Today is Monda y, September 23, 2019

Custom Sear ch

 Judicial Issuances  Other Issuances  Jurisprudence  International Legal Resources  AUSL Exclusive

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COUR T
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 79416 September 5, 1989

ROSALIN A BONIFACIO, surviving wif e; and childr en GABRIEL, PONCI ANO, TIBURCIO,
BEATRIZ, GENEROSA, SIL VERIA, LEON ARDO, FELOMENA, ENCARN ACION and LEONIL A,
all surnamed BONIF ACIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZ ON, Presiding Judge of the Regional T rial Cour t of Malolos,
Branch XIII, Malolos, Bulacan and P ASTORA SAN MIGUEL, respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari certified to us by the Court of Appeals
in its resolution 1 dated November 28, 1986 in CA-G.R. SP No. 10033 as involving a pure
question of law is phr ased by petitioners, thus:

WHETHER OR NO T, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMEN T OBTAINED BY THE DECEDEN T

IS INHERITED BY THE COMPULSOR Y HEIRS, THEREBY VESTING TO THE
LATTER, ALL THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE JUDGMEN T TO (sic) THE
DECEDEN T. 2

The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the complaint filed
on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth
Regional District, Branch I-A of Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of private
respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectar e agricultural land situated at
Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. The
ground relied upon therefor was personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultur al Land Reform Code (CAR Case No. 2160-B'68).

After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered therein on September 18, 1970 by Judge
Manuel Jn. Ser apio:

1. Granting authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant

PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in question situated at Patubig,
Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares, more or less, and
consequently, ordering said defendant to vacate the same landholding and
deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff for the latter's personal cultivation,
subject to the provisions of Section 25 of R.A. 3844; and
 3
2. Dismissing all other claims and counter claims of the par ties.

On appeal by private respondent Pastora San Miguel, the Court of Appeals 4 modified said
judgment with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the
amount of P 1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in all other r espects. 5

Still dissatisfied , private respondent Pastora San Miguel sought relief from this Court.
During the pendency of her petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no
notice of such death was given to the Court, no order for the substitution of his heirs was
made. On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny private respondent's petition
for lack of merit and t o affirm the decision of the Cour t of Appeals. 6

Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and Gabriel, Ponciano,

Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa, Silveria, Leonardo, Felomena, Encarnacion and Leonila all
surnamed Bonifacio, as children and heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio , moved for the execution
of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 before the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued on February 20, 1986 and on March 6, 1986, the
Deputy Sheriff submitted his Report (Partial Delivery of Possession), stating in part that
except for a portion thereof occupied by the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter
refused to vacate, he had delivered the land subject matter of the action to Rosalina
Bonifacio as sur viving wif e of Olimpio Bonifacio.

Thereafter, private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution.
This was opposed by petitioners who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition
and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for allegedly re-entering
the subject land.

After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986,
the dispositiv e portion of which r eads:

WHEREFORE, the implementation of the writ of execution of the Decision dated

September 18, 1970 made by the Sheriff of this Court, per directive contained in
our Order of February 18, 1986, is hereby declared null and void; the "Motion for
Demolition" filed by plaintiff is hereby denied; and, the "Petition for Contempt"
likewise denied.

SO ORDERED . 7

Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals, which as stated earlier, was certified to us pursuant to Section 9 (3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5 (2) [e], Art. X of the 1973 Constitution and Rule
50, Sec. 3 of the Re vised Rules of Cour t.

Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion

tantamount to lack of jurisdictio n in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68
can no longer be executed as said action is purely personal in character and therefore
cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs. They assert that CAR
Case No. 2160-B'68, being an ejectment case and not one of those specifically pr ovided by
law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party. Furthermore, as under Rule 39,
Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court, a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but
also on their successors-in-inter est, petitioners are entitled to enforce the decision in CAR
Case No. 2160-B'68.
Private respondent, on the other hand, places stress on the fact that the action under
consideration is not an ordinary ejectment case but an agrarian case for the ejectment of
an agricultur al lessee. She theorizes that the right being asserted in the action is personal
to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further contends that the non-
substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the proceedings taken after his
death null and void. She also points to certain supervening events which allegedly prohibit
execution of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, to wit: the amendment of Section
36 (1), R.A. 3844 b y R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the pr omulgation of P.D. No. 27.

Private responde nt is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 as more than an
ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultur al
lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is more closely and strictly
regulated by the State. This factor, however, does not operate to bar the application to the
instant case of the gener al rule that an ejectment case sur vives the death of a par ty. 8

Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for
ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave
the impression that the ejectme nt of an agricultur al lessee was allowed only if and when
the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving use to
a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-
lessor, and therefore his personal right alone. A reading of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844
however readily demonstr ates the fallacy of this interpr etation. Said section pr ovides:

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions . — Notwithsta nding any

agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultur al lessee
shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholdi ng except when
his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final
and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultur al lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will

personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-
agricultur al purposes . . . .

Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultur al lessee was authorized not only when the
landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his
immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly did not intend to limit the right
of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such
right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a
ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor . To
say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon
the landowner 's immediate family members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner 's immediate family members
evidently to place the landowner -lessor in parity with the agricultur al lessee who was (and
still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this regard, it
must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of
his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in " personal
cultivation."

Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultur al lessor or lessee, the term "personal
cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right personal and
exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the
lessor's or lessee 's immediate family members.

Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-inter est, but the immediate family
members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding
asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased
landowner-lessor , the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-
interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No.
2160-B'68.

Rules of procedure make it the duty of the attorney to inform the court promptly of his
client's death, incapacity or incompetency during the pendency of the action and to give
the name and residence of his executor, administr ator, guardian or other legal
representativ e. 9 In case of a party's death, the court, if the action survives, shall then order
upon proper notice the legal representativ es of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased within a period of 30 days or within such time as may be
granted. 10

In the case at bar, Olimpio Bonifacio's death during the pendency of private respondent's
petition was not communicated to the Court. As ruled by this Court in the case of
Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma , supra, involving substantially the same facts and issue:

. . . The petitioners challenge the proceeding in the Court of Appeals after the
death of the plaintiff-appellant Adela Salindon. The y are of the opinion that since
there was no legal representativ e substituted for Salindon after her death, the
appellate court lost its jurisdiction over the case and consequently, the
proceedings in the said cour t are null and v oid. This ar gument is without merit.

There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The
supervening death of plaintiff-a ppellant Salindon did not extinguish her civil
personality (Republic v. Bagtas 6 SCRA 242; Vda. de Haberes v. Court of
Appeals, 104 SCRA 534). . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel after her death on December 11, 1976
failed to inform the court of Salindon's death. The appellate court could not be
expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Salindon without the
proper manifestation from Salindon's counsel. In such a case and considering
that the supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality,
the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the
case. There is no showing that the appellate court's proceedings in the case
were tainted with irr egularities.

Private respondent's challenge against the proceedings held after Olimpio Bonifacio's
death cannot ther efore be heeded.

Neither can private respondent derive comfor t from the amendment of Section 36 (1) of
R.A. 3844 by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 11 and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. 12 In Nilo v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34586, April 2, 1984,128 SCRA 519, we categorically ruled that
both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule
that statutes ha ve no retroactive effect unless other wise provided ther ein.
There being no cogent reason to nullify the implementation of the writ of execution in CAR
Case No. 2160-B'68, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in having done
so. The writ pr ayed for should issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution dated July 15, 1986 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The immedia te execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 is
ordered. This decision is immediately ex ecutory. No pronouncement as t o costs.

SO ORDERED .

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cor tes, JJ., concur .

Feliciano, J., is on lea ve.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Celso L. Magsino concurr ed in by Associate

Justices Ser afin E. Camilon and Manuel C. Herr era.

2 Rollo, p. 2.

3 Rollo, p. 25.

4 Decision pr omulgated on Mar ch 6, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 46549-R penned b y

Justice Antonio G. L ucero and concurr ed in by then CA Justices Cecilia Muño z-
Palma and Guillermo S. Sant os.

5 Rollo, p. 35.

6 Rollo, p. 36.

7 Rollo, p. 17.

8 Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, G.R. No. 60544, Ma y 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 304.

9 Sec. 16, Rule 16, Rules of Cour t.

10 Sec. 17, Rule 3, Rules of Cour t.

11 Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was amended b y Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6389 t o read:

"(1) The landholding is declar ed by the depar tment head upon r ecommendation
of the National Planning Commission t o be suited for r esidential, commer cial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Pr ovided, That the agricultur al lessee
shall be entitled t o disturbance compensation equiv alent to five times the
average of the gr oss har vests on his landholding during the last fiv e preceding
calendar y ears," thereby eliminating personal cultiv ation as a gr ound for the
ejectment of a tenant/lessee.

12 P.D. No. 27 decr eed the emancipation of the tenant fr om the bondage of the
soil, transferred to him the ownership of the land he tills and pr ovided for the
 instruments and mechanisms for such tr ansfer.

The Lawphil Pr oject - Ar ellano Law F oundation