Engle vs Comelec

G.R. No. 215995. January 19, 2016

Facts: Marcelina Engle and Winston Menzon vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Babatngon, Province
of Leyte in the 2013 Elections. Petitioner's late husband, James L. Engle, was originally a candidate for said contested
position; however, he died of cardiogenic shock on February 2, 2013 to which petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy
as a substitute for her deceased spouse on February 22, 2013.

Menzon filed Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the COC of petitioner arguing in the main that the latter
misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute her husband, who was declared an independent candidate by the
COMELEC. It appears that Lakas-CMD to which James L. Engle's was a member failed to submit to the COMELEC Law
Department the authorization of Romualdez (Leyte chapter president) to sign the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as prescribed by Section 6 (3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Thus, the COMELEC
Law Department considered all Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were signed by Romualdez as independent
candidates. For this reason, private respondent charged petitioner with violation of Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No.
9518 which disallows the substitution of an independent candidate.

Menzon’s argument: He argued that petitioner’s declaration that she was a member of the political party, Lakas-CMD,
was intended to deceive the electorate that she was qualified to substitute her husband. Additionally, private
respondent claimed that “the false representation of the petitioner that she is qualified for public office consisted of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

Engle’s counter-argument: Petitioner posited that, under Section 1, Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, the
exclusive ground for denial or cancellation of a COC is the falsity of a material representation contained therein that is
required by law. Menzon’s assertion that petitioner’s statement in her COC was such a false representation is “absurd”
considering that her CONA was signed by Sen. Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr. And Mr. Raul L. Lambino, President and Senior
Deputy Secretary-General of Lakas CMD, respectively.

Assuming the veracity of private respondent’s allegations, his contention that petitioner is disqualified to run as a
substitute is not a proper subject of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC. The qualification or disqualification
of a candidate is allegedly covered by Section 12, 68, 69 and 78 of the OEC.

In petitioner’s view, the petition to cancel her COC is dismissible according to the second paragraph of Section 1 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 which provides that “a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
invoking grounds other than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate
remedy , shall be summarily dismissed.”

Engle’s counter-arguments on substantive: She contended that there was no official declaration from the COMELEC
that her deceased husband was an independent candidate. Menzon’s reliance on a mere print out fo the COMELEC
website listing her husband as an independent candidate was misplaced as the same cannot be considered
authoritative as opposed to official documents that showed James L. Engle’s nomination by Lakas-CMD and his
acceptance of said nomination to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte under the banner of Lakas-
CMD.

The petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner’s COC was still pending with the COMELEC 2nd Division when
the May 13, 2013 Elections were held. James L. Engle’s name remained on the ballot. On May 15, 2013, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. Petitioner was credited with the
6,657 votes cast for her husband as against private respondent’s 3,515 votes.

It was only on July 5, 2013 did the COMELEC Second Division promulgate the Resolution which denied due course
to and cancelled petitioner's COC resulting in the annulment of petitioner's previous proclamation as duly-elected Vice
Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the declaration of Menzon as winner of the contested position.
 COMELEC Second Division: The substitution of petitioner as a candidate in place of her deceased husband for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte was not a material misrepresentation which may be a ground for
cancellation of her COC under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the OEC. Citing jurisprudence, COMELEC ruled
that the false representation contemplated under the law refers to a material fact affecting a candidate’s qualification
such as citizenship or residence.

Despite the foregoing finding, the COMELEC Second Division nonetheless found sufficient basis to cancel petitioner’s
COC on the ground that she could not have validly substituted her husband, who was deemed an independent candidate
for failure of Lakas-CMD to submit to the COMELEC Law Department Romualdez’s authority to sign CONAs for and on
behalf of the party on or before October 1, 2012 in violation of Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. The
COMELEC Second Division noted that the purported authorization of Romualdez to sign CONAs for Lakas-CMD
candidates in Leyte was belatedly submitted with the proceedings on the petition to deny due course to, or cancel
petitioner’s COC.

Engle filed an MR with Comelec en banc which the latter denied for lack of merit.

Hence this appeal.

Issue #1: Whether or not there was false material representation in petitioner’s COC

Held: No, there was none.

Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a petition to deny due course to, or cancel a COC may be
filed on the exclusive ground of false material representation in said COC.

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.

Section 74 of the OEC in turn enumerates the items that should be stated in a COC.

Based on the foregoing provisions, the SC agrees on the COMELEC Second Divisions resolution dated July 5, 2013:
The false representation which is a ground for a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a candidate’s COC refers to
a material fact relating to the candidate’s qualification for office such as one’s citizenship or residence.

Undeniably, private respondent failed to demonstrate that petitioner made a false statement regarding her qualifications
or concealed any disqualification for the office to warrant its cancellation under Section 78. The records also show that
when petitioner’s husband filed his certitficate of candidacy on Oct. 4, 2012 with the Office of the Election Officer in
Babatngo, Leyte he clearly indicated therein that he was a nominee of Lakas-CMD and attanched thereto not only the CONA
signed by Romualdez but also the Authority to Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance dates Sept. 12, 2012 in favor
of Romualdez signed by Lakas-CMD President and Secretary-General.

Verily, it was publicly known that James L. Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD. As far as the party and his wife were
concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of Lakas-CMD, may be substituted as a candidate upon his death. There was no
evidence on record that the party or petitioner had notice or knowledge of the COMELEC's classification of James L. Engle
as an independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013 when petitioner filed her COC as a substitute for her deceased
husband. The only document in the record indicating that Lakas-CMD had been notified of James L. Engle's designation as
an independent candidate is the Letter dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law Department.

