March 8, 2016

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody
over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days
after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was
given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be
changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although
necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed
adoption, the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer
2

who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an
3

affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo
issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for
Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 by the Department of
6

Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988.
8

Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. 9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her
10

husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony
or on 29 July 1991. 11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992. Her two 12

daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July
1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained U.S. Passport No.
14

017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy
for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika.
She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of
her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
17

petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as
to assist in the settlement of his estate. 18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her
earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. The couple began preparing for their
19

resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for
the next semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and
20

cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be
21

followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the
22

U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification
24

Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed while her husband 25

was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home
there. 26

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of
2005. The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
27

Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006. Meanwhile, her children
28

of school age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings. She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
29 30

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S. The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006. Petitioner's
31 32

husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working
for a major Philippine company in July 2006. 33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing. A
34 35

Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same Act, she filed with
36

the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July
37

2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI 38

issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006. She also 40

secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999. This passport was renewed on 18
41

March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA. 42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an
43

"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated
44

in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the
45

BI and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped using her
46 47

American passport. 48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that day, she accomplished a sworn
49

questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. In the 50

same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines,
from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present. 51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010. 52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013." Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator
53

on 16 May 2013. 54

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the 56

petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before
9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached 57

to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC
cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due
course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division. She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition. Essentially, Elamparo's
59 60

contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on
account of the fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer
62

natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not
63
qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen to begin with. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have
64

lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born
65

citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration
she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6)
years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that
petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year
residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006,
when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified
to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of
Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they are
found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for President in the
May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24,
2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding
and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a purely
political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC,
filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and
Local Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED. 69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En
Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same. 70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras
(Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and
raffled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, docketed as SPA No.
71

15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency. 72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status. Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is
73

excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the
193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to
74

prove that she is a natural-born citizen. 75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings
have a nationality. According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that
76

local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. He also
77

stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings. 78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as
she was a foundling. 79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year
residency requirement. Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she
80

renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. Additionally, Tatad questioned
81

petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat
and her frequent trips to the U.S. 82

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC),
Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born
citizen. He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires
83

only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.
84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the
Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to
her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition, docketed as SPA No. 15-007
85

(DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be
cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and
that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
86

petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country
87

before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then
living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke
grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner
89

which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office. 90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her
ineligibility for the Presidency. A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
91

Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC. 92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents. Otherwise stated,
93

she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be
citizens of the country where they are found. Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen
94

of the Philippines. 95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the
right to reacquire her natural-born status. Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
96

presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. She 97

believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 98

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in
the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills. 99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she
renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied
with. She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for
100

the acquisition of a new domicile of choice. 101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake
made in good faith. 102

In a Resolution promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a
103

natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines
for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The
COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On
23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with
urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining
the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders
from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of
12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE
the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No.
15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution
of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in
the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or
cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The
exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue
of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
 accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration
with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of
the same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President,
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no
such provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, which was 104

affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
105

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 §
1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
 The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the
Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC
even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also
in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration
of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified
in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are
for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473)
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not
suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the
importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as
a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission
of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of
the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the
grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted
for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he
has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term
of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A.
Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the
COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they
seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only
in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the
case may be. 106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the
amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15
February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other.
Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the
qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before
an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
"provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course
on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he
or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation
can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity
of representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this
case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to
rule essentially that since foundlings are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
108

Constitution, they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted
109

that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC,
after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is
certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present
evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said,
110

there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.
The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she
is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are
Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such
parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to
111

1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in
the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is
natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960
and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304
foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were
230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349
Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190
female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino. 112

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
1âwp hi1

straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
113

Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more
than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the
evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the
Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so
they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where
the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a
50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances
that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there
were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children
in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children
to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child
born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino
children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines
on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am
confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a
foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their
children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their
 children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or
believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly
doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left
behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may
be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of
not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't
make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of
their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your
Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because
of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court held that:
114

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers
and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange
is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman
refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural
or illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino,
that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish
territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage
is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown
parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
 "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children
of unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not
unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina
with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think
those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the
constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born
in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively. 116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account, cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
117

said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but
this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant
the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they
were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed
that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of
a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong.
They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and
Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
 In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos
under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the
1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased
by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal.
118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that
"they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate
against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this
across the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice.
Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that
the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII,
Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and
Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee
is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by
119

aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of
a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over
the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. (Underlining supplied)
120

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the
child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
121

parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and
a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
122

petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his
wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
124

incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International
125

customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law
126

recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on
principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general
127

principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation." These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied
128

in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Article 15 thereof states:
130

