US V Ah Chong (Mistake of Fact)

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
“Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the

person who caused injury to another. He is not, however, criminally
liable, because he did not act with criminal intent.
An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal
intent which arises upon the commission of a felonious act.
Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:

1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts
been as the accused believed them to be.
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act

should be lawful.
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on

the part of the accused.”
FCATS:
- Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and
at the same place Pascual Gualberto, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
- "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and
in August, 1908, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the
two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which
opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had
with the other part of the house.
- The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
- On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room.
- He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
- Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you."
- At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed
against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of
after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening
of the door against which it rested.
- Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
- There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.
- Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition.
- Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the
following day.
- At the the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he
struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-
defense.
ISSUE:
- W/N the accused can be charged of simple homicide.
SC RULING:
- Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant
believed him to be.
- But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
- The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake
or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
- Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows
the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor
from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part.
- There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence
of wickedness, without which it can not be.
- The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has
supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man
guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
differs from civil.
- A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced
open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of
his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good
faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in
the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened
his person and his property and the property under his charge.
- the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

US V Ah Chong (Mistake of Fact)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

US V Ah Chong (Mistake of Fact)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

“Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the

Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:

2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act

3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on

- W/N the accused can be charged of simple homicide.

You might also like