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ISL Handout
ISL Handout
PENALTY
-suffering inflicted by the State for the transgression of a law
Philosophical Theories
Important Terms
b. Period and Degree -Period refers to each of the three equal parts
of a divisible penalty (one third portion of a divisible penalty),
while, Degree refers to the diverse penalties mentioned
by name in the Revised Penal Code.
Article 71
1. Death Indivisible
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correccional Divisible
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
Article 70
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correccional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Arresto menor
8. Destierro
9. Public censure
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POLICY:
-If the crime is punished by the RPC, the Court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of RPC, and the minimum
term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
1. Death 1. Treason
1. Habitual delinquent
2. Life imprisonment 2. Conspiracy or proposal
to commit treason 2. Persons who escaped from
3. Reclusion perpetua confinement or evaded
3. Misprision of treason sentence
4. Destierro
4. Rebellion 3. Persons granted with
5. Suspension conditional pardon and violated
5. Sedition its terms
Related Jurisprudence
a. Qualified Theft
1. Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Qualified
Theft is two degrees higher than that specified in Article 309.
Paragraph 1 of Article 309 provides that if the value of the thing stolen is
more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall be
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. In this case, the amount
stolen was P15,000.00. Two degrees higher than prision mayor minimum and
medium is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods.
Accordingly, the prescribed penalty under Article 309 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Considering,
however, that the theft is qualified, the prescribed penalty shall be increased by
two degrees, that is, to prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Taking into
account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken from
anywhere within the range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
and four (4) months of arresto mayor, which is the penalty next lower than the
prescribed penalty.
“In the determination of the penalty for Qualified Theft, note is taken of the
value of the property stolen, which is P797,984.00. Since the value exceeds
P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
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periods to be imposed in the maximum period — Eight (8) Years, Eight (8)
Months and One (1) Day to Ten (10) Years of prision mayor. To determine the
additional years of imprisonment, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from
P797,984.00, which yields a remainder of P775,984.00. This amount is then
divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end
result is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty. xxx As for the
penalty for Qualified Theft, it is two degrees higher than that for Simple Theft,
hence, the correct penalty is reclusion perpetua.”
4. Finally, in People v. Bago (G.R. No. 122290, April 6, 2000) the Supreme
Court held that:
“In the crime of theft, if the value of the thing stolen exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum period and one year for each
additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty shall not exceed twenty years or
reclusion temporal. However, if that crime of theft is attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances which convert the taking into qualified theft, the
penalty next higher by two degrees shall be imposed, that is, at least, reclusion
perpetua.”
b. Estafa
2. The range of penalty provided for in Article 315 is composed of only two
periods -to get the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total
number of years included in the two periods should be divided into three. (Luces
v. Damolec, 548 SCRA 373)
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The basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty, and not
the imposable penalty. (Id.)
The plain terms of the Indeterminate Sentence Law show that the
legislature did not intend intend to limit “attending circumstances” as referring
to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC – the wording of the law clearly permits other
modifying circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated
as “attending circumstances” for purposes of the application of the ISL, such as
quasi-recidivism under Article 160 of the RPC. (Id.)
The penalty prescribed for estafa is composed of only two, not three,
periods. In such a case, Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code requires the
division into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and
forming one period of each of the three portions. (People v. Abordo, G.R. No.
179934 May 21, 2009) Therefore, the maximum, medium, and minimum periods
of the penalty prescribed are:
4. Note also that since the penalty prescribed by law for estafa is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would
then be prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, while the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence should not exceed 20 years of reclusion temporal.
5. In Diaz v. People (G.R. No. 171121, August 26, 2008), the amount
involved is P265,900.00 and the trial court imposed on the petitioner an
indeterminate sentence of 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. The Supreme Court ruled that the
maximum term imposed is correct because it does not exceed the 20-year
maximum period allowed by law. However, the minimum term is wrong. The
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Hence, the proper penalty to be
imposed on the petitioner is an indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. (See also Real v. People, G.R. No. 152065, January 29, 2008)
7. In People v. Balagan (G.R. No. 183099, February 3, 2010), the trial court
convicted the accused of estafa after defrauding the amount of P57,000.00, and
imposed an indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision
mayor maximum, as maximum. The Court of Appeals, however, modified the
penalty and sentenced the appellants to suffer a prison term of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum
On appeal, the Supreme Court modified the penalty. It ruled that the both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly fixed the minimum term at 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional since this is within the range of
prision correccional minimum and medium. On the other hand, to compute the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each
of which portion shall be deemed to form one period. Following this procedure,
the maximum period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum
is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty,
when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court. Since the amount defrauded, in
this case, exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,000.00, 3 years shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years,
8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest
maximum term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 9 years, 8 months and
21 days of prision mayor, and not 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor.
c. Malversation
1. The penalty prescribed for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC is
reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
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is more than 12,000 but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
2. In Perez v. People (G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008), the amount
malversed totalled P72,784.57. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, which has a range of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years. Upon review, the
Supreme Court appreciated two mitigating circumstances (with no aggravating
circumstance) and lowered the prescribed penalty by one degree which is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, to be
imposed in any of its periods. This new penalty has a range of ten (10) years
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term could be ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, while the minimum term is again one
degree lower and could be four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional maximum.
d. Complex Crime
Special Complex Crime
1. Under Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
attempted robbery with homicide in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, is the higher half of the maximum period of reclusion
temporal or from eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor maximum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum. (People v. Bulalayao, G.R. No.
103497 February 23, 1994)
f. Special Law
1. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the
offense is punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, "the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Thus, the trial court erred in
imposing the straight penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day. Applying ISL the proper penalty should be an imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
(People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 185164 June 22, 2009)
effects, the indeterminate sentence law is applicable in this case. Accordingly, for
the crime of highway robbery, the indeterminate prison term is from seven (7)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years,
nine (9) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (Sayoc
v. People, G.R. No. 157723 April 30, 2009)
3. Section 28 of R.A. No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997 provides:
“Sec. 28. Penal Clause – (h) Any employer who after deducting the monthly
contributions or loan amortizations from his employee’s compensation, fails to
remit the said deductions to the SSS within thirty (30) days from the date they
became due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or
loan amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in Article Three
hundred fifteen [Art. 315] of the Revised Penal Code.”
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty in this
case should be x x x prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be;
x x x x.
Since the above-quoted Sec. 28 (h) of the Social Security Act (a special
law) adopted the penalty from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law also finds application.
months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of sexual
abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. The minimum
term imposed is correct because it is within the range of prision mayor medium
to reclusion temporal minimum, the penalty next lower in degree to that
imposed by Republic Act No. 7610. But the maximum term thereof is wrong. The
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 14
years, 8 months and one day to reclusion perpetua.
Thus, the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant is an
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of
sexual abuse.
Facts: The two accused were convicted of rape with homicide and were
sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Disagreeing with the sentence
imposed, the Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the
Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed." The judge
denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction after the accused have perfected their
appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Held: Under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide
is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. The Rules of Court mandates that after an
adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the accused." Here, the judge, fully aware of
the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he
disagrees because of his religious convictions. In so doing, the judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death subject to
automatic review by this Court.
Dissenting, J. Vitug:
The instant petition for certiorari has become academic since an appeal brings
the case wide open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would
be precipitate and might be so perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the
death penalty. Thus, petition should be dismissed.
Concurring:
J. Narvasa:
The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this
Court, because rendered "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in
light of the facts found to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a penalty
other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment being void, the
appeal attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not
be deemed to have thereby lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said
that it is being required by this Court to act in cases over which it has already
lost jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it
and its modification of the judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory
prescription of the law.
J. Regalado:
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It would be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and
the appellate review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized
penalty as the basis therefor, with this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant
mistake. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal
by writ of error from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of
reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in the penalty is now rectified with the death
sentence being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should be, then the case
will consequently be before this Court on automatic review. That provision
calling for automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted serves equally
the interests of both the defense and the prosecution through protective
features established by case law.
Facts: The RTC convicted Gatward and Win of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for thirty-five
(35) years and twenty-five (25) years of reclusion perpetua, respectively. Only
Gatward filed an appeal. Subsequently, Gatward filed an urgent motion to
withdraw appeal but was denied.
Held: The denial of Gatward's motion to withdraw appeal is not only justified but
is necessary since the trial court had imposed a penalty based on an erroneous
interpretation of the governing law thereon. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is
an indivisible penalty and the accused should necessarily suffer the entire extent
of 40 years of reclusion perpetua.
It may be contended that that the judgment against Win has already
become final. It may also be argued that an appeal taken by one accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable. These postulations, however, assume that the
penalties decreed in the judgment of the trial court are valid, specifically in the
sense that the same actually exist in law and are authorized to be meted out as
punishments. In the case Win, and the same holds true with respect to Gatward,
the penalty inflicted by the trial court was a nullity because it was never
authorized by law as a valid punishment. The penalties which consisted of
aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty are self-contradictory in terms
and unknown in penal law.
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of Win to appeal, his case was
reopened in order that a higher penalty may be imposed on him. There is here
no reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is being affirmed but with a
correction of the very substance of the penalty to make it conformable to law,
pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The penalty has not been
changed since what was decreed by the trial court and is now being likewise
affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of reclusion perpetua which,
unfortunately, was imposed by the lower court in an elemental form which is
non-existent in and not authorized by law. Just as the penalty has not been
reduced in order to be favorable to the accused, neither has it been increased so
as to be prejudicial to him.
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Facts: The accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of three (3)
counts of rape and three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness. The accused did
not appeal the above decision, but the prosecution filed a notice of appeal. The
prosecution alleges that the penalties for the three counts of rape imposed upon
the accused should each be increased to death; while the penalties meted out
for the three counts of acts of lasciviousness are erroneous and should each be
increased to "12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum,
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum."
[Reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Sia, G.R. No. 172989, June
19, 2007. J. Ynares-Santiago. In this case the SC held that the only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach, or the penalty may be increased is
through a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.]
[See also Icao v. Apalisok, G.R. No. L-59581, December 29, 1989, J.
Narvasa: A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be
amended or corrected except only as regards clerical errors. Hence, even the
subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify
correction of the judgment after it has become final.]
[See also Estarija v. People, G.R. No. 173990, October 27, 2009, J. Chico-
Nazario. In this case, the RTC imposed upon the accused a straight penalty of
seven (7) years. This is erroneous. The penalty for violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 is imprisonment for not less than six years and one month
nor more than fifteen years, and perpetual disqualification from public office.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special
law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law, and
the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same.
Thus, the correct penalty should have been imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from public office. However, since the decision of the
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RTC has long become final and executory, this Court cannot modify the same.]
UPDATES:
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be
based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00.
However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to
the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy
fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property
be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-
amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to
amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further
commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the
years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden
the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original
minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon
which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
xxx
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way
that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course
of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite
the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court
should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit,
especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court
should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of
the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine
of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. (Lito Corpuz v. People,
G.R. Nos. 180016, April 29, 2014)
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When,
however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to
such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted
upon by the Court en bane. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage
on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code
Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code"
as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged
herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance. SEC. 40. Article 217 of the
same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
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instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused,
the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment,
the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed. (Ophelia Hernan v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017)
Section 1. Article 9 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as “The Revised Penal Code” is
hereby amended to read as follows:
“Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies.— Grave
felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with
Article 25 of this Code.
“Less gave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties
which in their maximum period are correctional in accordance with
abovementioned article.
Classification of felonies:
Fine as a penalty:
Section 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1060, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
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Section 79. Article 299 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 80. Article 302 of the same Act, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
417, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 81. Article 309 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by R.A. No. 4885, P.D. No. 1689,
and P.D. No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).— Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: