Jurisdiction

Q: Give examples of civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

Answer: IRR CARDS

Injunction
Rescission or annulment of contract
Reformation of contract
Citizen Suit
Action for abatement of nuisance
Action for revival of judgment
Declaratory Relief
Specific Performance

Q: Can a suit for injunction be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the President of the
Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front? (03 Bar Q11)

A: No. An action for injunction is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction over the same, exclusive original jurisdiction being vested in the RTC.

Ultimate Objective Test

Q: Andre filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila an action for specific performance against
Brent, a resident of Quezon City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of
land situated in Quezon City having an assessed value of P19,000.00. Brent received the summons and a
copy of the Complaint on January 2, 2003. On Jan. 10, 2003, Brent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the suit was incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The court issued an Order denying the motion. In due time, Brent filed with the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for Certiorari praying that the said Order be set aside because the MeTC
had no jurisdiction over the case.

On February 13, 2003, Andre filed with the MeTC a motion to declare Brent in default. The motion
was opposed by Brent on the ground that his Petition for Certiorari was still pending.

a) Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?

b) Resolve the Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default.

Answers:

a) The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was correct.

The Supreme Court has held that even if the action is one for specific performance but the ultimate
objective of the plaintiff is to obtain title to real property, the action is a real action and not one incapable
of pecuniary estimation. (Ruby Shelters Builders vs. Formaran, G.R. No. 175914, February 10, 2009;
Gochan vs. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491 [2001]).
 Here, the ultimate objective of Andre was to obtain title to the land. Hence the action is a real one and
since the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, the MeTC has jurisdiction.

b) The Motion to Declare Defendant in Default should be granted.

The Supreme Court has held that the pendency of certiorari proceedings does not excuse the defendant
from filing an answer unless he has obtained a restraining order or injunction suspending proceedings in
the case. (China Bank vs. Oliver, 390 SCRA 263 [2002])

Here, the RTC did not issue any injunction or restraining order nor did Brent file an answer within the
reglementary period. Hence, it is proper for Brent to be declared in default.

Q: Olivia entrusted the owner’s duplicate certificate of title No. 105602 over her lot to his broker
Xander so as to subdivide the lot. Xander subdivided the lot into several titles. Xander forged the signature
of Olivia in a deed of sale and sold one of the lots covered by a title to Bea. Bea then sold the lot to Chad.
A new certificate of title No. 137466 was issued in the name of Chad.

Olivia filed with the RTC an action for cancellation of the title of Chad. The complaint alleged that
the land was bought by Chad for P15,000.00.

Judgment was rendered in favor of Olivia. On appeal Chad moved to set aside the judgment on the
ground that the same was a real action and since the value of the land was only P15,000.00, then the RTC
did not have jurisdiction. May the RTC’s judgment be set aside for lack of jurisdiction?

Suggested answer:

Yes. An action for cancellation of TCT is a real action where the court has to determine which of
two titles over the same lot is valid. In such a case, jurisdiction depends upon assessed value. Since the
complaint did not allege the assessed value, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage even on appeal. (Padlan vs. Dinglasan, March 20, 2013)

Q: Plaintiff filed with the MTC a case for unlawful detainer against the Defendant. The Plaintiff
averred that he had bought the property from the seller but had found that the Defendant staying thereon,
that he allowed Defendant to stay provided that Defendant will immediately vacate the land upon Plaintiff’s
prior notice that he will be needing the land, and that Defendant refused to vacate despite notice to do so.
The MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the proof showed
that the issue of possession cannot be properly determined without setting the issue of ownership.

On appeal by the Plaintiff, the RTC agreed with the MTC that jurisdiction lies with the RTC. The
RTC then took cognizance of the case and rendered a decision in favor of the Plaintiff ordering the
Defendant to vacate the premises. On appeal by Defendant, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
Decision. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for Plaintiff’s failure to allege
the assessed value of the subject property and, as a consequence, the assailed RTC Decision is null and
void. Was the CA decision correct?

Suggested answer:

No. In real actions there is a need to allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
action, or the interest therein, for purposes of determining which court (MTC or RTC) has jurisdiction over
the action. However, it must be clarified that this requirement applies only if these courts are in the exercise
of their original jurisdiction.
 Here, the RTC was exercising its appellate, not original, jurisdiction when it took cognizance of
Plaintiff’s appeal and Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 does not provide any amount or value of the subject
property which would limit the RTC’s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by first level
court. Clearly then, in the instant case, contrary to the ruling of the CA, the assessed value of the disputed
lot is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, all cases decided by the MTC are
generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. Hence, the CA erred in nullifying the
RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction. (Arrienda vs. Kalaw, April 6, 2016)

Rule 1 - General Provisions

Q: The Respondent offered to buy a parcel of land from the National Tobacco Administration. The
deed of sale was signed by Respondent and he paid the 20% down payment but the Petitioners, officers of
the NTA, refused to implement the sale. Respondent thus filed against Petitioners a Petition for Mandamus
with Damages. In the body of the petition, the amount of the moral and exemplary damages and the
attorney’s fees were mentioned but they were not mentioned at all in the prayer. The Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to pay the docket fees on the moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. The Respondent then filed an amended petition specifying the amount of the damages and fees in the
prayer and also asking that the deed of sale executed by NTA in favor of Stanford East Realty Corporation
be declared void and a TCT in favor of Petitioner be issued. The trial court, over the Petitioners’ objections,
admitted the amended petition stating that the Respondent had already paid the docket fee. Did the trial
court act properly in admitting the amended petition?

Suggested answer:

No. The trial court should have dismissed the petition pursuant to the ruling in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562, which had been rendered as far back as 1987 and which
states that the amount of damages claimed should be specified in the body and in the prayer. It is unfortunate
that up to this date, this ruling had been ignored. The trial court had no power to admit the amended petition
since it had no jurisdiction over the original petition. What is more the amended petition seeks to recover
interest over real property at bottom and hence the Respondent should have specified the assessed value,
or if none, the estimated value thereof, to serve as a basis for the computation of the docket fee. Evidently,
there was an intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees. The amended petition should be expunged
and the civil case dismissed. (Siapno vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 132260, August 30, 2005)

Rule 2 - Cause of Action

Q: What is a cause of action?

Suggested answer:

It is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. (S2 R2). The facts which give
rise to a right of action.
Q: Reviera Golf Club Inc. (RGC) and CCA Holdings (CCA) entered into a 5-year Management and
Royalty Agreement whereby RGC agreed to pay CCA monthly management and royalty fees for operating
and managing the Riviera Golf Club. Just three years into the contract, RGC preterminated the same on the
ground of financial difficulties and alleged violations by CCA of the agreement. CCA filed with the RTC
of Makati City, a complaint for collection of the unpaid management and royalty fees for services rendered
against RGC. The parties entered into a compromise agreement which became the basis of a compromise
judgment by the court. The compromise agreement contained a “non-waiver” clause wherein the
compromise agreement shall not be considered as a waiver of and is without prejudice to CCA’s cause of
action arising from the pre-termination of the Management and Royalty Agreement.

Subsequently, CCA filed a second complaint against RGC for the expected business profits it should
have derived from the unexpired two-year term of the agreement but did not because of the pretermination
of the agreement. RGC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. CCA opposed the motion
on the grounds that: (a) the two cases involve different causes of action, and (b) the parties had stipulated
in the “non-waiver” clause that the compromise agreement was without prejudice to CCA’s cause of action
arising from the pretermination of the Management and Royalty Agreement. Should the motion to dismiss
be granted?

Suggested answer:

Yes.
a) Both the first and the second cases involve the same cause of action, that is, the breach by RGC of
the Management and Royalty Agreement. CCA confuses the reliefs sought (collection of the unpaid
management and royalty fees, and the claim for the expected profits for the unexpired two-year
term) with the cause of action. A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action
can be filed. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into
two or more different actions. Here the single cause of action gave rise to two reliefs which should
have been sought by CCA in the first complaint. Hence, CCA was splitting its cause of action when
it brought the second complaint.

b) The stipulation is void for it in effect allows the plaintiff CCA to split its cause of action. The
provision on res judicata and against splitting of cause of action are based on public policy. Hence
the stipulation is repugnant to public policy and is thus void and unenforceable. (Reviera Golf Club,
Inc. vs. CCA Holdings, B.V., June 17, 2015)

Q: Define the following terms:

1) Right of action,
2) Relief,
3) Remedy, and
4) Subject matter.

Answers:

1) Right of action - the remedial right or right to relief granted by law to a party to institute an action
against a person who has violated his right; the legal right to sue.
2) Relief - the redress or other measure which a plaintiff prays the court to order or adjudicate in his favor.
3) Remedy - the form or type of action which the plaintiff may avail of in order to obtain relief from the
court.
4) Subject matter - the thing, act, contract, or property which is directly involved in the action, concerning
which the wrong has been done.

Joinder of causes of action

Q: Petitioner’s bus sideswiped a car owned by G. The cost of repair was P450,000.00. The insurer paid
G P60,000 and so the balance of P390,000 was shouldered by G. The insurer and G filed a single complaint
before the RTC of Las Pinas City against Petitioner wherein the insurer claimed for P60,000 and G claimed
for P390,000. The Petitioner filed an answer wherein he contends that the RTC of Las Pinas does not have
jurisdiction since the separate claims of the insurer and G fall below the jurisdictional amount and joinder
of the causes of action was not proper. Does the Las Pinas RTC have jurisdiction?

Suggested answer:

Yes. The joinder of causes of action by the Plaintiffs was proper since the two cases arose from a
single transaction, that is, Petitioner’s bus hitting the rear side of the car and there is also a common question
of fact: whether or not the bus driver was negligent. Hence, we apply the totality rule and thus the Las Pinas
RTC would have jurisdiction since the aggregate amount is Php450,000.00 (Pantranco North Express, Inc.
vs. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005)

Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Action

Q: Respondents filed a complaint for nullification of sale and damages against the Petitioner. The
Respondents alleged that they are the grandchildren and successors-in-interest of Udiaan and that an
impostor sold Udiaan’s land to the Petitioner. The RTC rendered summary judgment dismissing the
complaint since the Respondents being the grandchildren are not the real-parties-in-interest as they have
no successional rights. On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC’s findings that the Respondents are not real
parties-in-interest but it also nullified the deed of sale to Petitioner on the ground that Udiaan’s signature
was forged.

a) Are the Respondent’s real parties-in-interest?

b) Was it proper for the CA to render judgment nullifying the deed of sale?
Answers:

a) No, the respondents are not real parties-in-interest. As grandchildren, they have no successional
rights to the estate of Udiaan unless by virtue of the right of representation. Since the repsondents
did not show that their mother predeceased Udiaan, they have no successional rights.

b) No. Having established that respondents are not the real parties in interest to the instant suit, the
proper course of action was for the CA to merely affirm the RTC’s dismissal of their complaint. It
therefore erred in proceeding to resolve the other substantive issues of the case and granting one of
the principal reliefs sought by respondents, which is the declaration of the nullity of the questioned
deed of absolute sale. (Ang vs. Pacunio, July 8, 2015)

Rule 4 - Venue

Q: Amando brings an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against Bernardo for the
annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed value of P50,000 located
in Laguna. The complaint alleged prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due.
Bernardo timely moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the
RTC of Laguna. Decide with reasons. (2000 Bar Q18a)

Suggested answer:

Insofar as the motion to dismiss is based on improper venue- since it argued that the action should
have been brought in Laguna – the same should be granted.

The action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of property is a real action since there
has been a foreclosure sale and thus the action affects title to the real property mortgaged. (Chua vs. Total
Office Products & Services, September 30, 2005). Hence, the venue lies in Laguna, the place where the
real property is situated. [It should be filed with the RTC of Laguna, since the assessed value exceeds
P20,000.00].

Q: What is the venue of real actions?

Answer:
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and
tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated (Rule 4 Section 1)

Q: What is the venue of personal actions?

Answer:
All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (Rule 4 Section 2)

Q: BPI Family Bank filed with the RTC of Makati an action to recover deficiency against the real estate
mortgagors after the extrajudicial foreclosure sale had resulted in a deficiency. The realty mortgaged was
located in Manila while BPI FB has its main office in Makati. The mortgagors filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, res judicata, and waiver. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss. The mortgagors filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they reiterated the previous grounds
and added the ground of improper venue, contending that the action for deficiency was a real action which
should have been brought in Manila. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The mortgagors went up
to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. The CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal
of the action on the ground of improper venue, holding it was a real action which should have been filed in
Manila. Was the CA’s decision correct?

