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Joint Operations
17 January 2017
Incorporating Change 1
22 October 2018
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides
the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the
United States in all joint operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the
Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for
military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and
executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development
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Preface
Intentionally Blank
ii JP 3-0 CH 1
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0
DATED 17 JANUARY 2017
iii
Summary of Changes
Intentionally Blank
iv JP 3-0 CH1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS
CHAPTER II
THE ART OF JOINT COMMAND
Introduction ................................................................................................................II-1
Commander-Centric Leadership ................................................................................II-1
Operational Art ..........................................................................................................II-3
Operational Design ....................................................................................................II-4
Joint Planning.............................................................................................................II-5
Assessment .................................................................................................................II-8
CHAPTER III
JOINT FUNCTIONS
CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZING FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
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Table of Contents
CHAPTER V
JOINT OPERATIONS ACROSS THE CONFLICT CONTINUUM
CHAPTER VI
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE
CHAPTER VII
CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
CHAPTER VIII
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
APPENDIX
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Table of Contents
GLOSSARY
FIGURE
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Table of Contents
Intentionally Blank
Joint operations are military Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document
actions conducted by joint forces in the joint operations series and is a companion to
and those Service forces joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Doctrine for the
employed in specified command Armed Forces of the United States. It provides
relationships with each other, guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and
which of themselves do not their subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint
establish joint forces. A joint military operations. It also informs interagency
force is one composed of and multinational partners, international
significant elements, assigned or organizations, nongovernmental organizations
attached, of two or more Military (NGOs), and other civilian decision makers of
Departments operating under a fundamental principles, precepts, and philosophies
single joint force commander. that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of
the United States.
Principles of Joint Operations Joint doctrine recognizes the nine principles of war
(objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of
force, unity of command, security, surprise, and
simplicity). Experience gained in a variety of
irregular warfare situations has reinforced the
value of three additional principles—restraint,
perseverance, and legitimacy.
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Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
Joint Functions
Introduction
Joint functions are related capabilities and
activities grouped together to help JFCs
integrate, synchronize, and direct joint
operations. Functions that are common to joint
operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven
basic groups—C2, information, intelligence, fires,
movement and maneuver, protection, and
sustainment. Some functions, such as C2,
information, and intelligence, apply to all
operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the
JFC’s mission requires. A number of subordinate
tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define
each function, and some could apply to more than
one joint function.
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Executive Summary
Organizing the Joint Force The JFC’s mission and operational approach, as
well as the principle of unity of command and a
mission command philosophy, are guiding
principles to organize the joint force for
operations. Joint forces can be established on a
geographic or functional basis. When JFCs
organize their forces, they should also consider the
degree of interoperability among Service
components, with multinational forces and other
potential participants. Joint force options include
combatant commands (CCMDs), subordinate
unified commands, and joint task forces. All JFCs
may conduct operations through their Service
component commanders, lower-echelon Service
force commanders, and functional component
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Executive Summary
Organizing Operational Areas Except for AORs, which are assigned in the
Unified Command Plan (UCP), GCCs and other
JFCs designate smaller OAs (e.g., joint operational
area [JOA] and area of operations [AO]) on a
temporary basis. OAs have physical dimensions
comprised of some combination of air, land,
maritime, and space domains. GCCs conduct
operations in their assigned AORs. When
warranted, the President, Secretary of Defense
(SecDef), or GCCs may designate a theater of war
and/or theater of operations for each operation. An
AOR is an area established by the UCP that defines
geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A theater
of war is established primarily when there is a
formal declaration of war or it is necessary to
encompass more than one theater of operations (or
a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within
a single boundary for the purposes of C2,
sustainment, protection, or mutual support. A
theater of operations is an OA defined by the GCC
for the conduct or support of specific military
operations. For operations somewhat limited in
scope and duration, or for specialized activities, the
commander can establish the following OAs: JOA,
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Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
Setting Conditions for Theater CCDRs and JFCs execute their campaigns and
Operations operations in pursuit of US national objectives and
to shape the OE. In pursuit of national objectives,
these campaigns and operations also seek to
prevent, prepare for, or mitigate the impact of a
crisis or contingency.
Considerations for Seizing the As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit
Initiative friendly advantages and capabilities to shock,
demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately.
The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use
of all available elements of combat power to seize
and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the
opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate
in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and
defeat. Considerations for seizing the initiative
include: force protection, unit integrity during
deployment, entry operations, attack of enemy’s
COGs, full-spectrum superiority, C2 in littoral
areas, SOF-conventional force integration,
stability activities, protection, and prevention of
friendly fire incidents.
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Executive Summary
Considerations for Enabling In this phase, the joint operation is assessed and
Civil Authority enabling objectives are established for
transitioning from large-scale combat operations to
FID and security cooperation. The new
government obtains legitimacy, and authority is
transitioned from an interim civilian authority or
transitional military authority to the new
indigenous government. This situation may
require a change in the joint operation as a result of
an extension of the required stability activities in
support of US diplomatic, HN, international
organization, and/or NGO stabilization efforts.
Considerations for enabling civil authority include:
peace building, transfer to civil authority, and
redeployment.
CONCLUSION
“The US military’s purpose is to protect our Nation and win our wars. We do
this through military operations to defend the homeland, build security globally,
and project power and win decisively.”
1. Introduction
a. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document in the joint operations series
and is a companion to joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the
United States. It provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their
subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint military operations. It also informs
interagency and multinational partners, international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and other civilian decision makers of fundamental principles,
precepts, and philosophies that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of the United
States. This publication describes fundamental keystone constructs—such as unified
action and joint functions—that apply regardless of the nature or circumstances of a
specific joint operation. This publication provides context not only for the joint operations
series, but also for other keystone doctrine publications that describe supporting functions
and processes.
b. The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more Services
(from at least two Military Departments) in a single operation is through joint operations.
Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces
employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not
establish joint forces. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or
attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single JFC.
Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more information
on traditional warfare and irregular warfare (IW) and the instruments of national power.
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d. Joint Warfare is Team Warfare. The Armed Forces of the United States—every
military organization at all levels—are a team. The capacity of our Armed Forces to
operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any operational environment (OE).
Success depends on well-integrated command headquarters (HQ), supporting
organizations, and forces that operate as a team. Integrating Service components’
capabilities under a single JFC maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force.
However, a joint operation does not require that all forces participate merely because they
are available; the JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces to the mission.
Objective Security
Offensive Surprise
Mass Simplicity
Maneuver Restraint
Economy of force Perseverance
Unity of command Legitimacy
Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the joint force and
US Government, international, and other partners.
Leverage the benefits of operating indirectly through partners when strategic and
operational circumstances dictate or permit.
Integrate joint capabilities to be complementary rather than merely additive.
Focus on objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest and most enduring
results.
Ensure freedom of action.
Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without compensating
advantage.
Inform domestic audiences and shape the perceptions and attitudes of key foreign
audiences as an explicit and continuous operational requirement.
Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.
Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed effectively.
Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space.
contingencies joint forces face today cut across multiple combatant commands (CCMDs);
the physical domains of land, maritime, air, and space; and the information environment
(which includes cyberspace), as well as the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and involve
conventional, special operations, ballistic missile, electronic warfare (EW), information,
strike, cyberspace, and space capabilities. The strategic environment is fluid, with
continually changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict precisely
how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty,
ambiguity, and surprise will persist. The commander’s OE is influenced by the strategic
environment.
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Chapter I
c. These challenges are not specific to any single theater of operations and create
problematic consequences for international security. Such an environment induces
instability; erodes the credibility of US national power; can necessitate escalation in US
and allied responses; and weakens US alliances that promote trade, economic development,
and diplomatic agreements. In the most challenging scenarios, the US may be unable to
deploy, employ, and sustain forces the way it has in the recent past (i.e., build up combat
power in an area, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conduct
operations when and where desired). JFCs should consider a wide range of options
consistent with current realities of an OE not solely defined by state-on-state and force-on-
force engagements. A JFC’s OE, which encompasses all enemy, friendly, and neutral
factors relevant to a specific joint operation, can include actions directed against a variety
of state forces and non-state actors, to include insurgents, proxies, local warlords,
criminals, and others. Civilians and organizations other than an enemy may also affect
strategic outcomes. These actors may include the civilian population, host nation (HN)
government, potential opposition leaders, international organizations, and NGOs.
d. Enemies who attack the US homeland and US interests are likely to use asymmetric
tactics and techniques. They will avoid hard (well-secured and heavily defended) targets
and attack vulnerable ones. Vulnerable targets may include US and partner nations’ (PNs’)
lines of communications (LOCs), ports, airports, staging areas, civilian populations, critical
infrastructure, information centers, economic centers, and military and police personnel
and facilities. Advances in information technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth
of warfare. Developments in cyberspace can provide the US military, its allies, and PNs
leverage to improve economic and physical security. However, this also provides
adversaries increased access to open-source information and intelligence, the Department
of Defense information network (DODIN), critical infrastructure and key resources, and a
limitless propaganda platform with global reach. Asymmetric attacks can be countered
with well-planned joint operations synchronized with actions of interagency partners,
international organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and elements of the private sector.
Achieving unity of effort with these partners requires coordination, cooperation, and a
comprehensive approach to achieve common objectives.
Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and the Defense Strategy
Review (DSR) for more information on the strategic security environment. Refer to JP 3-
08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for more information on interorganizational
coordination.
b. The ability of the US to advance its national interests depends on how the United
States Government (USG) employs the instruments of national power to achieve national
strategic objectives based on global security priorities. USG officials, with National
Security Council (NSC) advice and Presidential direction, coordinate the instruments of
national power. The USG routinely uses the instruments of national power to advance
national interests. Interactions between the various instruments of national power can
enhance results as US culture, industry, science and technology, academic institutions,
geography, and national will combine to deliver synergistic benefit.
c. The ultimate purpose of the US Armed Forces is to fight and win the nation’s wars.
Although much of DOD’s focus is on war and war preparation, opportunities also exist to
prevent or mitigate the severity of conflict, legitimize US positions, reward PNs, provide
expertise to multinational operations, and enhance the positive perception of the US. US
national leaders can use military capabilities in a wide variety of activities, tasks, missions,
and operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity along the conflict
continuum. The military’s role increases relative to the other instruments as the need to
compel an adversary through force increases. The potential range of military activities
and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence
in times of relative peace up through major operations and campaigns that typically involve
large-scale combat. For more information on the range of military activities and operations
across the conflict continuum, see Chapter V, “Joint Operations Across the Conflict
Continuum,” paragraph 3, “The Range of Military Operations.”
Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more information
on the instruments of national power. Refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more
information about a GCC’s role in security cooperation. Refer to Chapter V, “Joint
Operations Across the Conflict Continuum,” for more information on the conflict
continuum and range of military operations.
4. Strategic Direction
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Chapter I
environment, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and
may not reflect the most current strategic direction.
(1) In general, the President frames the strategic context by defining national
interests and goals in documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), Presidential
policy directives, executive orders, and other national strategic documents, in conjunction
with the NSC and Homeland Security Council.
(2) DOD derives its strategic-level documents from guidance in the NSS. The
documents outline how DOD will support NSS objectives and provide a framework for
other DOD policy and planning guidance, such as the National Defense Strategy; Guidance
for Employment of the Force (GEF); Defense Planning Guidance; Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (simply known
as the JSCP).
(3) The President approves the contingency planning guidance contained in the
GEF, which is developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The GEF translates
national security strategic objectives into a prioritized and comprehensive planning tool to
guide the employment of DOD forces. It consolidates guidance for campaign planning,
security cooperation, global defense posture, and global force management. The Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) translates guidance from the GEF and publishes the
JSCP, which provides the framework for military direction to the joint force, implementing
and augmenting the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef’s) guidance. The
President also signs the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which is developed by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff in coordination with the NSC. The UCP
establishes the missions, responsibilities, and areas of responsibility (AORs) for
commanders of CCMDs (combatant commanders [CCDRs]).
b. From this broad strategic guidance, more specific national, functional, and theater-
strategic and supporting objectives help focus and refine the context and guide the
military’s joint planning and execution related to these objectives or a specific crisis.
Integrated planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff, CCMD staffs,
Service chiefs, and USG departments and agencies translate strategic priorities into clear
planning guidance, tailored force packages, operational-level objectives, joint operation
plans (OPLANs), and logistical support for the joint force to accomplish its mission.
(1) Based on guidance from the President and SecDef, GCCs and functional
combatant commanders (FCCs) translate national security policy, strategy, and available
military forces into theater and functional strategies to achieve national and theater
strategic objectives. CCMD strategies are broad statements of the GCC’s long-term vision
for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision for the global employment of functional
capabilities guided by and prepared in the context of SecDef priorities outlined in the GEF
and the CJCS’s objectives articulated in the National Military Strategy (NMS). A
prerequisite to preparing the theater strategy is development of a strategic estimate. It
contains factors and trends that influence the CCMD’s strategic environment and inform
the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in pursuit of GEF-directed objectives.
(2) Using their strategic estimates and theater or functional strategies, GCCs and
FCCs develop CCPs consistent with guidance in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP, as well as in
accordance with (IAW) planning architecture described in the Adaptive Planning and
Execution (APEX) enterprise. In some cases, a CCDR may be required to develop a global
campaign plan. FCCs develop operational support plans based on guidance in the UCP
and their priorities and objectives in the GEF. FCCs may be responsible for developing
functional-related global or subordinate campaign plans or both. As required, both GCCs
and FCCs develop contingency plans, which are branch plans to the overarching CCP.
(3) In joint operations, the supported CCDR will often have a role in achieving
more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the
primary responsibility of the supported CCDR. Others may require a more balanced use
of many or all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of another CCDR
or other agencies. Supporting CCDRs coordinate and synchronize their supporting plans
with the supported commander’s plan. CCDRs provide planning guidance; assign missions
and tasks; organize forces and resources; designate objectives; may establish operational
limitations, such as rules of engagement (ROE), constraints, and restraints; and implement
policies and the concept of operations (CONOPS) to be integrated into plans and operation
orders (OPORDs). In applying military power, CCDRs use the capabilities of assigned,
attached, and supporting military forces. They also integrate other instruments of national
power and the capabilities of multinational partners to gain and maintain strategic
advantage. Supporting and supported CCDRs coordinate with each other across
geographic and functional boundaries to facilitate mission accomplishment within the
capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces.
Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more information
on the strategic environment, strategic guidance, strategy and estimates, and the role of
CCDRs. For more information on APEX and joint planning, refer to CJCS Guide 3130,
Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework.
(4) Termination
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Achieve and maintain unity of effort between the joint force and
interorganizational participants.
define the desired military end state, which normally represents a point in time or a set of
conditions beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national
power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. This period or set
of circumstances usually signals a transition from military to civilian lead of subsequent
activities.
(b) Creating the conditions for lasting stability extends beyond the large-
scale combat that dominates the enemy’s will to resist. Often, overmatching the enemy’s
capabilities at critical times and places does not lead to the resolution of the drivers of
conflict nor initiate the transformation to eliminate the root causes of conflict. The Armed
Forces of the United States often remain in a supporting role to assist in reducing the means
and motives for violence, focusing on the sources of instability, developing opportunities
to promote stability. Military operations during this time can be leveraged to shape the
necessary perceptions in key audiences to create conditions for PN capabilities. Strategic-
and operational-level commanders plan for the termination of operations to enable civil
authority as part of the initial planning process. Understanding transitions is key to
operational design and planning.
For more information on end state and termination, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
5. Unified Action
a. General
(1) Whereas the term joint operation focuses on the integrated actions of the
Armed Forces of the United States, the term unified action has a broader connotation.
Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities
of governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve unity of effort. Failure to
achieve unity of effort can cost lives, create conditions that enhance instability, and
jeopardize mission accomplishment.
Unified Action
US Joint Forces
Unified
Action
Nongovernmental International
Organizations Organizations
Private Sector
and Others
The joint force commander plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and, when appropriate, integrates
military operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve
unity of effort.
agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies (i.e., multinational partners);
NGOs; and the private sector. This aligns with the term and definition of
interorganizational cooperation established in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.
b. The JFC’s Role. JFCs are challenged to achieve and maintain operational
coherence given the requirement to operate in conjunction with interorganizational
partners. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying joint force actions, since all of the elements
and actions that compose unified action normally are present at their level. However,
subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the
operations of other military forces and the activities of nonmilitary organizations in the OA
to promote unified action.
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(1) General. Joint forces must be prepared to plan and execute operations with
forces from PNs within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or other-than-
US leadership. US military leaders often are expected to play a central leadership role
regardless of the US Armed Forces’ predominance, capability, or capacity. Commanders
should expect the military leaders of contributing member nations to emphasize common
objectives, as well as to expect mutual support and respect. Although individual nations
may place greater emphasis on some objectives than on others, the key is to find
commonality within the objectives to promote synchronized progress to achieving the
objectives. Cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships among counterparts
enable success. Language and communication differences, cultural diversity, historical
animosities, and the varying capabilities of allies and multinational partners are factors that
complicate the integration and synchronization of activities during multinational
operations. Likewise, differing national obligations derived from international treaties,
agreements, and national legislation complicate multinational operations. Regardless of
whether other members participate in their treaty or agreement obligations, US forces will
remain bound by US treaties and agreements.
(2) Command and Control (C2) of US Forces. By law, the President retains
command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility to
effectively plan for, organize, coordinate, control, employ, and protect these forces.
Nevertheless, the President may deem it prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as
maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unified action) to place specific US forces
under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. Even
when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US
Armed Forces remain in the chain of command of US military authorities.
For more information on unified action with respect to multinational participation, refer
to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. For more information on all
aspects of multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For more
information on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of
Multinational Operations. For North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-specific
doctrine ratified by the US, see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine,
and AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
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e. The US has neither the capacity nor responsibility to directly lead the response to
every crisis. US military operations abroad invite diplomatic repercussions from enemies,
adversaries, and even allies with whom our objectives do not precisely align. In some
circumstances, friendly surrogates assisted by US military support may be able to
conduct operations and achieve mutually agreeable objectives when the direct
employment of US forces would be objectionable or infeasible. In other instances, such
as counterinsurgency (COIN), success depends on the indigenous government
demonstrating its own sovereignty; the overt exercise of force by the US military may
ultimately be counterproductive. JFCs may increasingly find it advantageous or necessary
to pursue objectives by enabling and supporting one or more interorganizational partners.
6. Levels of Warfare
Unified Action
Operational art links tactical action to strategic purpose. Operational art governs the deployment of
forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
Military strategy, derived from national policy and strategy and informed by doctrine,
provides a framework for conducting operations.
c. Operational Level
(1) The operational level of warfare links the tactical employment of forces to
national strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the planning and execution of
operations using operational art: the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—
supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to plan and execute (when required)
strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military capabilities by
integrating ends, ways, and available means. JFCs and component commanders use
operational art to determine how, when, where, and for what purpose military forces will
be employed, to influence the adversary’s disposition before combat, to deter adversaries
from supporting enemy activities, and to assure our multinational partners achieve
operational and strategic objectives.
(2) Many factors affect relationships among leaders at these levels. Service and
functional component commanders of a joint force do not plan the actions of their forces
in a vacuum; they and their staffs collaborate with the operational-level JFC to plan the
joint operation. This collaboration facilitates the components’ planning and execution.
Likewise, the operational-level JFC and staff typically collaborate with the CCDR to frame
theater strategic objectives, as well as tasks the CCDR will eventually assign to the
subordinate joint force.
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“When all is said and done, it is really the commander’s coup d’oeil, his ability
to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with
himself, that is the essence of good generalship.”
