ANTONIO ARANETA VS JUDGE RAFAEL DINGLASAN

Political Law – First Emergency Powers Cases

Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an
appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is
seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from
’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to
hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers
Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed
pursuant to it had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the
point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the
National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in
order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
RODRIGUEZ VS GELLA
Political Law – Second Emergency Powers Cases
Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating
the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
volcanic action and other calamities. These EO’s were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that
prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same
was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a
fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.

HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered
ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last
world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president
cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA
671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For
it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier
for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the
agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way
that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither
can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by Substitution
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the
House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in
that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR.
What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from
the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather
than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere
matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt
his over what has been done.
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
Political Law – Transfer of Funds
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then
Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section
provides that “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.” Demetria averred that this
is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to
be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act
may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one
department to another here.
TIO VS VIDEOGRAM
Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies

Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment
provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank
video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the
sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the
exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is
an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative power.
The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies
and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such
agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to
legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation. “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
valid objection can be made.” Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to
solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being
“subject to the direction and control of the Board.” That the grant of such authority might be the source
of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur,
the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ VS EDGARDO PARAS
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of
1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to
promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with
the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
INSULAR LUMBER VS COURT OF TAX APPEALS
Political Law – One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill
Insular Lumber (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC
purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In
1956, RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964 ILC filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5
years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue to
the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest
concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining
concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed,
only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the
refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILC’s right to claim the refund of a portion thereof,
particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed.
Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the
CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way. The title of RA 1435 is “An Act to Provide
Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund.” The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to
increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the
partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its
claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5
provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL.

HELD: The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law
is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to
specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of
the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might
completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law
or its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings
bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by
Congress which passed it.
LIDASAN VS COMELEC

Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan came to know later on
that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang,
also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for
voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for
being unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would
be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province –
Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill?

HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did
not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory
is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur;
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even
a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own
province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
ALALAYAN VS NAPOCOR
Political Law – Title Must Express One Subject
Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in
NAPOCOR that “in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder,” receiving at least
50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder “shall
not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month
operating expenses.” Also it could “renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of
electric power and energy,”. This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA
2641. Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by
NAPOCOR. They aver that the provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital
stock of NAPOCOR.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: No bill “which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in [its] title . . .” This provision is similar to those found in many American State
Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as well
as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular
matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative
measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being
a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to
is such a rider.
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be
deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the
title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating
to its subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a
statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state
the precise nature of the amendment. “Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.”
MANUEL CORDERO VS JUDGE CABATUANDO
Political Law – One Title, One Subject Rule – Tenancy Act
Cordero is the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Salazar who filed a case
against landlord Sta. Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a
motion to disqualify Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of RA 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by counsel of
tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the Dept of Labor. Judge
Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal RA
2263 AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES
was passed. This law, particularly Sec 19 & 20 thereof, amended the previous law and now allows trial
lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of creation of the Tenancy
Mediation Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment being the
done the issue has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando countered that the provision is not
embraced in the title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether or not to
allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants.

HELD: The SC ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The constitutional
requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject
which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid.
To declare sections 19 & 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of
representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the trial
attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of
Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263 would do harm to, and
would be nugatory of, the intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy
laws in the Department of Justice.
TATAD VS SECRETARY OF ENERGY
Political Law – One Title One Subject Rule – Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been
finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations
in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law
allows that “any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream
oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims that
section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates the one title one rule of Sec 26, Art 6 of the Constitution. Section 5
(b) provides:
“b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall
be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be
the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this
provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.”
The inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner
contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of
the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 not because it violated the one title one
subject rule but rather because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision
because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. The SC emphasized that the
provision of Sec 5 (b) of RA 8180 does not violate the one title one subject rule. The SC, as a policy, has
adopted a liberal construction of the one title – one subject rule. The SC also emphasized that the title
need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single
general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject. The SC held that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of
RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported
petroleum.
BENGZON VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Political law – Bill – Veto – Veto a Bill
Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen Pangasinan. Upon reaching 65 years
of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance to law. He later sought to claim gratuity pursuant
to Act 4051 “An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the
Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel
thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions
of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.” Sec 7 thereof
specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon but that provision has been
vetoed by the governor general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond the power of the gov-gen hence he
sought to file a petition to have the Sec of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity Law.

