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AT E S O F
Amphibious Operations
4 January 2019
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, conducting,
and assessing amphibious operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and
executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;
however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.
c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in
coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current
and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance
or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures
ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and
procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Development
i
Preface
Intentionally Blank
ii JP 3-02
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-02, 18 JULY 2014
iii
Summary of Changes
Intentionally Blank
iv JP 3-02
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... xi
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
CHAPTER II
TYPES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
Overview ....................................................................................................................II-1
v
Table of Contents
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL
CHAPTER IV
PLANNING PHASE
vi JP 3-02
Table of Contents
CHAPTER V
EMBARKATION, REHEARSAL, AND MOVEMENT
vii
Table of Contents
CHAPTER VI
ACTION PHASE
CHAPTER VII
FIRE SUPPORT
viii JP 3-02
Table of Contents
CHAPTER VIII
PROTECTION
CHAPTER IX
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
CHAPTER X
SUSTAINMENT
ix
Table of Contents
APPENDIX
A Assault Follow-On Echelon ...................................................................... A-1
B Composite Warfare Doctrine .....................................................................B-1
C Points of Contact ........................................................................................C-1
D References ................................................................................................. D-1
E Administrative Instructions ........................................................................ E-1
GLOSSARY
Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-6
FIGURE
I-1 Phases of an Amphibious Operation ........................................................... I-8
II-1 Assault Sequence......................................................................................II-10
III-1 Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship....................................... III-4
III-2 Coordination Responsibilities ................................................................ III-20
IV-1 Decisions Responsibilities Matrix ............................................................ IV-4
IV-2 Landing Timing Considerations ............................................................... IV-6
IV-3 Landing Area Selection ............................................................................ IV-9
IV-4 Over-the-Horizon Operations ................................................................. IV-16
IV-5 Sea Areas ................................................................................................ IV-22
IV-6 Ship-to-Shore Movement Planning Sequence........................................ IV-27
IV-7 Landing Plan Documents ....................................................................... IV-33
V-1 Landing Force Organization for Embarkation .......................................... V-5
V-2 Amphibious Task Force Organization for Embarkation ........................... V-6
V-3 Parallel Navy Combat Cargo Officer and Landing Force
Embarkation Officer .................................................................................. V-7
V-4 Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Ships
Worksheet (Data used in worksheet is illustrative only)......................... V-16
V-5 Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Ships
Worksheet: Embarkation Unit: ALPHA (Data used in
worksheet is illustrative only) ................................................................. V-18
V-6 Schematic Diagram of the Marshalling Area, Mounting
Area, Embarkation Area,and Embarkation Points .................................. V-20
IX-1 Communications System Support Plan .................................................... IX-8
IX-2 Communications Support Requirements ................................................ IX-10
X-1 Health Services Support Planning Considerations .................................... X-8
B-1 Composite Warfare Commander Integration Within the
Operational Area ........................................................................................B-2
x JP 3-02
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
xi
Executive Summary
Amphibious assaults are An amphibious assault requires the rapid buildup of combat
launched from the sea by the power ashore, from an initial zero capability to full
amphibious force on a hostile coordinated striking power as the attack progresses toward
or potentially hostile shore. AF objectives. In the amphibious assault, combat power is
progressively phased ashore. The assault is the most
difficult type of amphibious operation and one of the most
difficult of all military operations due to its complexity.
Many of the principles and procedures of the amphibious
assault apply to other types of amphibious operations.
xii JP 3-02
Executive Summary
The joint force commander The organization of the AF should be sufficiently flexible to
may conduct operations meet the planned phases of the operation and any
through the Service development that may necessitate a change in plan. Sound
component commanders or organization provides for unity of effort through unity of
at lower echelons. command, centralized planning and direction, and
decentralized execution. JFCs may decide to establish a
functional component command to integrate planning;
reduce JFC span of control; and significantly improve
combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon
systems management, component interaction, or control
over the scheme of maneuver.
Joint Force Commander The command relationships established between the CATF
and CLF and other designated commanders are important
decisions. The AF commanders are coequal in planning
matters. Planning decisions should be reached on a basis of
common understanding of the mission; objectives; and
tactics, techniques, and procedures and on a free exchange
of information. Typically, a support relationship is
established between the commanders and is based on the
complementary rather than similar nature and capabilities of
the amphibious task force (ATF) and LF.
xiii
Executive Summary
Command and Control (C2) of The composite warfare organization enables offensive and
Surface and Undersea defensive combat operations against multiple targets and
Operations threats simultaneously. The officer in tactical command
(OTC) may implement a composite warfare organization. The
OTC controls composite warfare commander (CWC) and
subordinate warfare commander actions through command by
negation. Command by negation acknowledges, that in many
aspects of often distributed and dispersed maritime warfare, it
is necessary to pre-plan the actions of a force to an assessed
threat and delegate some warfare functions to subordinate
commanders.
C2 of Surface Ship-to-Shore The CATF, in close coordination with the CLF, prepares the
Movement overall ship-to-shore movement and landing plans. During the
execution of the amphibious operation, the CATF is overall
responsible for ship-to-shore movement but will coordinate
with the CLF to adjust for changing situations. The CATF and
transport group commanders designate control ships and
control officers, as appropriate. The organization of the Navy
control group is based on the arrangement and number of
landing beaches used by the AF and is specifically designed to
support the LF’s organization for landing.
C2 of Air Operations Joint air operations in support of the AF are performed with air
capabilities and forces made available by components in
support of the JFC’s or AF’s objectives. The JFC synchronizes
and integrates the actions of assigned, attached, and supporting
capabilities and forces in time, space, and purpose by
designating a joint force air component commander, area air
defense commander (AADC), and airspace control authority
for the joint operations area (JOA). Air operations conducted
within the AOA are controlled by the ATF and/or LF air staff
as designated. When the JFC establishes an AOA within the
JOA, the supported commander is responsible for all actions
within the AOA. Any joint air operations that support
operations in the AOA or would have an impact on operations
in the AOA should be controlled by, or coordinated with, the
xiv JP 3-02
Executive Summary
Defensive Counterair The AADC bears overall responsibility for air defense
activities of the joint force, to include defense from missile
threats. The AADC may designate subordinate regional air
defense commanders (RADCs) for specific geographic regions
to accomplish the joint force mission. An RADC is normally
established within the ATF organization and is responsible for
the airspace allocated for amphibious operations, including,
but not limited to, the AOA. The CATF usually assigns an air
and missile defense commander (AMDC), normally located on
the most capable air defense platform, to carry out air and
missile defense operations. The AMDC may be assigned as
the RADC by the CWC.
Planning Phase
Amphibious Force Decisions The JFC order will contain guidance for the development of
the plan prepared by the AF commanders. This guidance may
include the amphibious mission, the purpose of the mission,
the general location, and typically a target date for execution.
xv
Executive Summary
Based on the orders passed from the JFC through the chain of
command to the AF, the AF commanders in turn make other
primary decisions. In the case of mutual decisions, both the
CATF and CLF must concur or the decision is referred to the
common superior or establishing authority for resolution.
Supporting decisions are those used by the CATF/CLF to
refine the plan, which include methods of entry, selecting the
landing area, selecting landing beaches, determining the sea
areas and echelon plan, LF objectives, and landing and drop
zones. Other decisions include determining go/no-go and
abort criteria, forward arming and refueling points, and
transition. The decision to conduct seabasing operations
depends on the tactical situation and the scope and intensity of
the assigned mission.
Operation Assessment Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the
commander ensure the operational approach remains feasible
and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and
orders. The CATF’s and CLF’s requirements for decision
making should focus the assessment plan and activity.
Movement and Areas The CATF prepares the movement plan. In operations
involving several attack groups, the CATF usually prepares a
general movement plan, which includes coordination measures
as necessary. Subordinate force and group commanders will
prepare their own detailed movement plans. Routes and route
points should be named to facilitate reference. Small-scale
charts, which show sea routes and route points, are prepared
and included in the operation plans (OPLANs) and operation
orders of appropriate ATF echelons. The CATF, in
consultation with the CLF, may decide to use staging areas
while en route to the operational area. The AF may stage at
one or more intervening ports for refueling, logistic support,
emergency repairs, or final rehearsals. The ability to conduct
littoral maneuver provides an advantage for the AF by
imposing a continuous coastal threat on the enemy that may
cause dispersal of enemy forces, potentially dissipating enemy
defenses. Littoral maneuver enables AFs to operate across a
wider geographic area in a more decentralized manner.
Ship to Shore Movement The plan for ship-to-shore movement to land troops,
equipment, and supplies at the prescribed times, places, and in
the formation required to support the LF scheme of maneuver
is developed by the CATF and CLF. Displacement and non-
displacement landing craft are used to land troops, equipment,
and supplies in amphibious operations by surface ship-to-shore
movement. Aircraft employed in ship-to-shore movement are
organic to the LF, and their employment is primarily
determined by the CLF.
xvi JP 3-02
Executive Summary
Landing Plan The landing plan is prepared after the final allocation of means
has been made. It represents the integrated sum of detailed
plans for waterborne and airborne ship-to-shore movement
prepared by corresponding ATF and LF commands at all
levels. The landing plan is composed of certain specific
documents that present, in detail, the numbers of landing craft,
helicopters, and surface craft available for use and the exact
personnel and equipment that will be loaded on each, along
with embarkation and landing times.
Other Planning When developing the overall plan for an amphibious operation,
Considerations other planning considerations, such as those associated with
supporting functions, should be considered. They are the
enablers that support execution, such as fire support, protection,
intelligence, communications, and logistics/sustainment.
Additional planning considerations include operations in
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments;
the electromagnetic spectrum operations; and cyberspace
operations.
Embarkation Phase The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces,
with their equipment and supplies, are embarked in assigned
ships. The organization for embarkation is a temporary task
organization that accounts for each element of the AF and other
forces that may originate from several locations and require
both sealift and airlift support. It conforms to the
circumstances of the deployment and the requirements of the
expected tactical situation. The development of detailed and
comprehensive embarkation and staging plans is a mutual
responsibility of the CATF, CLF, naval forces, and external
supporting agencies.
Rehearsal Phase Rehearsal is the period during which the prospective operation
is practiced. The types of rehearsals are based on the
individual needs of the ATF and LF. Rehearsals are not unit-
level training; rather, they are conducted to exercise the ATF
and LF ability to execute the OPLAN for the specific mission
assigned. The rehearsal phase may be conducted concurrently
with other phases of the amphibious operation but most often
is associated with the movement phase. Rehearsal plans
require execution of the various tasks and functions paralleling
those required during the operation.
Movement Phase In amphibious operations, the movement plan is the naval plan
providing for the movement of the ATF to the objective area.
It includes information and instructions concerning departure
xvii
Executive Summary
Action Phase
Preparation and Shaping of Prior to the execution of the action phase of an amphibious
the Operational Environment operation, the JFC seeks to shape the operational environment.
Shaping operations include supporting and prelanding
operations. Planners consider how to conceal the AF and their
intentions throughout all phases of the operation. Plans include
actions to hide the force, confuse the enemy, and reduce the
enemy’s sensors effectiveness, while embarking and
rehearsing and during movement and the action phases. The
amphibious advance force, in concert with supporting
operations, prepares the AOA or AO. Prelanding operations
take place between the commencement of the action phase and
the ship-to-shore movement.
Planning and Execution The commencement of landing craft and aircraft loading
operations, and the timing of other ship-to-shore movement
preparations, are dependent on the designated H-hour and L-
hour. Whether using landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or
helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft, the CATF—in conjunction
with the CLF—develops and adheres to a strict time schedule
based on H-hour. Scheduled waves are launched at
predetermined times and places of landing in the initial stages
of the assault. They include both waterborne and airborne
waves. On-call waves are LF units, equipment, and supplies
for which an urgent need ashore is anticipated but whose time
and place of landing by surface or air cannot be accurately
predicted. Naval surface fire support (NSFS) is used to destroy
or neutralize enemy defense installations that might interfere
with the approach and final deployment of the AF and to assist
in isolation of the landing area. NSFS is used to support
underwater demolition and mine countermeasures (MCM)
operations. Subsidiary landings should be planned and
executed by commanders with the same precision as the main
landing.
Fire Support
Properly planned and Properly planned and executed supporting fires that create
executed supporting fires that lethal and/or nonlethal effects are critical to the success of an
create lethal and/or nonlethal amphibious operation. Fire support planning and coordination
effects are critical in amphibious operations are continuous processes seeking
timely and appropriate application of force to achieve the
xviii JP 3-02
Executive Summary
Planning and Execution The purpose of fire support planning is to optimize the
employment of fire support to achieve the supported
commander’s intent by shaping the operational area and
providing support to maneuver forces. The CATF prepares the
overall NSFS plan based on the CLF and ATF requirements.
The plan allocates gunfire support ships and facilities. Fire
support coordination in multinational operations demands
special arrangements with MNFs and local authorities. To
maximize the fires of the MNF and to minimize the possibility
of friendly fire, the CATF and staff should be familiar with
each nation’s capabilities and limitations in munitions, digital
capability, and training to ensure they develop good fire
support coordination throughout the MNF.
Protection
Mine Countermeasures and Elements of mine warfare which can be used in support of
Obstacle Clearance and amphibious operations include mining (offensive, defensive,
Avoidance and protective) and MCM (offensive, including strategic strike
against mine stocks or minelayers, and defensive, including
avoidance of mined waters, operational deception, and active
use of MCM platforms to hunt or sweep for active enemy
mines). Enemies often employ integrated antilanding
capabilities that have incorporated the use of land,
maritime, air, and, in some cases, space assets. These
capabilities involve integration of reconnaissance, long-range
interdiction by air and sea forces, and a combined/arms ground
force at the beach. In most cases, enemies will employ mines
as an economy of force defensive measure.
Defense of the Amphibious Defensive counterair includes all measures designed to detect,
Task Force identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy air and missile
forces attempting to attack or penetrate through friendly
airspace. These operations employ both active and passive
measures to protect US or MNFs assets and interests. To
assure access for the AF, surface warfare-capable forces will
xix
Executive Summary
Intelligence The JFC should consider the size and duration of the operation
and the organic intelligence capabilities of the AF when
establishing either a joint intelligence support element or an
operational-level joint intelligence operations center to support
the AF. The joint intelligence support element or joint
intelligence operations center will be the central node in
securing theater- and national-level intelligence support for the
AF and provide direct intelligence support to AF components.
Every AF deploys with US Navy and USMC intelligence staff
that should plan to conduct intelligence operations and share
intelligence products with multinational partners. These staffs
must coordinate with the geographic combatant command
foreign disclosure officer as early as possible to determine
what classified military information may be shared with
participating foreign governments and international
organizations.
xx JP 3-02
Executive Summary
Sustainment
The commander, amphibious The requirement for afloat forces to provide support to the LF
task force and the commander, during the period in which the LF logistic system is primarily
landing force have co- sea-based has a significant influence on logistic planning for
responsibility for determining an amphibious operation. The AF logistic systems must be
overall sustainment responsive, simple, flexible, economical, attainable,
requirements for the sustainable, and survivable.
amphibious force.
Planning and Execution Logistics planning should include considerations for initial
supply and sustained operations. Wherever possible,
sustainment planning should include direct ship-to-user
delivery. From the CSS standpoint, the ship-to-shore
movement is divided into two time periods: selective
unloading and general unloading. The selective unloading
period is responsive to the requirements of LF units. General
unloading is undertaken when sufficient troops and supplies
have been landed to sustain the momentum of the attack and
when areas are able to handle the incoming volume of supplies.
CONCLUSION
xxi
Executive Summary
Intentionally Blank
xxii JP 3-02
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
“A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one
of the most difficult operations of war.”
1. General
b. An AF is an amphibious task force (ATF) and LF together with other forces that
are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. An ATF is a Navy task
organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. This may include various
combinations of United States Navy (USN), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and
Maritime Administration assets. An LF is a United States Marine Corps (USMC) or United
States Army (USA) task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. An AF
is a self-deploying, self-sustaining, combined arms team capable of conducting
simultaneous, disparate, geographically dispersed, or concentrated operations.
d. The ability to operate within the maritime domain, conduct operations from OTH,
dynamically size and organize the force, and limit reliance on infrastructure ashore enables
amphibious operations to be conducted during any phase of a larger joint operation (such
as a joint forcible entry) or campaign.
I-1
Chapter I
e. The preferred tactic for AFs operating against coastal defenses is to avoid or bypass
enemy strengths and to exploit enemy weaknesses and gaps in these defenses. Both require
not only the ability to gain timely information but also the capability to process and
disseminate accurate and useful intelligence to commanders at all levels enabling informed
decision making. This also requires strong OPSEC and the flexibility to exercise initiative
to exploit opportunities and overcome or mitigate challenges. If unable to bypass the
enemy strengths, the AF will be required to neutralize them to conduct operations in and
through the littorals.
I-2 JP 3-02
Overview of Amphibious Operations
3. Applications
b. The ability to conduct amphibious operations from the sea, without the
requirement for diplomatic clearance or host-nation support, provides the JFC with flexible
and sustainable options. Additionally, the ability to conduct OTH operations enhances
security, aids force protection efforts, provides additional maneuver space, and improves
the ability to achieve surprise. Conducted alone, or in conjunction with other military
operations, amphibious operations can be designed to support a number of JFC objectives
as characterized by the five types of amphibious operations.
I-3
Chapter I
potentially carries extreme risk to the AF. The CATF and CLF must ensure the
demonstration is sufficiently believable to deceive the enemy force.
Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4, Military Deception, for more information.
For more information on other types of forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint
Forcible Entry Operations.
I-4 JP 3-02
Overview of Amphibious Operations
operational area through supporting operations. The JFC may need to employ maritime,
air, land, and special operations forces; cyberspace forces; and space assets to shape the
operational environment. The JFC and joint force maritime component commander
(JFMCC) should shape the amphibious objective area (AOA) or area of operations (AO)
with maritime and other joint forces prior to the commencement of the amphibious
operation to establish the level of maritime and air superiority necessary for the amphibious
operation to occur. The JFC or JFMCC may employ a support force, which is a temporary
organization comprised of initial and crisis response forces and special operations forces
(SOF) in the AO, which assists in preparing the AO for amphibious operations by
conducting operations. These operations could include surveillance and reconnaissance,
beach studies, MILDEC, seizure of supporting positions, mine countermeasures (MCM),
preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, and air interdiction. Integration of
other Service components and SOF will enable complementary supporting operations. An
AF, in conjunction with other joint assets, should have the capacity to continuously support
forces ashore during all phases of an amphibious operation.
c. AFs are task-organized based on the mission. AFs routinely deploy with similar
task organizations and can be quickly reinforced or augmented with other assets. No
standard organization is applicable to all situations that may be encountered in an
amphibious operation. The C2 capabilities of the ATF and LF facilitate the
accomplishment of multiple and diverse missions and the integration of joint and
multinational forces.
6. Capabilities
a. AFs can be tailored and scaled to support a specific mission or situation and
repositioned to respond to a changing situation or modification of the CONOPS. AFs can
alleviate unnecessary political and logistical burdens on host nations by operating from the
sea base and reducing the footprint ashore. This adaptability and versatility enables
additional options for the JFC that do not limit the activities of the other components.
I-5
Chapter I
c. Routinely, forward-deployed AFs provide the JFC with a force proficient in time-
sensitive planning and capable of rapid response in crisis situations. They can perform a
wide range of mission-essential tasks to facilitate the accomplishment of the joint force
mission.
b. The initiating directive may come in the form of a warning order, an alert order, a
planning order, or an operation order (OPORD). The complete information required to
conduct an amphibious operation may come from a combination of these orders (e.g., a
warning order followed by an alert order or OPORD). The initiating directive normally
provides the following information:
I-6 JP 3-02
Overview of Amphibious Operations
a. The JFC should consider both the time it will take to close the force and how the
AF will be aggregated with other forward-deployed or surge forces, to support operations.
Forward-deployed AFs routinely conduct relatively small-scale amphibious operations to
enhance regional security and contribute to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. Larger-
scale amphibious operations may require additional forces that are aggregated from other
forward-deployed AFs in the same theater, in adjacent theaters, or surging AFs from the
continental US. While a forward-deployed AF is manned, organized, and equipped to meet
stated geographic combatant commander (GCC) requirements and the anticipated
operational environment (e.g., arctic, jungle), they are capable of various crisis response
operations and specified operation plan (OPLAN) requirements. A forward-deployed AF
accommodates the most likely missions to be encountered during deployment; surged AFs
typically conduct planning and embarkation for a specific mission and may include
compensating for any capability shortfalls in the forward-deployed AFs.
(1) Aggregated. The most common form where the AF is employed under a
single GCC who maintains operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) of
the ARG and MEU. “Split” is a subset of aggregated, where the ARG and MEU remain
employed within a single GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR), but the units are separated
by time, distance, or task while operating beyond the reach of organic tiltrotor aircraft or
landing craft. Aggregated provides unity of command and is the preferred employment
construct.
(3) Distributed. The ARG and MEU is partitioned for emergent requirements
for multiple GCCs; however, the original GCC to whom it was allocated retains OPCON
while the other exercises TACON of elements that are distributed for a specific mission or
duration mission. The ARG and MEU communication and computers systems are critical
for supporting distributed operations. The GCC that has OPCON may request re-
aggregation at any time, and the ARG and MEU commanders cannot make changes to
capabilities allocated OPCON or TACON without approval. Distributed is the preferred
employment construct to support multiple GCCs as the ARG and MEU is able to sustain
its elements, facilitate planning, and conduct military engagement and joint/combined
training across AOR boundaries and is supported throughout operations.
I-7
Chapter I
a. Amphibious operations generally follow distinct phases, though the sequence may
vary. The phases of an amphibious operation are planning, embarkation, rehearsal,
movement, and action (PERMA) and are summarized in Figure I-1.
I-8 JP 3-02
Overview of Amphibious Operations
b. While planning occurs throughout the entire operation, it normally dominates staff
actions prior to embarkation. Successive phases bear the title of the dominant activity
taking place within the phase and are covered in more detail later.
c. When AFs are forward-deployed, or when subsequent tasks are assigned upon
completion of the original mission, the sequence of phases may differ. This sequence
accounts for the new mission, reconstitution of forces, and initial cross-decking of staff
components or forces to support planning, preparation, and future actions. This sequence
flows from embarkation, through planning, rehearsal, and movement, to the operational
area and ends with action. The planning and execution of an amphibious operations
typically occurs against the backdrop of the concurrent major activities of a major operation
or campaign as discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
a. The criteria for how and when to terminate amphibious operations are discussed
during operational design. The termination of an amphibious operation is predicated on
either the accomplishment of the mission set out in the initiating directive or a change in
the situation that renders mission objectives no longer achievable or operationally
necessary. When the CATF and CLF are satisfied that the conditions for the
accomplishment of the mission have been met (normally predetermined or agreed upon),
they will propose termination of the operation to the establishing authority who issued the
initiating directive. Upon termination, the LF may re-embark to reconstitute the AF for
potential employment elsewhere, remain ashore as the land component commander, or be
attached to the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). The establishing
authority will terminate the amphibious operation and disestablish the AOA.
(2) Within the parameters of the joint campaign, responsibility for control of the
area previously covered by the AOA may have to be handed over to the JFC or another
component commander.
b. Detailed planning should be conducted between the CATF’s and CLF’s staffs to
identify when the conditions for termination have been met. Conditions might include:
I-9
Chapter I
(2) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to
ensure the continuous landing of troops and material required for subsequent operations.
(4) The CATF and CLF are in agreement, and the CLF is ready to assume full
responsibility for subsequent operations.
(1) Fire support control and coordination (e.g., artillery, naval gunfire, and
tactical air support).
d. When conditions for the termination of an amphibious operation are satisfied, the
CATF and CLF will recommend to the common superior a specific date/time for
termination of the amphibious operation and, if applicable, for concurrent transfer of
OPCON (or otherwise) of the LF to the appropriate commander ashore. The common
superior may, through the JFC, in consultation with other commanders in the area, direct
termination of the amphibious operation, thus disestablishing the AF and AOA and
arrange/effect the transfer of OPCON.
e. The LF may be required to reconstitute with the AF, after transfer of OPCON to a
commander ashore, for example to re-embark for further amphibious operations.
I-10 JP 3-02
CHAPTER II
TYPES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
1. Overview
2. General
II-1
Chapter II
or other high-value targets. The capture or killing of these personnel requires detailed
planning. Timely and accurate intelligence is essential. The need to avoid advance
warning of execution may require the force to be small in size while the target’s location
(e.g., in a complex urban area or an isolated mountain cave) and enemy disposition may
require a larger reaction (covering) force. Friendly forces executing these types of
operations normally try to avoid deliberate engagement with local forces, concentrating
specifically on those forces protecting the target and with direct impact on mission
execution. Execution authority for these operations may reside with the JFC or higher
authorities.
II-2 JP 3-02
Types of Amphibious Operations
execution, and violence of action at the objective. Thorough, integrated rehearsals are
essential to precision and speed in executing an amphibious raid. All participating forces
should be drilled in every detail of debarkation, movement ashore, operations ashore,
withdrawal, and reembarkation. An amphibious raid is planned and executed in the same
general manner as an amphibious assault, except that an amphibious raid will include a
provision for withdrawal of the raiding force. Specific characteristics of amphibious raids
include:
(2) The size of the amphibious raid force is normally limited to the essential
number of personnel required to accomplish the mission. This increases the chance of
maintaining OPSEC, achieving surprise at the objective, and facilitating rapid withdrawal
on completion of the mission. The amphibious raid force is normally formed by task
organizing from existing LF elements and is trained to conduct a specific mission.
(6) The objective, nature, and duration of the operation may simplify logistic
requirements.
(7) Compromise of the amphibious raid force or the AF before reaching the
objective area may require execution of an alternate plan or require the CATF and CLF to
abort the mission.
a. Surprise is essential for the success of an amphibious raid and helps to offset the
lack of fire support in preparing the objective area. It is an inherent force multiplier
II-3
Chapter II
c. The following factors will influence the choice of landing areas for the raid force:
d. The estimated time that the amphibious raid force is to be ashore may influence the
choice of H-hour and, consequently, the conditions of visibility under which it may be landed
and withdrawn. These factors likewise affect the scope of logistic support.
e. The purpose of the raid, including its relation to other concurrent or imminent
operations that it may support, will influence the selection of its D-day. In addition, these
same factors may affect the availability of shipping, aircraft, and logistic and fire support
means for the raid.
g. Fire support planning is similar to that for an amphibious assault. However, because
the success of an amphibious raid usually requires surprise, amphibious raid forces will
generally not employ any fires to prepare the objective for the raid or other fires in support
of their movement that might alert the enemy. Emission control (EMCON) and signature
control (SIGCON) should be maintained throughout the operation, even if surprise is lost, to
increase the survivability of the AF elements. Pre-H-hour fires may be an effective part of
deception operations to draw enemy attention away from the raid force or its objective. On-
call fire support should also be planned to support the amphibious raid force if it is detected
en route and requires assistance to break contact, conduct an emergency withdrawal, or
continue to the objective.
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Types of Amphibious Operations
h. Detailed planning for an amphibious raid requires intelligence that enables the CLF
to more precisely tailor the force size, conduct rehearsals, identify critical targets, and plan
support. The availability or lack of intelligence affects all aspects of the amphibious raid.
j. The withdrawal should be planned in detail, including time and place for egress and
re-embarkation. It should be swift and orderly and is influenced by the time it takes to secure
the objective, enemy reaction, time needed to care for and evacuate casualties, and the means
of attack and withdrawal. Every effort is made to leave nothing of intelligence value behind.
When equipment cannot be re-embarked, it is destroyed. Withdrawal should be tested during
rehearsals. The means for withdrawal should be available for immediate loading when the
amphibious raid force arrives at the beach or LZs. This is critical, as the enemy may be
actively pursuing the raid force. Covering fire may be required to prevent enemy
interference. Evacuation of casualties is expedited. Contingency recovery plans are
designated in the raid plan. If the landing point and withdrawal point are not the same,
positive means of location and identification of the latter should be established. Special
situations may permit planning for withdrawal of the raiding force directly into friendly
territory without re-embarkation. Withdrawal by air may be possible when the area of the
amphibious raid includes a usable airfield or terrain suitable for landing helicopters and
tiltrotor aircraft. Detailed planning should include provisions for an alternate extraction
method in the event of inclement weather or enemy action. One consideration may be to
have the raid force remain concealed ashore until extraction can be executed. Immediately
on embarkation, the raid force is normally debriefed by designated commanders and staff.
For additional information on amphibious raids, see Marine Corps Reference Publication
(MCRP) 3-30, Raid Operations. For additional information on personnel recovery, see JP
3-50, Personnel Recovery.
II-5
Chapter II
4. General
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Types of Amphibious Operations
To solidify what must have been the Iraqi military’s predicted axis of
attack, USCENTCOM [United States Central Command] regularly made
references to the press concerning the training capabilities and
presence of the amphibious force in the Persian Gulf and, later, off the
coast of Kuwait. Large-scale amphibious rehearsals were conducted,
including, notably, the one held during the last 10 days of January in
which 8,000 US Marines landed on the coast of Oman. Carrier air and
naval surface fire support missions were executed throughout the
period to support suspicions of a major coalition amphibious assault.
a. Location. The demonstration area should be near enough to the main effort to
permit subsequent employment of the demonstration force if required. It should also be
sufficiently separated from the main effort to avoid interference and intelligence collection
that may inadvertently detect the demonstration force and to delay the enemy in repositioning
forces. The demonstration area must be suitable for an actual landing so the threat of landing
is plausible. An alternate landing area will often prove suitable for demonstration purposes.
If the purpose of the demonstration is to cause the enemy to prematurely disclose its positions
or for harassment, it may be conducted prior to execution of the actual amphibious assault or
other joint operation. Rehearsals outside of the immediate operational area may also serve
as effective demonstrations or to enhance an enemy perception of a pending assault.
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Chapter II
(a) Draw enemy forces to the demonstration area and away from the area of
the main operation.
(2) A demonstration may commence at the same time as the main operation if it is
desired to prevent redeployment of enemy forces and deceive the enemy as to the location of
the main operation.
c. Forces. The demonstration force must appear to be of such composition and size as
to cause the desired reaction. When the demonstration force is constituted from within the
AF, the LF reserve and the shipping in which it is embarked may be employed if the presence
of the reserve is not required in the immediate area of the main landing.
e. Rehearsals. Sufficient rehearsals should be held to aid the perception that the
demonstration is an actual amphibious raid or assault.
f. Action. The demonstration should occur over a long enough period to cause the
enemy to react. The movement of waves toward the beach or LZs should be conducted as a
normal ship-to-shore movement, except that boat waves normally do not actually beach and
helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft waves do not land. Empty landing craft must maintain
sufficient distance from the beach to preclude close enemy observation. As our enemies will
most likely utilize unmanned aircraft systems to conduct intelligence and surveillance against
the AF, measures to deny their effectiveness should be included in the plan to increase the
plausibility of the amphibious demonstration. At a prearranged time or distance from the
beach and LZ, or on signal, the boat waves and helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft waves
withdraw. On completion of the demonstration, the demonstration force is dissolved and its
elements are reassigned in accordance with the OPORD or OPLAN.
II-8 JP 3-02
Types of Amphibious Operations
6. General
a. An amphibious assault is launched from the sea by an AF, embarked in ships or craft,
to employ an LF on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. An amphibious assault requires the
rapid buildup of combat power ashore, from an initial zero capability to full coordinated
striking power as the attack progresses toward AF objectives. The assault begins on order
after sufficient elements of the assault echelon (AE) arrive in the operational area and
specified operational criteria for landing are met. For an assault, the action phase ends when
conditions specified in the initiating directive are met, as recommended by the CATF and
CLF and approved by the JFC or designated commander. Amphibious assaults may be used
to initiate a campaign or major operation, such as the 1942 landing on Guadalcanal, which
began the campaign to neutralize the enemy base at Rabaul in the Southwest Pacific, or the
1944 Normandy landings that established a beachhead for the Allied campaign across
Western Europe.
b. The assault is the most difficult type of amphibious operation and one of the most
difficult of all military operations due to its complexity. Many of the principles and
procedures of the amphibious assault apply to other types of amphibious operations. The
normal sequence during the action phase of the operation is depicted in Figure II-1.
a. The LF mission is developed after careful analysis of the AF mission and only after
all specified and implied tasks are identified and understood. The mission is translated into
specific LF objectives by the CLF. These objectives serve as the primary basis for
determining the LF scheme of maneuver, fire support, organization for combat, formation
for landing, landing plan, and logistic support requirements. The CONOPS is the principal
means by which the commander’s intent is promulgated, enabling subordinate and
supporting commanders to understand the commander’s vision and accomplish detailed
planning and execution of the operation.
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Chapter II
Assault Sequence
Mission Accomplishment
c. The time required to phase the LF’s combat power ashore depends on many
factors, to include, but not limited to:
(1) Degree of enemy, noncombatant, and civilian interference with the landing.
(4) The location of the transport areas with respect to the beach.
(6) Extent of fire support available to the LF prior to establishing organic assets
ashore.
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Types of Amphibious Operations
d. The LF will seldom be able to secure control of the landward section of the landing
area in a single landing. Therefore, the CLF will have to phase forces ashore during
execution. Intermediate objectives and phase lines may be used to track and control the
phasing of forces ashore. Phasing can revolve around many mediums: time (in relation to
H-hour, L-hour, or D-day), distance (intermediate objectives or phase lines), terrain
(crossing of obstacles), or event (link up with surface or airborne forces or seizure of an
off-shore fire support position). Regardless of the method used, the plan should be based
on sound decisions and the capabilities of the AF as a whole. The action phase is
characterized by decentralized execution, especially during the landing of scheduled
waves. The concept for phasing combat power ashore should plan for the reestablishment
of centralized control of the LF. This reestablishment of centralized control normally
progresses successively from lower to higher echelons.
(2) The scheme of maneuver may support the rapid buildup of combat
power ashore vice the immediate seizure of AF objectives. The scheme of maneuver
may enable the engagement of the enemy on ground chosen by the CLF and at a time that
gives the LF a marked advantage.
(3) The landing of the force at separate locations can create problems in
achievement of mass, with attendant difficulties in C2, fire support, and other functional
areas. The CLF can overcome this obstacle by determining that the major elements of the
LF fully understand the mission and commander’s intent and are task-organized to act
independently during the early stages of the operation.
(4) The types and numbers of combat units in the LF task organization and their
strength influence the scheme of maneuver.
(a) LFs that have organic or attached combat support and CSS capabilities
are usually better suited for amphibious operations than LFs comprised of infantry units
alone.
(b) Armored elements provide substantial combat power and mobility for
the LF.
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Chapter II
(e) Air defense units organic to the LF are established ashore early to
provide for the landward extension of an air defense system. They will be part of the
CATF’s integrated air defense system until control is phased ashore. It is important the
CLF understands the CATF’s integrated air defense plan. Land operations might rapidly
move LF elements beyond the range of AF antiair and missile defenses requiring support
from other forces (such as those adjacent to the AOA or AO).
(a) Its primary purpose should be the seizure of objectives requisite to the
buildup and establishment of the LF ashore.
(e) Provide for the development of mutual support between units as the
attack progresses.
(2) When afloat, the reserve force may be delayed pending availability of
landing craft, amphibious vehicles, helicopters, or tiltrotor aircraft, plus the time required
for debarkation and movement ashore.
(3) Employment of the reserve force may delay the movement of other assault
formations because all elements of the LF share the same ship-to-shore movement assets.
(4) Landing of the reserve force by surface means depends on the availability
of landing craft, as well as a suitable landing beach near the area of intended employment.
g. The assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) is the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft,
equipment, and supplies that, though not needed to initiate the assault, is required to
II-12 JP 3-02
Types of Amphibious Operations
support and sustain the assault. It is divided into air-lifted and sea-lifted forces and
supplies. Required arrival time in theater, suitability of material for air- and sea-lift, and
lift availability, in that order, are the criteria to determine the best transportation mode.
Some other considerations for the AFOE are:
(1) The AFOE is organized for landing and embarkation, respectively, based
on anticipated requirements of operations ashore. Units, personnel, and material
configured in shipload and planeload lots as dictated by landing and embarkation plans
are then organized into movement groups. Embarkation plans are prepared by the LF
and appropriate subordinate commanders containing instructions and information
concerning the organization for embarkation, assignment to shipping, supplies and
equipment to be embarked, location and assignment of embarkation areas, control and
communication arrangements, movement schedules and embarkation sequence, and
additional pertinent instructions relating to the embarkation of the LF.
