Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents: First Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents: First Division
DECISION
CORONA , J : p
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the March 20, 2006
decision 2 and July 3, 2006 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
66952.
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through his
sister. Their courtship, which blossomed as a result of the exchange of long distance
calls between them, lasted six months. Back then, petitioner observed respondent to be
a very sweet and thoughtful person. This, he said, made him fall in love with her.
On July 26, 1992, six months after their rst meeting, they were married at the
UST Santissimo Rosario Parish Church. Everything went well for the rst three years of
their marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope for in a wife — sweet,
loving and caring. She also took good care of the house. As petitioner was based in
Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician at Saudia Airlines, the parties decided to
maintain two residences, one in the Philippines and another in Saudi Arabia. They took
turns shuttling between the two countries just so they could spend time together.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage.
According to petitioner, respondent ceased to be the person he knew and married. She
started becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time with her friends
than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason.
She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her
husband's needs and the upkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife. After
being gone from their home for days on end, she would return without bothering to
account for her absence. As a result, they frequently quarreled. Finally, on April 10, 1997,
respondent suddenly left for the United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 89, a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to ful ll her essential marital obligations
to petitioner. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33993.
Per sheriff's return, summons was served through substituted service as
personal service proved futile. Respondent, however, did not file an answer.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua to
investigate if there was collusion between the parties and to intervene for the State to
see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City Prosecutor Paragua
manifested that, since both parties failed to appear before him, he was unable to make
a ruling on the issue of collusion and determine if the evidence was fabricated.
In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that respondent was remiss in
her duties as a wife and had become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to
her husband's needs and who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of her
acts, as testi ed to by petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a
psychological incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism,
chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet one's duties and responsibilities as a married
person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not su ce to nullify a marriage on
the basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as
opposed to physical) illness. 1 7
The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to petitioner's own evidence,
was off to a good start. According to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving and
caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She even willingly consented to
the di cult living arrangement of taking turns in going back and forth between the
Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they could be together. Perhaps it was this unusual
arrangement which took a heavy toll on their relationship. They barely saw and spent
time with each other. Respondent could have gotten used to petitioner's absence. And
although absence can indeed make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well
be true: out of sight, out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell
out of love with petitioner.
Nevertheless, we agree with the CA that the change in respondent's feelings
towards petitioner could hardly be described as a psychological illness. It was not
enough that respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying
with her essential marital obligations, 1 8 had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do.
Consequently, we are unconvinced that respondent's condition was rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating disorder.
Even if we assume the correctness of petitioner's contention that the Molina
guidelines are not set in stone, there is still no reason to disavow the same as the facts
and circumstances in this case do not warrant a deviation therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 20, 2006 decision and
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July 3, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[a] code should not have so many definitions, because a definition straight-jackets the
concept and, therefore, many cases that should go under it are excluded by the
definition. That's why we leave it up to the court to determine the meaning of
psychological incapacity.
12. G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 764.
13. Supra note 8, at 526.
14. Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 376, citing Republic
v. CA, supra note 4, at 676.
15. Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, supra note 8, at 133, citing Choa v. Choa, supra note 8, at
655.
16. Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, supra.
17. Id., p. 135, citing Republic v. CA, supra note 4, at 674.
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18. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, supra note 8, at 129-130.