Suggested answer:

No, the CA’s decision was not correct.

First, an action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is
a personal action since it does not affect title to or possession of real property or any interest therein. Hence,
the action was properly brought in Makati where the mortgagee has its main office.

Second, even assuming that there was improper venue, the ground was waived by the mortgagors
since they did not timely raise it in their motion to dismiss. Here, the ground for improper venue was raised
belatedly in the motion for reconsideration, not in the motion dismiss. Hence the objection was waived
pursuant to S2, R9. (BPI Family Bank vs. Yujuico, July 22, 2015)
Rule 5- Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts

Q: In an ejectment case, the court dismissed the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to appear during
the preliminary conference. The Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. The
Defendant contends that the dismissal had become final and executory since the motion for reconsideration
is a prohibited pleading and hence does not suspend the reglementary period to appeal. Is the Defendant’s
contention correct?

Suggested answer:

No. The motion for reconsideration prohibited under Section 19(C) of the Rule on Summary
Procedure is that which seeks reconsideration of a judgment rendered by the Court after trial on the merits.
The dismissal order is not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. (Lucas vs. Fabros, 324 SCRA 1).

Rule 6 - Pleadings

Q: Plaintiff filed suit for nullification of a promissory note against the Defendant on the ground of
usurious and unconscionable interest rates. The Defendant counterclaimed for the payment of the
P1,000,000 loan with interest. He however did not pay the docket fees. Should the counterclaim be
dismissed for failure to pay docket fees?

Suggested answer:

No. The counterclaim for the payment of the loan with interest is compulsory since it arises out of
or is connected to the loan transaction subject of the complaint. The grant of the counterclaim would
necessarily negate or defeat the suit for nullification. Being compulsory, there is no need to pay the filing
fees thereon. (Tan vs. Kaakbay Finance Corp., G.R. No. 146595, June 20, 2003); Alba vs. Malapajo,
January 13, 2016)

Q: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure against
the Petitioners who are the mortgagors. After the foreclosure sale, Shell filed an action for the deficiency
against the Petitioners with the RTC of Manila. Petitioners in the meantime commenced an action to annul
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale with the RTC of Makati City. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of Shell.
This judgment became final and executory. Subsequently, the Makati RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners
and annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The Makati RTC ruled that no auction sale was actually
conducted. Shell filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Makati case should have been dismissed
on the ground of res judicata. The motion was denied and Shell appealed to the CA. Should the Makati case
have been dismissed?

Suggested answer:

Yes. The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground of litis
pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final, should have been dismissed on the ground
of being barred by res judicata. Petitioner’s claim for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure case should
have been set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. (Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, July
18, 2012)

Q: Jim filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the collection of P300,000.00. The defendant,
Jim, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the action
since the claimed amount of P300,000.00 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City. Before the court could resolve the motion, Bong, without leave of court, amended his
complaint to allege a new cause of action consisting in the inclusion of an additional amount of
P300,000.00, thereby increasing his total claim to P600,000.000. Bong thereafter filed his opposition to the
motion to dismiss claiming that the RTC had jurisdiction over his action. Is Jim’s opposition to the motion
to dismiss sustainable?

Answer:

Yes, Jim’s opposition to the motion to dismiss is sustainable. The motion to dismiss should be
denied. Basic is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. Under the Rules, a pleader
may amend his pleading as a matter of right before the other party has served his responsive pleading. (Sec.
2, Rule 10, Rules of Court) The court, in allowing the amendment, would not be acting without jurisdiction
because allowing an amendment as a matter of right does not require the exercise of discretion. The court
therefore would not be "acting" and thus, could not have acted without jurisdiction. It would have been
different had the amendments been made after a responsive pleading had been served. The court then would
have been exercising its discretion in allowing or disallowing the amendment. It cannot do so however,
because it would be then acting on an amendment of a complaint over which it has no jurisdiction. (Soledad
v. Mamangun, G.R. No. L-17983, May 30, 1963; Gumabay v. Baralin, G.R. No. L-30683, May 31, 1977;
Prudence Realty v. CA, G.R. No. 110274, March 21, 1994)

Alternative Answer:

The motion to dismiss should be granted. Jurisdiction must be conferred by the contents of the
original complaint. Amendments are not proper and should be denied where the court has no jurisdiction
over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. (Rosario
v. Carandang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955) While a plaintiff is entitled to amend the complaint before
a responsive pleading is served (Sec. 2, Rule 10, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002), still, a complaint cannot be
amended to confer jurisdiction on a court where there was none to begin with.

Q: Describe briefly at least four (4) modes of discovery under the Rules of Court.

Suggested Answer: Five modes of discovery under the Rules of Court are:

1. DEPOSITION. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of
any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. (Sec. 1, Rule 23, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)

2. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES. Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any
party shall file and serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories regarding material and relevant
facts to be answered by the party served. (Sec. 1, Rule 25, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)

3. ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY. At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any
material and relevant document or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact. (Sec. 1, Rule 26,
ROC)

4. PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS. Upon motion of any party

showing good cause therefore, a court may order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing of any designated documents, etc. or order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or property for inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. (Sec. 1, Rule 27, 1997 Rule 27 Rules of Civil Procedure.)

5.PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS. Rule 28

Q: In an admiralty case filed by Andrea against Y Shipping Lines (whose principal offices are in
Manila) in the RTC of Davao City, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum directing Jason, the president
of the shipping company, to appear and testify at the trial and to bring with him several documents. Jason
refused to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that he resides more than 100 kilometers
from Davao City, which the Court found justifiable. How can Andrea take the testimony of Jason and
present the documents as exhibits other than through the subpoena from the RTC?

Answer:

Andrea can take the testimony of Jason and present the documents as exhibits by taking his
deposition through oral examination or written interrogatories. (Rule 24; new Rule 23) He may also file a
motion for the production or inspection of documents. (Rule 27).

Jason can refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that he resides more than
50 (now 100) kilometers from the place where he is to testify, (Sec. 9 of former Rule 23; Sec. 10 of new
Rule 21).

The witness can also refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the
documents are not relevant and there was no tender of fees for one day's attendance and the kilometrage
allowed by the rules.

Q: The plaintiff sued the defendant in the RTC to collect on a promissory note, the terms of which were
stated in the complaint and a photocopy attached to the complaint as an annex. Before answering, the
defendant filed a motion for an order directing the plaintiff to produce the original of the note so that the
defendant could inspect it and verify his signature and the handwritten entries of the dates and amounts.
The judge granted the defendant’s motion for production and inspection of the original of the promissory
note, but the plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s order. How should the defendant plead to the alleged
execution of the note?

Answer:

The defendant is not required to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note, because of the non-compliance by the plaintiff with the order for production and
inspection of the original thereof. (Rule 8, sec. 8).

Alternative Answer: The defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint because of the refusal of the
plaintiff to obey the order of the court for the production and inspection of the promissory note. [Rule 29
Sec. 3(c)].

Q: What is the "most important witness" rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures?
Answer:

The “most important witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that the judge shall, during the pretrial conference, determine the
most important witnesses to be heard and limit the number of witnesses.

Q: What is the "one-day examination of witness" rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and
Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures?

Answer:

The “one-day examination of a witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that a witness has to be fully examined in one day only, subject
to the court’s discretion to extend the direct and/or cross-examination for justifiable reasons.

Q: Linda, as mother and in her capacity as legal guardian of her legitimate minor son, Habeas, brought
action for support against Albert, as father of Habeas and Linda’s lawfully wedded husband. Albert filed
his answer denying his paternity with counterclaim for damages. Subsequently, Linda filed a manifestation
in court that in view of the denial made by Albert, it would be futile to pursue the case against Albert. Linda
agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint, subject to the condition that Albert will withdraw his
counterclaim for damages. Linda and Albert filed a joint motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the case
with prejudice. Later on, minor son Habeas, represented by Linda, filed another complaint for support
against Albert. Albert filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.

(A) Is res judicata a valid ground for dismissal of the second complaint?
(B) What are the essential requisite of res judicata?

Answer:

(a) No, res judicata is not a defense in an action for support even if the first case was dismissed
with prejudice on a joint motion to dismiss. The plaintiff’s mother agreed to the dismissal of the complaint
for support in view of the defendant’s answer denying his paternity with a counterclaim for damages. This
was in the nature of a compromise of the right of support which is prohibited by law. (Art, 2035, Civil
Code; De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 176 [1999]).

(b) The Essential Requisites of Res Judicata are: 1 the judgment or order rendered must be final; 2
the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; 3 it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and 4. there must be between the two cases identity of parties, identity
of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. (San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil, 281 [1940]

Q: Continental Chemical Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for a sum of money against Barstow
Trading Corporation (BTC) for the latter’s failure to pay for its purchases of industrial chemicals. In its
answer, BTC contended that it refused to pay because CCC misrepresented that the products it sold
belonged to a new line, when in fact they were identical with CCC’s existing products. To substantiate its
defense, BTC filed a motion to compel CCC to give a detailed list of the products’ ingredients and chemical
components, relying on the right to avail of the modes of discovery allowed under Rule 27. CCC objected,
invoking confidentiality of the information sought by BTC. Resolve BTC’s motion with reasons.

Answer:
 I will deny the motion. The ingredients and chemical components of CCC‟s products are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure
by reason of their confidential and privileged character. Otherwise, CCC would eventually be exposed to
unwarranted business competition with others who may imitate and market the same kinds of products in
violation of CCC‟s proprietary rights. Being privileged, the detailed list of ingredients and chemical
components may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 which expressly makes
privileged information an exception from its coverage (Air Philippines Corporation vs. Pennswell, Inc.,
540 SCRA 215 [2007]).

Q: What are the instances of dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff?

Answer:

1) The plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint,
2) To prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
3) To comply with these Rules or any order of the court.

Q: On March 4, 2007, Liza filed a complaint against Nyoy in the RTC of Quezon City. Nyoy received
the summons on March 10, 2007. For some reason, Liza had a change of heart and filed a motion to dismiss
the action on March 14, 2007. On the same day, and without being served with a copy of Liza’s motion
to dismiss, Nyoy filed and served to Liza his verified answer to the complaint with counterclaim. The Court
granted Liza’s motion. On April 3, 2007, Nyoy filed a motion to declare Liza in default for her failure to
file an answer on his counterclaim. Liza argued that she was justified in not filing an answer because the
case was already dismissed by the court, including the counterclaim. Was Nyoy’s counterclaim dismissed
when Liza’s complaint was dismissed upon her own motion?

Answer:

No. Nyoy’s counterclaim was not dismissed. The dismissal of the action on her motion shall be
limited to the complaint (Section 2, Rule 17). The counterclaim is not dismissed, whether it is compulsory
or a permissive counterclaim.

If a counterclaim has already been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff‘s motion to dismiss, and the court grants said motion to dismiss, the dismissal ― shall be limited
to the complaint‖ (Sec. 2, Rule 17) . The phraseology of the provision is clear: the counterclaim is not
dismissed, whether it is a compulsory or a permissive counterclaim because the rule makes no distinction.
The defendant if he so desires may prosecute his counterclaim either in a separate action or in the same
action. Should he choose to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action, he must notify the court of
his preference within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the plaintiff‘s motion to dismiss. Should he opt
to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action, the court should render the corresponding order granting
and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint.

Q: Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Iligan City to collect Php350,000.00, an
amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha. A couple of
weeks later and before she was served with the answer of Yana, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal. The
RTC issued an order confirming the dismissal.

Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of action
in the same court. Again, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have the complaint dismissed
without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of the answer of Yana. Hence, the case
was dismissed. A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same RTC. May Yana
successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint? Explain your answer.

Answer:

Yes. Yana may successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint. Under
the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits provided it is
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same
claim. (S1, Rule 17)

Here, the first dismissal by the plaintiff was in a competent court as the RTC in Iligan City has
jurisdiction over the action. Hence, Agathat’s third complaint is barred by the Two-Dismissal Rule.

The two-dismissal rule applies when the plaintiff has (a) twice dismissed actions, (b) based on or
including the same claim, (c) in a court of competent jurisdiction. The second notice of dismissal will bar
the refiling of the action because it will operate as an adjudication of the claim upon the merits. In other
words, the claim may only be filed twice, the first being the claim embodied in the original complaint.
Since as a rule, the dismissal is without prejudice, the same claim may be filed. If the refiled claim or
complaint is dismissed again through a second notice of dismissal, that second notice triggers the
application of the two-dismissal rule and the dismissal is to be deemed one with prejudice because it is
considered as an adjudication upon the merits.

Q: Lilio filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court of Lanuza for the recovery of a sum of money
against Juan. The latter filed his answer to the complaint serving a copy thereof on Lilio. After the filing
of the answer of Juan, whose duty is to have the case set for pre-trial? Why?

Suggested Answer:

After the filing of the answer of Juan, the plaintiff has the duty to promptly move ex parte that the
case be set for pre-trial. The reason is that it is the plaintiff who knows when the last pleading has been
filed and it is the plaintiff who has the duty to prosecute (Rule 18, Section 1)

Q: Warren, the defendant in a case, failed to attend the pre-trial conference despite proper notice. The
plaintiff’s counsel moved in open court that Warren be declared in default due to his failure to attend the
pre-trial, which the court granted. Was the Court correct is declaring Warren in default?
Suggested Answer:

On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pretrial conference
does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is
only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if
a defendant fails to attend the pretrial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. There is
no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February
4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their nonattendance was due to the fault of their
counsel as he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-
trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their
inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor. (Sps. Salvador v. S
ps. Rabaja, GR No. 199990, 02/04/2015)
Q: Rolly filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmina because of the alleged
psychological incapacity of the latter. After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing the petition on
the ground that Rolly failed to prove the psychological incapacity of his wife. The judgment having become
final, Rolly filed another petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmina, this time on the
ground that his marriage to the latter had been celebrated without a license. Carmina moved to dismiss the
second petition on the ground that the same is barred by the judgment in the first? Resolve the motion.

Suggested Answer:

No, the second action is not barred by the judgment in the first because they are different causes of
action. The first is for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code, while the second is for declaration of nullity of marriage in view of the absence of a
basic requirement, which is a marriage license. They are different causes of action because the evidence
required to prove them,are not the same (Pagsisihan vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 540[1980])

Q: What are the grounds upon which a motion to dismiss may be filed?

Answer:

Under Sec. 1, Rule 16, a motion to dismiss may be filed on any of the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
b. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
c. The venue is improperly laid;
d. The plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
e. There is another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause (litis pendentia);
f. The cause of action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata) or by the statute of limitations
(prescription);
g. The pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
h. The claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
i. The claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
and
j. A condition precedent for filing the action has not been complied with.
1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
2. Compliance with earnest efforts between or among members of the family
3. Barangay conciliation

Q: Within the period for filing a responsive pleading, the defendant filed a motion for bill of particulars
that he set for hearing on a certain date. The judge granted the motion and ordered the plaintiff to file and
serve the bill of particulars, which the plaintiff failed to comply. On this ground, the judge dismissed the
case. Was the dismissal of the case in order?

Answer:

Yes, the judge may dismiss the case for failure of the plaintiff to comply with its order (Rule 17,
Section 3) or order the striking out of the pleading and may issue any other order at its discretion (Rule 12,
Section 4).
Q: What is demurrer to evidence?

Suggested Answer:

Demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant after the plaintiff had rested his
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It may be filed after the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence. It is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action similar
to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.

Q: Distinguish motion to dismiss from demurrer to evidence.

Distinctions:

(a) A motion to dismiss is usually filed before the service and filing of the answer; a demurrer to evidence
is made after the plaintiff rests his case;

(b) A motion to dismiss is anchored on many grounds; a demurrer is anchored on one ground—plaintiff
has no right to relief; and

(c) If a motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant may file his responsive pleading; in a demurrer, the
defendant may present his evidence.

Q: Kristina, the wife, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Pasig
City. James, the husband, filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasay City praying for
custody over their minor child. Kristina filed a motion to dismiss the James’ petition on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which she filed before the RTC of Pasig City.
If you were the judge of RTC of Pasay City, how will you resolve the motion?

Answer:

The husband‘s motion to dismiss his wife‘s petition for habeas corpus should be granted because
the case for nullity of marriage constitutes litis pendencia. The custody over the minor child and the action
for nullity of the marriage are not separate causes of action. Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity
of marriage case before the RTC of Pasig City, regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute
res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the RTC of Pasay City since the former has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter. The evidence to support the petition for nullity necessarily involves
evidence of fitness to take custody of the child, as the court in the nullity of proceedings has a duty under
the Family Code to protect the best interest of the child (Yu vs. Yu, GR No. 164915, 03/102006; Sec. 1[e],
Rule 16) and Sec. 2, Rule 102).

Q: Summons was issued by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iligan City and actually received on
time by the defendant from his wife at their residence. The sheriff’s return of proof of service filed with
the court, in sum, states that the summons, with attached copy of the complaints, was served on defendant
at his residence thru his wife, a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over his person as there was no valid
service of summons on him because the sheriff‘s return on proof of service did not show that the sheriff
first made a genuine attempt to serve the summons on defendant personally before serving it thru his wife.
Was there a valid service of summons? What is the purpose of summons? Explain.

Answer:

The motion to dismiss is not meritorious because the defendant actually received the summons on
time from his wife. Service on the wife was sufficient. It is the duty of the court to look in the sufficiency
of the service. The sheriff‘s negligence is not stating in his return that he first made a genuine effort to
serve the summons on the defendant, should not prejudice the plaintiff (Mapa v. CA, 214 SCRA 417
[1992]). The purpose of the summons is to inform the defendant on the complaint filed against him and to
enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over his person. It may be served by the sheriff or his deputy or any
person authorized by the court.

Q: Gina Guerrero filed with the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, a complaint for sum of
money amounting to P1 million against Carla Corro. The complaint alleges, among others, that Carla
borrowed from Gina the said amount as evidenced by a promissory note signed by Carla and her husband,
jointly and severally. Carla was served with summons which was received by Linda, her secretary.
However, Carla failed to file an answer to the complaint within the 15-day reglementary period. Hence,
Gina filed with the court a motion to declare Carla in default and to allow her to present evidence ex parte.
Five days thereafter, Carla filed her verified answer to the complaint, denying under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the promissory note and contending that she has fully paid her loan with interest at
12% per annum.

a) Was the summons validly served on Carla?

b) If you were the judge, would you grant Gina‘s motion to declare Carla in default?

Suggested Answer:

a) The summons was not validly served on Carla because it was served on her secretary and the
requirements for substituted service have not been followed, such as a showing that efforts have been
exerted to serve the same on Carla and such attempt has failed despite due diligence (Manotoc v. CA , GR
No. 130974, 08/16/2006).

b) If I were the judge, I would not grant Gina‘s motion to declare Carla in default because summons
was not properly served and, anyway, a verified answer to the complaint had already been filed. Moreover,
it is better to decide a case on the merits rather than on technicality.

Q: Yani filed an action for partition and accounting in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against her
sister Mary Rose, who is a resident of Singapore and is not found in the Philippines. Upon motion, the
court ordered the publication of the summons for three weeks in a local tabloid, Bandera. Linda, an OFW
vacationing in the Philippines, saw the summons in Bandera and brought a copy of the tabloid when she
returned to Singapore. Linda showed the tabloid and the page containing the summons to Mary Rose, who
said, “Yes, I know, my kumare Anita scanned and e-mailed that page of Bandera to me!” Was there a valid
service of summons? Did the court acquire jurisdiction over Mary Rose?

Answer:

Yes. Partition is an action quasi in rem. Summons by publication is proper when the defendant does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines, provided that a copy of the summons and order of the court
are sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant (Sec. 15, Rule 14). Publication of
the notice in Bulgar, a newspaper of general circulation, satisfies the requirements of summons by
publication.

Q: The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment against ST, copy of which was received by his
counsel on February 28, 2000. On March 10, 2000, ST, through counsel, filed for a motion for
reconsideration of the decision with notice to the Clerk of Court submitting the Motion for Reconsideration
of the court. On March 18, 2000, realizing that the motion lacked a notice of hearing, ST‘s counsel
filed a supplemental pleading. Was the Motion for Reconsideration filed within the reglementary period?
Answer: No, because the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration was March 15 if February had 28
days or March 16 if February had 29 days.

Although the original Motion for Reconsideration was defective because it lacked a notice of
hearing, the defect was cured on time by its filing on March 15 of a supplemental pleading, provided the
motion was set for hearing and served the adverse party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing
(Rule 15, Section 4)

Q: The plaintiff sued the defendant in the RTC for damages allegedly caused by the latter‘s
encroachment on the plaintiff‘s lot. In his answer, the defendant denied the plaintiff‘s claim and alleged
that it was the plaintiff who in fact had encroached on his (defendant‘s) land. Accordingly, the defendant
counterclaimed against the plaintiff for damages resulting from the alleged encroachment on his lot. The
plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to answer the defendant‘s counterclaim, but the court
denied the motion on the ground that it should have been set for hearing. On the defendant‘s motion,
therefore, the court declared the plaintiff in default on the counterclaim. Was the plaintiff validly declared
in default? Why?

Answer:

No, the plaintiff was not validly declared in default. A motion for extension of time to file an answer
may be filed ex parte and need not be set for hearing. (Amante v. Suñga, 64 SCRA 192 [1975]).

Q: The defendant was declared in default in the RTC for his failure to file an answer to a complaint for
a sum of money. On the basis of the plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence, judgment by default was
rendered against the defendant. The default judgment was served on the defendant on October 1, 2001. On
October 10, 2001, he filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment. In his
motion, the defendant alleged that, immediately upon receipt of the summons, he saw the plaintiff and
confronted him with his receipt evidencing his payment and that the plaintiff assured him that he would
instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion because it was
not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The defendant filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 challenging the denial order.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion or act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying the
defendant’s motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the default judgment?

Answer:

Yes, the trial court gravely abused its discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
denying the defendant’s motion because it was not accompanied by a separate affidavit of merit. In his
verified motion to lift the order and to set aside the judgment, the defendant alleged that immediately upon
the receipt of the summons, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt showing payment and
that the plaintiff assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. Since the good
defense of the defendant was already incorporated in the verified motion, there was no need for a separate
affidavit of merit.

Q: Andrea, who is engaged in tile installation business, was sued by EE Industries for breach of
contract for installing different marble tiles in its office as provided in their contract. Without filing any
motion to dismiss, Andrea filed her Answer with Counterclaim theorizing that EE Industries has no legal
capacity to sue because it is not a duly registered corporation. By way of counterclaim, Andrea asked for
moral and actual damages as her business depleted as a result of the withdrawal and cancellation by her
clients of their contracts due to the filing of the case. The case was dismissed after the trial court found that
EE Industries is not a registered corporation and therefore has no legal capacity to sue. However, it set a
date for the reception of evidence on Andrea’s counterclaim. EE Industries opposed on the ground that the
counterclaim could no longer be prosecuted in view of the dismissal of the main case. Is the stand of EE
Industries sustainable?

Answer:

No, because if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided in the
Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer which may include a counterclaim. This is
what Andrea did by filing an Answer alleging the lack of legal capacity of EE Industries to sue because it
is not a duly registered corporation with a counterclaim for damages. The dismissal of the complaint on
this ground is without prejudice to the prosecution of the counterclaim in the same action because it is a
compulsory counterclaim. (Sec. 6 of Rule 16)

Q: Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of P750,000.00 against Salvador in the RTC
in Quezon City for the latter's alleged breach of their contract of services. Salvador promptly filed his
answer, and included a counterclaim for P250,000.00 arising from the allegedly baseless and malicious
claims of Abraham that compelled him to litigate and to engage the services of counsel, and thus caused
him to suffer mental anguish.

Noting that the amount of the counterclaim was below the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC, Abraham filed a motion to dismiss vis-a-vis the counterclaim on that ground.

Should the counterclaim of Salvador be dismissed? Explain your answer.

Answer:

No, the counterclaim of Salvador should not be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In an original action before the RTC, the RTC has jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim
regardless of its amount. [See S7 R6]
Here Salvador’s counterclaim for damages arising from the alleged malicious and baseless claims
of Abraham is a compulsory counterclaim as it arises from Abraham’s complaint. Hence the RTC has
jurisdiction over Salvador’s counterclaim even if it did not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P400,000.

Q: For failure of KJ to file an answer within the reglementary period, the court upon motion of LM
declared KJ in default. In due time, KJ filed an unverified motion to lift the order of default without an
affidavit of merit attached to it. KJ however attached to the motion his answer under oath, stating in said
answer his reason for his failure to file an answer on time as well as his defense. Will the motion to lift the
order of default prosper? Explain.

Answer:

Yes, there is substantial compliance with the rule. Although the motion is unverified, the answer
attached to the motion is verified. The answer contains what the motion to lift the order of default and the
affidavit of merit should contain, which are the reasons of movant’s failure to answer as well as his defenses.

Q: Mario was declared in default but before judgment was rendered, he decided to file a motion to set
aside the order of default. What should Mario state in his motion in order to justify the setting aside of order
of default?

Answer:
 In order to justify the setting aside of the order of default, Mario should state in his motion that his
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious
defense. (Rule 9 Sec. 3b)

Q: On the basis of an alleged promissory note executed by Harold in favor of Ramon, the latter filed a
complaint for P950,000.00 against the former in the RTC of Davao City. In an unverified answer, Harold
specifically denied the genuineness of the promissory note.

During the trial, Harold sought to offer the testimonies of the following: (1) the testimony of an NBI
handwriting expert to prove the forgery of his signature; and (2) the testimony of a credible witness to prove
that if ever Harold had executed the note in favor of Ramon, the same was not supported by a consideration.

May Ramon validly object to the proposed testimonies? Give a brief explanation of your answer.

Answer:

1) Ramon may validly object to the proposed testimony of an NBI handwriting expert to prove
forgery.

Under S8 R8, the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document is deemed admitted by
the adverse party if he fails to specifically deny such genuineness and due execution.

Here the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, which is an actionable document,
was impliedly admitted by Harold when he failed to deny the same under oath, his answer being
unverified. Hence Harold is precluded from setting up the defense of forgery and thus Ramon may object
to the proposed testimony seeking to prove forgery.

2) Ramon may not validly object to the proposed testimony showing that the note was not supported
by a consideration.

The Supreme Court has held that an implied admission under S8 R8 does not preclude the adverse
party from introducing evidence that the actionable document was not supported by a consideration. The
reason is that such evidence is not inconsistent with the implied admission of genuineness and due
execution. [Acabal v. Acabal, 31 March 2005]

The fact that the defense of lack of consideration is inconsistent with Harold’s defense of forgery is
also not objectionable.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may set forth two or more statements of defense
alternatively or hypothetically. [S2 R8]

Q: Circe filed with the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage against siblings
Scylla and Charybdis, co-owners of the property and cosignatories to the mortgage deed. The siblings
permanently reside in Athens, Greece. Circe tipped off Sheriff Pluto that Scylla is on a balikbayan trip and
is billeted at the Century Plaza Hotel in Pasay City. Sheriff Pluto went to the hotel and personally served
Scylla the summons, but the latter refused to receive summons for Charybdis as she was not authorized to
do so. Sheriff Pluto requested Scylla for the email address and fax number of Charybdis which the latter
readily gave. Sheriff Pluto, in his return of the summons, stated that Summons for Scylla was served
personally as shown by her signature on the receiving copy of the summons. Summons on Charybdis was
served pursuant to the amendment of Rule 14 by facsimile transmittal of the summons and complaint on
defendant's fax number as evidenced by transmission verification report automatically generated by the fax
machine indicating that it was received by the fax number to which it was sent on the date and time indicated
therein."

Circe, sixty (60) days after her receipt of Sheriff Pluto's return, filed a Motion to Declare Charybdis
in default as Charybdis did not file any responsive pleading. Accordingly, Charybdis was declared in
default. What is the effect of Scylla's answer to the complaint?

Answer:

a) No, the court should not declare Charybdis in default.

Under the Rules of Court, the amendment of Rule 14 allowing service of summons by facsimile
transmittal refers only to service of summons upon a foreign private juridical entity under Section 12 of
Rule 14, not to a non-resident defendant under Section 15 of Rule 14. Service of summons by facsimile
cannot be effected under Section 15 unless leave of court was obtained specifically permitting service by
facsimile transmittal.
Here the defendant is not a foreign private juridical entity but a non-resident defendant and no leave
of court was obtained to serve summons by facsimile.
Hence there was no valid service of summons and thus the court could not declare Charybdis in
default.

b) The effect of Scylla’s answer to the complaint is that the court shall try the case against both
Scylla and Charybdis upon the answer filed by Scylla.
Under Section 3(c) of Rule 9, when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action
against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the
case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
Here there was a common cause of action against Scylla and Charybdis since both were co-
signatories to the mortgage deed.
Hence the court should not render judgment by default against Charybdis but should proceed to try
the case upon the answer filed and the evidence presented by Scylla.

Q: Aldrin entered into a contract to sell with Neil over a parcel of land. The contract stipulated a
P500,000.00 down payment upon signing and the balance payable in twelve (12) monthly installments of
P100,000.00. Aldrin paid the down payment and had paid three (3) monthly installments when he found
out that Neil had sold the same property to Yuri for P1.5 million paid in cash. Aldrin sued Neil for specific
performance with damages with the RTC. Yuri, with leave of court, filed an answer-in-intervention as he
had already obtained a TCT in his name. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering Aldrin to pay all
the installments due, the cancellation of Yuri's title, and Neil to execute a deed of sale in favor of Aldrin.
When the judgment became final and executory, Aldrin paid Neil all the installments but the latter refused
to execute the deed of sale in favor of the former. Aldrin filed a "Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution" with proper notice of hearing. The petition alleged, among others, that the decision had become
final and executory and he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of execution as a matter of right. Neil filed
a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it lacked the required certification against forum
shopping.

(a) Should the court grant Neil's Motion to Dismiss?

Despite the issuance of the writ of execution directing Neil to execute the deed of sale in
favor of Aldrin, the former obstinately refused to execute the deed.
 (b) What is Aldrin's remedy?

Answer:

a) No, the court should not grant Neil’s Motion to Dismiss.

Under Section 5 of Rule 7, a certification against forum shopping is required only for initiatory
pleadings or petitions.
Here the “Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,” although erroneously denominated as a
petition is actually a motion for issuance of a writ of execution under Rule 39.
Hence the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of a certification against forum shopping should
be denied.

b) Aldrin’s remedy is to file a motion for judgment for specific act under Section 10(a) of Rule 39.
Under Section 10(a) of Rule 39, if a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land and
the party fails to comply, the court may direct the act to be done at the disobedient party’s cost by some
other person appointed by the court or the court may by an order divest the title of the party and vest it in
the movant or other person.

Q: What are the formal requirements of a pleading or complaint under the Rules?

Q: What are the other requirements of a pleading or complaint set forth by pertinent circulars of the
Supreme Court?

Q: What are the requisites for an intervention by a non-party in an action pending in court?

Q: Berry and Cherry borrowed Php400,000.00 from Addy. The promissory note was executed by Berry
and Cherry in a joint and several capacities. Berry, who received the money from Addy, gave Cherry
Php200,000.00. Cherry, in turn, loaned Php100,000.00 out of the Php200,000.00 she received to Dina.

(a) In an action filed by Addy against Berry and Cherry with RTC of Quezon City, can Berry file a
cross-claim against Cherry for the amount of Php200,000.00?

(b) Can Cherry file a third party complaint against Dina for the amount of Php100,000.00?

Answer:

(a) Yes. Berry can file a cross-claim against Cherry for the amount of 200,000 given to Cherry. A
cross-claim is a claim filed by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action or a counterclaim therein and may
include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant
for all or part of a claim asserted against the cross-claimant. (Rule 6 Sec 8)

(b) No, Cherry cannot file a third-party complaint against Dina because the loan of P100,000 has
no connection with the opponent’s claim. C could have loaned the money out of other funds in
his possession.

Q: What is an actionable document?

Answer:
 A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such written instrument or
document.

Q: How can an actionable document be denied?

Answer:

Actionable document may be denied by specific denial under oath and by setting forth what is
claimed to be the facts.

Q: What is the remedy if the pleading denying the actionable document is not under oath?

Answer:

Q: When can the genuineness and due execution of an actionable documents not deemed admitted even
if the pleading is not under oath?

Answer:

When the adverse party was not a party to the instrument or when an order for inspection of the
document was not complied with.

Q: What are the provisional remedies under the rules?

Answer:

The provisional remedies under the Rules are preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction,
receivership, replevin, and support pendente lite.

Q: JK’s real property is being attached by the sheriff in a civil action for damages against LM. JK
claims that he is not involved in said case; and that he is the sole registered owner of said property. Under
the Rules of Court, what must JK do to prevent the sheriff from attaching his property?

Answer:

If the real property has been attached, the remedy is to file a third party claim. The third-party
claimant should make an affidavit of his title to the property attached, stating the grounds of his title thereto,
and serve such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the attached property, and a copy
thereof upon the attaching party (Rule 57, Section 1). The third-party claimant may also intervene or file
a separate civil action to vindicate his claim to the property involved and secure the necessary reliefs, such
as preliminary injunction, which will not be considered as interference with a court of coordinate
jurisdiction (Ong v. Tating, 149 SCRA 265).

Q: Distinguish attachment from garnishment.

Answer:

Attachment and garnishment are distinguished from each other as follows:

 Attachment is a provisional remedy that effects a levy on property of a party as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered, while garnishment is a levy on debts due to the
judgment obligor or defendant and other credits, including bank deposits, royalties, and other personal
property not capable of manual delivery under a writ of execution or a writ of attachment.

Q: In a case, the property of an incompetent under guardianship was in custodia legis. Can it be
attached? Explain.

Answer:

Although the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis, it may be attached
as in fact it is provided that in such case, a copy of the writ of attachment shall be filed with the proper
court and notice of the attachment served upon the custodian of such property (Rule 57, Section 7).

Q: May damages be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful attachment even if the judgment was
adverse to him? Explain.

Answer:

Yes, damages may be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful attachment even if the judgment
is adverse to him. This is authorized by the Rules. A claim for damages may be made on account of
improper, irregular, excessive attachment, which shall be heard with notice to the adverse party and his
surety or sureties (Rule 57, Section 20; Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., 32 SCRA 281).

(A) May a preliminary attachment be issued ex parte? Briefly state the reason(s) for your answer.
(B) May a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte?

Answer:

(A) Yes, an order of attachment may be issued ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing (Section
2). The reason why the order may be issued ex parte is that requiring notice to the adverse party and
hearing would defeat the purpose of the provisional remedy and enable the adverse party to abscond
or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment or dispose of his property before a writ of
attachment issues (Mindanao Savings and Loan Assn. v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480).
(B) No, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte. As provided in the Rules, no
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
be enjoined (Rule 58, Section 5). The reason is that a preliminary injunction may cause grave and
irreparable injury to the party enjoined.

Q: The plaintiff obtained a writ of preliminary attachment upon a bond of P1 million. The writ was
levied on the defendant‘s property, but it was discharged upon the posting by the defendant of a counter
bond in the same amount of P1 million. After trial, the court rendered judgment finding that the plaintiff
had no cause of action against the defendant and that he had sued out the writ of attachment maliciously.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint and ordered the plaintiff and its surety to pay jointly to the
defendant P1.5 million as actual damages, P0.5 million as moral damages and P0.5 million as exemplary
damages. Evaluate the soundness of the judgment from the point of view of procedure.

Answer:
 The judgment against the surety is not sound if due notice was not given to him of the application
for damages (Rule 57, Section 20). Moreover, the judgment against the surety cannot exceed the amount
of its counterbond of P1 million.

Q: A default judgment was rendered by the RTC ordering D to pay P a sum of money. The judgment
became final, but D filed a petition for relief and obtained a writ of preliminary injunction staying the
enforcement of the judgment. After hearing, the RTC dismissed D’s petition, whereupon P immediately
moved for the execution of the judgment in his favor. Should P’s motion be granted? Why?

Answer:

P’s immediate motion for execution of the judgment in his favor should be granted because the
dismissal of D’s petition for relief also dissolves the writ of preliminary injunction staying the enforcement
of the judgment, even if the dismissal is not yet final (Golez v. Leonidas, 107 SCRA 187 [1981]).

Q: Katy filed an action against Tyrone for collection of the sum of P1 million in the Regional Trial
Court, with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Upon posting of an attachment
bond, the court granted the application and issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Apprehensive that
Tyron might withdraw his savings deposit with the bank, the sheriff immediately served a notice of
garnishment on the bank to implement the writ of preliminary attachment. The following day, the sheriff
proceeded to Tyrone‘s house and served him the summons, with copies of the complaint containing the
application for writ of preliminary containing the application for writ of preliminary attachment, Katy‘s
affidavit, order of attachment, writ of preliminary attachment and attachment bond. Within fifteen (15)
days from service of the summons, Tyrone filed a motion to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of preliminary
attachment on the following grounds: (i) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the
writ was served ahead of the summons; (ii) the writ was improperly implemented; and (iii) said writ was
improvidently issued because the obligation in question was already fully paid. Resolve the motion with
reasons. (4%)

Answer:

The fact that the writ of attachment was served ahead of the summons did not affect the jurisdiction
of the court over the defendant. The effect is that the writ is not enforceable (Rule 57, Sec. 5). But, as
pointed out by jurisprudence, all that is needed to be done is to re-serve the writ (Onate v. Abrogar, 241
SCRA 659 [1985]). The writ was improperly implemented. Serving a notice of garnishment, particularly
before summons is served, is not proper. What should be served on the defendant are a copy of the writ of
attachment and notice that the bank deposits are attached pursuant to the writ (Rule 57, Section 7[d]). The
proper remedy where there is a payment is a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, Section 1[h]. A motion to
discharge on the ground that the writ was improvidently issued will not lie, since such a motion would be
tantamount to trial on the merits of the action which cannot be ventilated at a mere hearing of the motion
instead of a regular trial. The writ is only ancillary to the main case (Rule 57, Section 3; Mindanao Savings
and Loans Assn. v. v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480 [1989]; Davao Light & Power Co. v. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 343 [1991])

Q: After his properties were attached, defendant Porfirio filed a sufficient counterbond. The trial court
discharged the attachment. Nonetheless, Porfirio suffered substantial prejudice due to the unwarranted
attachment. In the end, the trial court rendered a judgment in Porfirio‘s favor by ordering the plaintiff to
pay damages because the plaintiff was not entitled to the attachment. Profirio moved to charge the plaintiff‘s
attachment bond. The plaintiff and his sureties opposed the motion, claiming that the filing of the
counterbond had relieved the plaintiff‘s attachment bond from all liability for the damages. Rule on
Porfirio‘s motion.
Answer:

Porfirio‘s motion to charge the plaintiff‘s attachment bond is proper. The filing of the counterbond
by the defendant does not mean that he has waived his right to proceed against the attachment bond for
damages. The attachment bond is posted to answer for any damage that a party may suffer if the attachment
is wrongful or improper (DM Wenceslao & Associates, Inc. v . Readycon Trading & Construction Corp.,
GR No. 154106, 29 June 2004).

Q: The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. The judgment obligee subsequently received
information that a bank holds a substantial deposit belonging to the judgment obligor. If you were the
counsel of the judgment obligee, what steps would you take to reach the deposit to satisfy the judgment?

Answer:

I would ask for a writ of garnishment against the deposit in the bank (Rule 57, Section 9[c]).

XXIX

Q: What is a TRO?

Answer:

A TRO is an order to maintain the status quo between and among the parties until the determination
of the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction cannot be granted without
notice and hearing. A TRO may be granted ex parte if it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the court in which the application for preliminary injunction was made may issue a
TRO ex parte for a period not exceeding 20 days from service to the party sought to be enjoined.

Q: An application for a writ of preliminary injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order
is included in a complaint and filed in a multi-sala Regional Trial Cout (RTC) consisting of Branches 1, 2,
3, and 4. Being urgent in nature, the Executive Judge, who was sitting in Branch 1, upon the filing of the
aforesaid application, immediately raffled the case in the presence of the judges of Branches 2, 3, and 4.
The case was raffled to Branch 4 and the judge thereof immediately issued a temporary restraining order.
Is the temporary restraining order valid? Why?

Answer:

No. It is only the Executive Judge who can issue immediately a temporary restraining order
effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance. No other judge has the right or power to issue a
temporary restraining order ex parte. The judge whom the case is assigned will then conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended. But in no case beyond 20
days, including the original 72 hour period (Rule 58, Section 5).

Q: May a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte? Why?

Answer:

No, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte. As provided in the Rules, no
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined (Rule 58, Section 5). The reason is that a preliminary injunction may cause grave and irreparable
injury to the party enjoined.

Q: Can a suit for injunction be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the President of the
Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front?

Answer:

No, a suit for injunction cannot be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the President of the
Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front, which is purely
political question. The President of the Philippines is immune from suit during his term (Madarang v.
Santamaria, 37 Phil. 304 [1917]).

Alternative Answer:

No, a suit for injunction cannot be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the President of the
Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front because injunction
is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and under the Rules, RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Q: What are the requisites for the issuance of (a) a writ of preliminary injunction; and (b) a final writ
of injunction?

Answer:

Requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are a verified complaint showing the
existence of a right in esse, violation or threat of violation of such right, damages or injuries sustained or
that will be sustained by reason of such violation, notice to all parties of raffle and of hearing, hearing on
the application, and filing of an appropriate bond and service thereof. On the other hand, a final writ of
injunction may be rendered by judgment after trial, showing applicant to be entitled to the writ (Rule 58,
Section 9).

Q: May the Regional Trial Court issue injunction without bond?

Answer:

Yes, if the injunction that is issued is a final injunction. Generally, however, preliminary injunction
cannot issue without bond unless exempted by the trial court (Rule 58, Section 4[b]).

(A) What is the duration of a TRO issued by the Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court?
(B) Differentiate a TRO from a status quo order.

Answer:

(A) In cases of extreme urgency, when the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
the duration of a TRO issued ex parte by and Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) is
 72 hours (Rule 58, Section 5). In the exercise of his regular functions over cases assigned to his
sala, an Executive Judge may issue a TRO for a duration not exceeding a total of 20 days.
(B) A status quo order (SQO) is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it does not direct
the doing or undoing of acts, as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. A TRO is
only good for 20 days if issued by the RTC; 60 days if issued by the CA; until further notice if
issued by the Supreme Court. The SQO is without any prescriptive period and may be issued
without a bond. A TRO dies a natural death after the allowable period; the SQO does not. A TRO
is provisional. SQO lasts until revoked. A TRO is not extendible, but the SQO may be subject to
agreement of the parties.

(A) Explain the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment.

(B) What are the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgment?

Answer:

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. RTC of Makati City, et al., G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011

(A) Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court
that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately
be struck down.

(B) But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Q: In a complaint for recovery of real property, the plaintiff averred, among others, that he is the owner
of the said property by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the defendant in his favor. Copy of the deed of
sale was appended to the complaint as Annex ―A‖ thereof. In his unverified answer, the defendant denied
the allegation concerning the sale of the property in question, as well as the appended deed of sale, for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. Is it proper for the court to
render judgment without trial? Explain?

Answer:

Defendant cannot deny the sale of the property for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth thereof. The answer, being defective amounts to an admission (Rule 8, Section
10). Moreover, the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale can only be denied by the defendant
under oath and failure to do so is also an admission of the deed. Hence, a judgment on the pleadings can
be rendered by the court without need of a trial (Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-
31869, August 8, 1973; Sec. 10, Rule 8) 52 SCRA 246 [1973]; Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA
127 [1976])

Q: After defendant has served and filed his answer to plaintiff’s complaint for damages before the
proper Regional Trial Court, plaintiff served and filed a motion (with supporting affidavits) for a summary
judgment in his opposition (with supporting affidavits) to the motion. After due hearing, the court issued
an order (1) stating that the court has found no genuine issue as to many material fact and thus concluded
that plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law except as to the amount of damages
recoverable, and (2) accordingly ordering that the plaintiff shall have judgment summarily against
defendant for such amount as may be found due plaintiff for damages to be ascertained by trial on October
7, 2004, at 8:30 o‘clock in the morning. May defendant properly take an appeal from said order? Or may
defendant properly challenge sad order thru a special civil action for certiorari? Reason.

Answer:

No, plaintiff may not properly take an appeal from said order because it is an interlocutory order
and not a final and appealable order (Sec. 4, Rule 35) . It does not dispose of the action or proceeding.
Partial summary judgments are interlocutory. There is still something to be done, which is the trial for the
adjudication of damages (but the defendant may properly challenge said order thru a special civil action for
certiorari (Section 1(c), Rule 41; Province of Pangasinan vs. CA, 220 SCRA 726 [1993]).

Q: Distinguish between a judgment on the pleadings and a summary judgment.

Answer:

Q: After Plaintiff in an ordinary civil action before the ZZ Regional Trial Court has completed
presentation on his evidence, defendant without prior leave of court moved for dismissal of plaintiff‘s
complaint for insufficiency of plaintiff‘s evidence. After due hearing of the motion and the opposition
thereto, the court issued an order, reading as follows: ―The Court hereby grants defendant‘s motion to
dismiss and accordingly orders the dismissal of plaintiff‘s complaint, with the cost taxed against him. It is
so ordered. Is the order of dismissal valid? May plaintiff properly take an appeal? Reason.

Answer:

The order or decisions is void because it does not state findings of fact and of law, as required by
Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Being void,
appeal is not available. The proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65.
Q: Pedro filed a complaint against Carlos in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City for the
recovery of the ownership of a car. Pedro filed his answer within the reglementary period. After the pre-
trial and actual trial, and after Pedro has completed with the presentation of his evidence, Carlos filed a
demurrer to evidence, which the RTC granted. Pedro appealed and the appellate court reversed the order
of the trial court. Thereafter, Carlos filed a motion with the RTC asking the latter to allow him to present
his evidence. Resolve the motion.

Answer:

The motion should be denied. Carlos can no longer present evidence. The Rules provide that the
motion for dismissal is granted by the trial court but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, he shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. (Section 1, Rule 33)

Alternative Answer:

No, because when the appellate court reversed the order of the trial court it should have rendered
judgment in favor of Carlos. (Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 1996)

Q: Sonny Ty filed in the RTC of Iligan City an action against Jerome Uy for collection of sum of
money. For his failure to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, Uy was declared in default,
Ty was allowed to present his evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court, and judgment was
rendered by the RTC for Ty. Uy appealed on the ground that the presentation of Ty’s evidence was void
because it should have been done before the judge and not the Branch Clerk of Court. Rule on the appeal.

Answer:

Dy, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 97130, July 19, 1991

With regard to the validity of the proceedings before the Branch Clerk of Court, we agree with the
observations of the Court of Appeals that:

Appellant is now estopped from questioning the retention of the proceedings held on August 19,
1983 before the Branch Clerk of Court since her husband agreed to the same during the pre-trial
conference held on November 12, 1987. Agreements reached at the pre-trial conference and
embodied in the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the trial and should not be
disturbed unless there could be manifest injustice.

The agreement is not unjust to appellant. Aside from appellant having the right to adduce evidence
on her behalf, the parties agreed that the evidence presented by appellee before the Branch Clerk of
Court would be retained, with appellant having the right to cross-examine appellee's witnesses.

xxx xxx xxx

The agreement of the parties as contained in the pre-trial order is not invalid. The parties are
authorized by the Rules of Court to consider "[s]uch other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action." An authority believes this includes "agreement on certain matters so that
witnesses need not and will not be called." Undoubtedly, the procedure agreed upon by the parties
in this case would have greatly accelerated the trial and the decision therein, which, at the, time of
the pre-trial conference, had been pending for three years and had already gone up on appeal to this
Court. (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
The presentation of the plaintiff's evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court was not void. The Supreme
Court, in the case of Continental Bank vs. Tiangco, et al. (94 SCRA 715) departing from its contrary
statement in the Lim Tan Hu case (66 SCRA 425), declared that a decision based on evidence heard by a
deputy clerk of court as commissioner is valid and enforceable because it was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, was not impaired by extrinsic fraud, nor by lack of due process, and there was no
showing that the private respondents were prejudiced by such a procedure, or that the commissioner
committed any mistake or abuse of discretion, or that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion and
collateral fraud. That ruling applies four square to this case.

The practice of designating the clerk of court as a commissioner to receive evidence in the event of the non-
appearance of the defendant and its counsel, is not irregular and is sanctioned by Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court on trial by commissioner (J.M. Tuazon, Inc. vs. Dela Rosa, 18 SCRA 591; Wassmer vs. Velez, 12
SCRA 648).

The petitioner was not denied due process. As pointed out by the appellate court:

. . . Appellant retained her right to present evidence on her behalf and the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses already presented by appellee. At any rate, if appellant believes that her right
to procedural due process had been curtailed, the same was due to a voluntary waiver by her
husband. (p. 28, Rollo)

Q: Juana filed with the RTC of Iligan City an action to quiet title against Jose. Answer was in due
course filed by Jose. The case was set for pre-trial on January 25, 2010. Jose’s counsel moved for
cancellation of this setting. The court reset the pre-trial to February 27, 2010, but again Jose’s counsel,
pleading illness, sought to have this second pre-trial setting cancelled by motion. The motion contained no
notice of hearing, hence denied by the court. At the scheduled pre-trial on February 27, 2010, neither Jose
nor his counsel appeared. The court consequently authorized Juana to present evidence ex parte. On
certiorari, Jose questions the orders of the court contending that (1) while his counsel’s motion for
postponement was defective in that it had not been set for hearing, the flaw was but a formal one caused by
its having been hastily drawn up when counsel was suffering from headache; and (2) the pre-trial setting
was void since notice thereof had not been given to Jose personally, only his counsel has been notified. Are
Jose’s contentions tenable?

Answer:

(a) The omission in defendants' motion for cancellation of the pre-trial scheduled on February 27, 1978 of
a notice of hearing was not a mere formal defect, as defendants seem to imagine. The motion for
cancellation or postponement was not one that could be granted by the Court as a matter of course, and
thus be acted on ex parte. No party has a right to a postponement of a trial or hearing, or pre-trial; and
his adversary has the right to oppose any move towards this end. A party or counsel desiring a
postponement of a pre-trial or trial must comply with the requisites of motions in general set out in Rule
15 of the Rules of Court, i.e., the motion shall be made in writing, shall state the grounds upon which
it is based and if necessary be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other papers and notice thereof
— specifying the date of hearing which is supposed to be specified by the movant himself — shall be
served by the applicant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days before said hearing, together with
a copy of the motion and of any affidavits and other relevant papers. Such notice of hearing, it must be
added, is essential. Its importance is underscored by the prohibition of action by the court on any motion
which is not accompanied by proof of service thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights
of the adverse party or parties are not affected. And if the motion be grounded on illness of a party or
counsel, the Rules further require an "affidavit that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial (or
 pre-trial) is indispensable and that the character of his illness is such as to render his non- attendance
excusable." 8

The defendants' counsel, Atty. Pacamarra, attributes his omission to include a notice of hearing in his
motion in question to his headache at the tune. But neither his motion nor its supporting medical
certificate showed "that the character of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance
excusable," i.e., that the headache was so severe and expected to last for such a period of time as to
make it impossible or extremely difficult for him to attend the pre-trial, still a month away. Indeed,
since rest was apparently all that was needed to relieve him of his indisposition at the time, January 27,
1978 (the date of his motion), he had enough time therefor, as the Trial Court tartly observed, "from
that date to the date of the next hearing of the case" (February 27, 1978). There was, too, a not
unreasonable hesitancy on the part of the Trial Court to give full credence to the medical certificate
attached to the motion, since it was not verified and was only a xerox copy.

Furthermore, as shown by the record, notice of the denial of his motion for postponement had been
served on Atty. Pacamarra on February 24, 1978, three (3) days before the pre-trial set on February 27,
1978. There is nothing in the record to excuse his failure to exert any effort to himself appear at the pre-
trial, or cause his client, or any other representative, to present himself before the Court to advise it of
his predicament.

(b) The objection that notice of pre-trial was not served personally on the defendants as well as on their
attorney is, in the premises, utterly without merit. Atty. Pacamarra did not protest against this defect in
relation to the pre-trial settings on January 25 and again on February 27, 1978. If he believed that failure
of notice to be a grave defect, he should have brought it to the Court's attention forthwith, and the matter
would have immediately been set aright. He did not do so. Moreover, this Court has already ruled that
service of the notice of pre-trial on a party through his counsel is not only proper but is the preferred
mode. 9

Explain briefly your answer.

Q: Distinguish action from cause of action.

Answer:

An action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, whereas, cause of action is the act or omission by which a person violates
the right of another.

Q: What is the rule on joinder of causes of action?

Answer:

The rule on joinder of causes of action is that a party may in one pleading assert in the alternative
or otherwise join as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, provided that the rule
on joinder of parties is complied with.

Q: After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Arlene returned to the Philippines to retire in Manila,
the place of her birth and childhood. Ten years before her retirement, she bought for cash in her name a
house and lot in Malate, Manila. Six months after her return, she learned that her house and lot were the
 subject of foreclosure proceedings commenced by ABC Bank on the basis of a promissory note and a deed
of real estate mortgage she had allegedly executed in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier. Knowing that
she was not in the country at the time the promissory note and deed of mortgage were supposedly executed,
Arlene forthwith initiated a complaint in the RTC of Manila praying that the subject documents be declared
null and void.

ABC Bank filed.a motion to dismiss Arlene's complaint on the ground of improper venue on the
basis of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon City as the exclusive venue in the event of
litigation between the parties arising out of the loan and mortgage. Should the motion to dismiss of ABC
Bank be granted?

Answer:

No, the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank should not be granted.

In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that a party is not bound by a venue
stipulation where he directly assails on the ground of forgery the validity of the contracts containing the
venue stipulation. The reason is that such a party cannot be expected to comply with the venue stipulation
since his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of the validity of the contracts he assails.
[Briones v. Cash Asia Credit Corp., 14 January 2015]

Q: Give the effects of the following:

(A) Splitting a single cause of action, and
(B) Non-joinder of a necessary party.

Answer:

A. The effect of splitting a single cause of action is found in the rule as follows: If two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on
the merits in anyone is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
B. The effect of the non-joinder of a necessary party may be stated as follows: The court may order
the inclusion of an omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The
failure to comply with the order for his inclusion without justifiable cause to a waiver of the
claim against such party. The court may proceed with the action but the judgment rendered shall
be without prejudice to the rights of each necessary party.

Q: A filed a complaint against B for cancellation of title. B filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
because C, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not impleaded as
defendant. Resolve the motion.

Answer:

The motion to dismiss should not be granted.

The Supreme Court has held that non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground of a motion
to dismiss.

Q: Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a promissory note
in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot as security
for her obligation. The loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action against
Elise to foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month after, and while the foreclosure suit was pending,
Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover the principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based on the
same promissory note previously executed by the latter.

In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting of a single
cause of action, Merchant Bank argued that the ground relied upon by Elise was devoid of any legal basis
considering that the two actions were based on separate contracts, namely, the contract of loan evidenced
by the promissory note, and the deed of real estate mortgage. Is there a splitting of a single cause of action?
Explain your answer.

Answer:

Yes, there is a splitting of a single cause of action.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a splitting of a single cause of action if two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action. [S4 R2]. A cause of action is the act or omission
by which a party violates a right of another. [S2 R2].

Here, both suits, the foreclosure and the collection suit, arose from the same cause of action, that is,
the non-payment by Elise of her P3 million loan from Merchant Bank. The fact that the two actions were
based on separate contracts is irrelevant, what matters is that both actions arose from the same cause of
action

Q: Perry is a resident of Manila, while Ricky and Marvin are residents of Batangas City. They are the
co-owners of a parcel of residential land located in Pasay City with an assessed value of P100,000.00. Perry
borrowed P100,000.00 from Ricky which he promised to pay on or before December 1, 2004. However,
Perry failed to pay his loan. Perry also rejected Ricky and Marvin’s proposal to partition the property. Ricky
filed a complaint against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City for the partition of the property. He
also incorporated in his complaint his action against Perry for the collection of the latter’s P100,000.00
loan, plus interests and attorney’s fees.

State with reasons whether it was proper for Ricky to join his causes of action in his complaint for
partition against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City.

Answer:

It was not proper for Ricky to join his causes of action against Perry in his complaint for partition
against Perry and Marvin. The causes of action may be between the same parties with respect to the loan
but not with respect to the partition which includes Marvin. The joinder is between a partition and a sum
of money and the former is a special civil action under Rule 69, which cannot be joined with other causes
of action. Also, the causes of action pertain to different venues and jurisdictions. The case for a sum of
money pertains to the municipal court and cannot be filed in Pasay City because the plaintiff is from Manila
while Ricky and Marvin are from Batangas.

Q: A purchased a lot from B for P1,500,000.00. He gave a down payment of P500,000, signed a
promissory note payable thirty days after date, and as a security for the settlement of the obligation,
mortgaged the same lot to B. When the note fell due and A failed to pay, B commenced suit to recover from
A the balance of P1,000,000.00. After securing a favorable judgment on his claim, B brought another action
against A before the same court to foreclose the mortgage. A now files a motion to dismiss the second
action on the ground of bar by prior judgment. Rule on the motion.
Answer:

The rule against splitting a cause of action and its effect are that if two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

The motion to dismiss should be granted. When B commenced suit to collect on the promissory
note, he waived his right to foreclose the mortgage. B split his cause of action.

Q: Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a large tract of land located in
Oriental Mindoro. She impleaded her two brothers John and Adrian as defendants but did not implead Leica
and Agatha, her two sisters who were permanent residents of Australia.

Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without impleading all indispensable
parties, John and Adrian moved to dismiss the complaint.

Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your answer.

Answer:

Yes, the trial court has a reason to deny the motion to dismiss.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, non-joinder of parties, even indispensable ones, is not a ground
of a motion to dismiss. [S11 R3; Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508 (2001)]

Q: Eduardo, a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a
complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy Bank (Galaxy),
and the consequent· foreclosure and auction sale of his mortgaged Makati property. Galaxy filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue alleging that the complaint should be filed with the RTC of
Makati since the complaint involves the ownership and possession of Eduardo's lot. Resolve the motion
with reasons.

Answer:

The motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue should be granted.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the venue of real actions shall be with the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area where the real property involved is situated. An action for annulment of mortgage
is a real action if there has already been a foreclosure sale. (See Chua v. Total Office Products and Services,
30 September 2005).

Here there was already a foreclosure sale. Hence, the action for annulment of mortgage is a real
action which should have been filed in Makati where the real property is situated.

Q: Lender extended to Borrower a P100,000.00 loan covered by a promissory note. Later, Borrower
obtained another P100,000.00 loan again covered by a promissory note. Still later, Borrower obtained a
P300,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage on his land valued at P500,000.00. Borrower defaulted
on his payments when the loans matured. Despite demand to pay the P500,000.00 loan, Borrower refused
to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule, filed against Borrower with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, a collection suit for P500,000.00.
 (A) Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action?

At the trial, Borrower's lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully elicited an admission
from the latter that the two promissory notes have been paid. Thereafter, Borrower's lawyer filed a motion
to dismiss the case on the ground that as proven only P300,000.00 was the amount due to Lender and which
claim is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. He further argued that
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

(B) Should the court dismiss the case?

Answer:

(A) No. Lender did not correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action.
None of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. All causes of action are governed by
a special rule, i.e. Rules on Small Claims.

Alternative answer: Yes. Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of
action.

Under the rule on joinder of causes of action, a party may in one pleading assert as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party. Under the totality rule, where the claims in all the causes
of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction.

Here, the causes of action by Lender are all against borrower and all the claims are principally for
recovery of money. Hence, the aggregate amount claimed, which is P500,000 shall be the test of jurisdiction
and thus it is the RTC of Manila which has jurisdiction.

Although the rules on joinder of causes of action state that the joinder shall not include special civil
actions, the remedy resorted to with respect to the third loan was not foreclosure but collection. Hence
joinder of causes of action would still be proper.

(B) Yes, the court should dismiss the case. RTC has no jurisdiction.

Alternative answer: No, the court should not dismiss the case.

The Supreme Court has held that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the amount of the
claim alleged in the complaint and not the amount substantiated during the trial. (Dionisio v Sioson Puerto,
31 October 1974).

Here, the amount claimed was P500,000. Even if the claim substantiated during the trial was only
P300,000 that is not determinative of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hence, the argument that lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time is misplaced since in the first place the RTC has jurisdiction.

Q: Juliet invoking the provisions of the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children filed with
the RTC designated as a Family Court a petition for issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
against her husband, Romeo. The Family Court issued a 30-day TPO against Romeo. A day before the
expiration of the TPO, Juliet filed a motion for extension. Romeo in his opposition raised, among others,
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262 (The VAWC Law) arguing that the law authorizing the issuance of
a TPO violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the 1987 Constitution. The Family Court
judge, in granting the motion for extension of the TPO, declined to rule on the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9262. The Family Court judge reasoned that Family Courts are without jurisdiction to pass upon
constitutional issues, being a special court of limited jurisdiction and R.A. No. 8369, the law creating the
Family Courts, does not provide for such jurisdiction. Is the Family Court judge correct when he declined
to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262?

Answer:

No, the Family Court judge was not correct when he declined to resolve the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9262.

The Supreme Court has held that despite its designation as a Family Court, a Regional Trial Court
remains possessed of authority as a court of general jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute. (Garcia v. Drilon, 25 June 2013)

Q: Strauss filed a complaint against Wagner for cancellation of title. Wagner moved to dismiss the
complaint because Grieg, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not
impleaded as defendant.
(A) Should the complaint be dismissed?
(B) If the case should proceed to trial without Grieg being impleaded as a party to the case, what is
his remedy to protect his interest?

Answer:

(A) No, the complaint should not be dismissed.

The Supreme Court has held that non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground of a motion
to dismiss. (Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508).
Here, although Grieg, the registered mortgagee, is an indispensable party (Metrobank v. Alejo, 364
SCRA 813 [2001]), his non-joinder does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.

(B) The remedy of Grieg is to file a motion for leave to intervene. Under Rule 19, a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation may intervene in the action.
Here, Grieg is a mortgagee and such fact was annotated in the title. Hence, he has a legal interest in
the title subject-matter of the litigation and may thus intervene in the case.

Q: A law was passed declaring Mt. Karbungko as a protected area since it was a major watershed. The
protected area covered a portion located in Municipality A of the Province I and a portion located in the
City of Z of Province II. Maingat is the leader of Samahan ng Tagapag-ingat ng Karbungko (STK), a
people's organization. He learned that a portion of the mountain located in the City of Z of Province II was
extremely damaged when it was bulldozed and leveled to the ground, and several trees and plants were cut
down and burned by workers of World Pleasure Resorts, Inc. (WPRI) for the construction of a hotel and
golf course. Upon inquiry with the project site engineer if they had a permit for the project, Maingat was
shown a copy of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the DENR-EMB, Regional
Director (RD-DENR-EMB).

Immediately, Maingat and STK filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus
against RD-DENR-EMB and WPRI with the RTC of Province I, a designated environmental court, as the
RD-DENR-EMB negligently issued the ECC to WPRI.
 On scrutiny of the petition, the court determined that the area where the alleged actionable neglect
or omission subject of the petition took place in the City of Z of Province II, and therefore cognizable by
the RTC of Province II. Thus, the court dismissed outright the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

(A) Was the court correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition?

Assuming that the court did not dismiss the petition, the RD-DENR-EMB in his Comment moved
to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to appeal the issuance of the ECC and to exhaust
administrative remedies provided in the DENR Rules and Regulations.

(B) Should the court dismiss the petition?

Answer:

(A) No, the court was not correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the requirement that the petition be
filed in the area where the actionable neglect or omission took place relates to venue and not to subject-
matter jurisdiction. Since what is involved is improper venue and not subject-matter jurisdiction, it was
wrong for the court to dismiss outright the petition since venue may be waived. (Dolot v. Paje, 27 August
2013).

(B) No, the court should not dismiss the petition.

The Supreme Court has held that in environmental cases, the defense of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies by appealing the ECC issuance would apply only if the defect in the issuance of
the ECC does not have any causal relation to the environmental damage.
Here the issuance of the ECC has a direct causal relation to the environmental damage since it
permitted the bulldozing of a portion of the mountain and the cutting down and buring of several trees and
plants. (See Paje v. Casiño, 3 February 2015).

Q: Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into a lease contract with Tenant, a resident of
Marikina City, over a residential house in Las Piñas City. The lease contract provided, among others, for a
monthly rental of P25,000.00, plus ten percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-payment on its due date.
Subsequently, Landlord migrated to the United States of America (USA) but granted in favor of his
sister Maria, a special power of attorney to manage the property and file and defend suits over the property
rented out to Tenant. Tenant failed to pay the rentals due for five (5) months. Maria asks your legal advice
on how she can expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals plus interests due.

(A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria?

(B) Where is the proper venue of the judicial remedy which you recommended?
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you reckon the one (1)-year
period within which to file the action?

Answer:

(A) The judicial remedy that I would recommend to Maria is to file a collection suit for the P125,000
rentals in arrears and the P12,500 interest due. The remedy would be expeditious since it would be
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure as the amount of the demand, excluding interest, does not
exceed P200,000.

(B) The proper venue of the collection suit would be in Marikina City, where Tenant resides.
 Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, venue in personal actions is with the residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, at the plaintiff’s election.
Since the Plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, venue may be laid only in Marikina City where
the defendant Tenant resides.

(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, the one-year period within which to file
the action shall be reckoned from the expiration of 5-days from notice of the last demand to pay and vacate.
(Cruz v. Atencio, 28 February 1959; Sy Oh v. Garcia, 30 June 1969).

Q: Prince Chong entered into a lease contract with King Kong over a commercial building where the
former conducted his hardware business. The lease contract stipulated, among others, a monthly rental of
P50,000.00 for a four (4)-year period commencing on January 1, 2010. On January 1, 2013, Prince
Chong died. Kin Il Chong was appointed administrator of the estate of Prince Chong, but the former failed
to pay the rentals for the months of January to June 2013 despite King Kong’s written demands.

Thus, on July 1, 2013, King Kong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for rescission
of contract with damages and payment of accrued rentals as of June 30, 2013.

(A) Can Kin Il Chong move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is without
jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.00?
(B) If the rentals accrued during the lifetime of Prince Chong, and King Kong also filed the
complaint for sum of money during that time, will the action be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death
during the pendency of the case?

Answer:

(A) No, Kin II Chong cannot move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is without
jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Here, the action is for rescission which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The P300,000 accrued
rentals is only incidental to the main purpose of the action which is to rescind the lease contract.

(B) No, the action will not be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the pendency of the case.
Under S20 R3, when the action is on a contractual money claim and the defendant dies before entry
of final judgment, the action shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of
final judgment.
Here, the action is on a contractual money claim, that is, a claim for rentals based on a lease
contract. Hence it shall be allowed to continue until final judgment. (S20 R3, S5 R86).

Q: While leisurely walking along the street near her house in Marikina, Patty unknowingly stepped on
a garden tool left behind by CCC, a construction company based in Makati. She lost her balance as a
consequence and fell into an open manhole. Fortunately, Patty suffered no major injuries except for
contusions, bruises and scratches that did not require any hospitalization. However, she lost self-esteem,
suffered embarrassment and ridicule, and had bouts of anxiety and bad dreams about the accident. She
wants vindication for her uncalled for experience and hires you to act as counsel for her and to do whatever
is necessary to recover at least Php100,000.00 for what she suffered.

What action or actions may Patty pursue, against who, where (court and venue), and under what
legal basis?
Answer:

Patty may avail any of the following remedies:

a) She may file a complaint for damages arising from fault or negligence under the Rules on Small
Claims against CCC Company before the MTC of Marikina City where she resides or Makati City where
the defendant corporation is holding office, at her option (A.M. No. 8-8-7-SC in relation to Section 2, Rule
4, Rules of Court).

b) She may also file an action to recover moral damages based on quasi delict under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code. The law states that, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi delict.
Since moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, Patty should file the action before the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina City where she resides or Makati City, where the defendant corporation
is holding office, at her option (Section 19[1], B.P. 129).

c) Patty can also file a civil action for damages against the City of Marikina for maintaining an open
manhole where she unfortunately fell. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, provinces, cities, and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision. The proper court having jurisdiction over the case is at least Php100,000 for as long
as the aggregate of the claims for damages does not exceed Php400,000.00

Q: A bought a Volvo Sedan from ABC Cars for P5.0M. ABC Cars, before delivering to A, had the car
rust proofed and tinted by XYZ Detailing. When delivered to A, the car’s upholstery was found to be
damaged. ABC Cars and XYZ Detailing both deny any liability. Who can A sue and on what cause(s) of
action? Explain.

Answer:

A can file an action for specific performance and damages against ABC Cars since the damage to
the Volvo Sedan’s upholstery was caused before the delivery of the same to A, and therefore prior to the
transfer of the ownership to the latter. (Art. 1477 NCC) Under Art. 1170 of the NCC, those who contravene
the tenor of the obligation are liable for damages. Hence an action for specific performance against ABC
to deliver the agreed Volvo Sedan in the contract, free from any damage or defects, with corresponding
damages will lie against ABC Cars.

Q: Raphael, a warehouseman, filed a complaint against V Corporation, X Corporation and Y

Corporation to compel them to interplead. He alleged therein that the three corporations claimed title and
right of possession over the goods deposited in his warehouse and that he was uncertain which of them was
entitled to the goods. After due proceedings, judgment was rendered by the court declaring that X
Corporation was entitled to the goods. The decision became final and executory

Raphael filed a complaint against X Corporation for the payment of P100,000.00 for storage charges and
other advances for the goods. X Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. X Corporation alleged that Raphael should have incorporated in his complaint for interpleader his
claim for storage of fees and advances and that for his failure he was barred from interposing his claim.
Raphael replied that he could not have claimed storage fees and other advances in his complaint for
interpleader because he was not yet certain as to who was liable therefor. Resolve the motion with reasons.
Answer:

The motion to dismiss should be granted. Raphael should have incorporated in his complaint for
interpleader his claim for storage fees and advances, the amounts of which were obviously determinable at
the time of the filing of the complaint. They are part of Raphael’s cause of action which he may not be split.
Hence, when the warehouseman asks the court to ascertain who among the defendants are entitled to the
goods, he also hast the right to ask who should pay for the storage fees and other related expenses. The
filing of the interpleader is available as a ground for dismissal of the second case. It is akin to a compulsory
counterclaim which, if not set up, shall be barred.

Q: Rolando filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmela because of the
alleged psychological incapacity of the latter.

After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that Rolando failed to prove
the psychological incapacity of his wife. The judgment having become final, Rolando filed another petition,
this time on the ground that his marriage to Carmela had been celebrated without a license. Is the second
action barred by the judgment in the first? Why?

Answer:

No, the second action is not barred by the judgment in the first because they are different causes of
action. The first is for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the FC, while the second is for declaration of nullity of the marriage in view of the absence of a basic
requirement, which is a marriage license. They are different causes of action because the evidence to prove
them are not the same.

Q: In an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC, defendant X raised in his answer the defense that
plaintiff A is not the real owner of the house subject of the suit. X filed a counterclaim against A for the
collection of a debt of P80,000.00 plus accrued interest of P15,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P20,000.00.
Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the counterclaim?

Answer:

The counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the MTC which does not exceed P100,000.00, because
the principal demand is P80,000 exclusive of interest and attorney’s fees (Sec. 33, BP 129, as amended).
However, inasmuch as all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are subject to summary procedure
and since the counterclaim is only permissive, it cannot be entertained by the Municipal Court.

Q: Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance praying for
the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case was
inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as a special commercial court. Later, the RTC rendered
judgment adverse to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC, approaches you
and wants you to file a petition to have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction. What advice would
you give to Era? Explain your answer.

