Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Defendant-Appellant C. Lozano Cecilo I. Lim Montinola, Montinola & Hontiveros
Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Defendant-Appellant C. Lozano Cecilo I. Lim Montinola, Montinola & Hontiveros
SYLLABUS
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ , J : p
In the year 1903, Balbino Dequilla, the herein defendant, and Perpetua Bearneza
formed a partnership for the purpose of exploiting a sh pond situated in the barrio of
Talisay, municipality of Barotac Nuevo, Province of Iloilo, Perpetua obligating herself to
contribute to the payment of the expenses of the business, which obligation she made
good, and both agreeing to divide the pro ts between themselves, which they had been
doing until the death of the said Perpetua in the year 1912.
The deceased left a will in one of the clauses of which she appointed Domingo
Bearneza, the herein plaintiff, as her heir to succeed to all her rights and interests in the
fish pond in question.
Demand having been made upon Balbino Dequilla by Domingo Bearneza for the
delivery of the part of the sh pond belonging to his decedent, Perpetua, and delivery
having been refused, Domingo Bearneza brought this action to recover said part of the
sh pond and one-half of the pro ts received by the defendant from the sh pond from
the year 1913-1919, as damages (the amended complaint was led on April 12, 1920),
amounting, according to plaintiff, to the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred pesos
(P13,100).
In his answer, the defendant denies generally and speci cally the allegations of
the complaint, and alleges, as special defense, that "the formation of the supposed
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant for the exploitation of the aforesaid
sh pond was not carried into effect, on account of the plaintiff having refused to
defray the expenses of reconstruction and exploitation of said sh pond." As another
special defense, the defendant alleges "that in the event that the court should hold the
plaintiff to be entitled to the undivided one-half of the sh pond, claimed in the
complaint, the plaintiff's action has prescribed, the time for bringing the same having
elapsed."
Proceedings having been held as usual, the court below rendered judgment,
declaring the plaintiff owner of one-half of the sh pond, which composed of the
portions known as "Alimango" and "Dalusan," but without awarding him any of the
damages claimed by him, the same not having been proven, in the opinion of the court,
and ordering the defendant to pay the costs.
From this judgment the defendant appeals, making various assignments of error.
The plaintiff did not appeal from that part of the judgment denying his claim for
damages; hence the only question we are called upon to decide is whether or not the
plaintiff has any right to maintain an action for the recovery of one-half of the said sh
pond.
The partnership formed by Perpetua Bearneza and Balbino Dequilla, as to the
existence of which the proof contained in the record is conclusive and there is no
dispute, was of a civil nature. It was particular partnership, as de ned in article 1678 of
the Civil Code, it having had for its subject-matter a speci ed thing, to wit, the
exploitation of the aforementioned sh pond. Although, as the trial court says in its
decision, the defendant, in his letters to Perpetua or her husband, makes reference to
the sh pond, calling it "our," or "your sh pond," this reference cannot be held to include
the land on which the said sh pond, was built. It has not been proven that Perpetua
Bearneza participated in the ownership of said land, and Exhibits 2 and 3 of the
defendant show that he has been paying, as exclusive owner of the sh pond, the land
tax thereon, although in Exhibit X he says that the said land belongs to the State. The
conclusion, therefore, from the evidence is that the land on which the sh pond was
constructed did not constitute a part of the subject-matter of the aforesaid
partnership.
Now, this partnership not having been organized in the form of a mercantile
partnership, and, therefore, the provisions of the Code of Commerce not being
applicable thereto (article 1670 of the Civil Code), it was dissolved by the death of
Perpetua Bearneza, and falls under the provisions of article 1700, subsection 3, of the
same Code, and not under the exception established in the last paragraph of said
article 1700 of the Civil Code.
Neither can it be maintained that the partnership continued to exist after the
death of Perpetua, inasmuch as it does not appear that any stipulation to that effect
has ever been made by her and the defendant, pursuant to the provisions of article
1704 of the Code last cited.
The partnership having been dissolved by the death of Perpetua Bearneza, its
subsequent legal status was that of a partnership in liquidation, and the only rights
inherited by her testamentary heir, the herein plaintiff, were those resulting from the
said liquidation in favor of the deceased partner, and nothing more. Before this
liquidation is made, which up to the present has not been effected, it is impossible to
determine what rights or interests, if any, the deceased had, the partnership bond
having been dissolved.
There is no su cient ground for that a community of property existed between
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
plaintiff and the defendant, it not being known whether the deceased still had any
interest in the partnership property which could have been transmitted by will to the
plaintiff. There being no community of property, article 395 of the Civil Code cited by
the plaintiff in support of his contention can have no application to the case at bar.
Neither can it be said that the partnership continued between the plaintiff and the
defendant. It is true that the latter's act in requiring the heirs of Perpetua to contribute
to the payment of the expenses of exploitation of the aforesaid shing industry was an
attempt to continue the partnership, but it is also true that neither the said heirs
collectively, nor the plaintiff individually, took any action in response to that
requirement, nor new contract of partnership existed.
We find that the plaintiff has not sufficiently shown his right of action.
The judgment appealed from is modi ed, the same being a rmed insofar as it
denies the plaintiff's claim for damages, and reversed insofar as it declares the said
plaintiff owner of one-half of the fish pond, "Alimango" and "Dalusan," here in dispute.
No special finding as to costs is made. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostand, and Johns, JJ., concur.