Professional Documents
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Arcilla Vs Arcilla
Arcilla Vs Arcilla
FACTS:
A case was filed before the lower court is for annulment of a deed of sale allegedly executed by
Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla in favor of one of his sons, petitioner Laureano Arcilla. It was
originally filed and instituted by the said Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla but she died even before
the pre-trial of the case and was therefore substituted by her other children.
Petitioner was a defendant in a case for Annulment of Sale with Damages, filed by the
respondents
Pre-trial was set in July 1975 but was reset in October 1975; Come October, Petitioner and his
counsel did not appear thus they were declared in default;
The judgment favored the respondents declaring the deed of sale null and void
Petitioner, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Set Aside the
Decision which the court denied
Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that they were not notified of the
setting for pre-trial to October and that petitioner learned of the decision of October 1976 only
on March 1977 when the herein undersigned counsel showed him a xerox copy of the same
which the undersigned counsel procured a day earlier
Petitioner wants to set aside the decision based on mistake and or excusable neglect for their
failure to inquire from their lawyer Atty. Monteclaros or with this Court believing that they will
be duly notified of any proceeding in connection with the case either by their lawyer Atty.
Monteclaros or by the Office of the Clerk of Court of this Court; Petitioner attached an affidavit
of merit
Court denied the petitioner’s motion because the petition for relief was filed out of time for the
judgment of this Court was received by counsel of petitioners on November 1976, hence, the
defendants had only up to January 1977 to file a petition for relief from judgment for notice to
counsel is notice to the client.
ISSUE:
HELD:
NO. The pertinent provisions of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court on "Relief from Judgments, Orders
or Other Proceedings" state —
"Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof. — When a judgment or order is
entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule
must be verified filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be."
The rule, therefore, is that in order for a petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be entertained by the
court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the
provisions of said Rule 38. Consequently, in assailing the lower court’s dismissal of his petition for relief
for having been filed out of time, it is incumbent upon herein petitioner to show that the said petition
was filed within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38. He has failed to do so, instead
he argues on the merits of his petition for relief, without first showing that the same was filed on time in
the court below. On this ground alone, the instant case should be dismissed.
Moreover, We agree with the respondent Judge that the petition for relief was filed late. We note that
the decision sought to be set aside was rendered on October 27, 1976. Petitioner, through counsel,
received a copy of the said decision on November 8, 1976, and he filed his petition for relief from
judgment only on April 18, 1977. Clearly, the same was filed beyond the period allowed by Section 3 of
Rule 38. As in previous cases, this Court holds and so rules that the instant petition filed after the lapse
of the reglementary period cannot be entertained.
A deeper examination of the pleadings and the record of the case would show that petitioner was
present during the pre trial conference on July 1975 when the lower court re-set the pre-trial to October
1975. On the said date, however, although notified, both petitioner and his counsel did not appear,
hence, the declaration of default.
Examining the petition for relief filed by petitioner, while the same appears verified and accompanied by
an affidavit of merit, the allegations of fact made therein do not prove either fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, nor show a valid defense in favor of the party seeking relief. The general
allegation made therein to the effect that "petitioner has a good and valid defense considering that the
late Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla voluntarily and willingly executed the document of Sale", is not sufficient
compliance with the rules. Since the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was written in English and it is
admitted that Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla is an illiterate and do not know how to read and write, it would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have secured the affidavit of Nemesio Jubay, the Notary
Public who allegedly notarized the document as well as the witnesses to the execution and signing
thereof to show that the contents of the document was fully explained to said Segunda O. Vda. de
Arcilla and that she voluntarily signed the same. This way, petitioner could convince the Court that in his
legal fight, he had a leg on which to stand. It thus results that reversal of the order complained of, as
well as the judgment rendered thereon would be an idle ceremony. It would not advance or for that
matter serve the ends of justice. It would only result in another waste of time, effort and expense.
For the reasons stated above, the Order of the lower court dated May 8, 1977 denying herein
petitioner’s Petition for Relief should be affirmed