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for
by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required
by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended,
and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles
of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to
wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in
cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the
State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found,
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the
nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations
131

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v.
132

Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the
133

Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of
international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of
international law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into
force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the
Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin
America, and State Practice in the United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, where 134

only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and
135

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The
Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the
Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In
all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of
foreign judgments was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness,
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and
which are "basic to legal systems generally," support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances
136

and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of
international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have
137

passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus
sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness;
twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as
citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international
law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino
children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been
pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows
that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a
virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended
up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny
them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship. 138

The COMELEC also ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did
139

not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must
perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in
general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140

repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
141

restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v.
142

Court of Appeals, where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
143

natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino
144

citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress
saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at
145

the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an
act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two
types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third
category for repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after
losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. 146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always
revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned
147

that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that
"while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected." 148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she
put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive
parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the
data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to
sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adoptee." Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate
149

"attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any
notation that it is an amended issue." That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the
150

adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency
or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." The law therefore
151

allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her
birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for
cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material
representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before
the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the
day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a
resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of
"Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months"
which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she
returned for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are
three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to
remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
152

must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In
other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her
arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences
starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household
items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry
inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine
schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued
in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of
items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27
April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that
she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased);
and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines
in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its
Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May
2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two
requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus
non-revertendi. The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis
154

of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July
2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied
on Coquilla v. COMELEC, Japzon v. COMELEC and Caballero v. COMELEC. During the oral arguments,
155 156 157

the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC. Respondents contend that these cases decree that
158

the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires
Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an
American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24
May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC, the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
159

declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC did not involve a candidate who
160

wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed
to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad
161

and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC, the candidate was found to be an
162

American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her
U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a
seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact
alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the
Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident
visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and
taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling
the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post
Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband
resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines
and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in
Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as
a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a
Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must
leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or
returns to the Philippines." The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the
163

necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their
return to the country" in line with the government's "reintegration program." Obviously, balikbayans are not
164 165

ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would
be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the
community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly
what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There
is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC, and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply
166

to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the
facts-of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that
petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was
false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012
COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November
2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from
April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.
In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC
itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return
of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat,
would include her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
167

residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the
evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005.
Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned
here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could
be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take
away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May
2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in
good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition
for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the
COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225,
was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted
that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist
Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not
disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media,
the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were
already matters of public record and were not hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her
Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when
she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated
a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide
her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement
and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's
pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his
COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but
should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office. 168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates
all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of
America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential,
the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC
said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency
requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the
fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the
constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that
cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence
far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner. It ignores, above all else, what we
169

consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which
declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner
made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6)
months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for
election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral
arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any
intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by
word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence
different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in
the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat
include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in
the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner]
enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in
Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she
was already old enough to go to school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their
family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who
handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents
are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some
of the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11
1a\^/phi1

March 2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the
family's abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they
eventually built their family home. 170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive
ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for
Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the
Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly
diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating
that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares
is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No.
15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission
First Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,

vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x

G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO
POE JR., respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege.
It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone -
either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the
nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of
the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence
that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated,
on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim,
presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an
affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting
to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or
entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being -
a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy
of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the
City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.
R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel
FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false" –

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections" -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 2 in an
action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987
Constitution also reads –

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be
taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental
right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to
designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this
Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on
the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might
have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived
under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist
of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and
Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18
April 1992, would support this premise -

"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto.
A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.

"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines
who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5 In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.,"
and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would
have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C.,
described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.6Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.7 The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was
limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as
rights to property, personal liberty and justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.10 The 20th century saw
the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
well-being and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking
global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.12

The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects."13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made
to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July
1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;15 however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically
defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar
of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.18

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate
of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would
be governed by special laws.19

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with
the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."20

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower,
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An
accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States.21 Under Article
IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United
States would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they
shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to
such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they reside.

Thus –

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States
shall be determined by the Congress."22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the
native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of
the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight."23

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.24

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during
which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago
within that period.25 More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902
-

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives
of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."26

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as
of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3)
since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.

"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time,
which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their
Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant
of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof
that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis28 – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor 30 (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant
of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him
to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an
Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
"uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth
certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some
degree of certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen?
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been
submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the
death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

"x x x xxx xxx

"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office."

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides:

"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated."

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1)
the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.31

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in
San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when
the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at
any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at
least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or
mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior
to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified."

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity,
the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his
birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient
proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it
contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its
contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either
of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature
of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by
decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office.
The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs
to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood
brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic
writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official)
or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall
have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties.

"x x x xxx x x x.

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence
as legitimate children.

"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent."

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended
to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate
or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken
in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation
of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."37

In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that,
in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial
bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the
rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage
and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the
national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating
that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, 39 such as on
successional rights and family relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the
child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended
only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the
Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old
Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to
keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge
on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance,
the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to
the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree."

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b)
the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the
declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as
Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ)
in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.

"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

"x x x xxx xxx

"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University
of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II,
and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate
until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.

"x x x xxx xxx

"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue
of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals,42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based
on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress."

Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to
Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states
-

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court
on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule
of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a
decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into
these cases.

"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of
a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have
the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a
legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan
who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father.
But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother.
The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x
It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would
grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But
real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose
but not for another purpose.

"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest
can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane
and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit
than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum –

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No.
161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the
Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC,
it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and,
in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case
before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.

Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on the matter.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should have been remanded.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Puno’s separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.

SEPARATE OPINION

DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:

The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:

On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and to deny due course to or
cancel his certificate of candidacy for the position of President in the forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidential
elections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ committed falsity in a material representation in his
certificate of candidacy in declaring that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth and in fact he is not,
since he is the illegitimate son of Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, a Spanish national. The case
was docketed as COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First Division.

At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier offered FPJ’s record of birth to prove
that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, who was then
married to Paulita Gomez. Upon the other hand, FPJ tried to establish that his father was a Filipino citizen whose
parents, although Spanish nationals, were Filipino citizens. He adduced in evidence a copy of the marriage
contract of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that they were married on 16 September 1940 in Manila.

In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed COMELEC Case SPA No.
04-003 for lack of merit. It declared that COMELEC’s jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national officials like
the President. It has, however, jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code on petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the
ground that any material representation contained therein is false. It found that the evidence adduced by
petitioner Fornier is not substantial, and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when
he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been denied, petitioner Fornier filed a
petition with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161824.

Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came to this Court via a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They assert that only this Court has
jurisdiction over the issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161634.

The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the oral argument, are as follows:

(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy of Presidential candidates;

(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a) Tecson, et al., (b) Velez, and (c) Fornier;
and

(3) Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.

Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in the last paragraph of
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the
ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said provision of
the Constitution are post-election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The petitioner
should have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such as those prescribed in Section 68
(Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69 (Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, which are
implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These pre-election remedies or
actions do not, however, fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court.

Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC has the original
jurisdiction to determine in an appropriate proceeding whether a candidate for an elective office is eligible for the
office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy or is disqualified to be a candidate or to continue such
candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for disqualification. Its jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No.
04-003 is, therefore, beyond question.

Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Fornier’s petition (G.R. No. 161824) under Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before
it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by
virtue of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of nay branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the following facts have been
established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either in the pleadings and the documents attached thereto
or from the admissions of the parties, through their counsels, during the oral arguments:

1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.

2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.

3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.

4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not shown to have
declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.

From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage of his parents. Thus, pursuant to
the Civil Code then in force, he could either be (a) a natural child if both his parents had no legal impediments to
marry each other; or (b) an illegitimate child if, indeed, Allan Poe was married to another woman who was still
alive at the time FPJ was born.

Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the
illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the
citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or
filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section
1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of
Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the
father.

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I dissent from the majority opinion.

The Antecedent Proceedings

Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") a "Petition for Disqualification of
Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." on the ground that Fernando Poe, Jr.
("FPJ") is not a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec First Division dismissed the petition, ruling that
petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that FPJ committed "any material misrepresentation when he
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen." On motion for reconsideration, the
Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the First Division. Petitioner Fornier now assails the Comelec En Banc
resolution under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Undisputed Facts

The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The first document is the Birth
Certificate of FPJ, showing he was born on 20 August 1939. The Birth Certificate is an evidence of FPJ.[1] The
second document is the Marriage Certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that their marriage took
place on 16 September 1940. The Marriage Certificate is also an evidence of FPJ.[2] Moreover, FPJ admits that
his mother Bessie Kelley was an American citizen.[3]

Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1) FPJ was born out of wedlock and
therefore illegitimate,[4] and (2) the mother of FPJ was an American citizen.

The Issues

The issues raised in Fornier’s petition are:

(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as a candidate for President on the
ground that FPJ is not a natural-born Philippine citizen;

(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Jurisdiction

The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article
IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and function to "[E]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates
of candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec.
The conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing laws
to run for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list of candidates will be cluttered with
unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out
every presidential election dozens of candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the
Comelec.[5]

Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to "[D]ecide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x." The power to decide "all questions affecting elections"
necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for
election to public office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely
to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is obviously
not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not
powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the
elections before such candidate may be disqualified.