(2) Units and their equipment are marshaled at their home stations or forward
bases and staged at ports of embarkation in accordance with their time-phased
deployment schedules. Materiel arriving from logistic sources is assembled at ports of
embarkation under LF supervision.
(5) Ship unloading is directed by the normal ATF-LF ship-to-shore control and
support activities (e.g., primary control officer [PCO], amphibious air traffic control
center [AATCC], tactical-logistical [TACLOG] group, landing force support party
[LFSP]). The size and organization of these agencies will change as the operation
matures. Additional cargo handling battalion and amphibious construction battalion
forces may be required to support the off-load of merchant ships. As they become
accessible, seaports and aerial ports are used to supplement traditional beach operations,
expanding the ship-to-shore organization accordingly. The CATF and CLF are
responsible for debarkation and off-load until termination of the amphibious operation.
In the case of an amphibious assault, the amphibious operation would not normally be
terminated until the entire AFOE is ashore. At that time, the responsibilities for off-load
of follow-up materiel may be passed to another off-load organization designated by
higher authority.
h. Follow-up shipping and aircraft carry reinforcements and stores for use after
landing of the AE and AFOE. The CATF will assume control of follow-up ships and
aircraft on arrival in the operational area.
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Chapter II
8. General
(1) Except in the case of withdrawals associated with amphibious raids, planning
processes will usually be abbreviated.
(2) Time available to execute will be limited when enemy action against the
withdrawing force is substantial or when the requirement to re-employ the force elsewhere
is urgent.
(3) Facilities and equipment for embarkation, available fire support means, and
means for C2 of the withdrawal may be limited.
(4) The operation may be conducted under adverse conditions (i.e., weather,
unfavorable terrain, or hydrographic features).
(5) The force to be withdrawn may not have been inserted by an amphibious
operation and its units may be unfamiliar with amphibious embarkation procedures, thus
significantly complicating the operation.
(1) Establish defense of the withdrawal and embarkation areas by air, naval, and
ground-covering forces while organizing and embarking LF personnel, supplies, and
equipment not required for support of operations ashore. As such, maintaining local air
and maritime superiority is essential to provide for the safety of personnel during the
withdrawal.
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Types of Amphibious Operations
(2) Progressively reduce troop strength and quantity of materiel and equipment
ashore. Depending on limitations in afloat cargo capacity and loading time, all usable
military materiel should be evacuated or destroyed.
c. Planning for the withdrawal of ground elements (or other elements) of the joint or
multinational force is more complicated than for those that may have been employed ashore
as part of a previously embarked LF. These elements should assign unit and team
embarkation officers to begin planning with the ATF upon notification that a withdrawal
by sea might be required.
10. General
a. AFs support to crisis response and other operations focuses on providing a rapid
response to crises, deterring war, and resolving conflict. AFs routinely conduct support to
other operations such as security cooperation, FHA, NEOs, peace support operations,
recovery operations, or protecting US facilities and personnel abroad. In the last 20 years,
amphibious support to crisis response and other operations has been the most common type
of amphibious operation. Examples of these operations include the 1999 peace operations
in Macedonia, the 2006 NEO in Beirut, the 2007 African Partnership Station, the 2010
FHA operations in Haiti and Pakistan, enforcement of the no-fly zone over Libya in 2011,
and the 2013 operations to capture high-value individuals in Libya.
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Chapter II
11. Planning and Execution of Amphibious Force Support to Crisis Response and
Other Operations
(1) On arrival in the area, the CATF establishes and maintains positive
communications and effects liaison with local diplomatic representatives. The CLF should
be prepared to augment or duplicate communications.
(3) The CLF may be tasked to augment existing security forces or to provide
forces to secure the evacuation area. Specific and detailed ROE should be promulgated.
II-16 JP 3-02
Types of Amphibious Operations
(8) In their planning, the CATF and CLF may need to consider potential US
embassy or Department of State requests to evacuate CBRN-contaminated or contagious
evacuees. The capabilities to handle these individuals are extremely limited onboard ship
and may impact the ship for further operations. Evacuees will likely need to be
decontaminated and segregated while ashore.
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Chapter II
A Royal Thai Navy medium tactical vehicle drives onto the beach from Landing Craft Utility
785, assigned to the Royal Thai amphibious and combat support service squadron, while
participating in a humanitarian assistance and disaster response training exercise during
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Thailand 2012.
(1) The CATF should prepare an estimate of the ATF disaster relief supplies and
equipment requirements, personnel availability and their skills, and the extent of contingency
funding. Similarly, the CLF should prepare an estimate of LF disaster relief capabilities; this
estimate would include an analysis of personnel skills, equipment, supplies, and special
capabilities of units as they individually relate to likely disaster relief. Skill sets could include
planners with regional/country or disaster response expertise, commercial bus or truck
licensed drivers, foreign language skills, and familiarity with local area.
(2) To understand the disaster’s impacts, the CATF and CLF should have a
comprehensive understanding of the current state of disaster response efforts. Civil affairs
forces, if available, and organic intelligence support can assist with this research and liaison.
II-18 JP 3-02
Types of Amphibious Operations
(4) The CATF and CLF should manage expectations and clearly articulate their
role and capabilities and limitations. It is critical to integrate the public affairs officer into
the operational planning process to ensure situational awareness of the actions and locations
of operational forces. This awareness is critical to the public affairs officer’s ability to
provide advice and counsel to commanders and staff on public sentiment, particularly with
respect to the impact the joint force has on the operating environment and its external
audiences, the potential unintended consequences of planned actions, and the identification
of perceived disparities between actions and words.
(5) Since FHA operations are typically conducted in support of the US Agency for
International Development or Department of State, the CATF and CLF will normally be in
a supporting role; thus, the JFC may not be responsible for determining the mission or
specifying the participating agencies. The CATF and CLF should plan for interaction and
coordination with interagency representatives, the GCC, local government agencies, and
international organizations. Because of the number of civilian and non-United States
Government (USG) entities involved in FHA activities, command relationships outside the
Department of Defense (DOD) command structures may not be clearly defined. Therefore,
appropriate organization, C2, and an understanding by the CATF and CLF of the objectives
of the organizations involved are all means to improve unity of effort.
Joint Task Force ODYSSEY DAWN was a US Africa Command task force
established to provide operational and tactical command and control of
US military forces supporting the international response to the unrest in
Libya and enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1973.
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Chapter II
Various Sources
II-20 JP 3-02
Types of Amphibious Operations
(c) Method to track AF personnel who are ashore (who, where, and why).
For more information on FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and Navy
Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-29, Disaster Response Operations.
For more information on other operations supported by an AF, see JP 3-05, Special
Operations, and JP 3-07, Stability. For more information on peace operations, see JP 3-
07.3, Peace Operations; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; JP 3-50, Personnel
Recovery; JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations; and JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
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Intentionally Blank
II-22 JP 3-02
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. General
a. The organization of the AF should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases
of the operation and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. Sound
organization provides for unity of effort through unity of command, centralized planning and
direction, and decentralized execution.
Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more details on joint
force organization.
b. All joint forces include Service component commands that provide administrative
and logistic support. The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component
commanders or at lower echelons. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity,
economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational
integrity of Service forces for conducting operations. The JFC has full authority to assign
missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. The JFC
should enable Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as
they were designed with the intent being to meet the requirements of the JFC while
maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizational structure.
d. The terms CATF and CLF are used throughout this publication to clarify the
doctrinal authorities, relationships, and responsibilities of these commanders. The CATF is
the Navy officer designated in the initiating directive as the commander of the ATF. The
CLF is the officer designated in the initiating directive as the commander of the LF for an
amphibious operation. During operations, amphibious commanders should be referred to by
their assigned task force or task group designators (e.g., Commander, Task Group 62
[Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)], or Commander, Task Group 62 [Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB)]).
III-1
Chapter III
Refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and Allied Tactical Publication-8, Doctrine for
Amphibious Operations, for more information on North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) amphibious operations.
b. The JFC will organize the AF in such a way as to best accomplish the mission
based on the CONOPS.
c. The command relationships established between the CATF and CLF and other
designated commanders are important decisions. The relationship chosen by the common
superior commander, or establishing authority, between the CATF, CLF, and other
designated commanders should be based on the mission, nature, and duration of the
operation, force capabilities, operational environment, and recommendations from
subordinate commanders. While the full range of command relationship options as
outlined in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, is available, in
amphibious operations, Service component commanders normally retain OPCON of their
respective forces. If the JFC organizes along functional lines, functional component
commanders will normally exercise OPCON over their parent Services’ forces and
TACON over other Services’ forces attached or made available for tasking.
III-2 JP 3-02
Command and Control
cases, may be the establishing authority. If a change in the mission occurs after
commencement of operations or if an amphibious operation is initiated from an afloat
posture, coequal planning relationships (either as described above or as specified in the
initiating directive) will apply to any subsequent planning.
(h) Development of joint tactical airstrike requests and air support requests.
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Chapter III
(5) The CATF and CLF will identify the events and conditions for any shifts of
the support relationship throughout the operation, ideally during the planning phase, and
forward them to the establishing authority for approval. See Figure III-1 for examples of
when the relationship might shift between commanders.
(a) If not specified in the initiating directive, the CATF and CLF will
determine who has primary responsibility for the essential tasks during mission analysis in
the planning process.
(c) When there is no littoral threat to the ATF, the establishing authority
may designate the CLF as the supported commander for the entire operation.
Legend
CATF commander, amphibious task force CLF commander, landing force
III-4 JP 3-02
Command and Control
(d) During the movement phase, the CATF may be designated the supported
commander based on having responsibility for the major action or activity during that
phase. The CATF may be designated the supported commander based on capabilities for
airspace control and the CLF’s air defense for the entire operation if, for example, the LF
does not intend to establish a Marine Corps tactical air command center (Marine TACC)
ashore.
(e) Considerations for shifts in the support relationship include, but are not
limited to, the following:
2. Force capabilities.
5. C2 capabilities.
(g) The AF and other forces may be embarked for what could be extended
periods of time on the same platforms but responsible to different or parallel chains of
command. Such parallel chains of command create special requirements for coordination.
Except in cases of emergencies, no significant decision will be made by a commander in a
chain of command that affects the plans, disposition, or intentions of a commander in
another chain of command without prior consultation. In emergency situations, the
commander making an emergency decision will notify corresponding commanders of the
action at the earliest practicable time.
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control operations to establish and maintain local maritime superiority in the AOA or
operational area. The establishing authority explicitly establishes priorities in the initiating
directive. The CATF and CLF resolve any conflicting requirements for mutual support
during planning or seek adjudication from the establishing authority during planning.
For detailed information on assigning Navy commanders as CATFs, see Chief of Naval
Operations Instruction 3501.316, Force Composition of Afloat Navy and Naval Groups.
b. Depending on the amphibious operation, an ATF may vary in size and can be task-
organized. Forward-deployed ATFs are normally organized into ARGs with three
amphibious warfare ships (an amphibious assault ship [general purpose]
[LHA]/amphibious assault ship [multipurpose] [LHD], amphibious transport dock [LPD],
and dock landing ship [LSD]). These ships, each with a flight deck and well deck (with
the exception of LHA-6 and LHA-7), can, or will be able to, embark, deploy, and land
elements of an LF in an assault by tiltrotor aircraft, helicopters, landing craft, amphibious
vehicles, and by combinations of these methods. An ESG may be formed to provide
additional amphibious warfare expertise and advocacy in the event of more complex
operations. ESGs are prepared to provide a deployable, scalable, flag officer-led CE with
task-organized naval forces to fulfill CCDR and fleet commander operational
requirements. ESGs include one ARG and MEU or ATF if a MEB embarks and may be
supported by other forces (e.g., surface combatants and auxiliary support vessels) based on
mission and CCDR requirements.
(1) The LHD has a full-length flight deck and hangar to support helicopter,
tiltrotor, and vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft. Well decks provide for ship-to-
shore movement of landing craft and AAVs. The CATF and CLF and their staffs are
normally embarked on these ships to control air, land, and maritime assets.
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Command and Control
(2) The LHA has a full-length flight deck and extended hanger to support
aviation facilities, but it lacks a well deck. Like the LHD, the CATF and CLF and their
staffs can also embark in the LHA to control air, land, and maritime assets.
(3) The LPD supports the landing of troops, equipment, and supplies using
landing craft, AAVs operating from its well deck, and helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft
operating from its flight deck.
(4) The LSD supports the landing of troops, equipment, and supplies using
various types of landing craft and AAVs using its well deck. It has the ability to render
limited docking and repair services to small boats and craft.
(5) The LCC [amphibious command ship] functions as a command ship for a
JTF, naval component commander, or numbered fleet commander as the command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence platform.
(3) Control Group(s). Personnel and ships designated to control the surface
ship-to-shore movement, for example, the central control officer (CCO) and PCO.
See Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP), 3-02.14, Naval Beach Group
Operations, for additional information on the naval beach group.
(5) Navy Tactical Air Control Group. The Navy tactical air control group is
an organization established to operate a Navy tactical air control center (Navy TACC)
and a tactical air operations center (TAOC) for control of air operations within the AOA
or operational area. Single-ship ATFs generally do not have a tactical air control group.
d. The ATF may include the following groups (not all groups will be required for
every operation):
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Chapter III
(4) Surface Fire Support Group(s). Surface combatants assigned to the ATF
to provide surface fire support of the assault landings and LF operations ashore.
(6) MIW Group. MCM ships conduct defensive MCM. The MIW group
submits requests for offensive MCM actions as part of the shaping process.
(8) AFOE Ships. These ships carry the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft,
equipment, and supplies that, although not needed to initiate the assault, are required to
support and sustain the assault. More information on the AFOE is contained in Appendix
A, “Assault Follow-On Echelon.”
(1) CSG. CSGs listed in the initiating directive or establishing directive may
be assigned to or in support of the ATF to provide air, surface, and subsurface protection
and strike warfare. They may aid in establishing the maritime and air superiority needed
to conduct the amphibious operation.
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(2) MIW Group. The same ships that could be part of the ATF could initially
be part of a support force.
(3) Theater ASW Force. This force will clear the AOA or AO of submarine
threats prior to the arrival of the ATF and then protect the ATF once they have arrived.
(4) Logistics forces. The combat logistics ships would supply both the ATF
and the LF.
f. The CATF will exercise OPCON over the ATF. Other groups may fall under
CATF OPCON as specified in the initiating directive or establishing directive. At a
minimum, however, the CATF will exercise TACON of forces from each of these other
groups while they are conducting operations inside the AOA.
5. Landing Force
a. The LF consists of ground combat units and any of its combat support and CSS
units. The CLF will be designated in the initiating directive. The LF may be composed
of USMC and USA forces, other US forces, and MNFs. If LF capabilities are required
by the CATF, the CLF will make decisions as to the appropriate LF capabilities to be
made available TACON to the CATF. If USA forces comprise part of the LF, they will
be task-organized with appropriate combat and sustainment capabilities to support the
LF. Army forces may provide intratheater ship-to-shore transport, to include landing
craft, cargo handling, logistics, traffic control, and general engineering capabilities.
When USMC forces are employed as the LF, they will be task-organized into a Marine
air-ground task force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps’ principal organization for missions
across the range of military operations. The MAGTF is functionally grouped into four
core elements: a CE, a GCE, an ACE, and a logistics combat element (LCE). The basic
structure of the MAGTF never varies, but the number, size, and type of Marine Corps
units comprising each of the four elements are mission-dependent.
(a) MEF. A MEF is the largest MAGTF, the Marine Corps’ principal
warfighting organization, and is capable of missions across the full range of military
operations. The size and composition of a deployed MEF can vary greatly depending on
the requirements of the mission. A MEF is normally built around a GCE infantry
division, a Marine aircraft wing, and a Marine logistics group—the largest respective
Marine Corps ground, air, or logistic units. It can operate from a sea base, land base, or
both and typically deploys with more than 45,000 personnel with up to 60 days of supply
(DOS). The ACE consists of a Marine aircraft wing with fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and
tiltrotor assets. The LCE is a combat logistics force that is organized to provide the full
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range of CSS to the MEF. The MEF headquarters can serve as a JTF headquarters. When
operating as part of a JTF, the MEF commander can operate as a functional component
commander. MEFs are capable of self-sustained forcible entry to overcome challenges
to access. It can seize and hold beachheads, airfields, and ports to enable the introduction
of follow-on forces. The MEF can then remain in theater to conduct the full range of
military operations in support of the joint operation or campaign.
(b) MEB. The MEB is a tailorable and scalable mid-sized MAGTF that is
typically led by a one-star general officer. It is normally built around a GCE of a
reinforced infantry regiment. The ACE consists of a Marine aircraft group with fixed-
wing, rotary-wing, and tiltrotor squadrons. The LCE is a combat logistics regiment that
is organized to provide the full range of CSS to the MEB. A MEB is capable of
deployment and employment via amphibious warfare ships and intratheater airlift and
sealift. It can operate by itself with a self-sustainment capability of 30 days. It may
include up to 19,000 personnel with up to 30 DOS. The MEB can conduct forcible entry
operations. The MEB is designed to aggregate with other MEBs, MEUs, and other pre-
positioning force assets to fight as the MEF.
(d) SPMAGTF. When situations arise for which a MEU or other unit is
either inappropriate or unavailable, a SPMAGTF is formed. A SPMAGTF may be of
any size, but normally no larger than a MEU, with tailored capabilities required for
accomplishing a particular mission. It may be task-organized from non-deployed Marine
Corps forces or formed on a contingency basis from a portion of a deployed MAGTF.
Frequently, SPMAGTFs conduct sea-based security cooperation activities, while others
have been formed to provide sea-based FHA or military support to civil authorities or to
participate in freedom of navigation operations.
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6. Other Forces
Amphibious operations are often supported by other forces that are not part of the ATF
or LF. These forces will serve for specific tasks, such as defending the amphibious advance
force, protecting the AF, USAF supporting the assault breaching mission, or shaping the
operational environment. Supporting naval (such as a CSG) and air resources, as well as
SOF, are assigned by the JFC or appropriate component commander to support the mission
of the AF during the amphibious operation. The support request may be originated by the
CATF or CLF. The initiating directive should provide the relationships of these forces
with the AF. The CATF or CLF will exercise coordination and control, as prescribed in
the initiating directive, over forces not a part of the AF when such forces are operating
within the AOA after the arrival of the amphibious advance force or the main body. When
such forces are merely passing through the AOA, control will be exercised only to the
extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference or for force protection purposes.
Maritime SOF, which includes naval special warfare forces and Marine Corps SOF, may
be employed in support of an amphibious operation as part of the amphibious advance
force or conducting other supporting operations. ARGs and MEUs may be augmented by
a special operations force liaison element to improve coordination with the global SOF
network and facilitate interdependent ARG and MEU and SOF operations, actions, and
activities.
7. Operational Areas
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c. AO. An AO is an operational area defined by the JFC for land and maritime forces
and should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and
protect their forces. Within the AO, the JFC specifies maritime (surface and subsurface)
and air defensive areas, in addition to the HIDACZ, used for air control measures. The
JFC may establish an AO with HIDACZ instead of an AOA if the CATF and CLF do not
possess the resources to C2 and defend all activity within the objective area.
For additional guidance on boundaries and synchronization of joint efforts within land and
maritime AOs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
8. Composite Warfare
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whenever and to whatever extent required, depending upon the composition and mission
of the force and the capabilities of the adversary. The OTC controls CWC and subordinate
warfare commander actions through command by negation. Allied maritime procedures
and instructions use the term command by veto to mean the same thing. Command by
negation acknowledges, that in many aspects of often distributed and dispersed maritime
warfare, it is necessary to pre-plan the actions of a force to an assessed threat and delegate
some warfare functions to subordinate commanders.
b. The OTC and/or CWC may choose to activate all commanders and coordinators
or activate only a few of them. The composite warfare construct allows the OTC to assign
some or all of the command functions associated with mission areas to warfare
commanders, functional group commanders, and coordinators, thus supporting
decentralized execution.
c. There are three tiers of the composite warfare structure: warfare commanders,
functional group commanders, and coordinators. They are differentiated from each other
by their focus and the command functions they exercise over assets in the force.
(1) Warfare commanders are usually established for extended periods of time
and normally impact all forces in the composite warfare organization. The warfare
commanders are: air and missile defense commander (AMDC), information operations
warfare commander, ASW commander, surface warfare commander (SUWC), and strike
warfare commander.
(3) Coordinators execute the policies of the OTC and/or CWC in managing
assigned resources; they do not initiate autonomous actions nor do they normally exercise
TACON. Coordinators include the air resource element coordinator and helicopter element
coordinator.
The sea combat commander, when assigned, plans, directs, monitors, and assesses
SUW and ASW tasks to protect the force from surface and subsurface threats during AF
movement to the AOA and as the LF transitions to and from the landing area. If a sea
combat commander is not assigned, the duties may be assigned to separate SUW and ASW
commanders. The MIWC has similar responsibility for threats from naval mines. The
OTC determines who will be assigned to these positions; the duties may be assigned to
commanders supporting but not part of the AF. The SUWC protects the force against
surface threats. The SUWC collects, evaluates, and disseminates SUW surveillance
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information and plans and manages the employment of SUW forces. SUW forces include
air, surface, and subsurface naval and assigned joint operational elements that are capable
of executing SUW tasks. USN ships are multi-mission and may be assigned primary
missions other than SUW. Other joint force assets may be tasked to participate in the SUW
mission and may function in both supported and supporting roles.
For more information on SUW operations, see NWP 3-20, Navy Surface Warfare Manual.
a. ASW missions will be centrally planned, typically under the direction of the
JFMCC or a Navy component commander, and executed in a decentralized manner in
support of the JFC’s CONOPS. ASW requires the coordination and integration of multiple
platforms and systems in the theater to mitigate the risks posed by enemy submarines.
b. The theater ASW commander is normally designated as a task force or task group
commander subordinate to a Navy component commander or JFMCC. The theater ASW
commander supports other maritime commanders (e.g., CATF) in the conduct of tactical
ASW to defend the AF and typically provides ASW support to afloat forces as they transit
through the joint operations area (JOA) and while they operate in the AOA.
For more information on ASW, see NTTP 3-21.1, Antisubmarine Warfare Commander’s
Manual.
c. The CATF has overall responsibility for MIW within the maritime areas of the
AOA. The MIWC and MCMC will act as supporting commanders to the CATF and
normally exercise OPCON of Navy MCM forces. During the planning process, a line of
demarcation boundary will be determined for the transition of responsibility between the
CATF and CLF for MCM in the AOA. Seaward of this line of demarcation, the CATF—
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supported by MIWC and MCMC—will be responsible for MCM on the beach, in the surf
zone (SZ), and at sea.
Additional discussion of the fundamentals of MIW C2 and its role in support of amphibious
operations can be found in JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint
Operations; NWP 3-15 (Vols. I and II)/MCTP 13-10J, Naval Mine Warfare; and NTTP 3-
15.24/MCRP 13-10J.1, Mine Countermeasures in Support of Amphibious Operations.
a. The relationships and authorities for the CATF, CLF, and commanders of other
forces assigned to the AF during ship-to-shore movement are established in the initiating
directive. Responsibilities for ship-to-shore movement include:
(1) The CATF, in close coordination with the CLF, prepares the overall ship-to-
shore movement and landing plans. During the execution of the amphibious operation, the
CATF is overall responsible for ship-to-shore movement but will coordinate with the CLF
to adjust for changing situations that affect the amphibious operation as revealed by
intelligence sources or forces ashore. The CATF is responsible for debarkation and ship-
to-shore movement until termination of the amphibious operation. At that time,
responsibility for the off-load of follow-on forces, follow-up shipping, and logistics over-
the-shore (LOTS) operations may be passed to another organization as designated by
higher authority. In the case of an amphibious assault, the operation will normally be
terminated only after the entire AFOE is ashore.
(2) The Navy control group keeps the CATF, CLF, and other designated
commanders informed of the progress of the surface movement from ship-to-shore,
including the actual landing of the waves and the visible progress of operations ashore. A
control group consists of personnel, ships, and craft designated to control the waterborne
ship-to-shore movement. The CATF and transport group commanders designate control
ships and control officers, as appropriate. The organization of the Navy control group is
based on the arrangement and number of landing beaches used by the AF and is specifically
designed to support the LF’s organization for landing. The Navy control group uses control
measures, such as approach lanes and boat lanes, to facilitate control of movement. The
primary agencies of the Navy control group include the following:
(a) CCO. This Navy officer is normally located aboard the CATF’s
flagship to coordinate all surface ship-to-shore movement. If there is only one colored
beach, there is no need for a CCO and thus, the PCO will work directly for the CATF. The
CCO:
2. Organizes the Navy control group to best support the landing plan.
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3. Maintain the current location and status of ships, landing craft, and
boats assigned to conduct a landing on a colored beach.
7. Arrange for fueling boats and provide rest and food for boat crews.
Detailed description and use of these control measures can be found in NTTP 3-02.1M/
MCTP 13-10E, Ship-to-Shore Movement.
(3) The CLF determines LF requirements for the ship-to-shore movement and
presents them to the CATF. The CLF provides information on the availability of organic
assets (airborne and amphibious vehicles) to the CATF and prepares the documents
contained in the LF landing plan.
(4) The commanders of other forces assigned to the AF (including those assigned
for movement to the operational area for tasks not part of the amphibious operation) present
their requirements to the CATF.
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a. Joint air operations in support of the AF are performed with air capabilities and
forces made available by components in support of the JFC’s or AF’s objectives. To create
synergy and avoid duplication of effort, the JFC synchronizes and integrates the actions of
assigned, attached, and supporting capabilities and forces in time, space, and purpose. The
JFC may accomplish this in the air through designation of a JFACC, area air defense
commander (AADC), and ACA for the JOA. If established, the JFACC uses joint air to
support amphibious operations within the AOA, as required, through coordination with the
JFMCC. Air operations conducted within the AOA are controlled by the ATF and/or LF
air staff as designated.
b. When the JFC establishes an AOA within the JOA, the supported commander is
responsible for all actions within the AOA. Any joint air operations that support operations
in the AOA or would have an impact on operations in the AOA should be controlled by,
or coordinated with, the CATF.
c. The JFACC staff will create an air operations directive to promulgate guidance for
each air tasking order (ATO) and the successive planning steps for the JOA. This order is
then issued to the joint air operations center for execution. Beyond the AF’s organic air
requirements, AF air planners support the ATO and the air operations directive with excess
sorties passed to the establishing authority for tasking. Likewise, the air operations
directive is used to deconflict and coordinate organic sorties and by the theater air control
system for overall control of AF assets.
For more information, see JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.
a. The AADC bears overall responsibility for air defense activities of the joint force,
to include defense from missile threats. The AADC may designate subordinate regional
air defense commanders (RADCs) for specific geographic regions to accomplish the joint
force mission. Additionally, sector air defense commanders (SADCs) may be designated
within and subordinate to RADCs. An RADC is normally established within the ATF
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organization and is responsible for the airspace allocated for amphibious operations,
including, but not limited to, the AOA (if established). The CATF coordinates joint air
requirements in support of active defense plans and procedures with the AADC. The
CATF usually assigns an AMDC, normally located on the most capable air defense
platform, to carry out air and missile defense operations. The AMDC may be assigned as
the RADC by the CWC. The AMDC coordinates with the Navy TACC to maintain a
current air picture.
c. Planning Considerations
(2) The area air defense plan is written with detailed engagement procedures that
are consistent with the airspace control plan (ACP) and operations in the AOA. The
geographic arrangement of weapons and the location of specific types of air defense
operations, as well as specific procedures for identification of aircraft, are important factors
to include in planning.
(3) The designated commander will request the airspace coordinating measures
(ACMs) to be included in the establishing directive (for a support relationship) or
CONOPS.
Refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for additional information.
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clearly delineate responsibilities in and around the AOA/AO and still support missions
performed by the JFACC.
See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for further information on control authority
designation.
c. The level of air control allocated to the AF depends on the ACM required for the
operation. Considerations for establishing this airspace include:
(2) Entry and exit routes and procedures into and out of the AOA or HIDACZ
and to the target area.
(4) Procedures for expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the AOA or
a HIDACZ.
(5) Coordination of fire support (to include assault breaching missions), as well
as air defense weapons control orders or status within and in the vicinity of the AOA or
HIDACZ.
(7) Location of enemy forces inside, and in close proximity to, the AOA or
HIDACZ.
(8) At a minimum, the AOA or HIDACZ should cover the ATF’s landing area
and extend inland to the LF’s objectives, which may be beyond the fire support
coordination line. Additionally, the AOA or HIDACZ should be large enough to
accommodate the flow of aircraft into and out of the amphibious operations airspace.
(9) Range and maximum ordinate of joint force ground-based artillery, rocket,
and mortar systems.
d. Under the ATF, the Navy TACC, typically onboard the amphibious flagship,
controls all air operations within the allocated airspace regardless of mission or origin to
include supporting arms and assault breaching. Regardless of where actual airspace control
is exercised, close and continuous coordination between airspace control and air defense
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agencies is essential. Emphasis will be placed on simple, flexible air traffic control plans.
AFs operating in a non-radar environment will rely exclusively on procedural control.
Amphibious ACPs employ a combination of positive and procedural control methods.
Coordination Responsibilities
Procedures to coordinate flight information.
Clearance of aircraft to enter and depart the airspace sector.
Procedures to assist and coordinate with airspace control elements
that respond to adjacent or supporting component commanders.
Procedures to deconflict operations during transitional operations
and during operations in overlapping airspace areas.
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The ACO and SPINS to the ATO may contain changes to airspace control procedures and
should be reviewed daily by all users of amphibious airspace.
The Navy TACC is the senior Navy amphibious air control agency. The functions of
the Navy TACC may be spread across several ships. The Navy TACC coordinates the
types of ACMs and controls all air operations within the operational area for the duration
of the operation or until an air control agency is established ashore. Once a land-based air
control agency receives control of all LF air operations, the Navy TACC may become a
tactical air direction center (TADC) supporting the land-based air control agency. The
Navy TACC has five sections.
a. Air Traffic Control Section (ATCS). The ATCS is located in the Navy TACC
and provides initial safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for close air support (CAS)
aircraft and all other aircraft entering, operating within, or traversing the amphibious
airspace, to include those not assigned to the AF. It coordinates search and rescue
operations and can provide early detection, identification, and warning of aircraft. The
ATCS also controls and routes rotary-wing CAS aircraft and assault support aircraft and
coordinates with the AATCC onboard the large-deck amphibious warfare ship(s) during
amphibious operations. In amphibious operations, the AATCC is the primary direct
control agency for the helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft group/unit commanders operating
under the overall control of the Navy TACC. The AATCC also coordinates rotary-wing
operations for:
The air traffic control section provides initial safe passage, radar control, and
surveillance for close air support aircraft in the operational area.
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b. Air Support Control Section (ASCS). The ASCS provides quick reaction to
satisfy requests from the LF for CAS. It is located in the SACC and is the section of the
Navy TACC designated to coordinate, control, and integrate all direct support aircraft (i.e.,
CAS) and assault support operations (including assault breaching). The SACC is a single
location on board an LHA or LHD in which all communication facilities required for the
coordination of fire support from artillery, air, and NSFS are centralized. This is the Navy
counterpart to the Marine fire support coordination center (FSCC) utilized by the LF.
c. Air Defense Coordination Section (ADCS). The ADCS, located in the Navy
TACC, provides early detection, identification, and warning of enemy aircraft and, through
liaison with the air defense commanders, receives missile warning information. The ADCS
provides the CATF and CLF (until the CLF establishes an SADC or RADC) an oversight
and coordination staff for the conduct of offensive and defensive air defense.
d. Plans Section. The plans section participates in the targeting board as air
operations subject matter experts. The section forwards excess air sorties and air support
requests to the establishing authority for tasking and allocation. The input from the
targeting board is processed by the ATO planning, production, and execution cell. This
section normally produces the following amphibious products: the ACO, the ATO, SPINS,
and additional fire support asset requests. If the Navy TACC is acting as the joint air
operations center for an enabling JFACC, the plans section may be required to produce the
air apportionment recommendation for the JFC.
e. Passenger, Mail, and Cargo (PMC) Section. The PMC conducts future planning
and coordinates, produces, and distributes the airborne portion of the PMC plan. The PMC
officer is in charge of the PMC section and works closely with the amphibious squadron
material officer to liaise with all ship’s supply, ship’s combat cargo, MEU supply, MEU
combat cargo, and amphibious squadron combat cargo officers in the ATF to identify air
PMC requirements and PMC assets. The PMC officer co-chairs the PMC board with the
amphibious squadron material officer and acts as a contributing member of the air planning
board.
Aircraft units employed in the air ship-to-shore movement are subordinate elements
of the LF. Plans include provisions for shifting control of aircraft operations to the CLF
when the situation ashore permits. During the ship-to-shore movement, the CATF
coordinates and controls air operations through the Navy TACC. The tactical air officer
(TAO) plans and conducts the airborne operations in coordination with the LF. The Navy
TACC watch officer, who is the senior watch officer in the Navy TACC, is responsible to
the TAO for control of air operations in support of the LF. Therefore, within the Navy
TACC, the air ship-to-shore movement is controlled by the Navy TACC watch officer, and
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the ATCS will control all flights into the LZs. The TAO and CCO should coordinate
respective ship-to-shore movement plans. If the operation does not require a TAO, then
the ATCS will work directly for the CATF. Control of air ship-to-shore movement is
further delegated to the AATCC. Once established ashore, the CLF coordinates and
controls air operations through the Marine TACC, if stood up; otherwise, the Marine direct
air support center (DASC) may provide procedural control under the supervision of the
Navy TACC.
a. The Marine TACC, when established ashore, provides the facilities for the ACE
commander and staff to conduct air operations. If the ACE is afloat, the Marine TACC
may be incrementally phased ashore. Initially, a Marine TADC is established ashore,
subordinate to the Navy TACC, and is responsible for air operations in the landward sector
of the operational area. On completion of its build-up and when airspace management
functions are passed from afloat to ashore, the Marine TADC assumes the title and
responsibilities of the Marine TACC. The Navy TACC may then become a TADC, in
support of the Marine TACC if the AOA or AO with HIDACZ is still established.
Otherwise, the Navy TACC would control the air over the water, while the Marine TACC
would control the air over the land. Initially, the Marine TACC would generally use
procedural control while the Navy TACC would continue to rely on positive control, which
includes radar and identification, friend or foe transponder.
b. DASC. The DASC is an organization within the Marine air C2 system that serves
as the central coordination point for all direct support air requests. Based on the tactical
situation, the DASC is normally located with the senior of the GCE, either the FSCC or the
MAGTF force fires coordination center (FFCC)/fires and effects coordination center. The
DASC assigns direct air support aircraft to terminal control agencies, provides aircraft
ingress and egress route instructions, and disseminates advisory information. When control
is afloat, the Navy TACC supervises the DASC’s operations. When control is ashore, the
Marine TADC or Marine TACC supervises the DASC’s operations. The DASC is
normally the first major LF air control agency to come ashore, typically landing about the
same time as the FSCC.
c. TAOC. The TAOC is the ACE commander’s principal air defense agency for
conducting surveillance, airspace control, tactical air battle management, and air and
missile defense. It also provides safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for CAS
aircraft en route to and from target areas. Until the Marine TADC or Marine TACC is
established ashore, the TAOC normally reports to the Navy TACC. The TAOC, or
elements thereof, typically deploy with the land elements of a MEB or MEF. The TAOC’s
capabilities incrementally increase as the size of the land force component increases.
19. Transition from Tactical Air Control Center to Tactical Air Command Center
a. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps air control systems are capable of
independent operations; however, in the conduct of an amphibious operation, elements of
both systems are used to different degrees from the beginning of the operation until the
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control is phased ashore. In some cases, it might be neither necessary nor desirable to
transfer authority ashore. Under the CATF, the Navy TACC will control all air operations,
to include supporting arms, regardless of mission or origin within the AOA or HIDACZ.
(2) In phase two, the DASC is normally the first principal air control agency
established ashore. When control is afloat, the Navy TACC supervises the DASC’s
operations.
(4) In phase four, the senior organization of the Marine air control group is
established ashore and functions as the Marine TADC under control of the Navy TACC.
See NTTP 3-02.1.3, Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations Air Control, for more details.
The air C2 procedures described below are frequently associated with an established
AOA or operational area.
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commander controls air operations in the designated area through an air control agency
tailored and trained for the mission. The CATF typically assumes responsibility for local
airspace control and air defense operations on arrival of the AF in the AOA or operational
area.
c. Control of Attack Groups. The CATF normally delegates authority for control
of airspace and air operations in the immediate area surrounding the respective landing
areas to each attack group commander. The attack group commander exercises control
through a local air control and defense agency consisting of airborne elements, an escorting
surface combatant, or a TADC on the appropriate attack group ship. Overall direction of
air operations as they apply to the amphibious mission is normally retained by the CATF
and exercised through the designated air control agency.
d. Air Tasking. The CATF and CLF coordinate the air support requirements for the
AF through the preparation of an air allocation request. An air allocation request message
provides, among other things, the vehicle to identify unfilled air requirements.
For more information, see JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.
21. Overview
b. The mission of the CE or headquarters is to C2, direct, plan, and coordinate the air,
ground, logistics, intelligence, and communications and information systems operations of
the LF. Designation of supported-supporting elements may change over the course of an
operation. For example, when the LF is conducting long-range battlespace shaping
operations, ACE or aviation units may be the main effort of the LF, and thus the supported
element.
c. The LF may potentially transfer from the JFMCC to the JFLCC as the operation
progresses; however, the CATF and CLF supporting relationship may remain with the
amphibious warfare ships acting as a sea base. Thorough consideration should be made on
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the JFLCC’s ability to provide the necessary C2 and sustainment for the LF before an
OPCON shift occurs. An example of this is Task Force-58 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in which the ATF remained under the JFMCC and the LF transitioned to the
JFLCC after land operations in Afghanistan commenced.
(1) Organization for LF Mission(s) Ashore. The CLF will organize combat,
combat support, and CSS forces in accordance with the CONOPS to accomplish the LF
mission. (For some missions, this may more accurately be described as the “organization
for combat.”) This organization is informed by the overall AF CONOPS, especially with
regard to what C2, aviation, and logistics functions might be retained afloat, as well as a
determination on whether or not to establish a floating reserve.
(2) Organization for Landing. The CLF will normally organize ground units
into company landing teams, battalion landing teams (BLTs), or regimental landing teams
(RLTs) to maneuver through the littoral by various vertical and surface means.
Subordinate ground unit commanders will further organize their units as needed for
embarkation in assigned aircraft, landing craft, or amphibious vehicles. Notionally, it
would appear desirable that the organization for landing mirror the organization for the LF
mission. In all but the smallest-scale operations, however, such alignment is unlikely for
a number of reasons. Troops projected inland via helicopters or tiltrotor aircraft may
require surface-landed vehicles for subsequent ground maneuver. Key resources, such as
crew-served weapons and communications equipment, are normally spread-loaded to
ensure loss of a single platform does not equate to a complete loss of particular capability.
Individuals or small units may be attached to a team only for landing and, once ashore,
detach to perform their specialized tasks. Sound planning, well-established unit standard
operating procedures, and effective rehearsals are essential to ensuring landing teams can
rapidly transition into the organization for the LF mission.
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For more information, see Chapter V, “Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement,” Section
A, “Embarkation Phase,” and MCTP 13-10M, Amphibious Embarkation.
a. Sea-based C2. C2 may remain afloat and not transfer ashore based on the type
and scope of the amphibious operation. Forward-deployed MEUs conducting small-scale
operations routinely exercise C2 afloat. In many areas, including fire support coordination,
communications, and intelligence, ATF and LF staffs may be integrated. To exercise C2
afloat, LF C2 should operate as an integral part of an overall naval C2 architecture. LF
tactical information systems should be fully integrated aboard ship with both local area
network connectivity and broadband multichannel ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore
communications connectivity. When afloat, the CLF and staff plan, direct, and monitor
the LF actions from the landing force operations center (LFOC) on the ATF’s flagship.
The LFOC is the shipboard space that has been specifically designed and allocated to CLF
and the LF staff for planning and executing an amphibious operation. The LFOC provides
situational awareness to the CLF and staff. Afloat LF C2 considerations include the
following:
(1) By retaining C2 afloat, the CLF can take advantage of the support capabilities
inherent in Navy platforms while greatly reducing the requirement for C2 nodes and
associated force protection requirements ashore and enhanced movement and maneuver.
(2) If air control does not transition ashore, the Marine TACC may not be
established, and the Navy TACC would, therefore, continue to provide air control and
support for the LF ashore. In a similar manner, if fire support does not transition ashore,
the FFCC and the FSCC may not be established, and the SACC would continue to provide
fire support coordination, planning, and control.
(3) When conducting amphibious operations, the CLF and the commanders of
the GCE, ACE, and LCE may conduct C2 from aboard ship. The CE may remain
embarked, moving ashore as the LF mission or operational situation allows. Although the
GCE commander may establish an airborne or forward CE ashore, the GCE main command
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post may remain afloat, at least initially. Likewise, the C2 structure of both the ACE and
the LCE may remain afloat.
(1) The SACC may incrementally phase responsibility for fire support
coordination to the FFCC and/or FSCC as control is shifted ashore.
(2) Supervision of the DASC transitions from the Navy TACC to the Marine
TACC as air control is passed ashore.
(3) As sufficient air defense assets are established ashore, the CLF will
coordinate with the CATF to assume SADC responsibility in the landward sector of the
operational area.
c. Ashore-Based C2. When C2 has formally moved ashore, the combat operations
center will normally be in control and the Marine TACC and FFCC are usually established.
However, until the amphibious operation terminates, the CLF may continue to utilize the
facilities and C2 on the ships for support. As the amphibious operation progresses, the
CLF may transition some C2 elements back to the sea base to reduce the footprint ashore.
In the transition of air control back to sea, the Marine TACC, for example, may become a
Marine TADC under control of the Navy TACC. The decision on when, and how, to
transition C2 from ashore back to the sea base is driven by the operational situation or
changes to the mission.
III-28 JP 3-02
CHAPTER IV
PLANNING PHASE
SECTION A. OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
IV-1
Chapter IV
unintended effects on other areas and events. Likewise, the AOA should be viewed as an
integrated portion of the larger operational environment.
For more information on joint planning, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and JP 3-33, Joint
Task Force Headquarters.
3. Planning Directive
4. Planning Methods
b. The rapid response planning process (R2P2) is often used by the CATF and CLF
in amphibious operations involving forward-deployed ARGs and MEUs. R2P2 uses a
compressed timeline—normally six hours—that provides commanders and staffs with an
accelerated planning mechanism that facilitates mission execution within six hours of
warning order or alert order receipt.
For more detailed information on planning, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Manual (CJCSM) 3122, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) series;
CJCSM 3130, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) series; and JP 5-0, Joint
IV-2 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
Planning. See Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, Marine Corps
Planning Process, for further information on R2P2. See NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, for
details on the Navy planning process.
5. Primary Decisions
a. The JFC issues an order (initiating directive) that sets in motion the planning for
the execution of an amphibious mission. This order will contain guidance for the
development of the plan prepared by the AF commanders. This guidance may include the
amphibious mission, the purpose of the mission, the general location, and typically a target
date for execution. Based on the orders passed from the JFC through the chain of command
to the AF, the AF commanders in turn make other primary decisions. The decisions and
who makes them are described below and reflected in Figure IV-1. In some cases, these
decisions may have been made by the establishing authority and promulgated in the
initiating directive. In the case of mutual decisions, both the CATF and CLF must concur
or the decision is referred to the common superior or establishing authority for resolution.
b. Develop COAs. AF staffs further develop COAs based on the guidance from the
AF commanders. Normally, the LF planners will provide an LF COA for the ATF planners
to build a supporting COA. At a minimum, COAs include the general area for a landing
(which may already be specified by higher headquarters), designation of the main effort,
the scheme of maneuver, and the task organization. Selected COAs will be wargamed and
compared based on criteria established by the commanders.
(1) Select COA. At this point, the JFC selects a COA and the CONOPS
(including fire support planning guidance) is prepared. The CONOPS is usually a written
and graphic representation, in broad outline, of the intent of both of the commanders with
respect to their portion of the operation. It gives an overall picture of the operation,
including the transit, formation for landing, and the scheme of maneuver for accomplishing
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Chapter IV
May Be Contained
Primary Decision In the Initiating Decision
Directive
Supporting Decisions
*CATF/CLF mutually agreed upon recommendations to JFC for final concurrence, who may delegate these
responsibilities to subordinate commander.
Legend
CATF commander, amphibious task force OPGEN operation general (message)
CLF commander, landing force OPTASK operations tasking (message)
JFC joint force commander
IV-4 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
(2) Select Date and Hour of Landing. The date and hour of the landing is selected
by the JFC or establishing authority and may be specified in the initiating directive. D-day is
the unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. H-hour, in
amphibious operations, is the time the first landing craft or amphibious vehicle of the
waterborne wave lands or is scheduled to land on the beach. L-hour, in amphibious operations,
is the time at which the first helicopter or tiltrotor aircraft of the airborne ship-to-shore
movement wave touches down or is scheduled to touch down in the LZ. Since most
amphibious operations are complex and involve both surface and air ship-to-shore movement,
L-hour may also be expressed in terms of a time differential from H-hour (e.g., H-12 or H+30
minutes), to assist in coordinating and synchronizing the operation across a common
continuum. If L-hour and H-hour coincide, utilize H-hour. During planning, H-hour and L-
hour are the scheduled or planned times for landing, but during execution, the JFC or
establishing authority (with recommendation from the CATF/CLF) can make the decision to
alter H-hour to the actual time of landing. For example, during planning, H-hour may be
scheduled for 0800; however, for various reasons on D-day, it is determined that H-hour does
not actually occur until 0900; accordingly, all events will now be based on the 0900 H-hour.
If the CATF delays H-hour, the CATF will then promulgate a new H-hour. Supporting actions,
such as NSFS or airborne assaults, are scheduled and conducted in relation to H-hour. In the
case where the landing will be delayed from the planned H-hour, some events scheduled in
planning for the period just prior to H-hour may be repeated until the new H-hour; others will
be delayed and others will have to be cancelled. H-hour and L-hour are confirmed prior to
commencement of the landing based on the weather, enemy situation, and other pertinent
factors. Landing timing considerations are shown in Figure IV-2.
6. Supporting Decisions
Supporting decisions are those used by the CATF/CLF to refine the plan.
a. Methods of Entry
IV-5
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IV-6 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
favorable since it lends itself to enemy enfilade fire. It does, however, represent a
compromise between the advantages of a convex shoreline and the disadvantages of the
concave shoreline.
(b) The vulnerability of the seaward areas of the beach and beach
approaches to enemy mining require direct input from the CATF and MIWC. The most
suitable landing sites are typically the most likely to be mined and may be the least
favorable when MCM considerations are taken into account. Integration of the CATF’s
supporting MIWC in the amphibious planning process is critical to the effectiveness of
MCM support for the amphibious operation.
(d) Suitability for the landing of landing craft, assault vehicles, and aircraft
and as a DZ for the LF.
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Chapter IV
additional forces (such as more MIW assets, SUW assets to counter small boats, and other
threats) time to set the conditions necessary to conduct the operation or time to clear
additional sea approaches. Seabasing more of the C2, logistics, sustainment, medical
support, and other capabilities enables forces using ship-to-objective maneuver to maintain
momentum with a smaller footprint ashore.
For more information on seabasing, see paragraph 10, “Seabasing Considerations,” and
NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-10, Seabasing.
b. Select Landing Areas. The landing area includes the beach, the approaches to the
beach, the transport areas, the fire support areas (FSAs), the airspace above it, and the land
included inland to accomplish the initial objectives. The selection of the landing area is a
mutual decision (see Figure IV-3).
IV-8 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
Air Considerations
Ability to achieve and maintain local air Ability to support the landing and
superiority and perform interdiction and subsequent operations.
close air support. Hostile counterair capabilities and
Ability to support the defense of the disposition.
amphibious force. Possibility of early seizure and
Ability to command and control air assets. rehabilitation of facilities.
within the selected landing areas. Multiple landing beaches enables the LF to achieve a
position of advantage over the enemy by distributing firepower within enemy gaps that can
concentrate and maneuver toward the main objective. Landing beaches that cannot be
approached from several different directions should be avoided. Principal factors in the
selection of landing beaches (in addition to those previously described for selection of
landing areas) include:
(1) Suitability for landing craft (e.g., landing craft, utility [LCU]; landing craft,
air cushion [LCAC]; and AAVs).
(3) The suitability, location, and number of beach support areas (BSAs), beach
exits, and nearby infrastructure. The BSA is to the rear of an LF or elements thereof,
established and operated by shore party units. It contains the facilities for the unloading of
troops and materiel and the support of the forces ashore; it includes facilities for the
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Chapter IV
evacuation of wounded, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), and captured materiel. Landing
beaches are designated by color (blue, red, green, yellow, orange, white, and purple).
Subdivisions are further designated with the addition of a number (e.g., Green Beach 1,
Red Beach 1, and Red Beach 2). The highest numbered beach is 3.
(6) The landing beach may also be that portion of a shoreline constituting a
tactical locality (e.g., the shore of a bay) over which a force may be landed.
d. Determine Sea Areas and Echelon Plan. A sea area is recommended by the
CATF and designated by the establishing authority to minimize the possibility of
interference between various elements of the AF and supporting forces. The CATF designs
all sea areas to support the amphibious operation. Included in the sea areas are the boat
lanes, the LCAC lanes, the inner and outer transport areas, the FSAs or fire support stations,
the approach routes for the ships to launch the AAVs, etc. The CATF determines the sea
echelon plan, which provides for the dispersion of amphibious warfare ships in either an
on-call or unscheduled status, to minimize losses due to enemy attacks and to reduce the
area that must be cleared for mines. For more information on sea areas, see paragraph 14,
“Sea Areas.”
f. Select LZs and DZs. An LZ is a specified zone used for the landing of all aircraft.
LZs may contain more than one landing site. A DZ is designated as a specific area on
which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are air-dropped. The CLF, in coordination
with the CATF, selects LZs and DZs. Airspace control, defense, and communication
support for the selected LZs and DZs may need to be provided by the CATF.
IV-10 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
lodgment or at intermediate LZs or DZs. FARP sites will be selected by the CLF based on
ease of use, ease of sustainment, and survivability.
b. Determine go/no-go and abort criteria for the execution or delay of the
amphibious operation. These criteria are a set of standards or conditions in the operational
environment that the commanders use to decide to proceed or not during the action phase
of the amphibious operation. The CATF and CLF should mutually agree on go/no-go/abort
criteria during planning. The commanders should consider that the amphibious operation
may be a part of a larger joint forcible entry operation that may require approval from the
JFC to abort an amphibious operation. Go/no-go/abort criteria will vary depending on the
type of amphibious operation and the specific mission. Examples of go/no-go/abort
criteria may include:
(1) Order and OPGEN/OPTASK Crosstalk. After step four of the planning
process and primary decisions have been completed, the AF commanders develop their
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Chapter IV
For more information on OPGENs and the OPTASK AMPHIB, see Allied Procedural
Publication-11, NATO Message Catalogue, and NTTP 3-02.1M/MCTP 13-10E, Ship-to-
Shore Movement.
8. Operation Assessment
IV-12 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to
ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and end state.
b. The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the initiation
of planning. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the commander ensure
the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy,
guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership
needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning and execution to be effective in
the operational environment.
d. The analyses of the operational environment might provide insight into basic
questions such as:
(1) Are the objectives achievable given changes in the operational environment?
(4) To what degree are the resources employed making a difference in the
operational environment?
e. The CATF’s and CLF’s requirements for decision making should focus the
assessment plan and activity. Assessment is a key component of the commander’s
decision-making cycle, helping to determine the results of operations in the context of the
overall mission objectives, and providing recommendations for the refinement of plans and
orders. Assessment also provides information the CATF and CLF use to inform adjacent
and higher headquarters for their decision-making processes. If assessment products and
analyses do not provide the commanders with answers to specific questions pertaining to
recommended actions to improve operational progress, acting on opportunities, or
mitigating risks, they do not provide value.
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Chapter IV
g. The true value of assessment reports lies in assessment analysis (vice the collected
raw data). Therefore, planners take great care in determining the appropriate assessment
analysis subject matter experts, collaboration venues, C2, and vetting processes. Planners
also choose the best format for the assessment report products. The particular use of
assessment products should drive the format and data analysis. Once assessment reporting
formats have been agreed upon, assessment personnel determine the reporting battle
rhythm—including any formal quality control or review process. Once the reporting cycle
begins, assessment personnel prepare to overcome obstacles and orient assessment for
emerging collection opportunities. Rarely will the required assessment analysis expertise
reside solely in one command. Therefore, planners identify the most qualified subject
matter experts throughout the AF to conduct the analysis.
h. The first step in planning the appropriate format for products is to determine the
assessment report audience’s current assessment format in place at the command. By
closely mirroring the assessment format used by the CATF/CLF or JFC, planners can both
save some time and also ensure the assessment data is presented in a manner that is familiar
to the decision maker. No single format is correct. Formats may range from narrative,
text-heavy reports to more simple Microsoft®PowerPoint stoplight charts, or even a web-
hosted format with hyperlinks and drill-downs.
i. Assessment reports are created at different levels. Each of these reports will have
different purposes and may require different periodicity and battle rhythm requirements.
Assessment reporting of events may occur on an as-conducted basis (directly after
feedback is received and analyzed) or they may be folded into periodic reporting (daily,
weekly, or monthly reports). Planners must strategize and determine how each assessment
report will feed and nest into the next echelon’s report. Each product should go through
some form of review or quality control check before it is distributed. This may be as simple
as a single review authority, or it may be more rigorous with a multistep review.
For more information on operations assessment, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and Army
Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.3/MCRP 5-10.1/NTTP 5-01.3/Air Force Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.87, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Operation Assessment.
9. Operational Environment
a. Amphibious operations will likely be planned and executed based on one of three
operational environments: permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
IV-14 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
b. Regardless of the size or nature of the mission, the organization, capabilities, and
techniques required to conduct large-scale amphibious assaults in a hostile environment
provide the basis for adaptation to conduct the other types of amphibious operations. Once
an LF has executed its initial mission ashore, it may remain ashore to support ongoing
operations or re-embark to be available for a new mission.
a. An OTH operation is initiated from beyond visual and radar range of the enemy
shore. The objective of OTH operations, especially during ship-to-objective maneuver,
may be to achieve operational surprise through creation of multiple threats and ultimately
to shatter an enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions
that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which an enemy cannot cope.
It is also a tactical option to hide intentions and capabilities and to exploit the element of
tactical surprise to achieve AF objectives.
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Chapter IV
balance. To increase combat power, ease the logistic strain for forces ashore, and support
follow-on forces, the designated commander may shift all or part of the AF to near-shore
operations. This decision is based on the threat to forces afloat, CLF requirements, and the
situation ashore. See Figure IV-4 for advantages and disadvantages inherent to an OTH
operation.
(1) Develop and maintain an accurate and timely tactical picture of the
operational area. The need for timely intelligence data is increased for OTH operations
because the number of possible landing sites is increased. The afloat tactical picture, as it
pertains to the presence or absence of enemy naval forces between the ATF and shore,
plays a significant role in the selection of possible landing sites and, therefore, affects the
scheme of maneuver. Using OTH tactics requires consolidation of the tactical picture of
land and water to provide the CATF and CLF with a consolidated base from which to plan
and make tactical decisions. Interoperable C2 systems for maintaining situational
awareness and a common tactical picture for the CATF and CLF are essential in OTH
operations.
Over-the-Horizon Operations
Advantages Disadvantages
Reduced risk to amphibious Extended vulnerability of landing craft.
task force ships. Expanded operational environment
Simplified air defense. requiring more self-defense assets.
Reduced mine threat to Increased cycle time for landing craft
amphibious task force ships. and aircraft (reduced throughput).
Enhanced operational or Lost or reduced availability of naval
tactical surprise. surface fire support.
Increased flexibility. Inability of amphibious assault vehicles
to swim ashore.
Reduced visible presence for
certain peacekeeping Decreased communications system
operations. connectivity.
Greater susceptibility to sea state.
IV-16 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
(5) OTH distances may be so great that the LCUs may not be able to be used
except for the scheduled waves. For example, if the ATF is 30-50 nautical miles off the
coast, the transit time could be four to six hours one way for the LCU. This means the
LCUs will be able to make only one landing per day. Further, the LCACs will be able to
land generally only three to four times per day under optimal conditions.
(6) If the amphibious operation is planned to be OTH, then more landing craft
should be embarked.
(7) If the amphibious operation is planned to be OTH, then the AAVs may not
be able to swim to the shore and thus, the LF will not be initially mechanized.
d. An OTH operation requires that the landing plan be fluid, containing alternate
beaches and LZs that may even be selected while landing craft are in transit. Last-minute
shift to landing beaches and LZs may dramatically affect all previous planning, including:
(3) Additional intelligence requirements to support the assault on the new beach
or LZ.
(7) C2 requirements to shift support for NSFS and CAS forces to a new
beach/LZ.
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Chapter IV
Landing craft, air cushion vehicles provide the over-the-horizon heavy lift capability for the
landing force.
IV-18 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
the permissions and force protection support required from or levied on host nations.
Seabasing is an enabler for ship-to-objective maneuver.
(1) The situation on the ground may require the CATF and CLF to minimize the
forces ashore. Seabasing allows certain ATF and LF support functions to remain aboard
ship.
(2) With a sustainable logistics tail at sea, a sea base leverages the ATF’s ability
to operate from international waters, while providing support for the LF ashore.
(3) Seabasing increases the maneuver options for LF ashore by reducing the need
to protect elements such as C2 and logistic supplies.
(4) Continuous sustainment of the sea base and the supported forces ashore
requires logistic operations and plans personnel to consider implications across the range
of logistics. Limited logistic support will be available to support other forces ashore that
arrived in the operational area via means other than the sea base.
a. Movement Plan. The CATF prepares the movement plan. In operations involving
several attack groups, the CATF usually prepares a general movement plan, which includes
coordination measures as necessary. Subordinate force and group commanders will
prepare their own detailed movement plans. Because details of the movement depend on
overall requirements of the operation, the movement plans are generally among the last to
be completed. Each movement plan is normally included as an annex to the appropriate
OPLAN or OPORD.
d. Alternate Plans. The alternate plan for an amphibious operation may differ from
the preferred plan and will necessitate branch movement plans. Movement plans should,
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Chapter IV
therefore, be flexible enough for execution of alternate plans at any point between the final
staging area and the operational area.
a. En Route to the Operational Area. Sea routes and en route points to the
operational area will normally be planned by the CATF. Routes selected should lead from
all possible ports of departure to the operational area. Alternate routes should also be
provided to avoid interference between forces and to permit execution of alternate plans
should the threat of enemy attack or weather prevent use of primary routes. Routes and
route points should be named to facilitate reference. Small-scale charts, which show sea
routes and route points, are prepared and included in the OPLANs and OPORDs of
appropriate ATF echelons. All sea routes should be wide enough for transport and
movement group commanders to maneuver the group without interfering with the
movement of other groups.
b. Within the Operational Area. CATF determines sea routes in the operational
area. During planning, sea route selection should take into consideration the missions of
various task forces, groups, units, and elements in the AF so they may proceed
expeditiously to their assigned stations without interference. Sea routes to the operational
area connect with sea routes within the operational area at designated points just outside
the ocean operating area to minimize interference during the deployment and movement of
United States Ship San Antonio (LPD-17) transits the Suez Canal
en route to the operational area.
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Planning Phase
forces from their cruising or approach formations to assigned stations or areas. Sea routes
in the operational area should be selected that:
(2) Provide areas clear of mines and navigational hazards to the maximum extent
possible.
(3) Provide sufficient dispersion to prevent concentrations that would make the
AF a desirable target for conventional or CBRN weapons attack.
a. The CATF, in consultation with the CLF, may decide to use staging areas while en
route to the operational area. The AF may stage at one or more intervening ports for
refueling, logistic support, emergency repairs, or final rehearsals. Considerations include:
(2) The distance of the staging area from the landing site, which should minimize
both risk of logistics delay and interdiction.
(3) Anchorages, which are assigned to facilitate entry and sortie of transport and
movement groups staging through the area while avoiding vulnerable concentrations.
b. Ocean Operating Areas. Two kinds of ocean operating areas may be selected.
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Chapter IV
Sea Areas
Landing Area
Fire Support Transit
AAV Lane
Area Launching
Area
Approach Lane
Inner Transport
Area Causeway
Operating Area
CLA
Transport Area
Not drawn to scale. Used for illustrative purposes only to show areas.
Legend
AAV amphibious assault vehicle LCAC landing craft, air cushion
CLA landing craft, air cushion launch area LOD line of departure
CLZ cushion landing zone
(2) Close Support Area. A close support area is the portion(s) of the ocean
operating area nearest to, but not necessarily in, the objective area. They are assigned
to CSGs, surface action groups, surface action units, and certain logistic ships.
c. Sea Areas Within the Landing Area. Areas in the landing area extending
outward to the inner limits of the close support areas include:
(1) Sea Echelon Area. The sea echelon area is the area to seaward of a
transport area from which amphibious warfare ships and surface combatants are phased
into the transport area and to which these ships withdraw from the transport area. The
use of a sea echelon area enables dispersion of the force as a defense against attack, but
its location is not so distant that ships cannot be readily available to enter the transport
area as required.
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Planning Phase
(a) Outer Transport Area. An area inside the screening area used by
amphibious warfare ships, surface combatants, and transports after arrival in the
objective area. It is located sufficiently seaward of landing beaches to provide for
effective protection against shore batteries or antiship missiles. Ships involved in the
operation remain underway in this area and may initiate OTH operations or be phased
into the inner transport area for a near-shore assault.
(b) Inner Transport Area. An area located close to the landing beach
which transports may utilize to expedite unloading by reducing the distance to the
beach. Considerations are: depth of water, navigational hazards, boat traffic, and
enemy action.
(3) Landing Craft, Air Cushion Launch Area (CLA). CLAs are usually
located in the transport area; however, in an OTH operation, CLAs may be located
anywhere in the landing area, to include the sea echelon area. The CLA (the sea
component) and CLZ (the beach component) are connected by transit lanes.
(4) AAV Launching Area. Areas located near and to seaward of the line of
departure (LOD) to which amphibious warfare ships proceed to launch AAVs.
(6) Boat and Approach Lanes. A boat lane is a lane for displacement
landing craft, which goes from a LOD to the landing beaches. The width of the boat
lane is determined by the number of craft that need to safely transit the boat lane. The
beach can be wider than the boat lane and several boat lanes can serve one beach. An
approach lane connects the transport area to the boat lane. It indicates the exact route
displacement landing craft use to approach the LOD from the transport area.
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a. Forces not a part of the AF that are supporting the AF must coordinate their
movement within the AOA with the ATF.
b. All commanders should remain cognizant of the general scheme and operational
areas of other forces and the need for maintaining the schedule and proceeding along
prescribed routes. If deviation is required, the commander of the group will determine
whether to break EMCON, if established, to advise other commanders of the situation.
c. The AF, or elements thereof, may receive significant intelligence while en route to
the operational area when advance forces or forces external to the AF conduct pre-D-day
operations in the operational area or where remote sensor data is provided. During the
extended transit period, the LF CE requires access to intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance products to determine the up-to-date enemy and friendly situation. The
AF’s intelligence center is responsible for timely dissemination of pertinent intelligence to
the CATF and CLF. ATF ships receiving intelligence share it with the embarked LFs.
a. Approach to the operational area includes the arrival of various task groups in the
vicinity of the operational area. These forces aggregate as necessary according to assigned
tasks and proceed to designated positions in the operational area. During this critical
period, additional protective measures may be necessary. These measures may include:
(1) Counterair measures, including air strikes against enemy airfields within
range of the landing area.
(3) Selection of approach routes that avoid lengthy exposure to fire from enemy
land-based threats.
b. Approach of the main body is usually more complicated than that of the amphibious
advance force due to the size of the force and its careful timing relative to H-hour. However,
if an amphibious advance force has been employed, they may have implemented many of the
necessary protective measures to protect the main body during its approach. In particular, mine
clearing assets of the amphibious advance force will normally have cleared enough of the
landing area to permit the main body to approach with less risk.
c. Coordination and timing is of utmost importance in the final stages of the approach
of all elements of each movement group to prevent interference between elements and
permit each to arrive at its assigned position at the proper time to commence its task. The
presence of advance force elements already in the landing area may increase the complexity
of the amphibious landing. The amphibious advance force commander is to keep elements
of the amphibious advance force from interfering with the approach of the main body.
When the AF is composed of two or more task groups, the CATF normally coordinates the
IV-24 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
approach of the various task groups, but the task group commander is responsible for the
movements of each individual task group.
a. Littoral maneuver provides ready-to-fight combat forces from the sea to the shore
to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. It relies on naval and other joint forces
to conduct sea control operations to establish local or regional maritime superiority to
provide maneuver space and enables the force to close within striking distance to remove
landward threats. The ability to conduct littoral maneuver provides an advantage for the
AF by imposing a continuous coastal threat on the enemy that may cause dispersal of
enemy forces, potentially dissipating enemy defenses. The mobility provided by naval air
and surface movement platforms is then employed to exploit those gaps. Littoral maneuver
enables AFs to operate across a wider geographic area in a more decentralized manner.
Informed by awareness of the enemy’s capabilities, the ability to maneuver within the
enemy’s weapons employment zone and evade detection by enemy sensors and weapons
is perhaps the critical consideration for littoral maneuver.
a. The plan for ship-to-shore movement to land troops, equipment, and supplies at
the prescribed times, places, and in the formation required to support the LF scheme of
maneuver is developed by the CATF and CLF. Ship-to-shore movement is the portion of
the amphibious operation that includes the deployment of the LF from amphibious warfare
ships to designated landing areas and LZs and is perhaps the most critical part of the action
IV-25
Chapter IV
phase. However, it can also include the movement of forces, personnel, and equipment
from shore back to ships at sea, such as in an amphibious withdrawal or retrograde from
either a raid or for the conduct of follow-on LF operations. For AF support to crisis
response and other operations, ship-to shore movement in NEOs and other crisis response
operations may involve the movement of the LF ashore to support the evacuation and then
the movement of evacuees back to the ships for further air or surface transport to a safe
haven. During humanitarian assistance, it may involve the movement of supplies,
personnel, and vehicles ashore to provide relief
(1) The CATF, in close coordination with the CLF, is responsible for the
preparation of the overall ship-to-shore movement and landing plan. During execution of
the amphibious operation, the CATF has overall responsibility for ship-to-shore movement
but will coordinate with the CLF to adjust for changing situations as revealed by
intelligence sources or LFs ashore. The CATF is also responsible for debarkation until
termination of the amphibious operation, at which time the responsibilities for off-load of
the AFOE and follow-up shipping and LOTS operations may be passed to another
organization designated by higher authority. In the case of an amphibious assault, the
operation will normally be terminated only after the entire AFOE is ashore.
(2) The CLF presents LF ship-to-shore movement requirements to the CATF. The
CLF provides information on the availability of organic assets (helicopters and amphibious
vehicles) to the CATF and prepares the documents contained in the LF landing plan.
c. Based on a rough estimate of the size of the LF, the CLF begins planning the scheme
of maneuver ashore. The scheme of maneuver influences the selection of beaches, designation
of assault lanes, fire support planning, the number of landing craft required, and the load-out of
the ships. Detailed planning for the ship-to-shore movement can begin only after the LF scheme
of maneuver ashore is determined and the LF CONOPS is approved. The ship-to-shore
movement planning sequence (see Figure IV-6) is a coordinated effort between the ATF and
LF. The planning of the ship-to-shore movement is an iterative process. The LF scheme of
maneuver and the threat affects the locations of the sea areas (e.g., inner transport areas, outer
transport areas), the method of entry, the beaches and the LZ, and the number and type of
landing craft and may affect the assignment to shipping. This iterative planning process
between the CATF and CLF will ensure the best load out and the best ship-to-shore plan that
considers the air and surface plan, the threat, the number of landing craft that need to be
embarked, etc. Included in the planning is the selection of necessary approach and retirement
lanes, checkpoints, rendezvous areas, and aids to navigation to facilitate movement of troops.
In an amphibious operation, a rendezvous area is the area in which the landing craft and
amphibious vehicles rendezvous to form waves after being loaded and prior to movement to the
LOD.
IV-26 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
Legend
AAV amphibious assault vehicle LCU landing craft, utility
CATF commander, amphibious task force LF landing force
CLF commander, landing force
LCAC landing craft, air cushion
assault on the operational area. Assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and
supplies that are not needed to initiate the assault, but are required to support and sustain
the assault, are known as the AFOE. The AFOE will usually come in after the AE has
conducted the initial assault. During ship-to-shore movement, the LF, landing craft,
aircraft, and amphibious warfare ships are most concentrated and vulnerable to enemy
fire, not to mention the natural hazards of weather, sea state, and surf conditions.
Movement control requirements are complex, and detailed coordination with
supporting arms is essential.
IV-27
Chapter IV
(2) Available amphibious warfare ships and landing craft. The type and quantity
of amphibious warfare ships, landing craft, small boats, and amphibious vehicles used for
the ship-to-shore movement will influence every aspect of the planning and execution of the
operation. The inherent capabilities and characteristics of available ATF assets play a role
in the development of the LF CONOPS.
(3) Ship and landing craft cycle time. The ship’s flight deck and well deck are
limited in the length of hours they can operate. Further, for large-scale operations, the ships
may be cycled into the inner transport areas for the most expeditious off-loading. Generally,
not all ships can be in the inner transport areas at the same time.
(5) Protection of the AF is a matter of mutual concern to the JFC, CATF, and CLF.
Coordination of the use of LF assets (e.g., aircraft, antiaircraft missiles, crew-served
weapons, ground-based air defense assets) to support the defense of the ATF may be
required. Protection comprising both active and passive measures should be provided during
all phases of the amphibious operation but particularly during the vulnerable period of ship-
to-shore movement. The increasing threat from precision-guided munitions should also be
considered. Active protection includes defensive counterair operations, ASW and anti-
small-boat screens, covering forces, electronic countermeasures, offensive counterfires,
obscuration, defeat of WMD delivery systems, and NSFS. Passive protection places major
emphasis on dispersion and mobility. The threat impacts the ATF’s standoff from the beach
and which beaches and LZs can be used. If, during the landing, an unforeseen threat appears,
ship-to-shore movement operations may need to be curtailed to enable the ships to maneuver
and/or reposition.
(6) Flexibility. The ship-to-shore movement plan should have sufficient flexibility
to exploit enemy vulnerabilities that may become apparent after the commencement of the
landing.
(7) Load-out. Once the AF is organized/loaded aboard the ATF in the embarkation
phase, it is very difficult to change landing serials while underway. Rearranging a vehicle
for a different off-load serial can take hours or, if a major change in mission occurs, days for
a complete load reconfiguration. In such cases, ATF units may have to divert to a sufficiently
sized off-load site, pier, or ISB, which could impact the timing of the amphibious operation.
(8) Weather and Sea State. Planners must consider the weather and sea state
forecast for the entire period. Rough seas or fog may impede, stop, or delay the ship-to-shore
movement. Weather conditions may be favorable for D-day, but, for subsequent days, the
forecast may be unsuitable for the ship-to-shore movement. Thus, while initial waves of the
LF may arrive ashore, subsequent waves may be delayed until more favorable conditions
allow the landing to continue. To accommodate emergent resupply, LF planners may
designate specific aircraft to deliver critical supplies ashore.
IV-28 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
“It was to be a brutal day. At first light on 15 June 1944, the Navy fire support
ships of the task force lying off Saipan Island increased their previous days’
preparatory fires involving all caliber of weapons. At 0542, Vice Admiral
Richmond K. Turner ordered, ‘Land the landing force.’ Around 0700, the
landing ships, tank (LSTs) moved to within approximately 1,250 yards behind
the line of departure. Troops in the LSTs began debarking from them in
landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs). Control vessels containing Navy and Marine
personnel with their radio gear took their positions displaying flags indicating
which beach approaches they controlled.”
John C. Chapin, Breaching the Marianas: The Battle for Saipan, 1994
See MCTP 13-10M, Amphibious Embarkation, and NTTP 3-02.1M/MCTP 13-10, Ship-to-
Shore Movement, for further detailed discussion on ship-to-shore movement
considerations and planning.
IV-29
Chapter IV
(1) Landing Craft. A landing craft is designed for carrying troops and their
equipment and for beaching, unloading, and retracting. They are also used for resupply
operations. Vehicles and the majority of equipment and supplies from amphibious warfare
ships are usually transported ashore by landing craft.
(e) Landing craft, mechanized, and MPF utility boats are not organic to
amphibious warfare ships and are used primarily for MPF support to amphibious
operations.
IV-30 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
(a) The AAV is a fully tracked, amphibious vehicle tasked to land the
surface assault elements of the LF and their equipment from amphibious warfare ships to
inland objectives. Once ashore, AAVs conduct mechanized operations and related combat
support.
For information on transporting troops and cargo on landing craft, see MCTP 13-10M,
Amphibious Embarkation. For additional information on employment considerations, see
NTTP 3-02.1M/MCTP 13-10E, Ship-to-Shore Movement; NWP 3-02.12/MCTP 13-10A,
Employment of the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC); MCTP 3-10C, Employment of
Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs); and NTTP 3-02.14, Naval Beach Group
Operations.
For additional information on modular systems, see JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-
Shore, and NTTP 3-02.3M/MCTP 13-10D, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.
(4) Small Boats and Riverine Craft. If small boats and riverine craft are
available, their organic fires, reduced signature, high speeds, and C2 capabilities provide a
unique capability and capacity to help provide force protection and guide the LF ashore.
a. Aircraft employed in ship-to-shore movement are organic to the LF, and their
employment is primarily determined by the CLF. They are used for personnel, supplies,
and equipment transport; escort; and C2 during ship-to-shore movement. Vertical lift
aircraft add significant flexibility to amphibious operations. Helicopters can operate from
all amphibious warfare ships and land in almost any cleared site within the landing area.
IV-31
Chapter IV
(2) Tiltrotor aircraft are a medium lift assault support aircraft primarily used for
the transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment. They are a multi-engine, self-
deployable, tiltrotor aircraft designed for assault support across the range of military
operations.
a. Ship-to-shore movement planning for the AF is given final form and expression in
the landing plan. The landing plan is designed to support the LF’s CONOPS, keeping in
mind the inherent capabilities and operational characteristics of available amphibious
warfare ships and landing craft.
(1) The landing plan is prepared after the final allocation of means has been made.
It represents the integrated sum of detailed plans for waterborne and airborne ship-to-shore
movement prepared by corresponding ATF and LF commands at all levels. The plan
should maximize range and speed capabilities of surface landing and amphibious assault
craft and aircraft (helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft) that enables coordinated operations over
a wide range. A flexible landing plan enables the AF to gain and retain tactical initiative,
enhances operational flexibility, takes advantage of enemy force dispositions and
weaknesses, and employs the element of surprise to the maximum extent.
(2) The landing plan is composed of certain specific documents that present, in
detail, the numbers of landing craft, helicopters, and surface craft available for use and the
exact personnel and equipment that will be loaded on each, along with embarkation and
landing times. These documents should be incorporated in annexes to operation and
administrative plans and orders. The body of the landing plan is usually short, with only
information of interest to all subordinate units. The bulk of the plan is a compilation of
documents included as tabs and enclosures that contain the facts and figures essential for
the orderly and timely execution of the landing. For those types of amphibious operations
other than amphibious assaults, the CATF and CLF may not need to develop or utilize all
of the documents for the landing plan shown in Figure IV-7.
b. The landing plan establishes relative landing priorities among the various elements
of the LF and with overall coordination of ship-to-shore movement planning. Specifically,
it provides:
IV-32 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
d. After the means for ship-to-shore movement have been assigned, LF plans are
prepared in the following sequence:
(1) CLF allocates or specifies landing assets to subordinate elements on the basis
of availability and in accordance with the CONOPS and scheme of maneuver ashore.
(2) CLF allocates blocks of landing serial numbers to elements of the force.
(3) CLF determines the relative landing priorities for the various elements of the
force.
IV-33
Chapter IV
Allied strategists meeting in Washington in May 1943, set the date for
the cross-channel invasion of France as May 1, 1944. Due to a shortage
of landing craft, however, the invasion date would be postponed from
May to June 1944. Planning for the invasion had been going on since
1942. The raid at Dieppe had provided an early and disastrous dress
rehearsal.
The Allies had decided in July 1943, that the Cotentin peninsula of
Normandy offered the best location for the invasion. The Germans, who
had 3,000 miles of coastline to defend, did not know where the invasion
would come. They put up their heaviest defenses in the Calais region of
the French coast. Nazi leaders disagreed on the most likely site for the
invasion and on the strategy for employment of their forces.
In England, the troops who would land on D-day went through endless
rehearsals for the invasion. In late May 1944, the rehearsals came to an
end. Soldiers were confined to their quarters then shipped to
concentration areas near ports and airfields from which they would
depart. For security reasons, they were not told their ultimate
destination. When they were safely at sea, they would finally be told
they were headed to Normandy.
By the end of the day of June 5, 1944, over 2,500 ships carrying the Allied
invasion force were heading toward the Normandy coast. More than
1,000 planes and gliders were being readied to carry the airborne troops
into battle.
(4) Subordinate LF elements prepare a plan for landing based on assigned tasks
and priorities. Landing plans for other forces not landing with ground combat forces are
submitted to the LF commander.
(5) The CLF consolidates these recommendations and publishes them in the LF
landing plan.
(6) Planning for the movement of supplies ashore and for the levels of supply
needed ashore is conducted concurrently with other ship-to-shore movement planning. If
the CLF uses the option of employing floating dumps, planning should include the
composition of the floating dumps.
IV-34 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
a. The CATF develops the naval landing plan documents required to conduct
ship- to-shore movement. The information contained in several of these documents is
vital to the CLF in the development of the landing plan. The naval landing plan organizes
the landing area to facilitate the conduct and control of ship-to-shore movement of the LF
and provides for medical regulating. It incorporates the unloading, landing control,
medical regulating plans, and other naval documents prepared to support LF planning.
(1) The landing craft availability table is the basis for assignment of landing
craft for the ship-to-shore movement. It lists the type and number of landing craft that will
be available from each ship in the transport group, specifies the total required for ATF use,
and indicates those available for troop use. It is prepared by the CCO.
(2) The landing craft employment plan provides for the assigned movement of
landing craft from the various ships to satisfy ATF and LF requirements. It indicates the
number of landing craft, their types, their parent ships, the ships to which they will report,
the time at which they will report, and the period during which they will be attached. The
plan is prepared by the CCO.
(3) The debarkation schedule is a plan that provides for the orderly debarkation
of troops and equipment and emergency supplies for the waterborne ship-to-shore
movement. Prepared jointly by the commanding officer of each ship and the commanding
officer of troops embarked, it is usually prepared after the troops are aboard and is distributed
IV-35
Chapter IV
The landing plan for Operation OVERLORD assigns beaches to US and Allied forces.
to all personnel responsible for control of debarkation. The debarkation schedule may be
accompanied by a ship’s diagram depicting where LF units stage or muster for debarkation
such as the hangar bay, upper or lower vehicle storage, side port areas, boat deck, or any
other location onboard ship. Debarkation schedules are not normally prepared for units
landing in AAV or aircraft. The debarkation schedule contains the following information:
(a) The sequence in which landing craft, by type, depart the well deck.
(b) The individual boats and boat teams or supply loads from each troop
debarkation station and the boats into which they are loaded.
(4) The unloading plan establishes the sequence and designates the means for off-
loading the LF. It consists of the landing craft availability table and the landing craft
employment plan.
(5) For each colored beach, the assigned PCO prepares the approach schedule to
indicate the time of departure from the rendezvous area, LOD, and other control points and
time of arrival at the beach for each scheduled wave.
(6) The assault wave diagram displays the assault waves as they will appear at a
specified time prior to H-hour. The diagram is prepared by the PCO for each colored beach.
(7) The landing area diagram is prepared by the CATF and is generally
delegated down to the PCO and shows graphically all the details of the landing area, sea
echelon, and outer transport areas if used; the approach lanes; the inner transport area; the
LCAC routes, routes, and areas (includes CLAs, LCAC departure points, LCAC control
points, LCAC penetration points, and CLZs ); boat lanes with their LODs; beaches; AAV
launching areas; causeway launching areas (if used); and FSAs.
IV-36 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
a. The CLF prepares the LF landing plan. It is the compilation of detailed plans
prepared by the LF. The following documents designate the forces going ashore and
promulgate the means, organization, sequence, and landing priorities:
(1) The amphibious vehicle availability table lists the number and type of
vehicles available for the landing, the LF units embarked in them, and the ships carrying
them.
(2) The landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table indicates the
organization of LF units into boat spaces and boat teams and the assignment of boat teams
to scheduled waves, on-call waves, or nonscheduled units. It may also include instructions
for assigning floating dump supplies to landing craft or amphibious vehicles. The table,
together with the debarkation schedule, furnishes the ship’s commanding officer with
information for debarking troops and floating dump supplies. The landing craft and
amphibious vehicle AAV assignment table is prepared and promulgated at the same time as
the landing diagram.
(3) The landing diagram graphically shows the tactical deployment of boat teams
in scheduled waves. It provides the wave composition, showing AAVs and landing craft and
touchdown times for a colored or numbered beach. The landing diagram is prepared by a
representative from the GCE based on recommendations from subordinate commanders and
promulgated concurrently with the landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table.
It is distributed to all personnel responsible for controlling the formation of the boat group
and its waves during ship-to-shore movement and the information it contains is used in the
preparation of assault schedules.
IV-37
Chapter IV
(4) The LF serial assignment table reflects the organization of the LF for ship-
to-shore movement. It indicates the tactical units, equipment, and supplies that are to be
loaded into each landing craft, amphibious vehicle, or aircraft and may be further broken
down into a serial assignment table (surface) and a heliteam wave and serial assignment
table. A landing serial is a group of LF units and their equipment that originate from the
same ship and that, for tactical or logistic reasons, will land on a specified beach or LZ at the
same time. A landing serial number is assigned to each serial (group). Landing serial
numbers are administratively assigned numbers and do not in themselves prescribe a priority
in landing. They are assigned only for reference purposes, and the assignment in no way
precludes the use of code names, designations, or unit titles when expedient.
(a) Early in the planning stage, the CLF allocates a block of consecutive
landing serial numbers on the basis of administrative organization to each LF unit and Navy
element to be landed, regardless of their location in the AE or AFOE. Allocation begins at
the highest echelon as each unit allocates a consecutive portion of its block to subordinate
units. Allocation continues until each element within the LF has a block of consecutive
numbers for assignment to its subordinate and attached elements.
(b) After the landing and embarkation plans have been determined, each
planning echelon assigns landing serial numbers from its allocated block to its units, parts of
units, or groupings. While allocation of blocks of landing serial numbers to units is based on
the administrative organization, the actual assignment of individual landing serial numbers
is based on the organization for landing. The method of assignment does not depend either
on the priority or on the estimated sequence of landing of nonscheduled units.
(5) The landing priority table is a worksheet used at the LF level to prescribe the
planned buildup of the LF ashore. It is based on the commander’s tactical plan and provides
a foundation for the orderly deployment of the LF in support of the plan. The table lists all
major units to be landed, the order or priority, the planned time of landing, and the designated
beaches and LZs. It is used principally when the LF is complex or when a phasing of LF
units is required.
(6) The LF landing sequence table is a complete list of the estimated landing
sequence of the nonscheduled units of the LF. It is the principal document prepared by the
CLF for executing and controlling the ship-to-shore movement of these units and is the basis
for their embarkation and loading plans. Unless specific requests for changes are made
during the execution of ship-to-shore movement, the landing proceeds in accordance with
the estimated sequence shown in the LF sequence table.
(7) The assault schedule prescribes the formation, composition, and timing of
waves landing over each beach. The GCE prepares the assault schedule based on the
recommendations of subordinate unit commanders.
(8) The amphibious vehicle employment plan shows the origin, number and
type, wave, destination, and contents of amphibious vehicles in initial movement and
subsequent trips from ship to the beach. The GCE develops this plan.
IV-38 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
(9) The assault support availability table lists the helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft
units, number available for first and subsequent lifts, their tentative load capacity, and the
ships on which they are transported for a proposed landing. It is prepared by the helicopter
and tiltrotor unit commanders.
(10) The assault support serial assignment table is prepared by the unit
commander requiring air movement in coordination with the ship’s commanding officer and
ACE representatives. It indicates the tactical units, equipment, and supplies that are to be
loaded into each heliteam by its assigned serial number and the serial number of the flight
and wave. It lists the weight of personnel and equipment and includes all landing
categories—scheduled and on-call waves.
(11) The assault support aircraft enplaning schedule shows the enplaning
stations on the flight deck, sequence in which aircraft are spotted at the enplaning stations,
and the serialized heliteam with equipment and supplies assigned to each aircraft in each
designated flight. It plans for the orderly enplaning of troops, supplies, and equipment for
the air ship-to-shore movement.
(12) The landing zone diagram illustrates the routes to and from LZs. It includes
the transport areas, rendezvous points, approach and retirement routes, departure and initial
points, other control points, LZs, and other details as are necessary for clarity. The diagrams
are prepared by the senior helicopter or tiltrotor unit commander in coordination with the
cognizant helicopter or tiltrotor transport unit commanders and are submitted via the chain
of command to the CATF for approval and coordination.
(13) The assault support landing table (ASLT) is a detailed plan for the airborne
ship-to-shore movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. It provides the landing
timetable for helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft movement and indicates the assignment of
specific troop units to specific numbered flights. Analogous to the assault schedule and
landing sequence table prepared by surface-landed units, it is the basis for the aircraft unit’s
flight schedules and the control of helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft movement by the
appropriate air control agency. The ASLT is prepared in close coordination between the
commanders of the units needing air movement and the helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft units
and with the AATCC, Navy TACC, and SACC.
(14) The GCE landing plan is developed by the senior GCE representative who
does the major portion of the detailed planning and immediate supervision of the surface and
air ship-to-shore movement on the part of the LF. It is developed in coordination with the
related Navy organization and based on information provided by both the CATF and CLF
concerning forces to be landed and landing assets available. Subordinate units down to the
battalion level prepare their own landing plans, including all relevant documents. These
plans may be incorporated into the landing plan of the next higher unit as an appendix or the
information contained in the documents incorporated in the documents of the GCE landing
plan.
(15) The ACE and LF aviation landing plan outlines the commander’s plans for
establishing aviation units ashore in the landing area by both air and surface means. It
IV-39
Chapter IV
provides detailed plans for the landing of aviation elements that are embarked in
amphibious warfare ships and landed with assault units or as nonscheduled units.
1. Plans for the echelonment and landing sequence of all aviation units
to be established ashore within the landing area.
(b) Elements of air control squadrons and helicopter groups comprising the
first echelon are landed by helicopter to initiate operations ashore. The second echelon of
these units is landed over the beaches with the heavy equipment and personnel required for
sustained operations.
2. The LF ACE organization for landing may appear different from the
task organization because of the division of air groups and squadrons into elements for
landing and wide variation in the time and method of landing these elements. The landing
plan provides for a grouping of the aviation elements into a series of echelons based on
time and method of landing. These echelons, and the time and manner of their movement
to the landing area, are shown in the general paragraph in the body of the aviation landing
plan. Detailed composition of echelons is in a separate appendix to the OPLAN or
OPORD.
1. Detachments of the aviation units and the LCEs that form part of the
helicopter support teams are often landed in scheduled waves. Air support radar teams
usually will be landed in on-call waves. Such elements are shown in the assault schedules
(or ASLT and helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft wave and serial assignment table) of the
division(s). Other aviation elements that are landed early in the ship-to-shore movement
are serialized and shown in the division or LF landing sequence table.
IV-40 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
(16) Serial numbers for nonscheduled aviation elements are allocated by the LF.
The assigned landing serials and an itemized list of personnel and equipment of aviation
elements that are to land in scheduled or on-call waves are submitted to the CLF for
coordination and approval. The division is then furnished the necessary information to
provide for landing nonscheduled aviation elements. These elements are incorporated into
the force landing sequence tables.
IV-41
Chapter IV
25. Overview
When developing the overall plan for an amphibious operation, other planning
considerations, such as those associated with supporting functions, should be considered.
They are the enablers that support execution, such as fire support, protection, intelligence,
communications, and logistics/sustainment. Fire support is discussed in detail in Chapter
VII, “Fire Support;” protection in Chapter VIII, “Protection;” intelligence and
communications in Chapter IX, “Intelligence and Communication;” and
logistics/sustainment in Chapter X, “Logistics.” Additional planning considerations also
include operations in CBRN environments, EMS operations, and cyberspace operations.
(1) CBRN defense-related plans may include provisions for the following:
IV-42 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
(d) The AF must all be well-versed in the processes, risks, and limitations of
LF re-embarkation when CBRN contamination has occurred during an amphibious
operation. The introduction of CBRN-contaminated material to the ATF should be
minimized by conducting decontamination before re-embarkation and limiting the number
of ships that receive contaminated equipment. Additional guidance is provided in Chapter
VI, “Action Phase.”
(5) CBRN Protection. Specific actions required of the ATF and LF before,
during, and after WMD attacks should be clearly communicated and rehearsed. CBRN
protection conserves the force by providing individual and collective protection
capabilities essential to mitigating the effects of CBRN hazards. Protecting the force from
CBRN hazards may include preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures
and applying medical prophylaxes. Individual protection also includes measures to protect
equipment, vehicles, and supplies.
IV-43
Chapter IV
IV-44 JP 3-02
Planning Phase
b. Once the allotted EMS has been allocated to support specific forces or systems in
the AOA, it is no longer available for use. EMS can, however, be reallocated or reused,
depending on distance and power between emitters. The CATF and CLF should conduct
an operational assessment of the impact of sacrificing one potentially critical capability to
use another.
d. EW planners should coordinate their planned activities with other activities that
may use the EMS. EW activity may create effects within and throughout the entire EMS
and cannot be limited to the AOA. AF EW planners should closely coordinate their efforts
with those members of the joint force who are concerned with managing military EMS use
in the AOR.
e. For the LF, the EW coordination cell can be used to support planning and
operations.
For more information on the EW coordination cell, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.
IV-45
Chapter IV
See JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, for additional information on offensive and defensive
cyberspace operations.
IV-46 JP 3-02
CHAPTER V
EMBARKATION, REHEARSAL, AND MOVEMENT
1. Overview
a. General. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with their
equipment and supplies, are embarked in assigned ships. The primary objective of this
phase is the orderly assembly of personnel and materiel and their embarkation in a
sequence designed to meet the requirements of the LF CONOPS ashore. Embarkation of
the AEs and AFOEs will be in accordance with the approved embarkation orders and plans.
Embarkation planning involves all the measures necessary to ensure timely and effective
loading and employment of the AF.
b. Ship requirements for the AE and AFOE must be determined as early as possible
in the planning phase so all echelons of the LF may proceed with detailed planning.
Initially, tentative requirements are determined and, as planning proceeds and more
specific information becomes available, requirements are refined and ship requirements
confirmed. Critical to planning is an understanding of the embarkation requirements and
amphibious warfare ships’ capacities. The six categories of embarkation requirements for
ships utilized in an amphibious operation are personnel, square feet, cubic feet, aircraft
spots, landing craft spots, and bulk liquids. In addition to the six categories, weight and
height should also be considered when determining ship requirements. Broken stowage
and related broken stowage factors are also applied as appropriate. Not all square footage
will be available for various reasons, including allowing room between vehicles for
movement of personnel, vehicles and cargo too large to fit in all the available space, and
the requirement to gripe or tie down vehicles. The broken stowage factor is a percentage
of the total space that is available. Planners should apply a 63 percent broken stowage
factor to vehicle spaces and a 75 percent broken stowage factor to cargo spaces to
determine stowable area aboard any class ship (less well-deck space).
(1) Mutual Effort. Embarkation is conducted by both the ATF and LF. Proper
embarkation depends, to a large extent, on the mutual understanding of objectives and
capabilities and full cooperation in planning and execution. Throughout planning and
execution of the amphibious embarkation, the LF staff works in concert with its ATF
counterparts.
(2) Degree of Flexibility. Ideally, units embarked for combat should be loaded
to allow the greatest flexibility in landing at the objective area. The organization for
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Chapter V
embarkation of the LF must be compatible with the plan for the ship-to-shore movement,
which in turn must support the scheme of maneuver ashore.
2. Responsibilities
The embarkation responsibilities for the CATF, CLF, other commanders, and external
agencies are as follows:
a. The CATF:
(3) Coordinates with port authorities or host nation and the LF to develop an
integrated force protection plan for security of the ATF in the embarkation area.
(4) Requests required amphibious warfare ships and AFOE ships as needed (if
not enough ships are in the ATF) upon receiving the CLF’s ship requirements for
embarkation, and then sub-allocates ships to the LF for embarkation.
(5) Organizes Navy forces for embarkation and provides information to CLF for
the organization for embarkation and assignment to shipping (OE&AS).
(6) Prepares movement orders for ships and coordinates with the CLF, control
of embarkation, and movement to marshalling and embarkation areas and embarkation
points, in accordance with embarkation schedule.
(7) Approves the LF embarkation and the amphibious and transport movement
groups’ loading plans as reflected in the OE&AS.
(8) Advises the CLF on Navy support forces’ embarkation requirements, for
example, helicopter detachments, explosive ordinance disposal teams, SOF, and naval
beach group requirements (e.g., assault craft units and beachmaster units).
b. The CLF:
V-2 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
(6) Moves embarking units to and within marshalling and embarkation areas, and
assembles cargo and personnel on shore in accordance with the embarkation schedule and
loading plans.
(7) Coordinates with the CATF and external agencies as prescribed by higher
authority to provide force protection within the marshalling and embarkation areas.
(8) Provides an embarkation control officer ashore for coordination and control
of embarkation evolutions with the CATF, ship representatives, and/or outside agencies.
(9) Provides for communications ashore for movement from home stations/bases
through to the embarkation area, including adequate communications security measures.
To conserve organic LF communications equipment to be embarked, additional equipment
should be available to satisfy all requirements. Where possible, arrangements should be
made with the commander of the area in which embarkation is to take place to provide
communications support as able.
(1) Specify and make available required marshalling areas, mounting areas,
embarkation areas, and embarkation points and developing and operating facilities therein.
(2) Provide authorized supplies and services to the ATF, including supplies to be
loaded and communications facilities for use during embarkation.
V-3
Chapter V
(5) Provide the proper loading equipment, technical assistance, stevedores, and
other loading aids for each embarkation point.
3. Organization
a. The organization for embarkation is a temporary task organization that accounts for
each element of the AF and other forces that may originate from several locations and
require both sealift and airlift support. It conforms to the circumstances of the deployment
and the requirements of the expected tactical situation. On completion of the embarkation
phase, these task organizations dissolve. Amphibious warfare ships and other ships are
assigned to counterpart tactical amphibious and transport groups for movement of the LF
to the AOA or AO. The number and types of ships assigned to each group is determined
by the size and composition of the LF organization for embarkation. For forward-deployed
ARGs and MEUs, embarkation occurred when the ARG completed onload prior to
deployment; however, reorganization and load reconfigurations may be necessary to
support specific operations.
(2) ATF Organization. Corresponding echelons are formed within the ATF,
which are amphibious and transport movement groups, transport units, transport elements,
and individual ships as shown in Figure V-2. The amphibious and transport movement
group(s) provide for the embarkation, movement to the objective, landing, and logistics in
support of the LF. Initially, the amphibious and transport movement groups are a planning
organization. As the landing plan, which is developed from the scheme of maneuver
ashore, is validated, ships are allocated and organized into task units and elements as
required to support the LF.
b. Ship Allocation. Upon receiving the CLF’s ship requirements for embarkation,
the CATF requests required amphibious warfare ships and AFOE ships as needed, if there
are not enough within the ATF. The CATF may need to request additional ships through
the JFC or JFMCC. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) may
allocate strategic sealift to the CATF for the AFOE. The CATF, in turn, sub-allocates AE
and AFOE ships to the LF. The CLF then sub-allocates the ships for embarkation in the
V-4 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
Embarkation Embarkation
Element Element
form of a published OE&AS worksheet. Development of the OE&AS can be done by two
methods:
(1) Sub-allocate the ships for embarkation to embarkation groups, which would,
in turn, sub-allocate the ships to subordinate embarkation echelons and so on down to the
embarkation team level.
(2) Sub-allocate the ships for embarkation to all embarkation echelons down to
and including the embarkation teams. Detailed allocation of ships may be necessary at the
LF level when compositing a MAGTF, joint, or multinational LF. Only the LF level has
all the information concerning the entire force.
V-5
Chapter V
Navy Component or
Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander
Commander,
Amphibious Task Force
Transport Transport
Element Element
In the LF, these mobility officers are referred to as embarkation officers. The LF
embarkation officers advise and assist their respective commanders in planning the
embarkation and supervising its execution. The CATF and CLF must coordinate plans for
embarkation of naval attachments; this coordination will result in these units being placed
in the embarkation plan by the appropriate embarkation officer. The embarkation officers
of the LF maintain continuous liaison with their counterpart combat cargo officers assigned
to billets within the ATF. Combat cargo officers are permanently assigned to amphibious
warfare ships or naval staffs as an advisor to and representative of the naval commander in
matters pertaining to the embarkation and debarkation of troops, their supplies, and
V-6 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
equipment. Figure V-3 shows the parallel corresponding relationship of combat cargo
officers and embarkation officers at each echelon level.
4. Embarkation Planning
a. Overview. The goal is the timely and effective loading of ATF assets starting on
E-day. Key to the success of this effort is the close working relationship that must exist
between LF operations and logistics officers and their Navy counterparts. The movement,
assembly, and embarkation of the LF relies principally on jointly developed detailed plans
and schedules that fully support approved AF embarkation plans. The development of
these detailed and comprehensive embarkation and staging plans is a mutual responsibility
of the CATF, CLF, naval forces, and external supporting agencies. The landing plan and
OE&AS provide the operational direction the embarkation and combat cargo planners
require in order to arrive at a load planning solution. Other processes, such as determining
overall ship requirements and embarkation schedules, also figure prominently in arriving
at workable loading plans. Amphibious embarkation planning must begin early and
proceed concurrently with all other planning; this cannot be overemphasized. It requires
detailed knowledge of the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of ships and their
relationship to the personnel, supplies, and equipment to be embarked. It is important to
note that the Navy support element to support MPS and other embarking organizations are
considered part of the MPF, with the exception of the MPSRON staff. These organizations
may impact berthing, cargo, and vehicle storage and should be considered in embarkation
planning. Additionally, the AE and AFOE ships may require additional stevedores, crane
Figure V-3. Parallel Navy Combat Cargo Officer and Landing Force Embarkation Officer
V-7
Chapter V
operators, hatch teams, or other support personnel, which may be provided commercially
or via a request for forces for military support (such as a Navy cargo-handling battalion,
Navy expeditionary logistics regiment, or USA seaport operations company). The CLF
places all requirements into the embarkation plan.
(1) Liaison between the corresponding USN, USMC, and other forces (if so
organized) is established by the CATF and CLF.
(3) The CATF obtains, from the naval forces and other forces that will be
embarked in addition to the LF, embarkation requirements (e.g., berthing, square feet,
cubic feet, aircraft spots, landing craft spots, and bulk liquids) and provides these
requirements, with recommended locations and echelonment, to the CLF for inclusion in
the LF assignment to ships.
(4) The CATF allocates ships to the LF and organizes these ships to satisfy the
LF’s organization for embarkation. Then the CLF allocates the ships to subordinate
embarkation echelons. Ship allocations are reflected in the published OE&AS worksheet.
(5) Ship’s loading characteristics pamphlets are distributed by the CATF to the
CLF.
(6) The LF organization (to include attached naval units) for embarkation is
established by the CLF in coordination with the CATF.
(8) Embarkation areas are selected and prepared by the CATF and CLF.
(9) The LF (to include attached naval units) marshalling areas are selected and
prepared by the CLF.
(10) The control, security, communications, facilities, and MHE requirements for
the embarkation phase (with consideration for force protection) are determined by the
CATF and CLF.
(11) The berthing and loading schedule for the ATF ships is jointly developed
and promulgated by the CATF and CLF.
V-8 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
(12) Movement schedules for LF (to include attached naval units) personnel,
supplies, and equipment to the embarkation areas are developed by the CLF.
c. Considerations. The scheme of maneuver ashore is the central plan that drives the
development of all other CATF and CLF plans. Embarkation is a result of the tactical plan
(i.e., the scheme of maneuver ashore). Embarkation planning is objective-focused and
developed by a reverse planning process—from objective to beach or LZ to ship to port of
embarkation. In planning for embarkation, consideration must be given to the following,
which will affect both landing plans and embarkation plans.
(1) Mission of the AF. The OE&AS must support the mission of the AF. It is
dependent on the earliest promulgation of those parts of the OPLAN/OPORD impacting
amphibious operations. This does not mean embarkation planners must wait for supporting
plans to be completely developed. Embarkation planning must proceed concurrently with
other planning.
(3) Size and characteristics of the forces involved, both LF and naval, to include
availability and characteristics of ships and quantity and types of materiel to be embarked.
Use of the minimum number of ships necessary to meet the requirements is an objective of
embarkation planning. Units of the LF not required initially in the assault phases, or whose
employment is deferred, should be loaded and dispatched so that arrival in the AOA or AO
is scheduled to coincide with their contemplated employment. In the event there are an
insufficient number of ships, planners must determine, based on the requirements of the
amphibious operation, what equipment can be left behind at the unit’s home base or station.
This equipment is known as remain-behind equipment (normally associated with MEUs)
or, in some cases, as cargo left on the pier.
(5) LF commanders and their staffs should be embarked in the same ships as
corresponding naval commanders. Many commands will want to be collocated with the
CATF and CLF. Every effort should be made to collocate staffs to facilitate mission
planning and execution.
(6) Embarkation areas and points must be selected, which can be influenced by:
V-9
Chapter V
(d) Adequacy of road and railway networks and space available for
processing supplies and equipment brought into the embarkation areas.
(e) Availability of harbor services and other usable facilities, such as cranes,
special slings and rigs for cranes, MHE, and pier ramps for stern gate loading.
(g) Suitability of beaches for the beaching of landing craft and for the
operation of amphibious vehicles.
(l) Cost of embarking at pier versus loading over the beach, as well as
weather considerations during the loading period.
(7) The feasibility and desirability of embarking personnel and equipment using
helicopters.
(1) Support the Tactical Plan. Loading plans must support the scheme of
maneuver ashore. Specifically, this normally includes the landing plan and the plan for
landing supplies. Personnel, supplies, and equipment must be loaded in such a manner that
they can be unloaded at the time and in the sequence required to support operations ashore.
Therefore, the ship should be loaded in the reverse order specified in the landing plan. That
is, the first equipment loaded is the last off-loaded, and the last equipment loaded is the
first off-loaded.
(2) Provide for Unit Self-Sufficiency. Loading plans must provide for the
highest possible degree of unit self-sufficiency.
(a) Personnel should not be separated from their combat equipment and
supplies. Thus, weapon crews should be embarked in the same ship as their weapons, radio
operators with their radios, drivers with their vehicles, and commanders and staff with their
units.
V-10 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
(3) Provide for Dispersion. Loading plans must provide for dispersion of
critical units and supplies.
(b) At the individual ship level, this can be achieved by dispersing critical
supplies among several stowage compartments that do not share the same debarkation
route. Individual ship dispersion militates against the loss of one debarkation route (e.g.,
crane, elevator), which might endanger the ship’s capability to provide timely embarkation
of critical supplies.
(c) Unit dispersion across several ships enables units to be off-loaded more
quickly than if the unit is on one ship. This is because only one landing craft can load at a
time per ship. Dispersion allows combat power to be loaded in parallel channels and to be
built up more quickly ashore.
(1) Combat Loading. Combat loading is a loading method that gives primary
consideration to the facility with which troops, equipment, and supplies can be unloaded
ready for combat rather than to economical use of ship space. Combat loading is the
arrangement of personnel and the stowage of equipment and supplies in a manner designed
to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of the organization embarked. Each
individual item of equipment and supply must be stowed aboard the ship so it can be
unloaded at the time and in the sequence that will most effectively support the planned
scheme of maneuver ashore. Whenever possible, each ship must be loaded to provide
maximum flexibility to meet changes in the tactical plan and facilitate discharge of cargo
to meet emergency calls for equipment or supplies. The methods of combat loading may
be employed, depending on the mission, organization, types of equipment assigned to the
force (including ships), and the planned tactical employment of the force. These methods
are as follows:
(a) Combat Unit Loading. Combat unit loading is the loading of an assault
element of the LF, with its essential combat equipment and supplies, in a single ship, in
such a manner that it will be available to support the tactical plan on debarkation. It
V-11
Chapter V
provides maximum flexibility to meet changes in the tactical plan and is the most common
type of combat loading in embarkation load planning.
b. Types of Cargo. Cargo to be loaded aboard ship is divided into four major
groupings by physical configuration as follows: vehicles; standard cargo (individual items
of equipment and cargo packaged in boxes and crates that can be carried, stacked, and
otherwise handled without MHE); unitized cargo (items of equipment or supplies that have
been grouped into larger packages to facilitate loading, off-loading, and transporting using
available MHE such as forklifts, pallet jacks, cranes, and container handlers); and bulk
petroleum, oils, and lubricants.
(1) Method of stowage, which includes horizontal stowage (fore and aft
distribution of unit equipment and supplies), vertical stowage (loaded in vertical columns
V-12 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
throughout the compartment so that items are available at any stage of the off-loading), and
block stowage (stows cargo together for a specific destination).
(2) Non-vehicle cargo stowage for D-1 cargo (supplies and equipment issued to
embarked forces prior to going ashore); critical supplies (CLF designated supplies for
which an immediate need ashore is anticipated); ammunition; petroleum, oils, and
lubricants; other hazardous cargo (materials include, but are not limited to, compressed gas
and lithium batteries); vital supplies (CLF designated supplies that are vital to mission
success); general cargo (all LF cargo not otherwise categorized); troop space cargo (cargo
planned for stowage in those spaces designated for billeting and working aboard the ship);
and mobile-loaded cargo.
(3) Vehicle stowage. As mentioned above, vehicle mobile loading is a key area
of concern depending on the overhead height clearances of the ships’ available vehicle
stowage areas. Embarking units must use caution when planning secondary loads,
especially non-reducible equipment as such configurations will constrain flexibility in
terms of the ability to fit the vehicle in the most advantageous location aboard ship for the
off-load.
(4) Factors to consider in combat loading include the loading of assault vehicles
and critical supplies so no other cargo interferes with their accessibility and off-loading
priority and broken stowage.
(5) Holds for MPF and MSC ships should be loaded and unloaded
simultaneously, if possible, which permits the most efficient use of ship facilities and
reduces loading and off-loading time. Loading and off-loading timetables, maintained by
ship’s personnel and based on past experience, provide a basis for planning balanced hold
loads. Off-loading priorities and space limitations may result in one hold being loaded
entirely with vehicles or heavy lifts. In this case, the fewer number of lifts would result in
a shorter off-loading time.
V-13
Chapter V
d. Loading of MSC Ships. The same compatibility regulations that apply to loading
amphibious warfare ships apply to ships in the AFOE or follow-up. When required in the
interest of national defense, a waiver of navigation and vessel inspection laws and
regulations should be obtained from the US Coast Guard to permit MSC-provided ships to
carry out their assigned missions in support of military operations or exercises. The AFOE
requires prioritized combat loading, rather than administrative loading, because access to
its equipment supports the concept of operations ashore. Because the ship’s company on
MSC ships is not responsible for, or capable of, loading the ship, the LF must take the
following actions:
(1) Establish early liaison with the ship’s master to obtain a current ship’s loading
characteristics pamphlet or other provided loading information, correct any ship’s loading
characteristics pamphlets held by the command, and visually inspect the cargo holds and
billeting facilities.
(2) Determine, on an individual ship basis, what services can be provided by the
ship because of the limited or, in most cases, complete lack of berthing, messing, and head
facilities on MSC cargo ships to support personnel beyond the ship’s assigned crew. Make
arrangements for all services that cannot be performed by the ship to be handled by other
means, such as pierside facilities or frequent rotation of working parties.
(3) Establish, through close liaison with the ship, the size and composition of the
ship’s platoon (drivers, guards, and maintenance personnel) that will be embarked during
the voyage. At this time, determine if cots, sleeping bags, combat rations, water,
containers, and portable sanitation accommodations will be required.
a. Embarkation Plan. The embarkation plan, which may serve as or inform the
embarkation annex to the OPORD, is prepared by the embarkation group, unit, or element.
(1) The plan includes the organization for embarkation (major organization of
each embarkation echelon directly subordinate to issuing headquarters, annex for detailed
list of units comprising each echelon, plan for AFOE and follow-up ships as required),
material to be embarked (organic equipment, types and amounts of supplies, preparation
instructions, allocation of supplies and equipment, and movement), personnel (uniform,
equipment, and baggage; advance party details, such as force protection; movement of
V-14 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
main body; and embarkation rosters), and embarkation areas (assignment of areas and
embarkation points, preparation, and MHE). The plan also includes tabs for the allocation
of supplies and equipment, assignment of embarkation areas, berthing and loading
schedule, and the OE&AS.
b. Loading Plan. Each individual ship will have a loading plan. The detailed ship
loading plan is prepared by the embarkation team for its designated ship. This load plan is
reviewed and signed by the commander of troops and submitted to the ship’s commanding
officer (or master for MSC ships) for approval. The ship’s commanding officer (or master
for MSC ships) ensures the plan does not exceed the capabilities of the ship and does not
adversely affect the stability, trim, or safety of the ship. Embarkation planners normally
use the Integrated Computerized Deployment System for ship stow planning.
V-15
Chapter V
SHIP CAPACITIES
ALPHA GROUP BRAVO GROUP CHARLIE GROUP
SHIP/NUMBER LHD-5 LPD-17 LSD-44 LHA-5 LPD-18 LSD-41 24 F/A-18C 6 EA-6B 18 AV-
OFFICER 191 66 34 172 66 34 24 F/A-18D 6 KC- 6B
SSNCO (Male/Female) 64/6 42/0 21/3 57/6 36/6 21/3 130
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 1,542/66 696/0 420/30 1,576/96 835/0 420/30
VEHICLE (SQFT) 29,203 23,163 18,451 35,663 23,163 18,431
CARGO (CUFT) 149,293 48,889 6,665 202,174 48,889 6,691
BULK DFM (GAL) 1,854,710 800,602 18,776 1,800,000 800,602 31,910 REFLECT FLIGHT FERRY
MOGAS (GAL) 500 330 500 500 500 500 (If Applicable)
BULK JP-5 (GAL) 604,915 315,000 50,569 417,009 315,000 53,000
SHIP/NUMBER LSD-50 LSD-51 LSD-46
OFFICER 32 32 35
SSNCO (Male/Female) 21/3 21/3 22/3
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 420/30 420/30 411/39
VEHICLE (SQFT) 16,003 16,003 19,067
CARGO (CUFT) 70,000 70,000 6,651
BULK DFM (GAL) 30,226 31,828 31,910
MOGAS (GAL) 500 500 500
BULK JP-5 (GAL) 53,230 53,230 53,000
TOTAL LIFT CAPACITY ALPHA GROUP CAPACITY BRAVO GROUP CAPACITY CHARLIE GROUP CAPACITY
OFFICER 662 323 339
SSNCO (Male/Female) 305/33 148/12 157/21
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 6,740/321 3,078/126 3,662/195
VEHICLE (SQFT) 199,147 86,820 112,327
CARGO (CUFT) 609,252 274,847 334,405
BULK DFM (GAL) 3,453,335 2,704,314 2,696,250
MOGAS (GAL) 4,330 1,830 2,500
BULK JP-5 (GAL) 1,914,953 1,023,714 891,239
UNIT LIFT REQUIREMENTS & GROUP EMBARKATION
ORGANIZATION UNIT LIFT EMBARKED UNIT LIFT EMBARKED UNIT LIFT EMBARKED UNIT LIFT
REQUIREMENT ALPHA GROUP BRAVO GROUP CHARLIE GROUP
CMD ELE, 2D MEB
OFFICER 76 63 13
SSNCO (Male/Female) 21/1 16/1 5/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 289/15 215/5 74/10
VEHICLE 2,776/22.7 2,118/17.3 658/5.4
(SQFT/STons) 1231/6.2 950/4.8 281/1.4
CARGO (CUFT/STons)
VMFA-115
OFFICER 50 50
SSNCO (Male/Female) 12/2 12/2
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 224/8 224/8
VEHICLE 9,118/72.3 9,118/72.3
(SQFT/STons) 11,200/83.7 11,200/83.7
CARGO (CUFT/STons)
~EXCERPTS~ (Note: Additional units not shown in this figure due to space – must be added to make total unit lift requirement and individual group unit lift embarked totals shown below)
TOTAL UNIT LIFT TOTAL UNIT LIFT EMBARKED TOTAL UNIT LIFT EMBARKED TOTAL UNIT LIFT EMBARKED
REQUIREMENTS APLHA GROUP BRAVO GROUP CHARLIE GROUP
OFFICER 775 303 422 50
SSNCO (Male/Female) 265/27 117/12 136/13 12/2
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 6,814/297 2,761/120 3,829/169 224/8
VEHICLE 182,711/5,960.4 85,899/3,075.6 87,694/2,812.5 9,118/72.3
(SQFT/STons) 402,206/2,128.4 207,810/1,086.7 183,196/958.0 11,200/83.7
CARGO (CUFT/STons)
Note: Ensure totals do not exceed Note: Ensure totals do not exceed Note: Ensure totals do not exceed
ALPHA Group Capacity BRAVO Group Capacity CHARLIE Group Capacity
LANDING FORCE SUPPLIES
SUPPLY CLASS SUPPLIES REQUIRED SUPPLIES EMBARKED SUPPLIES EMBARKED SUPPLIES EMBARKED
TYPE ALPHA GROUP BRAVO GROUP CHARLIE GROUP
GALLONS CUFT/STons GALLONS CUFT/STons GALLONS CUFT/STons GALLONS CUFT/STons
CLASS I
RATIONS 6,768/106.8 3,511/55.4 3,257/51.4
CLASS III
LUBE OIL 30WT 2,256/36.4 1,281/20.7 975/15.7
LUBE OIL 90WT 336/0.4 168/0.2 168/0.2
MOGAS 3,000 1,000 2,000
CLASS IV
MULTIPACK 8,648/37.6 5,000/21.7 3,648/15.9
LFORM PKG 5,620/46.0 2,810/23.0 2,810/23.0
CLASS VIII
AMAL 19,488/139.2 11,253/80.4 8,235/58.8
TOTAL 3,000 43,116/366.4 1,000 24,023/201.4 2,000 19,093/165.0
SUPPLIES
V-16 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
Legend
2D second LPD amphibious transport dock
AMAL authorized medical allowance list LSD dock landing ship
CAPT captain LTCOL Lieutenant colonel
CMD command MEB Marine expeditionary brigade
CUFT cubic feet MOGAS motor gasoline
DFM diesel fuel, marine PKG package
ELE element SQFT square foot
GAL gallon SSNCO senior staff noncommissioned officer
JP jet propulsion Ston short ton
LFORM landing force operational reserve material VMFA Marine fighter/attack squadron
LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose) WT weight
LHD amphibious assault ship (multipurpose)
Figure V-4. Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Ships Worksheet
(Data used in worksheet is illustrative only) (Continued)
b. Marshalling areas may be required when bivouac or camp areas are so located that
movement to embarkation areas cannot be accomplished without interruption. To facilitate
final movement to embarkation areas, the CLF selects sites for embarking units close to
the embarkation areas.
8. Embarkation Preparations
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Chapter V
SHIP CAPACITIES
SHIP NAME USS BOXER USS MESA VERDE USS TORTUGA
HULL NUMBER LHD-4 LPD-19 LSD-46
TOTAL ALPHA GROUP LIFT CAPACITY
OFFICER 273 172 66 35
SSNCO (Male/Female) 121/9 57/6 42/0 22/3
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 2,680/135 1,573/96 696/0 411/39
VEHICLES (SQFT) 77,893 35,663 23,163 19,067
CARGO (CUFT) 258,714 202,174 48,889 7,651
BULK DFM (GAL) 2,632,512 1,800,000 800,602 31,910
MOGAS (GAL) 1,300 500 330 500
BULK JP-5 (GAL) 785,009 417,009 315,000 53,000
UNIT LIFT REQUIREMENTS & SHIP EMBARKATION
ORGANIZATION UNIT LIFT REQUIREMENTS EMBARKED UNIT LIFT EMBARKED UNIT LIFT EMBARKED UNIT LIFT
ALPHA 1 ALPHA 2 ALPHA 3
CMD ELE 26 MEU
OFFICER 31 31 0
SSNCO (Male/Female) 7/0 7/0 0/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 214/0 208/0 6/0
VEHICLE SQFT/STons 3,642/89.8 3,269/79.0 373/10.8
CARGO CUFT/STons 4,929/75.0 4,365/72.0 564/3.0
VMM-365
OFFICER 65 65
SSNCO (Male/Female) 19/0 19/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 355/0 355/0
VEHICLE SQFT/STons 0/0.0 0/0.0
CARGO CUFT/STons 2,614/84.6 2,614/84.6
BLT 3rd BTN 6th MARINES
OFFICER 58 35 8 15
SSNCO (Male/Female) 26/0 16/0 3/0 7/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 1,063/0 535/0 191/0 337/0
VEHICLE SQFT/ST 21,668/1139.8 7,372/242.0 1,560/57.8 12,736/840.0
CARGO CUFT/STons 6,611/76.8 3,392/43.5 141/0.8 3,078/32.5
CLB-26
OFFICER 18 6 12 0
SSNCO (Male/Female) 17/0 5/0 11/0 1/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 253/0 81/0 137/0 35/0
VEHICLE SQFT/STons 14,336/751.2 1,992/132.9 8,275/374.3 4,069/244.0
CARGO CUFT/STons 4,303/105.1 1,036/13.3 1,200/12.8 2,067/79.0
NAVAL SUPPORT ELEMENT
OFFICER 12 10 1 1
SSNCO (Male/Female) 13/0 8/0 1/0 4/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 87/0 45/0 21/0 21/0
VEHICLE SQFT/STons 2,931/119.2 678/29.0 2,138/87.2 115/3.0
CARGO CUFT/ST 2,100/27.2 1,000/16.2 0/0 1,100/11.0
DET, HSC-6 (SAR)
OFFICER 8 8
SSNCO (Male/Female) 1/0 1/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 21/0 21/0
VEHICLE SQFT/ST 0/0.0 0/0.0
CARGO CUFT/STons 0/0.0 0/0.0
TOTAL UNIT LIFT TOTAL UNIT LIFT TOTAL UNIT LIFT TOTAL UNIT LIFT
REQUIREMENTS EMBARKED ALPHA 1 EMBARKED ALPHA 2 EMBARKED ALPHA 3
OFFICER 192 155 21 16
SSNCO (Male/Female) 83/0 56/0 15/0 12/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 1,993/0 1,245/0 355/0 393/0
VEHICLE SQFT/STons 42,577/2100 13,311/482.9 12,346/530.1 16,920/1087.0
CARGO CUFT/STons 20,557/368.7 12,407/229.6 1,905/16.6 6,245/122.5
Note: Ensure totals do not exceed Note: Ensure totals do not exceed Note: Ensure totals do not exceed
ALPHA 1 Ship Capacity ALPHA 2 Ship Capacity ALPHA 3 Ship Capacity
CLASS I
RATIONS 13,160/118.0 8,084/94.0 5,076/24.0
CLASS III
LUBE OIL 3,902/48.0 2,120/40.0 1,782/8.0
MOGAS 1200 400 300 500
CLASS IV
MULTIPACK 850/3.2 850/3.2
LFORM PKG 2,808/23.0 1,836/18.0 972/5.0
CLASS V
GROUND 43,922/409.0 40,000/395.0 3,922/14.0
AIR 35,826/452.0 23,000/407.0 12,826/45.0
CLASS VIII
AMAL 1,750/9.4 1,250/6.3 500/3.1
TOTAL SUPPLIES 1,200 102,218/1062.6 400 75,890/957.2 300 25,828/102.3 500 500/3.1
LIFT TOTALS (TOTAL UNIT LIFT + LANDING FORCE SUPPLIES)
GRAND LIFT REQUIRED TOTAL TOTAL LIFT EMBARKED TOTAL LIFT EMBARKED TOTAL LIFT EMBARKED
ALPHA GROUP ALPHA 1 ALPHA 2 ALPHA 3
OFFICER 192 155 21 16
SSNCO (Male/Female) 83/0 56/0 15/0 12/0
E1-E6 (Male/Female) 1,993/0 1,245/0 355/0 393/0
VEHICLE SQFT/STons 42,577/2,099.8 13,311/482,9 12,346/530.1 16,920/1,087.0
CARGO CUFT/STons 122,775/1,431.3 88,297/1,186.8 27,733/118.9 6,745/125.6
MOGAS (GAL) 1,200 400 300 500
Note: Ensure totals do not exceed Note: Ensure totals do not exceed Note: Ensure totals do not exceed
ALPHA 1 Ship Capacity ALPHA 2 Ship Capacity ALPHA 3 Ship Capacity
V-18 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
Legend
1ST LT first lieutenant LHD-4 amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
AMAL authorized medical allowance list LPD amphibious transport dock
BLT battalion landing team LSD dock landing ship
BTN battalion LTCOL lieutenant colonel
CAPT captain MAJ major
CLB combat logistics battalion MEU Marine expeditionary unit
CMD command MOGAS motor gasoline
CUFT cubic feet PKG package
DET detachment SAR search and rescue
DFM diesel fuel, marine SQFT square foot
ELE element SSNCO senior staff noncommissioned officer
GAL gallon Ston short ton
HSC helicopter sea combat (Navy) USS United States Ship
JP jet propulsion VMM Marine medium tiltrotor squadron
LFORM landing force operational reserve material
Figure V-5. Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Ships Worksheet:
Embarkation Unit: ALPHA (Data used in worksheet is illustrative only) (Continued)
forces to support the landing plan. ISBs play a critical role when facilities in the operational
area do not support the basing or terminal requirements of the strategic lift required to move
the LF into the operational area. An ISB may serve as the site of the landing rehearsal. Forces
deployed to an ISB normally remain under the OPCON of the CATF.
(2) Pre-Positioning
V-19
Chapter V
Base Area
Marshalling Area
Mounting Mounting
Area Area
Embarkation Area
E E
m m
b b
a P a P
r o r o
k i k i
a n a n
t t t t
i i
o o
n n
Figure V-6. Schematic Diagram of the Marshalling Area, Mounting Area, Embarkation Area,
and Embarkation Points
planners should take into consideration the timing for deployment of the off-load preparation
party and the survey-liaison-reconnaissance party. Ideally, the off-load preparation party
should embark on the MPSRON at least 96 hours prior to the MPSRON’s arrival in the
operational area. Positioning of the MPSRON will dictate the timing of these deployments, as
will the necessity, if required, for augmentation from the Selected Reserves of the Navy support
element, amphibious construction battalion, and cargo-handling battalion. The use of ISBs
will be mandatory for reconstituting the pre-positioned units and their fly-in elements, as well
as configuring them to fit into the landing plan. Reconfiguration will be accomplished through
restructuring units into the task organization necessary to carry out the landing plan.
(c) Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS). The Army maintains the APS
program. APS has both land and sea components. It possesses port operations support
packages and JLOTS capabilities for use when seaports do not exist, are unavailable, or are
insufficient.
V-20 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
“...the landing for Utah, geographically separated from the other four beaches,
was considered by planners to be almost a separate event and so was given
its own formal rehearsal. This was Exercise Tiger. Additionally, there simply
were not enough assault training beaches to give it and Force O a
simultaneous rehearsal. Finally, as the last Assault Force to be formed up
and given the least amount of time to train, Force U might have been seen as
the Assault Force requiring the greatest amount of special attention—hence,
a separate and additional rehearsal.”
9. Overview
a. Rehearsal is the period during which the prospective operation is practiced to:
(1) Test the adequacy of the C2; all plans, such as ship-to-shore movement,
communication, and NSFS; and the timing and sequence of detailed operations.
b. Each rehearsal should be followed by an after action review and, where necessary,
appropriate adjustments to the plan. The CATF and CLF should allow sufficient time to
make adjustments and, if necessary and circumstances permit, allow for another rehearsal
to assess if the adjustments are effective. Certain, more complex phases of the operation
may require several rehearsals to identify friction points. A rehearsal may not be possible
or may be limited to a staff rehearsal. Thus, the pace of the embarkation may be slowed
or movement to a more secure site may be required shortly after the withdrawing force is
embarked to enable selected cross-decking for safe transit to the selected debarkation
location. It may be necessary to rearrange the loads on the ships to accommodate lessons
learned from the rehearsal.
c. Types of Rehearsals. The types of rehearsals are based on the individual needs
of the ATF and LF. Rehearsals are not unit-level training; rather, they are conducted to
exercise the ATF and LF ability to execute the OPLAN for the specific mission assigned.
(1) Staff Rehearsals. Staff rehearsals are conducted by all staffs scheduled to
participate in the amphibious operation and may include command post and tabletop
exercises. They are conducted prior to integrated AF rehearsals. Wherever possible,
rehearsals should take place in the same spaces and using the same circuits that will be
used during mission execution.
V-21
Chapter V
The rehearsal phase may be conducted concurrently with other phases of the
amphibious operation but most often is associated with the movement phase. During this
period the AF, or elements thereof, conduct one or more rehearsal exercise(s), ideally
under conditions approximating those expected in the AOA and landing area. The
objective during this phase will be to exercise as much of the force and the CONOPS as
the situation permits, with OPSEC and time being limiting factors.
b. The number, nature, and scope of rehearsals will be influenced by the following
considerations:
(7) Logistic and CSS availability to replenish, replace, or repair assets used.
V-22 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
c. Factors influencing the dates on which rehearsals are conducted and the time
allocated for them include:
(4) After action reviews at all levels of command for evaluation and correction
of problems.
(5) Time to revise areas of the plan in which the rehearsal identified problems.
(3) OPSEC.
(5) Location of the rehearsal area in relation to the operational area and to points
of embarkation.
(7) Activity of civilian personnel, vehicles, shipping, and small craft that may
interfere with the rehearsal.
V-23
Chapter V
a. In formulating plans for movement to the operational area, sea routes and
rendezvous points should be carefully selected. Sea routes through mineable waters, or
close to enemy shore installations from which the enemy can carry out air, surface, or
subsurface attacks, are to be by-passed if possible. To minimize probability of detection,
routes will be planned to avoid known or probable areas of enemy surveillance.
Flexibility should be given in allocation of transit time to permit evasive courses to be
steered by movement groups if it becomes necessary to avoid surface or subsurface
threats.
b. Because of similarity between the rehearsal and the actual operation, strict
OPSEC measures must be enforced during rehearsals. The reconnaissance for, selection
of, and arrangements for the use of the areas in which rehearsal(s) are to be held must be
accomplished carefully. Deception measures may be necessary to provide for security
of the rehearsal.
V-24 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
13. Overview
The movement phase commences on the departure of ships from loading points in the
embarkation areas and concludes when ships arrive at assigned stations in the operational
area. During this phase, the AF is organized into movement groups, which execute
movement in accordance with the movement plan on prescribed routes (with alternate
routes designated for emergency use). In amphibious operations, the movement plan is the
naval plan providing for the movement of the ATF to the objective area. It includes
information and instructions concerning departure of ships from embarkation points, the
passage at sea, and the approach to and arrival in assigned positions in the objective area.
The movement phase presents an opportunity for the CATF to exploit the sea as maneuver
space. In the event of hostilities, the CATF has the difficult task of hiding a large force at
sea, providing for its defense, and then converging at a time and place not wholly
unexpected by the enemy. Knowledge of the enemy’s surveillance capability will be a key
consideration in achieving surprise. Movement of the force to the operational area may be
interrupted by rehearsals, stopped at staging areas for logistic reasons, or paused at
rendezvous points.
a. The echelons of the LF may include the AE, the AFOE, and follow-up. The MPF
ships of the APF may also be employed.
(1) The AE is that element of a force that comprises tailored units and aircraft
assigned to conduct the initial assault in the operational area. The AE is embarked in
amphibious warfare ships. The AE ships are combat loaded with troops, equipment, and
supplies that typically provide up to 15-30 DOS. Other elements included in the AE are
LF elements of the amphibious advance force that deploy with sufficient supplies to
accomplish their mission and sustain themselves until subsequent forces arrive.
(2) The AFOE is that echelon of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment,
and supplies, which, although not needed to initiate the assault, are required to support and
sustain the assault. The AFOE is normally required in the operational area no later than
five days after commencement of the assault landing. The AFOE is divided into air-lifted
and sea-lifted forces and supplies. Required arrival time in theater, suitability of material
for air and sea lift, and lift availability, in that order, will determine transportation mode.
b. MPF and other APF operations that augment and reinforce the LF are scheduled
to best support the AF in conjunction with the anticipated arrival of the AFOE. The APF
can provide equipment and supplies to a MEB or USA maneuver unit at a secure location
in the operational area. These additional troops, supplies, and equipment can then be
V-25
Chapter V
picked up and transported by ATF assets as they become available or other means to
reinforce or augment forces ashore.
b. Sealift. The ability to mass personnel and materiel, as well as the flexibility to
change the time and place of loading, usually dictates a heavy reliance on sealift. The AE
is embarked in amphibious warfare ships. Rolling stock and most equipment and supplies
of the AFOE arrive by USTRANSCOM provided ships.
c. Airlift. Intratheater, intertheater, and self-deploying air assets may be used to move
personnel and select low-density, high-demand supplies and equipment.
d. Mode Integration. Movement via sealift and airlift must be fully integrated to
optimize timeliness and minimize possible port throughput constraints. Port loading
considerations and modes of transportation must be fully integrated to ensure the smooth,
coordinated flow of personnel and materiel into the AOA or AO.
a. AF assets are organized into movement groups for embarkation and deployment
to support the amphibious operation based on the landing plan. The ATF may be task-
organized into movement groups based on ports of embarkation and individual ship speed,
mission, and required arrival time in the operational area. All LFs, self-deploying LF
aircraft, and self-deploying USAF units should be task organized into separate movement
groups. A movement group will include all required screen and logistic support. If more
than one landing area is established in the operational area, additional movement groups
may be formed.
V-26 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
c. The main body of the AF during transit should consist of one or more of the
following: amphibious movement groups, one or more transport movement groups, or one
or more combat logistic force ships and may include one or more surface action groups for
screening. It may be desirable to attach all or part of the combat logistic force ships or
surface action group to the amphibious and transport movement groups to provide support
and protection from attack while en route. The amphibious and transport movement groups
may be combined during movement to the AOA or operational area to reduce the number
of assets necessary to protect and sustain the force during transit. Protection from attack
while en route may also be provided by nonorganic forces. Elements of the AF may be
phased into the operational area by echelons or be brought in simultaneously.
(2) Transport Movement Groups. All other military, civilian, and commercial
ships carrying supplies, cargos, and forces allocated to an amphibious operation, such as
those in the AFOE, are included in this group. MSC manages a mix of government-owned,
MSC-operated ships. The crew are government or civil service employees; government-
owned, contract-operated ships with merchant marine crews through general agency
agreements with companies; and contracted ships. This group could include:
(a) APF vessels from the MPF that support the Marine Corps, APF that
support the Army as afloat pre-positioned stocks (three ships), and a collection of vessels
that support the USN and the USAF.
V-27
Chapter V
flag, privately owned ships operating in international commerce, which are also available
under agreement to provide capacity needed to meet DOD requirements during war and
national emergencies.
(g) Additional detachments provided by the Army can add capabilities such
as the logistic support vessel or LCU-2000 to augment transport group task organizations
when conditions will permit Army land component command seaborne and beach landing
capability integration.
(3) Airlift Movement Groups. Airlifted supplies and equipment that may be
brought in as part of the AFOE are included in this group. A fly-in echelon to link up with
equipment delivered by the MSC is also included. Aircraft assigned can be organic military
or commercial, to include:
(4) Support Movement Groups. These movement groups may include CSGs,
MIW ships, screening ships, fire support ships, and other combatants and ships to support
the amphibious operation.
V-28 JP 3-02
Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement
these elements until such time as the amphibious operation is terminated, the elements are
detached from the AF, or another off-load authority has been designated.
(1) Based on guidance provided by the supported CCDR, the CATF or the CLF
establishes time-phased force and deployment data to identify lift requirements and
preferred modes of transport, port of debarkations, and destinations.
(2) Deploying units provide unit movement information that includes available
and required load dates at ports of embarkation and unit personnel and equipment
characteristics (dimensions, weights, quantities), which, together, comprise load data that
are used to determine the number and types of strategic lift assets necessary to deploy the
force.
(1) Sealift. Since the CATF plans, schedules, and executes ship movements,
normal USN movement report procedures are employed. From strategic (intertheater)
sealift allocated by the Secretary of Defense at execution, the GCC and
CDRUSTRANSCOM will direct required fleet commanders and MSC to sail ships to
designated seaport(s) of embarkation. At Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC)-controlled seaport(s) of embarkation, SDDC assumes responsibility
for reporting ship loading. The Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping organization
V-29
Chapter V
office will file movement reports for ships on completion of loading and before sailing.
The Navy component commander enters scheduled ship movements into JOPES in
accordance with the JOPES procedures. At SDDC-controlled ports, strategic sealift ships
are loaded in coordination with the CATF and CLF and deployed under the control of the
Navy component commander. Strategic sealift ships convoy or deploy independently,
depending on the threat and ship capability. Control during transit is vested in the CATF,
who plans ship arrival in the AOA or AO as called for in the landing plan as reflected in
the JOPES time-phased force deployment data.
(2) Airlift. AMC develops and enters schedules in the Global Decision Support
System and executes the airlift in support of the CATF and CLF. The CLF, as the
preponderant user of airlift in the AF, may serve as the coordinating agent for the AF airlift
requirements and scheduling. Using the LF movement control agencies, the CLF plans
and monitors the airlift, through Global Command and Control System and the Global
Decision Support System, to ensure integration with the sea movement. AMC airlift
deploys in support of the CATF, under control of CDRUSTRANSCOM, to meet required
arrival times. Transport aircraft fall under control of the CATF while in the AOA or AO
until a land-based air control agency is established ashore so integration with the landing
of sealifted forces is achieved, and the unified air defense and airspace control of the
operational area is maintained.
V-30 JP 3-02
CHAPTER VI
ACTION PHASE
1. Overview
a. Prior to the execution of the action phase of an amphibious operation, the JFC
seeks to shape the operational environment. Although these operations are usually referred
to in the context of an amphibious assault or amphibious raid, they may be used to support
other types of amphibious operations such as shaping the operational environment for a
NEO or FHA. Shaping operations include supporting and prelanding operations.
b. The JFC and JFMCC will use CSGs, other maritime, and joint forces to prepare
the AOA or operational area prior to the commencement of the amphibious operation. The
support relationship between a CSG commander, other commanders shaping the
operational environment, the CATF, and the CLF should be outlined in an establishing
directive. The manner in which these operations are conducted will depend on the type of
amphibious operation. The forces required and the time period in which these operations
are conducted typically define the operation.
a. Planners consider how to conceal the AF and their intentions throughout all phases
of the operation. Plans include actions to hide the force, confuse the enemy, and reduce
the enemy’s sensors effectiveness, while embarking and rehearsing and during movement
and the action phases. The plans consider the AF as a whole and as the ATF or LF
individually.
b. MILDEC
(1) The initiating directive will normally specify the scope of employment of
deception operations. Additional AF requirements for employment of deception
operations will be made known to and coordinated with higher authority during planning.
(a) Cause the enemy commander to employ forces and assets in ways that
are advantageous to the joint force.
(c) Cause the enemy to withhold strategic reserves until friendly forces have
achieved mission success.
VI-1
Chapter VI
(e) Cause the enemy to waste combat power with inappropriate or delayed
actions.
(3) The MILDEC plan, if created, should clearly delineate both the goal and the
objective of the deception. This provides the commander with a solid understanding of how
the deception supports the overall operation and establishes a firm foundation for planning
and executing MILDEC operations.
(4) Feints are similar to demonstrations in that both intend to deceive the enemy,
but feints often involve contact with the enemy
(5) MILDEC may include the use of terrain masking, camouflage, darken ship
procedures, and EMS operations.
c. OPSEC
(1) OPSEC is a capability that identifies and controls critical information and
indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations and incorporates
countermeasures to reduce the risk of an enemy exploiting vulnerabilities. When effectively
employed, it denies or mitigates a threat’s ability to compromise or interrupt a mission,
operation, or activity. Without a coordinated effort to maintain the essential secrecy of plans
and operations, our enemies can forecast, frustrate, or defeat friendly military operations.
Good OPSEC helps to blind our enemies, forcing them to make decisions with insufficient
information.
For more information on River City, see NTTP 3-13.3M/MCTP 3-32B, Operations Security
(OPSEC).
VI-2 JP 3-02
Action Phase
shaping tool. It enables the commander to present the desired electronic and acoustic profile
to the enemy while achieving friendly situational awareness and C2 objectives.
f. Satellite vulnerability. Ships’ emissions may radiate in all directions, making them
detectable by space-based sensors. The satellite vulnerability program is designed to mitigate
this vulnerability. Data concerning the capabilities and orbits of these satellites is processed
to determine periods of vulnerability.
For additional information on EMCON and satellite vulnerability, see NTTP 3-51.1, Navy
Electronic Warfare.
3. Supporting Operations
VI-3
Chapter VI
ARGs and MEUs operations in which access to the above teams may be more difficult, the
CATF and CLF should use organic or supporting reconnaissance and surveillance assets
to provide hydrographic information. Beach surveys and hydrographic reconnaissance can
be conducted by SOF/SEAL teams that operate as a task unit within the AF or
independently under the OPCON of the theater special operations command commander.
SOF/SEAL teams can be employed prior to an opposed assault and may be part of an
operation to clear obstacles. When the teams are organic to the AF, these operations may
be part of the advance force operations.
(3) METOC support may be obtained directly from the Naval Meteorology and
Oceanography Command or via a joint or Service METOC forecast activity in support of
naval forces.
See JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, for more information on geospatial
products.
(5) Sea-based and land-based supporting air operations may establish maritime
and air superiority, conduct reconnaissance, and shape the operational area by attacking
maritime and land targets that may affect the amphibious operation.
(6) Assault breaching efforts and clearing of beach and anti-landing obstacles
using underwater demolition or aerial-delivered weapons to destroy obstacles such as
mines and barriers within the SZ and on the beach.
(7) Supporting SOF operations include, but are not limited to, MISO, civil-
military operations, FHA, special reconnaissance, direct action, and preparation of the
environment. SOF will usually remain under the OPCON of the theater special operations
command commander and be assigned to support depending on the location and nature of
the mission. SOF may also be operating in or near the AOA on distinctly separate low-
visibility or clandestine missions in support of the CCDR. Coordination must occur
between AF planners and SOF planners to maximize effectiveness. It is important to
maintain the SOF chain of command to preserve the C2 relationship(s) of SOF for the
gaining commander.
a. The amphibious advance force, in concert with supporting operations, prepares the
AOA or AO. An amphibious advance force is a temporary organization within the AF, which
precedes the main body to the AOA or AO. The amphibious advance force may consist of
JFC- or JFMCC-provided forces, such as forward-deployed ARGs and MEUs, MCM assets,
and other forces, task-organized by the CATF and CLF as a temporary organization within
VI-4 JP 3-02
Action Phase
the AF to help set conditions prior to the arrival of the AF into the operational area. The
amphibious advance force facilitates better coordination with the overall landing plan and
LF CONOPS ashore. The LF CONOPS, however, should not assume the amphibious
advance force will be available for tasking. The start of amphibious advance force operations
in no way implies a cessation or reduction in any ongoing supporting operations. The
mission of the amphibious advance force may be reconnaissance and intelligence collection
or it may be to help achieve local maritime superiority without giving away the location of
the AF. The amphibious advance force, for example, may be responsible for the LF
conducting reconnaissance, inserting the advance LF, supporting those units with supplies
and fire support, and if required, extracting those forces.
c. The CATF designates the amphibious task group commander for the advance force,
provides forces, and ensures the requisite command and information systems are available
to conduct the operation.
d. The CLF designates the amphibious advance force LF commander and provides that
commander the requisite staff and forces to accomplish assigned tasks. A landing group
commander is the officer designated by the CLF as the single tactical commander of a
subordinate task organization capable of conducting landing operations against a position or
group of positions. A reconnaissance group commander is used when LF units conduct only
reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
e. Upon arrival of the AF, the amphibious advance force is disestablished. Certain
tasks may dictate that MCM, reconnaissance teams, and SOF, for example, remain TACON
to the AF as part of the prelanding operations to minimize disruptions prior to the landing.
f. The decision to employ a support force is made after weighing the advantages of
operational and tactical surprise and the requirements for preparation of the landing area. The
use of support forces is an integral part of planning the overall amphibious operation.
However, the JFC or other higher authority may restrict or preclude the use of a support force
based on the diplomatic or military situation. Knowledge of the operational area, the
indigenous population, extent of enemy fixed defenses, air defenses, mines, and obstacles
should be evaluated.
(1) Complete surprise is difficult to achieve against an alert enemy and the
prospects of achieving it decrease with efforts to isolate the AOA/AO. Every effort should
be made to conceal the landing areas and AF objectives from the enemy until the
commencement of the ship-to-shore movement.
(2) When the landing area is well defended or the offshore areas are densely
mined, the destruction or neutralization of the fixed defenses far outweighs the disadvantage
of disclosing the selected landing area. Conversely, support operations may be less prudent
VI-5
Chapter VI
when the landing area selected is lightly defended and the main defending force is held in
reserve—waiting to employ against the AE.
(3) The command relationships between commanders within the support forces
must be specified in the initiating or establishing directive.
5. Prelanding Operations
a. Prelanding operations take place between the commencement of the action phase
(arrival of the AF into the operational area) and the ship-to-shore movement. Although they
encompass a continuation of similar actions conducted by the support force, they are
specifically focused on the landing beaches, sites, and LZs and readiness of the AF to
execute. There is no apparent transition between supporting and prelanding operations.
Final preparations of the landing area are usually under the control of the CATF and CLF
and are more overt in nature. Assets used to conduct these operations may reduce the
resources available for tasking at H-hour and L-hour. The CLF ensures inherent risks
associated with prelanding operations do not critically impair the LF CONOPS ashore. Some
of the planning considerations for prelanding operations include:
(2) Air operations in accordance with air support plans, including EW, and
preplanned air strikes against enemy installations en route to and in the vicinity of beaches,
DZs, LZs, targets of opportunity, and mines and obstacles in the SZ and on the beach.
(4) Artillery support on landing areas in accordance with artillery fire support
plans if artillery has been put in place during prelanding operations.
(5) Ammunition (e.g., naval, aviation ordnance, artillery) expenditure and fuel
consumption prior to the landing.
VI-6 JP 3-02
Action Phase
b. The reduced timeframe associated with prelanding operations is not conducive for
MCM with respect to the speed at which MCM forces conduct their mission. As such,
there are many factors that should be considered and risks weighed to inform a decision
for the use of MCM forces, either in the support force operations or in prelanding
operations (or some combination of both).
c. With the completion of prelanding operations, the AF will conduct operations into
the landing area to accomplish the decisive action.
a. In an amphibious operation, the action phase is the period of time between the
arrival of the AF in the operational area and the accomplishment of their mission.
Organization of forces, responsibilities for accomplishment of tasks, and command
relationships during the action phase of all types of amphibious operations are essentially
the same. Variations in responsibility and authority as required by the individual situation
will be specified in the initiating directive.
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Chapter VI
(1) ATF forces afloat provide the transport groups for the vertical and surface
ship-to-shore movement and also provide the necessary landing craft and AAV control
organization.
(2) For the surface movement, the LF may be landed from ships by landing craft,
AAVs, or small boats (e.g., combat rubber raiding craft).
(3) The amphibious warfare ships, landing craft, AAVs, and organic aviation are
organized to correspond to the tactical organization of troops to facilitate control and
maneuverability. This organization includes boat waves, boat groups, and boat flotillas.
(a) A boat wave consists of the landing craft or AAVs within a boat group
that carries the troops, equipment, or cargo requiring simultaneous landing.
(b) The boat group is the basic organization of landing craft. One boat group
is organized for each surface LF element within scheduled waves at a designated beach.
(4) Limited operations using one or more LCAC groups may be conducted from
distances that may approach the maximum capability of the craft; however, detailed
planning may be required.
(5) For movement by helicopter or tiltrotor aircraft, BLTs or RLTs are formed
into helicopter flights, waves, and teams.
d. The LF is organized to execute the landing and to conduct initial operations ashore
in accordance with the commander’s CONOPS. The major subordinate elements of the LF
should be capable of independent operations during the initial stages of the landing and
operations ashore. For example, a regimental commander will need time to establish C2
over the separate battalions, which may have landed across different beaches and LZs.
Depending on the type of amphibious operation, the organization for landing should also
provide for:
(2) Depth to the assault to ensure flexibility and a sustained buildup of combat
power.
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Action Phase
e. The Marine Corps will organize as a MAGTF to conduct LF assault operations but
will further organize into landing teams (i.e., BLT for a MEU) to facilitate the ship-to-
shore movement and initial operations ashore. As with the MAGTF, the Army LF will also
organize into landing teams that are based around ground maneuver units within the LF.
(1) The BLT or RLT is a specific tactical organization for landing and should be
differentiated from the infantry battalion or infantry regiment respectively or similar
organization. It consists of an infantry battalion for the BLT or an infantry regiment for
the RLT that is reinforced by such supporting and Service units as may be attached for the
movement. For ship-to-shore movement, the landing team is further organized for surface
and air movement. Insofar as practicable, the tactical integrity of troop units should be
maintained within boat waves and boat teams. A boat team consists of the LF personnel
assigned to an individual landing craft.
(2) Task grouping of tanks, artillery, antitank, engineer, and other combat-
supporting arms or Service units may be formed to support initial operations ashore but not
integrated into a BLT.
(3) Reserve forces are organized in a manner similar to their assault counterparts.
Although not tailored for a specific beach or LZ, reserve forces are normally prepared to
conduct an assault landing by either landing craft or helicopter movement.
f. The CATF controls both surface and air ship-to-shore movement. Initially, ship-
to-shore movement, both on the surface and through the air, is centrally controlled to permit
coordination of support for LF elements. Later, as circumstances permit, control of surface
movement is decentralized for efficient and rapid execution. However, aircraft movement
remains under centralized control.
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In some case, units may need to cross-deck prior to the ship-to-shore movement. Upon
completion of any pre-execution operations the ATF starts the final approach to assigned
positions for the landings. Ships prepare for the debarkation of the embarked troops,
equipment, and supplies in accordance with prepared plans. The commencement of
debarkation and the timing of the ship-to-shore movement depend on the designated H-
hour. All elements should be prepared to modify plans on short notice to conform to
changes in H-hour.
(1) The commencement of landing craft and aircraft loading operations, and the
timing of other ship-to-shore movement preparations, are dependent on the designated H-
hour and L-hour. Whether using landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or helicopters and
tiltrotor aircraft, the CATF—in conjunction with the CLF—develops and adheres to a strict
time schedule based on H-hour. All elements should be prepared to modify plans to
conform to changes in H-hour or L-hour. Prior to H-hour or L-hour, surface movement
control group personnel are cross-decked, as required, to ships of the control group.
Helicopter movement control groups take assigned stations and initiate actions to meet the
time schedule for initial landings.
(2) The loading of personnel, equipment, and supplies of the scheduled waves is
tedious work and time-consuming. Preparations are made for debarkation of on-call and
nonscheduled units and for dispatching these units when required.
(3) The CLF continually reviews progress of the landing and makes requests to
the CATF through TACLOG for changes to the landing sequence or employment if on-call
waves are necessary. The CATF, through the movement control center, will coordinate
with the CCO (or PCO) and the Navy TACC watch officer to respond to the CLF’s
requests.
(4) The LFSP commander, through the TACLOG, may request the appropriate
control officer to suspend the landing of units on the beach if conditions dictate (e.g., enemy
action, congestion, weather).
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Action Phase
(2) On-call Waves. On-call waves are LF units, equipment, and supplies for
which an urgent need ashore is anticipated but whose time and place of landing by surface
or air cannot be accurately predicted. The activation of this category normally depends on
a tactical development such as the need for reserve units for reinforcement, replacement,
or exploitation. Because of the urgency for landing this category, it takes precedence over
any other when activated. An on-call wave is placed in an alert status. The number of
personnel and equipment placed in an on-call status is minimized consistent with the LF
requirements. The landing of on-call waves is initiated when called for by the LF and
continues until the required personnel, supplies, and equipment are ashore. Commanders
ashore provide the desired place and time for the landing of an on-call wave, through the
TACLOG group collocated with the Navy movement control organization. The Navy
control officer then directs the landing of the on-call surface waves. The landing of on-
call airborne waves may preempt the landing of elements or items in other landing
categories. The number of airborne on-call waves or items should be kept to a minimum
if their high-priority status is to be preserved
(b) The responsibility for their landing is assigned to the commanders of the
cognizant control organizations by the CATF. In the landing of nonscheduled units, the
maximum coordination between ATF and LF control organizations is essential to enable
responsiveness and efficient use of amphibious warfare ships and craft. The CCO and
Navy TACC watch officer concerned regulate the movement of the ships and craft in
accordance with instructions from appropriate commanders and requests from the
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TACLOG group. Any changes in the landing sequence, no matter how slight they may
seem, will invariably disrupt the flow of the off-load and may result in unintended delays.
(c) The CLF requests the landing of the nonscheduled units and notifies the
CATF of any requested modifications to the landing sequence as early as possible. The
landing of nonscheduled airborne units commences on completion of scheduled landings
into the LZs. Once started, this process may be interrupted to permit the landing of on-call
or other selected units or supplies based on the request of the appropriate LF commander.
Furthermore, unforeseen circumstances, such as the requirement for LF helicopters or
tiltrotor aircraft to support other tactical missions, may interrupt the landing of
nonscheduled units. Once the airborne ship-to-shore movement is completed, transport
helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft are employed to meet tactical and logistical requirements
of LF operations ashore as directed by the CLF.
c. Unloading Operations
(1) The initial landing and unloading period is a tactical evolution and should
provide rapid buildup of combat forces ashore and quick response to LF requirements.
(2) Selective unloading is tactical in nature and used to satisfy immediate support
requirements when a full general unloading period is unnecessary or not feasible.
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Action Phase
facilities on the beach or ashore permit. It proceeds without regard to class, type, or priority
of cargo.
b. Fires in Close Support of the Initial Assault. During the initial assault, NSFS is
continued on those enemy installations that could prevent the landing until the safety of the
leading waves requires these fires to be lifted. The final approach of the leading waves of
landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft necessitates a shift
of the scheduled fires inland from the landing beaches or outward from the LZs. The major
portion of the fires delivered in close support of the landings consists of prearranged fires
delivered on a closely fixed schedule in the assault landing team’s zone of action. Because
the actual rate of advance and the estimated rate of advance may not coincide, the CATF,
through the SACC, retards or accelerates the movement of scheduled fires as requested by
the CLF. Close supporting fires continue until the shore fire control party with the assault
landing teams are in a position to conduct the fires of the assigned direct support ships. At
this time, the shore fire control party begins controlling fires.
c. Deep Support Fires. Deep support fires are usually delivered by ships assigned
in general support. Each general support ship is assigned a zone of responsibility that it
covers by fire and observation. Within assigned zones of responsibility and on a
prearranged schedule, ships neutralize known enemy targets, interdict enemy LOCs, attack
targets of opportunity, execute counterbattery fire, reinforce fires of direct support ships as
directed, and conduct missions assigned by the supported unit.
a. LF operations ashore begin with the landing of the first scheduled wave by surface
means, vertical insertion, or airborne landing. Elements of the LF quickly transition from
an organization for landing to an organization for combat to accomplish the LF missions
ashore. Once fully established ashore, the LF conducts tactical operations similar to normal
land operations but remains dependent on at-sea forces for support. As the operation
progresses and support is established ashore, the degree of dependence is reduced.
b. The CLF plans and executes LF operations ashore. During the initial preparation
of the plan, the LF staff develops the essential items necessary to frame the overall OPLAN.
The LF CONOPS ashore supporting fires plan, employment of LF aviation, CSS concept,
and the engineer breaching plan are produced based on the CLF’s guidance and intent.
(1) The LF CONOPS ashore amplifies CLF’s decisions and indicates how the
operation should progress. The development of the concept of LF operations ashore is an
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(2) The fire support plan has a major effect on the development of the LF plan
for operations. Until the LF’s organic artillery is ashore, NSFS and aviation assets (fixed-
wing and rotary-wing) are normally the only means of fire support for the LF. A portion
of these assets may also be tasked to defend the AF as a whole, limiting their availability
to the LF. Fires that create nonlethal effects are also included in the plan.
For additional information on supporting arms, see Chapter VII, “Fire Support.”
(3) The plan for the employment of LF aviation to support operations ashore is
integrated with the overall air plans of the CATF and CLF. Air operations performed by
ATF and LF aviation elements and other supporting air forces complement one another
and constitute a collective capability for support of the amphibious operation. When the
LF is a MAGTF, the MAGTF commander retains OPCON of the organic aviation assets
for use in support of the LF CONOPS and the overall mission. During the course of the
operation, excess MAGTF sorties can be allocated by the JFC to other component
commanders as appropriate. The MAGTF commander provides excess sorties and sorties
for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance to the JFC in
accordance with JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
(4) The plan for the employment of the LF CSS is expressed in the concept for
CSS. This document establishes the logistic support plan for the LF from the embarkation
phase through the termination of LF operations ashore.
(5) The plan for clearance and breaching will include a determination of the line
of demarcation on the beach that indicates the areas of clearance responsibilities for the
CATF and the CLF. The line of demarcation will be determined by the CATF and CLF
during the planning phase. Seaward of the beach, in the SZ and on the beach up to the line
of demarcation, the CATF is responsible for MCM and assault breaching. Landward of
the line of demarcation, the CLF is responsible for reduction of minefields, barriers, and
obstacles; explosive ordnance disposal; assault gap crossing; and follow-on clearance of
the beach.
For additional information on breaching and planning for breaching, see JP 3-15,
Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations; ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A,
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Action Phase
c. The CLF will usually plan to withhold a portion of the force in reserve during the
initial stages of the action phase. The LF reserve must be capable of landing when and
where required to best influence the tactical situation as it develops ashore.
(1) Subordinate units of the LF will normally not have their own reserve due to
the limited ship-to-shore movement assets and the need to commit all landing groups to
maximize the combat power ashore. On-call waves are the normal means by which the
ground commander can influence the action ashore. While afloat, certain units may be
treated as a reserve for commitment as required by the situation.
(2) When keeping the reserve afloat is no longer advantageous, it is landed and
positioned ashore to facilitate future employment. This action should not be undertaken
until sufficient area has been seized ashore to permit adequate maneuver space.
b. Subsidiary landings should be planned and executed by commanders with the same
precision as the main landing. Division of forces to conduct subsidiary landings is justified
only when such employment will be of greater value than commitment to the main landing.
Forces employed in subsidiary landings that precede the main landing may be re-embarked
and employed as a tactical reserve supporting the main landing. Subsidiary landings may
be executed to accomplish one or more of the following specific purposes:
(1) Seize specific areas to be used in support of the main landing (i.e., seizing
islands or mainland areas adjacent to the main landing area) for use as:
(2) Seize an area to deny its use to the enemy in opposing the main landing.
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(3) Divert enemy attention and forces from the main landing or fix enemy
defensive forces in place as part of a deception operation.
e. Initial size of the re-embarkation area depends on several factors such as:
(1) Terrain essential for defense in the event that the embarkation is conducted
under enemy pressure.
(3) Artillery, NSFS, and air support available for defense, if required.
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f. Planners should consider and develop, when required, options for establishing an
ISB to support rearrangement of forces and equipment that cannot be reasonably
reconfigured for timely at-sea transfer. An ISB comes with a price, for example, possible
loss of deception and surprise, increased personnel requirements, seaport of debarkation,
and hardening requirements, and a need for air defense assets and other force protection
requirements.
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CHAPTER VII
FIRE SUPPORT
SECTION A. OVERVIEW
1. General
a. Properly planned and executed supporting fires that create lethal and/or nonlethal
effects are critical to the success of an amphibious operation. Since the availability and
employment of one supporting weapon system influences the requirements for the others,
the fire support requirements of all components of the AF should be considered together in
planning the employment of fire support means. Fire support planning and coordination
in amphibious operations are continuous processes seeking timely and appropriate
application of force to achieve the objectives within the operational area. Fire support
planning integrates and synchronizes the AF organic fires with nonorganic supporting fires
to achieve the commander’s intent. Detailed integration of the ATF and LF fire support
agencies is necessary. Flexible, parallel C2 architecture that enables decentralized fire
support control is used when applicable.
b. Both the ATF and the LF may require fire support during the amphibious
operation.
(1) AFs in the AOA or AO normally require fire support for operations such as
beach reconnaissance, hydrographic survey, removal of beach and underwater obstacles,
and MCM. In addition, aircraft and ships capable of providing fire support must be
allocated to protect the force from air, surface, or subsurface attack.
(2) The LF normally requires fire support against shore targets before, during,
and after the initial landings. Once sufficient area is seized ashore, artillery can be landed
to provide additional fire support. Until ground fire support means (e.g., mortars, rockets,
and cannon artillery) of the LF are landed and ready to provide support, fire support is
provided by CAS, NSFS, and, in limited cases, direct and indirect fires from adjacent
friendly forces.
(3) The LF may require fire support during amphibious withdrawal as the LF
exits the beach LZ or DZ.
(4) To the greatest extent possible, fires that create nonlethal effects should be
planned in support of all phases of an amphibious operation.
2. Responsibilities
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(3) Determine requirements for air, NSFS, nonlethal effects, and artillery fire
support.
(4) Present the coordinated prioritized requests for NSFS and air support to the
CATF.
3. Processes
b. TA
(2) The typical AF has the capability to exploit the information provided from
nonorganic airborne surveillance and reconnaissance systems (manned and unmanned),
subsurface, surface (ground and maritime), military space systems, and national systems.
Fire support information could be provided by SOF, interagency and multinational
partners, and other nonorganic sources.
(3) The intelligence center established within the AF supports the TA system by
coordinating the use of limited collection assets throughout the operational area.
c. C2 Agencies
(1) The initiating directive should identify responsibilities for fire support
planning and coordination between the commanders of the AF. In planning fire support,
the designated commander is the commander who has been delegated the command
authority to plan and coordinate fires for either the entire amphibious operation or a
particular phase of it. The effectiveness of fire support in amphibious operations is
predicated on the supported commander providing clear and coordinated guidance to the
forces involved since unity of effort is essential.
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Fire Support
(a) The ATF staff mans the NSFS section. This section monitors the naval
gunfire control net, support net, and other gunfire nets as appropriate. The LF staff
provides liaison to the section.
(b) The ASCS is manned by members of a Navy air control agency (e.g.,
tactical air control squadron or tactical air control group) and directed by the air support
coordinator who reports to the Navy TACC watch officer. The Navy TACC watch officer
is the equivalent of the CCO and is in charge of ship-to-shore movement by air. This
section supports the Navy TACC by controlling, supporting, or transferring control to
subsidiary tactical air direction controllers afloat or ashore. The section is located in the
SACC and coordinates with the Navy TACC to assist in the deconfliction of air missions,
routes, and requests for fires. The LF staff provides liaison to the section.
(c) The target information center (TIC) collects, displays, evaluates, and
disseminates information pertaining to potential targets. It should be manned by an ATF
target intelligence officer, ATF air intelligence officer, LF target intelligence officer, and
other personnel, as required. TIC members will normally operate in the SACC. The ATF
target intelligence officer representative to the FFCC supervises the TIC and maintains
close liaison with ATF and LF intelligence and operations staff. The LF target information
officer normally works in the intelligence center of the AF.
(3) The FFCC is the LF senior fire support coordination agency that plans,
executes, and coordinates all fires within the operational area. Prior to control being passed
ashore, the FFCC incrementally assumes responsibility for fire support planning and
coordination from the SACC. The FFCC is organized and supervised at the MAGTF level
by the FFC, who is responsible to the LF operations officer for MAGTF fires. The
organization operates at both the tactical and operational level addressing current and
future fire support issues. The FFCC coordinates those matters that cannot be coordinated
by the GCE (FSCC), ACE Marine TACC, or CSS operations center for integration of fire
support plans.
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(4) The FSCC is the fire support coordination agency within the LF GCE.
FSCCs are established at the battalion, regiment, and division level. The FSCC plans,
executes, and coordinates all forms of fire support within the GCE’s AO. The FSCC is
organized and supervised by the fire support coordinator who is responsible to the
appropriate level GCE operations officer for GCE fires. FSCCs are initially subordinate
to the SACC and, if the FFCC is established ashore, subordinate to that agency.
d. Attack Resources
(1) The AF’s organic attack resources are capable of delivering fires and include
naval aviation, NSFS, EW systems, artillery, rockets, and mortars.
(2) The SACC and the FFCC are able to coordinate and control nonorganic
attack resources in support of the amphibious operation. Aircraft (manned and unmanned),
ship-launched missiles, SOF, and systems that create nonlethal effects attacking targets
within the operational area must be coordinated through the senior fire support
coordination agency.
4. Planning
a. The purpose of fire support planning is to optimize the employment of fire support
to achieve the supported commander’s intent by shaping the operational area and providing
support to maneuver forces. Fire support planning is the continuous and concurrent process
to analyze, prioritize, allocate, and schedule fire support to maximize combat power of the
force.
(1) Commanders determine how to shape the operational area with fires to assist
both maritime and land maneuver forces and how to use maritime and land maneuver
forces to exploit fires. When developing the fire support plan, the supported commander
will publish the guidance for fires. It is from this guidance that supporting and subordinate
commanders and fire support personnel begin to frame the role of fire support in the plan.
The supported commander’s guidance for fires should articulate the desired effects against
the enemy’s capabilities and how these effects will contribute to the overall success of the
operation. Commanders identify targets that are critical to the success of the operation
(high-payoff targets), force protection issues, and any prohibitions or restrictions on fire
support. A clear determination of the enemy’s COGs, decisive points, and critical
vulnerabilities is central to fire support planning.
(2) Attack resources may be considered for apportionment and allocation to the
AF when developing the fire support plan. In the general sense, apportionment is the
percentage of the force given to a specific mission set, while the allocation represents the
total number of assets/sorties given to a specific objective. For example, air apportionment
is a determination and assignment of the total expected air effort by percentage or priority
that should be devoted to the various air operations or geographic areas for a given period
of time. In comparison, air allocation is the translation of the air apportionment decision
into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task. The
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Fire Support
apportionment and allocation process requires input from the subordinate commands
within the AF to ensure their requirements are addressed.
(a) Direct support air requirements and any excess sorties are identified to
the establishing authority for further tasking.
(b) Normally, the JFC will apportion assigned air assets (by priority or
percentage) to support the AF. The JFC may also task supporting commanders for air
support as required.
(3) During the planning phase of joint fires, commanders develop a CONOPS
that includes ATF supporting arms. Effective joint fire support depends on planning for
the successive performance of the four basic fire support tasks: support forces in contact,
support the CONOPS, integrate and synchronize joint fire support, and sustain joint fire
support operations.
b. Targeting
(1) The AF normally conducts an integrated targeting board to provide broad fire
support and targeting oversight functions. Depending on the command relationships that
the establishing authority promulgates in the initiating directive, the designated
commander coordinates the targeting process for the AF through preparation and
submission of target nominations and FSCMs. The supported commander, during the
period within which the targets are attacked, has final approval authority over the fire
support plan and target list. Those targets to be serviced by organic assets are passed to
the appropriate agencies for servicing. Targets requiring servicing by nonorganic attack
systems are forwarded to the next higher-level targeting board for consideration. The AF
will provide, at a minimum, LNOs to this targeting board (i.e., component level) and may
provide LNOs to the senior joint targeting board (i.e., the JFC’s joint targeting coordination
board), if established. AF targeting timelines are normally out to 72-96 hours to match the
targeting timelines and planning cycle of the JFC.
(2) The AF may seek to shape their designated (but not activated) operational
area prior to the arrival of AFs through target nominations for attack by other components’
forces. Restrictions on the attack of certain targets may also be requested.
For additional information, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; and
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
c. Fire Support Coordination. From the beginning of the action phase until a short
time after the first waves land, the LF is normally supported by scheduled fires. Once
control agencies (e.g., forward observers and NSFS spotters) are ashore, the LF will
normally begin calling for fires to support operations. Coordination is accomplished at the
lowest echelon possible. This same principle applies in the planning of subsequent planned
fires. Planning is accomplished as required at each level of the LF before daily fire support
plans are transmitted to the next higher level for similar action.
For more details on fire support, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
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(1) Although normally only one SACC is active at any one time, amphibious
advance force operations may require the establishment of a fire support agency to
coordinate fires in support of the neutralization or destruction of enemy high-value assets
or the emergency extraction of SOF or reconnaissance units. The amphibious advance
force SACC should maintain situational awareness on the insertions and extractions of
teams, locations of teams ashore, and MIW operations within the area, to include sea and
air assets. The AF SACC assumes responsibility as the primary fire support agency from
the amphibious advance force SACC, upon its arrival in the operational area.
a. The CATF prepares the overall NSFS plan based on the CLF and ATF
requirements. The plan allocates gunfire support ships and facilities. The CATF
establishes the general policy on NSFS targeting priorities. The CLF determines LF
requirements for NSFS, including selection of targets to be attacked in pre-assault
operations, those to be fired on in support of the LF assault, and the timing of these fires in
relation to the LF scheme of maneuver. When designated the supported commander, the
CLF coordinates the timing, priorities, and desired effects of fires within the operational
area.
b. As a general rule, one NSFS ship provides direct support for a battalion with one
NSFS ship providing general support for the regiment.
c. Control of NSFS is exercised by, and passes to, different commands and agencies
as the operation progresses.
(1) The amphibious advance force commander has control of NSFS during
amphibious advance force operations. Control is normally exercised through the advance
force SACC.
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(2) On arrival in the objective area, the CATF exercises control of the NSFS
through the SACC.
(3) When subordinate amphibious task groups are formed and separate landing
areas are designated, the CATF may delegate to each attack group commander control of
NSFS in their landing area.
(4) Control may be passed to the CLF once the necessary control facilities are
established ashore. The CLF then has the authority to assign NSFS missions directly to
the fire support ships. The CATF or designated subordinate retains responsibility for
allocation of available fire support ships. The CATF also retains responsibility for logistic
support and OPCON functions other than control of fires.
d. NSFS Organization
(1) The ATF echelons involved in surface fire support are as follows:
(a) The AF is the highest echelon directly concerned with the NSFS of the
amphibious operation.
(b) The fire support group is usually subdivided into fire support elements
for efficient and effective delivery of gunfire support. When necessary for span of control
considerations, an echelon called the fire support unit may be interposed between the fire
support group and fire support element. The fire support unit will function similarly to the
fire support group; however, fire support unit commanders normally do not deal directly
with LF agencies. Each fire support group (or unit when established) is divided into smaller
task elements of fire support ships, regardless of type operating in the same general locality.
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(c) The individual fire support ship is the basic echelon in NSFS. Its
function is to deliver gunfire support under the control or direction of the agency to which
assigned. The ship deals directly with the LF agencies.
(2) The LF organization for control and employment of NSFS provides special
staff or liaison representation at every level from and including the infantry battalion or
comparable troop unit to the highest troop echelon present.
(b) The division NSFS section or team provides NSFS communications and
facilities for division headquarters, performs NSFS special staff functions, and directs
employment of assigned support ships.
(d) The battalion shore fire control party includes an NSFS liaison team and
an NSFS spotting team. The NSFS liaison team is specifically organized to handle NSFS
liaison matters for the supported commander, while the spotting team is charged with
requesting and adjusting fires of assigned direct support ships and general support ships.
For more information, see NTTP 3-02.2M/MCTP 3-31A, Supporting Arms Coordination
in Amphibious Operations.
e. NSFS Plans
(1) The pre-D-Day NSFS plans, which have the primary objective to prepare the
landing area for the assault, usually include the following elements:
(f) Provision to record target information and report latest intelligence data
to the CATF.
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(2) The essential elements of the plan for D-day NSFS plans include:
(a) Assignment of ships to FSAs, zones of fire, and in direct and general
support of specific LF units.
(d) Designation of targets, target areas, deep support areas, and probable
routes of approach of enemy reinforcements.
(j) Isolation of the landing area and defense against enemy counteroffensive
action by massed fires on probable routes of approach with particular provisions for
countermechanized programs.
(a) Fires on the flanks of the landing area and fires against targets of
opportunity.
a. Fires that create nonlethal effects are any fires that do not directly seek the physical
destruction of the intended target and are designed to degrade the performance of enemy
forces, functions, or facilities or to alter the decision making or behavior of an adversary.
Fires that create nonlethal effects may be employed so as to incapacitate personnel or
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materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage
to property and the environment. Employment of fires and information-related activities
that create nonlethal effects should be integrated into all amphibious operations to produce
synergistic results. Examples include masking smoke or obscurants; nighttime area
illumination; and employment of some information-related activities, such as EA,
MILDEC, and offensive cyberspace operations, that deceive the enemy, disable the
enemy’s C2 systems, or disrupt operations.
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for further discussion on considerations, planning, and
integration of information-related activities, weapons, and capabilities that can create
nonlethal effects.
c. The ATF and LF OPORDs should contain specific instructions on the procedures
to request EW and other forms of fire support that creates nonlethal effects from resources
within or external to the ATF and on EW coordination cell actions required to coordinate
or process these requests.
(1) The CATF determines overall air support requirements of the ATF,
determines air support capabilities, coordinates all air support requests, and prepares an air
plan.
(2) The CLF determines LF air support requirements, determines LF air support
capabilities, submits plans for deployment of aviation elements ashore, and prepares an air
plan.
(3) The JFACC provides JFACC representation, determines JFACC air support
capabilities, submits deployment plans, and prepares supporting air plans.
(1) All aircraft operating within the objective area must be under centralized
control of a tactical air control system. A combination of positive and procedural control
measures may be required.
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(2) Plans should usually provide for rapid seizure of existing airfields, airfield
capable sites, and sites for early warning and air control. This enables the early deployment
ashore of aviation elements and extends the radius of warning and control.
(2) LF requests for pre-D-day air operations are to satisfy intelligence needs and
offensive air operations to reduce enemy forces and defensive installations in the landing
area. The scope of pre-D-day operations may be limited by the need for surprise. The
standard joint tactical air strike request is used for air support requests.
(4) Post-D-day air support can only be planned in general because requirements
will depend on the tactical situation ashore and will not be fully known in advance.
Applicable pre-D-day and D-day air operations are continued.
(1) Until the TACPs arrive with assault units ashore, CAS missions are executed
under the direction of the tactical air coordinators (airborne) and the terminal control of the
forward air controllers (airborne). When the TACPs are established ashore, they request
CAS from the Navy TACC. The Navy TACC assigns aircraft to missions as requests are
received and in accordance with the commander’s guidance for priority of fires. As the
landing progresses, air control elements to be established ashore land and prepare to
operate shore-based facilities for control of air operations.
(2) As air support control agencies are established ashore, they function initially
under the Navy TACC. These agencies subsequently operate under the designated
authority when control of CAS has been passed ashore by the CATF. In any case, requests
are sent by the TACP directly to the air control agency, which assigns aircraft to CAS
missions. TACP requests are monitored by the SACC and FSCC or fires cell.
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(3) The terminal phase of a CAS strike is executed under the control of a joint
terminal attack controller or forward air controller (airborne). CAS missions are executed
only on the approval authority granted by the commander of the supported LF.
a. Ground-based fire support comes under the cognizance of the MAGTF. The two
principal ground-based assets available to the CLF commander are field artillery and
mortars. Artillery furnishes close and continuous fire support to neutralize, destroy, or
suppress targets that threaten the mission of the supported command. Mortars provide
immediately available, responsive, indirect fires in support of the LF scheme of maneuver.
Mortars also reinforce direct fire during close combat.
b. The artillery fire plan is normally formulated in the fire direction center (FDC).
These centers are the elements of a command post, consisting of gunnery and
communications personnel and equipment, which the commander uses to exercise fire
direction and/or fire control. The FDC receives target intelligence and requests for fire and
translates them into timely and effective tactical and technical fire control in support of
ongoing operations.
c. Some planning tasks, such as counterfire procedures and scheduling of fires, may
occur in the supported unit’s FSCC (division or regiment) when multiple supporting arms
are being integrated into the fire support plan. Remaining artillery fire planning tasks, such
as fire direction, resupply, and positioning to meet the fire support requirements, are then
performed at the appropriate FDC.
See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and NTTP 3-02.2M/MCTP 3-31A, Supporting Arms
Coordination in Amphibious Operations, for more information.
9. Multinational Considerations
b. Fire support coordination may be required with multinational partners that are
providing fire support from outside the designated AOA.
See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and Allied Joint Publication-3, Allied Joint
Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, for additional information on multinational
operations.
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CHAPTER VIII
PROTECTION
SECTION A. OVERVIEW
1. General
Protection of the AF is essential for all amphibious operations but especially during ship-
to-shore movement. The JFMCC will synchronize and coordinate operations between the
AF and other forces (SOF and other naval and joint forces) to counter and neutralize enemy
aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, small boats, land-based antiship cruise missiles,
antiship ballistic missile coastal defenses, mines, and other potential conventional and
asymmetric threats to the AF en route to and within the AOA to gain local maritime and air
superiority. Maritime superiority permits the conduct of amphibious operations without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force. During the planning phase of an amphibious
operation, the active protection of the ATF and LF is one of the most important
considerations. The inherent nature of amphibious operations limits the ability of the CATF
to employ passive protection measures once in the AOA.
For additional information on defense of the ATF, see NWP 3-02.14M/MCTP 13-10G,
Defense of the Amphibious Task Force.
2. Protective Measures
The LF must arrive in the landing area without critical reduction of its combat power.
Measures necessary for protection of the LF elements in transit from the sea include all
measures taken by any task force operating at sea. This includes operations to locate,
classify, and track surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft and, if required, apply force
against them. By establishing local maritime superiority in both the open oceans and the
AOA or AO, naval forces directly support the ability to project defense and assure access for
the LF. Gaining and maintaining advantage throughout the AOA/AO is necessary.
a. Sea mines and MCM have figured prominently in the Civil War; Spanish-American
War; both World Wars; Korea; numerous Cold War crises; and in Operations ERNEST
WILL, DESERT STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. Admiral David G. Farragut’s command
in 1864 at Mobile Bay during the Civil War to “...damn the torpedoes [mines], full speed
ahead….” was made easier by two months of extensive MCM operations that included
reconnaissance, mine hunting, and technical exploitation of captured weapons. Mines also
contribute to contested environments.
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operational deception, and active use of MCM platforms to hunt or sweep for active enemy
mines). In the current operational environment, coastal defenses against amphibious
operations have become a military necessity for a number of countries considered a threat to
regional stability and national interests.
c. The preferred tactic for AFs operating against countries or organizations employing
coastal defenses is to avoid, bypass, or exploit gaps in these defenses whenever possible.
However, operational limitations may preclude this tactic and a breach of these defenses may
be required. The capability to counter mines and other obstacles (either conventionally
manufactured and configured or locally improvised) is, therefore, essential to the conduct of
amphibious operations. Coastal mining may interfere with littoral maneuver at sea, in the
SZ, and on the beach. Specifically, it may affect amphibious advance force operations, ship-
to-shore movement, and possibly hinder or preclude unloading of the LF.
4. Antilanding Doctrine
b. In most cases, enemies will employ mines as an economy of force defensive measure.
In addition, some countries may base their coastal defense on the threatened employment of
WMD or may integrate WMD into their existing coastal defenses. Coastal defenses depend
on the hydrography, terrain, resources, development time available, and ingenuity of the
enemy. Antilanding doctrine usually focuses on the development of four layered barriers
within the littorals. These barriers may be under observation and covered by shore-based
fires. The four barriers from the littorals to land are perimeter, main, engineer, and beach.
(1) Perimeter Barrier. The perimeter barrier holds the perimeter minefield,
is located at the maximum range of shore-based covering fires, and is intended to delay
and break up the ATF prior to arrival in the AOA. Integrated fire is used to protect
defensive obstacles from assault force’s attempts to breach those barriers. Delays at the
perimeter minefield could allow coastal defenses time for final preparation and movement
of forces to potential landing beaches. Antiship cruise missiles and coastal artillery may
provide covering fires. Electric and diesel submarines and aircraft may attempt to attack the
AF.
(2) Main Barrier. The main barrier holds the primary minefield. This
minefield is intended to deny the maneuver of ATF ships and landing craft during ship-to-
shore movement. Land-based artillery, air defense systems, and possibly small boats and
aircraft cover the main barrier.
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Protection
Minefields and obstacles are placed along avenues of egress off the beach and in front of
defended positions.
(3) Engineer Barrier. The engineer barrier is located at or near the shoreline
and contains both minefields and nonexplosive, anti-landing obstacles. The engineer
barrier is positioned in very shallow water and the SZ. The engineer barrier is designed and
constructed by land force engineers to exploit the operational characteristics of landing craft,
amphibious, and tracked vehicles. It is positioned to reinforce the effect of existing terrain
features so that it disrupts, turns, fixes, or blocks the LF’s assault formation. The barrier is
integrated with an engagement area that is subjected to enemy observation and fires.
(4) Beach Barrier. The beach barrier canalizes the LF for counterattacks.
The beach barrier is located in natural avenues of egress between the landward edge of the
SZ and beach exits. It contains minefields and anti-vehicle obstacles that are positioned to
disrupt the operational tempo and canalize the tactical formation of a LF. These obstacle
effects, combined with enemy observation and integrated fires, will enhance the
effectiveness of an enemy counterattack against the LF.
5. Responsibilities
The CATF has overall responsibility for MIW within the sea areas of the operational
area. This includes the planning and execution of all facets of MIW supported by the
MIWC and MCMC and assigned forces or the MCM commander (if assigned) and
providing the logistics support and force protection for MCM assets. The MIWC or
MCMC will direct air and surface MCM assets, to include conducting MCM operations,
including breaching outer mine barriers from deep water to the very shallow water, and
underwater MCM forces conducting underwater MIW in very shallow water. The CATF
conducts assault breaching operations from the seaward edge of the SZ to the agreed upon
line of demarcation. This line of demarcation is mutually agreed upon by the CATF and
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CLF and identifies geographic limits of their respective clearance responsibilities and is
supported by planning input from the MIWC or MCMC. The CLF conducts mine and
obstacle breaching and clearing operations from the line of demarcation on the beach
landward and for follow-on clearance operations on the beach. Above all, MCM and
amphibious breaching operations must be synchronized. The CATF and CLF share
responsibility in integrating these operations into the overall strategy to support littoral
maneuver and the subsequent ship-to-shore movement and landing plan.
(1) MIW Planning Facilitation. The CATF and CLF should incorporate MCM
planners throughout the amphibious planning process. Potential issues include the location
and size of the AO in comparison to available MCM assets; slow surface MCM transit
times to the AO; ability of surface MCM operations to meet established deadlines; the
number and location of the beaches, boat lanes, approaches, and ship transit areas required
to be cleared or surveyed for mines; and requirements for protecting assets involved in the
surface MCM effort. Accomplishing this will enhance the ability of AF units to achieve
surprise and rapidly project combat power through littoral maneuver; build up troops,
equipment, and supplies ashore; or to conduct ship-to-objective maneuver to areas deeper
inland. The incorporation of MCM expertise in amphibious planning in any instance where
enemy mining is anticipated is critical to successful MCM support of the amphibious
objectives.
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Protection
(3) Local Air and Maritime Superiority. Local air and maritime superiority
in the operational area is normally required for the MCM forces to commence operations.
This may require naval and joint assets to provide the necessary protection.
(4) Offensive MCM. A key consideration in any potential littoral conflict is the
establishment of ROE that enable early, aggressive, and proactive MCM operations. If
ROE permit, MCM is best accomplished by preemptive destruction of mines prior to their
deployment. Offensive MCM includes attacks that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects
on production and storage facilities, transportation assets, and forces used to lay mines.
Supporting operations may also be conducted for offensive MCM and to wear down land
forces. A key consideration in any potential littoral conflict is the establishment of ROE
that enable early, aggressive, and proactive MCM operations.
b. MCM Forces. The time required for MCM operations will usually require MCM
forces to commence operations prior to the arrival of the AF and, potentially, the
amphibious advance force. Legacy MCM ships have slow transit speeds and may require
a heavy lift ship to transport them to the AO if not already forward deployed. MCM
helicopters, MCM forces, marine mammals, and unmanned undersea vehicle platoons may
also require the use of amphibious warfare ships or other platforms to conduct operations.
The CATF and CLF should consider that an amphibious warfare ship or afloat forward
staging base, for example, could be required to support MCM operations and plan for any
subsequent impacts on amphibious warfare ships load outs and the overall landing plan.
The vulnerability and relatively slow rate of speed in which MCM forces operate should
be taken into account when considering use of MCM during supporting or prelanding
operations. Due to the limited assets available for an MCM operation, the CATF will need
to prioritize the MCM effort in the AO. MCM operations have the potential to compromise
OPSEC of the impending amphibious operation with significant impact on the success of
the LF. Opposed landings are arguably one of the most difficult and dangerous large-scale
military operations and the element of surprise should be preserved by all available means.
Therefore, overt MCM operations that threaten the element of surprise should be kept to a
minimum and conducted as close as practicable to the arrival of the AF in the AOA.
Deception operations may maintain the element of surprise if overt MCM operations are
necessary. The principal techniques to accomplish active MCM are mine hunting and
minesweeping.
(1) Mine Hunting. During mine hunting, the MCM platform uses its available
assets to detect, classify, identify, and neutralize all mine-like contacts found. In favorable
hydrographic conditions, mine hunting is the preferred method for conducting enabling
MCM. Mine hunting does not require specific knowledge of the mine threat and provides
a means to estimate the remaining risk to transiting vessels. However, it is a time-
consuming operation limited by the acoustics, visibility, and topography of the underwater
environments in the operating area.
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produces either the acoustic and/or magnetic influence required to detonate the mine. It is
performed at slightly faster speeds than hunting, but its success is largely a factor of
environmental conditions and the intelligence data available relating the operational
characteristics of the mines being swept. Minesweeping does not provide an accurate
estimate of the remaining risk.
Estimated to cost about $1,500, an unsophisticated contact mine that was based on a
1908 Russian design caused some $96 million in damage in 1987 to the frigate
United States Ship Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), shown above with damage to the hull as seen
from dry dock, almost causing the ship to sink.
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Protection
include the full range of fires that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects from NSFS and
CAS to EA.
(3) Security. Support forces prevent the enemy from interfering with obstacle
reduction and the passage of the assault waves through the breach lanes. Security must be
effective against coastal defenses and counterattack forces. Vertical assault forces may
seize and deny routes of ingress into the landing area to prevent the counterattack of the
landing beaches.
For more information on MIW and breaching, see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine
Warfare for Joint Operations; NWP 3-15/MCTP 13-10J, Naval Mine Warfare; NTTP 3-
15.24/MCRP 13-10J.1, Mine Countermeasures in Support of Amphibious Operations; and
ATP 3-90.4/ MCTP 3-34A, Combined Arms Mobility Operations.
7. Air Warfare
Defensive counterair includes all measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and
destroy or negate enemy air and missile forces attempting to attack or penetrate through
friendly airspace. These operations employ both active and passive measures to protect
US or MNFs assets and interests.
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Chapter VIII
8. Surface Warfare
a. To assure access for the AF, SUW-capable forces will be required to operate in the
open ocean, the approaches to the littorals, and the more difficult littoral environment. The
objective in each operating area is the same: gain and maintain maritime superiority to
protect the AF. Because of unconventional threats and asymmetric tactics that may be
encountered during amphibious operations, the SUW challenge expands well beyond the
traditional war-at-sea scenario which pits similarly constructed, clearly defined naval
forces against each other in a known theater of action. SUW capabilities should continue
to include response options for conventional threats, but naval and joint forces conducting
SUW operations should also be prepared for potentially more dangerous unknown enemies
employing nontraditional methods to challenge US objectives. Just as conventional enemy
surface combatants present a threat to maritime superiority, terrorists using small, lightly
armed boats loaded with explosives or otherwise as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device can present challenges to maritime security. When an improvised explosive device
is deployed in a manned vessel, it is categorized as a manned vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device in a maritime environment.
(2) The inner and outer boundaries of the littoral operating environment are not
clearly defined. However, geography is a key factor. As the operational environment
transitions from the blue water to the littoral, maneuvering the force and the conduct of
SUW becomes increasingly difficult. Threat vessels can use geographic features to hide
or commercial activities (e.g., merchant shipping routes, fishing areas, oil platform
support) to mask their intentions. Speed; organic weapons; and embarked aviation assets,
including unmanned vehicles, are important for SUW success. SUW tasking in littoral
regions will likely be conducted within the territorial waters of another nation. A thorough
understanding of the law of the sea, as it pertains to the jurisdiction and sovereignty
exercised by nations, and the international legal status and navigational rights of warships
and aircraft is required before commencing operations. The mission will determine
whether the resources available for SUW are sufficient. However, as the focus shifts from
the open ocean to the littoral, additional collaboration with other warfare commanders will
be necessary to leverage forces for effective employment. The SUWC will normally flex
resources to support other mission areas and to respond to threats emanating from the sea
or from land. In some instances, the focus will be from seaward toward the beach such as
support to amphibious operations or strike missions.
(3) The threats and limitations associated with littoral operations are
compounded by a lack of freedom of maneuver due to enclosed areas, especially when the
AOA is in a concave area of the shoreline. Maintaining situational awareness is vital in
the littoral environment. Combat identification is complicated by the density of surface
craft in the immediate vicinity of forces. Integration with the AMDC to provide integrated
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Protection
b. Joint forces may significantly enhance SUW capabilities to defend the AF and
suppress potential adversaries, especially when operating in littoral environments. Joint
forces may contribute to SUW in the following areas:
(3) C2 support.
(1) The traditional surface threat to maritime superiority ranges from large
combatant-like cruisers and frigates to much smaller combatants such as patrol boats, patrol
gunboats, torpedo boats, and missile boats. Surface combatants equipped with surface-to-
surface missile or surface-to-air missile systems that have a surface engagement capability
pose a serious threat to maritime forces. Combatants armed with gun systems, torpedoes,
or mines pose a secondary surface threat. The threat from torpedoes launched from surface
ships will increase as more modern guided torpedoes become readily available to the
enemy.
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deploying capability. Naval guns can also present a threat to surface forces and are found
on nearly all surface combatants.
(3) Submarines are the best equipped of all force types to operate in a covert or
clandestine manner in a hostile environment. Many submarines can threaten the AF well
beyond the effective operational radius of land-based aircraft that may oppose AF
operations. Diesel-electric attack submarines provide a readily deployable weapon system
for a variety of peacetime and wartime missions for the enemy. Diesel-electric submarines
may be armed with torpedoes, antiship missiles, guns, mines, or a mix of these weapons.
Coordination with the ASW commander is a key planning element for all SUW operations.
(4) The main air threat to forces conducting SUW operations comes from sea-
or land-based multirole aircraft, including bombers, fighters, maritime reconnaissance
patrol aircraft, and helicopters armed with guided and unguided weapons. Although
designed primarily to attack land targets, fighter-bombers are a threat because of
widespread availability and combat radius. They may be armed with antiship missiles,
bombs, rockets, or guns. Many littoral nations have maritime reconnaissance patrol
aircraft, which can also be armed with SUW weapons such as antiship cruise missiles,
rockets, bombs, torpedoes, and mines. Additionally, many types of military helicopters
are readily available and could pose a threat to SUW operations. They are capable of
carrying a variety of weapons, including antiship cruise missiles, rockets, and guns.
Coordination with the air warfare commanders and JFACC (when assigned) should be a
part of every ATF SUW plan.
(5) Many nations and some non-state groups have coastal defense systems that
integrate coastal area surveillance, engagement of enemy forces, and support of friendly
forces operating in the area. A coastal defense system usually includes radar stations
(stationary or mobile), to provide coverage in the area of interest and various weapons
systems. Additional information resources may include acoustic sensors, human
intelligence, communications intelligence, sightings by commercial surface vessels (e.g.,
fishing vessels), surface combatants, auxiliaries, submarines, reconnaissance aircraft,
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and satellites. Weapon systems, depending on the
geographical features of the coastline, may include surface-to-surface missile systems
(which may be fixed or mobile), torpedoes, and controlled minefields situated along the
coastline at focal points or in restricted waters. When operating in littoral areas, the coastal
defense system capabilities of the bordering nations and other relevant actors (e.g., terrorist
groups) should be considered.
(6) The ATF may have limited air and missile defense/antiair warfare assets,
especially at the ARG and single-ship level, and should use them to destroy or reduce
incoming air threats to an acceptable level. The ATF’s classification, identification, and
engagement area is typically much smaller than the CSG’s. The problem of distinguishing
friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft while employing various weapons systems is a
complex task under normal circumstances. In the littorals, the complexity is further
increased due to the confinement of the operational area. It is critical to establish airspace
control measures that ensure identification of all joint/coalition airborne assets to prevent
friendly fire and identify incoming threats. It is also critical that the force bases the
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Protection
decisions on a combined and shared operating picture. These operations are frequently
characterized by confined and congested water and airspace occupied by friends, the
enemy, and neutrals, which makes rapid identification and efficient coordination
profoundly difficult.
(7) In an emergency defense of the ATF scenario, the relationship between the
Navy TACC and the warfare commanders becomes paramount to the survival of the ATF.
Unless the warfare commander has a predetermined emergency defense of the ATF plan
or assigned assets, they may have to coordinate immediate support from the Navy TACC.
The Navy TACC will then coordinate the dynamic retasking of available air assets with
the applicable battle watch captain, warfare commander, and/or LFOC to meet the
requirements of the requesting warfare commander.
For more information on legal considerations regarding the law of the sea, see JP 1-04,
Legal Support to Military Operations.
9. Antisubmarine Warfare
a. Control of the undersea portion of the operational area and establishing a defensive
perimeter of the AOA or operational area are vital to the success of amphibious operations.
To counter the enemy submarine threat, the JFC may coordinate, and when required,
integrate assets from the joint force to conduct ASW during all phases of an amphibious
operation.
b. Although often viewed as a Navy-only mission, the JFMCC may utilize a variety
of joint forces (air, land, maritime, space, and special operations) to facilitate or conduct
ASW in support of amphibious operations.
c. While the JFC is responsible for ASW planning inside the JOA, coordination of
ASW plans and activities with commands outside the JOA is essential and may require
close coordination with other USG departments and agencies and multinational partners.
d. The safe and effective employment of ASW assets conducting coordinated ASW
in littoral waters poses a significant problem to the CATF. Ships, helicopters, and
submarines each bring unique capabilities to the ASW problem. The highly variable
acoustic properties of the underwater environment, especially in the littorals, will impact
the ability to detect, identify, track, and engage enemy submarines. Factors that may affect
these properties include surface shipping (including those components of the ATF and
commercial shipping), inherent environmental noise and oceanographic properties, and
seasonal weather patterns. Acoustic sensor placement is highly dependent on the acoustic
properties of the water space. Because acoustics will not be the sole detection capability,
an environmental assessment will be required to identify the requirements for non-acoustic
detection systems (e.g., satellite imagery, electronic intercept, visual acquisition).
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g. Successful coordinated ASW depends upon effective use of each ASW asset and
a well-promulgated acoustic and nonacoustic search plan. Sensor employment should be
carefully considered in the CONOPS. Sensor platforms defending a congested AOA
should be placed to optimize sensor performance while minimizing the threat to the sensor
platform. The ability of the sensor to discern an enemy submarine may be hampered by
acoustic properties of the littorals and the congested AOA
a. Depending on the situation, the CLF may be called upon to help defend the ATF
before, during, or even after the landing. The AF is especially vulnerable when operating
in potential confined waters within the AOA or AO and while transitioning straits. The LF
may assist in a supporting role, but it is neither designed, trained, nor equipped for the roles
normally assigned and fulfilled by escorts, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and
other Navy assets. Further, serving in this role may also degrade the capabilities of the
LF’s mission ashore or within the AOA or AO.
c. The CLF, in a supporting role, may be able to designate a quick reaction force to
provide limited self-defense (e.g., snipers or a weapons company) against a surface threat
and low-altitude air defense against an air threat. Cross-decking of these personnel and
their weapons and equipment may not be desired once deployed but may be executed at
the discretion of the CLF. To ensure availability and employment options, early planning
for this type of capability should occur between the CATF and CLF. The incorporation of
LF quick reaction force teams into the ship’s battle orders and internal communications
plan is required. Some details that need to be coordinated:
(1) C2:
(a) How will the command to fire go from the commanding officer or tactical
action officer to the Marine firing the weapon?
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Protection
(2) What are the ROE and who is responsible for briefing the ROE?
(4) What are the quick reaction alert statuses (60-minute, 15-minute, etc.)?
(5) Who activates the quick reaction force and how is it announced? Which
quick reaction force (sniper, crew-served weapons, or low-altitude air defense) is required?
(6) Who sets the alert status and who changes the status?
d. The Marine CE may provide C2, information operations support, and snipers.
Similarly, the GCE can provide snipers and crew-served weapons, and the ACE can
provide aircraft and the low-altitude air defense detachment weapons systems.
e. A support relationship between the CLF and the CWC or appropriate warfare
commander may need to be established.
For additional information on defense of the ATF, see NWP 3-02.1.4M/MCTP 13-10D,
Defense of the Amphibious Task Force.
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Intentionally Blank
VIII-14 JP 3-02
CHAPTER IX
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION A. INTELLIGENCE
1. Introduction
For more information, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations.
(4) Intelligence dissemination systems linking widely dispersed forces afloat and
ashore.
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a. Intelligence Process
(1) Planning and Direction. The ATF and LF intelligence officers direct their
personnel from the intelligence center established aboard amphibious warfare ships to
support the intelligence needs of the entire AF. The intelligence center brings together all
AF intelligence-related activities. While personnel and material remain organic to their
respective commands, they may task organize to perform intelligence work necessary for
completion of the mission.
(4) Analysis and Production. During the analysis and production phase, all
available processed information is integrated, analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted to create
products that will satisfy the AF commanders’ requirements. Individual intelligence
sections within the AF will normally concentrate on particular areas of expertise, satisfying
their units’ requirements while contributing a broad-scope product to the general
intelligence production effort. For example, LF intelligence could analyze the land
operational environment, to include the enemy’s C2, ground forces, logistics, and reserves,
while ATF intelligence could analyze enemy maritime forces and coastal defense threats.
Air threats could be analyzed from a combined AF perspective.
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Intelligence and Communication
(6) Evaluation and Feedback. During the evaluation and feedback phase,
intelligence personnel at all levels assess how each phase of the intelligence process is
being performed. Commanders and staffs throughout the AF provide feedback if they are
not receiving anticipatory, objective, timely, accurate, usable, complete, and relevant
information to support the operation. Within the intelligence center, the AF intelligence
officers are also evaluating the intelligence process to improve performance.
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8. Air facilities.
For more information, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment.
(c) Provide focus on the threat through identification of threat COGs, critical
vulnerabilities, and potential COAs, with emphasis on the most likely and most dangerous
COAs.
(a) Identify and refine most likely and dangerous threat COAs and their
potential impact on the LF and actions and reactions to friendly COAs under consideration.
(d) Help to focus commanders and their staffs on the threat and
environment, with emphasis on the degree of uncertainty and resulting risk associated with
each friendly COA.
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Intelligence and Communication
(4) Plans and Orders Development. Once the AF COA has been mutually
selected, intelligence operations are focused to collect against specific priority intelligence
requirements and update relevant intelligence. This detailed intelligence collection
strategy is documented in the intelligence annex to the ATF and LF OPLAN/OPORDs.
The intelligence annex prescribes the conduct of intelligence operations and activities and
describes the methodology through which information and intelligence may be
disseminated, reconnaissance and surveillance missions assigned, and other intelligence
tasks and procedures stated. Drafts of the intelligence annex should normally be distributed
to other commanders in advance of the OPLAN/OPORD for use as planning studies. The
volume and complexity of the material in the intelligence annex dictates the use of
appendixes.
c. Intelligence Support
(a) Intelligence operations are focused where they can have the greatest
impact and value. A detailed, well-thought-out concept of intelligence support in
accordance with the CLF’s intent and synchronized to LF CONOPS will lead to the best
allocation of intelligence capabilities.
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process through accurate situational awareness and by recognizing emerging patterns that
enable the CLF and subordinate commanders to rapidly make decisions.
a. General. Every AF deploys with USN and USMC intelligence staff that should
plan to conduct intelligence operations and share intelligence products with multinational
partners. These staffs must coordinate with the geographic combatant command foreign
disclosure officer (FDO) as early as possible to determine what classified military
information may be shared with participating foreign governments and international
organizations, in accordance with National Disclosure Policy (NDP)-1, (U) National
Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign
Governments and International Organizations.
b. Maintain Unity of Effort. Intelligence personnel should view the threat from
multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of the MNF is a
threat to all MNF elements. Success in intelligence sharing requires establishing a trusted
partnership with foreign counterparts to counter a common threat and maintain a unity of
effort. This trusted partnership may be developed by the JFC to be leveraged by the AF
during years of shaping operations
c. Plan Early and Plan Concurrently. FDOs determine what intelligence may be
shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process, in accordance with
NDP-1. As soon as an AF learns who its multinational partners or as they prepare to deploy
into a theater of operations, they should contact the geographic combatant command FDO
to determine what policies and procedures may apply.
IX-6 JP 3-02
Intelligence and Communication
f. Multination Intelligence
(2) When establishing a multinational intelligence center, the AF must take into
account that not all multinational partners may be eligible to receive intelligence at the
same level and care must be taken to avoid the perception that certain partners have greater
access to US intelligence.
4. Overview
IX-7
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degraded when disturbed. The AF should plan for, provide C2 for, and support all
functional areas (e.g., fires, aviation, intelligence, CSS) afloat and ashore.
For additional information, see JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and CJCSM
6231.01, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications.
5. Communications Responsibilities
a. The CATF and CLF are responsible for communications system support planning,
with the supported commander consolidating the requirements. The communications
system support plan reflects the coordinated communications system requirements of the
AF. The requirements may include radio and weapon guidance and control frequencies;
call signs; compatible cryptographic and authentication systems; and special
communications equipment, computer equipment and systems, or support.
(2) The plan is prepared in detail to facilitate use by commanders at all echelons.
(3) The plan should include en route, intertheater, and intratheater communications
and systems requirements.
IX-8 JP 3-02
Intelligence and Communication
(5) Develop a coordinated communications plan for the ATF for inclusion in the
overall communications system support plan.
(6) Develop and promulgate a plan for communications connectivity with other
maritime forces, to include possible MNFs.
(2) Develop and promulgate a plan for communications connectivity with the
JFC, other components, and other ground forces ashore, to include possible MNFs.
(3) Request LF computer and network resources and support while embarked.
(1) Provides an EMCON plan and information security posture that balances
OPSEC versus operational requirements.
(2) Supports cyberspace defense and cyberspace security actions to protect the
network against unauthorized activity and to protect information from exploitation.
IX-9
Chapter IX
(5) Provides friendly forces’ position reporting to the Global Command and
Control System-Maritime common operational picture.
(9) The topography when operating in enclosed bays or estuaries and the vicinity
of mountains may affect communications paths. Communications support requirements in
amphibious operations are summarized in Figure IX-2.
b. Each major command of the force should have compatible and interoperable
communications that will support the tactics and techniques employed by that force.
Circuits provided must assure effective exercise of command and coordination of
supporting fires.
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Intelligence and Communication
d. Local frequencies and communications standards in use in the landing area should
be considered to ensure compatibility and to prevent interference.
(2) Assign call signs, coordinated with the CATF to facilitate handling of LF
traffic over naval circuits during all phases of the amphibious operation.
(3) Identify cryptographic and authentication systems that are used by ATF and
LF units.
IX-11
Chapter IX
(b) Convoy circuits for serials moving from point of origin to seaport of
embarkation.
(3) The rehearsal phase of the amphibious operation gives the CLF the
opportunity to test the LF communications plan. Under ideal conditions, the rehearsal will
involve all elements of the force and attempt to fully test the communications systems
involved without violating OPSEC or COMSEC procedures. By having a full-scale
rehearsal, the CLF can further refine communications requirements and identify critical
vulnerabilities, thus enabling appropriate adjustments to the OPLAN or OPORD before
execution. Specific considerations during the rehearsal phase include:
(a) Maximum use of secure voice equipment and use of minimum power on
electronic emitters for COMSEC reasons.
(b) Use of call signs and frequencies for rehearsal use only.
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Intelligence and Communication
(d) Plans to allocate and embark expendable items (e.g., wire and batteries)
for use during the rehearsal.
(e) Plans to allocate enough time to conduct an after action review of the
communications plan after the rehearsal and to modify portions of the plan as necessary.
(4) During the movement phase, the CATF normally establishes EMCON and
River City policies to restrict the use of equipment, particularly transmitters and emitters,
to prevent disclosure of locations, movements, and intentions of the force. The LF plan
addresses how the commander will communicate with LF units embarked on different
ships, and possibly even separate movement groups, during EMCON. Some potential
alternate means are helicopter messenger, visual signals, or line-of-sight radio if permitted
by the EMCON condition. Other LF communications considerations include:
(5) During the action phase, both the ATF and LF rely on radio communications
and tactical chat as the means for exercising C2. Accordingly, EMCON is modified by the
CATF prior to H-hour to test all circuits before the ship-to-shore movement begins. During
the initial portion of this phase, when the major LF headquarters are still afloat, LF circuits
are provided by facilities specifically installed in amphibious warfare ships for use by LF
personnel. LF communications should be complementary and generally parallel to those
established by the ATF. These parallel systems usually terminate at each significant
control center aboard the amphibious warfare ships (e.g., SACC, Navy TACC, AATCC,
and TACLOG group). The LF communications plan addresses the many operational
aspects of the action phase.
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(b) Communication nets for the control and coordination of the assault
support helicopters are established and maintained through the Navy TACC and AATCC.
LF personnel will augment the ATCS and integrate LF communications into the overall
aviation C2 systems. Helicopter and tiltrotor movement normally generate additional,
long-range communications requirements for the LF because of the inherent distances
associated with helicopter operations.
(c) Whether supervised by the ATF’s SAC or the LF’s FFC, the SACC
coordinates and controls all organic and nonorganic fires in support of the AF until the LF
establishes adequate control and communications facilities ashore. The LF communications
include nets that integrate all agencies that interface with the SACC. These include, but are
not limited to, the NSFS, the air support section, the TIC, the FFCC/FSCC/fires cell of the
LF, fire support observers, TACPs, forward air controller (airborne) and tactical air
coordinators (airborne), and artillery FDCs.
(e) Selected units and agencies of the LF are required to assist the CATF to
control and coordinate logistics during the action phase. LF communications provides a
means for the control of medical evacuation, EPW collection, and foot and vehicular traffic
ashore, as well as the means to control the movement of supplies and equipment. Landing
support units are required to establish communications within the CSS area. This
communications network includes the Navy beach parties, TACLOG group, supported LF
units, helicopter support teams and transport aircraft (if applicable), SACC, DASC (once
established ashore), and other key agencies within the ATF and LF.
j. In the transition of LF command posts ashore or afloat, the CLF should consider:
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Intelligence and Communication
(3) When an advance party is sent ashore before the major echelons of a
command post, direct radio communications are required between the advance party and
the command post afloat. The type and quantity of communications equipment and
personnel assigned to the advance party should be weighed against the need for those assets
back at the command post during the action phase.
(4) When in transit from ship-to-shore, the CLF and appropriate staff members
require communications with LF units already ashore (including the command post
advance party if employed), LF units also in transit, LF units remaining on shipping, and
appropriate ATF agencies afloat. The communications facilities normally available to the
CLF (e.g., C2 configured helicopter or AAV) will usually not be able to satisfy the total
communications requirement; therefore, the communications facilities should be allocated
to only the most essential circuits.
7. Multinational Considerations
(3) Standardize principles and procedures, which may mean non-US doctrine
may be employed.
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(9) Comply with JFC disclosure policy and ensure ready access to a trained
FDO.
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CHAPTER X
SUSTAINMENT
“The logistical effort required to sustain the seizure of Iwo Jima was enormous,
complex, largely improvised on lessons learned in earlier… operations in the
Pacific…. Clearly, no other element of the emerging art of amphibious warfare
had improved so greatly by the winter of 1945. Marines may have had the
heart and firepower to tackle a fortress-like Iwo Jima earlier in the war, but
they would have been crippled in the doing of it by limitations in amphibious
logistical support capabilities. These concepts, procedures, organizations,
and special materials took years to develop….”
From Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima, 1994, Joseph Alexander
SECTION A. Overview
1. General
a. The CATF and the CLF have co-responsibility for determining overall sustainment
requirements for the AF. Those requirements that cannot be supported from resources
available within the ATF are directed to the applicable Service component through the
chain of command as established in the initiating directive.
b. The requirement for afloat forces to provide support to the LF during the period in
which the LF logistic system is primarily sea-based has a significant influence on logistic
planning for an amphibious operation. Like all logistic systems, the AF logistic systems
must be responsive, simple, flexible, economical, attainable, sustainable, and survivable.
Development of effective logistic systems takes into account the planning considerations
and factors listed below:
(b) Establish and maintain a logistic system in the operational area that will
provide adequate support to all elements of the AF and subsequent support of base
development and garrison forces as directed.
(c) Impetus of logistic support from the sea, or the rear, and directed forward
to the point of application at the using unit.
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Chapter X
(a) Type, size, and duration of the operation, including the anticipated date
that support should commence and will no longer be needed.
2. Responsibilities
a. The CATF:
(2) Determines requirements that can be met by internal resources. Those which
cannot are directed to the supported commander or the appropriate Service through the
chain of command.
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(4) Provides the means required to establish and operate a logistic system in the
designated AOA.
(5) Develops plans for movement and sustainment of detainees and civilian
evacuees.
b. The CLF:
(1) Determines overall logistic requirements of the LF, including units, special
equipment, and shipping.
(3) Determines logistic requirements that cannot be met by the LF. Those which
cannot are directed to the CATF, supported commander, or the appropriate Service through
the chain of command.
(4) Develops the plans for the supplies and equipment to be embarked, including
the supplies and equipment of other assigned forces for which the LF is responsible.
(5) Prepares the LF embarkation and ship loading plans and orders in
coordination with the CATF.
(6) Plans for the coordination, conveyance, and distribution of logistics required
by the LF.
a. The necessity to provide logistics to the LF when the logistic system is primarily
sea-based requires coordination between the AF commanders to develop a control and
delivery system that will provide the LF with the necessary support from embarkation
through rehearsal, movement, execution, and continued operations ashore. Wherever
possible, sustainment planning should include direct ship-to-user delivery.
b. Logistics planning should include considerations for initial supply and sustained
operations.
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(1) Initial Supply comprises the logistic levels for both the AE and AFOE to
provide required initial support for the assault landing and initial operations ashore. Plans
for initial supply include the following:
4. Provide water for the LF ashore until supply from sources ashore is
available.
(b) LF should:
3. Plan logistic supply or staging points ashore (if required) and the
onward distribution of those supplies to forward units.
(c) The CATF and CLF may plan for the use of floating dumps, which are
sent ashore by the appropriate control officer, who directs their landing as requested by the
troop commander concerned.
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c. Logistics and CSS plans are prepared by the CATF, CLF, and other designated
commanders in the AF. These plans will include at a minimum:
(9) Retrograde.
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Chapter X
4. Key Constructs
a. From the CSS standpoint, the ship-to-shore movement is divided into two time
periods:
b. In the initial stages of the amphibious operation, CSS is principally concerned with
the provision of combat-essential supplies such as rations, water, ammunition, and fuel
normally drawn from LF stocks transported by AE and AFOE shipping. Other essential
services, including medical support, are provided within the capabilities of the AF. Other
CSS functions are of secondary importance during the early stages of the ship-to-shore
movement and will normally not be involved in the scheduled waves.
c. BSA and CSSA. As the operation progresses and CSS units are phased ashore,
the initial landing support organization is disestablished and its functions are assumed by
the LFSP. BSAs, initially developed by the landing support elements, may be
disestablished, consolidated, or expanded into CSSAs to provide continued support to the
LF. The need for CSSAs and their number, size, and capabilities are situation dependent
and are primarily influenced by the scope and duration of the operation.
d. BSA and CSSA Defense. The LF OPORD will specify the security commander
and the task organization designated to perform BSA or CSSA defense.
e. TACLOG Groups and the LFSP. The CLF places special emphasis on the
importance of CSS coordination during the ship-to-shore movement by establishing
TACLOG groups and the LFSP.
g. Sea Echelon Area Plan. The sea echelon area plan normally reduces the
concentration of amphibious warfare ships in areas near the beach. The majority of
shipping will remain in distant retirement or close support areas until called forward in
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i. LF Aviation. Fixed-wing aviation elements located outside the landing area may
require a task organized CSS detachment for support. When LF aviation is phased ashore
into the AOA, the CSS requirements (especially engineering and transportation) may be
extensive.
a. The health services plan is usually issued as annex Q (Medical Services) to the AF
OPLAN and provides for medical support to all elements of the AF. The LF health services
plan will be issued as annex Q (Medical Services) to the LF OPLAN. The CATF and CLF
surgeons should develop the medical logistic support plan. See Figure X-1 for LF health
services planning considerations.
b. Planning Responsibilities
(b) Establishes medical support requirements and standards for the civilian
population in the operational area, when not prescribed by higher authority.
(a) Provide medical support for all embarked personnel between points of
embarkation and the AOA.
(b) Provide medical personnel, supplies, and equipment for all units based
ashore and not attached to the LF in the AOA.
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Chapter X
Goal:
Providing for the health of the command and evacuation and
hospitalization of sick and wounded.
For more information of contractors authorized to accompany the force, see Department
of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).
(3) The CLF surgeon identifies and coordinates LF health services requirements
with the CATF surgeon. Once command is passed ashore, close coordination with the
CATF surgeon is still required. The CLF is responsible for preparation of health services
plans and should:
(b) Provide for medical personnel to assist in the care for LF personnel while
embarked.
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(c) Execute the patient movement policy established by the GCC for the
AOA.
(d) Execute the patient movement plan from the shore to ship in the AOA
as directed.
c. Patient Movement
(2) Plans for patient movement should be sufficiently detailed and widely
disseminated. These plans should include:
(d) Provisions for mass patient movement for situations that may require
rapid evacuation of multiple casualties to more distant secondary CRTSs.
(3) The preferred mode of patient movement is via aircraft. The speed, range,
and flexibility of aircraft serve to enhance the medical support capability of the LF.
However, patient movement plans should include provisions for maximum use of ground
and surface means.
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Chapter X
(a) Each successive role of care in the health services system has greater
treatment capability than the preceding role of care.
(b) During LF operations, patients are moved only as far rearward as the
tactical situation dictates and as clinical needs warrant.
d. Medical regulating is the actions and coordination necessary to arrange for the
movement of patients through the roles of care and to match patients with a medical
treatment facility that has the necessary capabilities and available bed space.
(1) The medical regulating plan contains procedures for evacuation of patients
to the appropriate role of care, as well as procedures for evacuation of patients outside the
AOA.
(2) The medical regulating team provides operational support for patient
movement and coordinates seaward casualty evacuation in the AOA and patient evacuation
within the afloat units during underway periods. The medical regulating team:
(c) Monitors medical materiel, blood and blood products, and medical
personnel replacement requirements.
e. Hospitalization
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Sustainment
their capabilities of holding patients. Overloading should be avoided to enable current and
future operations.
(1) Facilitate the landing and movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment
across the beach, into an LZ or through a port.
(2) Evacuate casualties and EPWs from the beach. Shipboard detention is only
a temporary measure permitted until the detained individual can be transferred to a shore-
based facility. It is limited to the minimum period necessary to transfer detainees from a
zone of hostilities or as a result of operational necessity.
(4) Facilitate the establishment of the LCE, ACE, and naval beach group.
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(b) Shore Party. The shore party is the LF component of the LFSP. The
nucleus for the shore party consists of elements from the LF’s logistics element, augmented
with personnel and equipment from the GCE, ACE, and other LCE units.
(c) Beach Party. The beach party is the Navy component of the LFSP.
Personnel and equipment for the beach party come from the naval beach group and
elements from a Navy cargo handling battalion, as required by the initiating directive.
(d) Special Attachments. Special attachments are made to the LFSP for
defense of the BSA, to provide liaison personnel, and for specialized tasks.
Detailed information about the LFSP is contained in NTTP 3-02.1M/MCTP 13-10E, Ship-
to-Shore Movement.
b. LFSP Plan
(1) The CLF and appropriate subordinate commanders prepare LFSP plans
containing instructions for the functioning of the LFSP, including the aircraft support team
and air mobile support party requirements.
(d) Plan for material staging areas, vehicle lots, fuel supply points, and a
trafficking plan.
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(6) Concept of CSS, amounts, and types of supplies and equipment to be landed.
(10) Landing area weather, sea state, terrain, and hydrographic conditions.
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Chapter X
(1) The CLF is responsible for the timely activation of the LFSP and the conduct
of LFSP operations. However, AF elements participate in and contribute to the development
of plans for its organization and employment.
(2) The CLF is responsible for the tactical employment and security ashore of all
elements of the LFSP and will integrate requirements into the fire support plan.
(3) The CLF determines and presents requirements for support of LFSP
operations to the CATF as early as possible in the planning phase.
(4) The CATF prepares related plans that provide facilities and means to ensure
effective support of LFSP operations. Examples of such plans are the pontoon causeway
and lighterage plan, unloading plan, casualty evacuation plan, and EPW evacuation plan.
Integrated training of shore party and beach party elements will be conducted before
embarkation begins.
e. Employment
(1) The responsibility for embarking and landing the landing support units rests
with the supported tactical unit. For this reason, the landing support units are attached to
the supported tactical unit for embarkation and landing.
(2) The buildup of the LFSP ashore parallels the tactical buildup ashore.
(3) Landing support operations begin with the landing of the advance parties and
continues until the operation is completed or until the parties are relieved. Throughout the
operation, the landing support task organization changes as required to meet the situation
until the operation is terminated or the LFSP is relieved of its responsibilities. In the initial
stages of ship-to-shore movement, the LFSP headquarters is afloat and is typically phased
ashore as the operation progresses. A shore party team and beach party team are among
the first waves of troops ashore to each colored beach.
For additional information on the organizational structure and changes in C2 for the LFSP
and its associated shore party and beach party, see NTTP 3-02.1M/MTWP 13-10E, Ship-
to-Shore Movement.
7. Engineer Operations
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(1) Combat engineers will normally be attached to the assault infantry units to
perform a variety of tasks such as engineer reconnaissance; minefield and obstacle
emplacement, reduction, and breaching; development of BSAs; LZ site preparation;
construction of beach exits; combat trails and roads; and tactical bridging.
(a) Combat engineers can proof lanes on the beach and prepare routes inland
from the beach. The combat engineers can also employ mechanical clearing equipment,
such as the assault breaching vehicle full width mine plow, flails, and hand-held mine
detectors, to clear and expand boat lanes and CLZs to facilitate the logistics flow ashore.
(1) When multiple naval mobile construction battalions (NMCBs) are deployed,
an accompanying naval construction regiment should be deployed to serve as the C2
coordinator for the CATF/CLF and assigned naval construction force units.
(2) The NMCB provides construction support to Navy, Marine Corps, and other
forces in military operations and conducts protection as required by the circumstances of
the deployment situation. The NMCB provides a major deliberate construction capability
and is employed to provide facilities that require extensive technical control and
construction capability. The NMCB can be employed in expanding or constructing airfield
complexes, constructing forward operating bases, repairing or developing ports,
constructing major temporary or semi-permanent camps, extensively repairing or
rebuilding principal bridges, and installing large-scale utilities systems (i.e., well drilling,
water distribution systems). When NMCBs are assigned to the LF, these units will
normally be attached to the LCE or CSS element.
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Chapter X
amphibious operation, and assists the landing support element in operations that do not
interfere with the amphibious construction battalion’s primary mission.
a. LOTS operations, which include Navy LOTS, Army LOTS, and JLOTS, support
off-load of supplies, vehicles, and equipment in amphibious operations following the initial
assault. OPDS and the amphibious bulk liquid transfer system may also be included in the
operations. The CATF is responsible for debarkation and off-load until termination of the
amphibious operation, when the responsibilities for debarkation or off-load are passed to
another off-load organization designated by higher authority, such as to the JLOTS
commander. The amphibious operation is not normally terminated until the AFOE is
ashore. Normally, during transition from ship-to-shore operations to JLOTS operations,
there is a period in which the Navy and supported ground forces continue to conduct ship-
to-shore movement for initial sustainment using the basic control organization and
procedures used for the amphibious operation.
b. In a representative situation, Navy LOTS forces would provide the initial ship
unloading capability reinforcing the CATF’s existing amphibious cargo discharge
organization, thereby maintaining sufficient capability to facilitate the delivery of follow-
on supplies and equipment to the AF. Then, as Army transportation units arrive in the area,
X-16 JP 3-02
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they report to their Service component but functionally integrate into the CATF’s and the
commander MPF’s cargo discharge organization. Finally, the JLOTS ship-to-shore C2
organization, when operationally ready and directed by the JTF, will assume responsibility,
and the Navy LOTS operation will transition to a JLOTS operation. At this point, control
of ship-to-shore assets is transferred from the Navy component commander to the JLOTS
organization, and any Navy ship-to-shore assets not already withdrawn will remain under
TACON of the JLOTS commander. Ultimately, the JLOTS operation may transition to
Army LOTS, using an agreed upon phased-transition procedure.
c. The MPF offers an augmentation capability for amphibious operations, but it is not
a substitute due to an inherent lack of forcible entry capability. An MPF operation provides
a means to standup and sustain a forward-deployed MAGTF, which can augment an
ongoing amphibious operation or another joint, multinational, or combined force operation.
When an MPF operation augments an amphibious operation, the MPF mission and
appropriate command relationship guidance is included in the initiating and establishing
directives.
For additional information, see JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, and NTTP 3-
02.3/MCTP 13-10D, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.
a. An AF usually does not have an assigned combat logistics force ship attached to
the ATF. The AF relies on combat logistics force ships assigned to a particular
AOR/numbered fleet. The ships of MSC’s combat logistics force are the supply lines to
AF at sea. These ships provide virtually everything the AF needs, including fuel, food,
ordnance, spare parts, mail, and other supplies. Combat logistics force ships enable the AF
to remain at sea, on station, and combat ready for extended periods of time.
b. Regardless of the composition of the AF, the combat logistic force provides the
sustainment for all AF operations. The operational endurance and readiness of the AF
requires a corresponding and capable combat logistic force system of sustainment that can
readily provide food, ammunition, fuel, and spare/repair parts. The JFMCC/Navy
component commander continually assesses and adjusts the logistic support system to
ensure the correct level and mix of combat logistic force support to match AF sustainment
requirements.
c. Unique to the AF is the logistical support provided as the LF moves from the
littoral, inland towards the objective. Strategic sealift, prepositioned force assets, and other
prepositioned material will be used in support of the LF ashore.
a. The types and quantities of supplies taken into the AOA directly affect the
requirement for air and surface transportation. For ease of control and planning for an
amphibious operation, requirements for supply support are stated under two major
categories—LF initial supplies and sustainment.
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Chapter X
(1) DOS. The first step in estimating overall requirements for supply support is
to determine the DOS. The DOS is based on standard Service planning factors and logistics
planning factors for the operation. In calculating the DOS, the requirements for each
separate class of supply are considered.
(2) Stockage Objective. The second step is to calculate the stockage objective
for each class of supply. In operations of limited scope, limiting the stockage objective to
30 DOS may be desirable. However, even the limited objective may not be reached until
the latter stages of the assault.
c. The Plan for Landing Supplies. In coordination with the CATF, the CLF
develops plans for selective unloading of supplies in the objective area. The CATF
allocates landing ships and craft required to carry supplies from ship to shore and to
establish floating dumps. Together, in the plan for landing supplies, the CATF and CLF
plan the ship-to-shore movement of supplies and equipment so that it is responsive to LF
requirements. TACLOG groups are established to ensure responsiveness is achieved. In
developing the plan for landing supplies, the following factors are considered:
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(2) Types and amounts of supplies to be established in floating dumps and pre-
staged helicopter-lifted supplies and on-call supply packages for potential surge requests.
(4) Techniques that ensure the orderly, rapid buildup of supply levels ashore,
such as:
(a) Use of landing craft and vehicles carrying assault troops to ferry
designated types and amounts of supplies ashore on each trip.
(b) Provision for the mobile loading of each vehicle of the LF not involved
in the lift of the assault elements ashore.
(c) Means for facilitating the transfer of supplies from ship to shore,
including the most efficient use of such items as pallets, containers, cargo nets, and slings.
d. Supply Operations Ashore. During the early stages of the attack, the ATF ships
are the primary supply source for the LF. Prior to the establishment of landing support
ashore, critical supplies are furnished directly to the requesting unit by the LCE or CSS
element, through the TACLOG group, from amphibious warfare ships. Subsequent to the
establishment of landing support units ashore, combat elements are supplied through shore-
based CSS facilities. As the operation progresses, several supply installations may be
established within the beachhead by other CSS units of the LF. When adequate supply
levels have been achieved in installations ashore and transportation means are available,
supply support of LF units will be provided from these areas. Supply sources may be
augmented by the aerial delivery of supplies by fixed-wing aircraft operating from bases
outside the landing area. The ships of the ATF continue as the primary source of immediate
resupply for the LF.
(1) Supply control and distribution are accomplished at both the LF level and
at the lowest levels that have an organic supply capability (e.g., battalion). These levels
are most important within the overall function of supply, especially during the critical
transition from sea-based to shore-based supply support during an amphibious operation.
Adherence to the following principles during the transitional and ashore stages of the
operation will result in a control and distribution system that is reliable, flexible, and
responsive.
(a) Supply Control. The flow of supply should be direct from source to
consumer; supplies should be handled as infrequently as possible.
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Chapter X
operation, as additional CSS units phase ashore and supplies are built up, supply point
distribution may be employed.
(2) Salvage is the term applied to materiel that has become unserviceable, lost,
abandoned, or discarded but which is recoverable. It includes captured enemy equipment.
Unit commanders at all levels are responsible for salvage collection and evacuation within
their respective unit areas. Designated salvage organizations receive and process salvage
received from combat units.
(5) Executing repairs as rapidly and as close to the using unit as possible.
(7) Provisions for battlefield salvage of large combat systems or vehicles via
maintenance channels and location of salvage points/yards and cannibalization lots.
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(5) Procedures to request and report data requirements, routing, distribution, and
means of transmission.
b. Transportation Requirements
(2) Detailed requirements state the specific numbers, types, and capacities of
vehicles, bulk fuel facilities, and aircraft required at specific times and places. They also
state the schedules of operation and routes to be traversed.
(3) The demarcation line between ATF and LF responsibilities for bulk
petroleum, oils, and lubricants supply is normally the high water mark. Delivering and
transporting fuel to internal storage distribution areas is an LF responsibility.
(1) The adequacy of the LOCs in the landing area (roads, rail, and waterway).
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Chapter X
(2) The extent of degradation of LOCs by weather, enemy action, and use.
d. Transportation in the AO
(1) The CLF, in coordination with the CATF, develops plans to sustain LF
operations ashore.
(2) The CLF establishes priorities for movement and ensures adequate
movement and traffic control within the LF operational area, optimizing the use of assets
and facilities.
(a) Transportation assets scheduled for landing during the initial landing and
unloading period.
(b) Combat loads prescribed for each vehicle prior to landing and once
ashore.
X-22 JP 3-02
APPENDIX A
ASSAULT FOLLOW-ON ECHELON
1. General
a. The AFOE is not to be confused with Marine Corps forces deployed by MPF. When
an ATF is being formed by the supported CCDR, USTRANSCOM allocates cargo space for
the AFOE mission to the supported CCDR. Ships are then integrated into the Navy component
commander’s operations and incorporated with the forces of the CATF. Sealift assets are
positioned and loaded at port facilities, generally where ATF support cargo and personnel can
be most expeditiously and efficiently loaded to meet AFOE mission requirements. Loadout of
AFOE shipping is nearly simultaneous with the loadout of AE shipping. The AFOE deploys
in accordance with the CATF’s amphibious OPLAN. The ships supporting the AFOE should
be loaded with off-load priorities to support the LF scheme of maneuver ashore. The AFOE
loads need to be discharged swiftly to support the LF.
b. When supporting ships are loaded and ready for sea, they will become TACON to the
CATF or the designated subordinate if the ship is to sail as a unit of a Navy formation or
movement group. Because of the tactical employment inherent in amphibious operations, the
CATF will have OPCON of the strategic sealift assigned. The AFOE is normally required in
the AOA or operational area early enough to commence off-load no later than five days after
the commencement of the assault. The AFOE will consist of additional merchant shipping and
support personnel and equipment to handle the added ship-to-shore movement. This will
require ships carrying off-load systems to be off-loaded as soon as possible (as early as D+1)
depending on the scope of the amphibious operation and size of the MAGTF. For example, a
single MEB’s AFOE off-load should commence no later than D+5 to support the arrival of its
fly-in personnel and unit equipment by D+9 with the goal of all supplies being ashore by D+15.
Off-loading of the AFOE is accomplished by the normal USN/USMC ship-to-shore movement
control and support organizations (e.g., PCO, TACLOG, LFSP). These organizations will
undergo changes in composition as the operation matures and the logistics element establishes
capabilities ashore. Upon release of the ships from tasking in the AOA or AO, the CATF will
transfer TACON of the ship back to MSC.
A-1
Appendix A
For more information, see JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations, and MCTP 13-10M,
Amphibious Embarkation.
a. The CATF and CLF are responsible for the AFOE debarkation and off-load, and
the amphibious operation does not normally terminate until the AFOE is ashore.
b. As the first elements of the AFOE approach the AOA or operational area, the
CATF should already have a well-defined ship-to-shore movement organization in place.
The CATF continues to maintain overall control of ship-to-shore movement during AFOE
operations.
(1) The role of the PCO will expand to include control of assigned AFOE
shipping. Additional Navy support element personnel will be required to assist the PCO
in performing these expanded duties. Additional Navy cargo-handling battalions and
NMCB forces are required to support the off-load of strategic lift merchant ships.
(3) As they become accessible, developed seaports and aerial ports are used to
supplement traditional beach operations and the normal ship-to-shore organization will be
expanded to include them.
c. The CATF administers afloat forces within the AOA or AO through the use of sea
areas to deconflict operations of the various components of the ATF and supporting units
and platforms. In general, AFOE ships would be assigned to the sea echelon area for
holding purposes prior to introduction into the transport areas. The CATF may designate
sea echelon and transport area commanders, as required, to facilitate C2 of shipping
assigned to those areas.
d. As off-load of the AE is normally already completed, the CLF should have in place
a well-established BSA and a TACLOG, which will continue to assist and advise the
CATF’s ship-to-shore movement and control agencies. The CLF continues to support off-
loading of AFOE strategic shipping and airlift and changes landing support organizations
employed during the debarkation of the AE, as required, and as the tactical situation
permits. The CLF organizes the beachhead to facilitate the off-loading and the CSS
buildup ashore and to accommodate the off-load and movement of any containerized cargo.
Throughout the AFOE off-load, the CLF maintains off-load control agencies, provides
USMC personnel to perform stevedore functions to assist in the off-load of merchant ships,
and provides vehicle and equipment operators for the off-load of embarked LF equipment
and material. The CLF does this through the following organizations:
A-2 JP 3-02
Assault Follow-On Echelon
shore movement and assists in the execution of the landing plan by providing a uniform
flow of materiel to units ashore. During the off-load of the AFOE, the LFSP remains intact
as a task-organized element and performs those same functions provided the AE; however,
as the situation changes, the LFSP will decrease in size and form the nucleus of the BOG
which will continue to provide landing support functions until off-load operations are
completed or terminated. As the situation changes, the CLF will change the size of the
LFSP required to handle throughput of the AFOE off-load.
(2) During off-load of the AFOE, the TACLOG will provide the necessary
support to ensure the AFOE off-load is responsive to LF requirements. When permitted
by the tactical situation, the CLF may recommend to the CATF that general unloading
begin. General unloading is normally expected to begin at about D+9 for a MEB landing.
When the order for general unloading is given, the TACLOG will cease active operation
but remain substantially intact, prepared to resume selective unloading should the tactical
situation ashore require.
(3) The BSA is the first CSS installation established ashore to support the
amphibious operation and it will continue to function as the initial throughput point in
support of AFOE off-load. To support initial off-load of containerized cargo, the
LFSP/BOG supports the container off-load, either across the beach by causeway ferries
and landing craft or over elevated causeways.
(4) The BOG originates from elements of the LFSP that are augmented with
terminal operations, beach and port, supply, engineer, motor transport, communications,
and military police personnel. The BOG is the CLF’s principle coordinating agency
providing C2 of throughput of AFOE equipment and supplies. The BOG will develop the
beach to support AFOE off-load and movement inland or to overflow areas.
(5) Should a seaport be available for use, the LF will establish a POG to prepare
the port prior to arrival of AFOE shipping and throughput of supplies and equipment of the
AFOE.
a. When a ship has been directed to off-load, it will move to the inner transport area
and report to an inner transport commander, if assigned. The ship-to-shore movement
organization, normally headed by the PCO, will monitor the conduct of the off-load of
ships. In instances when the AOA has been disestablished prior to completion of the AFOE
off-load, the functions of the PCO will be performed by a designated off-load coordinator.
As each ship arrives at its position for off-load, a debarkation team will embark consisting
of those personnel who will conduct the off-load of a particular ship. In addition to C2
personnel, this team will provide USMC personnel to perform stevedore functions, as well
as Navy personnel to support the operation of the ship off-load systems.
A-3
Appendix A
(1) First priority should always be given to off-loading the lighterage to support
the AFOE off-load. If a MPF or MPSRON is supporting the operation, lighterage may be
available for use from the MPSs. Other heavy lift ships may bring lighterage from the
naval beach groups or from the Army.
(2) The lead time required for the installation of the elevated causeway
necessitates priority off-load of these components and delivery to the beach to begin
installation.
(3) The auxiliary crane ship will normally be given priority for assignment to
off-load anchorage. It will then be in position to receive non-self-sustaining ships
alongside.
(4) If no pier facilities are available, RO/RO ships will normally be off-loaded
using a RO/RO discharge facility. Consideration should be given to aligning the RO/RO
anchorage with compatible beach off-load sites for assigned lighters (causeways preferred,
LCUs second) to maximize off-load.
(5) If the tactical situation ashore does not permit immediate off-load, the
aviation logistic support ship may be employed as a sea-based maintenance facility with
limited intermediate level maintenance capability.
(6) LF fuel requirements and lead time for preparation of installations ashore to
accept bulk fuel delivery may necessitate early assignment of anchorage and support craft
for an OPDS ship. The nature of fuel operations and the inland fuel distribution system
will normally drive selection of the location for the OPDS anchorage.
(7) Calm sea conditions or protected waterways are preferred for discharge of
lighter aboard ships and handling of small craft and barges. Extensive barge marshaling
areas may be required within protected waters.
c. When a merchant ship has completed its off-load, the ship will change TACON
back to MSC and return to the common user pool. Containerships should not loiter in the
AOA or operational area to retrograde containers.
d. Intertheater airlift could deploy AFOE forces and equipment directly to suitable
airfields in, or near, the AOA or operational area. Intratheater airlift could also be used to
transport AFOE forces from ISBs to airfields in closer proximity to the beachhead.
A-4 JP 3-02
Assault Follow-On Echelon
A-5
Appendix A
Intentionally Blank
A-6 JP 3-02
APPENDIX B
COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE
1. Introduction
a. The Navy uses the CWC to defend the ATF at sea. There may be multiple
CWCs assigned to support the JFC’s operation. Each CWC focuses on its own surveillance
and classification, identification, and engagement areas.
b. The CWC enables the OTC to aggressively wage offensive combat operations
against air, surface, and subsurface threats while carrying out the primary missions of the
force and to shape the operational environment for the amphibious operation. Although
assignment of various warfare commanders will enable control of different capabilities in
a single platform by multiple commanders, only one commander may exercise TACON
for the ship’s movements and maneuver. The use of a CWC can apply to any naval task
force or task group operating at sea and is capable of flexible implementation and
application.
a. Except for limited self-defense capabilities, amphibious warfare ships are ill-suited
to counter a sophisticated air, surface, and subsurface threat by their own means. For this
reason, the ATF may require assigned screening assets both during the movement phase
and while conducting operations in the AOA or AO. In a similar manner, depending on
the type and scope of the amphibious operation, a support relationship between an AF, a
CSG, and other joint forces may be necessary for the conduct of shaping operations to set
the conditions (maritime and air superiority) to commence the amphibious operation,
particularly in a contested environment.
b. The integration of CWC doctrine with amphibious doctrine is difficult due to the
wide variety of tactical situations that may be encountered. Coordination among the
organizations early in the planning is critical and should lead to a draft support relationship
that could be recommended for inclusion in an establishing directive promulgated by the
establishing authority. Consideration should be given to the following factors:
(1) Under all circumstances, upon activation of the AOA or AO, unity of effort
within the AOA or operational area should be maintained to ensure the CATF and CLF
retain that degree of authority necessary to ensure success of the operation. This will
normally dictate that the CATF is the CWC within the AOA or AO and receive or
provide support from or to a designated CWC outside the AOA or AO as shown in
Figure B-1.
B-1
Appendix B
Joint Operations
Area (JFC)
CWC Maritime AO
2 (JFMCC/CTF)
Operating
Area
CWC
1 Vital
Area
Classification, Identification,
Engagement Area
Legend
AO area of operations GCC geographic combatant commander
CTF commander, task force JFC joint force commander
CWC composite warfare commander JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
Figure B-1. Composite Warfare Commander Integration Within the Operational Area
(3) A CSG may be assigned the single mission of providing direct support to the
AF, but more likely, the CSG will be assigned multiple missions in support of the larger
joint operation which will significantly affect command and support relationships and
coordination requirements. A mechanism must, therefore, exist to adjudicate conflicting
requirements for the use of maritime assets between the JFMCC and the JFC.
(4) The LF capabilities that may be leveraged to support the CATF and the naval
force to ensure the AF is protected and the LF objectives can be met.
For more information on defending the ATF, refer to NWP 3-02.1.4M/MCTP 13.10G,
Defense of the Amphibious Task Force.
c. With the above factors in mind, the following is a description of three situations
that may exist, requiring different constructs for the association between the amphibious
and other forces. These can be tailored, as desired, to the specific requirements of the
mission.
B-2 JP 3-02
Composite Warfare Doctrine
(1) The support force is to join and integrate with the ATF. The CATF
becomes the OTC and CWC of the combined force unless otherwise directed by
establishing authority. All forces are integrated under a single OTC-CWC and set of
warfare commanders. This situation is most applicable to the movement phase.
(2) The support force does not join but provides support as designated by
establishing authority. The CATF coordinates the tactical operations of all assigned and
supporting forces. The supporting commander is authorized to answer directly to the
supported force’s requests for assistance and may establish a CWC to provide the support.
This situation also applies during the movement phase and action phase. The individual
CSG or task group should remain intact.
(3) Each force has its own OTC-CWC and warfare commanders. Force
(ATF, CSG) integrity is maintained. The OTC-CWCs operate in mutual support to achieve
the same broad mission objectives, but each has discretion as to how best to support the
other. This relationship is most applicable when the forces have multiple joint force
requirements beyond the amphibious operation.
For further details on the CWC, see JP 3-32, Command and Control of Joint Maritime
Operations; NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of
War; and NWP 3-02.1.4M/MCTP 13-10G, Defense of the Amphibious Task Force.
B-3
Appendix B
Intentionally Blank
B-4 JP 3-02
APPENDIX C
POINTS OF CONTACT
C-1
Appendix C
Intentionally Blank
C-2 JP 3-02
APPENDIX D
REFERENCES
m. JP 3-07, Stability.
D-1
Appendix D
3. Service Publications
D-2 JP 3-02
References
r. NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare; Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War.
4. Multi-Service Publications
D-3
Appendix D
5. Multinational Publication
c. Allied Tactical Publication-08 Vol II, Tactics Techniques and Procedures for
Amphibious Operations.
D-4 JP 3-02
APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the
Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
and e-mail it to: [email protected]. These comments should address
content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Navy. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor
for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).
b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Dave
MacEslin, Navy Warfare Development Command; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Glenn
Lawless, Joint Staff J-3; LCDR Omari Buckley, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis
Division; and LCDR Adam Yates, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.
3. Supersession
4. Change Recommendations
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Lessons Learned
The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness
of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
E-1
Appendix E
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).
6. Distribution of Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at
http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
E-2 JP 3-02
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS
GL-1
Glossary
EA electronic attack
EMCON emission control
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ESD expeditionary transfer dock
ESG expeditionary strike group
EW electronic warfare
GL-2 JP 3-02
Glossary
GL-3
Glossary
GL-4 JP 3-02
Glossary
TA target acquisition
TACLOG tactical-logistical
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party
TADC tactical air direction center
TAO tactical air officer
TAOC tactical air operations center (USMC)
TIC target information center
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
GL-5
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
action phase. In amphibious operations, the period of time between the arrival of the
landing forces of the amphibious force in the operational area and the accomplishment
of their mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
air support control section. In amphibious operations, the section of the Navy tactical air
control center designated to coordinate, control, and integrate all direct-support aircraft
and assault-support operations. Also called ASCS. (Approved for replacement of “air
support coordination section” and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)
air traffic control section. In amphibious operations, the section of the Navy tactical air
control center designed to provide initial safe passage, radar control, and surveillance
for close air support aircraft in the operational area. Also called ATCS. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
amphibious advance force. A temporary support force assigned to the amphibious force
that conducts shaping operations in the amphibious objective area or operational area
prior to the arrival of the amphibious force. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
amphibious air traffic control center. The centralized air traffic control agency on an
amphibious warfare ship responsible for operational control of aircraft departing from
and recovering on the ship and tactical control of airborne helicopters in support of
amphibious assaults. Also called AATCC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
amphibious assault vehicle launching area. An area, in the vicinity of and to seaward of
the line of departure, to which landing ships proceed and launch amphibious assault
vehicles. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
GL-6 JP 3-02
Glossary
requirements of the naval beach party. Also called PHIBCB. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
amphibious defense zone. The area encompassing the amphibious objective area and the
adjoining airspace required by accompanying naval forces for the purpose of air
defense. Also called an ADZ. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
amphibious force. An amphibious task force and a landing force together with other
forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. Also
called AF. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
amphibious vehicle. A wheeled or tracked vehicle capable of operating on both land and
water. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
GL-7
Glossary
amphibious vehicle employment plan. A plan showing, in tabular form, the planned
employment of amphibious vehicles during landing operations, to include initial
movement to the beach. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
amphibious warfare ship. A combatant ship having organic capability to embark, land,
and support landing forces in amphibious operations and which has characteristics
enabling long-duration operations on the high seas. (Approved for incorporation into
the DOD Dictionary.)
assault. 1. In an amphibious operation, the period of time between the arrival of the major
assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the
accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. (JP 3-02) 2. To make a short,
violent, but well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement,
a fort, or a machine gun nest. (JP 3-18) 3. A phase of an airborne operation beginning
with delivery by air of the assault echelon of the force into the objective area and
extending through attack of assault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
assault follow-on echelon. In amphibious operations, that echelon of the assault troops,
vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies that, though not needed to initiate the
assault, is required to support and sustain the assault. Also called AFOE. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
GL-8 JP 3-02
Glossary
attack group. A subordinate task organization of the Navy forces of an amphibious task
force composed of amphibious warfare ships and supporting naval units designated to
transport, protect, land, and initially support a landing group. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-02)
beach. 1. The area extending from the shoreline inland to a marked change in
physiographic form or material or to the line of permanent vegetation (coastline). 2.
In amphibious operations, that portion of the shoreline designated for landing of a
tactical organization. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
beachhead. A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized
and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel and provides maneuver
space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
beach party. The Navy component of the landing force support party under the tactical control
of the landing force support party commander. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
beach support area. In amphibious operations, the area to the rear of a landing force, or
elements thereof, that contains the facilities for the unloading of troops and materiel
and the support of the forces ashore. Also called BSA. (Approved for incorporation
into the DOD Dictionary.)
boat group. The basic organization of landing craft. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
boat lane. A lane for amphibious assault landing craft, which extends from the line of
departure to the beach. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
boat space. The space and weight factor used in planning for one person with individual
equipment to determine overall ship-to-shore movement requirements for boats,
landing craft, and amphibious vehicles. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
broken stowage. The space lost in the holds of a vessel because of the contour of the ship,
dunnage, ladders, stanchions, and the shape of the cargo. (Approved for incorporation
into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
broken stowage factor. A factor applied to the available space for embarkation, due to
the loss between boxes, between vehicles, around stanchions, and over cargo, that will
GL-9
Glossary
vary depending on the type and size of vehicles, type and size of general cargo, training
and experience of loading personnel, type of loading, method of stowage, and
configuration of compartments. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
causeway launching area. An area located near the line of departure but clear of the
approach lanes to an area located in the inner transport area. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-02)
central control officer. The officer, embarked in the central control ship, designated by
the amphibious task force commander for the overall coordination of the waterborne
ship-to-shore movement. Also called CCO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
close support area. Those parts of the ocean operating areas nearest to, but not necessarily
in, the objective area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
colored beach. That portion of usable coastline sufficient for the assault landing of a
regimental landing team or similar-sized unit. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)
combat loading. The arrangement of personnel and the stowage of equipment and
supplies in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of the
organization embarked. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
combat organizational loading. A method of loading by which a unit with its equipment
and initial supplies is loaded into a single ship, together with other units, in such a
manner as to be available for unloading in a predetermined order. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
combat service support area. An area ashore that is organized to contain the necessary
supplies, equipment, installations, and elements to provide the landing force with
combat service support throughout the operation. Also called CSSA. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
combat spread loading. A method of combat loading by which some of the troops,
equipment, and initial supplies of a unit are loaded in one ship and the remainder are
loaded in one or more others. (Approved for the incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
GL-10 JP 3-02
Glossary
combat unit loading. A method of loading by which all or a part of a combat unit, such
as an assault battalion landing team, is completely loaded in a single ship, with
essential combat equipment and supplies, in such a manner as to be immediately
available to support the tactical plan upon debarkation and to provide a maximum of
flexibility to meet possible changes in the tactical plan. (Approved for incorporation
into the DOD Dictionary.)
commander, amphibious task force. The Navy officer designated in the initiating
directive as the commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
commander, landing force. The officer designated in the initiating directive as the
commander of the landing force for an amphibious operation. Also called CLF.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
commanding officer of troops. On a ship that has embarked units, a designated officer
(usually the senior embarking unit commander) who is responsible for the
administration, discipline, and training of all embarked units. Also called COT.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
commodity loading. A method of loading in which various types of cargoes are loaded
together, such as ammunition, rations, or boxed vehicles, in order that each commodity
can be discharged without disturbing the others. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
control area. A controlled airspace extending upwards from a specified limit above the
Earth. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the
source JP.)
control group. Personnel and ships designated to control the surface ship-to-shore
movement. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
covering fire. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)
GL-11
Glossary
debarkation schedule. A schedule that provides for the timely and orderly debarkation
of troops and equipment and emergency supplies for the waterborne ship-to-shore
movement. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the
source JP.)
distant retirement area. In amphibious operations, the sea area located to seaward of the
landing area to which assault ships may retire and operate in the event of adverse
weather or to prevent concentration of ships in the landing area. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-02)
E-day. The day landing force personnel, supplies, and equipment begin to embark aboard
amphibious warfare or commercial ships. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
embarkation. The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores
and equipment into ships and/or aircraft. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
embarkation officer. An officer on the staff of units of the landing force who advises the
commander thereof on matters pertaining to embarkation planning and loading ships.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
embarkation order. An order specifying dates, times, routes, loading diagrams, and
methods of movement to shipside or aircraft for troops and their equipment.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
embarkation phase. In amphibious operations, the phase that encompasses the orderly
assembly of personnel and materiel and their subsequent loading aboard ships and/or
aircraft in a sequence designed to meet the requirements of the landing force concept
GL-12 JP 3-02
Glossary
of operations ashore. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP
3-02 as the source JP.)
embarkation plans. The plans prepared by the landing force and appropriate subordinate
commanders containing instructions and information concerning the organization for
embarkation, assignment to shipping, supplies and equipment to be embarked, location
and assignment of embarkation areas, control and communication arrangements,
movement schedules and embarkation sequence, and additional pertinent instructions
relating to the embarkation of the landing force. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
establishing directive. An order issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
fire support station. An exact location at sea within a fire support area from which a fire
support ship delivers fire. Also called FSS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
flight deck. 1. In certain airplanes, an elevated compartment occupied by the crew for
operating the airplane in flight. 2. The upper deck of an aircraft carrier that serves as
a runway. 3. The deck of an air-capable ship, amphibious assault ship, or aircraft
carrier used to launch and recover aircraft. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
fly-in echelon. Airlifted forces and equipment (typically associated with the use of pre-
positioned assets), to include flight ferry aircraft and aviation support equipment,
needed to support operations. Also called FIE. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)
follow-up. In amphibious operations, the reinforcements and stores carried on ships and
aircraft (not originally part of the amphibious force) that are off-loaded after the assault
and assault follow-on echelons have been landed. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-
02)
GL-13
Glossary
follow-up shipping. Ships not originally a part of the amphibious task force but which
deliver troops and supplies to the objective area after the action phase has begun.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
go/no-go. A critical point at which a decision to proceed or not must be made. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
hazardous cargo. Cargo that includes not only large bulk-type categories, such as
explosives; pyrotechnics; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; compressed gases; and
corrosives and batteries, but lesser-quantity materials like super-tropical bleach
(oxiderizer), pesticides, poisons, medicines, and specialized medical chemicals and
medical waste that can be loaded as cargo. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuels. The potential hazard that is created when
volatile combustibles, such as fuel, are exposed to electromagnetic fields of sufficient
energy to cause ignition. Also called HERF. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
helicopter coordination section. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)
H-hour. 1. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. (JP 5-0)
2. In amphibious operations, the time the first landing craft or amphibious vehicle of the
waterborne wave lands or is scheduled to land on the beach and, in some cases, the
commencement of countermine breaching operations. (Approved for incorporation into
the DOD Dictionary.)
GL-14 JP 3-02
Glossary
inner transport area. In amphibious operations, an area as close to the landing beach as
depth of water, navigational hazards, boat traffic, and enemy action permit, to which
transports may move to expedite unloading. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
landing area. 1. That part of the operational area within which are conducted the landing
operations of an amphibious force. 2. In airborne operations, the general area used
for landing troops and materiel either by airdrop or air landing. 3. Any specially
prepared or selected surface of land, water, or deck designated or used for takeoff and
landing of aircraft. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
landing area diagram. A graphic means of showing the beach designations, boat lanes,
organization of the line of departure, scheduled waves, landing ship area, transport
areas, and the fire support areas in the immediate vicinity of the boat lanes. (Approved
for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
landing beach. That portion of a shoreline required for the landing of an amphibious force.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table. A table showing the
assignment of personnel and materiel to each landing craft and amphibious vehicle
and the assignment of the landing craft and amphibious vehicles to waves for the ship-
to-shore movement. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
landing craft availability table. A tabulation of the type and number of landing craft that will
be available from each ship of the transport group. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
landing diagram. A graphic means of illustrating the plan for the ship-to-shore
movement. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
GL-15
Glossary
landing force. A Marine Corps or Army task organization, which is part of the amphibious
force, formed to conduct amphibious operations. Also called LF. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-02)
landing force support party. A temporary landing force organization composed of Navy
and landing force elements that facilitates the ship-to-shore movement and provides
initial combat support and combat service support to the landing force. Also called
LFSP. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
landing sequence table. A document that incorporates the detailed plans for ship-to-shore
movement of nonscheduled units. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
landing site. 1. A site within a landing zone containing one or more landing points. 2.
In amphibious operations, a continuous segment of coastline over which troops,
equipment, and supplies can be landed by surface means. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-02)
loading plan. All of the individually prepared documents which, taken together, present,
in detail, all instructions for the arrangement of personnel and the loading of equipment
for one or more units or other special grouping of personnel or material moving by
GL-16 JP 3-02
Glossary
highway, water, rail, or air transportation. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
massed fire. 1. The fire of the batteries of two or more ships directed against a single
target. 2. Fire from a number of weapons directed at a single target point or small
area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
movement group. Those ships and embarked units that load out and proceed to
rendezvous in the objective area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
movement phase. In amphibious operations, the period during which various elements of
the amphibious force move from points of embarkation or forward-deployed locations
to the objective area. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
movement plan. In amphibious operations, the naval plan providing for the movement of
the amphibious task force to the objective area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
Navy cargo-handling battalion. A mobile logistic support unit that is organized, trained,
and equipped to: a. load and off-load Navy and Marine Corps cargo carried in maritime
GL-17
Glossary
highway, water, rail, or air transportation. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
massed fire. 1. The fire of the batteries of two or more ships directed against a single
target. 2. Fire from a number of weapons directed at a single target point or small
area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
movement group. Those ships and embarked units that load out and proceed to
rendezvous in the objective area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
movement phase. In amphibious operations, the period during which various elements of
the amphibious force move from points of embarkation or forward-deployed locations
to the objective area. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
movement plan. In amphibious operations, the naval plan providing for the movement of
the amphibious task force to the objective area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
Navy cargo-handling battalion. A mobile logistic support unit that is organized, trained,
and equipped to: a. load and off-load Navy and Marine Corps cargo carried in maritime
GL-17
Glossary
coordinated planning for, and execution of, the amphibious operation. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
plan for landing. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary)
planning phase. In amphibious operations, the phase normally denoted by the period
extending from the issuance of the initiating directive up to the embarkation phase.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
prelanding operations. Operations conducted by the amphibious force upon its arrival in
the amphibious objective area or operational area and prior to H-hour and/or L-hour.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
primary control ship. In amphibious operations, a ship of the task force designated to
provide support for the primary control officer and a combat information center control
team for a colored beach. Also called PCS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
rehearsal phase. In amphibious operations, the period after embarkation and prior to the
action phase during which the prospective operation is practiced. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
rendezvous area. In an amphibious operation, the area in which the landing craft and
amphibious vehicles rendezvous to form waves after being loaded and prior to
movement to the line of departure. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
sea areas. Areas in the amphibious objective area designated for the stationing of
amphibious task force ships. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
GL-19
Glossary
sea echelon. A portion of the amphibious warfare ships or other ships that withdraws from
or remains out of the transport area during an amphibious landing and operates in
designated areas to seaward in an on-call or unscheduled status. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-02)
sea echelon area. In amphibious operations, an area to seaward of a transport area from
which ships are phased into the transport area and to which ships withdraw from the
transport area. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
sea echelon plan. In amphibious operations, the distribution plan for amphibious shipping
in the transport area to minimize losses due to enemy attack and to reduce the area to
be swept of mines. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
secondary loads. Unit equipment, supplies, and major end items that are transported in
the beds of organic vehicles. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary
with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
selective loading. The arrangement and stowage of equipment and supplies aboard ship
in a manner designed to facilitate issues to units. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
selective off-loading. The capability to access and off-load vehicles, supplies, and
equipment without having to conduct a major reconfiguration or total off-load, which
is influenced by the number and types of ships allocated and the space made available
for the embarkation of the landing force. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
serial assignment table. A table that is used in amphibious operations and shows the serial
number, the title of the unit, and the approximate number of personnel; the material,
vehicles, or equipment in the serial; the number and type of landing craft and/or
amphibious vehicles required to boat the serial; and the ship on which the serial is
embarked. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
GL-20 JP 3-02
Glossary
shore party. A task organization of the landing force, formed for the purpose of
facilitating the landing and movement off the beaches of troops, equipment, and
supplies; for the evacuation from the beaches of casualties and enemy prisoners of
war; and for facilitating the beaching, retraction, and salvaging of landing ships and
craft. Also called beach group. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
spot. 1. To determine by observation, deviations of ordnance from the target for the
purpose of supplying necessary information for the adjustment of fire. 2. To place in
a proper location. 3. An approved shipboard helicopter landing site. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-02 as the source JP.)
staging area. 1. Airborne – A general locality between the mounting area and the objective
of an airborne expedition through which the expedition, or parts thereof, pass after
mounting, for refueling; regrouping; and/or exercise, inspection, and redistribution of
troops. (JP 3-35) 2. Other movements – A general locality established for the
concentration of troop units and transient personnel between movements over the lines
of communications. (JP 3-35). 3. In amphibious operations, one or more intervening
ports for refueling, logistic support, emergency repairs, or final rehearsals. Also called
SA. (JP 3-02) (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
stowage. The placement of cargo into a hold or compartment or on a deck of a ship in such
a way as to prevent damage from load shifts while the ship is underway. (Approved
for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
supporting arms. Weapons and weapons systems of all types employed to support forces
by indirect or direct fire. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
tactical air officer. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)
tactical reserve. A part of a force held under the control of the commander as a
maneuvering force to influence future action. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
GL-21
Glossary
target information center. The agency or activity responsible for collecting, displaying,
evaluating, and disseminating information pertaining to potential targets. Also called
TIC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)
transport group. An element that directly deploys and supports the landing of the landing
force and is functionally designated as a transport group in the amphibious task force
organization. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
troop space cargo. Cargo, such as sea or barracks bags, bedding rolls or hammocks, locker
trunks, and office equipment, normally stowed in an accessible place, as well as
normal hand-carried combat equipment and weapons to be carried ashore by the
assault troops. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
GL-22 JP 3-02
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-02 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
Approval Development