G.R. No.

176102 November 26, 2014

ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the best
interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will ensure the observance of international standards of
child protection,1 and to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in
conflict with the law.2 The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment
whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.

Antecedents

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide under the following information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife ,
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached
as annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs in such amount as may be
proven in court.

Acts Contrary to Law.3

The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows: Alejandro Dequito testified that
around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he, together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon
Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony if the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola,
herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter. When asked to demonstrate in
open court how the appellant stabbed the victim, this witness demonstrated that with the appellant’s left arm around the
neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.

He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the hospital.

Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito’s companion at the time of the incident, corroborated the testimony of Dequito on all
material points.

Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front of the [elementary] school and later
brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son
was discharged. Later, however, when her son went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her son’s stab
wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to another operation, but died the day after. She, further, stated that the
stabbing incident was reported to the police authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the wake and
burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting
physician, was organ failure overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.

The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:

He testified that around seven inthe evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High School campus watching
the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way home,
he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not able to see or even
recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he
thought was one of the four men who ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When
asked why he was in possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who
was graduating that day. He went home after the incident.

While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay hall, and later to the Pasacao
PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after
hearing it.4

Judgment of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim ₱81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral
expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.5

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty and the civil liability
through the decision promulgated on July 19, 2006,6 disposing thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced
to six months and one day to six years of prision correccionalas minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision
mayor as maximum.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04, representing
expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is
awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. Weaffirm in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its amended decision on December 7, 2006, decreeing
as follows:7

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision promulgated on July 16, 2006,
which is the subject of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED such that the judgment shall now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number
2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04, representing
expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is
awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.

The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for appropriate action on the application for
probation of, herein, appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing the penalty, and for not
suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no
longer assails the findings of fact by the lower courts as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues,
namely: (1) whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into consideration the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal Codeand Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or
not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or
not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international
agreements.

Ruling of the Court

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporalfor homicide. Considering that the
petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he
committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,8 such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty
to prision mayor.9

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next lower
than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period – eight years and one day to 10 years – was
proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor
should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No.
968.

The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other
relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his
insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in
cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k),
whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.11 Consistent with this principle,
the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion
to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies from probation an offender sentenced to serve
a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we
annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law
adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to
Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.– If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19,
2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child inconflict with the law
as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements. A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344
1avvphi1

reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of
Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the rightnot to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of
imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or
imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the
letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the
penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his
sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortestduration permitted by the law.

A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action taken herein. The United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines),14 the United Nations Guidelines for the
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived
of Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed asa last resort
and for the minimum necessary period.

Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an
agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of
Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the
offender child’s best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on
December 7, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the trial court for
implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an
agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009

ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, Petitioner,

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review on certiorari1 of the Decision2 and Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals4 (CA) that affirmed with modification his conviction for the crime of qualified rape rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, in its decision of April 5, 2006.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA5 was playing with her friend BBB in the second floor of her family’s house in Palatiw,
Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then
undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual
intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.

AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a
classmate), who both accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical examination that
revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical
findings, the petitioner was charged with rape under the following Information:

On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15 years
old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latter’s will and consent.

Contrary to law.6

The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling
cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape. He also claimed that AAA only invented her story because she bore him a grudge for
the beatings he gave her. The parties’ mother (CCC) supported the petitioner’s story; she also stated that AAA was a
troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident happened.7

The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her; she confirmed the petitioner’s claim that AAA bore
her brother a grudge.

On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the said juvenile in
conflict with law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim the amount of
₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, and ₱25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.8

The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAA’s credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)9 to exempt him from criminal liability considering that he was only 15
years old at the time the crime was committed.

The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction with modification as to penalty as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award
of damages are likewise affirmed.

SO ORDERED.10

In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the CA held:

As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that Robert is not exempt from liability. First, it was not
clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the time of the commission of the
crime. It was incumbent for the defense to present Robert’s birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No.
9344. Neither is the suspension of sentence available to Robert as the Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:

We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence
shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not
been deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other
disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence,
juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.11

The CA denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.

THE ISSUES

The petitioner no longer assails the prosecution’s evidence on his guilt of the crime charged; what he now assails is the failure
of the CA to apply paragraph 1, Section 612 of R.A. No. 9344 under the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9344 on the petitioner’s exemption from
criminal liability;

(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense to present the petitioner’s birth
certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution by
express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
 (3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton13 thereby denying the petitioner
the benefit of exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.

