Election Law First 10 Cases
Election Law First 10 Cases
These discrepancies bolster the statement of During the pendency of the case, we deemed it
the Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner was not proper to issue an Order dated 07 September
and neverhad been a resident of their barangay. 2010 directing the parties to observe the status
At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only quo before the issuance of these COMELEC
show that petitioner was building and Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from the
developing a beach resort and a house mayoralty race in Baliangao. We issued the
in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed Order, considering that petitioner, having
in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she wanted to garnered the highest number of votes in the 10
oversee the construction of the resort and the May 2010 elections, had assumed office as
house. municipal mayor. However, with this final
determination of her ineligibility to run for
Assuming that the claim of property ownership office, there is now a permanent vacancy in the
of petitioner is true, Fernandez v. office of the mayor of Baliangao. Hence, the
COMELEC43 has established that the ownership vice-mayor of Baliangao shall become its mayor
of a house or some other property does not in accordance with Section 44 of the Local
establish domicile. This principle is especially Government Code.
true in this case as petitioner has failed to
establish her bodily presence in the locality and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
her intent to stay there at least a year before the Petition is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order
elections, to wit:cralawlibrary issued by this Court on 07 September 2010 is
hereby LIFTED.
To use ownership of property in the district as
the determinative indicium of permanence of
domicile or residence implies that the landed can G.R. No. 195649 : July 2, 2013
establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, CASAN MACODE MACQUILING,
imposing a property requirement to the right to Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
hold public office, which property requirement ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y
would be unconstitutional. CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA.
Respondents.
Finally, the approval of the application for
registration of petitioner as a voter only shows, SERENO, J.:
at most, that she had met the minimum residency
requirement as a voter.44 This minimum FACTS:
requirement is different from that for acquiring a
new domicile of choice for the purpose of This Resolution resolves the Motion for
running for public office. Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10,
2013 and the Supplemental Motion for
Accordingly, in the CoC of petitioner, her Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
statement of her eligibility to run for office
constitutes a material misrepresentation that We are not unaware that the term of office of the
warrants its cancellation.45 She contends that local officials elected in the May 2010 elections
respondent COMELEC never made a finding has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado,
that she had committed material therefore, has successfully finished his term of
misrepresentation. Her contention, however, is office. While the relief sought can no longer be
belied by its factual determination in its 04 June granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration
is important as it will either affirm the validity of citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior
Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never to expatriation."
qualified to run for public office.
American law does not govern in this
Respondent failed to advance any argument to jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local
support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Government Code calls for application in the
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he case before us, given the fact that at the time
presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only declaration, also an American citizen. It is the
twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, application of this law and not of any foreign
that the relevant question is the efficacy of his law that serves as the basis for Arnados
renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not disqualification to run for any local elective
the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the position.
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his
accomplishments as mayor affect the question With all due respect to the dissent, the declared
before this Court. policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run another country shall be deemed not to have lost
for a local elective position? their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act."This policy pertains to the
HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied. reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section
5(2)requires those who have re-acquired
REMEDIAL LAW: judicial notice of foreign Philippine citizenship and who seek elective
laws public office, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act of the United States as This requirement of renunciation of any and all
having the effect of expatriation when he foreign citizenship, when read together with
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of Section 40(d) of the Local Government
American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus Codewhich disqualifies those with dual
claims that he was divested of his American citizenship from running for any elective local
citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested position, indicates a policy that anyone who
of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact seeks to run for public office must be solely and
that he was still able to use his US passport after exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former
executing his Affidavit of Renunciation Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
repudiates this claim. continue using a foreign passport which
indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign individual as its national even after the Filipino
laws,which must be presented as public has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow
documentsof a foreign country and must be a complete disregard of this policy.
"evidenced by an official publication
thereof."Mere reference to a foreign law in a Further, we respectfully disagree that the
pleading does not suffice for it to be considered majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
in deciding a case.
POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible
Respondent likewise contends that this Court for local public office
failed to cite any law of the United States
"providing that a person who is divested of Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of
American citizenship thru an Affidavit of the Local Government Code disqualifies those
Renunciation will re-acquire such American with dual citizenship from running for local
elective positions. the administrative body had arbitrarily
disregarded or misapprehended evidence before
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a it to such an extent as to compel a contrary
passport is a positive declaration that one is a conclusion had such evidence been properly
citizen of the country which issued the passport, appreciated.
or that a passport proves that the country which
issued it recognizes the person named therein as Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that
its national. COMELEC First Division found that Arnado
used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born renounced his American citizenship. This was
Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which
citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport
that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by four times, and which agreed with Arnados
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines claim that he only used his U.S. passport on
and that he renounced his American citizenship. those occasions because his Philippine passport
It is also indubitable that after renouncing his was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc
American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. argued that Arnado was able to prove that he
passport at least six times. used his Philippine passport for his travels on
the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20
the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
American citizenship when he subsequently
used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of None of these dates coincide with the two other
foreign citizenship must be complete and dates indicated in the certification issued by the
unequivocal. The requirement that the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21
renunciation must be made through an oath January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making arrived in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport
the oath of renunciation to remain true to what No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that
he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of his nationality is USA-American. Adding these
a foreign passport because it is convenient for two travel dates to the travel record provided by
the person to do so is rendering the oath a the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado
hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon
oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25
June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and
The dissent states that the Court has effectively upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these
left Arnado "a man without a country".On the incidents sum up to six.
contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to
have more than one. Nowhere in the decision The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the
does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. use of the US passport was because to his
What the decision merely points out is that he knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet
also possessed another citizenship at the time he issued to him for his use."This conclusion,
filed his certificate of candidacy. however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado
claims that his Philippine passport was issued on
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of 18 June 2009. The records show that he
administrative bodies will not be interfered with continued to use his U.S. passport even after he
by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of already received his Philippine passport.
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless Arnados travel records show that he presented
the aforementioned findings are not supported his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21
by substantial evidence.They are accorded not January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These
only great respect but even finality, and are facts were never refuted by Arnado.
binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is ISSUE: Whether or not respondents COC should
based on a misapprehension of the facts that the be cancelled
use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when
Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. HELD: No. Decision of COMELEC en banc
Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport affirmed.
cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to
what the dissent wants us to believe. POLITICAL LAW: Material
misrepresentation contemplated by Sec. 78 of
It must be stressed that what is at stake here the Omnibus Election Code refer to
is the principle that only those who are qualifications for elective office
exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for
public office. If we allow dual citizens who In order to justify the cancellation of the
wish to run for public office to renounce their certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is
foreign citizenship and afterwards continue essential that the false representation mentioned
using their foreign passports, we are creating therein pertains to a material matter for the
a special privilege for these dual citizens, sanction imposed by this provision would affect
thereby effectively junking the prohibition in the substantive rights ofa candidate the right to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. run for the elective post for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy.
G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, Petitioner, v. false representation under Section 78 must
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE, Respondents. misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were both must be made with an intention to deceive the
candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the electorate as to ones qualifications for public
province of CamarinesSur in the May 2013 local office. The use of surname, when not intended to
elections. Petitioner file a with the COMELEC a mislead, or deceive the public as to ones identity
verified Petition to deny due course or cancel the is not within the scope of the provision.
certificate of candidacy of respondent alleging Respondents nickname is not considered a
that the latter intentionally misrepresented a material fact, and there is no substantial
false and deceptive name/ nickname that would evidence showing that in writing the nickname
mislead the voters when he declared under oath LRAY JR. MIGZ in his COC, respondent had
in his COC that LRAY JR.MIGZ was his the intention to deceive the voters as to his
nickname or stage name and that the name he identity which has an effect on his eligibility or
intended to appear on the official ballot was qualification for the office he seeks to assume.
VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.MIGZ NP; that
respondent deliberately omitted his first name Notably, respondent is known to the voters of
MIGUEL and inserted, instead LRAY JR., the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the
which is the nickname of his father, the then incumbent Governor of the province,
incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur,LRay popularly known as LRay. Their relationship is
Villafuerte, Jr. shown by the posters, streamers and billboards
displayed in the province with the faces of both
COMELECs First Division and COMELEC en the father and son on them. Thus, the voters of
banc ruled that there is no reason to cancel the the Province of Camarines Sur know who
COC of respondent as matters of material respondent is. Moreover, it was established by
misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to the affidavits of respondents witnesses that as
qualifications of a candidate and nothing is the father and son have striking similarities, such
mentioned about a candidates name. as their looks and mannerisms, which remained
unrebutted, the appellation of LRAY JR. has
been used to refer torespondent. Hence, the RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a
appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by the candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth
name MIGZ16written as respondents nickname District of Leyte, for lack of residency
in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters, requirement.
as in fact, such name distinguishes respondent
from his father, the then incumbent Governor SO ORDERED.
LRAY, who was running for a Congressional
seat in the 2ndDistrict of Camarines Sur. Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied by the COMELEC En
Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7
Tagolino v. House of Representatives Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date,
Electoral Tribunal Richard accepted the said resolution with
finality “in order to enable his substitute to
G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013 facilitate the filing of the necessary documents
for substitution.”
J. Perlas-Bernabe
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez
Facts: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together with
(Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10
(CoC) with the Commission on Elections from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the
(COMELEC), seeking congressional office as party’s official substitute candidate vice her
Representative for the Fourth Legislative husband, Richard, for the same congressional
District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal post. In response to various letter-requests
Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department
of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in
Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, the exercise of its administrative functions,
alleging that Richard, who was actually a issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010,
resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San approving, among others, the recommendation
Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his of the said department to allow the substitution
CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, of private respondent.
Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla
asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) The substitution complied with the requirements
year residency requirement under Section 6, provided under Section 12 in relation to Section
Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated
(Constitution) and thus should be declared October 6, 2009.
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office.
In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC xxxx
be denied due course and/or cancelled.
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First RECOMMENDS the following:
Division rendered a Resolution6 granting
Juntilla’s petition without any qualification. The xxxx
dispositive portion of which reads:
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ:
RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification
filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA Issue: Whether or not there is valid substitution.
against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly,
Held: No. A. Distinction between a petition for the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility
disqualification and a petition to deny due requirements as prescribed by law, such as age,
course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy. residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he
or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought
certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for by the commission of the above-mentioned
public office. Among these which obtain election offenses.
particular significance to this case are: (1) a
petition for disqualification under Section 68; On the other hand, a denial of due course to
and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s
78. The distinctions between the two are well- misrepresentation of any of the material
perceived. qualifications required for the elective office
aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section the relevant qualification; he or she must have
68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a also made a false representation of the same in
candidate’s possession of a permanent resident the CoC. The nature of a Section 78 petition was
status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC,
commission of certain acts of disqualification. where the Court illumined:
Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under
Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course
OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
In particular, these are: (1) giving money or the lack of qualifications but on a finding that
other material consideration to influence, induce the candidate made a material representation that
or corrupt the voters or public officials is false, which may relate to the qualifications
performing electoral functions; (2) committing required of the public office he/she is running
acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) for. It is noted that the candidates states in
spending in one’s election campaign an amount his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office
in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore,
soliciting, receiving or making any contribution is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 statutory provisions on qualifications or
of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, eligibility for public office. If the candidate
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subsequently states a material representation in
subparagraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following
same provision (Section 68) states that any the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
candidate who, in an action or protest in which cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has
he or she is a party, is declared by final decision already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of
COMELEC to have committed any of the the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility
foregoing acts shall be disqualified from or qualification of a candidate, with the
continuing as a candidate for public office, or distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78”
disallowed from holding the same, if he or she petition is filed before proclamation, while a
had already been elected. petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate.
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified (Emphasis supplied)
under Section 68 is still technically considered
to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the
continue as such only because of supervening deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much
infractions which do not, however, deny his or less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare
her statutory eligibility. In other words, while significance in a Section 78 petition as it is
enough that the person’s declaration of a disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
material qualification in the CoC be false. In this Revised Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then
relation, jurisprudence holds that an express President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an
finding that the person committed any deliberate order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16)
misrepresentation is of little consequence in the years, three (3) months and three (3) days.
determination of whether one’s CoC should be
deemed cancelled or not. What remains material On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register
is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because
course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of of his previous conviction, his application was
one’s ineligibility and that the same be granted denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the
without any qualification. Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting
him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal
Section 68 is still considered to have been a Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City.
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the Pending resolution of the same, he filed a
other hand, a person whose CoC had been CoCon October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor
denied due course to and/or cancelled under for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local
Section 78 is deemed to have not been a elections scheduled on May 13, 2013. In his
candidate at all. The reason being is that a CoC, petitioner stated,inter alia,that he is eligible
cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and for the said office and that he is a registered
thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga v.
COMELEC (Talaga), the Court ruled that: On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his
Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
xxxx absolute disqualification which in effect,
deprived him of the right to vote in any election.
While a person who is disqualified under Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section
candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended,
or denied due course under Section 78 is not otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never Code" (OEC), was immediately final and
filed a CoC. executory.
FACTS: On November 16, 2001, the Court ISSUES: [1] Did the COMELEC En Banc act
promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu
by final judgment.Consequently, he was proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing,
sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of violated petitioner's right to due process?
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for
each count, respectively, which carried the [2] Had petitioner's perpetual absolute
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office
already been removed by Section 40 (a) of the
LGC? mayor for Zamboanga City.
HELD: The COMELEC En Banc did not It is well to note that the use of the word
exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory
issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this
jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve respect, does not depend on the length of the
any election case before it or any of its prison term, which is imposed as its principal
divisions.Rather, it merely performed its duty to penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court's
enforce and administer election laws in ruling in Lacuna v. Abes,where the Court
cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as
perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of applied to the penalty of disqualification to run
which had already been established by his final for public office.
conviction.In this regard, the COMELEC En
Banc was exercising its administrative functions, The accessory penalty of temporary absolute
dispensing with the need for a motion for disqualification disqualified the convict for
reconsideration of a division ruling under public office and for the right to vote, such
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the disqualification to last only during the term of
same being required only in quasi-judicial the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article
proceedings. 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of
Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
The denial of due course to and/or cancellation
of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise But this does not hold true with respect to the
of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions other accessory penalty of perpetual special
commenced through a petition based on either disqualification for the exercise of the right of
Sections 12 or 78of the OEC, or Section 40 of suffrage.This accessory penalty deprives the
the LGC, when the grounds therefor are convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
rendered conclusive on account of final and hold public office perpetually, as distinguished
executory judgments as when a candidate's from temporary special disqualification, which
disqualification to run for public office is based lasts during the term of the
on a final conviction. sentence. DISMISSED.
(4) It is only when the protestant has shown The Rosal ruling, to be sure, does not involve
substantial compliance with the provisions of issues merely related to the appreciation or
law on the preservation of ballots that the burden calibration of evidence; its critical ruling is on
of proving actual tampering or likelihood thereof the propriety of relying on the revision of ballot
shifts to the protestee; and results instead of the election returns in the
proclamation of a winning candidate. In
(5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the deciding this issue, what it notably established
court of COMELEC that the integrity of the was a critical guide in arriving at its conclusion
ballots has been preserved should it adopt the the need to determine whether the court or the
result as shown by the recount and not as COMELEC looked at the correct considerations
reflected in the election returns. in making its ruling.[24]
This Court had long stated that "[u]pholding the
In the same case, the Court referred to various sovereignty of the people is what democracy is
provisions in the Omnibus Election Code all about. When the sovereignty of the people
providing for the safe-keeping and preservation expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not
of the ballots, more specifically Secs. 160, 217, enough for this Court to make a statement but it
219, and 220 of the Code. should do everything to have that sovereignty
obeyed by all. Well done is always better than
Rosal was promulgated precisely to honor the well said."[25] This is really what
presumption of regularity in the performance of the Rosal doctrine is all about.
official functions. Following Rosal, it is The Rosal doctrine ensures that in election
presumed that the BET and Board of Canvassers protest cases, the supreme mandate of the people
had faithfully performed the solemn duty is ultimately determined. In laying down the
reposed unto them during the day of the rules in appreciating the conflicting results of the
elections. Thus, primacy is given to the official canvassing and the results of a revision later
made, the Court has no other intention but to
determine the will of the electorate. (3) The ballot is properly accomplished;
The Rosal doctrine is also supplemented by (4) A voter personally prepared one ballot,
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC,[26] establishing the except in the case of assistors; and
following disputable presumptions:
(5) The exercise of one's right to vote was
SEC. 6. Disputable presumptions. - The voluntary and free.
following presumptions are considered as facts, Private respondent Co has not proved that
unless contradicted and overcome by other the integrity of the ballots has been
evidence: preserved