HELD: The governor – general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this is
also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the
veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided: “The Governor-General shall have the
power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item
or items to which he does not object.” The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold
that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative
purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS VALENCIA
Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item
Bolinao Electronics is co-owner an co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network Montserrat
Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the
Philippines. They were summoned by Valencia, then Sec of Communications, for operating even after
their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and
their continuing operation had caused damage to his department.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the
refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to
operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963
Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in
Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot
claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the
Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation
or item in the appropriation bill. This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed
by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
NEPTALI GONZALES VS MACARAIG
Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of
the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded
her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when
the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power
but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to
be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted
by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are
beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be
treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
BENGZON VS DRILON
Political Law – Veto Power of the President
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s
General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for
appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the
pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of
the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.

HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of
the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated
by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the
power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS ENRIQUEZ

235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development Fund”
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving
the General Appropriations Act of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said
that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would
be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this
petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to
items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting
that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by
revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor.
Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount
allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
“inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign
Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto
is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations.
The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this
Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said
item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the
addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the
budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in
a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated
in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is
allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed
under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically
authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to
the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Tañada
et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy
of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first
place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such
statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts
know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to
recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
ENRIQUE GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties,
taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5%
ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude
oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to
9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and
other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: ” All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.” He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority
to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive
Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming
they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
provides as follows: “(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.” There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress
to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix
“within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .”
PEPSI COLA VS THE CITY OF BUTUAN
Political Law – Uniformity in Taxation
In 1960, Ordinance 110 was passed in Butuan. It was later amended by Ordinance 122. This Ordinance
imposes a tax on any person, association, etc., of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles of Pepsi- Cola. Pepsi
operates within the Butuan and it paid under protest the amount of P4.926.63 from August 16 to
December 31, 1960 and the amount of P9,250.40 from January 1 to July 30, 1961. Pepsi filed a
complaint for the recovery of the total amount of P14,177.03 paid under protest and those that it may
later on pay until the termination of this case on the ground that Ordinance No. 110 as amended of the
City of Butuan is illegal, that the tax imposed is excessive and that it is unconstitutional. Pepsi averred it
is unconstitutional because it partakes of the nature of an import tax and it is highly unjust and
discriminatory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid.

HELD: The tax prescribed in sec 3 of Ordinance No. 110, as originally approved, was imposed upon
dealers “engaged in selling” soft drinks or carbonated drinks. Thus, it would seem that the intent was
then to levy a tax upon the sale of said merchandise. As amended by Ord No. 122, the tax is, however,
imposed only upon “any agent and/or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or
corporation engaged in selling . . . soft drinks or carbonated drinks.” As a consequence, merchants
engaged in the sale of soft drinks or carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax, unless they are agents
and/or consignees of another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged in business
outside the City. Besides, the tax would not be applicable to such agent and/or consignee, if less than
1,000 cases of soft drinks are consigned or shipped to him every month. When we consider, also, that
the tax “shall be based and computed from the cargo manifest or bill of lading . . . showing the number
of cases” — not sold — but “received” by the taxpayer, the intention to limit the application of the
ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated drinks brought into the City from outside thereof becomes
apparent. Viewed from this angle, the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond
defendant’s authority to impose by express provision of law. It is true that the uniformity essential to
the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or equality under all circumstances,
or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation. The classification made in the exercise of this
authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable and this requirement is not deemed satisfied
unless: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane
to the purpose of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present
conditions, but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the
classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class. These conditions are not fully
met by the ordinance in question. Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of
soft drinks or carbonated beverages, there is no reason why sales thereof by dealers other than agents
or consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan should be exempt from
the tax.
PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HERNANDO
Political Law – Exemption From Taxes – The Church
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge
Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there “is no
question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.” Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties
including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes.” “The proper remedy of the petitioner is appeal and
not this special civil action.’

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.

HELD: The Constitution provides that “charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” and
required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be
“exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption
from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed
against the taxpayer. In this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly
used for religious or charitable uses. Further, there is no merit in Abra’s contention that the validity of a
tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court.
APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF MT. PROVINCE VS TREASURER OF BAGUIO
Political Law – Exemption From Taxation – Assessment
In 1937, an ordinance (Ord. 137) was passed in the City of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to assess
properties of property owners within the defined city limits. Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province (APMP),
on the other hand, is a religious corporation duly established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to the
ordinance, it contributed a total amount of P1,019.37. It filed the said contribution in protest. APMP
later averred that it should be exempt from the said special contribution since as a religious institution,
it has a constitutionally guaranteed right not to be taxed including its properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes.

HELD: The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution. Based on Justice Cooley’s words: “While the word ‘tax’ in its broad meaning, includes both
general taxes and special assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an assessment
is a tax, yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is confined to local
impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements in its immediate vicinity
and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed. The differences between a special
assessment and a tax are that (1) a special assessment can be levied only on land; (2) a special
assessment cannot (at least in most states) be made a personal liability of the person assessed; (3) a
special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and (4) a special assessment is exceptional both as to
time and locality. The imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area, is a
tax and not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a street or
highway. A charge imposed only on property owners benefited is a special assessment rather than a tax
notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax.” In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption
because the assessment is not taxation per se but rather a system for the benefits of the inhabitants of
the city.
PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement” of “Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal,
assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for
private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said
Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and
approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns
those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if
the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the
said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private
property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for
the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were
to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
Political Law – Religious Freedom
The 33rd Int’l Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place sometime in
1936. In commemoration thereof, Ruiz the then Director of Posts initiated the production of stamps
which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually,
the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for
appropriation. Aglipay then appealed for the prohibition of the sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends
that the selling of stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Art 6 of
the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or
benefit of any church or denomination among others.

ISSUE: Is the sale of the stamps in support of a particular sect hence unconstitutional?

HELD: The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the
stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event.
Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. It merely said
that the director of posts may use such fund in a manner “as often as may be deemed advantageous to
the government”. It is duly noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as
elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to
establish an ideal government. Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of
profound reverence to religion.
MANUEL ALBA VS FRANCISCO PEREZ
Political Law – Appropriation
Dr. Perez was named Outstanding Health Worker in 1980. Being an awardee, he is entitled to have a
salary increase pursuant to Letter Of Iinstruction 562. The Ministry of Health submitted to the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be appropriated for the Perez’ salary. The
SP however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies to employees or officials of the
national government and Perez is a local government employee hence not covered. Upon appeal, the
Office of the Budget and Management determined that Perez is a national government employee hence
he is entitled to such increase. However, Alba – the City Health Officer – refused to recognize Perez’
right to such increase because he averred that the constitution provides that no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such
appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment
of the merit salary increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of
the Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per LOI.

HELD: Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of
the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Also their
positions are partially funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary
from the national funds and the other one-half from local funds. Others are wholly paid by either the
local or the national government. There is no basis in Alba’s allegations that they cannot be compelled
by mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the
Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Perez has been proven to be a national government
official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health
Ministry wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus
becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed
to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.
TERESITA FABIAN VS HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO & NESTOR AGUSTIN
Political Law – Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and
unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their
relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case
against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman – who inhibited himself –
later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the
decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides
that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO ET AL VS COMELEC
March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional
provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three
systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two
latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions
were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by former
Senator Arturo Tolentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution
and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
“Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . .
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is
obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot
operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly
stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress
for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled
that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution
which reads in part: