742 OCTOBER TERM, 1969

Syllabus 397 U. S.

BRADY v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 270. Argued November 18, 1969-Decided May 4, 1970

Petitioner was indicted in 1959 for kidnaping and not liberating the
vict'mn unharmed in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1201 (a), which
imposed a maximum penalty of death if the jury's verdict so
recommended. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had
confessed, would plead guilty and testify against him, petitioner
changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. The trial judge
accepted the plea after twice questioning petitioner (who was
represented throughout by competent counsel) as to the volun-
tariness of his plea, and imposed sentence. In 1967, petitioner
sought post-conviction relief, in part on the ground that § 1201 (a)
operated to coerce his plea. The District Court, after hearing,
denied relief, concluding that petitioner's plea was voluntary and
had been induced, not by that statute, but by the development
concerning his confederate. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Petitioner claims that United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570
(1968), requires reversal of that holding. Held: On the record
in this case there is no basis for disturbing the judgment of the
courts below that petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary. Pp.
745-758.
(a) Though United States v. Jackson, supra, prohibits imposi-
tion of the death penalty under § 1201 (a), it does not hold that
all guilty pleas encouraged by the fear of possible death are
involuntary, nor does it invalidate such pleas whether involuntary
or not. Pp. 745-748.
(b) A plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to
avoid the possibility of the death penalty, and here petitioner's
plea of guilty met the standard of voluntariness as it was made
"by one fully aware of the direct conseouences" of that plea.
Pp. 749-755.
(c) Petitioner's plea, made after advice by competent counsel,
was intelligently made, and the fact that petitioner did not antici-
pate United States v. Jackson, supra, does not impugn the truth
or reliability of that plea. Pp. 756-758.
404 F. 2d 601, affirmed.
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES 743

742 Opinion of the Court

Peter J. Adang, by appointment of the Court, 396

U. S.809, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Joseph J. Connolly argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Jerome M.
Feit, and Marshall Tamor Golding.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the

Court.
In 1959, petitioner was charged with kidnaping in
violation of 18 U. S. C: § 1201 (a).' Since the indict-
ment charged that the victim of the kidnaping was not
liberated unharmed, petitioner faced a maximum penalty
of death if the verdict of the jury should so recommend.
Petitioner, represented by competent counsel throughout,
first elected to plead not guilty. Apparently because
the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a
jury, petitioner made no serious attempt to reduce the
possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial.
Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed
to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available
to testify against him, petitioner changed his plea to
guilty. His plea was accepted after the trial judge twice
questioned him as to the voluntariness of his plea.

"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign com-

merce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, in-
veigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away and held
for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor,
by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped
person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the
jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of
years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed."
2 Eight days after petitioner pleaded guilty, he was brought before

the court for sentencing. At that time, the court questioned peti-
tioner for a second time about the voluntariness of his plea:
"THE COURT: ...Having read the presentence report and the
statement you made to the probation officer, I want to be certain
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969
Opinion of the Court 397 U. S.

Petitioner was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment,

later reduced to 30.
In 1967, petitioner sought relief under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not volun-
tarily given because § 1201 (a) operated to coerce his
plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure
upon him, and because his plea was induced by represen-
tations with respect to reduction of sentence and clem-
ency. It was also alleged that the trial judge had not
fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.'

that you know what you are doing and you did know when you
entered a plea of guilty the other day. Do you want to let that
plea of guilty stand, or do you want to withdraw it and plead not
guilty?
"DEFENDANT BRADY: I want to let that plea stand, sir.
"THE COURT: You understand that in doing that you are admit-
ting and confessing the truth of the charge contained in the indict-
ment and that you enter a plea of guilty voluntarily, without
persuasion, coercion of any'kind? Is that right?
"DEFENDANT BRADY: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: And you do do that?
"DEFENDANT BRADY: Yes, I do.
"THE COURT: You plead guilty to the charge?
"DEFENDANT BRADY: Yes, I do." App. 29-30.
1 When petitioner pleaded guilty, Rule 11 read as follows:
"A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent
of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty."
Rule 11 was amended in 1966 and now reads as follows:
"A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent
of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo
contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES

742 Opinion of the Court

After a hearing, the District Court for the District

of New Mexico denied relief. According to the District
Court's findings, petitioner's counsel did not put imper-
missible pressure on petitioner to plead guilty and no
representations were made with respect to a reduced
sentence or clemency. The court held that § 1201 (a)
was constitutional and found that petitioner decided to
plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was
going to plead guilty: petitioner pleaded guilty "by
reason of other matters and not by reason of the statute"
or because of any acts of the trial judge. The court
concluded that "the plea was voluntarily and knowingly
made."
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
determining that the District Court's findings were sup-
ported by substantial evidence and specifically approving
the finding that petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary.
404 F. 2d 601 (1968). We granted certiorari, 395 U. S.
976 (1969), to consider the claim that the Court of
Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result
on the authority of this Court's decision in United States
v. Jackson, 390 U. S.570 (1968). We affirm.

In United States v. Jackson, supra, the defendants

were indicted under § 1201 (a). The District Court dis-
missed the § 1201 (a) count of the indictment, -holding
a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea
of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judg-
ment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a
factual basis for the plea."
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459 (1969), we held
that a failure to comply with Rule 11 required that a defendant
who had pleaded guilty be allowed to plead anew. In JIalliday v.
United States, 394 U. S. 831 (1969), we held that the McCarthy
rule should apply only in cases where the guilty plea was accepted
after April 2, 1969, the date of the McCarthy decision.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969
Opinion of the Court 397 U. S.

the statute unconstitutional because it permitted imposi-

tion of the death sentence only upon a jury's recommen-
dation and thereby made the risk of death the price
of a jury trial. This Court held the statute valid, except
for the death penalty provision; with respect to the
latter, the Court agreed with the trial court "that
the death penalty provision . . . imposes an impermis-
sible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional
right . . . ." 390 U. S., at 572. The problem was to
determine "whether the Constitution permits the estab-
lishment of such a death penalty, applicable only to
those defendants who assert the right to contest their
guilt before a jury." 390 U. S., at 581. The inevitable
effect of the provision was said to be to discourage
assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead
guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment
right to demand a jury trial. Because the legitimate
goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which a
jury recommends it could be achieved without penalizing
those defendants who plead not guilty and elect a jury
trial, the death penalty provision "needlessly penalize[d]
the assertion of a constitutional right," 390 U. S., at 583,
and was therefore unconstitutional.
Since the "inevitable effect" of the death penalty pro-
vision of § 1201 (a) was said by the Court to be the
needless encouragement of pleas of guilty and waivers of
jury trial, Brady contends that Jackson requires the
invalidation of every plea of guilty entered under that
section, at least when the fear of death is shown to have
been a factor in the plea. Petitioner, however, has read
far too much into the Jackson opinion.
The Court made it clear in Jackson that it was not
holding § 1201 (a) inherently coercive of guilty pleas:
"the fact that the Federal Kidnaping Act tends to
discourage defendants from insisting upon their inno-
cence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES
742 Opinion of the Court

every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge

under the Act does so involuntarily." 390 U. S., at 583.
Cited in support- of this statement, 390 U. S., at 583
n. 25, was Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581 (D. C.
N. J. 1967), where a plea of guilty (non vult) under
a similar statute was sustained as voluntary in spite of
the fact, as found by the District Court, that the defend-
ant was greatly upset by the possibility of receiving the
death penalty.
Moreover, the Court in Jackson rejected a suggestion
that the death penalty provision of § 1201 (a) be saved
by prohibiting in capital kidnaping cases all guilty pleas
and jury waivers, "however clear [the defendants'] guilt
and however strong their desire to acknowledge it in order
to spare themselves and their families the spectacle and
expense of protracted courtroom proceedings." "[T]hat
jury waivers and guilty pleas may occasionally be re-
jected" was no ground for automatically rejecting all
guilty pleas under the statute, for such a rule "would
rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility." 390
U. S., at 584.
Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all
pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death
sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged
pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not. Jackson
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under
§ 1201 (a), but that decision neither fashioned a new
standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas nor
mandated a new application of the test theretofore
fashioned by courts and since reiterated that guilty
pleas are valid if both "voluntary" and "intelligent."
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969).'
4The requirement that a plea of guilty must be intelligent and
voluntary to be valid has long been recognized. See nn. 5 and 6,
infra. The new element added in Boykin was the requirement tlat
the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969

Opinion of the Court 397 U. S.

That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be

accepted only with care and discernment has long been
recognized. Central to the plea and the foundation
for entering judgment against the defendant is the
defendant's admission in open court that he committed
the acts charged in the indictment. He thus stands as
a witness against himself and he is shielded by the
Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so-hence
the minimum requirement that his plea be the volun-
tary expression of his own choice.' But the plea is
more than an admission of past conduct; it is the de-
fendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be
entered without a trial-a waiver of his right to trial
before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights
not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelli-
gent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences." On neither
score was Brady's plea of guilty invalid.

guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily. This Court

has not yet passed on the question of the retroactivity of this new
requirement.
5 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, 493 (1962); Waley
v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312
U. S. 275, 286 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940);
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223 (1927).
"See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 (1966); Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U. S.
276, 312 (1930).
Since an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of plead-
ing guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an
attorney, this Court. has scrutinized with special care pleas of guilty
entered by defendants without the assistance of counsel and without
a valid waiver of the right to counsel. See Pennsylvania ex rel.
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116 (1956); Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U. S. 708 and 727 (1948) (opinions of BLACK and Frankfurter,
MT..); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945). Since Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), it has been clear that a guilty
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES

742 Opinion of the Court

II
The trial judge in 1959 found the plea voluntary
before accepting it; the District Court in 1968, after
an evidentiary hearing, found that the plea was volun-
tarily made; the Court of Appeals specifically approved
the finding of voluntariness. We see no reason on this
record to disturb the judgment of those courts. Peti-
tioner, advised by competent counsel, tendered his plea
after his codefendant, who had already given a confes-
sion, determined to plead guilty and became available
to testify against petitioner. It was this development
that the District Court found to have triggered Brady's
guilty plea.
The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined
only by considering all of the relevant circumstances
surrounding it. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S.
503, 513 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556, 558
(1954). One of these circumstances was the possibility
of a heavier sentence following a guilty verdict after a
trial. It may be that Brady, faced with a strohg case
against him and recognizing that his chances for acquit-
tal were slight, preferred to plead guilty and thus limit
the penalty to life imprisonment rather than to elect
a jury trial which could result in a death penalty.! But

plea to a felony charge entered without counsel and without a waiver

of counsel is invalid. See White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963);
Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U. S. 5 (1968).
The importance of assuring that a defendant does not plead guilty
except with a full understanding of the charges against him and
the possible consequences of his plea was at the heart of our recent
decisions in McCarthy v. United States, supra, and Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969). See nn. 3 and 4, supra.
7 Such a possibility seems to have been rejected by the District
Court in the § 2255 proceedings. That court found that "the plea
of guilty was made by the petitioner by reason of.,other matters
and not by reason of the statute . .. ."
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969

Opinion of the Court 397 U. S.

even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded

guilty except for the death penalty provision of
§ 1201(a), this assumption merely identifies the penalty
provision as a "but for" cause of his plea. That the
statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily
prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an in-
voluntary act.
The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty
at every important step in the criminal 'process. For
some people, their breach of a State's law is alone suffi-
cient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting
punishment. For others, apprehension and charge, both
threatening acts by the Government, jar them into ad-
mitting their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indict-
ment accumulation of evidence may convince the
defendant and his counsel that a trial is not worth
the agony and expense to the defendant and his family.
All these pleas of guilty are valid in spite of the State's
responsibility for some of the factors motivating the
pleas; the pleas are no more improperly compelled
than is the decision by a defendant at the close of the
State's evidence at trial that he must take the stand
or face certain conviction.
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce
a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by
mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.
But nothing of the sort is claimed in this case; nor is
there evidence that Brady was so gripped by fear of
the death penalty or hope of leniency that he did not
or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh
the advantages of going to trial against the advantages
of pleading guilty. Brady's claim is of a different sort:
that it violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or
encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or promise of
leniency and that a guilty plea is coerced and invalid if
influenced by the fear of a possibly higher penalty for
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES

742 Opinion of the Court

the crime charged if a conviction is obtained after the

State is put to its proof.
Insofar as the voluntariness of his plea is concerned,
there is little to differentiate Brady from (1) the de-
fendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge and jury have
the same range of sentencing power, who pleads guilty
because his lawyer advises him that the judge will very
probably be more lenient than the jury; (2) the de-
fendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge alone has
sentencing power, who is advised by counsel that the
judge is normally more lenient with defendants who
plead guilty than with those who go to trial; (3) the de-
fendant who is permitted by prosecutor and judge to
plead guilty to a lesser offense included in the offense
charged; and (4) the defendant who pleads guilty to cer-
tain counts with the understanding that other charges
will be dropped. In each of these situations,' as in
Brady's case, the defendant might never plead guilty
absent the possibility or certainty that the plea will result
in a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be im-
posed after a trial and a verdict of guilty., We decline to
hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid
under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the
defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability
of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of pos-
sibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a
higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
The issue we deal with is inherent in the criminal
law and its administration because guilty pleas are not

8 We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor

or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing
powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty.
In Brady's case there is no claim that the prosecutor "threatened
prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the
trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted
after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969

