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History Philosophy of Education
· Waking up to life and its mysteries, its solvable problems and the ways to solve the
problems and celebrate the mysteries of life.
· Waking up to the inter-dependencies of all things, to the threat to our global village, to
the power within the human race to create alternatives, to the obstacles entrenched in
economic, social and political structures that prevent our waking up.
– Education in the broadest sense of the term is meant to aid the human being in his/her
pursuit of wholeness. Wholeness implies the harmonious development of all the
potentialities God has given to a human person.
True education is the harmonious development of the physical, mental, moral (spiritual),
and social faculties, the four dimensions of life, for a life of dedicated service.
DEFINITIONS
Since time immemorial, education is estimated as the right road to progress and
prosperity. Different educationists’ thoughts from both Eastern and Western side have
explained the term ‘education’ according to the need of the hour. Various educationists
have given their views on education. Some important definitions are:
1. Mahatma Gandhi – “By education I mean an all-round drawing out of the best in man
– body, mind and spirit.”
2. Rabindranath Tagore – “Education enables the mind to find out the ultimate truth,
which gives us the wealth of inner light and love and gives significance to life.”
3. Dr. Zakir Husain – “Education is the process of the individual mind, getting to its full
possible development.”
4. Swami Vivekananda – “Education is the manifestation of divine perfection already
existing in man.”
5. Aristotle – “Education is the creation of sound mind in a sound body.”
6. Rousseau – “Education is the child’s development from within.”
7. Herbert Spencer– “Education is complete living.”
8. Plato – “Education is the capacity to feel pleasure and pain at the right moment.”
9. Aristotle – “Education is the creation of a sound mind in a sound body.”
10. Pestalozzi – “Education is natural, harmonious and progressive development of man’s
innate powers.”
11. Froebel -“Education is enfoldment of what is already enfolded in the germ.”
12. T.P. Nunn – “Education is the complete development of the individuality of the child.”
13. John Dewey – “Education is the process of living through a continuous
reconstruction of experiences.”
14. Indira Gandhi – “Education is a liberating force and in our age it is also a
democratizing force, cutting across the barriers of caste and class, smoothing out
inequalities imposed by birth and other circumstances.”
John Locke said, “Plants are developed by cultivation and men by education”. This world
would have been enveloped in intellectual darkness if it had not been illuminated by the
light of education. It is right to say that the story of civilization is the story of education.
Thus, education is an integral part of human life. It is the basic condition for a
development of a whole man and vital instrument For accelerating the wellbeing and
prosperity by the light of education.
NATURE OF EDUCATION
As is the meaning of education, so is its nature. It is very complex. Let us now discuss the
nature of education:
AIMS OF EDUCATION
Aims give direction to activities. Aims of education are formulated keeping in view the
needs of situation. Human nature is multisided with multiple needs, which are related to
life. Educational aims are correlated to ideals of life.
The goal of education should be the full flowering of the human on this earth. According
to a UNESCO study, “the physical, intellectual, emotional and ethical integration of the
individual into a complete man/woman is the fundamental aim of education.”
The goal of education is also to form children into human persons committed to work for
the creation of human communities of love, fellowship, freedom, justice and harmony.
Students are to be moulded only by making them experience the significance of these
values in the school itself. Teachers could achieve this only by the lived example of their
lives manifested in hundreds of small and big transactions with students in word and
deed.
Individual and Social Aims:
Individual aims and social aims are the most important aims of education. They are
opposed to each other individual aims gives importance for the development of the
individuality. Social aim gives importance to the development of society through
individual not fulfilling his desire. But it will be seen that development of individuality
assumes meaning only in a social environment.
Individual Aims – Sir Percy Nunn observes, “Nothing goods enters into the human world
except in and through the free activities of individual men and women and that
educational practice must be shaped the individual. Education should give scope to
develop the inborn potentialities through maximum freedom.”
Because:
(1) Biologists believe that every individual is different from others. Every child is a new
and unique product and a new experiment with life. Thompson says, “Education is for the
individual”. Individual should be the centre of all educational efforts and activities.
(2) Naturalists believe that central aim of education is the autonomous development of
the individual. Rousseau said, “Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the
Author of Nature, but everything degenerates in the hands of man.” God makes all
things good, man meddles with them and they become evil. God creates everything
good man makes it evil. So individual should be given maximum freedom for its own
development.
Social Aim:
The supporters believe that society or state is supreme or real. The individual is only a
means. The progress of the society is the aim of education. Education is for the society
and of the society. The function of education is for the welfare of the state. The state will
make the individual as it desires. It prepares the individual to play different roles in
society. Individuality has no value, and personality is meaningless apart from society. If
society will develop individual will develop automatically. Here society plays an important
role.
(3) Society ignores the legitimate needs, desires and interests of the individual.
In general terms, Pragmatism asserts that any theory that proves itself more successful
in predicting and controlling our world than its rivals can be considered to be nearer the
truth. It argues that the meaning of any concept can be equated with the conceivable
operational or practical consequences of whatever the concept portrays. Like Positivism,
it asserts that the scientific method is generally best suited to theoretical inquiry,
although Pragmatism also accepts that the settlement of doubt can also be achieved
by tenacity and persistence, the authority of a source of ready-made beliefs or other
methods. For more details, see the section on the doctrine of Pragmatism.
The school's founder, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, first stated
the Pragmatic Maxim in the late 19th Century (and re-stated it in many different ways
over the years) as a maxim of logic and as a reaction to metaphysical theories. The
Pragmatic Maxim is actually a family of principles, not all equivalent (at least on the
surface), and there are numerous subtle variations with implications which reach into
almost every corner of philosophical thought.
The school of Pragmatism reached its peak in the early 20th Century philosophies
of William James and John Dewey. The term"pragmatism" was first used in print
by James, who credited Peirce with coining the term during the early 1870s.
After the first wave of Pragmatism, the movement split and gave rise to three main sub-
schools, in addition to other more independent, non-aligned thinkers:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of
our conception of the object. (EP1: 132)
William James cited this passage when introducing pragmatism in his 1906 lectures, and
Peirce repeated it in his writings from after 1900.
For all his loyalty to it, Peirce acknowledged that this formulation was vague: it does not
explain how we should understand ‘practical consequences’. We shall seek clarity by
looking at one of Peirce's illustrative applications of his maxim, by noting some of his
later reformulations, and by identifying the uses to which it was put in his writings.
Peirce's first illustrative example (‘the simplest one possible’ (EP1: 132) urges that what we
mean by calling something hard is that ‘it will not be scratched by many other
substances.’ I can use the concept hard in contexts when I am wondering what to do.
Unless there are cases where something's being hard makes a difference to what we
experience and what it is rational for us to do, the concept is empty. The principle has a
verificationist character: ‘our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects’ (EP1: 132)
but the use of the phrase ‘practical consequences’ suggests that these are to be
understood as having implications for what we will or should do. This is clear from his
later formulations, for example:
The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of
rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and
desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. (EP2: 346).
We become clearer about the concept hard, for example, by identifying how there can
be conceivable circumstances in which we have desires that would call for different
patterns of action if some object were hard from those it would call for if the object were
not hard. If I want to break a window by throwing something through it, then I need an
object which is hard, not one which is soft. It is important that, as Peirce hints here, the
consequences we are concerned with are generalones: we are to look for the laws that
govern the behaviour of hard things and for laws that show how such modes of
behaviour on the part of things can make a difference to what it is rational for us to do.
James never worked out his understanding of ‘practical consequences’ as fully as Peirce
did, and he does not share Peirce's restriction of these consequences to those that affect
‘intellectual purport’ or to general patterns of behaviour. Sometimes he writes as if the
practical consequences of a proposition can simply be effects upon the believer: if
religious belief makes me feel better, then that can contribute to the pragmatic
clarification of ‘God exists’. It is connected to these differences that James looks upon
Peirce's principle as a method for metaphysics: he hopes that the attempt to clarify
metaphysical hypotheses will reveal that some propositions are empty or, more
important, that, as in the squirrel example, some apparent disagreements are unreal.
Peirce sees uses for his maxim which extend beyond those that James had in mind. He
insisted that it was a logical principle and it was defended as an important component of
the method of science, his favoured method for carrying out inquiries. This is reflected in
the applications of the maxim that we find in his writings. First, he used it to clarify hard
concepts that had a role in scientific reasoning: concepts like probability, truth,
and reality. We shall discuss his view of truth below. It also had a role in scientific testing.
The pragmatist clarification of a scientific hypothesis, for example, provides us with just
the information we need for testing it empirically. Pragmatism, described by Peirce as a
‘laboratory philosophy’, shows us how we test theories by carrying out experiments
(performing rational actions) in the expectation that if the hypothesis is not true, then the
experiment will fail to have some predetermined sensible effect. In later work, Peirce
insisted that the maxim revealed all the information that was need for theory testing and
evaluation (EP2: 226ff). The pragmatist clarification revealed all the information we would
need for testing hypotheses and theories empirically.
