Carino - Monasterio Pe Vs Tong
Carino - Monasterio Pe Vs Tong
FACTS:
1. Jose Juan Tong (Tong) [through his representative Jose Ong (Ong)] filed an action for
ejectment against herein petitioners Anita Monasterio-Pe (Anita) and the spouses Romulo
Tan and Editha Pe-Tan (Spouses Tan).
2. It was alleged that Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161, together with the improvements
thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City; herein petitioners are
occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any contract of lease nor
are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere
tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that
respondents vacate the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter
they failed and refused to vacate the same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of
Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.
3. Herein petitioners alleged that Tong is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is
only a dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot
and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void; petitioners are the true and lawful owners
of the property in question and by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to
anybody.
4. There is a civil case which is being litigated in the CA regarding the ownership of the
subject property. The petitioners said that Tong should wait for the resolution of the said
action instead of filing the ejectment case.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Tong is the owner of the subject lots and is entitled to the possession thereof.
2. W/N Tong has no cause of action to recover physical possession of the subject properties
on the ground that the thing sold was never delivered to himm
HELD:
1. Yes. It can be inferred from the judgments of the SC in the two aforementioned cases that
Tong, as owner of the subject lots, is entitled to the possession thereof.
Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary incident of ownership.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are consequently barred from claiming that they have the
right to possess the disputed parcels of land, because their alleged right is predicated solely
on their claim of ownership, which is already effectively debunked by the decisions of this
Court affirming the validity of the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the subject
properties to respondent.
Tong alleged in his complaint that petitioners occupied the subject property by his mere
tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to
vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.
Tong sent petitioners a demand letter dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject
property, but petitioners did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Under Section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer
can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of
that period does the possession become unlawful. Respondent filed the ejectment case
against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was less than a year from December 1, 1999,
the date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the action was filed within the one-year
period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.
2. No. It has been established that petitioners validly executed a deed of sale covering the
subject parcels of land in favor of Tong after the latter paid the outstanding account of the
former with the Philippine Veterans Bank.
Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is
the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly
be inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that they
had no intention of delivering the subject lots to Tong when they executed the said deed of
sale. Hence, petitioners' execution of the deed of sale is tantamount to a delivery of the
subject lots to respondent. The fact that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed
properties does not prove that there was no delivery, because as found by the lower courts,
such possession is only by respondent's mere tolerance.