Enver Pasha and His Times

Prologue: In the Land of the Oriental

Despot
Part 1: And a savior was born
Part 2: Resuscitating the sick man
The Players 1: The big leaders
Part 3: Janissaries are reborn
The Players 2: Germans commanding
Turkish Armies
Enver's Thoughts on his German
Allies
The Players 3: Leaders caught in
Enver's war aims
The disintegration of the Ottoman
war machine
Part 4: The Armenians are nothing to
me!
The Players 4: Picking up the broken
pieces
Part 5: Lost in the wilderness
Part 6: There must be something to
fight for...
Part 7: My mission is to be a savior
once more!
Part 8: The Death of Enver Pasha
Part 9: Bringing this tale up to date
Part 10: The Son of Enver

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 Part 11: The Daughters of Enver
Part 12: The Brothers (and Sisters) of
Enver

Prologue: In the land of the oriental despot

"The Red Sultan" Abd-ul

Hamid II.  So nicknamed
by his contemporary
journalists in the west for
the brutal massacres of
Armenians that he nodded
to in the Eastern Vilayets
in 1894 and again
throughout the city of
Constantinople in 1896.
He was regarded as one of
the most clever and able
rulers of his day. He also
witnessed the greatest
decline of the Ottoman Empire in its history. Misfortune began as he came
to power in 1876 amidst the turmoil of the Bosnian insurrection, war
against the feudatory Serbia and Montenegro, and the Bulgarian massacres.
The Young Ottomans forced him to grant a western style constitution
complete with a parliament, but he was able to consolidate his power and
suspend it when the Russians marched against him. After a dramatic and
brutal siege at Plevna through the fall of 1877, the Russians finally broke
through and stood at the shores of the Bosporus.

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The victorious Russians imposed on the Sultan the Treaty of San
Stefano, which was to cost the Turks most of their European territories.
The Great Powers intervened, not for the Sultan's sake, but to deny Russia
its advanced position in the Balkans. Thus, the Sultan's power in Europe
was maintained but his authority would be contested several times: in
1885, when his feudatory Bulgaria annexed the Turkish province of
Eastern Rumelia; in 1894 and 1896, amidst the Armenian massacres, when
the Great Powers referred to the Treaty of Berlin [replaced the Treaty of
San Stefano] and its clauses concerning reforms in the Eastern Vilayets; in
1897, when Greece used rebellions on the isle of Crete as an excuse for
war, but was severely defeated; in 1902, when komitadjis in Macedonia
rampaged through the Balkans and brought fierce Turkish reprisals; and in
1903, when the Muerzteg programme was implemented in order to bring
reforms to those provinces.

Such programs of reform were considered by the Turks to be foreign

intervention, and anti-Mohammedan in nature. Islam as a unifying force
was something that Abd-ul Hamid II drew up as no other Sultan before
him had. Although the Ottoman Sultans had claims to the Caliphate as far
back as the XIV. century, they did not assume the mantle until the XVIII.
century, and under duress. The idea of Sultan-Caliph was reinforced by
Mahmud II when he was fighting his rebellious protege Mohammed Ali of
Egypt in the late 1830s. Forty years later, Abd-ul Hamid II saw the aura of
theocratic mastery as a truly nonwestern method of reining in the
progressive western tendencies of his opponents. In this, Abd-ul Hamid II
granted ground-breaking support to the wild Kurdish tribes in the Eastern
vilayets, and these people turned against their Armenian neighbors, who
were wealthier.

Abd-ul Hamid II also increased contacts with pan-Islamic forces outside of

3
the Ottoman Empire, in order to rebuild prestige lost from the Russo-
Turkish War in 1877. This idea of pan-Islam was taken to heart by most
Moslems throughout the world--Islam by nature is a single authority, both
spiritual and civil. However, the people who would have the greatest impact
on the destiny of the Ottoman Empire as it entered the new century were
those who tried to reconcile western-style reforms with pan-Islamic ideals.
Such as the Young Turks...

Added to the mix was an undefined "Turan movement." Essentially, it

started when the Young Ottomans had tried and failed to win their
parliament. The new consciousness among Turks that they were not merely
Moslems and soldiers was fertile ground for aggrandizement. Thus was
born the idea of Turan, a homeland for the Turks, stretching from Anatolia
all the way to the Gobi desert. Abd-ul Hamid II was generally opposed to
the pan-Turanian movement, because it conflicted with the Islam-only
effort underway. He was opposed to the creation of a Turkish nation-state
in the heart of his empire.

GWS, 10/00 [rev. 2/03]

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Part 1: And a savior was born

Ismail Enver was born in Abana, near Constantinople, on 23 November

1881 to a working class family from Monastir (today Bitolj, Macedonia).
His father Ahmed was a Turk, who rose from being a porter to a railway
official and acquired the honorable Bey. Enver's mother, Aisha, was an
Albanian from the Monastir region, who had the distasteful job of laying
out the dead, thus making her an outcast among her own people. Although
most histories suggest a humble origin for Enver and his family, it would
appear that Ahmet was not entirely penniless, and may have found his wife

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while on duty in the army. The family had a long military tradition, and
Enver's uncle Halil was an officer in the First Corps. Enver joined the
military academy and then entered the Turkish Army as a subaltern,
followed by his brothers within a few years.

Enver served for several years in the III. Army Corps, which brought him
to his mother's homeland in the wilds of Macedonia, where he took part in
the anti-bandit campaign in 1903. He was then stationed in the relative
calm of Salonika, where he came into contact with elements of the Young
Turk movement. This nascent political party spread as much disaffection
among the demoralized officers and troops in the city as the komitadji
rebels spread chaos in the countryside. The Ittihat ve Terakki (Committee
for Union and Progress) had as its primary aim to force the Sultan of the
Empire to return to Constitutional Monarchy first attempted in 1876.

At the turn of the new century, Turkey was wracked with disaffection
among the army and navy personnel for widespread corruption and abuse.
There were many rebellions and mutinies in the army especially from 1905
until the time of the revolution in 1908. The navy was in particularly bad
shape. Sultan Abd-ul Hamid II, whose palace of Yildiz was on the shores of
the Bosporus, feared a naval mutiny that might result in a warship steaming
into the Bosporus and shelling his palace. Therefore, he had every Turkish
ship disabled and confined to the Golden Horn. The shameful disrepair of
the navy was but one aggrievance by the Young Turks against the Sultan.
The army had mutinies by soldiers who were never paid and who were
mistreated by the officers; mutinies by officers who were also never paid
and who were never given promotions based on service or
merit; and uprisings by civilians who took the opportunity to attack
corrupt civil servants and governors while army mutinies occurred.

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 In June 1908, the Young Turk revolution began as yet another
typical mutiny. At the end of a month filled with turmoil,
Major Enver Bey, at that time a junior yet highly energetic and
active member of the Young Turks, was called to Constantinople
to receive a promotion. Instead, he fled into the mountains above Salonika.
His defiance created an unusual amount of speculation and he became
famous overnight. Contrary to popular belief, it is not true that Enver led a
mutiny of soldiers into the mountains--he was totally alone in this
endeavor. But it is true that Niyazi Bey led heavily armed soldiers into the
mountains, following Enver Bey's example. This was the beginning of an
armed rebellion against the Sultan.

Shemsi Pasha was sent into Macedonia to bring the rebels out, but was
shot in Monastir on 7 July 1908. As the duly appointed representative of
the Sultan, his death was most significant, and soon the entire III. Corps
had declared for the Young Turks' platform of the restored constitution.
Abd-ul Hamid sent troops from Anatolia to Macedonia in order to crush
the III. Corps, but these troops were responsible for far more mutinies than
the III. Corps. The Young Turks had propagandists and pamphleteers at the
docks in Smyrna, so that by the time the troops were unloaded at Salonika,
they all joined the III. Corps in rebellion. The Sultan promised any awards
to his commanders in Macedonia, but it was to no avail. The system was
collapsing and the Sultan saved his throne by announcing the unsuspension
of the Constitution of 1876. Enver Bey, who had risen in fame to be
considered a leader of the revolution, proclaimed the end of arbitrary
government, and the birth of genuine Ottomanism: "Henceforth, we are all
brothers. There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, Roumans, Jews,
Mohammedans; under the same blue sky we are all mequal, we glory being
Ottomans."

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According to those who met him, Enver's nature plainly consisted of
energy, remorselessness, cold-blooded determination, pitiless intention, all
of which could not be fathomed by merely staring at his cleancut,
handsome face or his small, sturdy figure. Enver, by all accounts, was a
pleasant little fellow, and was often referred to as Napoleonlik---the little
Napoleon. This moniker represented Enver's abiding conviction, even if it
did nothing to represent his military ability. In Enver's house, there was his
study, in which on one wall hung a picture of Napoleon and on the other
one, Frederick the Great. Between them sat Enver himself, gazed upon by
the two greatest military commanders in the modern world.

Enver was of a humble background and his title, "Hero of the Revolution,"
shows why Talaat Pasha and the Committee later approved him as
Minister of War. Enver had a military reputation but he had never had
military success. The revolution of which he had been one of the key
figures in 1908 had cost very few human lives, something he would
trumpet as the surest symbol of the righteousness of his cause. The number
of casualties he caused in the suppression of the reactionary Islamic forces
during the so-called March 31 Incident is unknown but certainly not a
small figure (see below). Still, the anti-democratic reactionaries are the
ones who savagely massacred tens of thousands of Armenians in Adana
vilayet in 1909, and the Committee's humanitarian efforts there threw a
positive light on the Young Turk movement.

GWS, 11/01 [rev. 4/08]

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Part 2: Resuscitating the sick man

Testing the 'Sick Man of Europe'

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As the Sick Man of Europe throbbed back to life in the democratic spirit of
the revolution in the summer of 1908, the barons and counts who dictated
policy among the Great Powers watched in stunned silence. Their
response? Seize the moment to aggrandize themselves while chaos reigned
in Constantinople! On 5 October 1908, the Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria
declared independence from the Sublime Porte. He was preparing for this
moment ever since he was the special guest at a meeting of the valis, the
governors of Turkey in 1906. On his entrance, he was announced as "Vali
Ferdinand of Vilayet Bulgaristan."

It was therefore not a coincidence that his declaration of independence

coincided directly with the announcement on 6 October that Austria-
Hungary was formally annexing the vilayet of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia
raised an even louder protest than did the Turkish government, and Russia
joined in the protests only after it was clear that Vienna would not support
Russian designs on opening the Straits to Russian warships. The revolution
faced its first great test but could only muster a Committee-inspired
boycott of Austrian and Bulgarian goods. Sultan Abd-ul Hamid saw in the
crisis a chance to regain supreme power. On 17 December 1908, he
suspended the parliament and the constitution, declaring the "revolutionary
experiment" a failure. The radical Islamic reaction was readying to strike
against the revolution and its star pupil, Enver Bey.

The Counterrevolution

Salonika was the headquarters of the Ottoman Third Corps, where Enver

Bey had served, as well as the home of the revolution. Therefore, only its
troops could be considered reliable enough to defend the revolution, and so
it dispatched units into Constantinople under the self-proclaimed title of
"Action Army" to suppress the recidivist Islamic movement of 13 April

8
1909, known as the March 31st incident. At their head rode Enver Bey,
saber in hand, eager to defend Ottoman democracy from the reactionaries.

The counterrevolution was staged by the madrasa, which were theological-

scholastic schools that had benefited greatly under Abd-ul Hamid's
patronage. Whipped up by the madrasa students and their supporters, the
March 31st incident involved massacres of secular troops by the
scholasticists, who demanded the abolition of everything not in conformity
with Sharia law. The cunning Sultan was the silent director of this
supposedly natural reaction to the secular heresies of the revolution. He
retained his throne even as the Action Army swiftly crushed the reaction in
Constantinople. Among the officers of the "Action Army" suppressing that
outbreak were also Mustafa Kemal and Omer Seyfettin.

But the counterrevolution spread beyond the confines of the Third Corps,
reaching Adana in late April 1909, where the madrasa fanatics turned
anger over their defeat against the Armenians, whose Hunchak party was
among the most vocal supporters of the 1908 revolution. Tens of
thousands of Armenians were slaughtered in the event, and thousands of
buildings were burned in the conflagration that spread from the fighting.
Ottoman troops put down the revolt with even more bloodshed. Contrary
to popular belief, the Committee was supportive of the Armenian cause,
and Jemal Bey was appointed vali of Adana. He organized aid and shelter
for the survivors, and the Armenians considered him their closest ally.
(Within six years, however, Jemal's name would be tied to the Armenians
in quite a different way.)

As retribution for secretly supporting the madrasa revolts, Sultan Abd-ul

Hamid was forced to abdicate on 27 April 1909. He was replaced by his
brother Reshad ed-din, who had been imprisoned in the harems for 30
years. During this crisis, the Ottoman government had settled with

9
Bulgaria, recognizing its independence, and also giving recognition to the
Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in exchange for a cash payment
of 2.2 million pounds on 27 February 1909. The whole affair served to
raise the popularity of Enver Bey and his Committee fellows, but the
Committee's representation in parliament was never large enough to attain
power. They had only 60 out of 220 seats in 1908. They would have to
wait for an even bigger crisis in order to secure complete power.

Turan, The Foundation of a New Order

The "Turk" was more of a state of mind rather than a racial quality. The
true Turanian could not be defined by racial features. During the Republic,
Kemal Atatürk would proclaim the ancient Hittites to be his people's true
ancestors. Hittites were not Turanians. None of the Turkish people could
claim anything greater than 25 percent Turanian blood. The rest was Greek
and Armenian, according to the vast population of both peoples who lived
in Anatolia when the Turks first occupied parts of the Byzantine Empire in
1085. However, none of this mattered to the budding Turan movement.

The racial and philosophical beliefs of Enver are difficult to sort out, as
they changed so frequently, perhaps based on whichever Young Turk
pamphlet happened into his possession. From the time of the revolution
until the end of the World War, he was a definite pan-Islamist. That is, he
desired the unity of Islam under the political rule of the Caliph ul-Islam,
the Sultan. At the same time, he was concerned with the racial concept of
Turan. This concerned unifying the Turanian or Turkic peoples of the
world under the Sultan's rule. The Turan system overlapped the Islam
system, as most Turanians were Moslems.

However, Enver grew disillusioned over the Islam system once it was

10
apparent that the Sultan's call for jihad against the Entente in December
1914 was not enthusiastically received by the Islamic world. Indeed, the
Islam system was shattered with Sherif Hussein's revolt at Mecca in 1916.
There was no shattering of Enver's misty Turanian dream, though. He
would die fighting for it.

GWS, 11/01 [rev. 4/08]

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The Players 1: The big leaders

Talaat Pasha, one of Jemal Pasha, one of the Sultan Mohammed

the Triumvirate. He first Triumvirate. He first V,  born Reshad,  who
became chief of the came into the world's was installed by the
Ottoman Postal Service, knowledge when he Young Turks in place of
but then led the Young served as governor of the his older brother Abd-ul
Turks' putsch in 1913. Adana Vilayet following Hamid II in 1909. He
He then became Grand the Armenian massacres played no role in the
Vizier and undisputed there in 1909. For his government, confined to
strongman of the work in rebuilding the issuing Young Turk
Ottoman Empire. He damage and salvaging fetvas and ulemas in his

11
was known as one of the the Armenians' own name. Mohammed
most affable gentlemen livelihood, he was V is generally regarded
to ever seize power in a actually remembered by history as being a
bloody rampage. His fondly there. He became moronic imbecile, with
gentlemanly, likeable the Ottoman Minister of a  tendency  to drool.
demeanor could only be the Navy after the Young According to The Near
spoiled by news of a Turks' putsch in 1913. East from Within: "The
catastrophe in the war Jemal pushed for the very appearance of
or else by simply purchase of the Goeben Mahomet V suggests
mentioning the and Breslau in August nonentity. Small and
Armenians, as the 1914, as World War I bent, with sunken eyes
American Ambassador was starting. This action and deeply lined face,
Henry Morgenthau helped turn the Turks an obesity  savoring  of
discovered. Talaat was toward the Central disease, and a yellow,
the real strongman in Powers in the war. What oily complexion, it
the Ottoman Empire. He is bizarre about this is certainly is not
was the mouth and fist that Jemal was actually prepossessing. There is
of the unseen pro-Entente at the start little or no intelligence
Committee, and he was of the World War. As the in his countenance, and
the one who appointed French ministers left he never lost a haunted,
Enver as War Minister Constantinople, Jemal frightening look, as if
and Jemal as Navy wished them victory in dreading to find an
Minister. His personal the war. His interest in assassin lurking in some
leanings were neither the two German ships dark corner ready to
toward the Entente nor may therefore be strike and kill him ...
toward Germany. He construed more as a Abdul Hamid hated and
distrusted all parties, but means of strengthening despised him, but was
at the beginning of the the navy, his chief afraid to have him
World War, he felt more concern at that time. For, killed,  perhaps  through
comfortable on the side the British in early fear that a stronger man

12
of the Germans, who August had announced might take his place." A
were fighting the Turks' the seizure of two story goes that shortly
hated enemy, Russia. cruisers that Turkey had after Abd-ul Hamid II
Before 1913, Talaat ordered and mostly paid was confirmed Sultan,
trusted Great Britain as for. This drove Jemal to all his brothers were
the protector of the strike a bargain with the imprisoned in the
Turks, but this was Germans, and in turn traditional Ottoman
thrown out the window gave Enver additional way [soft palaces and
when Britain joined support in turning his seraglios], to stifle rival
Russia in a war to friend toward the claimants to the throne.
destroy Germany. With Teutons. Jemal's former This was the traditional
Russia yearning for reputation as a way of the house of
Constantinople as its benefactor turned sour as Osman. Originally, the
glorious Mediterranean he became governor- brothers of the Sultan
naval base of Tsar grad general in early 1915 of were executed, this being
(the Romanov's intended the Syrian Vilayets, performed from the time
name for which stretched from of Mohammed the
Constantinople), it was Aleppo to Aden. The Conqueror in 1451 up
little wonder that Talaat murderous deportations to Selim the Grim in the
was swayed by Enver. of Armenians from the 1590s. However, from
On 2 August 1914, Eastern Vilayets to the XVII. Century,
Talaat approved of a Mesopotamia and Syria Sultans preferred to
secret military alliance occurred under his imprison their siblings.
between Germany and governorship, and the Being locked away for
the Ottoman Empire. deprivations that caused decades had
Six months later, he was the word "genocide" to the  tendency  of  weaken
giving orders to the enter common usage may ing  the mind, and
vilayet governors to deal be blamed on him. indeed, the Ottoman
with the traitorous GWS, 11/01 [rev. history is rife with
peoples in their midst; by 2/03] crazed and insane

13
which he meant the Sultans who were
Armenians, of course. simply the puppets of
GWS, 11/01 [rev. the Janissaries. Thus,
2/08] this tradition was quite
a reasonable
explanation for the
downfall of the
Ottomans. By 1909,
the Janissaries were long
gone, but Mohammed V
remained. He had been
imprisoned for 30 years
in the imperial harem,
which might have
seemed a
most  desirable  prison.
However, it had the
effect of making him
quite effeminate and
weak. Thus, his rule
was of such a state that
when
Ambassador  Morgentha
u  was leaving, the
Sultan lamented to him
that "had it not been for
the Russians attacking
us, we would never be
in this war."
Morgenthau was

14
 saddened at how the
Young Turks had
misguided the old
Sultan into believing the
Russians had wronged
him, when in fact
Turkish-owned cruisers
had been the aggressors.
Simple though the
Sultan might have been
in political affairs, he
was  recognized  as a
brilliant poet of the old
Persian style. In fact,
much news was made of
the Sultan's formal
poetic presentation to
Enver Pasha of a poem
celebrating the Turks'
brilliant victories in
Gallipoli. Surely, it was
a talent he perfected
during his years of
imprisonment in the
harems. The Sultan was
not the complete
drooling imbecile that
many observers relished
describing. His
confinement of thirty

15
 years, nine of them
alone in the harems,
had given him the
opportunity to study not
only Persian poetry but
also many other
subjects, and it
happened that the
Sultan was well-read
even in science and
imbued with knowledge
and wisdom that
unfortunately served
nobody while he was the
pawn of the Young
Turks.
GWS, 11/01 [rev.
2/03]

Part 3: Janissaries are reborn

In 1909, with both the Islamic counterrevolution successfully thwarted and

the Committee out of power, Enver traveled to Germany as a military
attache. He learned to speak German fluently, and when he returned to
Constantinople in 1911, he bore a waxed moustache slightly curled up at
the ends, emulating the Prussian style of Kaiser Wilhelm. In his private
conversations, Enver made no secret of his admiration for Germany, and
his future elevation to the Ministry of War would be a boon for the Kaiser.
However, before the young officer could seize the mantle and become the
all-highest warlord of the Sultan and Caliph ul-Islam, he would have to

16
prove himself in several very serious military tests.

Tripoli in 1911, the First Debacle

The Marchese di San Giuliano may have been the craftiest and most
intelligent Foreign Minister Italy or any other country ever had. He
announced to the Lower Chamber in Rome on 2 December 1910, "We
desire the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and we wish Tripoli always to
remain Turkish." About nine months later, San Giuliano notified the Great
Powers of his intention of occupying the African provinces of the Ottoman
Empire. None of the Powers raised objections, because there was little of
value there and most wanted Italy to focus away from the Balkan peninsula
where its claims could cause trouble.

At the end of October 1911, Rome declared war on the Porte and prepared
to send 50,000 men to Tripoli. Enver Bey, meanwhile, caught the last
steamer to Tripoli just after his return from Berlin, eager to put his
German military training to work. After a preliminary evening
bombardment by the Italian navy, which destroyed the lighthouse and
caused the first ship of the invading flotilla to ground itself on the rocks,
Tripoli was fully invested by morning. The town fell without resistance, as
did many coastal locations. However, the interior raised revolt and, spurred
on by Enver, bedouin Arabs joined whatever Turkish troops were stationed
in Tripoli province and resisted all Italian attempts to be victorious. In fact,
Enver saw to it that the orchards and groves surrounding the old town
should be fortified with trenches and mortars. The Italian army quickly
grew depressed over the weeks and then months of hit-and-run dueling
with the Turks and Arabs amidst apricot and pomegranate trees in the
outer oases of Tripoli.

17
Albania and Yemen in 1912, the Next Debacle

By spring 1912, the Italians were desperate for new battlefronts to bring a
decision to the bloody, drawn-out affair in Africa. Austria-Hungary in
particular placed a veto on Italian military action against the Turks in the
Balkans, fearful of stirring up more trouble than there already was
there. Egged on by the wily King Nikola of Montenegro (read about it
in Ambassador Wladimir Giesl's biography), the Catholic malissori tribe of
Albanians in the north had clashed with the Turks in early 1911 and Italy
had been their main source of arms. Since the beginning of the Italo-
Turkish War, other tribes had joined the rebellion of the malissori, and the
Turkish War Minister ordered more troops into Albania to fight the
insurgents than were fighting the Italians in Tripoli. This rebellion would
stretch through 1912 until the late summer, when Italy brought the war to
the Dardanelles with its warships and occupied the Dodecanese Islands to
force the Turks to accept the fall of Tripoli.

Meanwhile, the Italians enflamed the rebellion of the Imam of Sana in

Yemen, which had been on and off since 1910. Italian weapons were
transferred from Eritrea and Somaliland to Sana, and the Ottoman War
Minister ordered in spring 1912 his troops stationed Medina to march all
the way to Sana. Such was the distance and terrible conditions that the
troops were prepared to mutiny unless he withheld the march until after
the summer heat had passed. The Porte found it more convenient to
pressure its governors, the valis of Asir and Sana, to use whatever resources
they had to combat the Imam and wait for the end of the Italo-Turkish
War. These governors were completely powerless even after the war, and so
in 1913 the Porte decided to simply grant all the demands the Imam had
for almost total independence. (For this, the Imam made peace with the
Ottomans and even went to war on the Turks' behalf in 1914-1918,

18
fulfilling his duty to his great warlord, War Minister Enver.)

This capitulation wasn't the first for Turkey, however. The Italo-Turkish
War made a mess of the Diplomatic front for the Porte, and it made the
whole Albanian rebellion that much more egregious. In the spring of 1912,
after the Albanian insurgents had several times defeated the Ottoman
troops sent to quell them, Enver sent a message from the outskirts of
Tripoli, urging the Porte to meet the Albanians' demands. It was made even
more pressing by the fact that Italian-sponsored journalists were making
much of the Turks' attacks on Christian Albanian villages in rebellion.
There were also attacks on Macedonian Christian villages that caused
outrage in Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria; that the Ottoman army destroyed
Moslem villages as well did not make much news, but it was
inconsequential for the politics of the day. Now these events caused Tsar
Ferdinand of Bulgaria to confer with the Serbs and Greeks about meeting
the Turks on the battlefield while the Albanian rebellion was still hot.

The rebellion was suddenly cooled when in the summer of 1912, the

Ottomans granted full autonomy for a new Albanian entity composed of
the four vilayets of Scutari, Jannina, Uskub, and Monastir. These territories
were all claimed by the neighboring Christian states, but now a new,
hitherto ignored ethnic group appeared out of nowhere and forced the
Ottomans to grant their demands! The Greater Albanian vilayet was
intolerable for everyone involved, and by the end of the summer, all of the
neighboring Christian states were prepared to disinherit the Albanians
from their newfound gains.

The First Balkan War in Autumn 1912, a Very Serious Debacle

When Montenegro's king Nikola ceremoniously fired the first shot of the

19
war on 8 October 1912, he had only been invited to join the alliance a few
days before by Russia, whose Foreign Ministry had been at the center of
the conspiracy against the Ottomans. Enver's response was to advise
settlement with Italy as soon as possible, and War Ministry agreed. The
Treaty of Ouchy, signed in mid-October 1912, gave the Italians all that
they had fought for, except outright annexation. To keep with the claim by
the Marchese di San Giuliano in 1910 that Italy desired Tripoli to remain
part of the Ottoman Empire forever, the peace treaty reaffirmed the
Sultan's religious and de jure authority over Tripoli's inhabitants. It did not
grant such a privilege to the king of Italy.

It was a toothless declaration, as the Ottomans were shut out of the

government there and most Turkish assets were already seized. Enver kept
things warm in Tripoli, however. In violation of the Treaty of Ouchy, which
was supposed to have the Turkish Army evacuate under Italian supervision,
Enver Bey allowed his Turkish troops to remain in the service of the Imam
of the Senussi and the Emir of Fezzan, two local rulers. The soldiers could
not be transferred to Turkey anyway, thanks to the active Greek navy.
Rome protested to Enver personally as he boarded an Italian vessel bound
for Constantinople, but he assured his hosts that native Arab tribes had
done all the fighting. In the end, nearly 3,000 Turkish troops were patiently
waiting for the time when Enver Pasha would restart the war against Italy
and liberate the country. They would have to wait three years, until May
1915, when Italy declared war on Austria.

Enver did not have any role during the First Balkan War, as he was still in
Tripoli; by the time his former Italian enemy dropped him off at
Constantinople in December 1912, the crucial battles had been lost, and
the Ottoman military prestige shattered irreparably. And yet, his greatest

20
glory was to be found in this depressing nadir.

The Second Balkan War in March 1913, a Contrived Debacle

After the Grand Vizier Nazim Pasha had signed an armistice with the

Balkan States on 12 December 1912 , leaving the three heroic, still-
besieged cities of Scutari, Jannina, and Adrianople to the victors, Enver Bey
led the putsch against the government on 9 February 1913. Nazim was
killed and the Committee was placed in full control of the Empire. Enver
had the peace treaty torn up, and on 16 February, hailed the imminent
relief of Adrianople under his command! However, this new war (rarely
but properly called the Second Balkan War) was short. Enver personally led
the charge against the Bulgarian trenches along the Chatalja Lines, and
promptly came to an embarrassing halt after two days of bloody struggle.
Adrianople could not be relieved and it surrendered under a sustained
bombardment by Russian-loaned cannon on 26 March. Of the other
besieged cities, Jannina had never really been given a moment's rest by the
Greek army, and it fell on 6 March 1913, while the relatively light siege of
Scutari by the Montenegrins was beefed up by the Serbians, and it finally
fell on 22 April. Turkey was totally defeated in Europe, and the armistice
terms of December reacknowledged by the Committee. The belligerents
finally signed the peace Treaty of London on 17 May 1913. This
humiliating episode at least served to bring the Committee back into power
after a four-year absence.

The Third Balkan War in July 1913, Not a

Debacle but Not Glorious, Either

In the Third (almost always called the Second)

Balkan War that began on 1 July 1913, Tsar
Ferdinand of Bulgaria took matters into his own

21
hands and attacked his Serbian ally in order to win Macedonia, the prize
for which Bulgaria had marched to war but had been denied. Herein lay an
opportunity for revenge! With the hated Enos-Midian Line evacuated by
the Bulgarians, who were suffering major setbacks by the Serbians, Enver
rode all night long at the head of his army to the very gates of Adrianople.
By the time they arrived on the morning of 23 July 1913, the Bulgars had
already abandoned the city, and Adrianople had been won without battle.
Nevertheless, the occasion sealed his reputation as a victorious commander
as much as Tripoli had given him a reputation of competence and
determination. He was more than happy to receive laurels from the people,
and was awarded the honorable title "Pasha" from the Sultan. Postage
stamps were even printed to celebrate the victory of Adrianople.

How Enver Came to Rule the Ottoman Army in January 1914, a

Humorous Debacle

In January 1914, Enver took a leap with the

Committee's approval and increased his power
significantly. Izzet Pasha, the Turkish Minister
of War, was sick and failed to appear at his
office. Enver suddenly showed up at the office in
a general's uniform and declared that he was the
new Minister of War. Clearly, it was the doing of
the Committee, for Izzet Pasha did not challenge
this brazen usurpation. Nor did the Sultan, who
read about his new Minister of War in the
morning newspaper, and reportedly said, "It is
stated here that Enver has become Minister of War... That is unthinkable.
He is much too young!"

22
A few hours later, Enver strode before the Sultan in the same General's
uniform and presented himself as the new War Minister. Mohammed V
acknowledged the action without argument. Enver quickly assumed his
duties with unexpected strictness. Some 1,000 officers were dismissed
before the end of the month. They were described as "failures in the Balkan
Wars, the inefficient, and the old." Enver even imprisoned those officers
whom he suspected of anti-Committee sentiment.

Then he closed down the Supreme War Council, appointed himself Chief of
the General Staff, and henceforth expected all military questions to come to
his desk for determination. Among his more curious edicts was a revision
of written Arabic script in order to adapt western, especially German,
military terms and Turkish colloquialisms. This unexpected reform
confused virtually everyone, especially the lower officers who often were
only partially literate. Another of Enver Pasha's reforms made the Kabalak
headgear mandatory for all Turkish soldiers. Reputedly Enver's own
invention, it was officially called the "Enveriye" and was a wicker frame
wrapped with khaki cloth. Stylish and light, it was suitable for long
marches under the hot sun, but it was not useful as head protection in
battle.

A few months after this in spring 1914, War Minister Enver Pasha married
an Ottoman princess, Naciyeh, daughter of Sultan Abd-ul Mehjid I, and so
aligned himself with the eternal house of Osman and the prophet
Mohammed himself.

Al Hasa in 1914, the Forgotten Debacle

As if to test the resolve of a weakened enemy who appeared to surrender

on all terms, Wali Abd-ul Aziz ibn Abd-ul Rahman al Saud, ruler of the

23
Nejd, sent a contingent of horsemen across the desert from Riyadh in early
winter 1914 and approached Dahran on the Persian Gulf. They surprised
the Turkish garrison, which surrendered without offering resistance. News
of Saud's coup de main was wired by the British attache from Bahrein, and
the British ambassador personally informed Enver of the stunning
development.

The new war minister knew Saud was trouble, ever since the wily desert
ruler of the Wahhabi movement surprised and defeated his hated rival,
Emir Abd-ul Aziz Ibn al Rashid of Jebel Shammar in 1902, and reclaimed
the capital of Nejd and his throne. It was back in the 1870s that Jebel
Shammar's forces had driven the Saudi clan deep into the desert, nearly
destroying the puritanical Wahhabis. The Jebel Shammar warriors were
armed and instructed by the Turks, who even kept a garrison of troops in
Riyadh for many years, ensuring that the religious movement did not
reconstitute itself. But the fanatical Wahhabis returned to Riyadh twenty
years later, driving Rashid's forces back to Hail in northern Arabia. Another
ten years after that, Ibn al Saud had enough nerve not only to wage war on
Rashid, but even against the Turks themselves! Clearly, the Turks had been
giving much too little support to Rashid in the recent battles for supremacy
between the Jebel Shammar and the Nejd.

Obviously, the Porte's humiliating acceptance of the Imam of Yemen's terms

in 1913 decided the issue. Saud took for himself the entire al Hasa Vilayet,
which was the Persian Gulf coast between Koweit and Katar, which has
remained in Saudi hands ever since. In retaliation, Enver ordered Turkish
soldiers stationed Basra in Mesopotamia to prepare for the reconquest of al
Hasa vilayet. Meanwhile, he urged Rashid to advance on Riyadh, telling him
in May 1914 that shortly, all of the Nejd would be restored to the ruler of
Jebel Shammar. But then World War I broke out in Europe.

24
Enver halted the preparations for the advance on al Hasa in September
1914, and recalled all other Turkish troops to their depots. By December
1914, troops intended to fight Saudi nomads were instead engaging the
British, who had landed at Fao on the Persian Gulf north of Koweit and
marched on Basra. As for Saud, he was contacted by the British and happily
declared war on the Ottoman Empire, but confined all military activity to
his eternal enemy, the Jebel Shammar. Rashid, likewise, declared war on
Britain, heeding fully to the fetva by Sultan Mohammed V, calling on a holy
war against the British. But he too, had no time except to fight against his
hated opponent, Saud.

After World War I was finished, Saud received enough war surplus to finish
off Rashid for good, and by 1921, not only was the Jebel Shammar annexed
to the Nejd, but all of central Arabia bowed to the seemingly invincible
power of the Wahhabi. By 1926, Hejaz and the holy sites of Islam were
seized by Saud's unstoppable army, and the Wahhabi controlled the Red Sea
coast of Arabia. In 1931, Saud waged war against Enver Pasha's friendly
nemesis, the old Imam of Yemen, by then an independent king, and took
the former vilayet of Asir for himself. Finally, Saud was strong enough to
call himself the King of Saudi Arabia, first unifier of Arabia since the age of
the Ommayed Caliphate! All of Enver Pasha's allies and helpers in Arabia
were overthrown by one enemy: a common desert pirate with a fanatical
sect behind him.

World War I in Autumn 1914, the Final Debacle

As summer drew on, Enver was desperate to complete the Army

reforms. He organized German support to build up the officer corps which
he had decimated during the winter, and caused a diplomatic scandal of

25
epic proportions when he designated German General Otto Liman von
Sanders as Commanders of the Turkish First Corps at Constantinople.
Only months of political wrangling and much sabre-rattling by the Great
Powers succeeded in confirming his choice. The episode illustrated both
Enver's political naivete and his stern determination.

Enver also supported Jemal Pasha's efforts to purchase additional ships to

form some sort of naval presence. Enver knew nothing of naval matters,
only that Sultan Abd-ul Hamid feared the big guns of the vessels stationed
near his palace of Yildiz, and so he scuttled the navy rather than risk a
revolution and possibly be shelled!

Finally, Enver urged Talaat Pasha to secure further loans to pay for the
monumental increases in expenditure. With annual interest obligations
approaching 80 percent of the national budget, the Ottoman finances were
long considered junk status, and no loan offers were forthcoming.
Something drastic had to occur to allow for Enver's massive military
expansion. The entire government faced bankruptcy in 1915 unless the
creditors in Europe, already in charge of Ottoman finances, were convinced
to shore up the Ottoman Bank once more. Enver had little knowledge of
finances, however. He only knew that a complete overhaul of the shattered
army was critical, and the replacement of lost and seized armaments from
the Balkan Wars was a desperate necessity.

Even before World War I broke out, Enver was already contracting an
alliance with Germany. So certain was he that Germany would invest in
Ottoman rearmament, that he did not bother consulting with the
Committee over the details of such an agreement. For anyone but Enver,
failure to consult the Committee would have been a death sentence,
particularly since many members of the Committee were either pro-French

26
or simply anti-German. Many saw Germany as just another colonizing
power attempting to take over parts of the Empire as the British and
French and lately the Italians had. In fact, Germany was already a ma jor
creditor to the Porte, and none of the German banks would offer a loan to
the Ottoman government. Furthermore, Germany held many of the
oppressive and humiliating capitulations as collateral against the loans.
Jemal and Talaat and many other Committee members would do well to
wonder why Germany should be a better partner than the other powers.

Some, like Jemal Pasha, were openly pro-France, and considered Germany's
defeat inevitable in any future war. He expected the French would bail the
Ottomans out of their terrible financial burdens, and had close, personal
relationships with many French diplomats and businessmen in
Constantinople. Finally, Jemal was a true believer in the long-standing
French friendship with Turkey, dating back to the first exchange of
ambassadors between King Francis and Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in
the 1500s. (Neverminding Napoleon's invasion of the Levant or the French
seizure of Algiers in 1830 or the protectorate clauses over Lebanon in
1860 or the seizure of Tunis in 1881 of course!)

Against all advice of his Committee brothers, Enver signed a military

alliance with Germany on 2 August 1914, one day after Germany had
declared war on Russia. It was not a betrayal of the Entente as many
historians might think. They cite the fact that the alliance was secret and
the British seized two cruisers intended for the Ottoman Navy only on 4
August 1914, two days after Enver had signed the alliance treaty. But Enver
had negotiated the alliance for a long time before all of that, and the
prospect of a general European war was too advantageous for the young
Minister of War. In reality, the British seizure of the cruisers only served to
bring Jemal Pasha round to Enver's side of the table, and served as a

27
wonderful propaganda coup for the Porte when they finally declared war
two months later.

The alliance did not sit well with Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha, who loathed
all foreign governments. After the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia
and Serbia, effectively throwing her lot in with Germany to the end, Talaat
used the occasion to seize control of the Ottoman Bank and nationalize it,
expelling the foreign holders and putting Committee members in their
seats. Then he liquidated the Office of the Ottoman Public Debt, henceforth
declaring the Ottoman finance to be solvent. He also closed down all
foreign concessions and post offices, and seized telephone exchanges and
railway lines. It was the end of the hated capitulations, the foreign noose
that had strangled the Empire since the 1830s. Brazenly enough, he took
the assets of his German and Austrian allies! The stunned Central Powers
raised a clamorous protest, but it fell on deaf ears.

Enver did not attempt to intervene in the ugly affair, but he did have the
nerve to present the German military attaches with a vast list of demands
for outfitting the Turkish army. The German government must have been
reeling at the prospect! First their new ally seized all of their investments
throughout the Ottoman empire, and then they effectively received a
demand for the most advanced military hardware. Most exasperating of all,
Enver insisted it be free of charge, owing to the chaotic state of Ottoman
finances, and the impossibility of ever paying for it anyway. As Enver saw
it, Ottoman participation in the war was payment enough for the Germans.

For Talaat, the cancellation of all obligations and concessions was a

declaration of Ottoman independence. A victorious war would mean
acceptance of the terms by the defeated Entente and a chance to start fresh.
Defeat of course meant the destruction of the country. But then, Talaat

28
more than anyone knew that was doomed to happen. For Enver, the
opportunities for renewing the ancient Ottoman glories in battle presented
itself once more. A victorious war would mean reconquest of many lost
territories, and a chance to be a world power once more. Defeat of course
meant annihilation. But then, Enver knew this was doomed to occur.

Both men relied on Germany to guarantee a favorable outcome in the war

for the renewal of the Ottoman Empire. In so doing they were placing the
fortunes of an Empire into another's care. Jemal perhaps knew best of all
that such dependence meant the end of Ottoman sovereignty. But then,
what other choice was there?

GWS, 2/03 [rev. 4/08]

Top

The Players 2: Germans commanding Turkish armies

Colmar von der Otto Liman von Friedrich Kress von

Goltz,  originally Sanders, sent to Kressstein, directed
sent to Turkey in Constantinople in the ill-fated Turkish
1881, but in January 1914 to IV. Army in its
command of the command the I. Army assault on the Suez
Mesopotamian Front in the city; later Canal in early

29
 until his death in made chief of all 1915, and then
1916, either from operations during the defended Gaza until
Typhus or from Gallipoli campaign. its fall in late 1917.
poisoning...

Germans who Commanded Turkish Armies

Quite a few Germans served their Turkish Allies by commanding Turkish
armies. There had been a tradition of cooperation between the Prussians
and the Turks dating back to 1842, when, following first a long struggle
against rebellious Mohammed Ali of Egypt and then the humiliating
Protection Treaty with Russia in 1840, the tired, devastated Ottoman army
needed true European reform. Moltke and other Prussian officers lent their
expertise to bring the Ottoman armies out of the middle ages with their
janissary techniques. By the 1880s, a new round of Prussian-German
officers were serving in the Ottoman army as advisors following the
difficult Russo-Turkish War.

Colmar von der Goltz was the senior advisor, and his return to Turkey in
1915 was welcomed by Enver Pasha. The Germans invested even more in
the new Ottoman Empire following the revolution of 1908, but once the
Balkan wars caused the Turks to be expelled from Europe, the Entente
press mocked the years of German military training for its poor results on
the battlefield. The problem was not in the German training, but in the
failure of the Turkish military to successfully juxtapose Turkish oriental
habits with the strict European method. The upper class of Ottoman
princes who made up the officers were the biggest problem, but also
infighting and abuse among the NCOs were a substantial problem.
Furthermore, there was no way for the German advisors to improve the
infrastructure surrounding the army. Transportation and communication

30
was as big a problem in 1912 as it was in 1842, and would still be so in
1918, when the famed Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway still had not been
completed.

International trouble occurred in January 1914 when Enver Pasha

appointed German General Otto Liman von Sanders as commander of the
Turkish I. Corps in Constantinople. Russia objected loudly to a German
officer having total military control over the Straits. A long process of
diplomatic negotiation finally melted the Russian resolve and they allowed
the German general to remain in place. In spring 1915, six months after
Turkey declared war on Russia, Liman von Sanders was in the right place
to organize resistance to the invasion of Gallipoli by the Entente.

GWS, 3/04 [rev. 4/08]

Top

Enver's Thoughts on his German Allies

"Why should we feel any obligation to the Germans?" Enver would say to
[Ambassador Morgenthau]. "What have they done for us which compares
with what we have done for them? They have lent us some money and sent
us a few officers, it is true, but see what we have done! We have defeated
the British fleet---something which neither the Germans nor any other
nation could do. We have stationed armies on the Caucasian front, and so
have kept busy large bodies of Russian troops that would have been used
on the western front. Similarly we have compelled England to keep large
armies in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, and in that way we have weakened the
Allied armies in France. No, the Germans could never have achieved their
military successes without us; the shoe of obligation is entirely on their

31
foot."

Enver Pasha was not entirely wrong in his train of thought. Winston
Churchill, having advocated the Gallipoli campaign and then lost all
prestige in the British government after its disastrous failure, believed that
the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the war caused World War I to
last two years more than it should have. Its a debatable concept, to be sure.
But General Nikolai Golovin wrote in his book "The Russian Army in the
World War" that when the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia and
closed the Straits to Russian shipping in October 1914, suddenly Russia
lost access to 98 percent of its imports! And that meant, all of those critical
munitions and materiel that Russia depended upon could not be made up
in Russia's few factories. Nor could they be shipped into blockaded
Petrograd, nor into ice-bound Archangel, nor Vladivostok in the Far East
with a single line of track stretching 5,000 miles. Russia depended on the
Black Sea trade in the 19th and 20th centuries. And that is why the British
climbed down and allowed Russia to stake a claim for Constantinople after
a victorious conclusion to the war. Russia absolutely needed the Straits, and
the Russians dreamed of the day they could claim "Tsargrad" as their
southern gateway.

So the Turkish blockade had a gigantic effect on Russia's ability to

prosecute the war, and Russia's strength did not reach its full potential until
1916, a full two years after the war began. Unfortunately, Russian
manpower was ruined by those years of war, and revolution was right
around the corner. So, Churchill was close to the mark. Had the Straits
remained open from 1914 or forced open in 1915, the World War would
have ended far sooner than November 1918!

32
GWS, 4/06

Top

The Players 3: Rulers caught in Enver's war aims

Khedive Abbas Khedive Hussein Prince Salar ed-

Hilmi, son of the Kamel,  the first and dauleh, the leader of
flamboyant spender last Sultan of Egypt. the Kashkai in
Khedive Ismail. Hussein Kamel was southwestern Persia.
Abbas Hilmi ruled the uncle of Egypt's Enver quickly
Egypt from 1892 Khedive Abbas contacted this
until October 1914. Hilmi. When the opportunist with the
He happened to be Turks declared war, plan to conquer
visiting Abbas was in Persia for the
Constantinople, Constantinople and Ottoman Empire.
paying homage to consequently lost his Now, Persia was
the Ottoman Sultan rulership over Egypt. already occupied by
right at the time The British Russian and British
Enver decided to appointed Hussein police and troops.
declare war on Kamel as a known These grated on the
Russia. Britain loyal friend of nerves of the Persian
responded to this by England. He people, whose

33
staging a putsch in assumed the title revolution was foiled
Cairo, arresting the "Sultan" of Egypt by foreign
entire Egyptian instead of Khedive, interference. Salar
government. London since such a title ed-dauleh, who was
declared the ancient implied both a wanted by the
suzerainty of the challenge to the British for
Turks ended and legitimacy of Abbas instigating trouble
formalized their Hilmi and also throughout
protectorate. Abbas suzerainty to the Tangistan province,
Hilmi remained in Ottomans. His reign was hired by Enver's
Constantinople did not last long, for special German
during the entire in 1918, Sultan agent Wassmuss to
war and beyond. He Hussein Kamel died raise a native revolt
died in 1944. and was succeeded against the British
by his son Farouk. on Persian soil. This
GWS, 3/04 was from 1915
GWS, 3/04 until 1918. Salar
was only partially
successful; the
British did not
venture into the
interior of Persia
because of the
danger, but neither
did they leave their
fortified positions at
Bushire and in
Arabistan.

GWS, 3/04

34
 Disintegration of the Ottoman War Machine
Crazy adventures in Persia distracted the Ottomans from defending their
own violated territories. Russians invaded deep into Anatolia, capturing
Erzurum in 1916, as well as Van, Bitlis, and Mush. The British drove
through Irak and into Mesopotamia, seizing Baghdad in January 1917,
while Jerusalem fell in autumn 1917. In spite of a strong showing at
Gallipoli during 1915 and the great victory at Kut in 1916, defeats
outnumbered victories, and even the victories were achieved only with an
enormous loss of lives and equipment. It seemed like every move by the
Turkish Army had a terrible effect on morale.

Enver himself traveled to Mecca with his uncle Halil Pasha during the hajj
of 1915, and met with the Sherif Hussein and all of his sons, pressing the
Arab leader to support the Sultan-Caliph's fetva for holy war. As T.E.
Lawrence related in his book, while Enver Pasha was being entertained on
the garden rooftop of the Sherif's palace, Hussein's younger son Abdullah
pulled the Sherif to one side and asked his father, "Why do we not kill him
now?" The Sherif answered, "Because, my son, the Pasha is a guest in our
house. We cannot bring harm to him while he enjoys our hospitality."
Afterward, Enver departed for Damascus, where his fellow Committee
brother Jemal Pasha was already brutally suppressing Arab nationalists, and
within six months, the Sherif Hussein raised the standard of revolt against
the Ottomans! Arab rebellion swept through all of Hejaz until only the
Turkish garrison of Medina remained, so completely cut off from the entire
world, the garrison did not surrender until 13 January 1919, more than
two months after the Ottoman Empire signed the armistice at Mudros.

Of all the Arabs within the Ottoman Empire, only the Imam of Yemen
remained loyal, aiding the Turkish garrison to invade Perim Island in the

35
Straits of Aden (which was swiftly repulsed by the British) and pressing a
three-year siege on the city of Lahej, whose Sultan begged for British
protection against Turkish interference. Lahej was near the strategic port of
Aden, which Enver declared would be captured at the same time as the
Suez Canal, completing Britain's isolation from India. But neither goal was
reached, adding to the Pasha's growing list of failures.

Even as these setbacks tarnished Turkey's fighting reputation, Enver was

desperate to prove to his allies, Germany in particular, just how competant
his troops and officers were. This was not merely to elevate the rank of
Turkey from a junior to senior partner in the Quadruple Alliance, but to
extract further military concessions out of the Germans. Thus, 1917 saw
the movement of a whole Corps from the Caucasian and Persian fronts to
Galicia and Dobruja, where these troops were given the opportunity to
show their fighting prowess far from the homeland. Enver personally
selected the units that were sent to Galicia, and they formed the elite
"Yilderim" or Lightning Corps. Only the finest soldiery with the best
battlefield performance were allowed to make the journey to the trenches
of what is now Western Ukraine and be part of Yilderim. They were
outfitted with the best uniforms and new weaponry, to prove to the
German HQ of the South Army that a highly technical military force was
being sent to them. Enver did not want his allies to think he was delivering
oriental savages to them.

And what was the result of this demonstration? Practically nothing for
either theTurks or the Germans. The arrival of the Yilderim Corps was a
welcome insofar as any warm bodies counted on as massive sector as the
Eastern Front. For Turkey, however, Enver's little gift to the Germans
meant the best troops were far, far away from where they were really
needed--on every invaded front. Turkish troops remained in Galicia until

36
March 1918, when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended the war between
Russia and the Quadruple Alliance. Most of the troops were shipped to
Samsun on the Black Sea coast. From there, most of "Yilderim" was sent to
defend Damascus from the British advance, while the rest were marched to
the Caucasus as the "Army of Islam" under Enver's brother Nuri Pasha, in
order to fulfill Enver's dream of Turan.

Everywhere, the Turks were in retreat, suffering from bad leadership, poor
or nonexistent rations, exposure to frightful climate, and an ever-stronger
enemy. Enver's glorious hopes were crumbling just as quickly, but he
remained focused on Central Asia, even as he spent days in his offices by
the Bosporus, or on long train trips to Berlin. Always Central Asia, and the
mythical homeland called "Turan."

GWS, 2/03 [rev. 4/08]

Top

Part 4: Armenians are nothing to me

Defending the Father of the Republic

What role did Enver in Armenia's genocide? The modern Turkish Republic
goes to great effort to counter Armenian charges of genocide. In fact, it
seems that the fact that countless Armenians were killed and driven from
their homes is not a contestable issue, but rather how and why the word
"genocide" is used. For the story of Enver, the Ottoman government, and
the tragedy of history, such discussion is pointless. There are two reasons
for this, and both have to do with the Father of the Turkish Republic.

One is that the Turkish Government should sternly defend the image of

37
Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later Ataturk), who was intimately involved in the
affairs and therefore the reputation of the Turkish Armies following the
armistice in 1918. The Father of the Turkish Republic was responsible for
ensuring that no Armenian resurgence should occur on Turkish soil, and
therefore avidly supported all military action that deprived the Armenians
of even territory that had been part of Russia before 1918, such as Kars,
Ardahan, and Artvin.

Two, the Turkish government has long defended the sanctity of Turkish
territorial integrity. Admission of "genocide" would weaken Ankara's image
and strengthen their enemies' resolve, especially the Kurds who make up a
majority population of the former six eastern vilayets. The Turkish
government is caught by its own unwillingness to define what precisely
happened in the winter and spring of 1915.

The Worst Winter or the Worst Scheme?

Generally, the official line is that the winter of 1915 killed 150,000 or
more Armenians, and an equal or greater number of Moslems. One may
suppose its simply a continuation of 125 years of hostility between the two
peoples. In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin, which made peace between Russia
and the Porte, specified that certain reforms be made in the six eastern
vilayets of Anatolia. These vilayets contained the majority of Turkey's
Armenian subjects. The Porte never carried out these reforms, for the
simple reason that to do so would inevitably reduce Ottoman sovereignty
in a region where Armenians were actually a minority. In fact, the
Armenians were not a majority in any of the towns of the six vilayets,
except for Van.

Mostly, the Armenian issue comes down to number games. As the official
Turkish Embassy website states, "Demographic studies prove that prior to

38
World War I, fewer than 1.5 million Armenians lived in the entire Ottoman
Empire. Thus, allegations that more than 1.5 million Armenians from
eastern Anatolia died must be false ... Reliable statistics demonstrate that
slightly less than 600,000 Anatolian Armenians died during the war period
of 1912-22 ... The statistics tell us that more than 2.5 million Anatolian
Muslims also perished. Thus, the years 1912-1922 constitute a horrible
period for humanity, not just for Armenians.

The numbers do not tell us the exact manner of death of the citizens of
Anatolia, regardless of ethnicity, who were caught up in both an
international war and an intercommunal struggle. Documents of the time
list intercommunal violence, forced migration of all ethnic groups, disease,
and starvation as causes of death. Others died as a result of the same war-
induced causes that ravaged all peoples during the period." This is perhaps
the most interesting part, as "intercommunal violence" was indeed the key
to the Armenian problem. Enver's invasion of Russia failed miserably in
December 1914, when 70,000 Turkish soldiers were killed in the freezing
mountain passes. The Russian army advanced across the Turkish border by
the end of the month. Armenians were visibly overjoyed at the defeat of
their persecutor's forces, and welcomed the Russians when they came, both
verbally and violently. This is when "intercommunal violence" began.
Sporadic murders and outbreaks of rebellion occurred in several towns,
culminating in the expulsion of the Turkish garrison at Van in March
1915.

As the official Turkish Embassy website explains, "between 1893 and 1915
Ottoman Armenians in eastern Anatolia rebelled against their government
-- the Ottoman government -- and joined Armenian revolutionary groups,
such as the notorious Dashnaks and Hunchaks." In reality, there were no
widespread rebellions among the Armenians, but there were notorious

39
bandits who were armed by the Russians and who attacked Ottoman
authorities. Even Lev Trotsky wrote a few articles about Ottoman
Armenian rebels and their Russian benefactors for Pravda and other
socialist newspapers before the war, complaining of how the Romanov
agents financed terrorism abroad in order to further imperial aims.

The Turkish Embassy plainly admits this much: "The Armenians took arms
against their own government. Their violent political aims, not their race,
ethnicity or religion, rendered them subject to relocation." This is an
academic admission that the Turkish authorities forcibly uprooted the
Armenian population in the six vilayets. "On November 5, 1914, the
President of the Armenian National Bureau in Tiflis declared to Czar
Nicholas II, 'From all countries Armenians are hurrying to enter the ranks
for the glorious Russian Army, with their blood to serve the victory of
Russian arms. ... Let the Russian flag wave freely over the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus.' ... Boghos Nubar addressed a letter ... on January 30, 1919
confirming that the Armenians were indeed belligerents in World War I. He
stated with pride, 'In the Caucasus, without mentioning the 150,000
Armenians in the Russian armies, about 50,000 Armenian volunteers under
Andranik, Nazarbekoff, and others not only fought for four years for the
cause of the Entente, but after the breakdown of Russia they were the only
forces in the Caucasus to resist the advance of the Turks....'"

A Task for the Governors?