Answer:

The advice I would give to Era is that the petition for annulment of judgment on lack of jurisdiction
will not prosper. The Supreme Court has held that a special commercial court is still a court of general
jurisdiction and can hear and try a non-commercial case. (Concorde Condominium Inc. vs. Baculi, 17 Feb
2016)
Q: An amicable settlement was signed before a Lupon Tagapamayapa on January 3, 2001. On July 6,
2001, the prevailing party asked the Lupon to execute the amicable settlement because of the non-
compliance by the other party of the terms of the agreement. The Lupon concerned refused to execute the
settlement/ agreement. Is the Lupon correct in refusing to execute the settlement/agreement?

Answer:

Yes. The Lupon is correct in refusing to execute the settlement/ agreement because the execution
sought is already beyond the period of six months from the date of the settlement within which the Lupon
is authorized to execute. (Sec. 417, Local Government Code of 1991) After the six-month period, the
prevailing party should move to execute the settlement/agreement in the appropriate city or municipal trial
court.

Q: A brings an action in the MTC of Manila against B for the annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale of real property with an assessed value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The complaint alleged
prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due. B timely moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the RTC of Laguna. Decide with reason.

Answer:

The motion should be granted. The MTC of Manila has no jurisdiction because the action for the
annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure is not capable of pecuniary estimation and is therefore under the
jurisdiction of the RTCs. (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 [1999])

However, the action for annulment is a personal action and the venue depends on the residence of either A
or B. Hence, it should be brought in the RTC of the place where either of the parties resides.

Q: A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B, the natural son of A’s father, for the
partition of a parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an assessed value of Php20,000.00. B moves to
dismiss the action the ground that the case should have been brought in the RTC because the action is one
that is not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a determination of hereditary rights and
not merely the bare right to real property. Resolve the motion.

Answer:

The motion should be granted. The action for partition depends on a determination of the hereditary
rights of A and B, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, even though the assessed value of
the land is P20,000, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction. (Russel vs. Vestil)

Q: P sued A in the RTC Manila to recover the following sums: (1) 200,000.00 on an overdue
promissory note, (2) P80,000.00 on the purchase price of a computer, (3) P150,000.00 for damages to his
car and (4) P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Can A move to dismiss the case on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter? Explain.

Answer:

No. Because the RTC-Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter. P may sue A in one complaint
asserting as many causes of action as he may have and since all the claims are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Rule 2, Sec. 5[d]). The aggregate
amount claimed is P450,000.00, exclusive of the amount of P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses
for litigation. Hence, the RTC- Manila has jurisdiction.
 Q: A filed with the MTC of Manila an action for specific performance against B, a resident of Quezon
City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City
having an assessed value of P19,000.00. B received the summons and a copy of the Complaint on 02
January 2003. On 10 January 2003, B filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court
denied the motion. Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?

Answer:

The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not correct. Although the assessed value of
the parcel of land involved was P19,000.00, within the jurisdiction of the MTC of Manila, the action filed
by A for Specific Performance against B to compel the latter to execute a Deed of Conveyance of said
parcel of land was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore the action was within the jurisdiction
of RTC. (Russel vs. Vestil; Copioso vs. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October 28, 2002; Cabutihan vs. Land
Center Construction, 383 SCRA 353[2002]).

Alternative answer:

If the action affects title to or possession of real property then it is a real action and jurisdiction is
determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan
Trial Court.

Q: P sued A and B in one complaint in the RTC Manila, the cause of action against A being on an
overdue promissory note for P300,000.00 and that against B being on an alleged balance of P300,000.00
on the purchase price of good sold on credit. Does the RTC-Manila have jurisdiction over the case? Explain.

Answer:

No. The RTC-Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. A and B could not be joined as defendants
in one complaint because the right to relief against both defendants do not arise out of the same transaction
or series of transactions and there is no common question of law or fact common to both. (Rule 3, Sec. 6).
Hence, separate complaints will have to be filed and they would fall under the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Q: Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed with the RTC of Lipa
City a complaint for Rescission of Contract of Sale of Land against Brigido, a resident of Barangay San
Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The subject property, located in Barangay Talisay, Lipa City has an assessed
value of 19,700. Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo’s verification and certification of non-forum
shopping executed in New York City, duly notarized by Mr. Joseph Brown, Esq., a notary public in the
State of New York. Brigod filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(a) The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Amorsolo because he is not a resident of the
Philippine.
(b) The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action involving the real property with
an assessed value of P19,700; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the Municipal Trial Court.
Assume you’re the judge, resolve the motion.

Answer:

The first ground raised lacks merit because jurisdiction over the person of a plaintiff is acquired by
the court upon the filing of plaintiff’s complaint therewith. Residency or citizenship is not a requirement
for filing a complaint, because plaintiff thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
The second ground raised is also without merit because the subject of the litigation, Rescission of Contract,
is incapable of pecuniary estimation the exclusive original jurisdiction to which is vested by law in the
Regional Trial Courts. The nature of the action renders the assessed value of the land involved irrelevant.

Q: Josefa filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alicia and Mabili, a petition for the probate of
the will of her husband, Martin, who died in the Municipality of Alicia, the residence of the spouses. The
probable value of the estate which consisted mainly of a house and lot was placed at P195,000.00 and in
the petition for the allowance of the will, attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00, litigation expenses
in the amount of P5,000.00 and costs were included. Pedro, the next of kin of Martin, filed an opposition
to the probate of the will on the ground that the total amount included in the relief of the petition is more
than P200,000.00, the maximum jurisdiction amount for municipal circuit trial courts. The court overruled
the opposition and proceeded to hear the case. Was the municipal circuit trial court correct in its ruling?

Answer:

Yes. The MCTC was correct in proceeding to hear the case. It has exclusive jurisdiction in all
matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the value of the estate does not exceed P100,000.00
(now P200,000.00). The value in this case is P195,000.00 is within its jurisdiction. In determining the
jurisdictional amount, excluded are attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs; these are considered only
for determining the filing fees.

Q: Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect Php350,000.00, an
amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha. Realizing a
jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal before she was
served with the answer of Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming the dismissal.

Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of action this
time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have the
complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of the answer of
Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC.

A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC.

May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint? Explain your
answer.

Answer:

No, Yana may not successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint.
Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits
provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. (S1, R17)
Here the first dismissal by the plaintiff was not in a competent court as the RTC in Makati City did
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action seeking to recover P350,000. Hence Agatha’s third
complaint is not barred by the Two-Dismissal Rule.

Q: What trial court outside Metro Manila has exclusive original jurisdiction over an action filed on
November 13, 2017 to recover the possession of an apartment unit being occupied by the defendant by
mere tolerance of the plaintiff, after the former ignored the last demand to vacate that was duly served upon
and received by him on July 6, 2017?
Answer:
It would be either the MTC or the RTC depending upon the assessed value of the apartment unit.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, jurisdiction over real actions is vested in the MTC if the assessed value of the
real property involved does not exceed P20,000 and in the RTC if such assessed value exceeds P20,000.
The action to recover possession can no longer be one for unlawful detainer since it was brought beyond
one year from the last demand to vacate.
Q: What trial court outside Metro Manila has exclusive original jurisdiction over a complaint in which
the principal relief sought is the enforcement of a seller’s contractual right to repurchase a lot with an
assessed value of Php22,000.00?
Answer:
Exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the Regional Trial Court. The Supreme Court has held
that an action to enforce the right of redemption is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129. [Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo,
10 March 2014]
Q: What court in Metro Manila has jurisdiction over an action for specific performance or, in the
alternative, for damages in the amount of P180,000.00?
Answer:
The action falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. What is determinative of jurisdiction is the
alternative action for damages. The amount of P180000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Q: What court outside Metro Manila has jurisdiction over an action for a writ of injunction?
Answer:
An action for injunction falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC because it is an action not capable
of pecuniary estimation.
Q: What court in Metro Manila has jurisdiction over an action for replevin of a motorcycle valued at
P150,000.00?
Answer:
The action falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The value of the personal property involved
does not exceed P400,000.
Q: What court in Metro Manila has jurisdiction over an action for interpleader to determine who
between the defendants is entitled to receive the amount of P190,000.00 from the plaintiff?
Answer:
The action falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The value of the property involved does not
exceed P400,000.
Q: What court outside Metro Manila has jurisdiction over a petition for the probate of a will involving
an estate valued at P200,000.00?
Answer:
The action falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The value of the estate does not exceed
P300,000.
Q: What is an interlocutory order?
Answer:
An interlocutory order is an order which decides some point or matter between the commencement
and end of the suit but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy. It leaves something to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits (Metropolitan Bank &. Trust Co. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 110147, April 17, 2001; Gallardo v. People, G.R. No. 142030, April 21, 2005).
Q: How should the records of child and family cases in the Family Courts or RTC designated by the
Supreme Court to handle Family Court cases be treated and dealt with?
Answer:
The records of child and family cases in the Family Courts or Regional Trial Court designated by
the Supreme Court to handle Family Court cases shall be dealt with utmost confidentiality. (Sec. 12, Family
Courts Act of 1997) shall not be divulged unless necessary and with authority of the judge (Id.).
Q: How shall the Rules of Court be construed?
Answer:
The Rules of Court should be liberally constructed in order to promote their objective of securing a
Just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding (Sec. 6, Rule 1).
Q: What is the concept of remedial law?
Answer:
The concept of Remedial Law is that it is a branch of public law which prescribes the procedural
rules to be observed in litigations, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, and in special proceedings, as
well as the remedies or reliefs available in each case.
Q: Distinguish between substantive law and remedial law.
Answer:
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights and obligations,
the violation of which gives rise to a cause of action. On the other hand, remedial law prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.
Q: What is the objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law?
Answer:
The object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is to effect an amicable settlement of disputes
among family and barangay members at the barangay level without judicial recourse and consequently help
relieve the court of docket congestion (Preamble, PD 1508).
Q: In rendering a decision, should a court take into consideration the possible effect of its verdict upon
the political stability and economic welfare of the nation?
Answer:
No, because a court is required to take into consideration only the legal issues and the evidence
admitted in the case. The political stability and economic welfare of the nation are extraneous to the case.
They can have persuasive influence but they are not the main factors that should be considered in deciding
a case. A decision should be based on the law, rules of procedure, justice and equity. However, in
exceptional cases the court may consider the political stability and economic welfare of the nation when
these are capable of being taken into judicial notice of and are relevant to the case.
Q: What is the difference between a judgment and an opinion of the court?
Answer:
The judgment or fallo is the final disposition of the court which is reflected in the dispositive portion
of the decision, while the opinion of the court is contained in the body of the decision that serves as a guide
or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi of the decision.
Q: Under what conditions may the identity of parties in child and family cases be divulged?
Answer:
The records of child and family cases in the Family Courts or Regional Trial Court designated by
the Supreme Court to handle Family Court cases shall be dealt with utmost confidentiality. (Sec. 12, Family
Courts Act of 1997) shall not be divulged unless necessary and with authority of the judge
Q: What is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
Answer:
Where courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, a case must be filed before the
lowest court possible having the appropriate jurisdiction, except if one can advance a special reason which
would allow direct recourse to a higher court. The principle of hierarchy of courts requires that recourses
should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts. [Republic v. Caguioa, G.R.
No. 174385(2013)]
Q: What is the Harmless Error Rule in relation to appeals?
Answer:
The harmless error rule in relation to appeals provides that the appellate court should not reverse a
judgment as a result of any error or defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. [See
S6 R51; Bersamin, Appeal & Review in the Philippines 362]
Q: Distinguish jurisdiction from venue?
Jurisdiction is the power of the Court to decide a case on the merits, while venue refers to the place
where the suit may be filed. In criminal actions, however, venue is jurisdictional. Jurisdiction may not be
conferred upon a court by consent through waiver, but venue may be waived except in criminal cases.
Q: Distinguish error of jurisdiction versus error of judgment.

Answer:
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Such an
error does not deprive the court of jurisdiction and is correctible only by appeal; whereas an error of
jurisdiction is one which the court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Such an error renders an
order or judgment void or voidable and is correctible by the special civil action of certiorari.