay L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349: Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
505; La Peria Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Caparas, L-27948 and 28001-11, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1085; Mobil
Oil Phil., Inc. v. Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia,
L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111; Vda. de Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co.,
L-27489, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 553; Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-28463, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 269; Maritime Co. of the Phil. v. Reparations Commission, L-29203, July 26, 1971, 40 SCRA 70;
Allied Brokerage Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-27641, Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 555.; Gonzaga v. Court
of Appeals, L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381; Vallangca v. Ariola, L-29226, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 139;
Jalandoni v. Endaya, L-23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261; Pacis v. Pamaran, L-23996, March 15, 1974.
7 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 8-9.
8 2 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, 38 (1944).
9 Nery v. Lorenzo, L-23096, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 431, 438-439.
10 Article II, Section of the Constitution.
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Case 2.

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands,plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions
of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto
and on October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys
thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various
sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a
list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated
April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a
balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833,
the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the
sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the following dates: February
15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions
of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment
of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and
in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons
or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the
sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of
the cause. The defendant appealed and makes the following assignment of errors:

1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros,
were so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these
Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the
action taken by the former government.

2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being
at present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.

3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government
in its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of
June 3, 1863, in these Island.

4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30,
1912, is unconstitutional.

5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular
Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000)
given to it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands.

6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in
the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation,
with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.

In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government
in what manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered
damage by the earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had
assumed toward the donors.
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The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands, which reads:

Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.

Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the
funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains
the sum of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after tomorrow. Second: That, to
maintain the credit of the establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure
money. Third: That your Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a
part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake
of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board over $1090,000
which was deposited in the said treasury by order of your general Government, it having been transferred thereto from the
Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. fifth: That in the straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can,
to avert impending disaster to the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the
Treasury at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be
held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this
transfer not be approved for any reason, either because of the failure of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made
by your Excellency relative to the application to the needs of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to believe
the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad obligates
itself to return any sums which it may have received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the whole thereof, should it
have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate upon the
security of pawned jewelry. — This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the present crisis and the board of
directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the other officials who have take part in the transaction.

The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:

GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

MANILA, February 1, 1883.

In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated
that the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account
remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats the general Government
that, in pursuance of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de
Piedad $80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused
by the earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve
the said proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if
the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so
beneficient an institution; and in view of the report upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and
considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and
considering that this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after
strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the
Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the
wishes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of
charity which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious effects
of usury; and

Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated, and
that the great and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is
not granted, since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit of the Monte
de Piedad; and

Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present
juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting
from the late calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and

Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained, for the funds in question are
sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this general
Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the Intendencia de
Hacienda, resolves as follows:

First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands
obtained from the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its
needs may require, in installments of $20,000.

Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it
may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution.

Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the necessary
papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de
Piedad of having to suspend its operations may be averted.
 8

H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net

(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.

By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio
what is the total sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant
to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants, whose names were
published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein provided, as such
persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke
them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall identify themselves, without regard to their financial
status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been concluded and the Government
can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in the
vaults of the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the relief board and
your general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were
expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result
of the earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply with the provisions
contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General,
the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that
Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:

Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal Order No. 1044
of December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the
year 1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the
rules specified in the said royal order, one of them being that before making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall
be reduced to money. These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury
of the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of
charitable institutions and another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your
Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its
information and the purposes desired (that is, for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the
liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way
from that intended by the donors) and this Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of
the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of your general Government of the date of
February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the
period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad
the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its
return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it; and, besides,
it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the assets of the
earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without
doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during which it has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to
their persons. This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as,
far from investing it in beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent
interests, the result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had gratuitously
received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated demands refused
to return the money on the ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order the
reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, the
fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it received
from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion of this
Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the amount of the subscription
raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the
Monte de Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation whatever could be made of funds derived from a
private subscription raised for a specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and the names of the beneficiaries have
been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which has been unduly delayed. In
view of the unexpected reply made by the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the matter of the claim for
the aforementioned loan, or to argue in support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency necessary
in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg your Excellency
kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this
Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that the said
pious establishment, during the last few days and after demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank
nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the general deposit funds.

The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the Philippine Government
or the Spanish Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.

In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883,
$20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public
Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan,
and without interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the amount
to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop of
Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal
entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two account which on this date are united in
accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these
institutions, $95,000."
 9

On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status of the $80,000
and received the following reply:

MANILA, March 31, 1902.

To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.

SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this office as to when and for what
purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened
in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be useful for the report which your office
is called upon to furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have been
consulted for the purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a reimbursable loan and without interest,
twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with their own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12,
April 14 and June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand pesos,
making a total of eighty thousand pesos. — (Signed) Emilio Moreta.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.

Manila, November 19, 1913

(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,

Secretary

(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,

Managing Director.

The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the Government of Spain
and the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de
Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working
capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief
board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief
board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the
same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General, after reciting
the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that
the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus, should
be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution," and
"considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the
$80,000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return,
within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution." It will
be noted that the first and only time the word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000 appears in this resolution of
the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve of the transfer of
the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a
donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform the Madrid
Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de
Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing,
might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
should include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the Department of
Finance there can be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets
forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the $80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders
of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum
as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the
"Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account." Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad
recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without interest."
Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit
and not as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.

Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:

The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy
See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in
his kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and
his deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors;
the latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy
See, now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work,
for a charitable purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-
patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved,
in the majority, if not in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon
him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary
Government though Christian, was not Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and
inveterately maintained a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers.
 10

In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which
apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the
American Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter
to the Monte de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over such things would result in great
inconvenience to the American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for the reason that it
affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide
the exercise thereof to a Government like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)

It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this
regard; and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made,
but became impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance therewith is
excused and the contract has been cleared thereof.

The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the erroneous
theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity founded by
the donations for the earthquake sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first proposition
has already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that the fund was
given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose — the relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other purpose. The
money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money
to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including the King of Spain and the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official capacity, and the fact
that they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had
nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an institution under
the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the
King of Spain and the Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, respectively,
would have disposed of the fund as such and not in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to
the present Philippine Government, because the right to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the
Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was completely separated with the
change of sovereignty.

And in their supplemental brief counsel say:

By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the trustee
was the Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole
matter is one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no time was the owner
of the fund. Not being the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it
certainly never has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for
such a purpose even could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United
States, as a Government, have accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the
Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only
persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que
trustent, and this Government is neither.

If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the
ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to
show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change
of sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law
trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force
at the time there transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the
instructions promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)

The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which
were remitted to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board
constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a
temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the
creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under
article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the
donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other
purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power
upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them
to some other charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as they
were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above
mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the
rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the
Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for
which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised these
powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine
Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry
out the intention of the contributors. It will this be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere
trustees of the fund.

It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even
considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot
 11

maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon
any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the
Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December
10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the
sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings, wharves,
barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belonged to the public
domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover
this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence,
as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in
article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.
We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the
instructions promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs.Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws
theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose
their force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same public law
that the great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by
the new ruler.

If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign,
they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among
"that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless
they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and
character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right
and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in
exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed
such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer
(paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).

Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States.
In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court
said:

The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave their
Acts the same force and effect.

In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:

When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this
power still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will
is made known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.

Chancelor Kent says:

In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature,
by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com.,
508, note.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations,
said:

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person
or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the
great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often
necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.

The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court
held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts,
idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:

These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of
charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as
parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy
to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the
purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-
General had no power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a
whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of
the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to
prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1
Younge & C. C., 417):
 12

Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege
of the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public
generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the
interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)

It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it
was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the
proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions.
The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their
respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They
are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be
impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course
that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which
it was originally destined.

The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to
maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only
applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the
public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government.
(Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public
policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in
the future.

As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for
the reason that we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a
manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not,
as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property
without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of
the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.

In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its
present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of
the old city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of
the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the
old debt, said:

The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the
successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject
to all of its liabilities.

In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the
$80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the
time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the
other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription
cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not
prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact,
prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.

The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the
same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the
royal order of December 3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedadin June, 1893, to return the $80,000.
The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not
the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a
returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the
Monte, through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan, without
interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.

Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or corporations wherein
the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of
limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were
received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels'
theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after
March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)

Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said:

It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments
alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they
are confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of
limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S.
 13

vs. Knight, 14 Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272,
281.)

In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:

It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the
King, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy,
that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and servants. The
principle is applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation
of the interests and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods
within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs
to be remedied are of such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and
thing over which the State has jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.

In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:

In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the
sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a
nature that the state must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her
citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is
only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands
were ceded to the United States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty
with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds could
not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the
owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries
have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs.
Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B., 397].)

These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things,
applicable to the Philippine Government.

Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor
do they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the
equivalent in Philippine currency.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., did not sign.

Case 3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86162 September 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

VIRGILIO TAMAYO, ARTURO GARCIA alias "Zoro", RODRIGO IMBUIDO alias "Isong", accused.
 14

VIRGILIO TAMAYO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Aniceto L. Madronio for accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment1 of the court a quo finding accused VIRGILIO TAMAYO guilty of rape, imposing upon him a prison
term of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the offended party P30,000.00 for moral damages.

In a verified complaint, Raymundo Fabia charged that on or about the 14th of March 1981, in Barangay Cayanga, San Fabian, Pangasinan,
the accused Virgilio Tamayo, together with Arturo Garcia alias "Zoro"' and Rodrigo Imbuido alias "Isong," conspiring and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his daughter, Rosario E. Fabia, against her will and by
reason of which she became insane.2

The evidence for the government is to the effect that on 13 March 1981, after attending her classes at the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA), eighteen (18) year-old Rosario went home to the province where she was living with her parents in Gardonio, San
Fabian, Pangasinan. She took a jeepney that left Manila at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and arrived at the Poblacion of San Fabian, at
7:00 o-clock in the evening. She then rode a tricycle driven by Arturo Garcia alias "Zoro," one of the three (3) accused in the lower court,
to take her to Gardonio. However, instead of going to Gardonio, Garcia drove the tricycle towards San Fabian Beach. On the way,
however, Garcia stopped and boarded the other accused Rodrigo Imbuido. Imbuido then started embracing and kissing Rosario; the latter
tried to resist. When they reached the beach, the two accused forcibly brought Rosario to a nipa hut. Later, Tamayo arrived and tried to
embrace Rosario who struggled to push him away. Rosario was able to set herself free. She fled to the other side of the hut but Tamayo
followed her and embraced her. Rosario ran towards the sea but Tamayo pursued her and forced her to go back to shore. Garcia and
Imbuido just stood watching on the beach. Then, the three accused forced Rosario to board the tricycle and they proceeded to Barrio
Sabangan to the house of a certain Imbornal. Tamayo and his co-accused threatened Rosario that they would kill her if she talked to
Imbornal about her predicament or if she attempted to escape. When they arrived at the house of Imbornal, Rosario was offered by
Imbornal food and clothes. She was also invited to sleep there although, according to her, she was not able to sleep as she was not
comfortable sleeping in a stranger's house. As forwarned, she did not talk to Imbornal nor to his wife and daughter about her problem.
Nor did she attempt to escape from the house for fear that she would be killed if she did.

At about 2:00 o'clock the following morning, the accused told Imbornal that they were taking Rosario to her parents' home in Gardonio.
They then made Rosario board the tricycle with them. When they reached the foot of Cayanga bridge, Tamayo pulled Rosario out of the
tricycle, while Garcia was watching. Imbuido was nowhere to be found by Rosario. Tamayo suddenly embraced and kissed her. Rosario
wanted to shout for help but Tamayo covered her mouth with his hand. Tamayo laid her down and removed her panty as she struggled
to push him back, moving her body left and right to prevent Tamayo from inserting his penis into her private part. He succeeded
nonetheless. She felt the pangs of the breach. After he ejaculated, he stood up. Garcia was still there on top of the bridge, watching. She
was again forced to ride on the tricycle by Tamayo. By this time she was already weak and dejected. Together with Garcia, Tamayo
brought her to the house of his uncle, Barangay Captain Claudio Tamayo. It was there that Rosario lost her balance, her sanity; she could
no longer remember things.3

From the house of the barangay captain, Rosario was finally brought to her parents' home by the same accused Virgilio Tamayo and
Arturo Garcia accompanied by Panfilo Ferreria, a relative of Rosario, who was earlier summoned by Barangay Captain Tamayo to
accompany Rosario home to her parents.4 When Rosario arrived at her parents house, she did not recognize her family. She was also not
acting normally. Since then, her mental illness continued although from time to time, she would experience lucid intervals and return to
her normal self. On 18 March 1981, during one of these lucid intervals, she divulged to her father the outrage done to her.

