CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

SEPERATION OF POWERS
(Political Questions Under the New Constitution)

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v Secretary of Budget and Management

G.R. No. 164987 (24 April 2012)
Mendoza, J.

Petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF)

FACTS:
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) sought the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Secretary of Budget and Management from making and releasing
budgetary allocations to Members of Congress as “pork barrel” funds out of PDAF. LAMP aimed to stop the National
Treasurer and the Commission on Audit from enforcing the questioned provision.

LAMP assailed the constitutionality of the PDAF of the 2004 General Appropriations Act, alleging that its “silence
in the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of the Congress” prohibits an automatic or direct
allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. In other words, it does
not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select, and identify programs and projects to be funded out
of PDAF. LAMP argued that it runs afoul against the principle of powers because in receiving and, thereafter spending
funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. LAMP also
claimed that there are flaws in the implementation of the provisions:
(1) the DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favour of individual Members
of Congress
(2) the Members of Congress do not possess the power to propose, select, and identify programs and projects are to
be actually funded by PDAF

The Secretary countered that although PDAF traced its roots to Country Development Fund (CDF), it should not be
equated with “pork barrel”, which has gained a derogatory meaning referring to “government projects affording
political opportunism”. The Secretary argued that the petition lacked legal and factual basis as most of the evidence
was culled from media reports. The Secretary also invoked Philconsa v Enriquez where CDF was described as an
imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority programs or projects specified in the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal?

RULING:
The enforcement of the PDAF is constitutional.

LAMP would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAF’s enforcement based on the absence of
express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latter’s encroachment on
executive power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. These allegations lack substantiation. No
convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress,
who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds
by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into
the truth of their claims. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like
this, the Court’s hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits
unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoyance to divine from scanty
allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie. Again, newspaper or electronic reports showing the appalling
effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality,
but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
SEPERATION OF POWERS
(Political Questions Under the New Constitution)
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that
appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments. While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted by the President to
Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the
nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act
may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter,
budget execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the
cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of
fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the
law, the Executive takes the wheel. "The DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The
Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded
from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with
the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive." This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive
and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely
discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being
offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects
was already upheld in Philconsa.

In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and identify priority
projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature and it also recognized that individual members of
Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the
needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.

This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said
case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the
constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

The petition for certiorari is dismissed without costs.

NOTES:

Judicial review
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power (the case or controversy
requirement)
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota1 of the case.

The “case-or-controversy” requirement

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts are
centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated,
or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In
our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a

1
The cause of the suit or action
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
SEPERATION OF POWERS
(Political Questions Under the New Constitution)
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.

Important parts in the case

The Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress:
“Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every
presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.”
(Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary)

While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated by a piece of valid
legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, "all
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that
if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate
all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and
that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."