Carl von Clausewitz
On War
1. Introduction
b. While command authority stems from orders and other directives, the art of
command resides in the commander’s ability to use leadership to maximize
performance. The combination of courage, ethical leadership, judgment, intuition,
situational awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views helps commanders make
insightful decisions in complex situations. These attributes can be gained over time
through training, education, and experience. Joint training and joint doctrine are designed
to enable the conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization,
decision making, and leadership. Effective commanders combine judgment and
visualization with information to determine whether a decision is required, when to decide,
and what to decide with sufficient speed to maintain the initiative. Information
management (IM), situational awareness, and a sound battle rhythm facilitate decision
making.
2. Commander-Centric Leadership
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Chapter II
c. Commanders should interact with other leaders to build personal relationships and
develop trust and confidence. Developing these associations is a conscious, collaborative
act. Commanders build trust through words and actions and continue to reinforce it not
only during operations but also during training, education, and practice. Trust and
confidence are essential to synergy and harmony, both within the joint force and with our
interagency and multinational partners and other interorganizational stakeholders.
Commanders may also interact with other political, societal, and economic leaders and
other influential people who may influence joint operations. This interaction supports
mission accomplishment. The JFC emphasizes the importance of key leader engagement
(KLE) to subordinate commanders and encourages them to extend the process to lower
levels, based on mission requirements.
f. An essential skill of a JFC is the ability to assign missions and tasks that integrate
the components’ capabilities consistent with the JFC’s envisioned CONOPS. Each
component’s mission should complement the others’. This enables each component to
enhance the capabilities and limit the vulnerabilities of the others. Achieving this synergy
requires more than just understanding the capabilities and limitations of each component.
The JFC should also visualize operations holistically, identify the preconditions that enable
each component to optimize its own contribution, and then determine how the other
components might help to produce them. The JFC should compare alternative component
missions and mixes solely from the perspective of combined effectiveness, unhampered by
Service parochialism. This approach also requires mutual trust among commanders that
the missions assigned to components will be consistent with their capabilities and
limitations, those capabilities will not be risked for insufficient overall return, and
components will execute their assignments.
h. The JFC leads using operational art and operational design, joint planning, rigorous
assessment of progress, and timely decision making.
3. Operational Art
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Chapter II
Operational art informs the deployment of forces and the arrangement of operations to
achieve military operational and strategic objectives.
c. The commander is the central figure in operational art, not only due to education
and experience but also because the commander’s judgment and decisions guide the staff
throughout joint planning and execution. Commanders leverage their knowledge,
experience, judgment, and intuition to focus effort and achieve success. Operational art
helps broaden perspectives to deepen understanding and enable visualization.
Commanders compare similarities of the existing situation with their own experiences or
history to distinguish unique features and then tailor innovative and adaptive solutions to
each situation.
(1) What are the objectives and desired military end state? (Ends)
(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and
military end state? (Ways)
4. Operational Design
d. Commanders and their staffs blend operational art, operational design, and the JPP
to produce plans and orders that drive joint operations. Effective operational design results
in more efficient detailed planning and increases the chances of mission accomplishment.
5. Joint Planning
b. Joint planning consists of planning activities that help CCDRs and their subordinate
commanders transform national objectives into actions that mobilize, deploy, employ,
sustain, redeploy, and demobilize joint forces. It ties the employment of the Armed Forces
to the achievement of national objectives during peacetime and war.
d. The JPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of
military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to component
and subordinate commands when they participate in joint planning. Together with
operational design, the JPP facilitates interaction between the commander, staff, and their
HQ throughout planning. The JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their
planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent,
and develop effective plans and orders. Figure II-1 shows the primary steps of the JPP.
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(2) Mission Statement. The joint force’s mission is what the joint force must
accomplish. It is described in the mission statement, which is a sentence or short paragraph
that describes the organization’s essential task (or set of tasks) and purpose—a clear
statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement—
approved by the commander—contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why
of the operation. The eventual CONOPS will specify how the joint force will accomplish
the mission. The mission statement forms the basis for planning and is included in the
commander’s planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, commander’s
estimate, and the CONOPS. The JFC should develop clear mission statements and ensure
they are understood by subordinates.
(3) Commander’s Planning Guidance. JFCs guide the joint force’s actions
throughout planning and execution. However, the staff and component commanders
typically expect the JFC to issue initial guidance soon after receipt of a mission or tasks
from higher authority and provide more detailed planning guidance after the JFC approves
an operational approach. This guidance is an important input to subsequent mission
analysis, but the completion of mission analysis is another point at which the JFC may
provide updated planning guidance that affects COA development.
(5) CCIRs. CCIRs are elements of friendly and enemy information the
commander identifies as critical to timely decision making. They focus IM and help the
JFC and staff assess the OE. The CCIR list is normally a product of mission analysis, and
JFCs add, delete, and update CCIRs throughout an operation.
f. Freedom of Action. The JFC should maintain freedom of action throughout the
operation. Freedom of action in the OA is linked to freedom to act beyond the OA. For
example, operational reach—the distance and duration across which a joint force can
successfully employ military capabilities—can extend far beyond the limits of a JFC’s joint
operations area (JOA) and is inextricably tied to LOOs and the capacity and ability to
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throughput logistics to the point of destination. Consequently, the joint force must protect
LOOs to ensure freedom of action. Effective operational reach requires gaining and
maintaining operational access in the face of enemy A2/AD capabilities and actions.
Likewise, the C2 and intelligence functions depend on operations within the EMS and
cyberspace. Losing the capability to operate effectively in the EMS and cyberspace can
greatly diminish the JFC’s freedom of action. While various actions (e.g., cybersecurity,
cyberspace defense, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations [JEMSO], and the
consideration of branches to current operations) contribute individually to freedom of
action, operational design and joint planning are the processes that coherently link these
actions. The JFC and staff should consider freedom of action from the outset of operational
design and remain alert to indicators during operations that freedom of action is in
jeopardy.
Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on the JPP. Refer to JP 3-09, Joint
Fire Support; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more
information on fires and joint fire support planning. Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence,
and other intelligence series publications for more information on intelligence support and
planning. Refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and other logistics series publications for more
information on logistic planning. Refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, for more
information on cyberspace operations (CO). Refer to the National Military Strategic Plan
for Electronic Warfare; DOD Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Strategy; and Joint
Doctrine Note (JDN) 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, for more
information on JEMSO/EMS superiority. Refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations, for more
information on special operations planning.
6. Assessment
b. DOD and its components use a wide range of assessment tools and methods. In
peacetime and periods of conflict, assessments gauge the ability of the military instrument
of national power to prepare for and respond to national security challenges described in
Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Joint Operations.” Leaders assess operations and activities
across the levels of warfare and in all joint functions. At the strategic level, the CJCS
conducts deliberate and continuous assessments such as the Annual Joint Assessment and
the CJCS’s Readiness System, respectively. Theater-strategic and operational-level
assessments provide a methodology for joint commands and Services to adjust planning
and execution to be more effective, match the dynamic OE, and better identify their risks
and opportunities. At all levels, staff estimates are evaluations that assess factors in staff
sections functional areas (e.g., intelligence, logistics). Staff estimates complement the
overall operation assessment activity.
Refer to CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.01, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities,
for more information on CJCS and campaign assessments. Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning,
for more information on staff estimates, integration of assessment during planning, and
conducting operation assessment during execution.
c. Operation assessment refers specifically to the process the JFC and staff use
during planning and execution to measure progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating
conditions or effects, and achieving objectives. Commanders continuously observe the OE
and the progress of operations; compare the results to their initial visualization,
understanding, and intent; and adjust planning and operations based on this analysis. Staffs
monitor key factors that can influence operations and provide the commander information
needed for decisions. Without mistaking level of activity for progress, commanders devise
ways to update their understanding of the OE and assess their progress toward mission
accomplishment. The fundamental aspects of assessment apply in all types of joint
operations, although commanders and staffs may need to adjust the operation assessment
process to fit the nature and requirements of a specific operation. In operations that do not
include combat, assessments can be more complex.
d. The operation assessment process begins during mission analysis when the
commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it. Throughout COA
development, analysis, comparison, approval, and CONOPS finalization, the commander
and staff devise the operation assessment plan and process to incorporate in the overall
plan and order. They will follow this process during plan development, refinement,
adaptation, and execution. Key operation assessment indicators can be included in the
CCIR process to provide timely support to the commander’s planning and execution
decisions.
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military end states. By including assessment key indicators within the CCIRs, the staff can
better advise the commander whether the original operational approach is still valid.
g. Actions by a wide variety of entities affect military actions and objectives. These
actors include interorganizational participants, the civilian population, neutral non-partner
organizations in the JOA, and other countries outside the JOA in the GCC’s AOR. Since
assessment resources are limited, the commander must prioritize assessment activities.
This typically requires collaboration with interorganizational participants—preferably
in a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action. Since most of these
organizations are outside the JFC’s authority, the JFC is responsible only for assessments
of the activities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces. Nevertheless, the
JFC should grant some joint force organizations (e.g., civil affairs [CA] directorate or
CMOC) authority to coordinate directly with organizations, such as DOS and Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), and other CCMDs to facilitate effective integration and
synchronization of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as timely and
effective assessments by participants not under the JFC’s authority.
(2) Operation assessment is most effective when supported and supporting plans
and their assessments are linked. As Figure II-2 depicts, each level of assessment should
be linked with adjacent levels, both to provide a conduit for guidance and provide
information. For instance, assessment plans at the tactical level should delineate how they
link to or support operational-level assessments. Similarly, guidance from the operational-
level JFC should specify the relationship and mechanisms (e.g., tasks to subordinate
organizations) by which tactical-level assessment data can be gathered and synthesized into
the operational-level assessment.
(3) JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and measures during
planning, preparation, and execution. To optimize the assessment process given the
scarcity of intelligence collection assets, JFCs and their staffs can include key assessment
indicators in the CCIRs. This focuses assessment and collection at each level, reduces
redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the assessment process. At all levels,
commanders and staffs develop operation assessment indicators to track progress toward
mission accomplishment. An optimal method for developing indicators is to identify key
assessment indicators associated with tasks, effects, objectives, and end states for inclusion
in the assessment design. The most critical indicators of progress or regression should also
be included in CCIRs to guide the collection and assessment activity. These indicators
Assessment Interaction
Levels of
Warfare Guidance
Legend
operations and intelligence report flow assessment report flow
(4) Tactical-level assessment also uses MOEs and MOPs. Tactical tasks are often
physical activities, but they can affect higher-level functions and systems. Tactical
assessment may evaluate progress by phase lines; destruction of enemy forces; control of
key terrain, peoples, or resources; and other tasks. Combat assessment evaluates the results
of weapons engagement and the employment of capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal
effects and, thus, provides data for joint fires and the joint targeting processes at all levels.
Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: battle damage assessment,
munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations or future targeting.
Assessment of tactical results helps commanders determine progress at the operational and
strategic levels and can affect operational and strategic targeting and engagement
decisions. Tactical-level results provide JFCs comprehensive, integrated information to
link tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives.
Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on operation assessment (e.g.,
integration of assessment design during the planning effort, roles and responsibilities,
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tenets of an effective assessment, the assessment process, and development and use of
assessment indicators). Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on combat
assessment.
Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
1. Introduction
a. This chapter discusses joint functions, related tasks, and key considerations. Joint
functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs
integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions common to joint
operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven basic groups—C2, information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some
functions, such as C2, information, and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such
as fires, apply as the JFC’s mission requires. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and
related capabilities help define each function, and some could apply to more than one joint
function.
b. Joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the
functions is essential to mission accomplishment. For example, joint fires can enhance
the protection of a joint security area (JSA) by dispersing or disrupting enemy assets
threatening the JSA. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of
joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions
and accomplish the mission. Plans describe how the JFC uses military capabilities (i.e.,
organizations, people, and systems) to perform tasks associated with each joint function.
However, forces and other assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC
is employing them. Individual Service capabilities can often support multiple functions
simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task. For example,
an aviation asset might support all seven functions in a single combat operation. Just as
component commanders integrate activities across functions to accomplish tasks and
missions, the JFC and staff do likewise for the joint force. Various factors complicate the
JFC’s integration challenge, such as competing demands for high-priority capabilities and
the fact that joint force components have different function-oriented approaches,
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(5) Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and designate OAs.
(8) Communicate and ensure the flow of information across the staff and joint
force.
(10) Coordinate and control the employment of joint capabilities to create lethal
and nonlethal effects.
(12) Ensure the flow of information and reports to and from higher authority.
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Discussions over the potential command and control options led to the
decision to establish a support relationship between USCENTCOM
(supported) and USEUCOM (supporting). This relationship was
established by the Secretary of Defense. It enabled the development of
coherent and supporting campaign plans.
Various Sources
assigned missions. During crisis response and combat, or where critical situations require
changing the normal logistics process, the CCDRs’ directive authority for logistics (DAFL)
enables them to use all logistic capabilities of all forces assigned and attached to their
commands as necessary to accomplish their mission. The CCDR will exercise logistics
authority consistent with the limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations,
budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by
SecDef or the CJCS.
(2) OPCON is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the command.
OPCON is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or
below the level of CCMD to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces.
It involves organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint
training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. This authority should
be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally through
subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON
normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those
forces as the commander exercising OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned
missions; it does not, in and of itself, include DAFL or matters of administration, discipline,
internal organization, or unit training.
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For instance, a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) may be
supported for a direct-action mission while simultaneously supporting a JFLCC for a raid.
Similarly, a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) may be supported for a
sea control mission while simultaneously supporting a JFACC to achieve control of the air
throughout the OA.
(6) The perceived benefits of operations by joint forces do not occur naturally
just by virtue of command relationships. The integration necessary for effective joint
operations requires explicit effort; can increase operational complexity; and will require
additional training, technical and technological interoperability, liaison, and planning.
Although effectiveness is typically more important than efficiency in joint operations, the
JFC and component commanders must determine when the potential benefits of joint
integration cannot compensate for the additional complicating factors. Synergy is a means
to greater operational effectiveness, not an end in itself. The joint operations principle of
simplicity is always a key consideration.
(1) C2 in an AO. The land and maritime force commanders are the
supported commanders within their designated AOs. Through C2, JFLCCs and
JFMCCs integrate and synchronize movement and maneuver with information,
intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment and supporting activities and operations. To
facilitate this integration and synchronization, they have the authority to designate target
priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.
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(a) ACA. The JFC is ultimately responsible for airspace control within the
OA but normally delegates the authority to the ACA. The ACA, in conjunction with the
Service and functional components, coordinates and integrates the use of the airspace and
develops guidance, techniques, and procedures for airspace control and for units operating
within the OA. The ACA establishes an airspace control system (ACS) that is responsive
to the JFC’s needs, integrates the ACS with the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user
requirements. The airspace control plan (ACP) and airspace control order (ACO) express
how the airspace will be used to support mission accomplishment. The ACA develops the
ACP, coordinates it with other joint force component commanders, and, after JFC
approval, distributes it throughout the OA and to all supporting airspace users. The ACP
establishes guidance for the development of the ACS and distribution of the ACO. The
ACA publishes the ACO to maximize the combat effectiveness of the joint force and to
support mission accomplishment IAW JFC priorities. See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control,
and JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, for more information.
sustainment and force protection. The JFMCC is the supported commander for operations
within the JFC-designated maritime AO. The AADC will normally establish a congruent
air defense region, covering the open ocean and littorals, with a regional air defense
commander, who is delegated decision-making authority for counterair operations within
the region. The maritime regional air defense commander and AADC will coordinate to
ensure the JFACC can accomplish theater-wide responsibilities assigned by the JFC.
(5) C2 of Joint CO
(b) The CCDR will organize a staff capable of planning, synchronizing, and
controlling CO in support of their assigned mission. Each CCMD supports subordinate
JFCs through their CO supporting staff and assigned United States Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) cyberspace operations-integrated planning element (CO-IPE). Clearly
established command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective
employment of cyberspace capabilities. While Commander, United States Cyber
Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), exercises directive authority for CO, all actions with
the affected CCMDs are coordinated through their CO-IPEs to facilitate unity of effort and
mission accomplishment. The CCMD coordinates and deconflicts all cyberspace missions
in the AOR with other operations, including nationally tasked actions and the cyberspace
actions initiated in the CCMD. The CCMD coordinates and integrates cyberspace
capabilities in the AOR and has primary responsibility for joint CO planning, to include
determining cyberspace requirements within the joint force.
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or stand-alone. CO are enabled by the DODIN, and DODIN operations are CO missions.
CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported commander for global DODIN operations and
synchronizes planning for other CO. USCYBERCOM directs security, operations, and
defense of the DODIN. USCYBERCOM conducts military CO to enable US freedom of
action in cyberspace, enable actions throughout the OE, and deny the same to our
adversaries and enemies. CDRUSCYBERCOM is also a supporting commander for
regional DODIN operations and provides support to affected CCMDs, Services, and DOD
agencies. Other USG departments and agencies may also provide support per intra-
governmental agreements.
(6) C2 of JEMSO. JEMSO are those activities consisting of EW and joint EMS
management operations used to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic
environment (EME) to achieve the commander’s objectives. The electronic warfare
control authority (EWCA) develops guidance to execute electronic attack (EA) on behalf
of the JFC. EWCA can either be retained by the JFC or executed by the JFC’s designated
representative, normally the J-3. When so authorized, the J-3 will have primary staff
responsibility to plan, coordinate, integrate, and monitor execution of joint force EW
operations. Frequency allotment and assignment authority is normally delegated to the
joint frequency management office, who may further delegate this authority to facilitate
decentralization and to provide components with the maximum latitude and flexibility in
support of combat operations.
For additional guidance on the communications and intelligence systems support and
JEMSO, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations;
JP 6-0, Joint Communications System; JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Operations; JDN 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations; and JP
3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.
(1) The joint force staff is the linchpin of the C2 system, since the JFC
understands, plans, directs, and controls most aspects of operations through the staff’s
expertise and efforts.
(3) Control and Coordination Measures. JFCs establish various maneuver and
movement control, airspace coordination, fire support coordination, and communication
measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase
lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, OAs,
submarine operating patrol areas, no-fire areas, public affairs (PA) and other
communication-related guidance, and others as required.
For additional guidance on C2 of air operations, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control
of Joint Air Operations. For additional guidance on control and coordination measures,
refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. See Military
Standard-2525, Department of Defense Interface Standard Joint Military Symbology, for
additional guidance on the use and discussion of graphic control measures and symbols
for the joint force.
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(d) The communications system being planned is the primary means through
which intelligence flows to the JFC and throughout the OE. Communications system
planning must be conducted in close coordination with the intelligence community to
identify specialized equipment and dissemination requirements for some types of
information.
(CI), unless SecDef specifically approves that use. Also, requests for direct DOD support
to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are closely reviewed and processed separately
for approval to ensure compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act. When approved, use of
intelligence capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities is limited to incident
awareness and assessment. All incident awareness and assessment support within the
US is subject to USG intelligence oversight regulations and Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.
g. CCIRs
(b) FFIRs focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the
friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections can recommend potential
FFIRs that meet the JFC’s guidance. The J-5 typically consolidates FFIR nominations and
provides staff recommendation to the commander during planning prior to execution.
