1013 2018 Judgement 11-Mar-2019
1013 2018 Judgement 11-Mar-2019
VERSUS
JUDGMENT
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
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16.1.2009, a formal contract was entered into between the appellant
follows:-
had filed a writ petition, being Civil Writ Petition No. 18917 of 2016,
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before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. This writ petition was
arbitration clause by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 4882 of 2017. The
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in the event that the award is in favour of the claimant, what can be
is clear that clause 25(viii) would apply to both the parties equally,
hereinbelow:
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covered by the scope of arbitration under this contract.
The pending arbitration proceedings shall not disentitle
the Engineer-in-charge to terminate the contract and to
make alternate arrangements for completion of the
works.”
“9. It is well settled now that the courts can scrutinise the
award of the contracts by the Government or its
agencies in exercise of their powers of judicial review to
prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, there are
inherent limitations in the exercise of the power of judicial
review in such matters. The point as to the extent of
judicial review permissible in contractual matters while
inviting bids by issuing tenders has been examined in
depth by this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India
[(1994) 6 SCC 651]. After examining the entire case-law
the following principles have been deduced:
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“94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but
merely reviews the manner in which the decision
was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to
correct the administrative decision. If a review of
the administrative decision is permitted it will be
substituting its own decision, without the
necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be
open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to
tender is in the realm of contract. Normally
speaking, the decision to accept the tender or
award the contract is reached by process of
negotiations through several tiers. More often
than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by
experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of
contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is
a necessary concomitant for an administrative
body functioning in an administrative sphere or
quasi-administrative sphere. However, the
decision must not only be tested by the
application of Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness (including its other facts pointed
out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not
affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy
administrative burden on the administration and
lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.””
(emphasis in original)
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terms of the tender. It must have reasonable play in its
joints as a necessary concomitant for an administrative
body in an administrative sphere. The courts would
interfere with the administrative policy decision only if it is
arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias. It
is entitled to pragmatic adjustments which may be called
for by the particular circumstances. The courts cannot
strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the
Government because it feels that some other terms in
the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. The
courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary,
discriminatory or mala fide.”
Adani Exports Ltd., (2005) 4 SCC 435, where this Court held:
“10. The principle is, therefore, well settled that the terms
of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny
and the courts cannot whittle down the terms of the
tender as they are in the realm of contract unless they
are wholly arbitrary, discriminatory or actuated by malice.
This being the position of law, settled by a catena of
decisions of this Court, it is rather surprising that the
learned Single Judge passed an interim direction on the
very first day of admission hearing of the writ petition and
allowed the appellants to deposit the earnest money by
furnishing a bank guarantee or a bankers' cheque till
three days after the actual date of opening of the tender.
The order of the learned Single Judge being wholly
illegal, was, therefore, rightly set aside by the Division
Bench.”
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adhesion, i.e., contracts in which there is unequal bargaining power,
between private persons and the State are liable to be set aside on
the ground that they are unconscionable, does not apply where both
must fail.
follows:-
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Amount of claim Rate of
security deposit
1For claims below Rs 2% of amount
. 10,000 claimed
2For claims of Rs 10,000 5% of amount
. and above and below Rs claimed
1,00,000 and
3For claims of Rs 1,00,000 7% of amount
. and above claimed.”
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14. It will be noticed that in this judgment there was no plea that
arbitrary. The only pleas taken were that the ratio of Central Inland
Water Transport Corpn. (supra) would apply and that there should
which pleas were turned down by this court. Also, the security
arbitrator against the claimant party, and the balance remaining after
have seen, makes it clear that in all cases the deposit is to be 10%
balance being forfeited and paid to the other party, even though that
other party may have lost the case. This being so, this judgment is
wholly distinguishable and does not apply at all to the facts of the
present case.
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15. In ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee
Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553, this Court has held that
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16. Thus, it must be seen as to whether the aforesaid clause
17. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that
Shri Lal Narain Sinha was recorded thus (at page 661):-
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material for comparison, the plea of discrimination must
fail. As a corollary, it was urged that in the absence of
material for comparative evaluation not only the charge
of discrimination cannot be sustained but the executive
action cannot be struck down on the ground that the
action is per se arbitrary.”
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20. The first important thing to notice is that the 10% “deposit-at-
held:
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on evasion instead of abidance. It is the duty of every
court to firmly deal with such situations. The imposition of
exemplary costs is a necessary instrument which has to
be deployed to weed out, as well as to prevent the filing
of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts can set
apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the
concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition
of real time costs is also necessary to ensure that access
to courts is available to citizens with genuine grievances.
Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes
simply by the weight of undeserving cases which flood
the system. Such a situation cannot be allowed to come
to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of discretion but
a duty and obligation cast upon all courts to ensure that
the legal system is not exploited by those who use the
forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend
all courts to deal with frivolous filings in the same
manner.”
(Emphasis supplied)
costs.
(I) (P) Ltd. v. Ashok Ramnik Lal Tolat, (2015) 1 SCC 429, that
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“16. We proceed to deal with the issue of correctness of
finding recorded by the National Commission for
awarding punitive damages. Before doing so, we may
notice that the respondent complainant appearing in
person, in his written submissions has raised various
questions, including the question that the appellant
should be asked to account for the proceeds of the
vehicles sold by it. Admittedly, the vehicle in question has
been ordered to be handed back to the appellant against
which the respondent complainant has no claim. Thus,
the plea raised is without any merit. The other issue
raised for further punitive damages of Rs. 100 crores and
also damages for dragging him in this Court, merits no
consideration being beyond the claim of the complainant
in the complaint filed by him. Moreover, no litigant can be
punished by way of punitive damages for merely
approaching this Court, unless its case is found to be
frivolous.”
it is first found that the litigation that has been embarked upon is
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clause would be arbitrary in the sense of being something which
frivolous, as is obvious from the fact that where three arbitrators are
only one tenth of the deposit made will be liable to be returned to the
despite the fact that the aforesaid party has an award against it.
This would render the entire clause wholly arbitrary, being not only
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excessive or disproportionate but leading to the wholly unjust result
of a huge claim would be even greater than court fees that may be
charged for filing a suit in a civil court. This Court in State of J&K v.
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63,61,000. He gets away with Rs. 20,08,000 with interest
at the rate of 10% per annum and penal interest at the
rate of 18% per annum. Such type of arbitration
becomes subject of witticism and do not help the
institution of arbitration. Rather it brings a bad name to
the arbitration process as a whole. When claims are
inflated out of all proportions not only that heavy cost
should be awarded to the other party but the party
making such inflated claims should be deprived of the
cost. We, therefore, set aside the award of cost of Rs.
7500 given in favour of the contractor and against the
State of Jammu and Kashmir.”
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Several judgments of this Court have also reiterated that the
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prescribed in the arbitration agreement which the
parties have agreed to, that has to be generally
resorted to.””
(Emphasis in original)
Court system, and would render the arbitral process ineffective and
expensive.
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28. For all these reasons, we strike down clause 25(viii) of the
notice inviting tender. This clause being severable from the rest of
clause 25 will not affect the remaining parts of clause 25. The
judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal allowed.
………..……………… J.
(R. F. Nariman)
…..…………………… J.
(Vineet Saran)
New Delhi.
March 11, 2019.
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