Enver's response? In February 1915, he wanted to dispatch parts of the

Third Army against the Armenians and finish them off for good. Talaat had
enough foresight to see military disaster in this, what with the Russian
Armies already winning victories in the neighborhood, and urged his
impetuous War Minister to let the Third Army do its job fighting the
Russians. Instead, Talaat notified the valis of the vilayets to send local

40
contingents to quell the violence. That is, no regular soldiers, since these
were needed for the war effort. The valis baited Kurdish irregulars into the
Armenian settlements with incentives to meet two objectives: defeat the
rebellion and put the population on the move away from the war zone. In
this way, depopulation occurred, as well as starvation and mass murder.
The death marches to Mesopotamia and Syria were a matter for the civil
government to handle, since they were the ones ordering it.

Jemal Pasha, who was appointed governor of Greater Syria during the war,
found himself burdened with an order to handle thousands of deportees
being marched into Syria from the north. This territory was uniquely
inhospitable and Jemal must have known this order to be a death sentence
for all involved. The issue is whether Enver, Talaat, Jemal, and the
governors planned this as a death march for the population. If the horrific
deaths were a matter of poor supply and transportation in times of war,
then the word "genocide" cannot be used as effectively as, say, if Enver and
Talaat met in a dark room and plotted the deaths of all Armenians. The
permanent removal of all Armenians from the six eastern vilayets was
inevitable at this time, as the risk of an untrustworthy segment of the
population was not going to be tolerated by a hard-pressed authority like
the Ottomans. This was illustrated in January 1915, when the Armenians
of Van rose in rebellion and expelled the Turkish troops. They invited the
Russians as protectors, but General Izzet Pasha ordered a counteroffensive
against Van in the spring, resulting in a defeat for the Russians. As the
Russians retreated from Van, the entire Armenian population of some
50,000 also abandoned their homes, and the ancient city was totally
destroyed in the fighting. These Armenians never returned home, but
scrounged a meager existence in horrendous refugee camps throughout
southern Russia.

41
Similar things happened on the Turkish side of the battlezone. First the
Kurds, under orders from the Turkish valis, expelled Armenians close to
the battlefield. Kurds today freely admit that their grandfathers expelled the
Armenians and took their homes for themselves. Then the Kurds
themselves had to flee as the Russians advanced deep into Anatolia. By the
time the war had ended on the Caucasus front in MArch 1918, most towns
were totally destroyed, and empty except for a few who weathered the
Russian occupation. Kurds are surprisingly honest in their role in the
Armenian issue, since they have no friends among the Turks, whose civil
governors urged them to turn on the Armenians... Turks who later turned
against the Kurds themselves.

Clearing the battlefield of all Armenians because of their likely support for
the enemy was reason enough for the deportations, and Entente complaints
throughout the year 1915 were shot back with claims that this was "an
internal affair." Meaning, Armenians resisting deportation were rebels and
not entitled to any international protection accorded soldiers. Of course,
British General Townsend, who surrendered at Kut in 1916, met with a
death march of his own through the brutal Iraki desert. If half of his
"internationally protected" soldiers died of thirst, exposure, and savage
abuse on their way north, what percentage of "unprotected" Armenians
would have perished being force-marched south? Such cruelty must be left
to the imagination, which is why the Armenian Genocide issue is still
controversial and will always be so.

Conspiring with the Enemy?

The worst atrocities happened in 1915, which coincided with big advances
by the Russians into Turkish Armenian territory. The Russians entered a
barren, empty land, and part of their post-war plans drawn up in early

42
1916 was to annex this area and turn it into a Cossack territory suitable
for colonization. The Russians reasoned that, since there were almost no
people, there were no further claims to the land. In 1916, the war against
the Armenians also spread beyond the six eastern vilayets. Round-ups and
expulsions occurred in Edessa (Urfa), Adana, Sivas, Konia, and practically
every city in Anatolia except Constantinople, scene of the orchestrated
massacre of Armenians in 1896. (In her book about the Sultan's palaces,
Anna Bowman Dodd commended the Turkish authorities on how they
restricted the massacres just to Armenians in 1896: "Only Armenian bodies
were lying in the streets, and only Armenian property was destroyed. Even
Greek houses next door to smashed Armenian houses were perfectly
unscathed.")

Edessa in early 1916 was a particularly dramatic scene, where the

Armenian community barricaded itself in the old city as Turkish cannon
were brought to the scene to bombard the walls. Finally, the German
commander of the Mesopotamian Front, General Colmar von der Goltz,
negotiated the surrender of the community with guarantees that they
would not be deported. Unfortunately, the Turkish vali of Edessa turned on
the Armenians upon their surrender, and deported them all. Von der Goltz
was scandalized in the Entente newspapers for taking part in the tragedy.

In the same year, the Armenians of Lattakia, on the Syrian coast, fled to the
mountain of Muzdagh, and held off a Turkish battalion for several months
before French steamers landed on the shores just long enough to rescue the
besieged defenders of the mountain. Such actions merely confirmed the
suspicions of the Ottoman government that some sort of complicity existed
between the Armenian community and the Entente.

Turkish Armenia was not the only place to suffer. As soon as the battle of
Sarikamish foiled the Turkish invasion of Russia, Enver ordered the

43
invasion of Persia to find an alternate path to victory. In reality, the
campaign in Persia was a resource-wasting effort that gained the Ottomans
nothing, but fueled Enver's dream of unifying the Turkic peoples of the
world. He was pleased that the Azerbaijanis, Kashkai, Turkomans, Lurs, and
Kurds of northern Persia welcomed the arrival of the Turkish Army. Of
course, that may be a result of ten years of humiliating Russian occupation.
From 1915, the Armenian community in the Urmia-Dilman region was
devastated. Turks state that the local peoples turned against the Armenians
because the Russians favored them, but there is no evidence of favorable
treatment of any group in northern Persia by the Russians. Prince Sharraf
Khan, a Kurdish leader, took the banner of religious war against the
Russians, and gleefully entered the ranks of the Turkish army. However, his
troops were more adept at running Armenians and others from their
homes than battling hardened Russian troops.

Armenians and the Treaties: Brest-Litovsk, Batum, Mudros, Sevres,

Lausanne

In March 1918, peace had been signed between Soviet Russia and the
Ottomans at Brest-Litovsk, resulting in the clearing of occupied territory
and the cession of the Kars region to Turkey. Whichever Armenians had
returned to their homes in the Russian occupied Anatolia, now fled before
the oncoming Turks. Armenians living in Kars braced for the Turkish
advance and made a small defense before fleeing toward Erivan. By this
time, Enver was interested in making contact with Baku, and from there,
reaching across the Caspian Sea to the Turanian regions beyond. Turkish
troops faced down the small Armenian resistance in Erivan with sporadic
fighting and a few massacres, but nothing like deportation was
contemplated. Russian Armenia was occupied by the Turks, who permitted
the Dashnaktiun party, their old enemy, to run a government at Erivan.

44
In June 1918, the representatives of the three Transcaucasian governments
were invited to Constantinople to ratify the Treaty of Batum, which had
been drawn up by Talaat's government in April in order to normalize
relations between the Porte and these states. It must have been a moment
of supreme irony as Talaat Pasha welcomed the Armenian plenipotentiary
Avedis Aharonian into his office. Aharonian made the journey to protest the
onerous terms of Batum, which relegated the Armenian republic to some
4,000 square kilometers, basically the capital Erivan, Lake Sevan, and
Alexandropol. Erivan itself was a border town. The small state could not
care for itself, and the mountains were covered with refugee camps, most
of whose inhabitants lived in the areas the Treaty of Batum had assigned to
Turkey or Azerbaijan. By the Treaty, the Ottoman Empire had annexed one
half of the Batum-to-Baku railway system, including Batum, Kars, Ardahan,
Artvin, more than one-half of the Erivan province, and Nakhichevan.
Azerbaijan was granted the other half of the line, from Zangezur all the
way to the Caspian. Enver in particular had demanded these borders, so
that his Army of Islam, under the command of his brother Nuri, would
have a direct access to Baku and to the Turanian lands on the other side of
the Caspian Sea.

The Armenian plenipotentiary met with several Ottoman and Committee

members during his visit, including Enver. Aharonian reported that Talaat
was polite, but denied all involvement in the Armenian massacres. He wove
away the issue with his hand, and blamed any excesses on the Kurds, on
corrupt local officials, and on the Russian army. Aharonian later met with
Sultan Mohammed VI, who was quite frank about the Armenian tragedy
and lamented their treatment by the Turkish authorities, adding he hoped
that many of the Committee members could be replaced soon. Aharonian
considered Enver to be the most congenial of them all. He was courteous
and gracious, even friendly. However, he would not budge on the issue of

45
the Treaty of Batum or the refugee situation. He explained to Aharonian
just how important the Batum-to-Baku railway was to Turkish interests,
and that it was a large measure of trust that the Porte even allowed a
miniature Armenian state to exist. Finally, Enver advised the Armenian
government to clear out of Tiflis, Georgia (where it had been situated since
the revolution) while it still had a chance. They were to go to Erivan,
which was a refugee-choked backwater compared to urban, civilized Tiflis.

The Batum-to-Baku railway's importance was more than just Enver's

fantasy. Earlier in that same month, the Georgian government had signed
an alliance with Germany, placing itself in their protection. As Aharonian
was preparing to leave Constantinople, he took the Georgian
plenipotentiary aside and bitterly complained about the alliance, since it
basically left Armenia squarely in Turkey's hostile arms. The Georgian
diplomat defended himself by saying that Armenia would have done the
same thing if it was in Georgia's place. Talaat was already bristling with
bitter hatred for Germany over their Georgian alliance, which he
considered treasonous, as well as Germany's interference in the affairs of
the Crimea, which Talaat claimed for the Porte (for details, see Suleiman
Sulkevich's biography).The Germans landed troops at Poti in Georgia in
summer 1918 to stake their claim in the Caucasus, but the Treaty of Batum
prevented them from dealing with Armenia, except to wrangle with the
Porte over certain territories claimed by both Georgia and Armenia.

The Armenians simply waited for the war to conclude, as they were clearly
powerless in their own country. Enver's brother Nuri did reach Baku, and
saw to the expulsion of the small British force under Colonel Dunsterville
that temporarily occupied the city. Nuri's troops joined the local
Azerbaijanis and committed a massacre of Armenians throughout the city,
although one wonders just how many Armenians chose to remain in Baku

46
after the British fled.In spite of Turkish troops washing their boots in the
warm Caspian Sea, Enver's connection to the mythical Turanian lands
beyond the bright blue horizon was never made, and by 30 October 1918,
when the armistice treaty was signed at Mudros, Nuri evacuated his Army
of Islam from Baku, while the rest of the Ottoman army marched out of
northern Persia in the wake of the British advance on Mosul in northern
Mesopotamia and on Aleppo in northern Syria. The war was over.

Almost.

The Committee for Union and Progress collapsed, and Talaat fled to Berlin,
followed by Jemal and Enver. The Armenians attempted to fill in a "power
vacuum" in eastern Anatolia, but in reality there was none. Remnants of
Nuri Pasha's Army of Islam reoccupied all of Turkish Armenia and
returned most of the refugees--except for the Armenians who, for various
reasons, no longer existed. When the Armenian forces marched from
Erivan, they were able to seize Kars, but nothing beyond the old Turkish
frontier. Their lobby in the west was quite vocal, however. As
compensation for the massacres and deportations during the war, the
Armenian delegations to the Peace councils and western capitals demanded
the six eastern vilayets as part of the new Armenia. Only problem was, the
Armenians were too weak to take these areas militarily, there were no
longer any Armenians living in these areas (much less those who once lived
there were a minority), and none of the western powers wanted the
responsibility of occupation. Only the British were interested in securing
the Batum-to-Baku railway, recalling Colonel Dunsterville from the deserts
of Turkestan whence he had retreated. First he reoccupied Baku, and then
traveled the railway to Batum, occupying a portion of the western railway
on behalf of the Armenian republic, whose forces were being challenged by
the much enlarged Azerbaijani army.

47
When Nuri Pasha left Baku, he did quite the same thing Enver had done in
Tripoli seven years earlier: he permitted soldiers and officers of his Army of
Islam to join the Azerbaijan's national army, providing they received pay
and rations. From then on, Armenia was outclassed by Azerbaijan, and
sporadic but heavy fighting over the Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and Karabakh
regions did not really end until the Red Army laid both countries low in
1920-1921.Meanwhile, in winter and spring 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha
led a series of swift offensives against raids by the Armenians, and seized
Kars, Artvin, and Ardahan (briefly part of Georgia). Armenia was
henceforth exclusively in the old Russian territory, not the Turkish. The
infamous Treaty of Sevres of 1920 arranged for an Armenian state with
territories carved from the six vilayets, but of course there was no great
power willing to enforce the treaty's terms. When the subsequent Treaty of
Lausanne was signed by Kemal's government in 1923, Armenia no longer
existed. A deal was struck between Kemal and Soviet Russia, ensuring the
question should not be raised in the future.

Did Enver Pasha plot and carry out genocide against the Armenians?
Evidence shows he desired a brutal military suppression of the Armenian
rebels, but he personally had more to do with the misery of the Turkish
army and less to do with the misery of inhabitants of Anatolia, except that
it was he who brought war to them all in the first place!