Under Rule 25 on "Disqualification of Candidates" of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a voter may question
before the Comelec the qualifications of any candidate for public office. Thus, Rule 25 provides:

Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. — Any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party,
organization or coalition of political parties may file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition to
disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure[6] to expedite the disposition of cases or controversies falling within its jurisdiction.

The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the Constitution provides that some other
body shall be the "sole judge" of the qualifications of the holders of the public offices involved. The Court has
upheld the jurisdiction of Comelec to issue such rulings,[7] even when the issue is the citizenship of a
candidate.[8] Thus, the Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially if FPJ meets the citizenship qualification to
run for President.
However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual bases of its ruling. The
Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue presented – whether FPJ is a natural-born
Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc affirmed the First Division ruling that "[W]e feel we are not at liberty to
finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born citizen." In short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a
candidate for President to run in the coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born
Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 1, Article
VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.

To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a candidate for President only after
the elections would lead to an absurd situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election
day before he could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided immediately after the election,
an alien who wins the election may even assume office as President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly,
this is not what the Constitution says when it provides that "[N]o person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines."[9] The clear and specific language of the Constitution prohibits the
election of one who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for President is a
natural-born Philippine citizen must be decided before the election.

Governing Laws

Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth depends on the Constitution and
statutes in force at the time of his birth.[10] FPJ’s citizenship at the time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in
force in 1939, determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.

Natural-born Philippine citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[11] If a person has to perform an act, such as proving in
an administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to
Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural born citizen.[12]

The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the governing laws that
determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent
legislation cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would violate
the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one who
is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent legislation a natural-born citizen.

General Principles

A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child born within wedlock is presumed
to be the son of the father[13] and thus carries the blood of the father. Under the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as
provided for in Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy,
automatically follows the citizenship of the Filipino father.

An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to any father unless the father
acknowledges the child at birth.[14] The law has always required that "in all cases of illegitimate children, their
filiation must be duly proved."[15] The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy,
is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, unless the father acknowledges
the illegitimate child at birth, the illegitimate child can only acquire the citizenship of the only legally known parent
- the mother.

However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood relation of illegitimate child to the father)
of the child to the Filipino father is established in accordance with law, the child follows the citizenship of the
Filipino father. This gives effect, without discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children, to the
provision of the 1935 Constitution that "[T]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines"[16] are Philippine
citizens.

Nature of Citizenship
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a natural-born Philippine citizen
because no other act after his birth is required to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. The child possesses
all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth.

If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as of the time of the
acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not possess all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth
because an act - the acknowledgement of the Filipino father - is required for the child to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be given effect because
they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural- born citizens as those who are Philippine citizens
at birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child has the blood of any man who is
supposed to be the father. There is only a conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the mother. If an
illegitimate child claims to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the child’s father, such blood relation
must be established in accordance with proof of filiation as required by law.

Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of the putative father, the burden is
on the illegitimate child to establish a blood relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption
that an illegitimate child has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father admits paternity after the
birth of the illegitimate child, there must be an administrative or judicial approval that such blood relation exists
upon proof of paternity as required by law.

Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child of an alien
mother on the mere say so of the putative Filipino father. The State has a right to examine the veracity of the
claim of paternity. Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of an alien mother is left to
the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For example, a Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply
claim that he has several illegitimate children in China. The State cannot be required to grant Philippine passports
to these supposed illegitimate children born in China of Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father
acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative or judicial
determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.

The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of Vietnamese mothers and allegedly of Filipino
fathers, is illustrative. These children grew up in Vietnam, many of them studying there until high school. These
children grew up knowing they were Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a Philippine Navy vessel brought them,
together with their Vietnamese mothers, to the Philippines as Saigon fell to the communists. The mothers of these
children became stateless when the Republic of (South) Vietnam ceased to exist in 1975. The Department of
Justice rendered Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995 that being children of Filipino fathers, these Vietnamese
children, even if illegitimate, are Philippine citizens under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and
Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973 Constitution. This Opinion is cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a
natural-born Philippine citizen.[17] However, this Opinion categorically stated that before the illegitimate
Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens "it is necessary in every case referred to that such
paternity be established by sufficient and convincing documentary evidence."[18]

In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial authority the paternity of the
alleged Filipino father by "sufficient and convincing documentary evidence." Clearly, an administrative or judicial
act is necessary to confer on the illegitimate Vietnamese children Philippine citizenship. The mere claim of the
illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father, or the mere acknowledgment of the alleged Filipino father, does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship on the child. The State must be convinced of the veracity of such claim
and approve the same. Since the illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform an act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They become Philippine citizens only from the
moment the proper administrative or judicial authority approve and recognize their filiation to their alleged Filipino
fathers.