During execution, the joint force J-3 consolidates these nominations and provides the
recommendation for FFIRs that relate to current operations. The J-5 consolidates
nominations and recommends FFIRs related to the future plans effort. JFC-approved
FFIRs are automatically CCIRs.
h. Battle Rhythm. The HQ battle rhythm is its daily operations cycle of briefings,
meetings, and report requirements. A stable battle rhythm facilitates effective decision
making, efficient staff actions, and management of information within the HQ and with
higher, supporting, and subordinate HQ. The commander and staff should develop a battle
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rhythm that minimizes meeting requirements while providing venues for command and
staff interaction internal to the joint force HQ and with subordinate commands. Joint and
component HQ’s battle rhythms should be synchronized to accommodate operations in
multiple time zones and the battle rhythm of higher, subordinate, and adjacent commands.
Other factors such as planning, decision making, and operating cycles (i.e., intelligence
collection, targeting, and joint air tasking cycle) influence the battle rhythm. Further,
meetings of the staff organizations must be synchronized. The chief of staff normally
manages the joint force HQ’s battle rhythm. When coordinating with other USG
departments and agencies, the joint force HQ should consider that those organizations often
have limited capabilities and restricted access to some information.
(2) Collaboration, KS, IM, and information and intelligence sharing activities are
essential to assist the commander in providing vision, guidance, and direction to the joint
force. How these activities support understanding and decision making are addressed in
paragraph 3, “Information.”
(4) IM. IM is not only critical to understanding the OE, but it also supports
decision making. IM involves numerous decision support tools and technologies that are
integrated throughout the CCIR process. Refer to paragraph 3, “Information,” for more
details on the process of IM relevant to the process of facilitating shared understanding.
Making Decisions
Wisdom
Experience
Insight
Shared
Understanding
Sharing Knowledge to Art and
Create Shared Team Leadership
Understanding Learning
Knowledge
Individual
Learning
Managing
Information Information Science
and
Systems
Processing
Data
(a) KS is the free exchange of ideas between the commander and staff that
should typify early operational design is an activity that shares the individual knowledge
of numerous functional experts, modifies and increases their collective knowledge, and
promotes shared understanding. In a similar way, the after action sessions a commander
conducts with subordinate commanders and staff during and following an operation create
an environment of learning in which participants share knowledge and increase their
collective understanding.
j. Risk Management
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(1) Risk management is the process to identifying and assessing hazards arising
from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.
It assists organizations and individuals in making informed decisions to reduce or offset
risk, thereby increasing operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success.
The commander determines the level of risk that is acceptable, with respect to aspects of
operations, and should state this determination in commander’s intent. Risk is one of the
key outputs of mission analysis and should be reviewed at every successive step in the JPP.
The assessment of risk to mission includes an overall risk to mission analysis (e.g., low,
moderate, significant, or high) along multiple criteria (e.g., authorities and permissions;
policy; forces, basing, and agreements; resources; capabilities; PN contributions; and other
USG support). To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or
institute a risk management process tailored to their mission or OA. The joint risk analysis
methodology described in CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis, provides a consistent,
standardized way to analyze and manage risk. Figure III-3 is a generic model that contains
the likely elements of a risk management process.
Identify Hazards
Implement Develop
Controls Controls
key consideration in risk management. However, risk management does not inhibit a
commander’s flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether (or support a zero-defects
mindset), dictate a go/no-go decision to take a specific action, sanction or justify violating
the law, or remove the necessity for standard operating procedures (SOPs). Risk
management is relevant at all levels, across the range of military operations, and through
all phases of an operation and its branches and sequels. To mitigate risk, commanders may
take a variety of actions, such as changing the CONOPS, changing the plan for employment
of fires, executing a branch to the original plan, or employing countermeasures.
(3) Safety preserves military power. High-tempo operations may increase the
risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation
measures, education, and training lessen those risks. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap
by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety
program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety planning factors could include
geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, identification of
uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment hazards.
For additional and more detailed guidance on C2 of joint forces, refer to JP 1, Doctrine
for the Armed Forces of the United States.
3. Information
b. All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features
and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain
understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and
decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an
advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging
the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strategic outcomes.
c. The information function includes activities that facilitate the JFC’s understanding
of the role of information in the OE, facilitate the JFC’s ability to leverage information to
affect behavior, and support human and automated decision making.
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(a) Information affects the perceptions and attitudes that drive the behavior
and decision making of humans and automated systems. In order to affect behavior, the
JFC must understand the perceptions, attitudes, and decision-making processes of humans
and automated systems. These processes reflect the aggregate of social, cultural, and
technical attributes that act upon and impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world
views, and actions.
(b) The human and automated systems whose behavior the JFC wants to
affect are referred to as relevant actors. Relevant actors may include any individuals,
groups, and populations, or any automated systems, the behavior of which has the potential
to substantially help or hinder the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical
action. For the purpose of military activities intended to inform audiences, relevant actors
may include US audiences; however, US audiences are not considered targets for influence.
For specific planning guidance and procedures regarding language and regional
expertise, refer to CJCSI 3126.01, Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC)
Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing.
(2) Leverage Information to Affect Behavior. Tasks aligned under this activity
apply the JFC’s understanding of the impact information has on perceptions, attitudes, and
decision-making processes to affect the behaviors of relevant actors in ways favorable to
joint force objectives.
(a) Influence Relevant Actors. Regardless of its mission, the joint force
considers the likely impact of all operations on relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and
other drivers of behavior. The JFC then plans and conducts every operation in ways that
create desired effects that include maintaining or inducing relevant actor behaviors. These
ways may include the timing, duration, scope, scale, and even visibility of an operation;
the deliberately planned presence, posture, or profile of assigned or attached forces in an
area; the use of signature management in deception operations; the conduct of activities
and operations to similarly impact behavioral drivers; and the employment of specialized
capabilities (e.g., KLE, CO, military information support operations [MISO], EW, CA) to
reinforce the JFC’s efforts. Since some relevant actors will be located outside of the JFC’s
OA, coordination, planning, and synchronization of activities with other commands or
mission partners is vital.
(3) Support human and automated decision making. The management aspect
of the information joint function includes activities that facilitate shared understanding
across the joint force and that protect friendly information, information networks, and
systems to ensure the availability of timely, accurate, and relevant information necessary
for JFC decision making.
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However, the added risk of reliance on long-distance collaboration may create a critical
vulnerability an adversary can exploit. These capabilities not only improve efficiency and
common understanding during routine, peacetime interaction among participants, but they
also enhance effectiveness during time-compressed operations associated with both
combat and noncombat operations.
For additional guidance on collaboration and related capabilities, refer to JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System. For additional information on intelligence sharing, refer to JP
2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations.
understanding, which is necessary to have an advantage in the OE. While information can
be collected, processed, and stored as structured or unstructured content, such as in reports
and databases, individuals acquire knowledge through a cognitive process. Certain
products are particularly relevant to the process of KS. For example, lessons-learned
databases are knowledge-based products that help users avoid repeating previous mistakes
and adopt proven best practices. These databases exemplify how IM and decision support
processes can improve future operations by sharing knowledge gained through experience.
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both by protecting the information and by assessing and mitigating risks to that
information. The preservation of information includes both passive and active measures
to prevent and mitigate adversary collection, manipulation, and destruction of friendly
information, to include attempts to undermine the credibility of friendly information.
For further guidance on IM, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and JP 3-33,
Joint Task Force Headquarters.
(1) KLE. Most operations require commanders and other leaders to engage key
local and regional leaders to affect their attitudes and gain their support. Building
relationships to the point of effective engagement and influence usually takes time.
Language, regional expertise, and culture knowledge and skills are keys to successfully
communicate with and, therefore, manage KLE. Commanders can be challenged to
identify key leaders, develop messages, establish dialogue, and determine other ways and
means of delivery, especially in societies where interpersonal relationships are paramount.
Interaction opportunities with friendly and neutral leaders could include face-to-face
meetings, town meetings, and community events. Understanding cultural context,
cognitive orientation patterns, and communication methods is essential. The J-2’s joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) should identify key
friendly, neutral, and threat leaders who are not in the commander’s sphere of influence.
However, the entire staff should identify leaders relative to their functional areas as part of
JIPOE.
For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs. For additional guidance
on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
(3) CMO. CMO are activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions with the
objective to reestablish or maintain stability in a region or HN. During all military
operations, CMO can coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of
national power. CA support CMO by conducting military engagement and humanitarian and
civic assistance to influence the populations of the HN and other PNs in the OA. These
activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. CA forces
enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the OE,
identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society, and/or involve the
application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.
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On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense
Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a
significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a
determined defense and counterattack drove them back.
For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the
operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical
observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup
and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no
action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the
attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they
perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced. The Israeli
Defense Force intelligence convinced itself that the Arabs would be
unable to attack for a number of years, and they ignored warning
intelligence.
Various Sources
(6) OPSEC
For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01, Joint Operations Security,
and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
(7) EW. EW is the military action ultimately responsible for securing and
maintaining freedom of action in the EMS for friendly forces while exploiting or denying
it to adversaries. EW is an enabler for other activities that communicate or maneuver
through the EMS, such as MISO, PA, or CO.
(8) Combat Camera (COMCAM). Imagery is one of the most powerful tools
available for informing internal and domestic audiences and for influencing foreign
audiences. COMCAM forces provide imagery support in the form of a directed imagery
capability to the JFC across the range of military operations. COMCAM imagery supports
capabilities that use imagery for their products and efforts, including MISO, MILDEC, PA,
and CMO, and provides critical operational documentation for sensitive site exploitation,
legal and evidentiary requirements, and imagery for battle damage assessment/MOE
analysis, as well as operational documentation and imagery for narrative development
during foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations and NEOs.
(9) Space Operations. Space operations support joint operations throughout the
OE by providing information in the form of ISR; missile warning; environment monitoring;
satellite communications; and space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).
Space operations also integrate offensive and defensive activities to achieve and maintain
space superiority. Offensive activities prevent the use of space to provide information to
enemy forces. Defensive activities protect friendly space capabilities from attack,
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(11) CO. CO include the missions of OCO, DCO, and DODIN operations.
These missions include the use of technical capabilities in cyberspace and cyberspace as a
medium to leverage information in and through cyberspace. Refer to paragraph 7,
“Protection,” for a discussion of DCO.
For additional guidance on all CO missions, refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, and
for additional specific guidance on DODIN operations, refer to JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System.
f. Key Considerations
(3) Legal Considerations. Planners deal with diverse and complex legal
considerations. Legal interpretations can occasionally differ, given the complexity of
technologies involved, the significance of legal interests potentially affected, and the
challenges inherent for law and policy to keep pace with the technological changes and
implementation. Additionally, policies are regularly added, amended, and rescinded in an
effort to provide clarity. As a result, legal restraints and constraints on information
activities are dynamic and are further complicated by multinational considerations, since
each nation has its own laws, policies, and processes for approving plans.
4. Intelligence
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b. Tailored, continuous JIPOE products support JPP steps 2-7 and the four planning
functions starting with an OE baseline characterization to facilitate planning. Throughout
execution, tailored, continuous JIPOE products capture the dynamic OE in support of the
assessment process to facilitate risk management and operations adjustments and to
identify new opportunities. Joint forces may suffer casualties due to various health threats
such as disease, including infectious disease, and combat or noncombat injuries, including
injury from environmental health hazards that limit operational functions and adversely
affect combat power. Medical intelligence preparation of the operational environment
(MIPOE) products help decision makers devise protection measures to mitigate these
threats.
d. JIPOE
(1) JFCs use assigned and attached intelligence forces and coordinate with
supporting interagency intelligence capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture
and analyze the OE. These supporting capabilities include combat support agencies (e.g.,
National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency [NGA]) and national intelligence agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence
Agency). National intelligence support may be provided to the J-2 as requested to integrate
national intelligence capabilities into a comprehensive intelligence effort designed to
support the joint force. The J-2 should integrate these supporting capabilities with the
efforts of the assigned and attached intelligence forces. Liaison personnel from the various
agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can
focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements.
(2) As crises emerge that potentially require military action, JFCs examine
available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs focus intelligence
efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy capabilities,
dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current situation.
They look for specific warning intelligence of imminent enemy activity that may require
an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.
e. The intelligence function encompasses the joint intelligence process. The joint
intelligence process consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence operations:
f. Key Considerations
(1) Responsibilities. JFCs and their component commanders are the key
players in planning and conducting intelligence tasks. Commanders are more than just
consumers of intelligence. They are responsible for fully integrating intelligence into their
plans and operations. They are also responsible for distributing intelligence and
information to subordinate commands and, when appropriate, to relevant participants
through established protocols and systems. Commanders establish operational and
intelligence requirements and continuous feedback to ensure optimum intelligence support
to planning and operations. This interface supports the commander and operational
planning and execution. It also mitigates surprise, assists friendly deception efforts, and
enables joint operation assessment.
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For additional guidance on the intelligence function, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP
2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; and other subordinate
JPs that address intelligence support to targeting, CI, HUMINT, geospatial intelligence
(GEOINT), and JIPOE.
5. Fires
a. To employ fires is to use available weapons and other systems to create a specific
effect on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the employment of forces from two
or more components in coordinated action to produce desired results in support of a
common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects, but various other tools and
methods can be employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This function
encompasses the fires associated with a number of tasks, missions, and processes,
including:
(1) Conduct Joint Targeting. This is the process of selecting and prioritizing
targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of command
objectives, operational requirements, and capabilities.
(2) Provide Joint Fire Support. This task includes joint fires that assist joint
forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, space, cyberspace, airspace,
and key waters.
(3) Countering Air and Missile Threats. This task integrates offensive and
defensive operations and capabilities to achieve and maintain a desired degree of air
superiority and force protection. These operations are planned to destroy or negate enemy
manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch.
(5) Conduct Strategic Attack. This task includes offensive action against
targets—whether military, political, economic, or other—which are selected specifically
to achieve national or military strategic objectives.
(6) Assess the Results of Employing Fires. This task includes assessing the
effectiveness and performance of fires, as well as their contribution to the larger operation
or objective.
b. Key Considerations. The following are key considerations associated with the
above tasks:
(1) Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to
actions and tasks at the component level. Commanders and their staffs must consider
strategic- and operational-level objectives, the potential for friendly fire incidents and other
undesired fires effects, and operational limitations (e.g., constraints and restraints) when
making targeting decisions. Impact on all systems in the OE should be considered during
this process. Successful integration of engagement options to create nonlethal effects
through cyberspace into the targeting process is important to mission accomplishment in
many operations.
(a) Oversight. JFCs may task their staff to accomplish broad targeting
oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander.
Typically, JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so
designates, a JTCB may be either an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review
mechanism. In either case, it should be composed of representatives from the staff, all
components and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to
link target priorities, guidance, and the associated effects to the JFC’s objectives. JTCB
participants should ensure all components and applicable staff elements coordinate and
synchronize targeting efforts with intelligence and operations.
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with other component commanders, the JFACC recommends air apportionment to the JFC,
who makes the air apportionment decision. The JFACC’s rationale for the
recommendation may include priority or percentage of effort based on the JFC’s CONOPS,
specific tasks for which air assets are essential, and other factors such as the component
commanders’ joint fires requirements. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision,
the JFACC allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made available.
For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control of
Joint Air Operations.
(2) Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime,
cyberspace, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory,
populations, airspace, cyberspace, EMS, and key waters. Joint fire support may include,
but is not limited to, manned and unmanned fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tiltrotor aircraft;
naval surface fire support; artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles; and other effects of
some cyberspace attack, space control operations, EA, and other capabilities to create
nonlethal effects. Close air support is a critical element of joint fire support that requires
detailed planning, coordination, and training of ground and supporting air forces for safe
and effective execution. Integration and synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support
with the fire and maneuver of the supported force are essential.
For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. For
more information on close air support, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.
(a) The JFC counters air and missile threats to ensure friendly freedom of
action, provide protection, and deny enemy freedom of action. Counterair integrates
offensive and defensive operations to achieve and maintain the JFC’s desired degrees of
control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles,
both before and after launch. The counterair mission is inherently a joint and
interdependent endeavor. Each component of the joint force contributes capabilities
necessary for mission success. In addition, Service capability and force structure
development reflect a purposeful reliance on all components to maximize complementary
and reinforcing effects while minimizing relative vulnerabilities. Due to the joint and
interdependent nature, all components of the joint force normally are tasked to conduct
operations in support of the counterair mission. The JFC will normally designate an AADC
and a JFACC to enhance unity of command (or unity of effort), centralized planning and
direction, and decentralized execution for countering air and missile threats.
(c) Control of the Air. Control of the air is a prerequisite to success for
modern operations or campaigns because it prevents enemy air and missile threats from
effectively interfering with operations thus facilitating freedom of action and movement.
Control of the air cannot be assumed. In the air, the degree of control can range from no
control, to parity where neither opponent can claim any level of control over the other, to
local air superiority, to air supremacy over the entire OA. Control of the air may vary over
time. It is important to remember that the degree of control of the air is scalable and can
be localized geographically (horizontally and vertically) or defined in the context of an
entire theater. The desired degree of control will be at the direction of the JFC and based
on the JFC’s CONOPS and will typically be an initial priority objective of joint air
operations. Air superiority is that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the
conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from
air and missile threats. Air supremacy is that degree of control of the air wherein the
opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the OA using air and missile
threats. Counterair operations usually begin early in the conduct of an operation or
campaign to produce the desired degree of control of the air at the times and places chosen
by the JFC.
(d) Integrating Air and Missile Defense. While joint combat focuses on
operations within one or more OAs, threats to joint forces can come from well outside
assigned JOAs, and even outside a GCC’s AOR. In particular, an enemy’s missiles and
long-range aircraft can pose significant challenges that require integration of defensive
capabilities from both within and beyond a GCC’s AOR. The GCC integrates air and
missile defense capabilities and activities within the theater. In support, SecDef establishes
command relationships for global missile defense, global strike, and other cross-AOR
operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM exercises coordinating authority for planning of global
missile defense, in coordination with other CCDRs, the Service component commanders,
and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies. The intended result is
integration of OCA attack operations, DCA operations, and other capabilities as required
to create the JFC’s desired effects.
Refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for additional guidance on air
superiority and countering air and missile threats.
(4) Interdiction
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normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while
JFLCCs and JFMCCs are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.
(c) Many elements of the joint force can conduct interdiction operations.
Air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces can conduct
interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, an
amphibious force charged with seizing and securing a beachhead along a coast may include
the interdiction of opposing land and maritime forces inside the amphibious objective area
(AOA) as part of the overall amphibious plan.
Refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, for more guidance on joint interdiction operations.
Refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, for more information on CTF.
(a) Global strike is the capability to rapidly plan and deliver extended-range
attacks, limited in duration and scope, to create precision effects against enemy assets in
support of national and theater commander objectives. Global strike missions employ
capabilities against a wide variety of targets to create lethal and nonlethal effects.
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(8) Capabilities That Can Create Nonlethal Effects. Some capabilities can
generate nonlethal effects that limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and may
reduce opportunities for enemy or adversary propaganda. They may also reduce the
number of casualties associated with excessive use of force, limit reconstruction costs, and
maintain the good will of the local populace. Some capabilities are nonlethal by design
and include, but are not limited to, blunt impact and warning munitions, acoustic and
optical warning devices, and vehicle and vessel stopping systems.
(c) MISO. MISO actions and messages can generate effects that gain
support for JFC objectives; reduce the will of the enemy, adversary, and sympathizer; and
decrease the combat effectiveness of enemy forces. MISO are an effective capability that
creates effects throughout the entire conflict continuum. However, MISO require unique
dissemination, budget, attribution, and series approval authorities, which often require
longer lead times than other authorities.
(1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint and/or component force formations
within the OA by any means or mode (i.e., air, land, or sea).
(3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver
without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.
(4) Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. This
includes operations that employ obstacles (i.e., countermobility), enforce sanctions and
embargoes, and conduct blockades.
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appropriate time and place. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a
joint force can successfully employ its military capabilities. At other times, mobilization
and deployment processes can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces
from the continental United States (CONUS) or other theaters to redress any unfavorable
balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place.
(2) JFCs must carefully consider the movement of forces and whether to
recommend the formation and/or movement of multinational forces. They must be aware
of A2/AD threats, which may slow or disrupt the deployment of friendly forces. At times,
movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension; while at other times, its
deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces may deter adversary
aggression or movement.
Refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for more information on the
deployment process.
(2) There are multiple ways to gain positional advantage. An amphibious force
with aircraft, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach
of an enemy’s COG, has positional advantage. In like manner, land and air expeditionary
forces that are within operational reach of an enemy’s COG and have the means and
opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have positional advantage.
Maintaining full-spectrum superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating
freedom of action. See Chapter VIII, “Large-Scale Combat Operations,” paragraph 5.g,
“Full-Spectrum Superiority.”
(3) At all levels of warfare, successful maneuver requires not only fire and
movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations.
It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the
principles of mass and economy of force.
(a) At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an
OA are forms of maneuver if such movements seek to gain positional advantage. Strategic
maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a
campaign.
(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the
terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations.
Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where
they are in position of operational reach from which to achieve operational objectives. The
enemy may use AD actions to impede friendly operations when A2 actions fail. The
objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.
(4) Force posture (forces, footprints, and agreements) affects operational reach
and is an essential maneuver-related consideration during theater strategy development and
adaptive planning. Force posture is the starting position from which planners determine
additional contingency basing requirements to support specific contingency plans and
crisis responses. These requirements directly support the development of operational
LOCs and LOOs and affect the combat power and other capabilities a joint force can
generate. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of temporary contingency bases
underwrite the ability of the joint force to project power by shielding its components from
enemy action and protecting critical factors such as sortie or resupply rates. Incomplete
planning for contingency base operations can unnecessarily increase the sustainment
requirements of the joint force, leading to unanticipated risk. Political and diplomatic
considerations can often affect basing decisions. US force basing options span the range
from permanently based forces to temporary sea basing that accelerates the deployment
and employment of maritime capabilities independent of infrastructure ashore.
(5) JFCs should consider various ways and means to help maneuver forces gain
positional advantage. Specifically, combat engineers provide mobility of the force by
breaching obstacles, while simultaneously countering the mobility of enemy forces by
emplacing obstacles and minimizing the effects of enemy actions on friendly forces.
7. Protection
(1) The function focuses on force protection, which preserves the joint force’s
fighting potential in four primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that
protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and LOCs from
an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly forces,
systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy by reducing the probability of,
and minimizing the effects of, damage caused by hostile action without the intention of
taking the initiative. The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of
friendly fire incidents is equally important. Finally, emergency management and response
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reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to isolating events, accidents, health
threats, and natural disasters.
(2) Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect
against accidents, weather, or disease. FHP complements force protection efforts by
promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the mental or physical well-being of Service
members.
(3) As the JFC’s mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond
force protection to encompass protection of US noncombatants.
(4) Conduct OPSEC, cyberspace defense, cyberspace security, defensive EA, and
electronic protection activities.
(8) Secure and protect combat and logistics forces, bases, JSAs, and LOCs.
(9) Provide physical protection and security for forces, to include conducting
operations to mitigate the effects of explosive hazards.
(13) Protect the DODIN using cyberspace security and cyberspace defense
measures.
(15) Conduct identity collection activities. These include security screening and
vetting in support of I2.
e. Key Considerations
(1) Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and
reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations
protect combat and logistics forces, bases, JSAs, and LOCs. Physical security includes
physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to
equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process determines
vulnerabilities to known threats; applies appropriate deterrent, control, and denial
safeguarding techniques and measures; and responds to changing conditions. Functions in
physical security include facility security, law enforcement, guard and patrol operations,
special land and maritime security areas, and other physical security operations like
military working dog operations or emergency and disaster response support. Measures
include fencing and perimeter stand-off areas, land or maritime force patrols, lighting and
sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic
surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any
defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.
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For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security
Operations in Theater.
(2) DCA. DCA supports protection using both active and passive air and missile
defense measures.
(a) Active air and missile defense includes all direct defensive actions taken
to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against
friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air and missile defense weapons,
multiple sensors, EW, and other available weapons. Ideally, integration of systems will
allow for a defense in depth, with potential for multiple engagements that increase the
probability for success.
(b) Passive air and missile defense includes all measures, other than active
air and missile defense, taken to minimize, mitigate, or recover from the consequences of
attack aircraft and missiles, reducing the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment,
deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the
use of protective construction.
For additional guidance on countering theater air and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01,
Countering Air and Missile Threats.
(a) OPSEC denies the adversary the information needed to correctly assess
friendly capabilities and intentions. It is also a tool, hampering the adversary’s use of its
own information systems and processes. OPSEC should be integrated into planning. The
purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces to
successful adversary exploitation of critical information. Unlike security programs that
seek to protect classified information and controlled unclassified information, OPSEC
identifies, controls, and protects critical information and indicators that are associated
with specific military operations and activities. OPSEC applies to all activities that
prepare, sustain, or employ forces. The OPSEC process subsequently analyzes friendly
actions associated with military operations and other activities to:
For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01, Joint Operations Security,
and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
(5) PR. PR missions use military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and
reintegrate isolated personnel. There are five PR tasks (report, locate, support, recover,
and reintegrate) necessary to achieve a complete and coordinated recovery of US military
personnel, DOD civilians, DOD contractors, and others designated by the President or
SecDef. JFCs should consider all individual, component, joint, and multinational partner
capabilities available when planning and executing PR missions.
Refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, and DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the
Department of Defense, for further guidance on PR.
(6) CBRN Defense. Preparation for potential enemy use of CBRN weapons is
integral to joint planning. Even when an enemy does not possess CBRN materiel or WMD,
access to materials such as radiation sources and toxic industrial materials is a significant
planning consideration. Whether a CBRN attack achieves traditional military objectives,
it will likely generate adverse strategic, operational, psychological, economic, and political
effects. CBRN defense focuses on avoiding CBRN hazards (contamination), protecting
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individuals and units from CBRN hazards, and decontaminating personnel and materiel to
restore operational capability. CBRN defense may also contribute to the deterrence of
enemy WMD use through the enhancement of US forces’ CBRN survivability. CBRN
defense capabilities may also respond to a noncombatant incident or accidental causes such
as toxic industrial chemical incident.
(b) The staff should develop CID procedures early during planning. These
procedures must be consistent with ROE and should not interfere with the ability of a unit
or individual to engage enemy forces. When developing the JFC’s CID procedures,
important considerations include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all
participants.
For further guidance on countering insider threats, see JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations
in Theater. For more information on identity activities, see JDN 2-16, Identity Activities.
f. FHP complements force protection efforts and includes all measures taken by the
JFC and the Military Health System to promote, improve, and conserve the mental and
physical well-being of Service members. These capabilities enable a healthy and fit force,
prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. FHP measures focus
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on the prevention of illness and injury. The JFC is responsible for allocating adequate
capabilities to identify health threats and implement appropriate FHP measures. Health
threats are a composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions; occupational,
environmental, geographical, and meteorological conditions; endemic diseases; and the
employment of CBRN weapons or agents that can reduce the effectiveness of military
forces. Therefore, a robust health surveillance system is essential to FHP measures.
Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk; identifying and assessing
hazardous exposures; employing specific countermeasures to eliminate or mitigate
exposures; and monitoring and reporting battle injury, disease, and non-battle injury trends
and other health outcomes. Occupational and environmental health surveillance enhances
the joint force’s ability to limit all categories of injuries including combat and operational
stress, exposure to CBRN, and explosive hazards.
g. Protection of Civilians. Persons who are neither part of nor associated with an
armed force or group nor otherwise engaged in hostilities are categorized as civilians and
have protected status under the law of war.
(1) It is US policy that members of the DOD components comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other
military operations. Such compliance includes taking measures to protect civilians. In
addition, the accountability, credibility, and legitimacy of a joint operation; the success of
the overarching mission; and the achievement of US strategic objectives depends on the
joint forces’ ability to minimize harm to civilians in the course of their own operations and,
potentially, their ability to mitigate harm arising from the operations of other parties.
Strategic objectives often involve strengthening security, stability, and civilian well-being.
(3) Civilian casualty mitigation directly affects the success of the overall mission.
Even tactical actions can have strategic and second-order effects. Minimizing and
addressing civilian casualty incidents supports strategic imperatives and are also at the
heart of the profession of arms. Failure to minimize civilian casualties can undermine
national policy objectives and the mission of joint forces, while assisting the enemy.
Additionally, civilian casualties can incite increased opposition to joint forces. Focused
attention on civilian casualty mitigation can be an important investment to maintain
legitimacy and accomplish the mission.
See Department of Defense Law of War Manual regarding obligations for protection of
civilians.
8. Sustainment
(1) Coordinate the supply of food, operational energy (fuel and other energy
requirements), arms, munitions, and equipment.
(3) Coordinate and provide support for forces, including field services; personnel
services support; health services; mortuary affairs; religious support (RS); postal support;
morale, welfare, and recreational support; financial support; and legal services.
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the JFC’s CONOPS. The relative combat power that military forces can generate against
an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver
forces and materiel to points of application. Logistics covers the following core
functions: supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, joint health services,
logistic services, engineering, and operational contract support (OCS). Associated
with these functions, logistics includes those aspects of military operations that deal with:
(4) Logistic services (food, water, and ice; contingency basing; and hygiene).
(2) RS.
For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For further
guidance on personnel services, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. For further
guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations. For
further guidance on religious affairs, refer to Joint Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint
Operations. For further guidance on financial management support, refer to JP 1-06,
Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.
e. Key Considerations
(1) Employment of Logistic Forces. For some operations, logistic forces may
be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles and in
nonstandard tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other military forces or may be the
only forces deployed. Logistic forces may also continue to support other military personnel
and civilians after the departure of combat forces. In such cases, they must be familiar
with and adhere to applicable status-of-forces agreements and acquisition and cross-
servicing agreements to which the US is a party. Given the potential complexity of OEs,
logistic forces must be familiar with and adhere to legal, regulatory, and
diplomatic/political restraints governing US involvement because of the specialized nature
and unique authorities in operations such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance
(2) Protection. Logistics forces, like all other forces, must be capable of self-
defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces. However,
the JFC should view combat and logistics forces as a unit with a seamless mission and
objective and balance the allocation of security resources accordingly in support of the
JFC’s mission.
(3) Facilities. JFCs should plan for the early acquisition (leasing) of real estate
and facilities and bases when temporary occupancy is planned or the HN provides
inadequate or no property. Early acquisition of facilities can be critical to the flow of
forces. Use of automated planning tools can help forecast construction labor, materiel, and
equipment requirements in support of the JFC’s contingency basing plan.
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members. All significant risks must be clearly and accurately communicated to deploying
DOD personnel and the chain of command. Environmental considerations, risk
management, and health risk communication are enabling elements for the commander and
an essential part of military planning, training, and operations. While complete protection
of the environment during military operations may not always be possible, careful planning
should address environmental considerations in joint operations, including legal aspects.
(5) Operational Energy. The ability of the joint force to conduct operations
depends on availability of sufficient energy, such as bulk fuel and electricity. Proper
consideration of operational energy requirements improves the joint force’s ability to
maintain operational access. Furthermore, efficient management and use of operational
energy may enable greater availability of combat forces for a variety of missions.
(6) Joint Health Services. Joint health services promote, improve, preserve, or
restore the behavioral or physical well-being of personnel. Joint health services include,
but are not limited to, the management of health service resources, such as manpower,
funding, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; medical evacuation and
patient movement of the sick, wounded, or injured; selection of the medically fit and
disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and
maintenance thereof; combat and operational stress control; and medical, dental,
veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services.
Medical logistics, included within joint health services, includes patient movement,
evacuation, and hospitalization. CCDRs are responsible for joint health services of forces
assigned or attached to their command and should establish joint health services policies
and programs.
(c) Medical and rehabilitative care provides essential care in the OA and
rapid evacuation to definitive care facilities without sacrificing quality of care. It
encompasses care provided from the point of illness or injury through rehabilitative care.
For further guidance on health services, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. For
further guidance on procedures for deployment health activities, refer to DODI 6490.03,
Deployment Health.
(8) OCS. Logistics support requirements are often met through contracts with
commercial entities inside and outside the OA. Most joint operations will require a level
of contracted support. Certain contracted items or services could be essential to deploying,
sustaining, and redeploying joint forces effectively. OCS is the process to plan for and
obtain supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint
operations. OCS is a multi-faceted joint activity executed by the GCC and subordinate
JFCs through boards, centers, working groups, and associated lead Service or joint theater
support contracting-related activities. It includes the ability to plan, orchestrate, and
synchronize the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and
contractor management.
For further information on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; DODI
3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational
Contract Support.
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Chapter III
(10) Legal Support. Legal support is important across all joint functions. Many
decisions and actions have potential legal implications. The JFC’s staff judge advocate
(SJA) provides the full spectrum of legal support during all joint operations through direct
and reachback capability. A key member of the JFC’s personal staff, the SJA provides
legal advice on the laws, regulations, policies, treaties, and agreements that affect joint
operations. Legal advisors actively participate in the planning process from mission
analysis to execution, an essential function given the complexity of the OE. Legal
representatives advise on fiscal activities, international law, and many other factors that
can affect operations, to include identifying legal issues that affect operational limitations.
Further, the JFC should integrate HN legal personnel into the command legal staff as soon
as practical to obtain guidance on unique HN legal practices and customs.
Refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, for more detailed information and
guidance on legal support.
(11) Religious Affairs. The joint operations area requires both the provision of
RS and advisement of the impact of religion upon operations, morale, and ethics. The
JFC’s religious support team (RST) provides both required capabilities directly and by
means of reachback capability. As a member of the JFC’s personal staff, the chaplain
provides advisement on morals, ethics, and religion as they pertain to the OE and the joint
force.
Refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, for more detailed
information and guidance on financial management support.
“Good will can make any organization work; conversely, the best organization
chart in the world is unsound if the men who have to make it work don't believe
in it.”
1. Introduction
Organizing for joint operations involves many considerations. Most can be associated
in three primary groups related to organizing the joint force, organizing the joint force HQ,
and organizing OAs to help control operations. Understanding the OE helps the JFC
understand factors that may affect decisions in each of these areas.
a. General. Factors that affect joint operations extend far beyond the boundaries of
the JFC’s assigned JOA. The JFC’s OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances,
and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander. It encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and space domains;
the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the EMS; and other factors.
Included within these are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a
specific joint operation. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the
commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations.
(1) Physical Areas. The fundamental physical area in the OE is the JFC’s
assigned OA. This term encompasses more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which
joint forces conduct military operations. OAs include, but are not limited to, such
descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, AOA, joint special
operations area (JSOA), and AO.
(2) Physical Factors. The JFC and staff must consider many factors associated
with operations in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information
environment (which includes cyberspace). These factors include terrain (including urban
settings), population, weather, topography, hydrology, EMS, and other environmental
conditions in the OA; distances associated with the deployment to the OA and employment
of joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; the
physical results of combat operations; and both friendly and enemy forces and other
capabilities. Combinations of these factors affect operations and sustainment.
IV-1
Chapter IV
For more information on the EMS and EMS operations, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare,
and JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.
e. A Systems Perspective
(3) Understanding PMESII systems, their interaction with each other, and how
system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC’s knowledge of how
actions within a system can affect other system components. Among other benefits, this
perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources of warning intelligence
and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex interaction of friendly,
adversary, enemy, and neutral systems. A systems understanding also facilitates
identification of operational design elements such as COGs, LOOs, and decisive points.
For example, Figure IV-1 depicts notional operational and strategic COGs (there could be
more). It shows each as a sub-system composed of related nodes and clarifies that the two
COGs are related by a common node. This helps commanders and their staffs visualize
and develop a broad approach to mission accomplishment early in the planning process,
which makes detailed planning more efficient.
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Chapter IV
a. General. How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces affects the
responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The JFC’s mission and operational
approach, as well as the principle of unity of command and a mission command
philosophy, are guiding principles to organize the joint force for operations. Joint
forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis. JFCs may centralize
selected functions within the joint force but should not reduce the versatility,
responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and special
operations tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities to function
generally as they were designed. All Service components contribute distinct capabilities
to joint operations that enable joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful
Information
Infrastructure
Social
Military
Operational
COG
Economic
Strategic
COG Political
A systems perspective facilitates operational design and joint operation planning by providing
the joint force commander (JFC) and staff with a common frame of reference for collaboration
with interorganizational and multinational partners to determine and coordinate actions that are
beyond the JFC’s command authority.
Legend
COG center of gravity Decisive Point COG Node Node Link
(3) Joint Task Forces (JTFs). A JTF is a joint force constituted and designated
by SecDef; a CCDR; a subordinate unified command commander; or an existing
commander, joint task force (CJTF), to accomplish missions with specific, limited
objectives and which do not require centralized control of logistics. However, there may
IV-5
Chapter IV
be situations where a CJTF may require directive authority for common support
capabilities delegated by the CCDR. JTFs may be established on a geographical area or
functional basis. However, JTFs can also be established based on a security challenge that
focuses on specific threats that cross AOR boundaries or multiple noncontiguous
geographic areas. The proper authority dissolves a JTF when the JTF achieves the
objectives for which it was created or is no longer required.
(4) There are several ways to form a JTF HQ. Normally, a CCMD may employ
a Service component HQ or one of the Service component’s existing subordinate HQ (e.g.,
Army corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet, or Marine expeditionary force) as the
core of a JTF HQ and then augment that core with personnel and capabilities from the
Services comprising the JTF. Also, the theater special operations command (TSOC) or a
subordinate SOF HQ with the C2 capability can form the foundation for a JTF HQ. CCDRs
verify the readiness of assigned Service HQ staffs to establish, organize, and operate as a
JTF-capable HQ. JTF HQ basing depends on the JTF mission, OE, and available
capabilities and support. JTF HQ can be land- or sea-based, with transitions between both
basing options. JTFs are normally assigned a JOA. JTFs must be able to integrate
effectively with USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, and indigenous
and regional stakeholders. When direct participation by USG departments and agencies
other than DOD is significant, the TF establishing authority may designate it as a joint
interagency TF. This typically occurs when the other interagency partners have primacy
and legal authority and the JFC provides supporting capabilities, such as humanitarian
assistance.
(5) Forming and training the joint force HQ and task organizing the joint force
can be challenging, particularly in crisis situations. Joint forces must quickly adjust both
operations and organization in response to planned operational transitions or unexpected
situational transitions. For example, achieving combat objectives in the dominate phase of
an operation much earlier than anticipated could signal to the JFC to shift emphasis and
organization quickly to stability actions commonly associated with the stabilize and enable
civil authority phases. Similarly, the JFC’s mission will affect the echelon at which joint
capabilities are best employed. Advances in areas ranging from communications and
information sharing to munitions effectiveness make it possible to synchronize lower
echelons of command in some situations without the risks and inefficiencies associated
with fragmenting the assets themselves. JFCs should exploit such opportunities.
For further guidance on the formation and employment of a JTF HQ, refer to JP 3-33,
Joint Task Force Headquarters.
IV-7
Chapter IV
functional component staff for exercises and actual operations. The number of staff
personnel should be appropriate for the mission and nature of the operation. The staff
structure should be flexible enough to add or delete personnel and capabilities in changing
conditions without losing effectiveness.
(c) The JFC designates forces and/or military capabilities that will be made
available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate
command relationship(s). JFCs may also establish a support relationship between
components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority
and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the CONOPS, and the
JFC may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation.
(3) Combination. Joint forces often are organized with a combination of Service
and functional components. For example, joint forces organized with Service components
normally have SOF organized under a JFSOCC, while the conventional air forces will
normally have a JFACC designated, whose authorities and responsibilities are defined by
the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s CONOPS.
(1) Used independently with conventional force support (since USC limits SOF
combat support and combat service support) or integrated with conventional forces, SOF
provide strategic options for national leaders and the GCCs through a global network that
fully integrates military, interagency, and international partners. SOF are most effective
when special operations are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of
special operations is through proper SOF C2 elements employed intact.
Joint force HQ include those for unified, subordinate unified, and specified commands
and JTFs. While each HQ organizes to accommodate the nature of the JFC’s OA, mission,
tasks, and preferences, all generally follow a traditional functional staff alignment (i.e.,
personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications) depicted in
Figure IV-2. The primary staff functional areas are also generally consistent with those at
Service component HQ, which facilitates higher, lower, and lateral cross-command staff
coordination and collaboration. Some HQ may combine functions under a staff principal,
while other HQ may add staff principals. Based on the mission and other factors, some
joint HQ may have additional primary staff organizations focused on areas such as
engineering; force structure, resource, and assessment; and CMO.
a. General. Except for AORs, which are assigned in the UCP, GCCs and other JFCs
designate smaller OAs (e.g., JOA and AO) on a temporary basis. OAs have physical
dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains.
While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical
environment in which operations are conducted (the OA), the use of the term “domain” is
not meant to imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. Specific
authorities and responsibilities within an OA are as specified by the appropriate JFC. JFCs
define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help commanders and staffs
Chief of Staff
Working
Centers and Offices and Groups and
Cells Boards
Groups Elements Planning
Teams
NOTE: The commander may add additional primary J-staff directorates as required.
Legend
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
Figure IV-2. Notional Joint Force Headquarters and Cross-Functional Staff Organization
IV-9
Chapter IV
During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the joint forces rear area was
centered around the separate sites of the embassy compound, port, and
airfield in the city of Mogadishu, while its operational area was widely
scattered around the towns and villages of the interior. The area of interest
included the rest of the country and particularly those population and relief
centers not under the joint force commander’s supervision.
Various Sources
coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force components and
supporting commands. The size of these OAs and the types of forces employed within
them depend on the scope and nature of the mission and the projected duration of
operations.
(1) AOR. An AOR is an area established by the UCP that defines geographic
responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has authority to plan for operations within the AOR
and conduct those operations approved by the President or SecDef. CCDRs may operate
forces wherever required to accomplish approved missions. All cross-AOR operations
must be coordinated among the affected GCCs.
AOR Theater of
War
JOA
Theater of
Operations
JSOA
This example depicts a combatant commander’s AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR,
the combatant commander has designated a theater of war. Within the theater of war are two
theaters of operations and a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatant
commander has established a theater of operations and a JOA, within which a joint task force will
operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.
Legend
AOR area of responsibility JSOA joint special operations area
JOA joint operations area
operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are normally
associated with major operations and campaigns and may cross the boundary of two AORs.
c. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, or for specialized activities,
the commander can establish the following OAs.
(1) JOA. A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a GCC or
subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) conducts military
operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations
are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the
boundaries between theaters.
(2) JSOA. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the
commander of SOF to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to
accommodate a discreet direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a
continuing broad range of unconventional warfare (UW) operations. A JSOA is defined
by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and
facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations. The JFSOCC is the supported
commander within the JSOA.
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Chapter IV
(3) AOA. The AOA is a geographic area within which is located the objective(s)
to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to accomplish
the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary
sea, air, and land operations.
(4) AO. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. AOs do not
typically encompass the entire OA of the JFC but should be large enough for component
commanders to accomplish their missions (to include a designated amount of airspace) and
protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate
AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full
range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other
component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict
operations, and achieve unity of effort.
(1) OAs may be contiguous or noncontiguous (Figure IV-4). When they are
contiguous, a boundary separates them. When OAs are noncontiguous, subordinate
commands do not share a boundary. The higher HQ retains responsibility for the
unassigned portion of its OA.
Refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, for specific guidance on assuming
responsibility for an OA.
JSOA
ARFOR
AO
MARFOR
AO ARFOR MARFOR
AO AO
JSA
JSA
Contiguous Noncontiguous
Adjacent, subordinate command’s operational Subordinate commands are assigned operational
areas share boundaries. In this case, the higher areas that do not share boundaries. The higher
headquarters has assigned all of its operational headquarters retains responsibility for the portion
area to subordinate commands. of its operational area not assigned to subordinate
commands.
Legend
AO area of operations JSOA joint special operations area
ARFOR Army forces MARFOR Marine Corps forces
JSA joint security area
IV-13
Chapter IV
Intentionally Blank
“I am confident that our Nation has the most professional and capable military
in the world. Our Joint Forces have proven effective and resilient throughout
years of combat, kept the homeland safe, and advanced our national interests
across the globe.”
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Force Quarterly 80
1. Introduction
a. Threats to US and allied interests throughout the world can sometimes only be
countered by US forces able to respond to a wide variety of challenges along a conflict
continuum that spans from peace to war. Our national interests and the nature of crises
that can occur along this continuum require our nation’s Armed Forces to be proficient in
a wide variety of activities, tasks, missions, and operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk,
and combat intensity.
V-1
Chapter V
military and law enforcement personnel identify terrorists and piece together their human
networks as part of combating terrorism.
b. Military operations are often categorized by their focus, as shown in Figure V-1.
In some cases, the title covers a variety of missions, tasks, and activities. Many activities
accomplished by single Services, such as tasks associated with security cooperation, do not
constitute a joint operation. Nonetheless, most of these occur under a joint “umbrella,”
because they contribute to achievement of CCDRs’ CCP objectives. Following are brief
summaries of examples of military operations and activities.
(3) FHA. FHA is DOD activities, normally in support of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) or DOS, conducted outside the US and
its territories to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. See JP 3-
29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
(4) Recovery. Recovery is operations to search for, locate, identify, recover, and
return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national
security. See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.
(6) Peace Operations (PO). PO are operations to contain conflict, redress the
peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the
transition to legitimate governance. PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace
enforcement operations (PEO), peacemaking (PM), peace building (PB), and conflict
prevention efforts. See JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.
(8) CBRN Response. CBRN response is DOD support to USG actions that plan
for, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of domestic and foreign CBRN
incidents. See JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.
V-3
Chapter V
a. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military
activities and operations in scope and purpose. The potential range of military activities
and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in
times of relative peace up through large-scale combat operations. The range encompasses
three primary categories: military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence;
crisis response and limited contingency operations; and large-scale combat
operations. Figure V-2 depicts these categories against a backdrop of the conflict
continuum. All operations across this range share a common fundamental purpose—to
achieve or contribute to national objectives.
c. The complex nature of the strategic environment may require US forces to conduct
different types of joint operations and activities simultaneously across the conflict
continuum. Although this publication discusses specific types of operations and activities
under the various categories in the range of military operations, each type is not doctrinally
Range of
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Military
Operations
Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict
continuum in a wide variety of operations and activities that are commonly characterized in
three groups as this figure depicts.
fixed and could shift within that range. For instance, security cooperation activities may
be satisfying internal security requirements of a PN, but the emergence of a violent internal
security threat that overwhelms PN security forces could require the USG to commit to
FID or COIN operations in that PN, while security cooperation activities continue.
(3) Large-Scale Combat Operations. The nature and scope of some missions
may require joint forces to conduct large-scale combat operations to achieve national
strategic objectives or protect national interests. Such combat typically occurs within the
framework of a major operation or campaign. A major operation is series of tactical actions
(battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services,
coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an OA. The
term can also refer to a noncombat operation of significant size and scope. A campaign is
a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives
within a given time and space. Usually associated with large-scale combat, a campaign
can also comprise predominately limited combat and noncombat operations of extended
duration to achieve theater and national strategic objectives. See Chapter VIII, “Large-
Scale Combat Operations.”
V-5
Chapter V
c. The CCP also provides context for ongoing crisis response and contingency
operations to facilitate execution of contingency plans as branch plans to the CCP. These
are plans to respond to potential crises such as natural or man-made disasters and military
Counterterrorism OPLAN/
OPORD
Stability Actions
Peacekeeping
Time
The geographic combatant commander’s theater campaign encompasses and provides context for all planned
and ongoing theater activities, crisis response requirements, and combat operations. The goal is to preclude the
necessity for a combat solution to problems, while maintaining an acceptable level of stability.
Legend
OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order
aggression. Also linked to the GCC’s CCP and subordinate campaign plans are designated
DOD global campaign plans that address integrated execution of global security priorities.
f. Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. For example,
FHA is focused on a humanitarian purpose (e.g., Operation TOMODACHI, an assistance
operation to support Japan in disaster relief following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and
tsunami). A strike may be conducted for the specific purpose of compelling or deterring
an action (e.g., Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 operation to coerce Libya to
conform with international laws against terrorism). Often, however, military operations
will have multiple purposes (based on strategic and operational-level objectives) and will
be influenced by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and sequel events may produce
additional tasks for the force, challenging the command with multiple missions (e.g.,
Operations PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia were PEO
that evolved from FHA efforts). Joint forces must strive to meet such challenges with
clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes.
V-7
Chapter V
example, Figure V-4 shows six general groups of military activities that may typically
occur in preparation for and during a single large-scale joint combat operation.
b. The nature of operations and activities during a typical joint combat operation will
change from its beginning (when the CJCS issues the execute order) to the operation’s end
(when the joint force disbands and components return to a pre-operation status). Shaping
activities are usually ongoing and may continue during and after the operation. The
purpose of shaping activities is to help set the conditions for successful execution of the
operation. Figure V-4 shows, that from deter through enable civil authority, the operations
and activities in these groups vary in magnitude—time, intensity, forces, etc.—as the
operation progresses (the relative magnitudes in the figure are notional). At various points
in time, each specific group might characterize the main effort of the joint force. For
example, dominate activities would characterize the main effort after the joint force seizes
Enable
Activities
Dominate
Level of Military Effort
Stabilize
Activities Activities
Develop Revise,
and Maintain,
Maintain or Cancel
Operation Operation
Plan Plan
XXXX XXXX
Deter Activities
Operation Shaping Activities
Theater Shaping Activities
The model depicts six general groups of military activities that typically comprise a single joint
combat operation. The model applies to a large-scale combat operation as well as to a combat
operation relatively limited in scope and duration. It shows that emphasis on activity types shifts as
an operation progresses.
Operation shaping activities may begin during plan development to help set conditions for
successful execution. They may continue after the operation ends if the command continues to
maintain an operation plan.
Theater and global shaping activities occur continuously to support theater and global requirements.
Specific theater and global shaping activities may support a specific joint operation plan during its
execution.
the initiative until the enemy no longer is able to effectively resist. Even so, activities in
the other groups would usually occur concurrently at some level of effort. The following
paragraphs provide more information on the nature of these activities.
(1) Shape
(a) In general, shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater
operations. Shaping activities include long-term persistent and preventive military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure friends, build partner
capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. They help identify, deter, counter,
and/or mitigate competitor and adversary actions that challenge country and regional
stability. A GCC’s CCP provides these and other activities tasked by SecDef/CJCS
strategic guidance in pursuit of national objectives. Likewise, CCDRs may direct more
focused geographic and functional shaping activities at the potential execution of specific
contingency plans for various types of operations. In the best case, shaping activities may
avert or diminish conflict. At the least, shaping provides a deeper, and common,
understanding of the OE. Preparatory intelligence activities inform operation assessment,
planning, and execution to improve the JFC’s understanding of the OE.
V-9
Chapter V
(3) Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through
decisive use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and
offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate
offensively and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint
combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression and
to deny the enemy its initial objectives. Operations to gain access to theater infrastructure
and expand friendly freedom of action continue during this phase, while the JFC seeks to
degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.
(4) Dominate. These actions focus on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in
noncombat situations, to control the OE. Successful domination depends on overmatching
enemy capabilities at critical times and places. Joint force options include attacking
weaknesses at the leading edge of the enemy’s defensive perimeter to roll enemy forces
back and striking in depth to threaten the integrity of the enemy’s A2/AD, offensive
weapons and force projection capabilities, and defensive systems. Operations can range
from large-scale combat to various stability actions depending on the nature of the enemy.
Dominating activities may establish the conditions to achieve strategic objectives early or
may set the conditions for transition to a subsequent phase of the operation.
(5) Stabilize. These actions and activities are typically characterized by a shift
in focus from sustained combat operations to stability activities. These operations help
reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent is to help
restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may lead
operations during part or all of this period, but the JFC will typically provide significant
supporting capabilities and activities. The joint force may be required to perform limited
local governance (i.e., military government) and integrate the efforts of other supporting
interagency and multinational partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. The
JFC continuously assesses the impact of operations on the ability to transfer authority for
remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity.
(6) Enable Civil Authority. Joint force support to legitimate civil governance
typically characterizes these actions and activities. The commander provides this support
by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. In some cases, especially for operations
within the US, the commander provides this support under direction of the civil authority.
The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to govern and administer the
services and other needs of the population. The military end state is typically reached
during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation. CCMD involvement with other
nations and other government agencies beyond the termination of the joint operation, such
as lower-level stability activities and FHA, may be required to achieve national objectives.
c. Some joint operations below the level of large-scale combat will have
distinguishable groups of activity. However, activities may be compressed or absent
entirely according to the nature of the operation. For example, deployment of forces
associated with seize the initiative activities may have a deterrent effect sufficient to
dissuade an enemy from conducting further operations, returning the OE to a more stable
state. Likewise, although FID and NEO may occur as supporting operations to larger
combat operations in the OA, they will have no evident dominating activities. Figure V-5
shows a notional successful joint strike, which did not require follow-on operations. Figure
V-6 shows a notional FHA operation that required predominantly stabilize and enable civil
authority activities.
Dominate
Deter Activities
This is a notional example of the balance of military activities in a successful operation to coerce
the enemy to stop unacceptable behavior (e.g., state-sponsored terrorism, pursuit of nuclear
weapons). In this example, the President ordered strikes (seize the initiative activities). The
President prepared to order follow-on operations to compel enforcement when military-enforced
economic and other sanctions (deter activities) failed.
Examples include Operations EL DORADO CANYON (Libya, Apr 1986) and DESERT THUNDER
(Iraq, Dec 1998)
V-11
Chapter V
Enable Activities
Do
mi
Seize na
Initiative
te
Stabilize Activities
Activities
Deter Activities
This is a notional example of the balance of military activities by a joint task force (JTF) responding
to one type of crisis (foreign humanitarian assistance). There is no pre-existing operation plan in
this example. Therefore, there are no planned pre-crisis shaping activities except for theater
shaping that may generally support unplanned crisis response. Dominate activities might not occur
depending on the extent of criminal activity and lawlessness and the host nation government’s ability
to control it. Theater shaping activities that support stabilization and enable civil authorities in the
affected area may increase after the operation ends and the JTF disbands.
An example is Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (Haiti, Jan-Mar 2010).
Figure V-6. Notional Balance of Activities for a Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operation
a. The six general groups of activity in Figure V-4 provide a convenient basis for
thinking about a joint operation in notional phases, as Figure V-7 depicts. A phase is a
definitive stage or period during a joint operation in which a large portion of the forces and
capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose
that often is represented by intermediate objectives. Phasing, which can be used in any
operation regardless of size, helps the JFC organize large operations by integrating and
synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize, plan,
and execute the entire operation and define requirements in terms of forces,
resources, time, space, and purpose. It helps them systematically achieve military
objectives that cannot be achieved all at once by arranging smaller, focused, related
Enable
Level of Military Effort
Stabilize Activities
Activities
Deter Activities
Operation Shaping Activities
Theater Shaping Activities
The six general groups of activities provide a basis for thinking about a joint operation in notional
phases.
Phasing can be used in any joint operation regardless of size.
Phasing helps joint force commanders and staffs visualize, plan, and execute the entire operation
and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose to achieve
objectives.
operations in a logical sequence. Phasing also helps commanders mitigate risk in the more
dangerous or difficult portions of an operation.
b. Figure V-7 shows one phasing alternative. Actual phases of an operation will vary
(e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation
and the JFC’s decisions. For example, UW operations normally use a seven-phase model.
During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, and events for transitioning
from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies.
Phases may be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a
previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit
opportunities presented by the enemy and operational situation or to react to unforeseen
conditions.
V-13
Chapter V
The use of groups of activities for the purpose of phasing applies only
to planning and executing individual joint operations, not to a GCC’s
theater campaign or strategy development.
c. A GCC’s campaign encompasses all operations and activities for which the GCC
is responsible, from relatively benign security cooperation activities through ongoing
large-scale combat operations. All six groups of joint operation activities may be present
in the GCC’s AOR. However, use of the groups of activities for the purpose of phasing
applies only to planning and executing individual operations, whether small-scale
contingencies or large-scale campaigns that support the GCC’s campaign. The groups of
military activities associated with phases in Figure V-7 can serve as a frame of reference
that facilitates common understanding among interagency and multinational partners and
supporting commanders of how a JFC intends to execute a specific joint operation, as well
as progress during execution.
d. Transitions
(1) During execution, a transition marks a change between phases or between the
ongoing operations and execution of a branch or sequel. This shift in focus by the joint
force often is accompanied by changes in command or support relationships and priorities
of effort. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution. The
activities that predominate during a given phase rarely align with neatly definable
breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that
a set of objectives has been achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires
a major change for the joint force. Thus, the transition to a new phase is usually driven by
events rather than time. An example is the shift from sustained combat operations to
stability activities to enable civil authority. Through continuous assessment, the staff
measures progress toward planned transitions so that the force prepares for and executes
them.
(2) Sometimes, however, the situation facing the JFC will change unexpectedly
and without apparent correlation to a planned transition. The JFC may choose to shift
operations to address unanticipated critical changes. The JFC must recognize fundamental
changes in the situation and respond quickly and smoothly. Failure to do so can cause the
joint force to lose momentum, miss important opportunities, experience setbacks, or even
fail to accomplish the mission. Conversely, successful transitions enable the joint force to
seize the initiative and quickly and efficiently garner favorable results. The JFC should
anticipate transformations, as well as plan shifts, during operations.
Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on phasing. Refer to JP 3-05.1,
Unconventional Warfare, for additional information on phasing UW operations. Refer to
Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space.
a. Combat missions and tasks can vary widely depending on context of the operation
and the objective. Most combat operations will require the commander to balance
offensive, defensive, and stability activities. This is particularly evident in a campaign or
major operation, where combat can occur during several phases and stability activities may
occur throughout. Figure V-8 depicts notional proportions of offensive, defensive, and
stability activities through the phases of a joint operation.
V-15
Chapter V
Deter
Offense
Stability
Defense
Seize Initiative
Offense
Stability Defense
Dominate
Offense
Stability Defense
Stabilize
Stability Offense
Defense
NOTES:
The figure reflects a single operation.
Stability activities are conducted outside the United States. Department of Defense provides similar
support to US civil authorities for homeland defense and other operations in the US through defense
support of civil authorities operations.
(2) Figure V-8 relates to Figure V-7 and the phasing explanation in paragraph 6,
“Phasing a Joint Operation.” Figure V-8 illustrates the notional balance between offensive
and defensive actions and stability activities as an operation progresses. Since the focus of
the CCMD’s ongoing campaign is on prevention and preparation, any stability activities in
the JFC’s proposed OA might continue, and combat (offense and defense) may be limited
(3) Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to assumption
of responsibility by civil authority should begin during plan development and continue
during all phases of a joint operation. Planning for redeployment should be considered
early and continue throughout the operation and is best accomplished in the same time-
phased process in which deployment was accomplished. An unnecessarily narrow focus
on planning offensive and defensive operations in the dominate phase may threaten full
development of the stabilize and enable civil authority phases and negatively affect joint
operation momentum. Even during sustained combat operations, the joint force should
establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as areas are
occupied, bypassed, or returned to civilian control. Planning for humanitarian assistance
should be coordinated through the security cooperation organization USAID (if it has
mission presence) and shared with the senior development advisor to the CCDR to avoid
duplication of effort in the HN.
a. In linear operations, each commander directs and sustains combat power toward
enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of
operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs). In linear operations,
emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to other
friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing
of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas,
especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected LOCs, in turn,
increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods.
A linear OA organization may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation.
Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the information
needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered. Linear operations
are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to
LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations
allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily. World Wars
I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.
V-17
Chapter V
functions may depend on sustainment assets moving with forces or aerial delivery.
Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require careful judgment in
clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Situational awareness, coupled with precision fires,
frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several
decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce paralysis and shock
among enemy troops and commanders. Nonlinear operations were applied during
Operation JUST CAUSE. The joint forces oriented more on their assigned objectives (e.g.,
destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers)
and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. To protect themselves,
individual forces relied more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom
of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on the communications,
intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.
II Rear
X
XX X XX Area
X XX
Forward Line Forward Line X
XX
X Forward Edge X
Forward Edge
of the Battle X of the Battle X
Area X
Area
XX
X X II
Rear
X
Area
XX
XXX
XXX
X X
XXX
XX
XX X
XX X
XXX XXX
V-19
Chapter V
“Building security globally not only assures Allies and partners and builds their
capacity but also helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and
increasing stability.”
1. Introduction
VI-1
Chapter VI
joint operation model described in Chapter V, “Joint Operations Across the Conflict
Continuum,” has limited application with respect to phasing these activities for normal
cooperative and competitive environments. Figure VI-1 shows a notional depiction of
activities in an environment of cooperation and competition. DOD forces, as part of larger
whole-of-government efforts, conduct operations with partners to prevent, deter, or turn
back escalatory activity by adversaries.
Diplomacy Joint
Operation
Effort Diplomatic efforts (shaded area) increase
Resources during times of increased tension. Increasingly,
Intensity legal actions, economic sanctions, and other or
Risk
deterrent options may be used to reduce nsion
ing Te
tension and return to an environment of Increas
peaceful cooperation and beneficial
competition.
Return to
The Goal: Prevent Conflict Diplomacy
(3) Despite the efforts to prevent or mitigate conflict, an armed conflict may
occur. As conditions and objectives become more defined, GCCs may transition to the
notional phasing construct for execution of a specific contingency operation as Figure VI-
1 depicts. However, time spent “to the left” allows DOD to develop a deeper understanding
of the environment to see and act ahead of conflict flashpoints, develop options, and
maximize the efficiency of resources.
e. Security Cooperation
(1) Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests,
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational
operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN. The
policy on which security cooperation is based resides in Presidential Policy Directive-23,
Security Sector Assistance. This directive refers to the policies, programs, and activities
the US uses to work with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the
security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of
legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and enable
foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.
(2) Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping activities
and critical aspect of communication synchronization. GCCs shape their AORs through
security cooperation and stability activities by continually employing military forces to
complement and support other instruments of national power that typically provide
development assistance or humanitarian assistance to PNs. The GCC’s CCP provides a
framework within which CCMDs conduct cooperative security cooperation activities and
development with PNs. Ideally, security cooperation activities mitigate the causes of a
potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires US military intervention.
Security assistance and security force assistance (SFA) normally provide some of the
means for security cooperation activities.
f. Deterrence
VI-3
Chapter VI
(1) Arms control agreements refer to the written or unwritten embodiment of the
acceptance of one or more arms control measure by two or more nations. Arms control
refers to mutually agreed upon and verifiable restraints between states on the research,
manufacture, or levels of, and/or locations of, deployment of troops and weapon systems.
VI-5
Chapter VI
Arms control may be used by states to restrain military modernization of another party to
the agreement, to entitle a party to achieve at least military parity with another party, to
free up hard currency for other priorities, to redirect military modernization efforts so as to
take advantage of technological advances in new weapon system areas, to facilitate sources
and methods of intelligence gathering, or to enable states to negate first strike capabilities.
include all instruments of national power to undermine enemy power, will, credibility, and
legitimacy, thereby diminishing its ability to influence the relevant population.
e. Support to CD Operations. DOD supports federal, state, and local LEAs in their
effort to disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal drugs into the US. Specific
DOD authorities that pertain to a CD are contained in Title 10, USC, Sections 124 and 371-
382. Discussion of similar authorities is discussed in DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of
Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.
VI-7
Chapter VI
(1) International law has long recognized that a coastal state may exercise
jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner it can exercise
sovereignty over its own land territory. International law accords the right of “innocent”
passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is “innocent”
as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The
high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.
The Berlin air corridors, established between 1948 and 1990, which
allowed air access to West Berlin, were set up to maintain international
airspace to an “air-locked” geographical area. When Soviet forces
disrupted ground passage to Berlin, the US asserted its rights to utilize
these air corridors during the Berlin airlift. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT
series of operations against Libya in 1986 were freedom of navigation
operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra, a recognized
international body of water over which Libya illegally claimed
sovereignty.
Various Sources
US and that nation (e.g., Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation
JUST CAUSE in Panama). Foreign assistance supports the HN by promoting sustainable
development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term
regional stability. Foreign assistance programs include security assistance, development
assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance and can support FID and stability
activities. To be effective, foreign assistance should include collaborative planning among
the joint force, DOS, USAID, the embassy, the country team in the HN, HN authorities,
and any supporting international organization or NGO. Normally, DOD foreign assistance
activities in an HN are integrated into and support objectives of the chief of mission’s
integrated country strategy, which is consolidated in the CCP and the country-specific
security cooperation section/country plans that are nested within the CCP.
k. SFA. SFA is DOD’s contribution to unified action by the USG to support the
development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their
supporting institutions, to achieve objectives shared by the USG. SFA is conducted with
and through FSF. The US military conducts activities to enhance the capabilities and
capacities of a PN (or regional security organization) by providing training, equipment,
advice, and assistance to those FSF organized in national ministry of defense (or equivalent
regional military or paramilitary forces). Other USG departments and agencies focus
forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or
intelligence services.
For further information about security cooperation, security assistance, and SFA, refer to
JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.
VI-9
Chapter VI
US FID programs may address other threats to the stability of an HN, such as civil disorder,
illicit weapons, drug and human trafficking, and terrorism. While FID is a legislatively
mandated, special operations core activity, conventional forces also contain and employ
organic capabilities to conduct SFA activities for FID.
For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. For further
guidance on SOF involvement in FID, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.
m. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by Title 10, USC,
Section 401. This assistance may be provided in conjunction with military operations and
exercises but must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian
benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA
operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs generally encompass planned
activities in the following categories:
(1) The US deploys forces abroad to lend credibility to its promises and
commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use
military force if necessary. In addition, SecDef orders a show of force to bolster and
reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve
both diplomatic and military purposes. These operations may influence other governments
or political-military organizations to refrain from belligerent acts.
p. Support to Insurgency
(2) The US may support insurgencies that oppose oppressive regimes. The US
coordinates this support with its friends and allies. US military support is typically through
UW, which includes activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce,
disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating with an underground,
auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Special forces are well-suited to conduct
UW and provide this support. Conventional forces have functional specialties they may
contribute to the mission. US forces may provide logistic and training support, as they did
for the Mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In
certain circumstances, the US can provide direct combat support, such as support to the
French Resistance in World War II, the Afghanistan Northern Alliance to remove the
Taliban in 2001-2002, and for NATO’s liberation of Kosovo in 1999.
Various Sources
VI-11
Chapter VI
3. Other Considerations
VI-13
Chapter VI
Intentionally Blank
“If we are to retain ... a choice other than nuclear holocaust or retreat, we must
be ready to fight a limited war for a protracted period of time anywhere in the
world.”
1. Introduction
Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically focused in scope and
scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational-level objective in an
OA. They may be conducted as a stand-alone response to a crisis (e.g., NEO) or executed
as an element of a larger, more complex operation. Joint forces conduct crisis response
and limited contingency operations to achieve operational and, sometimes, strategic
objectives.
a. CCDRs plan for various situations that require military operations in response to
natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies and crises as directed by
appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the
circumstances. Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of US citizens and US
interests while maintaining and improving the ability to operate with multinational partners
to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (e.g., JTF SHINING HOPE in the spring
of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many of these operations involve a
combination of military forces and capabilities operating in close cooperation with
interorganizational participants. APEX integrates planning into one unified construct to
facilitate unity of effort and transition from planning to execution. Planning functions can
be performed in series over a period of time or they can be compressed, performed in
parallel, or truncated as appropriate.
b. Initial Response. When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond.
If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint
forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train
in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability,
US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE
DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g.,
natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct DSCA and
HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt deployment of sufficient
forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later.
Effective early intervention can also deny an adversary time to set conditions in their favor,
achieve destabilizing objectives, or mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster.
Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deterring or blocking aggression.
VII-1
Chapter VII
However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence
involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force is able to conduct decisive
operations and the national leadership is willing to employ that force and to deploy more
forces if necessary.
c. Strategic Aspects. Two important aspects about crisis response and foreign
limited contingency operations stand out. First, understanding the strategic objective helps
avoid actions that may have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in
some operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions that have
significant strategic implications. Second, commanders should remain aware of changes
not only in the operational situation but also in strategic objectives that may warrant a
change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious. Therefore,
commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which may eventually lead to disconnects
between national objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in
national objectives early may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations.
3. Typical Operations
support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.
For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass PKO, predominantly military
PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, PM processes, and conflict prevention. PO
are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities and humanitarian
efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to
each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or
after conflict. PO support national/multinational strategic objectives. Military support
improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic
actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.
d. Recovery operations may be conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and
return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or human
remains (e.g., JTF FULL ACCOUNTING, which had the mission to achieve the fullest
possible accounting of Americans listed as missing or prisoners of war from all past wars
and conflicts). Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery operation is
generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning to execute. Recovery
operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt depending on whether the OE is hostile,
uncertain, or permissive.
VII-3
Chapter VII
During the brief time of the operation, the JTF’s aircraft carried a total of
714.3 short tons of intergovernmental organization (IGO)/nongovernmental
organization (NGO) cargo, most of it for direct support of the local
population. Helicopters and C-130s also moved 511 non-US passengers.
The majority were medics or aid workers carried on special operations
forces HH-60s bringing immediate relief to populations cut off from the rest
of the world.
(2) Raids are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually through forcible
entry, to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy
an objective or capability (e.g., Operation RHINO, a raid led by US SOF elements on
several Taliban targets in and around Kandahar, Afghanistan, in October 2001). Raids end
with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
f. HD and DSCA. Security and defense of the US homeland is the USG’s top
responsibility and is conducted as a continuous, cooperative effort among all federal
agencies, as well as state, tribal, and local government. Military operations inside the US
and its territories, though limited in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two
missions—HD and DSCA.
(2) DSCA
The strike was designed to hit directly at the heart of Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi’s ability to export terrorism with the belief that such
a preemptive strike would provide him “incentives and reasons to alter
his criminal behavior.” The final targets were selected at the National
Security Council level “within the circle of the President’s advisors.”
Ultimately, five targets were selected. All except one of the targets were
chosen because of their direct connection to terrorist activity. The
single exception was the Benina military airfield which based Libyan
fighter aircraft. This target was hit to preempt Libyan interceptors from
taking off and attacking the incoming US bombers.
The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time) and lasted
less than 12 minutes, resulting in the dropping of 60 tons of munitions.
Navy A-6 Intruders were assigned the two targets in the Benghazi area,
and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of
Tripoli. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was
nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft never launched. One F-111
strike aircraft was lost during the strike.
Various Sources
VII-5
Chapter VII
domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. For DSCA operations,
DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. The majority of DSCA operations
are conducted IAW the NRF, which establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards
approach to domestic incident response. Within a state, that state’s governor is the key
decision maker and commands the state’s National Guard forces when they are not in
federal Title 10, USC, status. When the governor mobilizes the National Guard, it will
most often be under state active duty when supporting civil authorities.
For more information on DSCA, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and
for detailed guidance on DSCA, see DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA).
For more information on National Guard support, see DODD 3025.18, Defense Support
of Civil Authorities (DSCA), and DODI 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for
Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
4. Other Considerations
a. Duration and End State. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may
be relatively short in duration (e.g., NEO, strike, raid) or last for an extended period to
achieve the national objective (such as US participation with ten other nations in the
independent [non-UN] peacekeeping operation, Multinational Force and Observers, in the
Sinai Peninsula since 1982). Short-duration operations are not always possible, particularly
in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are
such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve national strategic objectives.
Nevertheless, it is imperative to have clear national objectives for all types of contingencies.
(1) HUMINT may often provide the most useful source of information and is
essential to understanding an enemy or adversary. If a HUMINT infrastructure is not in
place when US forces arrive, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. HUMINT
also complements other intelligence sources with information not available through
technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number
of people gathered in a town square, it cannot gauge the motivations or enthusiasm of the
crowd. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas, belligerent forces may not rely heavily on
radio communications, thereby denying US forces intelligence derived through signal
intercept.
(3) Tailored products based on continuous JIPOE can promote timely and
comprehensive understanding of all aspects of the OE needed for crisis response and
limited contingency operations.
(4) GEOINT consists of the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial
information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically
referenced activities. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial
information.
For further guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.
VII-7
Chapter VII
imposed on any agency or organization involved in the operation should be clarified for
other agencies and organizations to facilitate coordination.
“Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped
and battle hardened. He will fight savagely.
But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of
1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats,
in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their
strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home
Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions
of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The
tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!
I have full confidence in your courage and devotion to duty and skill in battle.
We will accept nothing less than full Victory!”
1. Introduction
a. Traditionally, campaigns are the most extensive joint operations, in terms of the
amount of forces and other capabilities committed and duration of operations. In the
context of large-scale combat, a campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at
achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. A major
operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes, and is the
primary building block of a campaign. Major operations and campaigns typically include
multiple phases (e.g., the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
and 2003 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). Campaign planning is appropriate when the
contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.
VIII-1
Chapter VIII
b. CCDRs document the full scope of their campaigns in the set of plans that includes
the CCP or FCP and all of its GEF- and JSCP-directed plans, subordinate and supporting
plans, posture or master plans, country plans (for the geographic CCMDs), OPLANs of
operations currently in execution, and contingency plans.
(1) GCCs, as directed in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP, prepare CCPs in APEX
OPLAN format for their UCP-assigned AOR and integrate the planning of designated
missions assigned to specified CCDRs into their CCPs.
(2) FCCs, as directed in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP, prepare CCPs in APEX
OPLAN format for their UCP-assigned missions and responsibilities and synchronize
planning across CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies for designated missions.
(3) The scale and projected duration of a subordinate JFC’s crisis response or
contingency mission may require the GCC or JFC to develop a campaign plan subordinate
to the GCC’s theater campaign.
For detailed guidance on joint planning and campaign plans, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest
of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation
of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD
began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to
force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations (UN) Security
Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait,
finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to
force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.
• OFFENSE
The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed.
The Commander, United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM),
balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent
capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy,
and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and
deployment continued throughout this phase.
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While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces
repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using
extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of
movements to the enemy. Coalition land forces moved a great distance
in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the
more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces
threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi
attention and defensive effort in that direction.
The end of combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The
coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief,
security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and
humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush
announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern
Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies
over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had
participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to
Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.
This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with
the redeployment and demobilization of forces.
Various Sources
a. General. CCDRs and JFCs execute their campaigns and operations in pursuit of
US national objectives and to shape the OE. In pursuit of national objectives, these
campaigns and operations also seek to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate the impact of a
crisis or contingency. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between potential
multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when
required, and strengthen the capability for future multinational operations, all of which help
prevent crises from developing.
b. Organizing and Training Forces. Organizing and, where possible, training forces
to conduct operations throughout the OA can be a deterrent. JTFs and components that are
likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime.
Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint and multinational
operations. The composition of joint force staffs should reflect the composition of the joint
force to ensure those employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities
and limitations. When possible, JFCs and their staffs should invite non-DOD agencies to
participate in training to facilitate a common understanding and to build a working
relationship prior to actual execution. Commanders must continue to refine interactions
with interagency partners they will work with most often and develop common procedures
to improve interoperability. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of
employment, as with US-based forces with multiple tasks, commanders should make
maximum use of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. The training focus
for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the CCDR’s joint mission-
essential tasks.
e. Space Considerations. Space operations support all joint operations. Prior to and
during conflict, commanders need to ensure US, allied, and/or multinational forces gain
and maintain space superiority. Commanders must anticipate and mitigate hostile actions
that may affect friendly space operations. Commanders should also anticipate the
proliferation and increasing sophistication of commercial space capabilities and products
available that the commander can leverage but which may also be available to enemies and
adversaries. USSTRATCOM plans and conducts space operations. The GCC, in
coordination with other USG departments and agencies, conducts certain aspects of
theater space operations, to include planning for, supporting, and conducting the
recovery of astronauts, space vehicles, space payloads, and objects as directed. They
may also request the CDRUSSTRATCOM’s assistance in integrating space forces,
capabilities, and considerations into each phase of campaign and major OPLANs. Global
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and theater space operations require robust planning and skilled employment to
synchronize and integrate space operations with the joint operation. It is therefore
incumbent upon the GCCs to coordinate as required to minimize conflicts. Space
capabilities help shape the OE in a variety of ways, including providing intelligence and
communications necessary to keep commanders and leaders informed worldwide. JFCs
and their components should request space support early in the planning process to ensure
effective and efficient use of space assets.
For further guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations, and Air
Force Doctrine Annex 3-14, Space Operations.
f. EMS Considerations. The joint force is critically dependent on the EMS for
operations across all joint functions and throughout the OE. For example, modern C2
requires operation of EMS-dependent sensing and communication systems, while
advanced weapons rely on PNT information transmitted through the EMS. Therefore, the
joint force should strive for local EMS superiority prior to executing joint operations. EMS
superiority is that degree of dominance in the EMS that permits the conduct of operations
at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting an adversary’s
ability to do the same. Achieving EMS superiority is complicated by increasing joint EMS-
use requirements, EME congestion, and proliferation of EMS threats. Joint forces execute
JEMSO, facilitated by electromagnetic battle management (EMBM), to achieve the
necessary unity of effort for EMS superiority.
For further information on EMS/JEMSO, see the National Military Strategic Plan for
Electronic Warfare; JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations; JP
3-13.1, Electronic Warfare; and the DOD EMS Strategy.
(maintaining a level of believability that the proposed actions may actually be employed),
and communication (transmitting the intended message to the desired audience) to ensure
greater effectiveness (effectiveness of deterrence must be viewed from the perspective of
the agent/actor that is to be deterred). Before hostilities begin, the JFC and staff analyze
and assess the adversary’s goals and decision-making process to determine how, where,
and when these can be affected and what friendly actions (military and others) can
influence events and act as a deterrent. For example, traditional US military force may be
less of a deterrent to irregular and non-state threats, and the assessment should therefore
consider alternative or complementary approaches. Emphasis should be placed on setting
the conditions for successful joint combat operations should deterrence fail.
b. Preparing the OA
(1) Special Operations. SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the OA
and OE by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on
operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language capabilities, and
relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of
conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can provide
operational leverage by gathering critical information; undermining an adversary’s will or
capacity to wage war; and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, multinational, or
indigenous/surrogate forces. CDRUSSOCOM synchronizes planning for global
operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and,
as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies. In coordination with GCCs and
the supported JFC, CDRUSSOCOM plans and executes or synchronizes the execution of
activities related to preparing the OE and OA or provides SOF to other CCMDs.
(2) Stability Activities. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to
commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation to conduct stabilization
and enable civil authority. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power
vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Accomplishing this task
should ease the transition to stability activities and shorten the path to national objectives
and transition to another authority. Considerations include actions to:
(a) Limit the damage to key infrastructure (water, energy, medical) and
services.
(d) Provide for the availability of cash or other means of financial exchange.
(e) Determine the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA,
engineer, medical, multinational).
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(g) Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law enforcement and
first responder services.
(3) CA have a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation
being planned. CA conduct military engagement and humanitarian and civic assistance to
influence HN and foreign nation populations. CA assess impacts of the population and
culture on military operations, assess impact of military operations on the population and
culture, and facilitate interorganizational coordination. Establishing and maintaining civil-
military relations may include interaction among US, allied, multinational, and HN forces,
as well as other government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. CA can
provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations, to include culture,
social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. CA may be able to
perform functions for limited durations that normally are the responsibility of local or
indigenous governments. Employment of CA should be based upon a clear concept of CA
mission requirements for the type of operation being planned.
For further guidance on sustainment and distribution operations, refer to JP 4-0, Joint
Logistics, and JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.
(1) With Presidential and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support, JFCs
strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip
away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible while limiting the enemy’s
potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked by the President
and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.
(2) The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its strategic
leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved through
the use of information-related activities and the physical interdiction of LOCs or resources
affecting the enemy’s ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to
deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy
leadership and military from their public support.
d. FDOs and FROs. FDOs and FROs are executed on order and provide scalable
options to respond to a crisis. Both provide the ability to scale up (escalate) or de-escalate
based on continuous assessment of an adversary’s actions and reaction. While FDOs are
primarily intended to prevent the crisis from worsening and allow for de-escalation, FROs
are generally punitive in nature.
(2) FROs. FROs, usually used in response to terrorism, can also be employed in
response to aggression by a competitor or adversary. Like FDOs, the discussion should
include indicators of their effectiveness and probability of consequences, desired and
undesired. The basic purpose of FROs is to preempt and/or respond to attacks against the
US and/or US interests. FROs are intended to facilitate early decision making by
developing a wide range of prospective actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects,
congruent with national security policy objectives. An FRO is the venue in which various
military capabilities are made available to the President and SecDef, with actions
appropriate and adaptable to existing circumstances, in reaction to any threat or attack.
For further guidance on planning FDOs and FROs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
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e. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action to
accomplish their mission. This dictates that JFCs not only provide force protection but be
aware of and participate as appropriate in the protection of interagency and regional
multinational capabilities and activities. JFCs may spend as much time on protection to
assure partners to preserve coalition resolve and maintain access as on direct preparation
of their forces for combat.
f. Space Operations. JFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space
capabilities. During the deter phase, space forces are limited to already fielded and
immediately deployable assets and established priorities for service. As the situation
develops, priorities for space force enhancement may change to aid the JFC in assessing
the changing OE. Most importantly, the JFC and component commanders need to
anticipate “surge” space capabilities needed for future phases due to the long lead times to
reprioritize or acquire additional capabilities.
For further guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations, and Air
Force Doctrine Annex 3-14, Space Operations.
h. Physical Environment
(1) Weather, terrain, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations and
sustainment support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before and during
sustained combat operations. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of
operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded
conditions. Climatological and hydrographic planning tools, studies, and forecast products
help the JFC determine the most advantageous time and location to conduct operations.
(2) Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape,
coupled with man-made construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a
complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations
in many ways. The most distinguishing characteristic of operations in urban areas,
however, is not the infrastructure but the density of civilians. Joint urban operations
(JUOs) are conducted in large, densely populated areas with problems unique to clearing
enemy forces while possibly restoring services and managing major concentrations of
people. For example, industrial areas and port facilities often are collocated with highly
populated areas, creating the opportunity for accidental or deliberate release of toxic
industrial materials which could impact JUOs. During JUOs, joint forces may not focus
only on destruction of enemy forces but may also be required to take steps necessary to
protect and support civilians and their infrastructure from which they receive services
necessary for survival. As such, ROE during JUOs may be more restrictive than for other
types of operations. When planning JUOs, the JFC and staff should consider the impact of
military operations on civilians to include their culture, values, and infrastructure, thereby
viewing the urban area as a dynamic and complex system—not solely as terrain. This
implies the joint force should be capable of understanding the specific urban environment;
sensing, locating, and isolating the enemy among civilians; and applying combat power
precisely and discriminately.
(3) Littoral Areas. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area
from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore.
Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended
directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is essential to maritime superiority.
Maritime operations conducted in the littoral area can project power, fires, and forces to
achieve the JFC’s objectives. These operations facilitate the entry and movement of other
elements of the joint force through the seizure of an enemy’s port, naval base, or air base.
Access to, and freedom of maneuver within, the littorals depend on the enemy’s A2/AD
actions and capabilities, such as the use of surface-to-surface missiles and use of mines.
The ability to avoid detection and maneuver to evade can be reduced in the littorals due to
the proximity to enemy sensors and the lack of maneuver space, thus increasing risk.
Depending on the situation, mine warfare may be critical to control of the littoral areas.
(4) The EMS, which has become increasingly complex, contested, and congested
as technology has advanced, can significantly affect joint force operations. Operational
experiences demonstrate not only how successful control of the EMS can influence the
outcome of the conflict but also highlight US vulnerabilities and dependence on the EMS
to successfully operate. When planning operations, the JFC should consider both the
impact of military operations on the current EME, as well as its effect on military
operations. Key to this is the JFC’s execution of JEMSO, facilitated by EMBM, to achieve
integration. This will ensure EMS-dependent systems are mission ready and compatible
within the intended EME.
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generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the JFC
coordinates with other USG departments and agencies to facilitate coherent use of all
instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives.
b. Force Projection
(2) The President and SecDef may direct a CCDR to resolve a crisis quickly,
employing immediately available forces and appropriate FDOs as discussed above to
preclude escalation. When these forces and actions are not sufficient, follow-on strikes
and/or the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater and/or the use of
multinational forces may be necessary. Consequently, the CCDR must sequence, enable,
and protect the deployment of forces to create early decisive advantage. The CCDR should
not overlook enemy A2/AD capabilities that may affect the deployment of combat and
logistic forces from bases to ports of embarkation. The CCDR may have to adjust the time-
phased force and deployment data to meet a changing OE. The deployment of forces may
be either opposed or unopposed by an enemy.
(3) Commanders should brief deploying forces on the threat and force protection
requirements prior to deployment and upon arrival in the OA. Also, JFCs and their
subordinate commanders evaluate the timing, location, and other factors of force
deployment in each COA for the impact of sabotage, criminal activity, and terrorist acts
and their impact on joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI)
and the follow-on CONOPS. The threat could involve those not directly supporting or
sympathetic to the enemy but those seeking to take advantage of the situation. When the
situation involves a failed or failing WMD-possessor state, commanders should consider
that opportunists could employ lost or stolen WMD.
(5) JRSOI occurs in the OA and comprises the essential processes required to
transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting
operational requirements. Forces are vulnerable during JRSOI, so planning must include
force protection requirements.
(1) US military forces normally train as units and are best able to accomplish a
mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue
to operate under established procedures, adapting them to the mission and situation, as
required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness
may be decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an ad hoc force
takes more time to form and adjust to requirements of the mission. This not only
complicates mission accomplishment but may also have an impact on force protection.
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retain unit integrity through the deployment process with the effective use of strategic lift
platforms. While maximizing unit integrity may reduce JRSOI requirements and allow
combat units to be employed more quickly, doing so will often have a direct negative
impact on the efficient use of the limited strategic lift. In some cases, this negative impact
on strategic lift may have a negative effect on DOD deployment and sustainment
requirements beyond the GCC’s AOR. A general rule of thumb is that unit integrity is
much more important for early deploying units than for follow-on forces.
d. While access operations focus on enabling access to the OA, entry operations
focus on actions within the OA. Joint forces conduct entry operations for various
purposes, including to defeat threats to the access and use of portions of the OE; to control,
defeat, disable, and/or dispose of specific WMD threats; to assist populations and groups;
to establish a lodgment; and to conduct other limited duration missions.
(1) Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault
operations or any combination thereof. Forcible entry operations can create multiple
dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond. Commanders
will employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to attack the objective area or areas. The
net result will be a coordinated attack that overwhelms the enemy before they have time to
react. A well-positioned and networked force enables the defeat of any enemy reaction
and facilitates follow-on operations, if required.
(2) Forcible entry is normally complex and risky and should, therefore, be kept
as simple as possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, detailed
coordination, innovation, and flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between
forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. Forces are tailored for the mission
and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When airborne,
amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of command is vital.
Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to
be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and
intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements.
(4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the enemy and ease
forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. Additionally, the
actions, themes, and messages portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if
MILDEC is to be believable.
(5) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, establish, or
modify conditions in the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial
lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire
support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry, such as seizing
airfields or conducting reconnaissance of landing zones or amphibious landing sites. They
may conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well beyond the lodgment to identify,
interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry force.
(6) The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations
can be formidable but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the
forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs must carefully balance the introduction
of sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to
establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment, as well as forces required to transition to
follow-on operations.
For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint
Forcible Entry Operations.
f. Attack of Enemy COGs. As part of creating decisive advantages early, joint force
operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs using conventional forces
and SOF if COGs are vulnerable and sufficient friendly force capabilities are available.
These attacks may be decisive or may begin offensive operations throughout the enemy’s
depth that can create dilemmas causing paralysis and destroying cohesion.
(1) JFCs normally strive to achieve air and maritime superiority early. Air
and maritime superiority allows joint forces to conduct operations without prohibitive
interference from opposing air and maritime forces. Control of the air is a critical enabler
because it allows joint forces both freedom from attack and freedom to attack. Using both
defensive and offensive operations, JFCs employ complementary weapon systems and
sensors to achieve air and maritime superiority.
(2) Land forces can be moved quickly into an area to deter the enemy from
inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational advantage. The
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Various Sources
rapid deployment and employment of land forces (with support of other components)
enable sustained operations, more quickly contribute to the enemy’s defeat, and help
restore stability in the OA.
(5) Control of the EME must be achieved early to support freedom of action.
This control is important for superiority across the physical domains and information
environment.
h. C2 in Littoral Areas
(1) Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from which to
begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in OAs with limited or poor
infrastructure for supporting US joint operations ashore. JFCs can gain and maintain the
initiative through the ability to project fires and employ forces from sea-based assets in
combination with C2, intelligence collection, and information-related activities. Maritime
forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas and rapidly generate high-
intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Maritime forces’
relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily
strike opponents. Maritime forces’ very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that
the enemy cannot ignore.
(2) JFCs can operate from a HQ platform at sea. Depending on the nature of
the joint operation, a maritime commander can serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC
while the operation is primarily maritime and shift that command ashore if the operation
shifts landward IAW the JFC’s CONOPS. A sea base provides JFCs with the ability to C2
forces and conduct select functions and tasks at sea without dependence on infrastructure
ashore. In other cases, a maritime HQ may serve as the base of the joint force HQ, or
subordinate JFCs or other component commanders may use the C2 and intelligence
facilities aboard ship.
Various Sources
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(3) Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires detailed planning, active liaison,
and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition may involve a simple
movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint
force HQ. The new joint force HQ may use personnel and equipment, especially
communications equipment, from the old HQ, or it may require augmentation from
different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. Another technique is
for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new
HQ is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed
checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The
value of joint training and rehearsals in this transition is evident.
and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment also contribute
significantly to force protection at the onset of combat operations.
l. Prevention of Friendly Fire Incidents. JFCs must make every effort to reduce the
potential for the killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive
power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of
modern combat, increase the potential for friendly fire incidents. Commanders must be
aware of those situations that increase the risk of friendly fire incidents and institute
appropriate preventive measures. The primary mechanisms for reducing friendly fire
incidents are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among
component commands and multinational partners, SOPs, training and exercises,
technology solutions (e.g., identify friend or foe, blue force tracking), rehearsals, effective
CID, and enhanced awareness of the OE. Commanders should seek to minimize friendly
fire incidents while not limiting boldness and initiative. CCMDs should consult with
USAID when it has a mission presence to determine locations of friendly international
organizations, NGOs, and local partners operating in the targeted area to avoid friendly fire
incidents.
a. General. JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a swift victory is not
possible. During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional
forces and SOF throughout the OA. The JFC may designate one component or LOO to be
the main effort, with other components providing support and other LOOs as supporting
efforts. When conditions or plans change, the main effort might shift. Some missions
continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action, or informational
advantage. These missions, when executed concurrently with other missions, degrade
enemy morale and physical cohesion and bring the enemy closer to culmination. When
prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and
operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents
to concentrate their forces, facilitating their attack by friendly forces. In some
circumstances (e.g., regime change, ensuring stability prior to transition to civil authority),
the JFC may be required to maintain a temporary military occupation of enemy territory
while continuing offensive actions. If the occupation is extended and a country’s
government is not functioning, the JFC may be required to establish a military government
through the designation of a transitional military authority.
b. Operating in the Littoral Areas. Even when joint forces are firmly established
ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to gain leverage over
the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce
significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear
or flanks of the enemy. The mobility and fire support capability of maritime forces at sea,
coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to
achieving military operational objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by
operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting
opportunities.
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(2) As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint
force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve
the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When
interdiction and maneuver are employed, JFCs need to carefully balance the needs of
surface maneuver forces, area-wide requirements for interdiction, and the undesirability of
fragmenting joint force capabilities. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected
in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to fully exploit
the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing
requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction.
As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring
JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and maritime force commanders responsible for
integrating and synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their AOs should be
knowledgeable of JFC priorities and the responsibilities and authority assigned and
delegated to commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide
functions. JFCs alleviate this friction through the CONOPS and clear statements of intent
for interdiction conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations. In doing
this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to
achieving theater-strategic objectives. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to
assist in identifying requirements and applying capabilities to meet them. JFCs must define
appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and
make apportionment decisions.
(3) All commanders should consider how their operations can complement
interdiction. These operations may include actions such as MILDEC, withdrawals, lateral
repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition
surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction. Likewise, interdiction
operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver. This
complementary use of maneuver and interdiction places the enemy in the operational
dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to
interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.
(4) Within the JOA, all joint force component operations must contribute to
achievement of the JFC’s objectives. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish
AOs within their OA. Synchronization and/or integration of maneuver and
interdiction within land or maritime AOs is of particular importance, especially when
JFCs task component commanders to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions.
(a) Air, land, and maritime commanders are directly concerned with those
enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations.
Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on air, land, and maritime
maneuver normally supports that maneuver. In fact, successful operations may depend on
successful interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy
force before battle is fully joined.
(b) JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize execution of land
and maritime component operations, allow rapid maneuver, and provide the ability to fight
at extended ranges. The size, shape, and positioning of land or maritime AOs will be based
on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or maritime commanders’ requirements to accomplish
their missions and protect their forces. Within these AOs, land and maritime
commanders are designated the supported commander for the integration and
synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. Accordingly, land and maritime
commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations
within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land or maritime commander, a
component commander designated as the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide
interdiction has the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized missions within a land or
maritime AO. If theater or JOA-wide interdiction operations would have adverse effects
within a land or maritime AO, then the commander conducting those operations must
readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult
with the JFC for resolution.
(c) The land or maritime commander should clearly articulate the vision of
maneuver operations to other commanders that may employ interdiction forces within the
land or maritime AO. The land or maritime commander’s intent and CONOPS should
clearly state how interdiction will enable or enhance land or maritime force maneuver in
the AO and what is to be accomplished with interdiction (as well as those actions to be
avoided, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions
in a specific area). Once this is understood, other interdiction-capable commanders can
normally plan and execute operations with only that coordination required with the land or
maritime commander. However, the land or maritime commander should provide other
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Chapter VIII
(d) Joint force operations in maritime or littoral OAs often require additional
coordination among the maritime commander and other interdiction-capable commanders
because of the highly specialized nature of some maritime operations, such as
antisubmarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-
capable commanders maintain communication with the maritime commander. As in all
operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in maritime OAs can result in
friendly fire incidents and failed missions. The same principle applies concerning joint
force air component mining operations in land or maritime OAs.
(5) JFCs need to pay particular attention and give priority to activities impinging
on and supporting the maneuver and interdiction needs of all forces. In addition to normal
target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or maritime
force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to
engage with organic assets within their OAs that could affect planned or ongoing
maneuver. These targets may be identified individually or by category, specified
geographically, or tied to a desired effect or time period. Interdiction target priorities
within the land or maritime OAs are considered along with theater and JOA-wide
interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the air apportionment decision. The JFACC
uses these priorities to plan, coordinate, and execute the theater- and/or JOA-wide air
interdiction effort. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and
allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or
maritime forces.
(1) Locating WMD and WMD Materials. Since an enemy’s use of WMD can
quickly change the character of an operation or campaign, joint forces may be required to
track, seize, and secure any WMD and materials used to develop WMD discovered or
located in an OA. Once located, resources may be required to secure and inventory items
for subsequent exploitation. If WMD sites are located, but joint forces are unable to seize
and secure them, the JFC should plan to strike the sites if required to prevent WMD from
being used or falling into enemy control. The desired effects of strikes are to minimize
collateral effects and deny access to WMD. If sites are not under enemy control or in
imminent jeopardy of falling to the enemy, monitor them persistently until sites can be
seized and secured. During combat operations, exploitation, secure transport of WMD,
and safe transport of technical personnel for disposition may depend upon a permissive
OE.
(2) Enemy Employment. The use or the threatened use of WMD can cause
large-scale shifts in strategic and operational-level objectives, phases, and COAs.
Multinational operations become more complicated with the threatened employment of
these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against friendly force multinational partners,
especially those with little or no defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the alliance
or coalition. The enemy may also use CBRN weapons as part of an A2/AD plan.
(a) Intelligence and other joint staff members advise JFCs of an enemy’s
capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that enemy is most likely to do so.
This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness and intent to employ these
weapons. The JFC should avoid large force or materiel concentrations, as they may
provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.
(b) Known threat of WMD use and associated preparedness against such use
are imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by
anticipating their employment and taking appropriate offensive and defensive measures.
Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training; MISO;
OPSEC; dispersion of forces and materiel; use of individual protective equipment,
collective protection equipment, and medical countermeasures; and proper use of terrain
and structures for shielding against blast and radiation effects. Enhancement of CBRN
defense capabilities may reduce incentives for a first strike by an enemy with WMD.
(c) The combination of active and passive defense can reduce the
effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD. The JFC may have to conduct
offensive operations to control, defeat, disable, and/or dispose of enemy WMD capabilities
before they can be brought to bear. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and
operations to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. When conducting offensive
operations, the JFC must fully understand the collateral effects created by striking or
neutralizing enemy WMD capabilities.
(3) Friendly Employment. When directed by the President and SecDef, CCDRs
will plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with
national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an
escalation of the war and is a presidential decision. USSTRATCOM’s capabilities to lead
in the collaborative planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear
weapon employment. If directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons, JFCs typically
have two escalating objectives.
(a) The first objective is deterring or preventing the enemy from using
WMD. Effective WMD deterrence rests on a credible deterrence policy that declares an
VIII-23
Chapter VIII
adversary, expresses the will to pursue that adversary, and is backed by the capability to
defend against the use and protect against the effects of WMD. A demonstrated, collective
military capability may contribute to the success of all three criteria for WMD deterrence.
JFC deterrence efforts should involve security cooperation plans that emphasize the
willingness of the US and its partners to employ forces for collective interests. Various
bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations support deterrence by demonstrating
collective willingness and capability to use force when necessary. Overall USG deterrence
goals are supported by a credible capability to intercept WMD in transit; destroy critical
nodes, links, and sources; defend against WMD attack; attribute WMD attacks; and
dismantle WMD programs.
f. Stability Activities. Stability tasks and activities that began in previous phases may
continue. These activities may focus on stability tasks that will help achieve strategic and
operational-level objectives and create the conditions for the later stabilization and enable
civil authority phases. Minimum essential stability activities should focus on protecting
and facilitating the personal security and well-being of the civilian population. Stability
activities provide minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.
If no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing, then JFCs and their staffs must
resource these minimum essential stability tasks. When demand for resources exceeds the
JFC’s capability, higher-level joint commanders should provide additional resources.
These resources may be given to the requesting JFC or the mission may be given to follow-
on forces to expeditiously conduct the tasks. JFCs at all levels assess resources available
against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum essential stability
tasks and what risk they can accept to accomplishment of combat tasks.
Operations then move increasingly toward transitioning to an interim civilian authority and
enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. The
JFC’s mission accomplishment requires fully integrating US military operations with the
efforts of interorganizational participants in a comprehensive approach to accomplish
assigned and implied tasks. As progress is made, military forces will increase their focus
on supporting the efforts of HN authorities, other USG departments and agencies,
international organizations, and/or NGOs. The Secretary of State coordinates with SecDef
to ensure harmonization with planned and ongoing operations. Military support to
stabilization efforts within the JOA are the responsibility of the JFC.
c. Forces and Capabilities Mix. The JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities
or adjust force structure to begin stability activities in some portions of the OA even while
sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. For example, CA and
HUMINT capabilities are critical to supporting stabilize phase operations and often involve
a mix of forces and capabilities far different than those that supported the previous phases.
Planning and continuous assessment will reveal the nature and scope of forces and
capabilities required. These forces and capabilities may be available within the joint force
or may be required from another theater or from the Reserve Component. The JFC should
anticipate and request these forces and capabilities in a timely manner to facilitate their
opportune employment.
d. Stability Activities
(1) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their focus
to stability activities as the military instrument’s contribution to the more comprehensive
stabilization efforts by all instruments of national power. Force protection will continue
to be important, and combat operations might continue, although with less frequency and
intensity than in the dominate phase. Of particular importance will be CMO, initially
conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect or
rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be
prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks, especially if conducting
a military occupation, and restore rule of law when indigenous civil, USG, multinational,
or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once
VIII-25
Chapter VIII
legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support
such activities as required/necessary. SFA plays an important part during stability
activities by supporting and augmenting the development of the capacity and capability of
FSFs and their supporting institutions. Likewise, the JFC’s communication
synchronization will play an important role in providing public information to foreign
populations during this period.
(2) The military’s predominant presence and its ability to C2 forces and logistics
under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stabilization efforts normally
governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, most stability activities
will likely be in support of, or transition to support of, US diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts.
Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success and military forces need to work
competently in this environment while properly supporting the agency in charge. To be
effective, planning and conducting stabilization efforts require a variety of perspectives
and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of other USG departments and agencies,
other Services, and alliance or multinational partners. Military forces should be prepared
to work in integrated civilian-military teams that could include representatives from other
US departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international
organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and expertise.
Typical military support includes emergency infrastructure reconstruction, engineering,
logistics, law enforcement, health services, and other activities to restore essential services.
For further guidance on stability activities and USG stabilization efforts, refer to JP 3-07,
Stability, and DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.
For more information on identity activities, see JDN 2-16, Identity Activities.
e. In the stabilize phase, commanders must consider protection from virtually any
person, element, or group hostile to US interests. These could include activists, a group
opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will have to be even more alert to
force protection and security matters after a CBRN incident. JFCs should also be
constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize
mission accomplishment. Protection may involve the security of HN authorities, other
USG department and agency personnel, and international organization and NGO
members if authorized by higher authority. For contractors, the GCC must evaluate the
need for force protection support following the guidelines of DODI 3020.41, Operational
Contract Support (OCS).
f. Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or no perceived risk.
JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready to counter activity
that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. However, security
requirements should be balanced with the military operation’s nature and objectives.
During some stability activities, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms,
wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications may cause military
forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force’s legitimacy
and hurt relations with the local population.
g. Restraint. Military capability must be applied even more prudently since the
support of the local population is essential for success. The actions of military personnel
and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE.
These ROE will often be more restrictive and detailed when compared to those for
sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns. Moreover, these rules may
change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of
violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect
efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the achievement of both short- and long-
term objectives. The use of capabilities that can create nonlethal effects should be
considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with
unarmed hostile elements and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. The JFC
must determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how
well the force is trained to use it, and how the established ROE authorize its employment.
The principle of restraint does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when
appropriate and authorized, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the
restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member, because a single
act could cause adverse diplomatic/political consequences.
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Chapter VIII
h. Perseverance. Some operations may move quickly through stability activities and
transition smoothly to the enable civil authority. Other situations may require years of
stabilization activities before this transition occurs. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and
persistent pursuit for as long as necessary of the conditions desired to reach national
objectives is often the requirement for success.
i. Legitimacy. Military activities must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of
the emerging or host government. During operations where a government does not exist,
extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid
inadvertently legitimizing them. Implementation of strategic guidance through
communication can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of stabilization efforts.
a. General. To enable civil authorities, the joint operation is assessed and objectives
are established for transitioning from large-scale combat operations to FID and security
cooperation. The catalyst for transition is that a legitimate civil authority has been
established to manage the situation without further outside military intervention. The new
government obtains legitimacy, and authority is transitioned from an interim civilian
authority or transitional military authority to the new indigenous government. This
situation may require a change in the joint operation as a result of an extension of the
required stability activities in support of US diplomatic, HN, international organization,
and/or NGO stabilization efforts.
b. PB. The transition from military operations to full civilian control may involve
ongoing operations that have a significant combat component, including COIN operations,
antiterrorism, and CT. Even while combat operations are ongoing, the operation will
include a large stability component that is essentially a PB mission. PB, transitioning to a
DOS-led effort, provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to
the HN populace. Stability measures establish the conditions that enable PB to succeed.
PB promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions,
builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict.
The ultimate measure of success in PB is political, not military. Therefore, JFCs seek a
clear understanding of the national/PN objectives and how military operations support that
end state.
d. Redeployment
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Chapter VIII
one CCDR to another higher-priority mission if the risks warrant. If SecDef approves the
sourcing recommendation, the allocation will be ordered in a deployment order.
Commanders and their staffs should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure
they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as a prioritized
redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking intratheater and
intertheater airlift, the most recent intelligence assessments and supporting GEOINT
products for the new contingency, and some consideration to achieving the national
objectives of the original contingency through other means.
1. Introduction
The principles of joint operations are formed around the traditional principles of
war. Three additional principles—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy—are relevant to
how the Armed Forces of the United States use combat power across the range of military
operations. These three, added to the original nine, comprise 12 principles of joint
operations. The principles do not apply equally in all joint operations. Most principles, if
not all, are relevant in combat. Some principles, such as offensive, maneuver, and surprise,
may not apply in some crisis response operations like FHA. However, principles such as
unity of command, objective, and legitimacy are important in all operations.
a. Objective
(1) The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation
toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.
(3) Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because national
and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation or they may occur because
the situation itself changes. The JFC should anticipate these shifts in national
objectives necessitating changes in the military objectives. The changes may be very
subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives may no longer support the
national objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be
compromised.
b. Offensive
(1) The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
(2) Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly
defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and
holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.
The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of warfare.
A-1
Appendix A
(3) Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must
seek every opportunity to seize or regain the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent
in the conduct of all defensive operations.
c. Mass
(1) The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most
advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.
(2) To achieve mass, appropriate joint force capabilities are integrated and
synchronized where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must
often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects of combat power, rather than
concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive
results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.
d. Maneuver
e. Economy of Force
f. Unity of Command
(1) The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one
responsible commander for every objective.
(2) Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with
the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity
of command may not be possible during coordination and operations with multinational
and interagency partners, but the requirement for unity of effort is paramount. Unity of
effort—the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the
participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—is the product
of successful unified action.
g. Security
(1) The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected
advantage.
h. Surprise
(1) The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which
the enemy is unprepared.
(2) Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus
achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to
surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement;
effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and
variations in tactics and methods of operation.
i. Simplicity
(1) The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and
operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and
concise orders.
(2) Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise
orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest
plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at
all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the
stress, fatigue, fog of war, and complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to
success in multinational operations.
j. Restraint
(2) A single act could cause significant military and political consequences;
therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined
balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and national
objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the
legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the
A-3
Appendix A
opposing party. Sufficiently detailed ROE the commander tailors to the specific
circumstances of the operation can facilitate appropriate restraint.
k. Perseverance
l. Legitimacy
(1) The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority in the
conduct of operations.
(3) Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host
government, where applicable. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy
concerns. All actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic-
and tactical-level requirements and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing
factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to
by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation and to
perceptions of fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force,
restructuring the type of forces employed, protecting civilians, and ensuring the disciplined
conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy.
(4) Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local
government through the perception of the populace that it governs. Humanitarian and civil
military operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported government.
Because the populace perceives the government has genuine authority to govern and uses
proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate, especially
when coupled with successful efforts to build the capability and capacity of the supported
government to complete such operations on its own. During operations in an area where a
legitimate government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with
individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them.
1. General
c. The RST. The RST is a team comprising at least one chaplain and one enlisted
religious affairs person. The RST plans, executes, and assesses the commander’s religious
program and training. The geographic combatant command chaplain is the senior chaplain
assigned to the staff of, or designated by, the GCC to provide advice on religion, ethical
and moral issues, and morale of assigned personnel and to coordinate RS within the GCC’s
AOR. The command chaplain is the senior chaplain assigned to or designated by a
commander of a staff, command, or unit. The joint force chaplain (JFCH) is the military
chaplain designated by the JFC to serve as the senior chaplain for the joint force. Each
echelon is responsible for training and supervision of subordinate RSTs.
B-1
Appendix B
of the government. Chaplains and enlisted RS personnel enable and support free
expression of faith and/or religious practice for all assigned, attached, or authorized
personnel. They also guard against religious discrimination within the command.
Commanders are responsible for the religious accommodation of joint force personnel.
d. Functions. Joint RS requirements are determined and validated IAW existing joint
processes. RSTs need to be integrated into their staffs and must use command reporting
and tasking procedures. Chaplains must understand the limits of their tasking authority.
Official tasking comes from appropriate command authority. Command chaplains do not
task subordinate unit RS personnel directly. Tasking occurs through normal command
tasking processes.
a. RSTs and the Conflict Continuum. Religious affairs in joint military operations
will require a variety of actions supporting different types and phases of operations across
the conflict continuum. The JFCH and RST support the joint force during military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency
operations; and major operations and campaigns. Close coordination should be maintained
among the RSTs of the CCMDs, Service components, JTFs, and other subordinate units
involved in joint military operations.
For more doctrinal information, see Joint Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint
Operations.
1. General
p. UN Charter.
a. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and
NLW Policy.
C-1
Appendix C
h. DODI, 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.
b. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for US Forces.
g. CJCSI 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.
C-3
Appendix C
C-5
Appendix C
Intentionally Blank
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using
the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
[email protected]. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
a. The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff
Director for Joint Force Development (J-7).
b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Joint Staff
doctrine sponsor, and Joint Doctrine Analysis Division action officer, Mr. Ricky Rowlett,
Joint Staff J-7 and Joint Doctrine Division action officer, Mr. Lloyd Brown, Joint Staff J-
7.
3. Supersession
4. Change Recommendations
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Lessons Learned
The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness
of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
D-1
Appendix D
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).
6. Distribution of Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/ (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
A2 antiaccess
AADC area air defense commander
ACA airspace control authority
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
ACS airspace control system
AD area denial
AJP Allied joint publication
AO area of operations
AOA amphibious objective area
AOR area of responsibility
APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution
GL-1
Glossary
EA electronic attack
EMBM electromagnetic battle management
EME electromagnetic environment
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EW electronic warfare
EWCA electronic warfare control authority
HD homeland defense
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
I2 identity intelligence
IAW in accordance with
IED improvised explosive device
IM information management
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW irregular warfare
GL-3
Glossary
OA operational area
OCA offensive counterair
OCO offensive cyberspace operations
OCS operational contract support
OE operational environment
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OSINT open-source intelligence
PA public affairs
PB peace building
PEO peace enforcement operations
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PKO peacekeeping operations
PM peacemaking
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure
PN partner nation
PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
PO peace operations
PR personnel recovery
PSYOP psychological operations
GL-5
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
air apportionment. The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by
percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a
given period of time. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more
nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the
members. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
area denial. Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy
force’s freedom of action within an operational area. Also called AD. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence,
areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. Also called AOI. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
area of operations. An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime
forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their
forces. Also called AO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional
damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application
of lethal or nonlethal military force. Also called BDA. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)
boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination
and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
close air support. Air action by manned or unmanned fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft
against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
Also called CAS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
combatant command chaplain. The senior chaplain assigned to the staff of, or designated
by, the combatant commander to provide advice on religion, ethical, and moral issues,
and morale of assigned personnel and to coordinate religious ministries within the
combatant commander’s area of responsibility. (Upon approval of this change of an
existing publication, this term and its definition will be included in the DOD
Dictionary.)
combat power. The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military
unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)
GL-7
Glossary
commander’s intent. A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and
the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the
staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the
commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not
unfold as planned. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
control. 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over
part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1) 2. In mapping,
charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on
the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both) have
been or will be determined. (JP 2-03) 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted
with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. (JP 3-0) 4.
In intelligence usage, an indicator governing the distribution and use of documents,
information, or material. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 2-01)
crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military
forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such
diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and
resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)
effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of
actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A
change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP
3-0)
end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s
objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
engagement. 1. An attack against an air or missile threat. (JP 3-01) 2. A tactical conflict,
usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)
force projection. The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the
United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
GL-9
Glossary
foreign assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military
equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations of food and medical
supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that may be provided
through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
friendly force information requirement. Information the commander and staff need to
understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
full-spectrum superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime,
and space domains; electromagnetic spectrum; and information environment (which
includes cyberspace) that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective
opposition or prohibitive interference. (Upon approval of this changed publication,
this definition will modify the existing definition and be incorporated into the DOD
Dictionary.)
joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components
in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces
to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
joint force. A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military
Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)
joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or
made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or
accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. Also called JFACC.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
joint force chaplain. The military chaplain designated by the joint force commander to
serve as the senior chaplain for the joint force. Also called the JFCH. (Upon approval
of this change of an existing publication, this term and its definition will be included
in the DOD Dictionary.)
joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or
made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or
accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. Also called JFLCC.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified
command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the
establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned,
attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets;
planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational
missions as may be assigned. Also called JFSOCC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP
3-0)
GL-11
Glossary
joint functions. Related capabilities and activities placed into seven basic groups of
command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver,
protection, and sustainment to help joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and
direct joint operations. (Upon approval of this changed publication, this definition will
modify the existing definition and be incorporated into the DOD Dictionary.)
joint operations. Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces
employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves,
do not establish joint forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic
combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force
commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to
accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force
commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special
operations activities. Also called JSOA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
military intervention. The deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its
military forces into the course of an existing controversy. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)
mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken
and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0) 2. In common usage, especially when applied to
lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 3-0) 3. The
dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-30)
neutral. In combat and combat support operations, an identity applied to a track whose
characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor
opposing friendly forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
neutrality. In international law, the attitude of impartiality during periods of war adopted
by third states toward a belligerent and subsequently recognized by the belligerent,
which creates rights and duties between the impartial states and the belligerent. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
operational access. The ability to project military force into an operational area with
sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)
GL-13
Glossary
operational level of warfare. The level of warfare at which campaigns and major
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within
theaters or other operational areas. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
operational reach. The distance and duration across which a force can successfully
employ military capabilities. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
permissive environment. Operational environment in which host nation military and law
enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability to assist
operations that a unit intends to conduct. (Upon approval of this changed publication,
this definition will modify the existing definition and be incorporated into the DOD
Dictionary.)
physical security. 1. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to
safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations,
material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage,
and theft. (JP 3-0) 2. In communications security, the component that results from all
physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and
documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 6-0)
protection of shipping. The use of proportionate force, when necessary for the protection
of United States flag vessels and aircraft, United States citizens (whether embarked in
United States or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
withdrawal. (Upon approval of this changed publication, this definition will modify
the existing definition and be incorporated into the DOD Dictionary.)
religious advisement. The practice of informing the commander on the impact of religion
on operations, to include, but not limited to, worship, rituals, customs, and practices of
United States military personnel, international forces, and the indigenous population, as
well as the impact of military operations on the religious and humanitarian dynamics in
the operational area. (Upon approval of this change of an existing publication, this term
and its definition will be included in the DOD Dictionary.)
religious affairs. The combination of religious support and religious advisement. (Upon
approval of this change of an existing publication, this term and its definition will be
included in the DOD Dictionary.)
religious support team. A team comprising at least one chaplain and one enlisted
religious affairs person. Also called RST. (Upon approval of this change of an
existing publication, this term and its definition will be included in the DOD
Dictionary.)
risk management. The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions
that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)
show of force. An operation planned to demonstrate United States resolve that involves
increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific
situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or
national objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
stability activities. Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the
United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or
GL-15
Glossary
reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (Upon approval of
this changed publication, this definition will modify the existing definition and be
incorporated into the DOD Dictionary.)
strategic level of warfare. The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a
group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic
security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve
those objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power
in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or
multinational objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects
of a task assigned by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3110.01, (U) 2015
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or other joint planning authority. 2. In the
context of joint planning, the commander who prepares operation plans or operation
orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. In
the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives
assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for
ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (Upon
approval of this changed publication, this definition will modify the existing definition
and be incorporated into the DOD Dictionary.)
sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and
prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)
tactical level of warfare. The level of warfare at which battles and engagements are
planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task
forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate
response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
termination criteria. The specified standards approved by the President and/or the
Secretary of Defense that must be met before a military operation can be concluded.
(Upon approval of this changed publication, this definition will modify the existing
definition and be incorporated into the DOD Dictionary.)
unity of command. The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander
who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a
common purpose. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
weapon system. A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment,
materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable)
required for self-sufficiency. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
GL-17
Glossary
Intentionally Blank
JOINT
DOCTRINE
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-0 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
Approval Development