On 23 March 1981, acting on the information of Rosario, her father brought her to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital where she was
examined by Dr. Evelyn Rosario Castro, a government physician. Dr. Castro confirmed that Rosario was suffering from a laceration on her
hymen, probably caused by sexual intercourse, with her vaginal canal admitting one finger, an indication that she was no longer a virgin.5

On 29 March 1981, Rosario's mental condition not having improved, she was admitted at the National Mental Hospital where she was
examined by Dr. Homer Galvez, Chief of the Children Adolescence Unit, who found her suffering from psychosis or insanity caused by the
trauma of having been raped.6

On 1 March 1982, Raymundo Fabia, in behalf of her daughter Rosario, filed the complaint for rape against Virgilio Tamayo, Arturo Garcia
and Rodrigo Imbuido. But only Tamayo and Imbuido were arrested; Garcia remained at large. Hence, only Tamayo and Imbuido were
tried.

Appellant Tamayo denies having had carnal knowledge of Rosario. He claims that in the early morning of 14 March 1981, he accompanied
Garcia to the house of a certain Imbornal located in Sabangan to fetch a lady passenger by the name of Rosario who was staying there.
Tamayo claims that they stayed in that house for an hour, after which, he and Garcia brought Rosario to the house of Barangay Captain
Claudio Tamayo at Cayanga. To support his professed innocence, Tamayo relates that he even joined Garcia and Ferreria in escorting
Rosario home. When asked of the probable reason why the father of Rosario filed a complaint against him, he countered that the family
of Rosario wanted to extort P10,000.00 from him.
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Accused Rodrigo Imbuido narrated a different story: In the evening of 13 March 1981, Garcia who was his brother-in-law arrived with
Rosario as passenger in his tricycle. Imbuido was at the back of Garcia, while Rosario was in the passenger's seat. Imbuido denied having
kissed or embraced Rosario inside the tricycle. He said that he and Garcia just drove Rosario to the Holiday Beach in San Fabian where
she took a dip for an hour. Thereafter, they brought her to Imbornal's house in Sabangan where she was given food and clothes. Imbuido
denied that, Tamayo was present at the house of Imbornal. Imbuido further alleged that he left the place with Garcia at 9:00 o-clock in
the evening, went home, and slept from 10:00 o'clock that evening until 6:00 o'clock the following morning.7

The trial court believed the prosecution's theory and convicted appellant Tamayo of the crime charged. It however acquitted Imbuido on
the basis of the victim's testimony pointing to Tamayo as the sole perpetrator of the rape.

In this appeal, appellant assails the trial court (a) for assuming jurisdiction over the case as the complaint is null and void, having been
filed not by the offended party who was already eighteen (18) years old at the time the offense was committed but by her father
Raymundo Fabia; (b) for finding that immediately after the rape, victim Rosario Fabia became insane and recovered only on 1 September
1981; and, (e) for not acquitting him on reasonable doubt.

The appellant maintains that in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction to try a criminal case for rape, the complaint must be filed
by the offended woman even if she be a minor, and if she does not want to file the complaint, her, parents, grandparents or guardian
may file the same. Appellant submits that there is no showing in the instant case that Rosario refused to file the complaint; hence, the
complaint filed by her father did not vest jurisdiction on the trial court.

We find the appeal devoid of merit.

The law is clear that "[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian . . . In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before
she could file the complaint and has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the above offenses, independently of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, unless she is competent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended
party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same."8

There is no doubt that 18-year old Rosario is still a minor, not having reached twenty-one (21) when the crime was committed on her.
The records also fail to disclose that she filed a complaint on the outrage done to her. Consequently, when she failed to file her complaint,
the filing by her father was justified under the Rules. Thus, when appellant filed a motion to dismiss in the court below for lack of
jurisdiction, it was not error for the trial court to deny the same.

The appellant also assails the trial court for upholding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He argues that the testimonies of the
four (4) prosecution witnesses were inconsistent on the date Rosario regained her sanity. He argues that according to Raymundo Fabia,
it was 18 March 1981, or four (4) days after the incident, because Rosario was able to narrate to him what happened to her, while Rosario
herself said it was much later, particularly on 1 September 1981, when she recovered from her mental illness. He submits that while Dr.
Evelyn Rosario testified that Rosario was conscious, coherent and ambulatory when she was physically examined on 23 March 1981, Dr.
Homer Galvez, the psychiatrist, claimed that Rosario fully recovered from insanity on 3 July 1981. Appellant further contends that as early
as 18 March 1981, Rosario was already mentally normal and capable of filing the complaint herself, thus her failure to do so militates
against the truth of her story.

Rape is a most abominable crime wherein the offender should be severely punished, especially in our country where religion, tradition
and culture demand high respect for Filipino women. Since the crime of rape is not normally committed in the presence of witnesses, the
court merely relies on the credibility of the victims testimony as weighed against the credibility of the accused. It is settled that in rape
cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness provided such testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of

things.9

In the instant case, the trial court found the testimony of Rosario accurate and credible. The testimony of Rosario, partly reproduced
hereunder, is enlightening:

Q When you reached Cayanga near the foot of Cayanga bridge, what happened there?
A They forced me to come out the tricycle, sir.
Q Who forced you to come out the tricycle?
A It was Tamayo, sir.
Q What were the two other accused doing when Tamayo tried to force you out the tricycle?
A I do not know where Imbuido (was), sir, but, Garcia was there watching.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened at the foot of the bridge?
A After bringing me out from the tricycle and brought me (sic) at the foot of the bridge, Tamayo embraced, kissed me and forced
me to take my virginity, sir (sic).
Q When Tamayo embraced, kissed and tried to get your virginity, what did you do?
A I fought him but I was not able to resist because I am weaker, sir.
Q What else did you do, if any?
A I wanted to shout but he was able to place his hand on my mouth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else happened after that?
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A Tamayo was able to lay me down and was able to remove my panty and insert his private part, sir.
Q After Tamayo insert(ed) his penis inside your vagina, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
Q When accused inserted his penis inside your vagina, what did you do?
A I struggled, sir.
Q How did you struggle, what did you do to him, if any?
A I fought him, sir.
Q Tell us, demonstrate.
A Witness is demonstrating that he was pushing back Tamayo.
Q What else aside from pushing?
A I was moving my body left and right, sir . . . I do not like that he will be able to get my virginity, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After accused inserted his penis inside your vagina, what did you do?
A After inserting his penis inside my vagina accused stood up, sir.
Q What did he do after, that?
A Tamayo wanted to bring me inside the tricycle again, sir.
Q What did you do?
A I was so weak at the time and so they brought me to the Barangay Captain, sir. 10

A perusal of Rosario's testimony shows that her narration of her misfortune is clear and convincing, and recounted with candor and
sincerity. Her testimony does not contain any self-contradiction. Her answers to the questions of the court are spontaneous, discounting
the possibility that she has been tutored or rehearsed before taking the witness stand. Rosario narrates with sufficient clarity and detail
the events leading to the time appellant sexually abused her, the manner he raped her, and her positive identification of him as her
rapist.

The rule is settled that with regard to the credibility of witnesses, the trial court's findings and conclusions are binding upon this Court,
We quote with approval the observations of the trial court —

Although accused Tamayo denies having had carnal knowledge of the complaining witness and states that he even helped the victim in
delivering her to her father's house, this Court cannot escape the observation that the complaining witness positively identified him as
the one who raped her while accused Arturo Garcia stood by watching. It is difficult to believe that a young and unmarried woman would
tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of public trial, unless
she was not (sic) motivated by a(n) honest decision to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Francisco (Francisquite),
56 SCRA 764). The testimony of the offended party during the hearing of the instant case, in the observation of this Court was
straightforward and untainted with ulterior motive other than to seek justice for her defloration. No young Filipina, of decent repute
would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused, unless that is the truth . . . 11

As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, this Court finds the same to be insignificant. They
merely refer to immaterial and irrelevant details, particularly the date when Rosario recovered from her mental illness. Further,
witnesses, possessed with different capacities for observation, cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity matters relating
to the crime. 12 This is true especially when the inconsistencies refer to minor and insignificant details, in which case, the inconsistencies
do not destroy the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies on material points. 13

The contradictions referred to by appellant do not detract from the overwhelming evidence that appellant Tamayo committed the crime
charged which caused Rosario her insanity. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements
of appellant, the former deserves more credence and weight. Besides, the records do not show any sufficient motive on the part of victim
to falsely impute to appellant Tamayo such a serious crime of rape.

It is worthy to note at this point the marked receptivity on the part of courts to lend credence to the testimonies of victims who are of
tender years, such as 18-year old Rosario in this case, regarding their versions of what transpired, since the State, as parens patriae, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves. 14

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death. However, since the death penalty cannot be imposed under the 1987 Constitution, the trial court correctly imposed upon
appellant Virgilio Tamayo the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the payment of moral damages to Rosario E. Fabia in the
amount of P30,000.00 is increased to P50,000.00 conformably with recent jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant VIRGILIO TAMAYO guilty of rape and imposing upon him a prison term of
reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity in favor of complaining witness Rosario E. Fabia is increased
to P50,000.00.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

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Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.