As well as treating the pragmatist maxim as part of a constructive account of the norms
that govern inquiry, Peirce, like James, gave it a negative role. The maxim is used as a
tool for criticism, demonstrating the emptiness of a priori ‘ontological metaphysics’. In
section 3.1 we shall see how the pragmatic clarification of reality could be used to
undermine the flawed ‘nominalistic’ conception of reality that led to the ‘copy theory of
truth’, to Cartesian strategies in epistemology and the Kantian assumption that we can
possess the concept of a ‘thing in itself’. Such applications reflect Peirce's concern with
logic: he uses the maxim to criticize concepts whose use can be an impediment to
effective inquiry. A more vivid non-logical example of using the concept to undermine
spurious metaphysical ideas was in showing that the Catholic understanding of
transubstantiation was empty and incoherent (EP1: 131f). All we can mean by wine is
something that has certain distinctive effects upon the senses, ‘and to talk of something
as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless
jargon.’
Why should the pragmatist maxim be accepted? Here another difference between James
and Peirce emerges. James made no concerted attempt to show or prove that the
principle of pragmatism was correct. In his lectures, he put it into practice, solving
problems about squirrels, telling us the meaning of truth, explaining how we can
understand propositions about human freedom or about religious matters. But in the
end, inspired by these applications, we are encouraged to adopt the maxim and see how
well things work out when we do so.
Since Peirce presented the maxim as part of the method of science, as a logical or,
perhaps better, methodological principle, he thought that it was important to argue for
it. Indeed, after 1900, he devoted much of his energy to showing that the maxim could
receive a mathematical proof. He used several strategies for this. In 1878, he relied upon
the idea that beliefs are habits of action: when we form a belief, we acquire a disposition
to act in some distinctive way. Applying the pragmatist maxim to the clarification of a
proposition, he argued, involved describing the habits of action we would acquire if we
believed it (EP1: 127f). In the lectures on pragmatism which he delivered at Harvard in
1903, he adopted a different strategy. He offered a detailed account of the cognitive
activities we carried out when we used the method of science: these consisted in the
three kinds of inference, inductive, deductive and abductive. His strategy then was to
argue that the pragmatist clarifications brought to the surface all the information that
was required for responsible abductive reasoning, and that our use of inductive and
deductive arguments made no use of conceptual resources that could show that
pragmatism was mistaken. (EP2: 225–241; Hookway 2005) None of these arguments fully
satisfied him, and the task of fine tuning these arguments and seeking for alternatives
was his major philosophical concern of the last ten years of his life. Although he
remained optimistic of success in this, he was never satisfied with his results.
These differences in motivation become clearest when we consider how both Peirce and
James applied their pragmatist maxims to the clarification of the concept of truth.
Peirce's account of truth is presented as a means to understanding a concept that was
important for the method of science: reality (3.1); while James was ready to use his
account to defend the pluralist view that there can be different kinds of truths (3.2).
The final section of ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’ promises to ‘approach the subject of
logic’ by considering a fundamental logical conception, reality. It possesses a form of
unreflective clarity: ‘every child uses it with perfect confidence, never dreaming that he
does not understand it.’ An abstract definition is also readily forthcoming: ‘we may define
the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to
be.’ But, he announces, we shall need to apply the pragmatic maxim if our idea of reality
is to be ‘perfectly clear’. It is at this stage that the concept of truth enters the discussion:
Peirce's strategy for clarifying the concept of reality is, first, to give an account of truth,
and, then, to observe that ‘the object represented in [a true proposition] is the real’. So
we have to turn to his remarks about truth to see how the kind of mind-independence
captured in the abstract definition of reality is to be understood from a pragmatist
perspective.
Peirce's motivations are evident when he says that ‘the ideas of truth and falsehood, in
their full development, appertain exclusively to the scientific (in a later revision he altered
this to ‘experiential’) method of settling opinion’. This reflects a law which is evident from
scientific experience: when different people use different methods to identify, for
example, the velocity of light, we find that all tend to arrive at the same result:
So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic
views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to
one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where
we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of
the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind
even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. (EP1: 138)
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we
mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I
would explain reality. (EP1: 139)
Peirce had presented this way of thinking about reality seven years earlier when he
described it as the ‘realist conception of reality’ (EP1:88–9). In doing this, he contrasts it
with another ‘nominalist’ conception of reality, which he thinks is flawed, but which many
earlier philosophers had accepted. In a review of a new edition of the writings of
Berkeley—a philosopher who, according to Peirce, was in the grip of this misleading
picture—Peirce asks ‘where the real is to be found’, observing that there must be such a
‘real’ because we find that our opinions (the only things of which we are immediately
aware) are constrained. While acknowledging that there is ‘nothing immediately present
to us but thoughts’, he continues:
These thoughts, however, have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are
constrained by something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind, which directly
influences sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is
independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real. (EP1: 88)
We can then think of the real only as the cause of the (singular) sensations which, in turn,
provide our sole evidence for beliefs about the external world, and this naturally leads to
both nominalism about universals and skepticism about empirical knowledge. Peirce's
pragmatist clarification of truth offers an alternative conceptualization of ‘being
constrained by reality’. It is explained in terms of this fated agreement of convergence
through the process of inquiry rather than in terms of an independent cause of our
sensations. Although the nominalist theory is not clearly worked out here, it is clearly
related to the ‘intellectualist’ or ‘copy’ theory of truth attacked by other pragmatists. It
articulates a metaphysical picture that all pragmatists tried to combat. See (Misak 2007,
69f) where Cheryl Misak emphasises that Peirce does not offer a traditional analysis of
truth. Rather, he provides an account of some of the relations between the concepts of
truth, belief, and inquiry, She describes this as a naturalistic understanding of truth, and
calls it an anthropological account of how the concept is used.
Claims about truth had a much more central role in James's work and he was even
prepared to claim that pragmatism was a theory of truth. And his writings on this topic
rapidly became notorious. They are characteristically lively, offering contrasting
formulations, engaging slogans, and intriguing claims which often seem to fly in the face
of common sense. We can best summarize his view through his own words:
The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good,
too, for definite assignable reasons. (1907: 42)
‘The true’, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as
‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any
fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course. (1907: 106)
Ideas … become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with
other parts of our experience. (1907: 34)
Any idea upon which we can ride …; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any
one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working
securely, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.
(1907: 34)
This might be taken to suggest that beliefs are made true by the fact that they enable us
to make accurate predictions of the future run of experience, but other passages suggest
that the ‘goodness of belief’ can take other forms. James assures us that it can contribute
to the truth of a theological proposition that it has ‘a value for concrete life’ (1907: 40);
and this can occur because the idea of God possesses a majesty which can ‘yield
religious comfort to a most respectable class of minds’ (1907: 40). This suggests that a
belief can be made true by the fact that holding it contributes to our happiness and
fulfilment.
The kind of passages just noted may lend support to Bertrand Russell's famous objection
that James is committed to the truth of ‘Santa Claus exists’ (Russell 1949: 772). This is
unfair; at best, James is committed to the claim that the happiness that belief in Santa
Claus provides is truth-relevant. James could say that the belief was ‘good for so much’
but it would only be ‘wholly true’ if it did not ‘clash with other vital benefits’. It is easy to
see that, unless it is somehow insulated from the broader effects of acting upon it, belief
in Santa Claus could lead to a host of experiential surprises and disappointments.
So far, we have concentrated on the pragmatist maxim, the rule for clarifying ideas that,
for both Peirce and James, was the core of pragmatism. When we think of pragmatism as
a philosophicaltradition rather than as a maxim or principle, we can identify a set of
philosophical views and attitudes which are characteristic of pragmatism, and which can
lead us to identify as pragmatists many philosophers who are somewhat sceptical about
the maxim and its applications. Some of these views may be closely related to the maxim
and its defence, but we shall now explore them rather as distinctive characteristics of the
pragmatist tradition. The first of the themes that we shall consider is epistemological, and
it picks up on Hilary Putnam's claim that one mark of pragmatism is the combination of
anti-skepticism and fallibilism.
Like some other philosophers, the pragmatists saw themselves as providing a return to
common sense and the facts of experience and, thus, as rejecting a flawed philosophical
heritage which had distorted the work of earlier thinkers. The errors to be overcome
include Cartesianism, Nominalism, and the ‘copy theory of truth’: these ‘errors’ are all
related.
The initial pragmatist response to this strategy has several strands. It is a strategy that we
cannot carry out effectively, and there is no reason to adopt it anyway. Peirce begins his
response by claiming that any attempt to adopt the method of doubt will be an exercise
in self-deception because we possess a variety of certainties which ‘it does not occur to
us can be questioned.’ What is produced will not be a ‘real doubt’ and these beliefs will
lurk in the background, influencing our reflection when we are supposed to be
suspending judgment in them. Peirce urges that we should not ‘pretend to doubt in
philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’. We should doubt propositions only if
we have a real reason to do so. It is necessary to separate some different threads here.
4. You are a student of master of education; suggest your own philosophy of education
in detail?
One morning while dropping off my son at day care (he was then eighteen months old), I
heard the mother of a three- or four-year-old boy say a dirty word: homework — as in,
her pre-K-aged son had “done his homework.” Though I never had any doubts about the
warmth of the care my son was receiving at this family day care center, I did have some
reservations about the curriculum for the older children (work on computers, for
example); once I heard the word homework I was certain that we would be looking for a
different preschool for our little Critter.
As a teacher and someone who has worked for more than one decade in educational
publishing, I have strong opinions about learning and education. The idea of a three- or
four-year-old child bringing homework home (from a day care center, no less!) runs
counter to my philosophy of education, which includes such ideas as:
As my husband and I sought a new placement for the Critter (who now attends a
Montessori preschool three days each week), it became apparent that my husband had
no strong opinions about the education of children. I started to think about how those
who have not been educated to be an educator can discover their own philosophy of
education.
The word philosophy might suggest something abstruse or difficult, but really all that I
am talking about is a statement of your beliefs about the purposes of education. And,
because your philosophy of education is a reflection of your values and worldview, it is
by necessity unique to you. There is no one philosophy of education.
One of course does not “get” a philosophy of education as one gets milk and eggs from
the store; it is rather a process of discovering and clarifying the beliefs you already hold.
There are several ways to do so.
Understanding the fact that our intellect can gather direct knowledge only
through our five sense organs (instruments of knowledge) and only from the
exclusive fields within which each one of them operate in, is important to
understand and appreciate the limitations we have without external instruments
of knowledge. (The microscope, the telescope, and so on, enhance the capability
of our existing instruments of knowledge and are not to be confused with
external instruments of knowledge.)
The five sense organs in our body that help us gain direct knowledge, operate
only in their exclusive fields; one cannot substitute for the other. We have to be
intelligent enough to appreciate the fact that none of our five sense organs, be it
the eyes (sense of colours and shapes), nose (sense of smell), skin (sense of
touch), ears (sense of sound) or tongue (sense of taste), operate in the field of
knowledge of the creator, the relationship between the creator and the created
(apparently created or otherwise), laws governing our actions and
rewards/punishments, why good things happen to bad people and vice versa,
what makes some happy at all times irrespective of external happenings, and so
on.
Acknowledging the fact that none of our five instruments of knowledge operate
in this exclusive field of knowledge will make us humble enough to appreciate
the need for the faith/shraddha (faith until experiential validation) based
scriptures, and accept it as the sixth sense organ to reveal knowledge not
revealed by the five others.
The only sources of knowledge to get answers for these important questions that
all of us search for are the religious scriptures, which are either purely faith-driven
or shraddha-driven.
Having faith in the scriptures and practising the religious way of life certainly give
a certain comfort to the devout. Questioning the logic without knowing that it is
beyond logic, yet is not illogical, and when no logic is found choosing to cause
hurt by ridiculing scriptural teachings, is certainly not inkitham, which, loosely
translated, means the appropriate response or choice of words with an evolved
understanding of the impact that words or behaviour can have on the
sensitivities of the other people.
Some religious scriptures ask one to go beyond the religious/ritualistic way of life
and intellectually challenge the first part of the scriptures that teach a
religious/ritualistic way of life and guides one to discover the ‘self’. This part of
the scriptures acts like a mirror that helps the eyes see themselves and helps the
‘self’ as commonly (mis)understood, see its ‘true self’.
These texts that challenge our intellect, and the religious, ritualistic way of life, do
it without causing hurt to the hitherto religious/ritualistic person who looked
upon the Lord as an external entity, separate from him. It actually presents the
religious/ritualistic way of life, as a necessary/desirable stepping stone, a
necessity until ‘self’ discovery happens. This is similar to the scaffolding that is
used to hold the roof until the concrete sets, not quite useless or meaningless.
It would become intelligent to ridicule the scriptures only when we can truly claim
that with the five instruments of knowledge which we are equipped with, we are
able to find answers to all questions. Until then, it would be wise to accept our
scriptures faithfully or with shraddha.