Opinion of the Court 397 U. S.

constitutionally forbidden, because the criminal law

characteristically extends to judge or jury a range of
choice in setting the sentence in individual cases, and
because both the State and the defendant often find it
advantageous to preclude the possibility of the maximum
penalty authorized by law. For a defendant who sees
slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of plead-
ing guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvi-
ous-his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes
can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a
trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advan-
tages--the more promptly imposed punishment after an
admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objec-
tives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial,
scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved
for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the
defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt
that the State can sustain its burden of proof.' It is this
mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact
that at present well over three-fourths of the criminal
convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty," a
great many of them no doubt motivated at least in part
by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be
imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial to
judge or jury.
Of course, that the prevalence of guilty pleas is ex-
plainable does not necessarily validate those pleas or
9 For a more elaborate discussion of the factors that may justify
a reduction in penalty upon a plea of guilty, see American Bar
Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of
Guilty § 1.8 and commentary, pp. 37-52 (Approved Draft 1968).
10 It has been estimated that about 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all
criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty; between 70% and 85%
of all felony convictions are estimated to be by guilty plea. D. New-
man, Conviction, The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without
Trial 3 and n. 1 (1966).
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES

742 Opinion of the Court

the system which produces them. But we cannot hold

that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a
benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substan-
tial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his
plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and
to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind
that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a
shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.
A contrary holding would require the States and Fed-
eral Government to forbid guilty pleas altogether, to
provide a single invariable penalty for each crime defined
by the statutes, or to place the sentencing function in
a separate authority having no knowledge of the manner
in which the conviction in each case was obtained. In
any event, it would be necessary to forbid prosecutors
and judges to accept guilty pleas to selected counts, to
lesser included offenses, or to reduced charges. The Fifth
Amendment does not reach so far.
Bram v. United States, 168 U.'S. 532 (1897), held that
the admissibility of a confession- depended upon whether
it was compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment. To be admissible, a confession must be "'free
and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any
sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct
or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exer-
tion of any improper influence.'" 168 U. S., at 542-
543. More recently, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1
(1964), carried forward the Bram definition of compul-
sion in the course of holding applicable to the States the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. 1

11 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 7 (1964). See also Haynes v.

Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U. S. 528 (1963); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S.613, 622-623
(1896).
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969
Opinion of the Court 397 U. S.

Brain is not inconsistent with our holding that

Brady's plea was not compelled even though the law
promised him a lesser maximum penalty if he did
not go to trial. Brain dealt with a confession given by
a defendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by
counsel. In such circumstances, even a mild promise
of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession,
not because the promise was an illegal act as such, but
because defendants at such times are too sensitive to
inducement and the possible impact on them too great
to ignore and too difficult to assess. But Bram and its
progeny did not hold that the possibly coercive impact
of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by the
presence and advice of counsel, any more than Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), held that the possibly
coercive atmosphere of the police station could not be
counteracted by the presence of counsel or other
safeguards. 12
Brady's situation bears no resemblance to Brain's.
Brady first pleaded not guilty; prior to changing his plea
to guilty he was subjected to no threats or promises in
face-to-face encounters with the authorities. He had
competent counsel and full opportunity to assess the
advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with
those attending a plea of guilty; there was no hazard
of an impulsive and improvident response to a seeming
but unreal advantage. His plea of guilty was entered
in open court and before a judge obviously sensitive to
12 "The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would
be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process
of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege
[against compelled self-incrimination]. His presence would insure
that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are
not the product of compulsion." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.
436, 466 (1966).
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES
742 Opinion of the Court

the requirements of the law with respect to guilty pleas.

Brady's plea, unlike Bram's confession, was voluntary.
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas
must be essentially that defined by Judge Tuttle of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
"'[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of
the direct consequences, including the actual value
of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue im-
proper harassment), misrepresentation (including
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by
promises that are by their nature improper as having
no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business
(e. g. bribes).' 242 F. 2d at page 115." "
Under this standard, a plea of guilty is not invalid merely
because entered to avoid the possibility of a death
penalty.'