The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the burden of proof for purposes of determining exemption
from criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the time the crime was committed.

The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution as the party who stands to lose the case if no
evidence is presented to show that the petitioner was not a 15-year old minor entitled to the exempting benefit provided
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344.14 He additionally claims that Sections 3,15 7,16 and 6817 of the law also provide a presumption
of minority in favor of a child in conflict with the law, so that any doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.

The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on record – specifically: the allegation of the
Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never objected to, and the findings of the RTC –
established that he was not more than 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

The People’s Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the burden belongs to the petitioner
who should have presented his birth certificate or other documentary evidence proving that his age was 15 years or below.
The OSG also stressed that while petitioner is presumed to be a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence suspended
following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton.18

THE COURT’S RULING

We grant the petition.

We examine at the outset the prosecution’s evidence and the findings of the lower courts on the petitioner’s guilt, since the
petition opens the whole case for review and the issues before us are predicated on the petitioner’s guilt of the crime
charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the
criminal, not on the civil, liability.

We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision and the records of the case, to deviate from the lower
courts’ findings of guilt. The records show that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime charged through the
credible testimony of AAA and the other corroborating evidence; sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the information
charged.19 As against AAA’s testimony, the petitioner could only raise the defenses of denial and alibi – defenses that, in a long
line of cases, we have held to be inherently weak unless supported by clear and convincing evidence; the petitioner failed to
present this required evidentiary support.20 We have held, too, that as negative defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the credible and positive testimony of the complainant.21 We sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility, as we see no
compelling reason to doubt the validity of their conclusions in this regard.

While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground – i.e., exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 – that implies
an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the defense is entitled to
present all alternative defenses available to it, even inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense’s claim of exemption
from liability was made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of theory
that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, 22 no essential change is really involved as the claim for exemption
from liability is not incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the lower courts’ conclusion that the petitioner
is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the
accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable
therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that
the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even on questions that the
parties did not raise.23 By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance and resolve
every doubt in favor of the accused.24 It is with these considerations in mind and in obedience to the direct and more specific
commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in this Rule
45 petition.

We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law on exemption from liability compelling because of
the patent errors the CA committed in these regards. Specifically, the CA’s findings of fact on the issues of age and minority,
premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on record; it also manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.25

In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the ages of both the petitioner and the complaining
victim are material and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in characterizing the crime committed and in
considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.

Minority as an Exempting Circumstance

R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the
rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children are dealt with in
a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision
orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs and other alternatives to institutional
care.26 More importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility
for minor offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
previously provided – i.e., from "under nine years of age" and "above nine years of age and under fifteen" (who acted without
discernment) – to "fifteen years old or under" and "above fifteen but below 18" (who acted without discernment) in
determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law – as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12
of the RPC did – presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so that
their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be held accountable.27 The current law also drew its changes
from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives
minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention measures.28

In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability because he was not more than 15 years old at
the time the rape took place. The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioner’s failure to present his birth certificate as
required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344.29 The CA also found him disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence because the
imposable penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua to death.

Burden of Proof

Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of
the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution
completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this
point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by
evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable
therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had done everything that the law requires it to do.
The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if
guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not
the prosecution, has the burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he committed the
rape charged.30

This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape; the
prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would
make minority and age integral elements of the crime when clearly they are not. 31 If the prosecution has a burden related to
age, this burden relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape.32

Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence

The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he
committed the crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may be
determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the
child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case
of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. [Emphasis supplied]

Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provides the implementing details of this provision by
enumerating the measures that may be undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain the child’s age:

(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the child’s age, such as

(a) Child’s birth certificate;

(b) Child’s baptismal certificate ;or

(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the child’s school records, dental records, or
travel papers.

(2) x x x

(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such documents, the law enforcement
officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age by:

(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e.g. date of birthday, grade level in
school);

(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of the child (e.g. relatives, neighbors,
teachers, classmates);

(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the child; and

(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.

xxx

Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been passed only in 2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence
existing at that time on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accused’s minority and age.

In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,33 we accepted testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in the
absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas34 where
the defendant’s statement about his age was considered sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to establish that he
was a minor of 16 years at the time he committed the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,35 the Court
appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense in the absence of any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then, in
People v. Villagracia,36 we found the testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his
minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. Morial37 and David v. Court of Appeals,38 and ruled that the
allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the prosecution’s failure to disprove the claim by
contrary evidence.

In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the accused’s minority and age upon the concurrence of
the following conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate,
or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a
relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of
the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused’s and/or his relatives’ testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his minority and age when
the rape was committed.39 Second, the records before us show that these pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected
to by the prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was
above 15 years old when the crime was committed.

We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the child must be
resolved in his favor.40 Hence, any doubt in this case regarding the petitioner’s age at the time he committed the rape should
be resolved in his favor. In other words, the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place should be
read to mean that he was not more than 15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.

Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and established jurisprudence in accord with the latest
statutory developments, the CA therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the
petitioner’s and CCC’s testimonies relating to the former’s age.

Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344

That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20
years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No.
9344 grants.41 As we explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 934442 in the recent case of Ortega v. People:43

Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of
the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the
CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the commission of the
offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
[Emphasis supplied]

The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended, which provides that
penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not found to be a habitual criminal.
Nothing in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a habitual criminal.

Civil Liability

The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his
exemption from criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his exemption from criminal liability. The
extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he would have been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from
criminal liability.

The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, that the petitioner is guilty of qualified rape
because of his relationship with AAA within the second civil degree of consanguinity and the latter’s minority.44 Both courts
accordingly imposed the civil liability corresponding to qualified rape.

The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not appear to be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC,
declared in her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her children. The prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated in
the proceedings below that the relationship exists. We find, however, that AAA’s minority, though alleged in the Information,
had not been sufficiently proven.45 People v. Pruna46 laid down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the complainant:

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.
 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives
concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. [Emphasis supplied]

The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not likewise show that the petitioner ever expressly
and clearly admitted AAA’s age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither can his failure to object to AAA’s testimony
be taken against him.

Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the crime to qualified rape – i.e., relationship within the
third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim – does not exist. The crime for which the petitioner should have been
found criminally liable should therefore only be simple rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified rape.
The civil liability that can be imposed on the petitioner follows the characterization of the crime and the attendant
circumstances.

Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of ₱50,000.00 but increase the awarded exemplary damages ₱30,000.00,
both pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.47 Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity
of proof; the law assumes that the victim suffered moral injuries entitling her to this award.48 Article 2230 of the Civil Code
justifies the award of exemplary damages because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of relationship between
AAA and petitioner and dwelling.49 As discussed above, the relationship (between the parties) is not disputed. We appreciate
dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on AAA’s testimony that the rape was committed in their house.50 While
dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the Information, established jurisprudence holds that it may
nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the award of exemplary damages.51 lavvphi1

We modify the awarded civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, the latter being the civil indemnity appropriate for
simple rape52 on the finding that rape had been committed.53

In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need to discuss the petition’s third assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29, 2008 and Resolution
dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H for rape filed against petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is
hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is REFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer who shall proceed
in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Unless there are other valid causes for petitioner’s continued detention, we hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the
above terms.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of
this Decision the action he has taken.

Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council.

G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that there was
physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.2

Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and executory only after his
disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System,
Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes."

Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of the judgment
of his conviction.4

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-
141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality
of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years old.7

On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the existence of the following
documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape
incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of the story.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be summarized in the following
manner:

FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF’s house is along the road. That of appellant lies at the back
approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by FFF’s house, the frequency of which the latter
describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no
grudge against appellant prior to the incident.13

AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time – playing at the basketball court near
her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the
incident.14

At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy
Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was
watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15

Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At the store, he saw appellant
place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left the store at the same
time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the
direction of the "lower area or place."20

AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held her hand while on the
road near the store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the
Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-
naked from waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made
a push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in turn,
went straight home crying.29

FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found her face greasy.32 There
was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury and found on her neck a
contusion that was already turning black.34 She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her
vagina.35 AAA told him that appellant brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the
Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast;38 and that he
proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39

True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he did to AAA.41 Appellant
replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to check on his
daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again,44 and boxed him.45

Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the house of Rita.46 AAA and her
mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she
replied that appellant raped her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you
really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.51 Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant
that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow
(sic) and my knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.53

On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered.54 FFF also had AAA
undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a
medical certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:

Injuries seen are as follows:

2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.

3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area

4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line

5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area

6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material

7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding

8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position

Impression

MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

HYMENAL LACERATIONS

Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination at the provincial hospital on the
following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a
medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:

P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of
examination. (sic)59

Evidence for the Defense

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan
[Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the
crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition,
Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident
was revealed.63

Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of FFF’s house.64 He denied
that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that
he occasionally worked for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him.67

At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the
evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a
drinking session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the
house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .68

Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the birthday party; and that
appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was
back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that appellant’s white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69

At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his uncle
Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the house
of the Perochos.72 From where she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry
AAA.73 AAA’s face was covered and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a
game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito,
now in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just
outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82

Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that appellant was twice boxed
by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and
again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and
another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.83

On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening, she was watching the television along with other people at
the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house
drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what
happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia’s advice, Julito released her and went out of the house.84

Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a bolo, and
accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 o’clock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and
asked again why he molested his daughter.85

On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the
court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
With costs87

The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently born on 1
March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial
court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. xxx

Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling in People v.
Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following MODIFICATIONS:

xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie
M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91

On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal.92 This Court required the
parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively
discussed their positions in their respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.94

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support
a conviction."96

Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched principles:

(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent,
to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.97

Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused.98 More so,
when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime,100 except
when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.101

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the
following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.102

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of appellant’s
organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

AAA testified:

PROS. OMANDAM:

xxxx

Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?

A He mounted me.

Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?

A Yes.

Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?

A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.

Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?

A They were apart.

Q Who pushed them apart?

A Hermie.

Q Did Hermie push anything at you?

A Yes.
 Q What was that?

A His penis.

Q Where did he push his penis?

A To my vagina.

Q Was it painful?

A Yes.

Q What was painful?

A My vagina.

Q Did you cry?

A Yes.103

The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA
well understood the information elicited from her, said it all – she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so,
she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally
badges of truth and honesty.105

Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5 o’clock and 9
o’clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could have been
"the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ.107

The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration conclusively established the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge.108

II

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are now in
dispute.

The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when the crime
was committed.109

We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially when he is not a
stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known
appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs
criminus111 that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the
rice field.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.

The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called "kuya" and who used to
play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her,
was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child,
on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older,
who molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of the
witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that
material facts and circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114

Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:

xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise
in view of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also
admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus
corroborating the latter’s testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child."115

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi weak despite
the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies
that even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s very testimony.

Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to
his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.

This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed that
her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work
only after FFF came to their house for the second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her
husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after the appellant’s errand to the
store.119

Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.

Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria’s statement that her
husband was at work.

Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito
arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition,
while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in
saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later
changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.

Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after she returned to the
Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial
court’s appreciation in order. Thus:

xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped her.
She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would
have the court believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only
later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki
said.120

Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by
disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one
way or another linked to each other."121

Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi
cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.122

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused
when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at
the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.123

In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the crime was considered
not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than
five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was
fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the
accused slept all throughout.126

In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their
company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:

Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law and co-worker, in
unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an
established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape occurred, was a stone’s throw away from the fishpond. Their
claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible
for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much
occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50
meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not
farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his
house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.) 1avvphi1

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from the 5-minute
errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was
committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road
near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle’s
house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the
immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.130

Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place of the
commission of the crime.

All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

III

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

We determine discernment in this wise:

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such capacity may
be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case.136

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.137 Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.138

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime,
to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old
appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.139

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5) years old
when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child
below seven (7) years old141 applies.

The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of
death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant,
which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code.143

Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it
lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146

We differ.

In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Civil Liability

We have consistently ruled that:

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would
have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity and
extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the
amount of ₱75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.151

Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the penalty
by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be
increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.

Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of Sentence

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has
reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however,
That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with
Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155

Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike
P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by
the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted
of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in
conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.157

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the
provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation
reads:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious
offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago’s] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159

On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which reflected
the same position.160

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant.
The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-
five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with
the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the
crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration
in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of
the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is
not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic
Act No. 9344.164

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law
may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement
in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie
M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death
penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015

GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner,

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 213886

JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated December 6, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners
Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts
In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each
other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of
one ELNER ARO y LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death thereafter.

That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength. CONTRARY TO LAW.4

According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 2004, he was eating
corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby
establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the
ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro
but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in
pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.5

At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and was set for
operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large
intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid
contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.6

Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died the next day.
While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his

death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an
autopsy performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic
injuries."7

In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They averred that while playing pool,
they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout
and pick up a stone to throw at Aro but Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of
wood if not for Quibac' s intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground. Quiniquin
Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered and kicked the latter, and the two
engaged in a fist fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and told Wacoy to go home.8

The RTC Ruling In a Judgment9 dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as maximum, and ordered them to pay Aro's heirs the amounts of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.10

The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired in
the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the
mauling directly contributed to his death. 11

In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show the extent and effect of
injury [that Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his death xx x," Wacoy and Quibac should be held
criminally liable for the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray and not for Homicide.12

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.13

The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of Homicide under A1iicle 249
of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their
prison term to an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one ( 1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA also imposed a legal interest of six percent ( 6%) per annum
on the damages awarded by the RTC pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.15

In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this relation, it observed that
the mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his credibility since there was no proof that his testimony
was driven by any ill motive.16 However, contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be
convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm on the
victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead, they were convicted of the crime of
Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the
purpose of their assault on Aro was only to maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.17

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. 18 In a Resolution19 dated July 21, 2014, the CA denied
Quibac's motions for reconsideration;20 hence, the instant petitions.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision
based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.21

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac' s conviction from Death
Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained hereunder.

Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as follows:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by prision mayor.

If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.

The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several
persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the
course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.22 Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place
when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which
some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.23
On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads:

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be
punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed
him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was
not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.24

In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro died. On the
1âwphi1

contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one
defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There
was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident.25 Since
Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to have been caused
in a tumultuous affray.26 Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate
cause27 of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the crime of Homicide.

On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical
injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore in its maximum period,28 pursuant to Article 49
of the RPC. The said provision reads:

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In cases in
which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be
observed.

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty
person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for
either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be
imposed in the maximum period.

Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from that intended and
where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences
not intended by the offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem),29

as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.30 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of
personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.31

Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and
Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since
intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and
external overt acts.32 In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of
evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing
the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of ₱50,000.00 each are increased to
₱75,000.00 each in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.33 All other awards, as well as the imposition of interest at
the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until the same are
fully paid, are retained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo
Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of Elner Aro the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages,
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

G.R. No. 183566 May 8, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

On automatic review is the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00129, which
found accused-appellant Bonifacio Badriago guilty of Frustrated Homicide in Criminal Case No. 4255 and Murder in Criminal
Case No. 4276.

The Facts

Accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) under the following Informations:

Criminal Case No. 4255

That on or about the 13th day of September 2002 in the Municipality of Carigara, [P]rovince of Leyte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack one ADRIAN QUINTO, with the use of a long sharp bolo
(sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following wounds, to
wit:

SURGERY NOTES:

(+) hacked wounds transverse approximately 16 cms.

Linear (L) lumbar area level of L-L5

(+) hacked wound (L) forearm.

ORTHO NOTES:

A) Near amputation M/3rd (L) forearm 2˚ to hack wound.

Hack wound 15 cms. oblique level of L2 posterior

lumbar area, transecting underlying muscle.

Fracture both radius and ulna.

OPERATION: September 14, 2002.

Wound Debridement and Repair

ORIF (Pinning)

Which wounds required a period of from thirty (30) days to ninety (90) days to heal and incapacitated said offended party
from performing his habitual work for the same period of time; thus the accused performed all the acts of execution which
[would] have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Adrian
Quinto which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 4276

That on or about the 13th day of September, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one OLIVER QUINTO with the
use of a long sharp bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter
the following wounds, to wit:

1. [Stab] wound 4 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 16 cm. (L) ant. chest at the level of 5th ICS along the (L) ICL;

2. [Stab] wound 6.5 x 3 cm. x 22 cm. (L) ant. chest at the level of 6th ICS along (L) anterior AAL;

3. [Stab] wound 3.5 cm. x 1.5 x 2 cm., (L) arm proximal 3rd lateral aspect;

4. Amputating wound (L) 3rd, 4th and 5th finger;

5. [Stab] wound 5 cm. x 3.5 cm. x 6 cm. umbilical area with intestinal and omental prolapsed;

6. Hacking wound 9 cm. x 2 cm. (L) occipital area with skull fracture;

7. [Stab] wound 3 cm. x 1 cm. x 15 cm. (L) posterior back at the level of T 12, 3 cm. away from vertebral line;

8. [Stab] wound 2 cm. x 1 cm. x 9 cm. (L) posterior back 8 cm. away from vertebral line;

9. Hacking wound 11 cm. x 2 cm. x 9 cm. (L) posterior iliac with fracture of hip bone;

10. [Stab] wound 3 cm. x 2 cm. x 3 cm. (L) buttocks;

11. [Stab] wound 5.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 2.5 cm. lumbar area along the vertebral line.

which wounds caused the death of said Oliver Quinto.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The parties later agreed to try the case jointly.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Ma. Bella Profetana, Adrian Quinto, Dr. Frederic Joseph
Asanza, and Victoriano Quinto. The defense witnesses consisted of accused-appellant and Rodolfo Gabon.

The prosecution’s presentation of evidence is summarized as follows: Adrian testified that on the morning of September 13,
2002, he was asked by his mother to bring a letter to one Berting Bello at Barangay Guindapunan, Leyte. He drove a tricycle to
deliver the letter along with his younger brother, Oliver. After finishing the errand they headed back to the town plaza where
their mother was waiting for them. Before they could reach their destination, however, they were approached by accused-
appellant at Sitio Mombon in Carigara. Accused-appellant then suddenly hacked him with a sundang or long bolo on his
lumbar area.2 Accused-appellant aimed a second time but Adrian was able to somehow shield himself. His lower left arm
suffered a hack wound as a result. Struck with panic, he jumped off the tricycle but could not run away. He was able to push
Oliver off the tricycle so he could run away and call for help. He could no longer testify on what happened thereafter as he lost
consciousness and only woke up while confined at Carigara District Hospital. His mother later informed him that Oliver was
also attacked and did not survive.

Dr. Asanza’s testimony showed that Adrian suffered from two wounds that could have been fatal: the hack wound on the
lumbar area and on his left arm. He explained that Adrian could have died had he not been brought to the hospital. When
cross-examined, he stated that there was a possibility that Adrian could still crawl or walk despite the infliction of the wound
on the lumbar area. He also testified that it was possible that Adrian was first hit on the forearm as he was facing accused-
appellant and that he could have been hit on the lumbar area while he was running.3

Dr. Profetana told the court that her post-mortem examination of Oliver showed that eight of the 11 wounds inflicted on him
were fatal. She identified hypovolemic shock as Oliver’s cause of death. Furthermore, she stated that it was impossible for the
victim to have survived the wounds as these severed the blood vessels and caused hemorrhage.4

Victoriano, father of the victims, testified that his family incurred PhP 20,000 in expenses for the stainless bar placed on
Adrian’s injured arm. According to his estimate, they spent about PhP 50,000 for Adrian’s two-month hospitalization but they
were not able to keep the receipts. For the death of his other son, Oliver, they spent PhP 9,000 for the coffin and about PhP
10,000 for the wake. He likewise testified that if his family’s losses could be quantified they would claim the amount of PhP
100,000.5

In his defense, accused-appellant stated under oath that on the morning of September 13, 2002, he was on his pedicab
looking for passengers. While he was on his way to the bus terminal in Carigara, Leyte, he was accosted by Adrian and Oliver,
who carried stones with them. Adrian called out to him, "Now Boning, let us fight." He tried to speed away but the two chased
him, with Adrian driving his pedicab and Oliver standing on the cargo compartment. They bumped accused-appellant’s
pedicab, causing him to swerve to the middle of the road.6 When accused-appellant looked back, Adrian got out of his pedicab
and approached him with a knife about 10 inches long. Seeing Adrian was about to stab him, he grabbed a bolo from his
pedicab’s passenger seat and used it to strike at Adrian, injuring his left hand. Adrian’s knife fell and when he bent to pick it
up, accused-appellant again hacked at him with his bolo. Adrian then managed to run away from accused-appellant and head
towards Barangay Guindapunan. Accused-appellant, meanwhile, ran towards the municipal building to inform the police that
he had injured someone. He denied killing Oliver as while he was fighting with Adrian he did not even see Oliver.7 l a vv p h i l.zw+

When cross-examined accused-appellant admitted that he did not suffer any injury following the confrontation with Adrian.
He claimed not to know what happened to Oliver.

The other defense witness, Rodolfo, testified that he knew accused-appellant as a pedicab driver. On the day of the incident
he saw two pedicabs engaged in a chase. He noticed that accused-appellant was in one pedicab and he was being chased by
the pedicab driven by Adrian. The bumper of accused-appellant’s pedicab was bumped by Adrian’s pedicab. From a distance
of about four arms’ length, he saw the two go down from their respective pedicabs. Adrian said "let’s have a fight" while
drawing a short bolo from his waist. Adrian tried to stab accused-appellant but was unable to hit him. He then saw accused-
appellant draw his own bolo from his waist and hit the left arm of Adrian. Adrian’s bolo fell to the ground and when he was
about to pick it up he was again hit by accused-appellant.
On cross-examination, Rodolfo stated that he had not seen if Adrian had a passenger on board his pedicab, and that the
incident occurred along a national road with many houses and shrubbery.8

On July 29, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment. Accused-appellant was found guilty of the crimes charged. The fallo of the
Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the Court [finds] accused BONIFACIO
BARDIAGO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER instead of Frustrated Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 4255, and [sentences him] to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision
Mayor as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS and one (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum, and to pay Adrian Quinto
actual damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos and exemplary damages in the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.

Likewise, pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and further amended by R.A. No. 7659 (The Death
Penalty Law) the Court found accused BONIFACIO BARDIAGO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
charged under the information in Criminal Case No. 4276, and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and pay
the heirs of Oliver Quinto civil indemnity in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) and exemplary damages in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos; and [to] pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.9

On September 14, 2004, the records of the case were transferred to this Court on automatic review as the death penalty was
involved. But conformably with People v. Mateo,10 the case was transferred to the CA via a Resolution dated February 15,
2005.

Accused-appellant, in his Brief filed before the CA, claimed that the trial court erred in convicting him of frustrated murder as
what was read to him at his arraignment was a charge for frustrated homicide, and the trial court likewise erred in convicting
him of frustrated murder and murder as his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He also challenged the conviction
on the ground that the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, incomplete self-defense, and lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong were not appreciated by the trial court.

The CA sustained accused-appellant’s first contention. It ruled that his conviction for frustrated murder was a gross violation
of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him. Accused-appellant’s other
arguments, however, were not given merit. The CA noted the undisputed fact that it was accused-appellant, claiming self-
defense, who inflicted the wounds sustained by Adrian and Oliver. The circumstantial evidence presented showed accused-
appellant’s culpability. Moreover, according to the CA, his choice of weapon and the areas he hacked on the victim’s bodies
revealed a clear intention to kill. The CA said he was able to injure the brothers with no injury caused to himself.

Lastly, the appellate court rejected the mitigating circumstances proffered by accused-appellant. It ruled that there was no
voluntary surrender as accused-appellant himself testified that he had merely reported the injury and did not surrender. As to
the self-defense theory, the CA stated that accused-appellant failed to establish the victims’ unlawful aggression, a requisite in
such a mitigating circumstance.

In view of Republic Act No. 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death,11 the CA reduced accused-appellant’s penalty
to reclusion perpetua with respect to the murder charge in Criminal Case No. 4276.

The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing taken into account, the instant appeal is partially granted.

Accordingly, in Criminal Cases No. 4255 accused-appellant is found guilty only of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and is hereby
penalized to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years
and 1 day of prison mayor as maximum and to pay Adrian Quinto the sum of twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) by way
of temperate damages.
In criminal case no. 4276 accused-appellant is found guilty of MURDER and is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity; twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) by way of
temperate damages, fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.12

The Issues

On September 1, 2008, this Court notified the parties that they may file supplemental briefs if they so desired. The parties
manifested that they were dispensing with such filing. Accused-appellant, thus, re-pleads his arguments first made before the
CA. His appeal being partially granted, the only remaining issues to be resolved are the following:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE AND
MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER,
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE, AND LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG

Our Ruling

We affirm accused-appellant’s conviction.

Frustrated Homicide

To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder,
or by that of parricide or infanticide.13 Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.14

On the other hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) The offender performs all the acts of
execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence; (3) but the felony is not produced; and (4)
by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.15

From the evidence presented to the trial court, it is very much clear that accused-appellant was able to perform all the acts
that would necessarily result in Adrian’s death. His intention to kill can be presumed from the lethal hacking blows Adrian
received. His attack on Adrian with a bolo was not justified. His claim of self-defense was not given credence by both the trial
and appellate courts. Neither are there any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide, and infanticide. The
circumstances, thus, make out a case for frustrated homicide as accused-appellant performed all the acts necessary to kill
Adrian; Adrian only survived due to timely medical intervention as testified to by his examining physician.

Murder Qualified by Treachery

It is also argued by the defense that the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Accused-appellant reasons that Adrian was still able to put up a defense by parrying the blow made by
accused-appellant and was even able to jump off from the pedicab he was driving. He, thus, maintains that the trial court
erroneously characterized the incident as a sudden attack.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or to escape.16 There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no
opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.17 The records show that Adrian was suddenly attacked with a
bolo, and the most he could do at that moment was to shield himself somehow from the blow with his arm. Another blow to
Adrian’s back showed the vulnerability of his position as he had his back turned to accused-appellant and was not able to flee
from attack. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victims were warned of the danger to their lives where they were
defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.18

Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence

Accused-appellant speculates that if the incident happened in broad daylight and near a bus terminal, there should have been
independent eyewitnesses identifying accused-appellant as Oliver’s killer. Much is made of the fact that not even Adrian was
able to identify accused-appellant as Oliver’s assailant.

The failure by the prosecution to present the weapon allegedly used in the attack is, in accused-appellant’s mind, yet another
obstacle to the State’s obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We hold that the circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-appellant. Circumstantial evidence may be
competent to establish guilt as long as it is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, and not
someone else, was responsible for the killing.19 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction as long as there is (1) more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.20

We go back to accused-appellant’s own admission that he indeed injured Adrian, causing him near-fatal injuries. From this
admission the rest of the evidence, albeit circumstantial, made out a clear case for Oliver’s murder. First, the victims were
together in Adrian’s pedicab when the attack took place; second, accused-appellant hacked Adrian with a bolo; third, Adrian’s
injuries were caused by a bolo; fourth, Adrian tried to push Oliver to safety before he lost unconsciousness; fifth, Oliver’s
wounds were found to have been caused by a weapon that made similar hacking wounds as the one made by accused-
appellant when he assaulted Adrian; and sixth, Oliver died on the same day Adrian sustained stab wounds. Although there is
no direct evidence of Oliver’s actual wounding, the circumstantial evidence presented sufficiently established that it was
accused-appellant who perpetrated the twin attacks on the brothers.

Accused-appellant, thus, cannot argue that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to convict him. Furthermore, we have
long ago held that the presentation of the murder weapon is not even essential for a conviction.21

Voluntary Surrender

For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous and in a
manner that shows that the accused made an unconditional surrender to the authorities, either based on recognition of guilt
or from the desire to save the authorities from the trouble and expenses that would be involved in the accused’s search and
capture.22 Moreover, it is imperative that the accused was not actually arrested, the surrender is before a person in authority
or an agent of a person in authority, and the surrender was voluntary.23

None of these requisites are present in accused-appellant’s case. In fact, jurisprudence holds that merely reporting the
incident cannot be considered voluntary surrender within contemplation of the law.24 By accused-appellant’s own admission,
he only went to the authorities to inform them that Adrian was injured. What is more, accused-appellant claims he had
nothing to do with the murder of Oliver. Even if we were to consider voluntary surrender as mitigating, this would only apply
to the injury inflicted on Adrian. Accused-appellant denies culpability in Oliver’s death and this negates any acknowledgement
of guilt.

Incomplete Self-Defense

We likewise find implausible accused-appellant’s assertion that he employed self-defense. The records show that the
requisites of a successful claim of self-defense were not met. As found in the Revised Penal Code, these are:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.––The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Any one who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression.

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

In incomplete self-defense, the indispensable requisite is unlawful aggression.25 What is missing is either reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it or lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons defending
themselves. In the instant case, accused-appellant’s self-serving claim of self-defense coupled with the fact that he did not
sustain any injuries from his supposed attacker, Adrian, fails to support any claim of unlawful aggression, the crucial requisite
to his defense. As the appellate court noted, there was no clear, credible, and convincing evidence that Adrian was the one
who instigated the fight and that accused-appellant was merely fending off an attack. Unlawful aggression by the victim must
be clearly shown.26

Lack of Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong

Under Article 13(3) of the Code, the circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed mitigates criminal liability. This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the
particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act.27 Looking at the victims’ wounds, however, we
cannot count the circumstance in accused-appellant’s favor. Adrian suffered a hacking wound on his left forearm that caused
near amputation, and another one on his lumbar area. These wounds would have been fatal were it not for timely medical
assistance. Oliver, on the other hand, bore the brunt of the attack with eleven (11) different stab wounds, including one on
the skull and on the chest. The number, location, and nature of these stab wounds belie accused-appellant’s claim of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong against his victim.28 1avvphi1

Conclusion

We agree with the findings by the trial and appellate courts on the particulars of the case. Findings of facts of the trial court,
as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of
the outcome of the case.29 Since the aforementioned exceptions are not present, accused-appellant’s conviction is warranted.

Finally, we affirm the sentence imposed on accused-appellant in both criminal cases. In accordance with jurisprudence,30 we,
however, additionally award moral damages of PhP 50,000 to Adrian. His physical, psychological, and moral sufferings from
the wounds inflicted on him serve as the basis for the award and this does not require proof or pleading as ground for this
award.311awphi1

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00129 which found accused-appellant guilty of
Frustrated Homicide in Criminal Case No. 4255 and Murder in Criminal Case No. 4276 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he is likewise ordered to pay Adrian the amount of PhP 50,000 as moral damages.