Axiology is from Greek axios=worthy + -logy=the study of. Therefore, axiology is the
study of the nature of the worthy conceived of as value, specifically as to ethics and
aesthetics, which are value-based realities.
Ontology is a metaphysical doctrine. Usually defined as the study of the nature of being
and existence.
Epistemology is the philosophical doctrine that studies what knowledge is. Some
questions in epistemology may include: how can we know what knowledge is? what are
the limits of knowledge? and what is certainty?
Axiology is another term for Value Theory. Value Theory is quite broad but it is the study
of all things we value and have an evaluative aspect. Some key areas in value theory
include Aesthetics, Ethics, and Political Philosophy.
It all started with two Greek guys on steroids! Plato and Aristotle.
Now if you think all dogs come out of a ideal dog with ideal legs, ideal ears, ideal head
and ideal tail, then congratulations, you belong to team Plato - you're an idealist!
This means you think that before the dogs themselves came into existence, there was an
idea of a dog and this idea of a dog exists independent of the actual dog ( in the mind of
the creator). The idea was eternal and the actual dog is only a temporal replica of the
idea and a poor one at that.
That's why Idealists are so hard to satisfy. To them, everything is short of their idea(l).
Reality can never match the idea, because idea exists in a place of perfection beyond
space and time where as reality is limited by it.
But then came Aristotle who took the exact opposite stance on it and said that the dog
came first and the idea followed it by observation. Realists are people who take people
as they are and take into consideration their limitations.
Realists can argue that if ideas indeed came first, then thought must be absolutely
limitless, or in other words we should be able to think anything. But as our experience
shows, thoughts are limited by reality. (Realism is based on actual experience.) We can
imagine a monster with five faces, twelve arms and a hundred legs. But ultimately, they
are grounded in reality because faces, arms and legs actually exist. We cannot think of
what doesn't exist. (Idealism says the opposite - we can think of something that doesn't
already exist and that can be brought into existence.) Realists say reality exists first.
This has interesting consequences. The idealist might say: "But the inventions of mankind
started as an idea which was later translated into reality." But the realist retort to it is:
"Humanity only improvised on what already existed and did not actually invent anything."
An invention is never completely invented. A lie is still based on truth.
That's the difference between idealists and realists. Here is a picture of Plato and
Aristotle. Plato points upward to "Heavens - Ideas" and Aristotle to "Earth - Reality"
Realism and Idealism are two competing philosophies in the field of education.
Dating back to ancient Greece, these theories influence the philosophy of
education to this day.
Idealism
Idealism is the school of educational thought promoted by Plato in 400 B.C. Plato
thought that humans could be improved from within, by correcting their thoughts
and discovering knowledge already there since birth. Idealism focuses on reasoning
and how a person can bring knowledge up from inside of himself. In this view, the
world exists solely in the minds of people and that ultimate truth relies on a
consistency of ideas. The more perfect our ideas become, therefore, the better we
can serve the world. In Emmanuel Kant's idealism, the world exists, but our minds
are separate from it.
Realism
Different Methods
Idealism seeks to ascertain an ultimate reality through logic and introsp ection. Plato
held that individuals are born with great knowledge that can be unlocked through a
study of ideas and through the Socratic Method, a series of questions that lead the
pupil to greater knowledge. For instance, in Plato's dialogue "Meno," Socra tes helps
a slave boy discover an inner knowledge of mathematics, despite no prior training.
Thus, every student is equally capable of tapping inner resources of knowledge and
wisdom. Realism, on the other hand, seeks to instruct students as though they we re
empty vessels for knowledge. Any practical methods are appropriate, including
technology. This philosophy also accepts the scientific testing of students to place
them in appropriate classrooms.
Realism and Idealism are fundamentally opposing views, and a teacher's philosophy
will be evident in the classroom. An idealist, for instance, will seek the role of
facilitator, guiding students toward truth. Students will be able to seek truth
independently, thinking freely with the careful guidance of the teacher. As a
facilitator, the teacher will not act as an absolute authority but as a gentle guide for
the student. A realist, on the other hand, will seek to infuse students with
knowledge from without. A realist will seek to employ the scientific method of
hypotheses and careful study over a use of pure logic and reason, as found in an
idealistic education. Realism is consistent with behaviorism, which is a system of
learning through punishment and reward. Being reliant solely on inf ormation from
the external world, realism discounts the original thought of the student. The
teacher, then, will be seen as the highest authority, a figure to which students must
answer rather than a guide who can be questioned.