13 Shelton v. United States, 246 F. .2d 571, 572 n. 2 (C. A. 5th

Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on confession of error on other grounds,
356 U. S. 26 (1958).
14 Our conclusion in this regard seems to coincide with the conclu-
sions of most of the lower federal courts that have considered
whether a guilty plea to avoid a possible death penalty is involun-
tary. See United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F. 2d 457
(C. A. 2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Thomas, 415 F. 2d 1216
(C. A. 9th Cir. 1969); Pindell v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 751
(D. C. Conn. 1969); McFarland v. United States, 284 F. Supp.
969 (D. C. Md. 1968), aff'd, No. 13,146 (C. A. 4th Cir., May 1,
1969), cert. denied, post, p. 1077; Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp.
581 (D. C. N. J. 1967); Gilmore v. California, 364 F. 2d 916 (C. A.
9th Cir. 1966); Busby v. Holman, 356 F. 2d 75 (C. A. 5th Cir.
1966); Cooper v. Holman, 356 F. 2d 82 (C. A. 5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U. S. 855 (1966); Godlock v. Ross, 259 F. Supp. 659
(D. C. E. D. N. C. 1966); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Fay,
348 F. 2d 705 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 997
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969

Opinion of the Court 397 U. S.

III

The record before us also supports the conclusion that

Brady's plea was intelligently made. He was advised by
competent counsel, he was made aware of the nature of
the charge against him, and there was nothing to indicate
that he was incompetent or otherwise not in control of
his mental faculties; once his confederate had pleaded
guilty and became available to testify, he chose to plead
guilty, perhaps to ensure that he would face no more
than life imprisonment or a term of years. Brady was
aware of precisely what he was doing when he admitted
that he had kidnaped the victim and had not released her
unharmed.
It is true that Brady's counsel advised him that
§ 1201 (a) empowered the jury to impose the death
penalty and that nine years later in United States v.
Jackson, supra, the Court held that the jury had no such
power as long as the judge could impose only a lesser
penalty if trial was to the court or there was a plea of
guilty. But these facts do not require us to set aside
Brady's conviction.
Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced
by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case
against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing
leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.
Considerations like these frequently present imponder-
able questions for which there are no certain answers;
judgments may be made that in the light of later
events seem improvident, although they were perfectly
(1966); Overman v. United States, 281 F. 2d 497 (C. A. 6th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 993 (1962); Martin v. United States,
256 F. 2d 345 (C. A. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U. S. 921 (1958).
But see Shaw v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 824 (D. C. S. D. Ga.
1969); Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F. 2d 340 (C. A. 4th Cir.
1968), prob. juris. noted, 394 U. S. 956 (1969), restored to calendar
for reargument, post, p. 1060.
 BRADY v. UNITED STATES

742 Opinion of the Court

sensible at the time. The rule that a plea must be intel-

ligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be
vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not cor-
rectly assess every relevant factor entering into his deci-
sion. A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea
merely because he discovers long after the plea has been
accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of
the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alterna-
tive courses of action. More particularly, absent misrep-
resentation or other impermissible conduct by state
agents, cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708 (1948), a
voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of
the then applicable law does not become vulnerable be-
-cause later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested
on a faulty premise. A plea of guilty triggered by the
expectations of a competently counseled defendant that
the State will have a strong case against him is not
subject to later attack because the defendant's lawyer
correctly advised him with respect to the then existing
law as to possible penalties but later pronouncements
of the courts, as in this case, hold that the maximum
penalty for the crime in question was less than was
reasonably assumed at the time the plea was entered.
The fact that Brady did not anticipate United States
v. Jackson, supra, does not impugn the truth or re-
liability of his plea. We find no requirement in the
Constitution that a defendant must be permitted to
disown his solemn admissions in open court that he
committed the act with which he is charged simply
because it later develops that the State would have had
a weaker case than the defendant had thought or that
the maximum penalty then assumed applicable has been
held inapplicable in subsequent judicial decisions.
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold
no hazards for the innocent or that the methods of taking
guilty pleas presently employed in this country are
 OCTOBER TERM, 1969

Opinion of the Court 397 U.S.

necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction

is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to
the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against
unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether
conviction is by plea or by trial. We would have serious
doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty
pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the
likelihood that defendants, advised by competent coun-
sel, would falsely condemn themselves.. But our view
is to the contrary and is based on our expectations that
courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are
voluntarily and intelligently made by competent de-
fendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there
is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the
defendants' admissions that they committed the crimes
with which they are charged. In the case before us,
nothing in the record impeaches Brady's plea or suggests
that his admissions in open court were anything but the
truth.
Although Brady's plea of guilty may well have been
motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death
penalty, we are convinced that his plea was voluntarily
and intelligently made and we have no reason to doubt
that his solemn admission of guilt was truthful.
Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, while adhering to his belief that

United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, was wrongly
decided, concurs in the judgment and in substantially
all of the opinion in this case.

[For opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in

the result, see post, p. 799.]