Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. Commission On Elections and Joseph Socorro B. Tan
Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. Commission On Elections and Joseph Socorro B. Tan
FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s
COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the
petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status,
residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen
and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and
amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s
COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5,
2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume
office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the
House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office.
3. Whether or not there was denial of due process.
HELD: 1. YES. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which
has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That
the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however
unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC
never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership. Indeed,
the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the
indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the
COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the
COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide
the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as
a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's
proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the
Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC
First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation
on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision
favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her
certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013
but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.
2. NO. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public
office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA,
and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with
the requirements.
Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with RA 9225.
As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen
who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition
of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim
that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to
July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
3. NO. Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given
every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's
petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had
a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard.