G.R. No.

151867 January 29, 2004 Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed
on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner, marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article
vs. 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star
IBRAHIM, Respondents. Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering
that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines.7
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she
DECISION conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
whatever he does.
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from
he was working in the advertising business of his father. The
Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity
exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September
for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to
28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20,
live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
1967.2
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her
family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.8
September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
20, 1976.6 The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither
property nor debt.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church
marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
national.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by
parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of
Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite
property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the
the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with
previously acquired by creditors.
whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by
Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special SO ORDERED.9
occasions.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:
appealed alleging that –
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
I physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
II of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
VOID.
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
III judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE. addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
marriage.10 legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition. of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent
suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
(2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists,
evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
incapacity suffered by respondent. might be helpful or even desirable.13

The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy
psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can
behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
"psychological incapacity?" she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that
respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital
union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced
four children.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by

themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation
of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal
separation under Article 5517 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out
in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds
for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent.
The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court
of the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate
court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of
1âw phi 1

petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances,

like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answers to every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with
petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the
law no matter how harsh it may be.20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.