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People v. Sandiganbayan
People v. Sandiganbayan
DECISION
BERSAMIN , J : p
The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the
Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies. Thus, the fact- nding investigation should not be deemed separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Of ce of the Ombudsman if the aggregate time
spent for both constitutes inordinate and oppressive delay in the disposition of any case.
The Case
The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify, in
G.R. No. 188165, the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest Escaler,
and Ramon A. Arceo, for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended;
and, in G.R. No. 189063, the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of SB-08-CRM-0266 entitled
People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest Escaler, and
Ramon A. Arceo, for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of the Revised
Penal Code. ETHCDS
On even date, Secretary Perez, through counsel, requested Ombudsman Marcelo that the
Of ce of the Ombudsman itself directly verify from the Coutt's Bank whether he (Secretary
Perez) had ever held any account in that bank to which the sum of US$2 Million had been
remitted by Cong. Jimenez. 1 0
On January 15, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special
Panel to refer the complaint of Cong. Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown fact- nding
investigation. 1 1
On June 4, 2003, the Of ce of the Ombudsman received the letter dated May 30, 2003
from the counsel of Cong. Jimenez, submitting the supplemental complaint-af davit dated
April 4, 2003 of Cong. Jimenez.
In his letter dated July 3, 2003, Secretary Perez, through counsel, sought the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of probable cause. 1 2
On July 17, 2003, Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol informed Secretary Perez
about the letter from Coutts Bank stating that "Hernando B. Perez" had no account with it,
and assured that the letter would be considered in the final resolution of the case. 1 3
On August 22, 2005, Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special Panel to evaluate CPL-C-
02-1992, and, if warranted, to conduct administrative and preliminary investigations,
thereby superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed on January 2, 2003. 1 4
On November 14, 2005, the Field Investigation Of ce (FIO) completed its fact- nding
investigation and filed complaints against the following individuals, namely: HSDIaC
On November 23, 2005, the Special Panel directed Secretary Perez (who had meanwhile
resigned from of ce), his wife Rosario S. Perez (Mrs. Perez), Escaler and Arceo to submit
their counter-af davits in OMB-C-C-02-0857-L, OMB-C-C-05-0633-K, OMB-C-C-05-0634-K
and OMB-C-C-05-0635-K (criminal cases). In another order of the same date, the Special
Panel directed former Secretary Perez to le his counter-af davit in OMB-C-A-02-0631-L
(administrative case). 1 6
On November 29, 2005, the respondents filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file
their counter-affidavits.
On December 2, 2005, the counsel for Escaler entered his appearance and sought the
extension of the time to file Escaler's counter-affidavit. 1 7
On December 5, 2005, the Special Panel ordered the respondents to le their counter-
affidavits within ten days from December 4, 2005, or until December 14, 2005. 1 8 HCaDIS
On December 7, 2005, Asst. Ombudsman Apostol issued PAMO Of ce Order No. 22,
Series of 2005, creating a new team of investigators to assist in the preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication of OMB-C-C-02-0857L, OMB-C-A-02-0631L
(administrative case), OMB-C-C-05-0633K to OMB-C-C-0635K (forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379). The of ce order cancelled and superseded PAMO Of ce
Order No. 01-2003, Series of 2003. 1 9
On December 12, 2005, former Secretary Perez, Mrs. Perez and Arceo led an urgent
motion to be furnished copies of the complaints. 2 0 On December 13, 2005, they
submitted a consolidated joint counter-affidavit dated December 12, 2005. 2 1
On December 15, 2005, the respondents led a manifestation to which they attached the
affidavit of Atty. Chona Dimayuga. 2 2
On December 20, 2005, Escaler, instead of ling his counter-af davit, moved to disqualify
the Of ce of the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation, and to require
the Special Panel to turn over the investigation to the Department of Justice (DOJ). 2 3
On December 22, 2005, the respondents submitted the af davit of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuño. 2 4
On December 29, 2005, the Special Panel denied the motion to disqualify the Of ce of the
Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation, and ordered Escaler to submit
his counter-affidavit within five days from notice. 2 5 HAaScT
On January 4, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed an urgent motion for extension of the period to file
his opposition to the motion earlier led by Escaler, and to be granted a new period to
reply to the consolidated joint counter-affidavit of the Perezes and Arceo. 2 6
Between January 9, 2006 and February 10, 2006, Cong. Jimenez led urgent motions for
time to le his opposition, the last of them seeking an extension until February 10, 2006. 2 7
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On February 21, 2006, the Perezes and Arceo reiterated their urgent motion to be furnished
copies of the complaints. 2 8
On February 22, 2006, Cong. Jimenez opposed Escaler's motion to disqualify the Of ce of
the Ombudsman. 2 9 On the same date, Escaler asked for at least 20 days from February
17, 2006 (or until March 9, 2006) within which to reply to Cong. Jimenez's opposition to
his motion. 3 0 On March 9, 2006, Escaler replied to Cong. Jimenez's opposition. 3 1 On
March 28, 2006, Cong. Jimenez sought leave to file a rejoinder to Escaler's reply. 3 2 cAIDEa
On May 15, 2006, Escaler moved for the reconsideration of the order of December 29,
2005. 3 3
On May 25, 2006, the Special Panel denied Escaler's motion for reconsideration; directed
the FIO "to let respondent Escaler examine, compare, copy and obtain any and all
documentary evidence described, attached to and forming part of the complaints" of the
cases; and granted Escaler an extension of ve days within which to submit his counter-
affidavit. 3 4
After Escaler failed to submit his counter-af davit despite the lapse of the ve day period
given to him, the preliminary investigation was terminated. 3 5
On August 23, 2006, Escaler commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari
with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) docketed as G.R. No. 173967-71.
3 6 On September 4, 2006, the Court required the Of ce of the Ombudsman to comment on
the petition of Escaler. 3 7
On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel issued a joint resolution, nding probable cause
and recommending that criminal informations be led against the respondents, as follows:
1) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler
and Ramon S. Arceo, Jr. for Extortion (Robbery) under par. 5 of Article 294
in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code;
On April 18, 2008, the Perezes brought a petition for certiorari with an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction in this Court (G.R. No. 182360-63). 4 9 In due time, the Court
required the respondents in G.R. No. 182360-63 to file their comments on the petition. 5 0
On April 18, 2008, the Of ce of the Ombudsman led in the Sandiganbayan four
informations against respondents, namely:
1. for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended;
2. for Robbery (Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code);
3. for Falsi cation of Public/Of cial Document under Art. 171 of the Revised
Penal Code; and
That during the month of February, 2001 and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Hernando B. Perez, a high ranking public of cer, being
then the Secretary of the Department of Justice, while in the performance of his
of cial function, committing the offense in relation to his of ce and taking
advantage thereof, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with accused
Ernest L. Escaler, Rosario S. Perez and Ramon C. Arceo, all private individuals, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally request and demand the amount
of US TWO MILLION DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00) for himself and/or other persons
from Mark Jimenez a.k.a. Mario B. Crespo, and thereafter succeeded in receiving
from the latter the sum of US$1,999,965.00 in consideration of accused Hernando
S. Perez's desisting from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute af davits
implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against former
President Joseph 'Erap' Estrada and in connection with the pending application of
Mark Jimenez for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the
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government, over which transaction accused Hernando S. Perez had to intervene
in his of cial capacity under the law, to the damage and prejudice of Mark
Jimenez.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 3
On May 8, 2008, the Perezes moved to quash the information. 5 4 Escaler presented a
similar motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam on May 12, 2008, 5 5 while Arceo
adopted the motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13, 2008. 5 6 On June 4, 2008, the
Office of the Ombudsman countered with a consolidated opposition. 5 7
On July 17, 2008, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution
denying the motions to quash, 5 8 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash of accused
Hernando B. Perez and Rosario S. Perez and the urgent Ex-Abudanti Ad Cautelam
Motion to Quash of accused Ernest Escaler are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let the arraignment of the accused herein proceed on July 18, 2008
at 8:30 in the morning as previously set by the Court.
SO ORDERED . DcaCSE
"It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a
contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed
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as analogous to the terms which precedes it. A transaction like a
contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit
transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner ." (Emphasis supplied) CDaTAI
Thus, applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in the case at bench,
the Court believes and so holds that the alleged desistance of accused Hernando
B. Perez "from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute af davits implicating target
personalities involved in the plunder case against former President Joseph 'Erap'
Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for
admission into the WPP of the government", cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as "contract" o r "transaction" as de ned within the
ambit of the fourth element of the offense under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because
no "monetary consideration" as in credit transaction is involved.
The Court nds untenable the prosecution's contention that the execution by
Mark Jimenez of the af davits in connection with his pending application for
admission in the WPP (and not the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B.
Perez from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute af davits implicating target
personalities involved in the plunder case against President Estrada) is the very
contract or transaction required by the offense charged in this case; and that all
the elements of a contract contemplated therein are present as there is allegedly
consent between the government and Mark Jimenez, object or subject matter
which is the execution of af davits in connection with his application for
admission in the WPP, and a cause or consideration which consists of security
and monetary bene ts to be given by the government to Mark Jimenez in
exchange for his participation as a witness under the WPP. HDCAaS
For even assuming for the sake of argument that the pending application of Mark
Jimenez for admission in the WPP can be considered as a contract or transaction,
it bears stressing that the principal consideration for the said application of Mark
Jimenez is the latter's obligation to testify as a witness under the WPP on one
hand and his entitlement to the protection granted to a witness in the WPP on the
other hand and as such, does not entail any money consideration. Certainly, this
is not the (monetary) consideration which is essential or involved in credit
transactions. Any pecuniary or monetary expense that may be incurred by the
Government as a result of the implementation of the program in favour of Mark
Jimenez is purely incidental. Such alleged monetary bene t is de nitely not the
reason that impelled Mark Jimenez to allegedly avail of the WPP of the
government. EAcTDH
More precisely, however, what appears as the main consideration of the alleged
demand or receipt of accused Hernando B. Perez of the sum of US$2,000,000.00
from Mark Jimenez is the former's alleged desistance from pressuring the latter
to execute af davits implicating targeted personalities in the plunder case
against former President Estrada. In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, such alleged desistance of accused Hernando
B. Perez (and even the application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP
as argued by the prosecution) can hardly be considered as a "contract" or
"transaction" that is contemplated in Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended.
Moreover, the Court takes note of the admission made by the prosecution in its
Memorandum that the transaction involving Mark Jimenez's execution of
af davits for his admission to the WPP is not yet a perfected contract between
the Government and Mark Jimenez since it is still in its "negotiation phase"
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because of the refusal of Mark Jimenez to execute the af davits against certain
individuals. This admission is another indication that there is indeed no contract
or transaction to speak of that is covered under the fourth element of the offense
of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.
Finally, it may be argued that while the material allegations in the subject
information may not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA
3019, as amended, the same material/factual allegations nevertheless constitute
Direct Bribery or another felony which is necessarily included in the offense
charged herein so that the subject information in this case should not be
quashed. It is believed, however, that the ling of the Information charging the
accused with Robbery in SB-08-CRM-00266 pending before the Second Division
of this Court on the basis of the same acts complained of in this case, constitutes
a bar against the information for said lesser felony as it would result into two
differently charged felonies from a single act and thus, would unnecessarily or
unjusti ably expose the accused to the danger of suffering two penalties for a
single offense if the subject information is not quashed. If a single act results into
two or more offenses, they should not be charged and/or punished separately
unless the other offense with different elements is penalized under a special law.
To do so would violate, if not the principle of double jeopardy, the rule against
splitting a single act into various charges. It is settled that a defendant should not
be harassed with various prosecutions upon the same act by splitting the same
into various charges, all emanating from the same law violated, when the
prosecution could easily and well embody them in a single information because
such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the
administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would
require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before different
courts. aTCADc
All told, with the absence of the fourth element, the Court nds that the
factual/material allegations in the subject Information do not constitute the
offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, and therefore, It is
constrained to quash the said Information. In this regard, the Court deems it
unnecessary to discuss/resolve the other issues raised in the subject motions for
reconsideration of the herein accused and/or disturb the other ndings contained
in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered.
WHEREFORE , the instant Motions for Reconsideration of the herein accused are
resolved accordingly and the subject Information for violation of Section 3(b) of
R.A. 3019, as amended, is hereby QUASHED .
SO ORDERED .
The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the information in
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265.
During the pendency of the State's motion for reconsideration, Criminal Case No. SB-08-
CRM-0265 was re-raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On April 21, 2009, the Third Division denied the Ombudsman's motion for reconsideration,
6 0 holding thusly:
(a) ...
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or bene t, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public of cer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out
a case of Direct Bribery de ned and penalized under the provision
of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of
Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support,
if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense
charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included
in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution
showed that: the accused is a public of cer; in consideration of
P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was
allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss
a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him,
which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of
dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was
related to the exercise of the function of his of ce. Therefore, it is
with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct
Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)
DASEac
Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene
in the setting of the hearing of cases and she does not formulate
resolutions thereof. The branch clerk of court is the administrative
assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist in the management
of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the
exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge. It is this special relation of
the petitioner with the judge who presumably has reposed con dence in
her which appears to have been taken advantage of by the petitioner in
persuading the complainants to give her money in consideration of a
promise to get a favorable resolution of their cases.
In the Peligrino case, the Supreme Court ruled: SDTIHA
Having resolved the core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Prosecution, there is no further need to discuss the other arguments of the
Prosecution in its Motion. prLL
SO ORDERED .
On June 22, 2009, the Of ce of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via
petition for certiorari the resolution of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17, 2008
quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and the resolution
promulgated on April 21, 2009 denying the State's motion for reconsideration.
On November 18, 2009, the Court denied the Perezes' urgent motion for leave to le a
motion to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading, and instead required the respondents to
comment on the petition, among other things. 6 1 cdtai
The Court after a careful perusal of the issue and the record on hand, is
persuaded. Extant in the record and which the prosecution admits or at least does
not deny are the following:
5. The information was filed with this Court only on April 18, 2008.
With the Ombudsman's nding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated
on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez
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US$1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in
favour of the accused, there is no reason why within a reasonable period from
these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of intimidation was
there, the asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why was the
information led only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge of Robbery
there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which
to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or to dismiss it
are on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same
is a clear transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy
respect for the constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the
Ombudsman to act within a reasonable time. ISCaDH
The long wait of the accused is without valid cause or justi able motive and has
unnecessarily trampled upon their constitutional prerogatives to a speedy
disposition of the case. This is an impermissible course of action that our
fundamental law loathes.
As Justice Laurel said, the government should be the last to set an example of
delay and oppression in the administration of justice. It is the moral and legal
obligation of the Court to see that criminal proceedings come to an end (People
vs. Calamba, 63 Phil. 496).
The Constitution of the Philippines provides:
Art. 3 Sec. 16: All persons shall have a right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial(,) quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
Thus under our present fundamental law, all persons are entitled to a speedy
resolution of their cases be it civil, administrative or criminal cases. It is, in
criminal cases however where the need to a speedy disposition of their cases is
more pronounced. It is so, because in criminal cases, it is not only the honor and
reputation but even the liberty of the accused (even life itself before the
enactment of R.A. 9346) is at stake.
The charge is a simple case for Robbery. Certainly it does not involve complicated
and factual issues that would necessitate painstaking and gruelling scrutiny and
perusal on the part of the Ombudsman. It may have its novel, and to it, valid
reason for departing from the established procedure and rules, but virtually in
doing so, it has failed to discharge its duty as mandated by the Constitution to
promptly act on complaints led in any form or manner against public of cers
and employees. SAHITC
The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears unmistakably
the earmarks of inordinate delay, making the applicability of the doctrine
enunciated in Anchangco Jr. and Duterte cases cited in the parties' pleadings
irrefragable.
While the ground upon which the Court banked and relied this dismissal order
was not invoked in the motions for reconsideration of accused Escaler and Arceo,
since they are similarly situated with their co-accused spouses Perez, this
resolution applies to them with equal force and effect.
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On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, We hereby consider the Motion for
Reconsideration of our resolution denying the motion for consolidation moot and
academic; even as, We rule that the said motion lacks persuasiveness considering
that, per Manifestation of accused Escaler he is not in any way a party to all the
cases pending, the accused in each of the cases were charged with different
offenses, and the different cases are already at different stages of the
proceedings, and considering the argument of the prosecution that the different
offenses in the four (4) cases consist of different elements necessitating
presentation of different proofs and evidence for each case.
Accused'(s) bonds are ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order issued
against them in this case is lifted and set aside.
So ordered.
The State moved to reconsider the resolution of November 20, 2008, 7 1 but the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration on June 19, 2009, 7 2
stating thusly:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the People of the Philippines
dated December 8, 2008 seeking to reconsider the Resolution of this Court
promulgated on November 20, 2008 dismissing the case, as well as accused-
spouses Perez Opposition dated December 22, 2008, accused Arceo's
Comment/Opposition of even date, and the Opposition dated January 5, 2009 of
accused Ernest L. Escaler. HCSAIa
On record too, are the Plaintiff's Consolidated Reply dated January 19, 2009 to
the three (3) Opposition/Comment of the accused, the three (3) Rejoinders of the
accused of different dates, the plaintiff's sub-rejoinder dated February 9, 2009,
accused Perezes(') Manifestation and Plaintiff's Comment dated February 16,
2009 to Perezes(') Manifestation.
Considering thus, the situation, there seems plausibility for the accused claim of
transgression of the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, considering the transfer of the date of hearing, and that all the
parties were given ample time to le and submit their respective pleadings which
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at the time the issue was to be resolved had grown voluminous, the Court is not
inclined to give due consideration for this procedural impropriety.acHITE
The Court takes note however that the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was
led only on December 8, 2008 beyond the fteenth day period within which it
should be led, since it received a copy of the Resolution of this Court on
November 21, 2008. Thus, the fteenth day fell on December 6, 2008 after which
the said Resolution has become nal and executory. The Resolution in question
therefore which nally disposes of the case is not only nal but executory as well
which is virtually beyond the reach of the motion for reconsideration belatedly
filed.
We will now tackle the merits of the grounds invoked by the People.
The rst ground cited in the People's motion was that the ling of complaint
against former secretary Hernando B. Perez was not attended by ill motive since it
reasoned out that it was the intimation of the Court when it stated in its
Resolution the Ombudsman . . . "should have demanded a reasonable
explanation from the complainant who was then a congressman, wealthy and
in uential and in whose house the alleged intimidation took place, why he was
ling the complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter of more than eighteen
(18) months. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible
motive in ling the complaint. . . . "We take note of the response of the
prosecution "Jimenez thought that after the pay-off, Secretary Perez would stop
threatening him and would leave him in peace for good. This was the reason why
Jimenez did not immediately le a complaint against Secretary Perez and his co-
accused." CDISAc
The rst and foremost impression We can gather is that the alleged about two
million dollars which supposedly was the result of accused Perez' alleged
extortion was delivered already to the accused. All along therefore, if the claim of
the prosecution is to be believed, Robbery has long been committed that was on
or about February 2001 as alleged in the information. With or without ill-motive,
the Ombudsman should have acted within a reasonable time. Certainly eighteen
(18) long months from the ling of the complaint can not be considered within a
reasonable time.
The movant then argued that the ling of the information only on April 18, 2008
were due to legal impediments which were beyond the control of the of ce of the
Ombudsman. HaAISC
The Court can not understand those alleged "legal impediments" in the
prosecution for Robbery. Here is the prosecution claiming strongly that the ling
of the complaint was not attended by ill-motive and that after the pay-off even if a
crime has been committed against complaint Congressman Mark Jimenez, the
latter delayed his ling of the complaint because he thought the accused would
leave him in peace. This is the only impediment we can think of, and this
de nitely is not a legal impediment; certainly too this is not beyond the control of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
But the Court shall keep track of the movant's argument about this supposed
legal impediment. Admitting that the asportation was complete on February 23,
2001, the prosecution reasoned out that the case can not be led in Court at that
time due to insuf ciency of evidence. As averred in the Opposition of accused
Ernest Escaler, ". . . the plaintiff's duty is to determine whether there exists
probable cause to hold the accused for trial for simple robbery", and those
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documents which the prosecution so capitalized it exerted so much offer to
obtain, are mere evidentiary matters. This is even admitted in the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration.
Congressman Mark Jimenez did not le my complaint against the accused in any
Court or prosecutor office. This, despite his claim in his counter-affidavit that:
Taking exception to our ruling that the totality of facts and surrounding
circumstances bear unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate delay, the movant
made a comparison of those cases dismissed by the Supreme Court for violation
of the Constitutional right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases, and this
case, and wrongfully conclude there was no delay in their handling of the case at
bar.
We have already resolved and passed upon rather adequately this issue in our
Resolution with the observation that not anyone of the cases cited involved the
charge of Robbery. The movant's discussion asserted no new and substantial
reason and argument to persuade us to reverse or modify our considered opinion.
We however pose this question to the prosecution. If Asst. Ombudsman Pelagio
Apostol recommended the ling of the information against the accused on
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November 7, 2006 why did it take the Ombudsman only on January 5, 2007 to
approve the recommendation. And if, on January 11, 2007 the accused submitted
their Motion for Reconsideration, why did it take the Ombudsman up to April 15,
2008 — a matter of about fifteen (15) months to resolve the same when there was
NO OPPOSITION nor comment from the other party? cECaHA
The argument that "the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the
claimed delay in ling the information as this authority is vested by law" is a
reckless reasoning that only shows that while admitting there was undue delay in
the disposition of the case, it could still proceed with its information to charge the
accused.
The prosecution need not be reminded of the uniform ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court dismissing the cases of Tatad, Angchangco, Duterte and other
cases for transgressing the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases. To argue "that the authority of the Ombudsman is not
divested by the claimed delay in ling the information . . ." is to limit the power of
the Court to act on blatant transgression of the constitution.
As to fact- nding investigation, the Court nds it so baseless for the movant to
capitalize on what it supposedly did in the process of the fact- nding stance; and
then reasoning out as if clutching on straws that the sequences of events should
excuse it from lately ling the information. But it took the movant six (6) years to
conduct the said fact- nding investigation, and then unabashedly it argues that is
not part of the preliminary investigation.
Determining probable cause should usually take no more than ninety (90) days
precisely because it only involves nding out whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the persons charged could be held for trial or not. It does
not require sifting through and meticulously examining every piece of evidence to
ascertain that they are enough to convict the persons involved beyond reasonable
doubt. That is already the function of the Courts.
As argued by accused Ramon Arceo, the claim of the movant that the preliminary
investigation of the instant case commenced only on November 14, 2005 when
the Field Investigation Of ce (FIO) led its complaint, and not on December 23,
2002 when Mark Jimenez led his complaint-af davit, is rather specious and
does not hold water as Robbery was not among the offenses included in the
charge of the FIO. As such, it is not correct to say that the counting of the period
for delay should commence only in November 2005. HCSEcI
The conclusion thus, that the long waiting of six (6) years for the Of ce of the
Ombudsman to resolve the simple case of Robbery is clearly an inordinate delay,
blatantly intolerable, and grossly prejudicial to the constitutional right of speedy
disposition of cases, easily commands assent. This Court, it must be made clear,
is not making nor indulging in mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved.
In its sixth ground the movant argued that the First, Third and Fourth Divisions all
junked the claimed inordinate delay of the accused and asked that the Second
Division should ". . . co-exist not work on cross-purposes with the other Court's
Division . . .". The argument begs the question! Suppose if and when the incident
reaches the Supreme Court, the highest Court of the land ruled that it is the
Second Division which is correct, and the other Divisions in error, what would
happen now to the argument of the movant that ". . . there is rhyme or reason for
the Sandiganbayan, Second Division to co-exist . . . with the other Court's Division
. . .".
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Moreover, the information in the rst division charges the accused of Violation of
Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. 3019, in the third division the accusation was for Falsi cation of
Public Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, while the accused
have been indicted for violating Sec. 7 R.A. 3019 in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6713
before the Fourth Division. The Court can not say whether there is need for paper
trail or monitoring of documents in those cases, as the Divisions concerned can
competently resolve and pass upon it but certainly in this instant case of Robbery,
to indulge in a prolonged fact- nding process is not a boon but a bane on the part
of the prosecution. ADCEcI
On August 24, 2009, the State assailed the resolutions of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan in this Court (G.R. No. 189063). 7 3
Consolidation of the petitions
On October 26, 2009, the Court directed that G.R. No. 189063 be consolidated with G.R.
No. 182360-63 (entitled Hernando B. Perez and Rosario S. Perez v. The Ombudsman, Field
Investigation Of cer of the Ombudsman and Mario B. Crespo a.k.a. Mark Jimenez ) and
G.R. No. 173967-71 (Ernest B. Escaler v. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.). 7 4
On April 7, 2010, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 188165 with G.R. Nos. 173967-71, G.R.
Nos. 182360-63 and G.R. No. 189063 (People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,
2nd Division, et al.). 7 5
G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 were special civil actions for certiorari to
prevent the filing of the criminal informations against the respondents.
Deconsolidation and dismissal of
G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63
on the ground of their intervening mootness
On February 11, 2013, the Court deconsolidated G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-
63 from G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063 on the ground that the intervening ling of
the informations in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-
0266 had rendered the petitions in G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 moot. 7 6
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Issues
In G.R. No. 188165, the State raises the following issues: DIEcHa
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE
INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-265, BY CONFINING THE
DEFINITION OF THE WORD "TRANSACTION" IN SECTION 3(B) OF R.A. 3019 AS
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING MONETARY CONSIDERATION.
II.
III.
Whether or not it was the Of ce of the Solicitor General, not the Of ce of the
Ombudsman, that had the authority to le the petitions to assail the
Sandiganbayan resolutions.
II.
Whether the State, as the petitioner in G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063,
resorted to the wrong remedy in assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dismissing the criminal charges against the respondents through petitions for
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certiorari instead of petitions for review on certiorari. cHDAIS
Ruling
The petitions for certiorari are devoid of merit.
I.
The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to
file an appeal or certiorari from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court.
Respondents contend that the Of ce of the Ombudsman has no authority to le the
petitions for certiorari because only the Solicitor General could le the petitions in this
Court pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code as
amended by E.O. No. 292, which pertinently states: cISDHE
Section 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its of cials and agents in any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of
the of ce concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled
corporations. The Of ce of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law of ce of
the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a
lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: ASCTac
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and
its of cers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any of cer thereof in his of cial capacity
is a party.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the ling of the petitions in these cases by the Of ce of the Ombudsman,
through the OSP, was authorized by law.
II.
Petitioner did not establish grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
The petitions for certiorari brought by the State must nonetheless be dismissed for failure
to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed
resolutions.
A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based on the speci c grounds
provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and can prosper only the jurisdictional
error, or the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the inferior court or judge is alleged and proved to exist.
In De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company , 8 0 the Court has expounded on
the nature and reach of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, to wit: IcHTAa
We remind that the writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in scope and
in exible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties
from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in
law to perform) — is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be
issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ certiorari
was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or of cers
of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to
give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior
court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if
allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to
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whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority,
the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari
was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its
jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and
would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the
same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise
of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the
instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue
the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or of cer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz.: HDATSI
Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal,
board or of cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending
or nullifying the proceeding.
Considering that the requisites must concurrently be attendant, the herein
petitioners' stance that a writ of certiorari should have been issued even if the CA
found no showing of grave abuse of discretion is absurd. The commission of
grave abuse of discretion was a fundamental requisite for the writ of certiorari to
issue against the RTC. Without their strong showing either of the RTC's lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the writ of certiorari would not issue for being bereft
of legal and factual bases. We need to emphasize, too, that with certiorari being
an extraordinary remedy, they must strictly observe the rules laid down by law for
granting the relief sought.
Did the petitioner show grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the issuance of the
writ of certiorari prayed for?
A.
G.R. No. 188165
The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the
restrictive meaning of the term transaction as
used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019
adopted in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265, the
Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 8 1 in which the principal
issue was whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted
by petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a Fiscal, was a "contract or transaction" as to bring the
complaint within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which punished any
public of cer for "[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or bene t, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract
or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public of cer in
his of cial capacity has to intervene under the law." The Soriano, Jr. Court ruled in the
negative, and pronounced: DHACES
The State now argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the
term transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the term transaction should be construed
more liberally, and positing that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the Court, citing for
that purpose the rulings in Mejia v. Pamaran, 8 2 Peligrino v. People, 8 3 and Chang v. People .
84
In Mejia v. Pamaran , decided en banc on April 15, 1988, Mejia had demanded and received
money from some persons involved in certain cases in a trial court where Mejia was then
serving as the branch clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she would help in
getting a favorable judgment for them. The issue was whether or not Mejia could be
convicted under the information that alleged that she had demanded a certain amount,
although the Sandiganbayan found that the amount was different from that charged in the
information. The Court dismissed her petition, and ruled that "[i]n a prosecution under the
foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift, money or present, etc. is
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immaterial . . . [w]hat is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage, or
bene t by a public of cer in connection with a contract or transaction with the
Government, wherein the public of cer has to intervene in his of cial capacity." The Court
nowhere ruled on the proper interpretation of the term transaction.
In Peligrino v. People , decided on August 13, 2001, Peligrino, an examiner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, was convicted of violating Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 for
demanding the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant in connection with the
latter's tax liabilities. Peligrino's defense was that he did not "demand" the money, but the
money was just given to him. He argued that he had only informed the complainant of his
tax de ciencies, and that the complainant had then requested the reduction of the amount
claimed as his tax de ciencies. The Court found no merit in Peligrino's argument. The
ruling had nothing to do with the interpretation of the term transaction. caHASI
Chang v. People , decided on July 21, 2006, was a case in which two persons — Chang and
San Mateo — were convicted of violating Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 after
being found to have received P125,000.00 in consideration of their issuance of a
Certi cate of Examination to the effect that the complainant had "no tax liability" in favour
of the municipality, notwithstanding that it had not settled with them on their assessed
de ciency tax of P494,000.00. Chang and San Mateo contended that the charge had
resulted from an involuntary contact whereby complainant Magat had simply tossed to
them the brown envelope; that there had been no conspiracy between them; and that what
had transpired had been an instigation, not an entrapment. In af rming their conviction, the
Court did not touch on the proper interpretation of the term transaction as used in Section
3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The three rulings the State has cited here did not overturn the interpretation made in
Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019
because the proper interpretation of the term was clearly not decisive in those cases. On
the contrary, in the later ruling in Merencillo v. People , 8 5 promulgated in 2007, the Court
reiterated the restrictive interpretation given in Soriano, Jr. to the term transaction as used
in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with a differentiation between
bribery under the Revised Penal Code and the violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
3019 by holding that the latter is "limited only to contracts or transactions involving
monetary consideration where the public of cer has the authority to intervene under the
law." CAaSED
And, secondly, it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in Section 3
(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and
liberally, considering that laws creating, de ning or punishing crimes and laws imposing
penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party
seeking to enforce them, and liberally against the party sought to be charged. 8 6
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the
information for failing to properly state the fourth element of the violation of Section 3 (b)
of Republic Act No. 3019.
B.
G.R. No. 189063
The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in finding that there had
been an inordinate delay in the resolution
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against respondents of the charge in
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266
Upon its nding that the Of ce of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in
resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the respondents, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the case against
the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Of ce of the
Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan , 8 7 in which the Court held that
speedy disposition of cases was also consistent with reasonable delays, the State
supported its contention by listing the various incidents that had caused the delay in the
investigation, and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves. aEcDTC
The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution,
which declares:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
8 8 While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or exible, such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not suf cient, 9 the right to the speedy
8
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or
justi able motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. 9 0 EDcICT
It is clear from the foregoing that the Of ce of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually
long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to
criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate
and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright
violation of the respondents' right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their
cases. If, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan , 9 4 the Court ruled that a delay of almost three years in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of his case, taking into
account the following, namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected only after the
accused had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating that political
motivations had played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process;
(b) the Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure prescribed by
law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the simple factual and legal issues
involved did not justify the delay, there is a greater reason for us to hold so in the
respondents' case.
To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that
the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State miserably failed.
For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately led in court
primarily because of the insuf ciency of the evidence to establish probable cause, like not
having a document showing that the funds (worth US$1,999,965.00 as averred in the
complaint of Cong. Jimenez) had reached Secretary Perez; 9 5 and that it could not obtain
the document, and to enable it to obtain the document and other evidence it needed to
await the rati cation of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR Agreement), 9 6 and
the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT). 9 7 ASICDH
To us, however, the State's dependence on the rati cation of the two treaties was not a
suf cient justi cation for the delay. The fact- nding investigation had extended from
January 15, 2003, when Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the
Special Panel and referred the complaint of Cong. Jimenez for fact- nding investigation,
until November 14, 2005, when the FIO completed its fact- nding investigation. That
period accounted for a total of two years and 10 months. In addition, the FIO submitted its
report only on November 14, 2005, which was after the Department of Justice had
received on September 8, 2005 the letter from Wayne Walsh, the Deputy Government
Counsel of the Hongkong Special Administrative Region in response to the request for
assistance dated June 23, 2005, 9 8 and the reply of the Of ce of Justice of Switzerland
dated February 10, 2005 and a subsequent letter dated February 21, 2005 from Liza Favre,
the Ambassador of Switzerland, to Atty. Melchor Arthur Carandang, Acting Assistant
Ombudsman, FIO, together with documents pertaining to the bank accounts relevant to the
investigation. 9 9 For the Of ce of the Ombudsman to mark time until the HKSAR
Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were rati ed by the Senate before it would proceed
with the preliminary investigation was oppressive, capricious and vexatious, because the
respondents were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution
applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The
guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State
is accepted. Whether or not the fact- nding investigation was separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Of ce of the Ombudsman should not matter
for purposes of determining if the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their
cases had been violated.
There was really no suf cient justi cation tendered by the State for the long delay of more
than ve years in bringing the charges against the respondents before the proper court. On
the charge of robbery under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, the preliminary investigation would not require more than ve years to ascertain the
relevant factual and legal matters. The basic elements of the offense, that is, the
intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Jimenez, the manner by which the
money extorted had been delivered, and the respondents had been identi ed as the
perpetrators, had been adequately bared before the Of ce of the Ombudsman. The
obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish probable cause to
charge them with the offense. We thus agree with the following observation of the
Sandiganbayan, viz.: TEacSA
With the Ombudsman's nding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated
on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez
US$1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in
favor of the accused, there is no reason why within a reasonable period from
these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of intimidation was
there, the asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why was the
information led only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge of Robbery
there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which
to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or dismiss it
are on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same
is a clear transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy
respect for the constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the
Ombudsman to act within reasonable time. 1 0 1
In ne, the Of ce of the Ombudsman transgressed the respondents' right to due process
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as well as their right to the speedy disposition of their case.
WHEREFORE , the Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari for their lack of merit.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED . ACIDTE
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
60. Id. at 42-51; penned by Associate Justice Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. (later Presiding
Justice, but already retired), joined by Associate Justice Efren N. De la Cruz and
Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz.
81. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 184, 188.
82. Nos. L-56741-42, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 457.
83. G.R. No. 136266, August 13, 2001, 362 SCRA 683.
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84. G.R. No. 165111, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 321.
85. G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 31, 46.
89. De la Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478, 485.
90. Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 298, 307.
91. G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301.
92.Id. at 304.