The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices[19] is to insure
that the holders of these high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their
formative years they knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other country
claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and loyal to the Philippines of which they were citizens from birth.
This is particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[20] The President of
the Philippines must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have grown up knowing that he was a
citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its
meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later[21] a
natural-born Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity.

Proof of Filiation

Article 131[22] of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized only the following as proof of
filiation of a natural child:

a. acknowledgment in a record of birth;

b. acknowledgment in a will;

c. acknowledgment in some other public document.

To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an acknowledgement in a record of birth,
or an acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgment
executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such acknowledgment since
the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.

After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent legislation liberalizing proof of
filiation cannot apply to such person to make him a natural-born citizen. A natural-born Philippine citizen is
expressly defined in the Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a citizen at birth, no
subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth since it would violate the constitutional
definition of a natural-born citizen.

Burden of Proof

Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his Philippine citizenship. Any
person who claims to be qualified to run for President because he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine
citizen, has the burden of proving he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born citizen
is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for
election as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v.
Chan: [23]

It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is
really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.

Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been born out of wedlock, the burden is
on FPJ to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino father. An illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of
blood relation to any father. Such blood relationship must be established in the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with law.

Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person because citizenship is not a private
right or property, but a matter of public and State interest. Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although
illegitimate, is the son of Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ
the status of a natural-born Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not
recognize a person as a natural-born Philippine citizen just because the private party litigants have admitted or
stipulated on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor General, as representative of the Government, is
strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a natural-born Philippine citizen.

Legitimation

Under Article 123[24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage. There was no
retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired
the rights of a legitimate child only as of the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one year earlier on 20 August 1939.
Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJ’s natural father, the effects of legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ
on 20 August 1939.

Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child. As the Court held in Ching
Leng:[25]

The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein political questions. Hence, apart
from reproducing the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship, the Code contains no precept thereon except
that which refers all matters of "naturalization", as well as those related to the "loss and reacquisition of
citizenship" to "special laws." Consistently with this policy, our Civil Code does not include therein any rule
analogous to Articles 18 to 28 of the Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship. (Underscoring in the original)

Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley legitimated FPJ, such legitimation did
not vest retroactively any civil or political rights to FPJ.

Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902

FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came to the Philippines from Spain.[26]
To benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ
must prove that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is
established that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he is
presumed to have acquired Philippine citizenship under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of
1902.[27] Being an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899 is the determinative fact to fall
under the coverage of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[28]

There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine inhabitant and resident on 11 April
1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines is not known. If he arrived in the Philippines after 11
April 1899, then he could not benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the
Philippine Bill of 1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo Pou was naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11
April 1899. Thus, there can be no presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine citizen.

There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou and the alleged father of FPJ, was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the evidence adduced there is no legal basis for claiming that
Allan F. Poe is a Philippine citizen. Nevertheless, there is no need to delve further into this issue since the Court
can decide this case without determining the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe. Whether or not
Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe were Philippine citizens is not material in resolving whether FPJ is a natural-born
Philippine citizen.

Convention on the Rights of the Child

The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified the same on 21
August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean "every human being below the age of eighteen years
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier." Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the
Convention since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he was born half a century before the
Convention came into existence. FPJ’s citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be affected by the
Convention which entered into force only on 2 September 1990.

The Convention has the status of a municipal law[29] and its ratification by the Philippines could not have
amended the express requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to
be President. While the Constitution apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are not, that is the
explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither the Executive Department nor the Legislature, in ratifying a
treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention cannot amend the definition in the Constitution that natural-born
citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship."

In any event, the Convention guarantees a child "the right to acquire a nationality,"[30] and requires States
Parties to "ensure the implementation" of this right, "in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless."[31] Thus, as far as nationality or citizenship is concerned, the Convention guarantees the right of the
child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be stateless. The Convention does not guarantee a child a
citizenship at birth, but merely "the right to acquire a nationality" in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was
born in 1939, he was apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth.[32] After his birth FPJ also
had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino father in accordance
with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the
Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.

The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang

The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother follows the
citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known parent. The illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and
legally adopted by the Filipino father, cannot acquire the citizenship of the father. The Court made this definitive
doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. Galang,[33] which involved the illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino
of Chinese descent with a Chinese woman, Sy An. The illegitimate children were later on jointly adopted by the
naturalized Filipino and his legal wife, So Buan Ty.

The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial court’s decision are as follows:

After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court dated May 2, 1950 granting
his petition for naturalization, he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court in
Special Proc. No. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam,
Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An, all minors and admittedly the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng
with one Sy An, a Chinese citizen. Finding the petition for adoption proper, this Court granted the same in a
decision dated September 12, 1950, declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and purposes the children of the adopter
Ching Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and obligations provided by law.

On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a full pledge (sic) Filipino
citizen. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate children became Filipino citizens by virtue of his naturalization,
petitioner Ching Leng addressed a communication to the respondent Commissioner of Immigration requesting
that the alien certificate of registration of the said minors be cancelled. (Bold underscoring supplied)

In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor child or children" in Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law,[34] as well as the meaning of children "whose parents are citizens of the Philippines" under
the Constitution. The Court categorically ruled that these children refer to legitimate children only, and not to
illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:

It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child", used in these provisions, include adopted
children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a
legitimate child. Whenever, the word "children" or "child" is used in statutes, it is generally understood, however,
to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for
instance, when the Constitution provides that "those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines, "and "those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines," who shall elect Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the age of
majority", are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions 3 and 4), our fundamental law clearly
refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May
12, 1952).

Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful wedlock, when the adopter, at
least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality, not that of the illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Gov’t of
the Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra; Gallofin v. Ordoñez, 70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although, adoption gives "to the adopted person the same rights and duties as
if he were a legitimate child of the adopter", pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code, we have already seen
that the rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264, and do not include the acquisition of
the nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term "children" could not possibly refer to
those whose relation to the naturalized person is one created by legal fiction, as, for instance, by adoption, for,
otherwise, the place and time of birth of the child would be immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons involved
in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation
before us, for, by legal fiction, they are now being sought to be given the status of legitimate children of said
appellant, despite the circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their legitimation. (Bold
underscoring supplied)

Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a unanimous decision of the Court En
Banc. Subsequent Court decisions, including Paa v. Chan[35] and Morano et al. v. Vivo,[36] have cited the
doctrine laid down in Ching Leng that the provision in the 1935 Constitution stating "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines" refers only to legitimate children. When the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted,
the framers did not attempt to change the intent of this provision, even as they were presumably aware of the
Ching Leng doctrine.

Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The inexorable direction of the law,
both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate
and illegitimate children. Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children,
we should not also distinguish, especially when private rights are not involved as in questions of citizenship.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine upholds the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning the
Ching Leng doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the Rights of Children
mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on the status of children, save of course
those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution itself like the reservation of certain high public offices to
natural-born citizens.

Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an
alien mother automatically becomes a Philippine citizen at birth. We have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate
child does not enjoy any presumption of blood relation to the alleged father until filiation or blood relation is proved
as provided by law.[37] Article 887 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[I]n all cases of illegitimate children,
their filiation must be duly proved." The illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he
establishes his blood relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is established after the birth of the
illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since an act is required after birth to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Conclusion

In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since there is no
showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a
natural-born citizen as a Philippine citizen "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect" his
Philippine citizenship. Private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does not meet this citizenship qualification.

Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to dismiss the petitions of Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo Antonio Velez on the ground that their direct petitions
invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the Constitution are premature,
there being no election contest in this case.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.

FRIVALDO, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and
upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari
and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December
19,19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated February 23,
19963 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Facts
 On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.
On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the
Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of
the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the
following disposition:6

"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after
the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns
and a Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes
obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

RaulR.Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)

petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the
winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x."
Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC
No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for
his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization
in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21,
1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two
cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of
governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was
not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship
by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725
xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to

GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered
the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass,
proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered
the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold
the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof."

On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996,
the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court
issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain
the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions":15

"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the
exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two
of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo

from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is
not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755.
However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not
rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the
election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the
petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as
provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and
void.
 By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and
123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in
the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of
the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required
them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as

follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing

bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold
legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during
the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding
the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according
to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected
governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988
elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice,
he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and
discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote
from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on
Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the
third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with
no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the
validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That
he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June
30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould have been proclaimed
as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met
at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his
citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects,
which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that
"then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential
Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of
policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion,
should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution,"
adding that in her memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725.
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It
is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not categorically and/or
impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the
other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a
legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an
exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of
applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D.
725 but left it to the first Congress once createdto deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring
the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in
terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any
other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the
repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed
on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x,"
which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo
counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the President
in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor
General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when
presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995,
he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of
his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is
simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for
repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a
Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that
the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such
proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under
P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In
fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and
regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to
promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets
a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the
case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully
served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States a
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of
the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning
to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of
favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of
Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and,
failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the
date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in
G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution
require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously,
however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held
his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office
should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now
directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be
elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
 * In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years
of age on election day."

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must
consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge
his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very
day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to
govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life
and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law
was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it
should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the
certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be possessed
when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this
Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral
argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time
the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all,
Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item
of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a
citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less
a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If
the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship
a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason
that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER,
even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the
voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to
reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN
THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It
should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official
to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot
the actual votingis the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in
this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in
the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that
he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been
sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct
on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr.
Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in
1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to
vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to
be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned
from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the
ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that
authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility
arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days
after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue
of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very
moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already
and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of
the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage.
Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to
this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or
when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors
and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their
intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with
some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are
necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative
statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing
existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to
render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do
not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule
against the retrospective operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also
provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble,
P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law
(C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands
or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the
1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution
does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these womenthe right to re-acquire
Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in
favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now
desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D.
725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome
process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:

"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA
1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon
the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A.
63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and
thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the
intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof."45It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to
"reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a
political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined
in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D.
725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute
must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted,
so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless
to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This
is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or
qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725
benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo
lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation
even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor,
August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of
the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest
number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be
given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the
law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As
earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
 Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a
liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the
Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for
any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for
causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and
grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same
were filed.48The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the
likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation.
Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only
where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the
government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing
only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not
present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated,
should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in
treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his
application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession
of the nationality qualification whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the
date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20,
1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also
be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise
deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced
and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo
was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he
was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in
SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11,
1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining
order having been issued by this Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and
executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which
Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also
become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time
disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final
and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second
Division) in its assailed Resolution:55

"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However,
there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for
the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March
25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was
in connection with the 1992 elections."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by
law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again, as the occasion demands."

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be
entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but
that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6,
1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's
"recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample
power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead
of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear
and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously
is one.58Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:

"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of
nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA
484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be
done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition
was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the
Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not
the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx
just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of
this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:

"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected."

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none
was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less
the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed
by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office
of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case."

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in
this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992
when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on
election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which
reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in
1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he
was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the
electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words,
that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for
him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and
not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to
paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the
emphatic teaching of Labo:

"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his

citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently
erroneous and should now be corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec
(Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May
11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were
rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code which reads as follows:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division)
on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his
election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications
even after the elections, thus:

"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." (Italics supplied)

Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a
suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a
suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not
a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of
P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by
xxx repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as
a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two
previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or
mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of
the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and
1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to
question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the
ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74.
Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely
directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in
G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May
11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the
election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we
hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.
A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the
elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is
merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to
"DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches
that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within
the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period
during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided
even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision
promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a
petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor
conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique
factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He
argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first
(and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode
of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections.
That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status not in
1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to
his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to
lose American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the
determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who
are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines
ONLY those who are its own citizens not who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The
issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such
finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled
case law, such finding is binding and final.
 The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to
Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's
ineligibility for being an American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no
empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such
knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the
Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during
and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to
the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and
that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by
candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the
latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official"
while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended
to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so,
instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress
had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior
thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f)
for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's
repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only
after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however
that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or
repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word
"elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding
Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity,
were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to
uphold the Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the
issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it
can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception
of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice;
in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the
voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed,
to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute
unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
 EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to
be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further
hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation
by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover,
by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to
resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique
situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive
effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was
stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he
possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office
of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of
course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement
is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once
again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority
and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of
our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt,
political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections
(citations omitted)."67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and
refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would
give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective
offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this
undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause.
The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and
hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered
as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the
Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent
dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But
the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as
a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled
against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context
consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine
political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of
the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty
and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted
for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his
nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and
in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to
re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty
to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world.
But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his
struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of
the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above
Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be
governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions
of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and
academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., J. dissenting opinion
Puno., J. concurring opinion
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice.
 Melo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for
the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by
petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition
for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen
of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an
American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in
favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to
suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to
show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau
of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration
No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the
Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980
(Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate
child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a
valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he
has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial
Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having
been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the
office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation
of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the
petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for
disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private
respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification to
hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the
merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for
and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had
lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any
other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the
petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was
given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American",
private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization
Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person
is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It
was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier
stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v.
COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was
forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The
Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other
Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as
Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that he was
naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in
the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that
by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United
States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously
participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained
Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the
second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our
mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or
certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if
a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents
a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of
University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider
that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be
no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even
before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance,
the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual
citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento.

Cortes, J., concur in the result.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, only that he did not
necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American
citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989).
If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather than
choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply
because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained
Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one
is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the
"uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of
those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate
conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the
legal convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen.
The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really
matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof.
In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation
when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance
to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the
petitioner not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in
which he stated that he was not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship.
"Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on
"naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her
despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and
solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and
deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the
repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to
me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent
claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is:
Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and
voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following
observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register
him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these
acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though,
is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine
government as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it
exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked
the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land
that was willing to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in
connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for
the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the
preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine
citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest
resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty
from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is
where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other
state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add,
of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions.
But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although
supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual
citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an
American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B)
filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano express renunciation means a
1

renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age,
and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that
distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration
authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979
(Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration
Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his
request are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also
be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu
City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration
records). This document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is a duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by
private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be
underestimated For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said
Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines).
The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:

SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act, apply for
registration, in the case of those residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of
those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other office designated
by the President. ... . (Emphasis supplied)
3

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the
year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under
oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly
manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and
under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment
on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934 —
hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in
1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records
disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth
of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then
in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien,
he was 41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more
importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in
person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty of registering
such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall,
within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino
citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958
(at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private
respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention
that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But
said acts of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In
turn the Philippine Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's
aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition
or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different
countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino
Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among others:

... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must
be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which
such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides —

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe
the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time
or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when
as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly
desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable

loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is the
hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality, and this choice
should be honored by all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one
nationality. (Emphasis supplied)
5
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like
many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning,
distinguished and respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its
recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.) I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of sworn
statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn
statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino."
Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander. The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions
should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his
own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989)
and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I
cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil
degree.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, offly that he did not
necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American
citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989).
If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather than
choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply
because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained
Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one
is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the
"uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of
those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate
conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the
legal convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen.
The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really
matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof.
In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation
when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance
to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner
not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in which he
stated that he was not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship.
"Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on
"naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her
despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and
solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and
deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the
repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to
me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent
claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is:
Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and
voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following
observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register
him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these
acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though,
is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine
government as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it
exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked
the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land
that was willing to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in
connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for
the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the
preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine
citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest
resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty
from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is
where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other
state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add,
of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions.
But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although
supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual
citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an
American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B)
filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano express renunciation means a
1

renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age,
and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that
distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration
authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979
(Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration
Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his
request are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also
be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu
City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration
records). This document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is a duly-registered alien (American) residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by
private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be
underestimated. For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said
Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines).
The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:

SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act, apply for
registration, in the case of those residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of
those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other office designated
by the President. ... . (Emphasis supplied)
3

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the
year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under
oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly
manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and
under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment
on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence,
our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979
when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records
disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth
of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then
in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien,
he was 41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more
importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in
person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty of registering
such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall,
within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino
citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958
(at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private
respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention
that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But
said acts of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In
turn the Philippine Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's
aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition
or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different
countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino
Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among others:

... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must
be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which
such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides-

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe
the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time
or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when
as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly
desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable

loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is the
hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality, and this choice
should be honored by all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one
nationality. (Emphasis supplied)
5

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like
many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning,
distinguished and respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its
recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of sworn
statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn
statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino."
Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions
should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his
own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989)
and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I
cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil
degree.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, offly that he did not
necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American
citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989).
If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather than
choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply
because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained
Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one
is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the
"uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of
those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate
conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the
legal convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen.
The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really
matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof.
In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation
when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance
to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner
not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in which he
stated that he was not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship.
"Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on
"naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her
despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and
solemnly transferred his troth It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and
deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the
repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to
me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent
claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is:
Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and
voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following
observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register
him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these
acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though,
is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine
government as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it
exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked
the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land
that was willing to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in
connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for
the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the
preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine
citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest
resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty
from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is
where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other
state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add,
of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions.
But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although
supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual
citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an
American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B)
filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano express renunciation means a
1

renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age,
and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that
distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration
authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979
(Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration
Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his
request are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also
be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu
City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration
records). This document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is a duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by
private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be
underestimated For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said
Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines).
The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act, apply for
registration, in the case of those residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of
those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other office designated
by the President. ... . (Emphasis supplied)
3

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the
year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under
oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly
manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and
under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment
on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence,
our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979
when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records
disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth
of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then
in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien,
he was 41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more
importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in
person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty of registering
such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall,
within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino
citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958
(at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private
respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention
that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But
said acts of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In
turn the Philippine Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's
aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition
or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different
countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino
Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among others:

... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must
be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which
such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides-

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe
the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time
or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when
as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly
desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable

loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is the
hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality, and this choice
should be honored by all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one
nationality. (Emphasis supplied)
5

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like
many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning,
distinguished and respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its
recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Ph. Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a
Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact,, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared
that he was a citizen of Australia"(p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of
sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn
statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino."
Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gender The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions
should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his
own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989)
and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I
cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil
degree.