GWS, 11/02 [rev. 4/08]

Top

The Players 4: Picking up the pieces

48
Halil Pasha, Enver's uncle Mohammed VI,  the last Mustafa Kemal
and general in the Turkish Sultan. He was born Pasha, the hero of
army. He was also an early Vahid-ed-din, younger Gallipoli, the stealer
and influential member of brother of Abd-ul Hamid of Enver's glory.
the Committee for Union II. He was spared Here, he is
and Progress. Like most imprisonment in the photographed after
political parties of the time, Harems, unlike his older his victory over the
the Committee's doings were brother who was to Greeks in 1923.
not for the general public. become Sultan Mustafa Kemal was
Indeed, they met in secret, Mohammed V. Vahid-ed- actively involved the
in a closed, windowless din traveled abroad and revolution of 1908,
room in an unnamed villa gained a knowledge of but criticized the
in Constantinople. The the outside world and Committee's
entire leadership never once also a desire to improve involvement in army
assembled congress-style, conditions within the affairs. According to
even though they all lived in Ottoman Empire. He Enver Pasha's uncle,
the same city. It is difficult was an idealistic General Halil (see
to ascertain whether Halil visionary, but he came to biography on this
influenced his nephew the throne in the midst page), Enver asked
Enver, or the other way of the Empire's death Halil to have one of
around. Certainly, being throes, too late to have the committee
related to the young and any positive effect. The brothers assassinate
dashing "hero of the sorry condition of the Kemal for his
revolution" was very helpful state as the war wound "dangerous anti-

49
for Halil's military career, down filled the new revolutionary
as well as bringing him to Sultan with melancholy behavior." Halil chose
the top of the Committee's and then depression. He to ignore the request,
leadership posts. On the became bitter and and claims that
other hand, it is antagonistic. He also Kemal never forgot
questionable if Enver could became afraid both for him for saving his
have risen to the absolute himself and for his 700 life. (It may be true,
heights of popularity and year-old dynasty. When especially fifteen
influence within the army the time came for peace, years later, when
had it not been for his uncle the triumvirate of Enver, Halil himself was
Halil's established and Talaat, and Jemal beat a sentenced to death for
respectable connections. hasty retreat to plotting against the
After the putsch of February Germany and whichever Nationalist
1913, Halil was granted other places that would government, but
various positions in the grant them asylum. This spared by Kemal.)
government, including being suddenly left the Now, Kemal
the Caliph's official leader formerly powerless struggled to a
of the last great hajj to figurehead Sultan in respectable position
Mecca in 1915. He was an complete control of the under Enver's
active general in the war, situation, and his new indomitable shadow,
and conducted several Grand Vizier issued as the young War
operations in Persia with warrants for the Minister was
varying success. In 1918, triumvirate's arrest on propagandized as the
his force paralleled the charges of war crimes. all-highest warlord of
movements of his other However, overwhelmed the revived Ottoman
nephew, Enver's brother as he was by the war machine. It took
Nuri Pasha, who superior force of the a horrific failure such
commanded the "Army of Entente's advancing as Sarikamish in
Islam." Halil's brother armies, the Sultan December 1914 for
Ahmet, who was Enver's capitulated in every way Enver's shadow to

50
and Nuri's father, also had to his enemies' demands. recede, and a great
a position of power in the The British and French victory in Gallipoli
Turkish force that marched quickly understood just for the sun to shine
to Baku. In December how beaten their royal in Kemal's direction.
1919, General Arthur foe was, and took more Yet, Kemal did not
Gough-Calthorpe, the than an advantage over receive his just
British general in charge of him. The Entente began recognition even after
the occupation of to violate one armistice his glorious triumph,
Constantinople and the agreement after another, so jealous was Enver
Straits, ordered the "Army of and used threats and of his reputation.
Islam" out of Baku, and ultimata to force the Kemal was sidelined
recalled General weakened Sultan to do in the Turkish press,
Dunsterville from Turkestan their bidding. After they and the War Minister
to trail them. Among those unlawfully occupied trumpeted his
to be expelled from the Constantinople, the Yilderim or
Transcaucasus were "one Entente considered "Lightning Corps" as
Nuri Pasha, Ahmet the expelling the Sultan to the new modern
father of Enver Pasha, and Konia, that their control Turkish attack force.
his brother Halil." After the over the Straits would Still, the weight of
war, Halil maintained not be impeded by even more and more
strong connections with his the symbolic sovereignty defeats shortened
nephew, even visiting Russia of the Turkish ruler. Enver's shadow, and
as an emissary of the However, they considered the armistice of
Nationalist government that a banished Sultan Mudros on 30
under Mustafa Kemal deep in the heart of October 1918 wiped
Pasha. However, in May Anatolia might become a it away altogether.
1921, Halil was arrested rallying point for Kemal became well-
and sentenced to death for Turkish resistance. known to the Turks
leading a bolshevik putsch Therefore, the Entente only after he
against Kemal. Two other made him a virtual succeeded in

51
so-called bolshevik usurpers prisoner in his preserving the core of
were also condemned, and sumptuous palace of the Turkish army,
this was a particular low Yildiz, and even posted defying the Sultan
point in relations between British and French and the Entente, and
Soviet Russia and troops as guards around bringing destruction
Nationalist Turkey. On the palace grounds. The to the Armenians and
news of his uncle Nationalists were Greeks in Anatolia.
condemnation, Enver meanwhile gathering True modern Turkish
publicly stated he was ready their forces together in nationalism was
to lead a Red Army into Anatolia, and at first literally invented by
Turkey and bring both swore allegiance to the Kemal, and it is
revolution to the people as Sultan. Mohammed VI fitting that he chose
well as save his uncle. worried that the for himself the name
Kemal Pasha spared Halil Nationalists were Atatürk, which
from the death penalty, antagonizing the means "Father of the
however, and charges were Entente, and considered Turks."
later dropped. A payback, that the Greeks and
perhaps, for Halil once Armenians would be GWS, 12/00 [rev.
saving Kemal from Enver's given free reign over the 4/08]
deadly plot? Turkish nation in
response. He therefore
GWS, 3/01 [rev. 4/08] expelled men such as
Kemal Pasha from the
army and ordered their
arrest. This only had the
effect of turning the
Nationalist cause away
from defending the
ancient dynasty of
Osman and also the

52
 Caliphate.

GWS, 3/01 [rev. 4/08]

Part 5: Lost in the wilderness

Enver departed from Constantinople shortly before the occupation of the

capital by the joint British, French, and Italian forces in November 1918,
after the Armistice. Only the end of the war opened the Straits to the Allied
Fleets.

At the outbreak of the First World War, the Germans were utilizing both
the "Pan-Turanian" and the "Pan-Islamic" rhetoric towards their own ends,
from opposite theaters. When the Bolshevik Revolution took place, the
Germans -- already hard pressed by the Allies -- facilitated (and, according
to sources apparently instigated) Enver's and his colleagues' visit to
Moscow, the second aspect of German influence on Enver. When Enver
finally arrived in Moscow, he proposed to his Bolshevik hosts an Islamic
Army in Central Asia to "liberate India." Such a military operation, of
course, would have tied down substantial number of Allied troops in India,
away from the Western theaters. Before his clandestine departure from
Istanbul, Enver had dispatched a number of Ottoman officers to Central
Asia -- in his own thinking, to lay the groundwork of a national liberation
movement there. At that time, his former classmates and colleagues were
making preparations for the Turkish War of Liberation in Asia Minor.

Enver's German connection was significant with respect to the Turkistan

National Liberation Movement for two reasons. First, Enver's stay in the
German Empire brought him into direct contact with the products of
Institutes of Oriental studies, and the Orientalist professors themselves,

53
especially with the proponents of "Pan-Turanianism," also called "Pan-
Turanism." In fact, some of those scholars were also his official sponsors
and hosts. To that end, the German authorities urged the Ottoman
leadership to adopt Pan-Turanian policies and subsequently, those of the
separate Pan-Islamic Movement. Second, Germany would facilitate Enver's
visit to Moscow.

--H.B. Paksoy

Enver, the King of Kurdistan, condemned to death for war crimes!

The new Ottoman government under Izzet Pasha convened a tribune in

July 1919, finding the chief members of the Committee guilty of war
crimes. Talaat, Jemal, and Enver were condemned to death. But Enver was
already living Berlin under the assumed name "Ali Bey" after a circuitous
route through the Ukraine with German troops who were leaving Turkey.
Enver was good friends with General von Seeckt, who was chief of Staff for
the Southeastern Front in 1917, and the two had met on several occasions
while Turkish troops were on loan to Seeckt's command. Once Seeckt
became chief of staff for the much reduced German Reichswehr, he might
have found some use for his undercover friend with international
connections.

And yet, 1919 was a chaotic period for the disheartened war minister.
Rumors ruled more than truths. While "Ali Bey" the refugee eked a
mundane existence at the will of General Seeckt and sympathetic
committee members in hiding, "Enver Pasha" the notorious war criminal
was seen everywhere.

He was reportedly arrested and thrown into a German prison, awaiting

extradition to Constantinople for a war crimes trial!

54
He was reported to have fled arrest in Berlin and taken refuge in the
Caucasus, protected by wild bands of Tartars who had fought in his
brother's "Army of Islam!"

He was reported to have abducted by Nationalist agents and smuggled back

to Angora so that he couldn't overthrow Mustafa Kemal's Nationalist
Congress!

He was reportedly crowned the King of Kurdistan, and was preparing his
two million fanatical subjects for an invasion of Central Asia to build the
new caliphate with himself as the heir to the Prophet Mohammed!

He was supposed to seize power in Baku, unify the Turanian peoples, and
then ally himself with mad General Semyonov, who was supposed to
control Mongolia and Siberia, and together they would turn Central and
North Asia's undeveloped agricultural potential over to the Japanese, who
would end western dominance in Asia once and for all by curbing the
global food supply!

In 1919, Enver Pasha was the wandering nightmare of western politicians

and the unseen terror of global military strategists! In reality, he was just
Ali Bey, an exile awaiting opportunity. Looking for something to fight for.
Anything...

GWS, 2/01 [rev. 4/08]

To

Part 6: There must be something

to fight for, anything...
Opportunity Knocks in Russia

55
After hearing of promising opportunities in the east from other former
committee members, Enver attempted to reach Russian territory in May
1919 by aeroplane. Owing to mechanical trouble, he was forced to land
near Riga. Enver attempted to return to Germany on land but was arrested
at Shavli (Siauliai) by the Lithuanian government on charges of being a
spy. He was imprisoned in Kowno (Kaunas) while the Lithuanians
contemplated what to do with their famous captive. After four months of
captivity, Enver escaped and was able to cross back into Germany where he
waited for more favorable traveling conditions.

He returned to Berlin, and made surprising contacts with the imprisoned

bolshevik emissary Karl Radek in August 1919, who suggested he attempt
to bring revolution to the Islamic people of the World. He made up
his mind to visit Soviet Russia in order to make this new dream a
reality. Traveling by boat was out of the question, since he was wanted by
the Entente. Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia were all clients of the Entente
and also engaged in sporadic fighting with the Russians.

Finally, almost a year later, open war between Poland and Russia provided
a narrow window of opportunity. The Red Army's advance to the German
frontier in July 1920 permitted him to cross into the Russian zone without
hindrance. Two commissars were waiting for him at the Grajewo border
crossing on 10 August. Together, they traveled via Grajewo, Vilnius, Minsk,
and Smolensk, and Enver finally arrived in Moscow on 16 August 1920.
With him was a special briefcase from his friend, General von Seeckt,
containing a proposal for a secret military alliance between Soviet Russia
and Germany. Enver was the starter of negotiations that ended with the
infamous Rapallo Treaty of 1922, which permitted the German general
staff to maintain secret military training and weapons installations on
Russian soil.

56
Following interviews with Lenin, Trotsky, and Brussilov, Enver was forced
to wait for months, ostensibly to await favorable conditions for his agenda.
His hosts were distracted by the see-sawing events on the Polish war front
at that time, anyway. In September 1920, as the "Miracle of the Vistula"
swept the Red army out of Poland, Enver traveled to Baku to be a special
guest speaker at the bolshevik "Congress of Eastern Peoples" chaired by
Zinoviev. Scarcely versed in the ideology of Marxism, Enver nevertheless
proclaimed the importance of unifying the Turanian peoples from the
Bosporus to the Gobi. Whether this great task be accomplished under the
crescent of Islam or the sickle of communism mattered little to the former
war minister. Among the speakers was Enver's old contact in Berlin, Karl
Radek.

Meanwhile, the Soviets swallowed their stunning defeat on the Polish

battlefield by making fresh conquests all across the Caucasus and the far
east. Enver was finally dispatched to Batum in April 1921. They kept him
there as a virtual prisoner in order to lead a revolutionary army into
Turkey should the Nationalist government under Kemal Pasha be destroyed
by the Greek offensive then underway. The Greeks were favored to win, as
both the Soviets and the Nationalists believed the Greeks were being
heavily supported and directed by the Entente. The Turkish victory at
Sakarya caused the Soviets to rethink their policy in Turkey. The Entente
had long known of the "friendship" between the Soviets and the
Nationalists. Kemal's Ankara government was the first to recognize the
Soviet government and vice-versa.

Preparing to Bring Red Revolution into Turkey

What the Entente didn't realize was that both were preparing for war
against the other. Kemal didn't trust any of his "friends" in Moscow,
especially when he learned of Enver's army stationed on the border. Soviet

57
suggestions that the army was to be transported across the Caspian Sea to
fight in Turkestan were dismissed by Kemal, who knew that Enver was far
more interested in Turkey than Central Asia. Indeed, Enver had written his
uncle Halil in December 1920, telling him that soon, he would march into
Anatolia at the head of a vast Moslem force. A few months later, he
informed his supporters in Turkey that they should prepare an armed
organization that could dominate the situation in Central Anatolia once he
began his revolutionary invasion. Halil begged Enver to wait until the
Entente had finished their London Conference on the Eastern Question. If
the settlement was unsatisfactory to the Turkish people, they might be
more willing to overthrow both the Sultan in Constantinople and Kemal in
Angora.

As it turns out, the defeat of the Greeks was tonic enough for the Turkish
people to rally around Kemal's Nationalist government. Kemal had actually
written to Enver in November 1920. Kemal had wanted peace with
Moscow to secure his eastern frontier, but the continued presence of Enver
in the Transcaucasus had done nothing to help the situation. Therefore,
Kemal wrote Enver, telling him to foment Moslem uprisings in the Eastern
countries--Turkestan, India, Afghanistan, etc. without informing the Soviets
of his plans, and to keep in touch with the Nationalist government of his
progress.

At this time, the Soviets allowed Enver to come and go as he pleased.

Therefore, Nationalist Representative Kazim Karabekir went so far as to
suggest giving aid to Enver in order to begin a revolution in Azerbaijan and
points eastward. Enver was not to be fooled by this scheme, however. He
already had an army at his disposal and enjoyed at least superficial
confidence from Moscow He remained in Batum, awaiting orders to cross
the border and bring revolution to Turkey.

58
Thus, when the Treaty of Kars was signed between Karabekir and Soviet
Ambassador Ganetski, the former asked the Ambassador why the Soviets
had kept Enver in Batum? Surely, it was an act of war, Karabekir
reasoned--this was the sort of talk that was carried on during the signing
of the Peace Treaty between the Turkish Republic and the Soviets.
Karabekir also asked Ganetski to come clean and tell him whether the
Soviets expected the fall of the Turkish Republic and its imminent
replacement by a Soviet system of government. Ganetski was evasive, and
assured Karabekir that Enver was a freebooter with no serious credentials.
The two plenipotentiaries signed the Treaty of Kars, which ended all border
disputes and guaranteed normal relations between the two states. Turkey
was given Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin, which it claimed at the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918; the Soviets were allowed to retain Batum,
whose claim Turkey dropped.

Enver returned to Moscow shortly thereafter, feeling not a little cheated

that he was thwarted in bringing destruction to his Nationalist enemies.
But the Kremlin had other uses for him. Back in September 1920, Enver
had been the guest speaker at Zinoviev's Congress of Eastern Peoples at
Baku, which was designed to foment red revolution among the Asiatics,
particularly the Turkic peoples in Russian Central Asia, the Indians, and the
Persians. Enver's cryptic theme concerned the viable intermarriage of his
Turanian mythology and Marxist ideology. However, Pan-Turkic
Nationalism and Marxism were impossible to mesh, Ganetski had
concluded in a letter to Lenin in April 1921. Despite growing mistrust,
Enver Pasha was assuring his bolshevik mentors that there was no other
way to bring revolution to Turkestan than through him.

GWS, 2/01 [rev. 4/08]

59
Top

Part 7: My mission is to be a
savior once more!
Before Enver, "...first Halil and Jemal Pashas arrived in Moscow [May 1920]
with the aim of undertaking propaganda on behalf of 'Islamic
Revolutionary Society' [now known to have been headquartered in Berlin],"
writes Togan.

By spring 1919, Togan was in Moscow and heading the secret Society for
the liberation of Central Asia. By spring 1920, Togan had openly broken
with the Moscow Bolsheviks and moved to Central Asia to assume control
of the movement. He, like some other resistance leaders, went in disguise to
the Comintern-sponsored Baku Congress of the Toilers of the East
(September 1920), where Russian control over the Revolution in Asia was
reasserted. Enver spoke at the Congress, but went on an arms-buying trip
to Germany the next month. He returned to Russia only in 1921.

Even before the arrival of Enver in Turkistan (September 1921), Islam still
exerted some political force among an increasingly small portion of the
populace. By then, Islam had declined from its earlier intellectual vitality,
had become conservative and closely associated with powerful individuals,
as if a personal cult. The Emir of Bukhara was one such personality. Togan
states: "...[prior to the establishment of the 'Society' in Turkistan] there were
three types of Basmachi: 'Emirists,' 'somewhat Emirists,' and Anti-Emirists.'
The political spectrum of the Basmachi did not end there. Jemal Pasha
wished to manage the problems of Turkistan and the Basmachi from Kabul.
Enver Pasha, on the other hand was conducting pro-Bolshevik 'Union of
Islam' (as noted, instigated by Berlin) propaganda from Moscow. This had
some effect."

60
While the "Society" was undertaking regular if secret political and military
preparations for a free and independent Turkestan, "Enver Pasha arrived in
Bukhara and sent word that he wished to speak with me" continues Togan.
"On 2 October [1921] I met him, and upon his request, provided him with
the details of the circumstances, especially the status of the Society. Enver
Pasha's arrival in Bukhara, especially his plans were a totally unexpected
development for us. A few months ago this person was engaged in
propaganda through the pamphlets of 'Union of Islam,' in connection with
Jemal Pasha advocating cooperation with the Bolsheviks against
imperialism. Now [he indicated that] he was not only taking a position
against the Bolsheviks, but actually... planned to attack them."

Togan suggested that Enver should cross over to Afghanistan and continue
his personal struggle from there, leaving the Society to continue with its
own planned actions. Instead, Enver chose to take his headquarters to
Eastern Bukhara to convene a congress of the Basmachi there. Vehement
but polite objections from the Society's Central Committee did not affect
Enver's decision. Togan wrote: "That day I learned that this person [Enver]
was a great idealist, who had not squared himself with events in life, and he
had not equipped himself with the geography and the statistics of Turkistan
even from the Russian and the European publications. Undoubtedly, he had
decided on his actions during the twenty three days he was resident in
Bukhara."

Apparently Togan was justified in his advice to Enver, for, the latter was
detained by the Emirist forces upon arrival in Eastern Bukhara. Only after
Enver had proclaimed himself "Commander of the Islamic Forces and
Bukhara, Son-in-Law of the Caliph" etc. and began issuing edicts under
those titles he was released from virtual prison. It was ironic that Enver,

61
who had once fought against the Scholasticist Recidivists demanding Sharia
in Constantinople, should collaborate with a similar group, using religious
epithets more than a dozen years later and more than a thousand miles
away.

The Society decided to stay aloof, and attempted to cope with this fait
accompli as best as it could. It was receiving the details of Enver's actions
through its well ordered intelligence network. The Emirists began taking
openly hostile actions against the known members and units of the Society,
and even endeavouring to enter into separate armistice negotiations with
the Bolsheviks. The Society decided to take drastic action, even considered
persuading Enver to cross over to Afghanistan by any means. Before action
could be taken, Enver, the former Deputy Commander in Chief of the
Armies of the Ottoman Empire, was killed in battle with the Russians. He
headed a platoon-sized force, sword in hand, and was assaulting a machine-
gun position.

--H.B. Paksoy

Top

Part 8: The death of Enver Pasha

ENVER PASHA SLAIN BY SOVIET FORCE;

Turks' War Leader Is Left Dead on the Field After Desperate Fight in
Bokhara.
LAST OF THE TRIUMVIRATE
His Colleagues Talaat and Djemal Assassinated by Armenians After
Fleeing From Constantinople.

62
MOSCOW, Aug. 16, 1922.--Enver Pasha met his death in a desperate
battle against odds in Southeastern Bokhara territory, between
Knovalingam and Barijuan on Aug. 4. The Turkish leader had been pressed
severely by Soviet troops during the past months until he was virtually
surrounded with a small body of cavalry of seven or eight sabres.--

So wrote New York Times Moscow correspondent Walter Duranty,

infamous for his later cover-ups of Stalin's atrocities during the
collectivization of Russian and Ukrainian peasants in 1930-1933. He went
on to write how Enver Pasha's small force was pressed from all sides by the
encroaching bolshevik force. They charged him with treason, and he was
attempted to crown himself Emir of Bukhara when he was set upon by the
Reds.

Enver was forced to carry the fight into easternmost Bukhara, today
Tajikistan's rugged Pamir region, ringed by towering mountains and the
Afghanistan border. Duranty states that Enver was surrounded, divided his
army in two, and sent each part in a mad dash to break out of the
tightening Red vise. A chance for escape presented itself, but Enver was
shot down while leading the cavalry charge to freedom. Duranty claims
Enver's body revealed five wounds, and his identity had to be confirmed by
personal items on the body. Duranty's story also was the official Soviet line
as to what happened, but generally other histories disagree, as do Enver's
family and the locals who supported the basmachi rebels.

The Death of Enver: A Heroic Hail of Machine Gun Fire, or a

Humiliating Assassination?

The truth behind the death of Enver may never be known. Locals in the
Ferghana Valley swear Enver died in a hail of bullets while leading the
cavalry charge against a Red Army strongpoint. People who claim to know

63
Enver's personality insist he would never to something as brash and
foolhardy as charging a bolshevik machine gun nest. But events in his life
speak more of courage than calculated wisdom. Enver's daughter,
Mahpeyker Enver (see Part 11, below) owned the blouse-shirt in which he
died. It bore the blood stains and a single bullet hole in the middle of the
chest.

Armenian lore has it that he was captured alive and executed with a single
gunshot by an Armenian commissar attached to the Red Army. Some
reports name the leader of the company that cornered Enver Pasha as Agop
Melkumian. However, such a story is a little too contrived: Is it possible the
big three of the Committee, the triumvirate of the Ottoman Empire and
"conspirators in the Armenian genocide," were all killed by vengeful
Armenian assassins?

Talaat Pasha was definitely gunned down in the streets of Berlin in 1919
by an Armenian student, who was put on trial but acquitted by the
sympathetic judges. Similarly, Jemal Pasha was shot by an Armenian in the
streets of Tiflis in 1921; he was passing through there after negotiating an
arms deal for the Afghan army. However, that an Armenian should be on
hand to finish off Enver Pasha in the wilds of the Pamir mountains in 1922
is, for the lack of better words, "too good to be true." The story of Enver
being shot dead by machine gun appears more reasonable when one
considers that a machine gun's purpose is to hit many men with one bullet,
rather than cutting down one man with many bullets.

Furthermore, the Red Army sent to suppress the basmachi revolt was
commanded by Semyon Budyonny, the colorful, swashbuckling, if stupid,
commander of the horsebound Konarmia, whose fame was founded on
eliminating the anarchists of the Ukraine as well as the white forces in the

64
Don and Kuban regions of Russia.

The Konarmia inherited from the anarchists the horse-pulled machine gun,
called the tachanka. For its time, it was a much-feared and highly effective
weapon. Fast-moving and low-profile, the enemy often did not know they
were going to face a tachanka until the cavalry squadron wheeled around,
and the machine gun was already blazing away at its unsuspecting targets.
Since Budyonny applied dozens of these effective weapons against the
basmachi, it is not unreasonable to suspect that perhaps even Enver Pasha
himself was caught unawares by the tachanka and shot down. For all the
lack of concrete information, the death of Enver Pasha is open to
speculation.

Still, it wasn't more than three weeks after his death on 4 August 1922,
that newspapers ran the following headline, thus causing many to wonder if
the fate of Enver Pasha would ever truly be known:

ENVER PASHA HAS BEEN KILLED AGAIN.

MOSCOW, Aug. 19, 1922.-- ENVER Pasha has been killed again, this time
in Southeastern Bokhara, in a skirmish with troops of the Russian Soviet
Government.

GWS, 4/08

Top

Part 9: Bringing this tale up-to-

date
Turkish Daily News 5 Aug 1996

65
ISTANBUL- "A state funeral was held in Istanbul Sunday for Enver Pasha
(1881-1922), the mercurial and tempestuous leader of the Young Turks
revolution and a member of the triumvirate that ruled the Ottoman Empire
during World War I. In military ceremonies, attended by President
Suleyman Demirel, ministers, deputies and Turkey's top generals,
authorities buried the remains of the Ottoman general and former war
minister, returned to Turkey Saturday from Tajikistan, at the H?rriyet-i
Ebediye Tepesi, a memorial hill in the Caglayan district.

"Enver Pasha, with his faults and merits, is an important symbol of our
recent history. We have no doubt that history will reach the proper
judgements through evaluating past events," President Suleyman Demirel
said, adding that Enver Pasha's separation from his home country and exile
had come to an end. State Minister Abdullah Gul said that Enver Pasha was
a general who had died along with thousands of others, thus attaining the
status of a martyr, while fighting to unite all Muslim and Turkic countries
in Asia. "We will build a monument on the spot where Enver Pasha's grave
used to be," he said. The hill contains an impressive monument 12 meters
high commemorating the 1908 Young Turks revolution that restored the
constitution and ended the absolute monarchy in the Ottoman Empire as
well as the tombs of many of the leaders of the Committee of Union and
Progress, the political group that ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1900-
1918.

"The funeral began with a religious ceremony at Sisli Mosque, in

downtown Istanbul, where thousands of Turks gathered. The flag-draped
coffin was then carried through Sisli in a hearse to Memorial Hill where
Enver Pasha was buried in a newly built tomb next to Talat Pasha, one of
the Ottoman World War I triumvirate. The ceremony was held on the 74th
anniversary of his death Enver Pasha entered the Turkish army and was

66
sent to Salonika, where he instigated the Young Turks revolt. He served as
military attache in Berlin in 1909, returning to Istanbul to help suppress a
counterrevolution. He eventually became leader of the triumvirate, which
included Ottoman Prime Minister Talat Pasha and Cemal Pasha, the marine
minister, that led the Ottoman Empire to its defeat in World War I on the
side of Germany and the losing Axis Powers and to its dismemberment.

"After the end of the war, he was court-martialed in 1919 for signing a
secret deal with the Germans and sentenced to one-year in exile and
deprived of his civil rights. He was also blamed for leading the disastrous
Sarikamish winter military campaign in 1914, during which nearly 70,000
Ottoman soldiers froze to death in the cold weather.

"After the war, he fled from Istanbul to Germany and eventually to Russia
where he sided first with the White Russians and then the Bolsheviks, with
whom he finally broke to lead a failed Pan-Turkist movement aimed to
unite all Turks under one flag in Central Asia. He was killed in a battle on
Aug. 4, 1922, leading a cavalry charge against Bolshevik troops near
Dushanbe.

The Turkish delegation responsible for bringing back the body of Enver
Pasha from Tajikistan have said that they were impressed by the local
people's commitment to the Turkish national hero.

The residents of the remote mountain village of Obtar in Belcivan,

Tajikistan, say that they understand that the Pasha, whom they deem to be
a 'martyr' and a 'hero,' is going back to his motherland, but that they feel
sad that they are parting from him. They say that it is a consolation that a
monument will be built in the place of the grave. The Turkish delegation is
also bringing back a letter to Mahpeyker Hanim, Enver Pasha's daughter

67
from a "close friend of her father whom she does not know," living in the
village of Obtar. Muzaffer Sah, who took care of the Pasha's grave, is the
person who has helped the most to end the Pasha's 74-year long separation
from his home country.

"Muzaffer Sah's links to Enver Pasha go back to his father, Talip Sah, who
took care of financial matters at Enver Pasha's headquarters. After
removing the Pasha's dead body so that it would not be desecrated by the
Russians, Talip Pasha built a secret grave for him not only on Cegan Hill,
but also on the spot where the Pasha's blood had collected in a ditch. Talip
Sah considered it a sacred duty for himself and his family to protect the
grave of Enver Pasha, whom he called 'my commander' and accompanied
until his last breath.

Muzaffer Sah, who is leading a very harsh life in Tajikistan which is

currently suffering from political and economic crises, wrote in his letter:
"We greet the daughter of Enver Pasha. We have taken good care of your
father for 75 years. We hope you will help us." Osman Mayatepek, the
grandson of the Pasha, could not hold back his tears upon reading the
letter. "The Pasha's family will not let such an example of loyalty go
unrewarded," he said."

Top

Part 10: The son of Enver

Enver Pasha had married a princess of the House of Osman. In this

case, the princess Emine Naciye Sultana. She was the daughter of Prince
Shehzade Suleiman Effendi (died in 1909) and his fourth wife, Ayshe
Tarzandar Kadin Effendi, who died in 1958. Prince Suleiman, in turn, was
a son of Sultan Abd-ul Mejid I, and therefore Prince Suleiman's uncles were

68
the Sultans Abd-ul Hamid II, Mohammed V, and Mohammed VI, as well as
the last Caliph ul-Islam, Abd-ul Mejid II . By this union with the extensive
and elaborate family of the Sultans, Enver had a son, named Ali.

Ali was still a baby when Enver went to Turkestan to fight the bolsheviks.
After 1923, young Ali was exiled with his mother, sisters and all the
members of the House of Osman. After the death of Kemal Atatürk in
1937, Osmali royals were permitted to return to their homeland. They
settled with other relatives in "exile" from the palaces, but still lived in
Istanbul. Ali chose the surname "Enver" in honour of his father to comply
with the law passed by the Republic that required surnames. Later, Ali
Enver joined the British Royal Air Force and eventually rose to the rank of
captain, flying combat missions during WWII.

In time, he quit the armed forces and began to work in the public sector.
While he was doing an internship in London, the then Turkish Ambassador
to the U.K., Rauf Orbay (see paragraph about Enver's sister Medihe in Part
11, below), introduced him to Winston Churchill. The famous former
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Royal Navy received him well and
said, jokingly, "Your father caused my political career to go back for 20
years!"

After working for some years overseas, Ali decided to move to Australia.
He married there and started a family, having a daughter, Arzu, in 1955.
One source reports that, In December of 1971, Ali Enver lost his life in a
car accident in Australia. Some suggest Ali died immediately after being
spurned by a woman. (It was said that he did everything well, except
choosing the right soulmate.) Apparently an expert swimmer who spent
much time bathing in the Bosporus, it was therefore tragic that Ali dove
from a tall cliff into less than half a meter of water, in his adoptive country

69
of Australia. Death by auto accident, or by diving accident? The truth is yet
to be known.

GWS, 2/03 [rev. 4/08]

Top

Part 11: The daughters of Enver

Enver Pasha had two daughters in addition to a son, and they settled in
Istanbul after 1937, when the ban on the house of Osman was lifted and
the exiles were allowed to come home. The life of the unseated House of
Osman may be illustrated this way: In 1955, while visiting a certain Karl
Pokorny who lived next door, Naciye Sultana and her cousin, the widow of
the exiled Nizam of Hyderabad, asked that his then 2-year old grandson be
sent over, so the ladies could play with him. The house of Osman's royal
ties with the near and far east persisted well past the fall of the Ottomans.
And, their less than idyllic lifestyle continued in the shadow of their former
palaces and harems.

"Doctor Enver," the War Minister's Eldest Child

Mahpeyker was Enver's oldest child with his wife, the princess Emine
Naciye Sultana. Mahpeyker was born in 1917. She married Fikret Urgup,
had a son in 1947, and divorced sometime after 1950, as it was about then
that she and her husband came to finish their studies in the U.S., becoming
Psychologists with US degrees. She became Dr. Mahpeyker Enver after her
divorce, thus assuming the same surname as her brother Ali had. She is
listed as having died in 2000.

70
 Above: Mahpeyker Enver and her son, Hasan, 1973.
Below, Mahpeyker and Hasan in 1973, sitting beneath her painting of Enver
Pasha as War Minister

Mahpeyker's son Hasan was the direct descendant of the enigmatic warlord

and his princess bride. Mahpeyker, meanwhile, became the second of the
warlord's children to adopt his surname as their own. To complete the
tragedy of this line of Enver Pasha, Hasan died in 1989.

Türkan, the Ambassador's Wife

Türkan Mayatepek was Mahpeyker's next younger sister, born in 1919.

Her husband Huveyda Mayatepek was the Turkish Ambassador to
Britain and then Denmark for several years. They had one son, Osman

71
Mayatepek in 1950, who is the other grandson of Enver Pasha. Türkan
herself died in 1988. Her son Osman is a successful businessman in
Ankara.

Above: Enver Pasha's grandson Osman Mayatepek and his wife.

A Lost Daughter?

"Princess" Senije was known throughout the world as the third sister of

Ahmet Zogu, King Zog I of Albania. The first and only official royal
wedding in Albanian history occurred at Tirana when Senije was married
on 27 January 1936 to Prince Mehmed Abid, youngest son of Sultan Abd-
ul Hamid II. King Zog gave the bride away in the glittering ceremony.
What is most interesting about Senije is that her descendents suggest she
was the wife of Enver Pasha!

And, that hey had a daughter called Elsea, who would have been born
around the same time as Enver's other daughters. So, is the case of Senije
one of bigamy, a mistress or concubine, a second wife as permitted in
Islam, or just mistaken identity?

72
 Above: The wedding day for Ahmet Zogu and Senije at Kruje?
Senije's daughter Elsea is barely visible in the background

To add to the drama, it is stated that Senije was not Ahmet Zogu's third
sister but rather his first wife! They were supposedly married at Kruje,
Albania before Zogu became President, or perhaps even Prime Minister,
which would be right around the time of Enver's death in autumn 1922.
Senije's descendants state that, after Zogu attained high public office, Elsea
was taken away by one of Zogu's strongmen and raised apart from her
mother.

Exactly why Ahmet Zogu would call Senije his "sister" and break apart her
family is unknown, but personal and family problems were a daily part of
Zogu's existence. During his reign as king, Zogu's life was threatened with
the vendetta or honour killing by the former prime minister Shefket Bey.
Zogu was supposed to marry Shefket's daughter but broke the engagement
when he assumed the crown in 1928. Perhaps Zogu kept his marriage to
Senije secret in order to fend off similar vendettas. The truth is not known.
There are only stories, rumors, and hearsay.

GWS, 4/06 [rev. 4/08]

Top

73
 Part 12: The brothers (and sisters)
of Enver
Osman Nuri, "Hero of Egypt" and "Butcher of Baku"

Osman Nuri Pasha, brother of Enver, was one of those "celebrated

villains" of the late Ottoman period. He was a divisional commander of
average talent in the Turkish Army. Having participated in the Tripoli
campaign with his brother, he returned to the deserts of Cyrenaica in
1915, and led Turkish soldiers who had remained there since 1912 in an
invasion of Egypt from the west. With the help of the Senussi horsemen,
his troops occupied every major oasis west of the Nile by the end of
summer 1915 and even raided towns on the Nile itself. The British
increased their cavalry and armored car strength in 1916 to keep this
threat at bay; however, neither Nuri's Turks nor the Senussi horsemen
proved more than a dashing and romantic desert nuisance. The British even
thought Nuri had been killed for a while, after a major raid on the oasis of
Birani scattered the Turks and several officer bodies were discovered.

Nuri remained in the service of the Senussi until their new leader, Sidi
Mohammed al Idris, ordered his fighters out of Egypt. The oasis campaigns
had been a fruitless waste of Senussi resources and Idris had been a vocal
opponent of the action from the moment his older cousin had called for
war against Britain. As Idris turned his Senussi warriors solely against the
Italian enemy besieged at Tripoli, Nuri took a German u-boat back to
Constantinople.

Nuri's notoriety came late in the war as the so-called "Butcher of Baku"
when in August 1918, he led a column of Turkish soldiers across the
Transcaucasus in the wake of the Russian collapse. Erivan cleared out
completely before his arrival, and the German "Georgische Legion" out of
Samsun under Kress von Kressstein paralleled Nuri's "Army of Islam" and

74
blocked his attempt at seizing Tiflis. Nuri crossed Azerbaijan, causing a
flood of Armenian refugees in his wake that never fully recovered their
original settlements after the war.

At the end of August, Nuri approached Baku, which was held by

"DunsterForce" under the command of British Colonel Dunsterville. It was
under Dunsterville's watchful eye that the twenty-six commissars were
arrested and shipped across the Caspian Sea. They were later executed by
Captain Reginald Teague-Jones on trumped up charges of trying to escape
while being force-marched toward India. Thus, they forever became
martyrs of the Soviet cause, and damning the independent Transcaucasian
republics. DunsterForce cleared out of Baku on steamer upon Nuri's
approach, because the Turks were several dozen times larger in manpower
and artillery.

As a matter of fact, Dunsterville crossed to the Turkestan coast of the

Caspian, riding out the remainder of the war camped by the magnificent
ruins of Merv in what is now Turkmenistan. Why did he go there? Because
the British were paranoid that the Red Guards might attempt to invade
India from Turkestan. (The end of World War I and the beginning of the
Russian civil war put off that threat until 1920, when General Brussilov
was sent to Ashkabad to prepare for the invasion of India.)

Below: The celebrated "Nevruz Dede." The last soldier from Nuri's Army of
Islam?
Some sources claim he is really the son of Nuri Pasha!

75
Anyway, in September 1918 most of the Armenians cleared out as fast as
Dunsterville, headed for Derbent and Russian territory. The Turks by now
closed upon Baku. Nuri's troops saw to the execution of any Armenian
leadership in Baku, in what is now a famous and over-dramatized event
called the Massacre of the Baku Armenians--in reality, his troops spent
three days rounding up and eliminating not only Armenians but Russians,
the workers, the Reds, the clergy, indeed, anyone who could be considered
an opponent. Georgadze, the Georgian Minister of War, toasted Nuri when
he was the guest of honor at a banquet: `I congratulate you on chasing the
Bolshevik usurpers from Baku and establishing your splendid democracy
there.'

Nuri Pasha’s advance on Baku was marred also by atrocities committed

against German residents, where Lieutenant Colonel Paraquin, the German
Chief of Staff for the Georgische Legion of Samsun under the direction of
General Kressstein, confronted Nuri during the same banquet at the Hotel
Metropole on 16 and 17 September 1918 about the mistreatment of local
German residents. After this, Nuri went out of his way to persecute
Germans in Baku.

By November 1918, the war was over and Nuri was stranded in Baku. His
troops battled Armenia's Hunchak and Dashnak militias as they marched
back to Turkey, and a portion joined the Azerbaijan national army to fight
the Armenians. At the same time, Dunsterville had recrossed the Caspian

76
Sea to Baku, and followed Nuri all the way to Batum in January 1919.
There, Nuri and what remained of his officers surrendered to Dunsterville
according to the terms of the armistice, but not his soldiers. Most of them
had disbanded and crossed the Turkish frontier in small groups with their
rifles and even pieces of artillery, where they became the kernel of the
Nationalist Army under Mustafa Kemal. In May 1919, Nuri escaped from
prison in Batum with the aid of Karakol, a group of former officers and
Committee brothers who supported the Nationalists.

In January 1920, Nuri was reported as already being in the service of the
Red Army in Daghestan, raising the red banner over the mountain peoples,
even before Enver had made contact with Lenin. Although all of Enver's
family had certain contacts with Soviet Russia, it is unclear whether Nuri
himself was a Red army commander. It is known that he returned to
Constantinople after the allies evacuated the Straits, and settled into a
peaceful existence.

After the war, Nuri was inclined to distance himself from the Baku
campaign and its stories of atrocities, preferring to spend more time
impressing guests and visitors on his small but illustrious role in the earlier
Egyptian campaign. As the family clan name was "Killigil," Nuri Pasha
assumed the surname Killigil when Kemal Ataturk ordered national name
reform. By the 1940’s, Nuri had become a major producer and exporter of
Nitrogen-based munitions, especially for German customers during World
War II. In 1949, the entire munitions factory exploded, killing Nuri and
many others in the process.

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 Above, from left to right: Enver, his father Ahmet, and Nuri, likely taken in
1914

Mohammed Kamil, the Father of Enver's Children

Mohammed Kamil Bey was Enver's youngest brother. He was a civil

engineer and was an avid hunter. He married Naciye Sultana after Enver's
death in 1922 and they had a daughter Rana in 1926; thus Rana, who took
her father's adopted surname Killigil, is both half sister and cousin of
Enver's children, and Kamil was a proper father for Enver Pasha's three
children. Kamil died of cancer in 1960. Rana Eldehem died on the morning
of 15 April 2008. She is succeeded by two daughters.

Below, left to right, a photograph of Kamil, Fikret Urgup, Kamil's daughter Rana,
Mahpeyker's and Fikret's son Hasan, Karl Pokorny, and Mahpeyker.

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Mediha, the Army Chief's Wife

Mediha was Enver's younger sister. She married General Kazim Orbay,

who was a staff officer under her brother, Enver Pasha, during World War
I, and Chief of Staff of first Afghanistan's army and later the Army of the
Turkish Republic. He served as the Chief of the General Staff of the
Turkish Army from 2 January 1944 and 23 July 1946, before he resigned.
Kazim Orbay retired from the army on 6 July 1950, but he entered politics,
was elected senator in 1961 and served as the president of the parliament
for a short period of 9 January 1961 to 26 October 1961.

Mediha and Kazim had a son, divorced, but then remarried in 1964 as
Kazim lay dying of stomach cancer.

Kazim's brother, of course, was Husein Rauf, the famous captain of the
cruiser Hamidie which won fame during the Balkan Wars for evading the
entire Greek navy and shelling Greek installations, and later the same
ambassador to Great Britain who introduced Ali Enver to Churchill.

GWS, 4/06 [rev. 4/08]

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 "The Enver Pasha Appreciation Page"

9/00 [Rev. 4/08] by G. Stefanovics Contact

Webmaster: [email protected]

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