First, the COMELEC Law Department’s “ruling” was issued only after the filing of petitioner’s COC. Second, with respect to
the denial of due course to James L. Engle’s COC as a nominee of Lakas-CMD and to petitioner’s COC as his substitute, the
COMELEC Law Department’s letter is not binding and at most, recommendatory.
 It is settled in jurisprudence that the denial of due course or cancellation of one's COC is not within the
administrative powers of the COMELEC, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. We have also
previously held that the COMELEC, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, is mandated by the
Constitution to hear and decide such cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. In
resolving cases to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, the COMELEC cannot merely rely on the
recommendations of its Law Department but must conduct due proceedings through one of its divisions. Returning to the
case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division only formally ruled on the status of James L. Engle as an independent candidate
and the invalidity of petitioner's substitution on July 5, 2013, months after the May 13, 2013 Elections. Under these
premises, the COMELEC did not correctly cancel petitioner's COC on the ground of false material representation as there
was none.

Issue #2: Whether or not petitioner can validly substitute her husband James L Engle

Held: Yes, she can validly substitute her husband.

The COMELEC anchored its action on the fact that Romualdez’s authority to sign James L Engle’s CONA was belatedly
submitted and thus, the latter should be considered an independent candidate who cannot be substituted under Section 77
of the OEC and Section 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518.

The Court recognizes that the COMELEC is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and
successful the conduct of elections. However, it is a long standing principle in jurisprudence that rules and regulations for
the conduct of election are mandatory before the election, but when they are sought to be enforced after the election they
are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be
deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. Over time, we have qualified this doctrine to refer only to
matters of form and cannot be applied to the substantial qualifications of candidates.

As may be recalled, petitioner’s deceased husband’s name remained on the ballot notwithstanding his death even before
the campaign period for the local elections began on March 29, 2013. Yet, he received almost twice the number of votes as
the second placer, private respondent, in a decisive victory. Since the people of Babatngon, Leyte could not have possibly
meant to waste their votes on a deceased candidate, we conclude that petitioner was the undisputed choice of the
electorate as Vice-Mayor on the apparent belief that she may validly substitute her husband. That belief was not
contradicted by any official or formal ruling by the COMELEC prior to the elections.

We held in Rulloda v. Commission on Elections that: Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be
made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed
to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns
upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in
an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.

Applying these jurisprudential precedents, we find that the late submission of Romualdez’s authority to sign the CONA of
James L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere technicality that cannot be used to defeat the will of the electorate in a fair and
honest election.

From the evidence, it can be concluded that James L Engle was not an independent candidate ut indeed a nominee
of Lakas-CMD and he may be validly substituted by his wife, who was nominated by the same political party, in light
of his unexpected demise prior to the elections.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Marcelina S. Engle is declared the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte during the May 13, 2013
Elections.
TALAGA vs COMELEC
GR. NO. 197015

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner
of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s disqualification.

FACTS:

Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon declared
that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course
to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City
Mayor of Lucena. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three
consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the upcoming elections.

Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms;
and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an
involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of
the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of
the three-term limit rule. Thus, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, acknowledging that
he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City; yet did not withdraw his CoC.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration, however, he later on filed for its withdrawal. On the same
date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, her husband.

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were
counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with
44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.

Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC, alleging that Barbara Ruby could not substitute
Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate
because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon
should be considered stray.

Thereafter, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene, positing that he should
assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

ISSUES:
1. WON Barbara Ruby’s substitution was valid
2. Who among the contending parties should assume the position

HELD:
1.
 Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a
candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for
disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate
under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may
not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.

 Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be
properly substituted.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a
qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. The false representation under Section 78 must
likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a
mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no
deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs
and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and statutory
law. The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office."

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility
to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for
containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run.

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December
30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the
COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.

2. Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final
before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is
categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. On the other hand, the COMELEC En
Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no
valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility.

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the
law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. x x x

CONCURRING OPINION/s:

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code1 is clear that before a substitution of candidates for an elective position could be
validity done, the official candidate of a registered or accredited political party should die, withdraw or must be qualified
for any cause. In the present case, the records will show that at the time Ruby C. Talaga filed her Certificate of Candidacy,
or May 4, 2010, there was still no ground for substitute since the judgment on Ramon Talaga’s disqualification had not yet
attained finality.

DISSENTING OPINION/s:

 It is Castillo who should be seated as Mayor -

a. the violation of the three-term limit rule is a unique but proper ground for disqualification and not for the cancellation
of a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC);

b. the petition filed by Castillo against Ramon was based on the three-term limit rule and, hence, was a petition for
disqualification, but no effective disqualification ever took place since Ramon never qualified to serve for a fourth term;
and

c. since Ruby did not validly substitute Ramon and Ramon opted to exit out of the election race (although through an
erroneous mode of asking for a ruling disqualifying him), neither of the two can be considered candidates and the votes
cast in their favor should be considered stray; thus, Castillo should be proclaimed as Mayor of Lucena City.

Hidden behind but not erased by this simplistic recital of the issues, rulings and dissent is the legal reality that these cases
pose issues way beyond the question of substitution that appears on the surface. They require a look into the nature of a
CoC; distinctions between eligibility, or lack of it, and disqualification; the effects of cancellation and disqualification; the
applicable remedies; and the unique nature and the effect of the constitutional three-term limit for local elective officials.

 Although Castillo denominated his petition as one for cancellation or denial of due course to Ramon’s COC and sought
the same relief, it did not raise any of the specified grounds for such action under Sections 69 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code
 Reyes vs Comelec

Facts:

Respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before
the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the
ground that it contained material misrepresentations.

Petitioner’s alleged misrepresentations:

1. That she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;
2. That she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the
residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa
Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
3. That her date of birth is July 3, 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either July 8, 1959 or
July 3, 1960.
4. That she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant of
the United States of America;
5. That she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen

Petitioner’s answer:

1. There is no valid and binding marriage between them as it did not comply with certain formal requirements
as prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio;
2. She is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his residence is not attributed to her
3. The Certificate of Live Birth issued by the NSO shows that it was on July 3, 1964
4. The allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not
supported by evidence.

For allegedly making material misrepresentations in her COC, the Comelec first division cancelled petitioner’s COC in its
resolution dated March 27 2013 and affirmed by the Comelec en banc on 14 May 2013.

Four days later or on 18 May, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 elections.

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of
promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution.

On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives.
But petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.

With the proclamation and taking of oath, petitioner posits that the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was
duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction
to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC is without jurisdiction over petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the HR for the lone congressional district of
Mariduque.

Ruling:

No, COMELEC still has jurisdiction. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such
action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. xxx

The next inquiry then is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representative?

Vinzons-Chato vs COMELEC, citing Aggabao vs COMELEC and Guerrero vs COMELEC, the Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably ruled that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and disqualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

From previous analogous cases, it is clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. To repeat what has been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only
“at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.

Exception to the general rule of membership in the HR:

Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualification ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office,
but who also assumed office.

Apparently, the cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed office, and hence, was already
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case.

Summary on why petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives:

a. She has not yet assumed office

b. Her oath of office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr., is not the oath of office which confers membership
to the House of Representatives. (To be valid, it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the HR, and (2) in open
session; accdg to Sec. 6, Rule II of the Rules of the HR)
c. Before the proclamation of petitioner, the COMELEC En Banc had already disposed of the issue of petitioner’s
lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated May 14, 2013.

MOR – October 22, 2013

In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner asked the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and
exclusively pass upon such qualifications and set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied petitioner her right to
due process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution. Petitioner,
averring that she is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the
HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not there was basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18, 2013

Held: No, there was no basis.

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no
valid and effective assumption of office.

The Supreme Court ruled that they have clearly stated in their Resolution of June 5, 2013 that:
“More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on May
18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency. After
May 14, 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives. xxx As the point has obviously been missed by petitioner who continues to argue on
the basis of her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat
that the proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in
the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed
because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to
avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court
intervention became even more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would
allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an
attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law
into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on 14
May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.

She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with
knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
 Jurilla vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 105436

June 2, 1994; Belosillo, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Eugenio Jurilla, Marciano Medalla, Bernardo Nazal, Rey Medina, Melencio Castelo, Godofredo Liban, and
private respondent, Antonio Hernandez were among the candidates in the elections for the six positions of councilor for
the Second District of Quezon City.

On March 23, 1992, Hernandez filed with COMELEC his certificate of candidacy. In item No. 6 thereof, he gave as his address
“B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City.” However, he did not indicate his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay
where he was a registered voter. In other words, his certificate of candidacy did not expressly state that he was a registered
voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof.

Petitioners challenged respondent’s qualification. However, since petitioners only became aware of such after elections, the
petition was made in accordance with Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizing the filing a petition at any
day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

COMELEC denied the petition for being filed outside the reglementary period under Section 5 of RA 6646, which pertains
to nuisance candidates.

ISSUE: Was the omission sufficient to cause the disqualification of respondent?

HELD: NO. It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, earlier quoted,
that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number
and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct
where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office.

In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by
him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of
Quezon City. He was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was
already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second District of Quezon City.

***Additional Issue: Is respondent a nuisance candidate?

The holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance candidate" is erroneous because, tested
against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which we can categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the
procedure therein provided could not have been properly invoked by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which would require such petition to be filed at any day after the last day for filing
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise that private respondent Hernandez should be treated as a
"nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless its conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the
candidacy of private respondent he being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan
Hills, must be sustained.
TEODULO M. COQUILLA,
petitioner,vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ,
Respondents

FACTS: Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner
thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in
1985, he remained in the United States.

On1998 he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States. Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization
which was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

` On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
"two (2) years.”

Oras’ incumbent mayor, Neil Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy
on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material representation as he only resided
therein for six months after his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquillo was proclaimed the winner. He received
the highest number of votes (6, 131) against private respondent’s 5, 752 votesm or a margin of 379 votes. On July 19, 2001, the
Second Division of the COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate
of candidacy.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner

HELD: YES. The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, Sections 2 and 4 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure should be counted from the receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC Division.
In this case, petitioner received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28, 2001.
Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On Februaru 6, 2002, he received a copy of the
order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration. Five days later, on Fevruary
11, 2002, he filed his petition for certiorari. There is no question, therefore, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the COMELEC
en banc, was filed within the period provided for in Rule 19, Sections 2 and 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in
Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution.

The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari
in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the
court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision
but a new trial ro some other remedy.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding th eproclamation
of petitioner

Held: The rule is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the
votes cast for them shall not be counted. But for those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered
may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because
the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the
proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificated of candidacy, which have begun
before the election, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella vs COMELEC and
Salcedo II vs COMELEC, the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation were
voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case,
affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on
the gournd that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamation but on the merits.
ISSUE: Was COMELEC’s order of cancellation of the certificate of candidacy Teodulo M. Coquilla proper ?

RULING: COMELEC properly ordered the cancellation of Coquilla’S COC. COMELEC still had jurisdiction over his case
although he was already proclaimed because RA 6646 provides that the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or
for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even
after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In this case, the COC was correctly cancelled because Coquilla did not
possess the legal qualification of at least 1 year residency. The term "residence" is to be understood as the" domicile" or
legal residence. That is the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matted
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin
is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisistion of new domicile (domicile of choice).

He has lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy. The petitioner was an
alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor
or as a resident alien.

It is not true that he has re-established his claimed domicile in Oras by mere filing of taxes or by obtaining a voter’s
registration as it only requires six-months residency. The status of being an alien and non-resident can be waived either
separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time
when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under Section 13 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1984 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-
resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case
he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country is the statement “Philippine
Immigration – Balikbayan stamped in his U.S. Passport. Under Section 2 of R.A. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes
or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a “visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of
one (1) year”. Therefore, he lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
material falsification he committed merits the cancellation of his COC.
August 16, 1999
VICTORINO SALCEDO II, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.

SUMMARY: Victorino Salcedo filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of Emerlita Cacao Salcedo’s
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty race in Sara, Iloilo on the ground that she had made a false representation therein
by stating that her surname was Salcedo. He contends that Emerlita had no right to use said surname because she was not
legally married to Neptali Salcedo. SC HELD: There was no false representation in her certificate of candidacy. There are 2
requisites to satisfy in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78: 1) the false
representation must pertain to a material matter and 2) there must be intent to deceive the electorate as to one’s
qualifications for public office. Looking at SC’s previous interpretation of material representation, it may be concluded that
the material misrepresentation refer to qualifications for elective office. Victorino was not able to prove that Emerlita lacks
the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office. Also, the
use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of the
provision.

DOCTRINE: The material representation contemplated by Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to qualifications for
elective office. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political
right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Sec. 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.”

FACTS:
 Feb. 18, 1968- Neptali Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage is evidenced by a certified true copy of the
marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo.
 Sept. 21, 1986 - Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali Salcedo married resp, Ermelita Cacao in
a civil ceremony
 Sept. 23, 1986 – 2 days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a
marriage certificate
 Pet. Victorino Salcedo II and Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of
Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections. Both of them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy on
Mar. 27, 1998.
 Apr. 17, 1998 - Victorino filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of Ermelita’s certificate of candidacy
on the ground that she had made a FALSE REPRESENTATION therein by stating that her surname was “Salcedo.”
o Ermelita had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo.
 May 13, 1998 - Ermelita was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
 Ermelita claimed that she had no knowledge at the time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married
o Upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with
Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home since 1972 and has not been heard from
since that time
o Feb. 16, 1998 - Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death before RTC Iloilo, which
was granted by the court in its April 8, 1998 decision.
o Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person (the plot thickens)
o Since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname “Salcedo” in all her personal, commercial and public
transactions.
 COMELEC 2nd Division (2:1): Ruled for Victorino. It cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy of Ermelita.
o Since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage
of the former with Ermelita is null and void.
o The use by Ermelita of the surname “Salcedo” constitutes material misrepresentation under Sec. 78 (see
in Ratio) in relation to Sec. 74 of the Omnibus Election Code and is a ground for the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy.
o A candidate’s name or surname contained in the certificate of candidacy is required under Sec. 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code and is a material misrepresentation.
o Regardless of whether Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are the same persons, the fact remains irrefutable
that at the time Ermelita contracted marriage with Neptali Salcedo, the latter has a valid existing marriage
with Agnes Celiz
o There was NO pronouncement to the effect that the marriage of Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz was annulled
by the court (Agnes was only presumptively dead).
 COMELEC en banc: Reversed COMELEC’s 2nd Division. Ermelita’s certificate of candidacy did not contain any material
misrepresentation; hence, her proclamation as mayor of Sara, Iloilo, remains valid.
o Ermelita Salcedo married Neptali Salcedo on Sept.21, 1986. Under NCC 370, Ermelita may use her husband’s
surname. Hence, there is no material misrepresentation.
o Filing of a certificate of candidacy is a technicality that should be enforced before the election, but can be
disregarded after the electorate has made the choosing” (Collado vs. Alonzo).
o The rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory BEFORE the elections, but when it is
sought to enforce them AFTER the elections, they are held to be directory only” (Lambonao vs. Tero).
o The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Ermelita. Any defect in her certificate of candidacy should
give way to the will of the electorate.
 Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 by Victorino arguing that Ermelita is not entitled to use such surname
in her certificate of candidacy and that she merely adopted the surname “Salcedo” for purposes of improving her
chances of winning in the local elections by riding on the popularity of her husband (former mayor).

ISSUE # 1: Whether the use of such specific surname “Salcedo” constitutes a material misrepresentation under Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy? (NO)

RATIO # 1:
 Ermelita did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of
candidacy.
 Every person aspiring to hold any elective public office must file a sworn certificate of candidacy. One of the things
which should be stated therein is that the candidate is eligible for the office1.
 In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Sec. 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
o Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code: “A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be FILED at any time not
later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be DECIDED, after due
notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election.”
 BEFORE ELECTION: If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is subsequently declared by
final judgment to be disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted.
 AFTER ELECTION: If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Comelec shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
o The 15-day period in Sec. 78 for deciding the petition is merely directory.
FIRST REQUIREMENT: MATERIAL REPRESENTATION
 In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78, it is essential that the false
representation pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
 Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a “material representation,” the Court has interpreted
this phrase in a line of decisions applying Sec. 78 of the Code.
o Abella vs. Larrazabal: challenge pertaining to alleged false statements in the certificate of candidacy
regarding residence was properly classified as a proceeding under Sec. 78, despite the fact that it was filed
only on the very day of the election.

1
BP 881, Section 74: The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or
sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a candidate shall use in a certificate of
candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, of if he has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office
of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after
performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and
surname, each candidate, upon being made aware of such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may
continue to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one nickname or stage
name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality….
 o Labo vs. COMELEC: challenge pertaining to alleged false representation in the certificate of candidacy that
he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Possession of citizenship, being an indispensable
requirement for holding public office, may not be dispensed with by the fact of having won the elections for
it “strikes at the very core of Labo’s qualification to assume the contested office.”
o Frivaldo vs. COMELEC: disqualification proceeding praying that Frivaldo’s certificate of candidacy be
cancelled as he is not a citizen of the Philippines.
 SC has likened a proceeding under section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Sec. 253
since they both deal with the qualifications of a candidate.
o Aznar vs. COMELEC: a petition to disqualify Osmena on the ground that he does not possess the requisite
Filipino citizenship
 2 Instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the
office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881
 (1) Before election, pursuant to Sec. 78 (Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy)
 (2) After election, pursuant to Sec. 2532 (Petition for quo warranto)
 Quo Warranto v. Sec. 78
Petition for Quo Warranto (Sec. 253) Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy (Sec. 78)
Grounds 2 grounds: The qualifications for elective office are
(1) ineligibility or misrepresented in the certificate of
(2) disloyalty to the Republic of the candidacy
Philippines
* A candidate is ineligible if he is
disqualified to be elected to office, and he
is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualifications for elective office.
When Initiated Within 10 days after the proclamation of Before the elections
the election results
o Loong v. COMELEC: petition to disqualify based upon an alleged false representation in the certificate of
candidacy as to the candidate’s age.
 If a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition
within the 25-day period prescribed by Sec. 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the elections
laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of
the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within 10 days from the proclamation of the
results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code.
 From this, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Sec. 78 of the Code refer
to qualifications for elective office.
 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave – to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected,
from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.
 It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be
voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
 CASE AT BAR: Victorino has made no allegations concerning Emerlita’s qualifications to run for the office of mayor. He
does not claim that Emerlita lacks the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary
to run for a local elective office as provided for in the LGC3.

2
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer
on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten
days after the proclamation of the results of the election. [Note: quo warranto as to members of Congress now with Electoral Tribunal pursuant to
Const.]
3
R.A. No. 7160, section 39. Qualifications. -
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one
(21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
 o Thus, he failed to discharge the burden of proving that the misrepresentation allegedly made by Emerlita in
her certificate of candidacy pertains to a material matter.
SECOND REQUIREMENT: INTENTION TO DECEIVE
 Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Sec. 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
 In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office.
 The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity, is not within the scope
of the provision.
 CASE AT BAR: No showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by Ermelita.
 Victorino does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in
favor of “Ermelita Cacao Salcedo” or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
 It may be assumed that the electorate knew who Ermelita was, not only by name, but also by face and may have even
been personally acquainted with her since she has been residing in the municipality of Sara, Iloilo since at least 1986.
 She has been living with Neptali Salcedo, the mayor of Sara for 3 consecutive terms, since 1970 and the latter
has held her out to the public as his wife.
 Ermelita started using the surname “Salcedo” since 1986, several years before the elections.
o In her application for registration of her rice and corn milling business filed with the DTI in 1993, Ermelita
used the name “Ermelita Cacao Salcedo.”
o From 1987 to 1997, she also used the surname “Salcedo” in the ITRs filed by herself and by Neptali Salcedo.

ISSUE # 2: Whether COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion as evidenced by certain questionable acts?
(NO)

RATIO # 2:
 Victorino: The ff. circumstances constitute GAD on the part of the COMELEC:
o (1) COMELEC’s en banc Resolution, sustaining the validity of Ermelita’s certificate of candidacy, merely
duplicated the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Desamito of the Second Division
o (2) Chairman Pardo, the ponente of the en banc Resolution, and Commissioner Guiani, both members of the
Second Division who ruled in favor of Victorino in the Second Division Resolution, reversed their positions in
the en banc resolution; and
o (3) the en banc Resolution was promulgated on the very same day that Chairman Pardo took his oath of office
as Associate Justice of the SC.
 SC: Untenable. Victorino does not indicate what legal provision or equitable principle the Comelec transgressed by the
commission of these acts.
 As to adoption of dissenting opinion & change of positions: There is nothing legally assailable with the Comelec’s
adoption of Desamito’s dissenting opinion nor is the en banc Resolution rendered infirm by the mere change of position
adopted by Chairman Pardo and Guiani of the Second Division. The purpose of a MR is to allow the adjudicator a second
opportunity to review the case and to grapple with the issues therein, deciding anew a question previously raised.
 As to simultaneity of the decision’s promulgation and Pardo’s oath of office: Chairman Pardo enjoys the presumption
of regularity in the performance of his official duties, a presumption which Victorino has failed to rebut. At any rate,
the date of promulgation is not necessarily the date of signing.
 The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved.
 In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic voice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be
ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates
that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election.
 When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so
noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our
democratic institutions.”
 Since there appears to be no dispute as to Ermelita’s qualifications to hold the office of municipal mayor, the
will of the electorate must prevail.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMS en banc COMELEC Resolution denying the petition to cancel Ermelita Salcedo’s certificate of
candidacy.
LOONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest
LOONG vs. COMELEC
216 SCRA 760, 1992

Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-
Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after
the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for
the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy
as to his age.

Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The
motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition.

Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was
filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law.

Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong
on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of
the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation,
is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative
powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.
 FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC

[On Matters of Retroactivity Only]

Ponente: Justice PANGANIBAN, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Frivaldo filed his certificate for Candidacy for Governor about 3 weeks before the election. Private Respondent
Lee, another candidate for the said position, filed a petition to disqualify Frivaldo by reason of not being a citizen of the
Philippines.

A week before the election, Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the petition of Lee.

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by Frivaldo which remained unacted until after the elections. Thus, his candidacy
continued and he was voted during the elections.

Few days after the Election, COMELEC En Banc affirmed the promulgated resolution of the Second Division.

Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes in the said election.

Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as Governor.

Lee was then proclaimed as Governor.

Frivaldo filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation alleging that he had already
taken his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines which he filed a couple of months ago before the election.

Frivaldo’s motion was recognized and was then proclaimed as Governor.

Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUES:

Private Respondent Lee filed this instant petition for Certiorari, Preliminary Injunction, and Annulment of the COMELEC
decision and resolution.

W/N Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal. If it, did was it able to cure his lack of citizenship. If not, may it be given a
retroactive effect?

DECISION:

The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of COMELEC.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

A Citizen of the Philippines

The court held that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. At
the same time, literally speaking, such qualification of citizenship should thus be possessed when the “elective [elected]
official” begins to govern. In the instant case, Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of office of
governor (and other elective official) began; he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold the office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
Marquez vs COMELEC AND RODRIGUEZ

Facts:

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez
won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate
because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal chargeagainst him for 10 counts of insurance
fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was
issued for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government
Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from
justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final
judgment, and this was adaptedverbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.

Issue:

What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?

Held:

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after
being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded
as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the
term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves
great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguityin an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand
nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a determination as to his status as a
fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)
Aguinaldo vs Santos
Date: August 21, 1992
Petitioner: Rodolfo Aguinaldo
Respondents: Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas

Ponente: Nocon

Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat
was crushed, the Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, to petitioner requiring him to show cause why
he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt
thereof.
A sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico
Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan,
against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup.
In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution,
though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. The Secretary suspended petitioner from
office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. During the hearing, petitioner did not
present any evidence and instead moved that the Secretary inhibit himself, which motion was denied. Later, the Secretary
rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. The Vice Governor, Melvin
Vargas was installed as Governor.
In this appeal, the power of the Secretary to suspend officials was repealed by the 1987 Constitution and that the
act of disloyalty committed by petitioner was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
While the case was pending before the SC, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor
of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet
attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the
resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Issue: WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before
Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among
the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al:
‘the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office,
it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.’
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during
a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government of officials is anchored on both the Constitution
and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the
1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and
the power of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are
presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself
has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution,
Section 2. A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government code, which provides for the
manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then
it can not be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs.
Davide, Jr., BP 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local
Government Code of 1991 is approved.
The power of he Secretary of the DILG to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of
BP 337. As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of the Secretary to appoint Melvin Vargas as Governor, We
need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to show the fallacy of the same. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim
that before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is
charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the RPC.
Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the RPC, but administratively with the end in view of
removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.
Grego vs COMELEC
Romero (1997)

Facts: In 1981, SC found Humberto Basco, then Deputy Sheriff of the City Court of Manila, guilty of serious misconduct in
an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. SC ordered Basco dismiss from service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its
agencies and instrumentalities, or GOCCs (“Tordesillas ruling”).

Subsequently, Basco ran for and won as Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988 local elections.
He sought reelection in the 1992 election and won again. However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo
(another candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco’s ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas
ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG.

In 1995, Basco ran for for the third time as councilor. William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of District II, City of
Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco’s disqualification, suspension of his
proclamation, and declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila’s Second District.

Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila. In view of the
proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed the petition
for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by
the electorate who elected him.

Issue #1: WON Section 40(b) of Republic Act. No. 7160 applies retroactively to thos removed from office before it took
effect on January 1, 1992. NO.

Petitioner’s Contention: Although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40(b) must nonetheless be given
retroactive effect because the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from
office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, as long as a candidate was once removed
from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code,
the disqualification applies. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for disqualification, the provision must
have also referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code.

Held: No. While the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or
affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect
so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from office and
that is couched in the past tense are noy deterrents to applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics
that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively. A statue, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law
looks forward, not forward.

Issue #2: WON private respondent’s election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections
wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office. NO.

Petitioner’s Contention: According to Frivaldo vs COMELEC, a candidate’s disqualification cannot be erased by the
electorate alone through the instrumentality of the ballot.

Held: Issue is irrelevant. Petitioner’s argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified
when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was not subject
to any disqualification at all under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code which, as said earlier, applies only to those
removed from office on or after January 1, 1992.

Petitioner’s allegations that (1) Basco circumvented the Tordesillas ruling and that (2) the term “any position” therein is
broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration are unmeritorious.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. The
term used was “reinstatement”. Under the former Civil Service Decree (PD 807), the law applicable at the time Basco was
administratively dismissed, the term “reinstatement” had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position.
Thus, what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position.
Issue #3: Is Basco’s proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still
pending consideration by COMELEC void ab initio? NO.

Petitioner’s Contention: Basco violated the provision of Section 20, paragraph (i) of Republic Act No. 7166, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, as well as the rulings in Duremdes vs COMELEC, Benito vs COMELEC, and Aguam vs COMELEC.

Held: No. RA 7166 Section 20(i) does not apply considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to
a contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.

On the other hand, RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner’s contention that the Manila City BOC, should have
suspended the proclamation. The use of the word “may” indicated that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory
and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision
itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Moreover, there is no reason why the
Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of
irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a
mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare
the result.

Finally, the cases of Deremdes, Benito, and Aguam cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable. These three cases
do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.

Issue #4: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate. NO.

Held: No. Basco was a duly qualified candidate. Petitioner’s emphatic reference to Labo vs COMELEC, where we laid down
a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this
case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as
to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner’s allegation that Basco was well-known to have
been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural.
Caasi v. CA, 191 SCRA 317

Caasi v. CA

GR No. 88831, 84508 November 8, 1990

Grino-Aquino, J.

Doctrine: To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green
card holder must have “waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.

Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the CA and Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Commission on
Election

Facts:

 Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of 1988.
 Petitions were filed for his disqualification under Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the ground that he is a
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the US, not of Bolinao
o One of the petitioners is Mateo Caasi, his rival candidate for the position of mayor
 Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is
a permanent resident of the US
o He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there.
o He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previous elections.
 COMELEC dismissed the petitions, except for Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr.
o According to COMELEC, the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he
had abandoned his residence in the Philippines
o COMELEC said that as the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for
candidates to elective local officials under Sec 42 of Local Govt. Code, there is no legal obstacle to his
candidacy for mayor.
o In the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Badoy, he opined that a green card holder, being a permanent
resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country, under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, has to
prove that he has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant to be qualified to run for
election office.

Issue: Is green card a proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US? Yes.

Did Miguel waive his status as permanent resident or immigrant to US prior to the local elections? No.

Is he disqualified to become a candidate of municipal mayor? Yes.

Ruling:

 Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines
o The intention to live there permanently is evidenced by his application for an immigrant’s visa.
o Immigration – removing into one place from another/entering into a country with the intention of
residing in it.
o Immigrant – person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence
 As a resident alien in the US, Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the US, in return for the protection
given to him during the period of his residence.
 Sec 18, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to Miguel
o “Any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law”
o not applicable to Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of US before he was elected to public
office, not “during his tenure” as mayor
 Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the applicable law to him
 o “Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws”
o Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office
must possess.
 He resided in Bolinao for only 3 months after his return to the Phils and before he ran for mayor
 Clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens
who possess dual loyalties and allegiance, as such are incapable of the entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland
 To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
holder must have “waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.
o His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a
waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of US
o The waiver of green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office
o Without such prior waiver, he was “disqualified to run for any elective office”
 Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the US and his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of US despite his occasional visits to
the Philippines
o Miguel filled up his application for Immigrant Visa in his own handwriting, answering “Permanently” on
the question of his length of intended stay.
o On its face, the green card identifies Miguel in clear bold letters as a Resident Alien
 SC annulled the election of Miguel as municipal mayor.
 Election Laws

MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 (1999)

G.R. No. 135083

Facts:

Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City during the May 11,
1998 elections. A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on Manzano contending that Manzano is
an American citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private respondent.

COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on May 7, 1998 on
the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local Goverment Code from running any elective
position. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the motion remained pending even after the
election. The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification which was opposed by the private
respondent.

On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the decision of the COMELEC's Second
Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vice mayor of Makati. Pursuant to the
resolution rendered by the COMELEC enbanc, on August 31, 1998, the board of canvassers proclaimed private
respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.

Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private
respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.

Issues:

1. WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.

2. WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?

3. WON there was a valid election of citizenship?

Reasons:

1) Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of
R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter
 of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was Mercado since the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor
of Makati City. Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 which provides that
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment
rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion,
justifying this petition for certiorari.
2) NO. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code
(which declares as “disqualified from running for elective local position… Those with dual-citizenship”), Congress
has “command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective
office.” Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of
circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual
allegiance is a result of a person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a question of
which state’s law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a country’s sovereignty. Hence, “dual
citizenship” in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean “dual allegiance”. Therefore, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
3) Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such
persons with dual citizenship have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In
private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a
Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.” “I am
eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.

Ruling:

Petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA, respondents.

Ponente: PARAS, J.:

Petitioner: Aznar – provincial chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu
Respondent: COMELEC and Osmena – candidate for provincial governor of Cebu

FACTS:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC
for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration
and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a
holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911,
issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder
of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has
been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship? (NO.)

HELD:

SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did
not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and
the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate
stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there
is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to
reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
 VALLES vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

FACTS:

In 1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was
contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent
had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. When Lopez ran for re-election in
1995 elections, her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship but
the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles.

The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she
was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a
Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship
on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was
accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining that the Lopez is an Australian citizen,
placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19,
1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued
Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent is a Filipino

2. If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
3. Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental under Section 40 of Republic Act 7160

HELD:

1. Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality
or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These
were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of
an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed
to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having
been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
2. No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-
one years of age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country,
she acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The mere fact that private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the case of
Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of
one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding
of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been
included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her
Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

3. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and
reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which
a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:

“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as
referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public
office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of
a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which
is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent
filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12,
1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to
by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation
holds no water.
4. Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the
resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same,
citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in
cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this general rule was
recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship,
the following must be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings
on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really
binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions.
However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper
CASE DIGEST Labo v Comelec

176 SCRA 1 – Law on Public Officers – Election Laws – Citizenship of a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship – Labo Doctrine

In January 20, 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. Six days later, his rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a
petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified. That
through the records from the Australian Embassy, it was found that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married
an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual
citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen,
such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event
Labo is disqualified.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry about Ramon J. Labo, Jr. as the newly elected

Mayor of Baguio, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.

4. Whether or not Ramon J. Labo is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

1) No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in
1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by
taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport
to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual
citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino
citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he
became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a
Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will
of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of
the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted
for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance
to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to
preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2) Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would
be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound
policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election.
3) Yes, COMELEC has jurisdiction regarding the petition of quo warranto being filed against the petitioner was paid on
time. It is contrary to the petitioner’s claim that the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable
time. Lardizabal was able to pay the said fee within the required 10-day period.
4) Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is not a Filipino citizen anymore because of the following requisites based on the Constitution: a.) He
is already a naturalized citizen in a foreign country; b) He renounced his Filipino citizenship by c) taking and pledging
to the oath of allegiance of the foreign country promising to faithfully observe the laws and fulfill the duties of an
Australian citizen. He also did not make a move in reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by doing the following modes of
action: a) reacquiring by direct act of Congress; b) by naturalization; and c) by repatriation.

HELD: WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore

DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ORDERED to vacate his office and surrender the

same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executor. The temporary restraining order

dated January 31, 1989, is lifted.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)

Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due
time. On October 27, 1988, respondents, The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment
of petitioner’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired
Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor.

Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not
“impressed with voluntariness.” In other words, Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the speacial and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American Citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial
Law era. His oath in his COC stated that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally,
his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the
US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His election did
not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and the
Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.

Held: No. First, petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic
restoration of his Philippine citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of
repatriation.

Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications,
a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Republic vs. dela Rosa

G.R. No. 104645, June 6, 1994

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the
Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as
amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC
Manila captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of the Philippines.

The respondent Judge, Judge dela Rosa, set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the
said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last
publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing.

On January 14, 1992, private respondent, Frivaldo filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule”, to ask the Judge to
cancel the March 16 hearing and that it shall be done on January instead of having it on March, " where he manifested his
intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the hearing was moved on
February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO,
is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the
Supreme Court. Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify
the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.

Issue:

WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino.

Held:

No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory.
No pronouncement as to costs. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing
of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of
hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of
allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed
with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
CASE Number (including date): GR No. 147927, Feb 4, 2002
CASE Name: Adormeo vs. Commission on Elections
Ponente Quisumbing J.

FACTS
Petition for certiorari on COMELEC ruling that qualifies Ramon Talaga to run for mayor
 Petitioner (Raymundo Adormeo) and private respondent (Ramon Talaga) were the only ones who filed for
candidacy for mayor in Lucena city on the elections to be held on 9 May 2001.
 Talaga served to consecutive terms (1992-1998). He was defeated in the 1998 elections to Bernard Tagarao but
he won the recall elections in 12 May 2000 and served the unexpired term until 30 june 2001. When Talaga ran
for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had duly served as mayor for three
consecutive terms in ciolation of the three term-limit rule.
 Adormeo filed a petition to deny due course and cancel certificate of candidacy to Talaga for it is violative of Sec 8
Art. X of 1987 Constitution.
o Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected (emphasis
mine).
 20 April 2001 – COMELEC 1st division disqualified Talaga for having served 3 consecutive terms.
 27 April 2001 – Talaga filed motion for reconsideration stating that he did not serve 3 consecutive terms of office
which must amount to nine consecutive years.
 2 May 2001 – Adormeo filed opposition to motion saying serving an unexpired term counts as serving a full term.
 9 May 2001 – COMELEC en banc ruled the disqualification must be lifted because of he was not elected for three
terms
o He was only installed as mayor because of the recall elections
o His loss in 1998 did not count in the 3 term rule
o He did not fully serve 3 terms

ISSUES
1. Whether or not Talaga was disqualified to run for mayor or Lucena city

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

 NO: Sec. 8 Art X of the 1987 constitution clearly states that a person must have served three consecutive terms in
office. It cited Borja jr vs COMELEC where the Court ruled that an official must have served and must have been
ELECTED for three consecutive times. The court highlights the last sentence of sec. 8 which states that voluntary
renunciation does not count as interruption. Talaga’s loss in the 1998 elections does not count as voluntary
renunciation. He was removed from office because of an expiring term and an electoral defeat. He did not serve a
full ELECTED term.
 The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.

 For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in
the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there
was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

 Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections.
His election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute
his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
“voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the law.

RULING:
Wherefore the petition is denied
Borja vs COMELEC
September 3, 1998
Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending in 1992. In 1989, he became Mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two
more terms, from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the
ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be
ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en
banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as
mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term
is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor
in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he
only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship
in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted
in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8
of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving
the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term
limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of
election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection
would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them.
Lonzanida vs. COMELEC
July 28, 1999 | Gonzaga-Reyes

Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was
however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest. In 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a
failure of elections. After a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and ordered petitioner to vacate the post.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again ran for mayor. His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify
Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive
terms in the same post.

COMELEC: Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated
before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

Issue:
WON petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials
– NO.

Held:
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art.
X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for
the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the
accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate
his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who
will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office
after a term of nine years. The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials
run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after
serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was
agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive
terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.

In Borja vs. COMELEC, the Court sets two conditions which must concur in order to disqualify elective local officials from
serving more than three consecutive terms: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, the two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered
as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested
ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and
his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to
have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. A proclamation subsequently declared void is
no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board
of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election
protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term. He did not fully serve three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three
years cannot serve as basis to bar petitioner’s right to be elected.

The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was
proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May
1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. Proclamation nor the assumption
of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits. The outright dismissal of the petition
for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought
to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the
resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

Issue: WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed
winner. NO.

Held: No. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of office of a candidate
against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction
to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

“Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall

not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final

judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such

election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon

motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the

proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the
election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly
reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition
until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation