Estate of Jaime Ceballos v. City of Thornton, Et Al.

Case 1:15-cv-01783 Document 1 Filed 08/18/15 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 30
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 15-CV-1783
ESTATE OF JAIME CEBALLOS;

QUIANNA VIGIL;
NAVEYAH CEBALLOS, through next friend;
JAYDEN CEBALLOS, through next friend;
Plaintiffs,
v.
WILLIAM HUSK, individually;

DANTE CARBONE, individually;
RANDY NELSON, in his official capacity;
CITY OF THORNTON
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, HOLLAND, HOLLAND EDWARDS & GROSSMAN,
P.C., complain against Defendants and request trial by jury as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This is an action for damages and injunctive relief for a fatal and entirely
preventable police shooting of a known to be emotionally disturbed individual in a mental health
crisis.
2. On August 30, 2013, Quianna Vigil called the Thornton Police Department for
emergency assistance in getting her mentally ill husband to leave the house.
3. She reported he was off of his prescribed psychiatric medication, intoxicated, and
was highly agitated walking around with a bat.

4. Multiple police officers, including Defendant Officer Husk and Defendant
Commander Carbone arrived on the scene.
5. Rather than calming the situation down and offering professional help to this
woman in dealing with her mentally ill husband, these Defendant officers escalated the situation,
shooting and killing him instead, in violation of his constitutional rights.
6. These officers knew they were not responding to a crime or attempting to
effectuate an arrest.
7. Rather, they knew they were responding to a 911 call for a potentially mentally ill
and emotionally disturbed individual.
8. Within under one minute of Thornton police arriving on scene in response to this
911 call, Mr. Ceballos was shot multiple times in the chest by Officer Husk.
9. The use of deadly force against Mr. Ceballos, under circumstances in which he
was known to be mentally compromised, was grossly excessive and also the result of
deliberately indifferent training and customs on the part of the City of Thornton Police
Department with respect to the handling of mentally ill, emotionally disturbed, or agitated
individuals.
II. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND NOTICE
10. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983, §12132 and §1988. The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1343, 2201.
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11. This case is instituted in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 as the judicial district in which all relevant events and
omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.
12. Supplemental pendent jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §1367 because the
violations of Federal law alleged are substantial and the pendent causes of action derive from a
common nucleus of operative facts.
13. Timely Notice of Claims under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act has
been given by all Plaintiffs to redress the willful and wanton conduct alleged in this lawsuit,
which also violates state law.
III. PARTIES
14. At all times relevant hereto, the decedent, Jamie Ceballos was a resident of the
State of Colorado and a citizen of the United States of America.
15. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Quianna Vigil, individually and also as
personal representative of the Plaintiff Estate of Jamie Ceballos, was a resident of the State of
Colorado and a citizen of the United States of America.
16. At all times relevant hereto, Naveyah Ceballos, was the minor daughter of Jaime
Ceballos and Quianna Vigil, and is a resident of the State of Colorado and a citizen of the United
States of America.
17. At all times relevant hereto, Jayden Ceballos, was the minor son of Jaime
Ceballos and Quianna Vigil, and is a resident of the State of Colorado and a citizen of the United
States of America.
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18. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant William Husk was a citizen of the United
States and a resident of the State of Colorado and was acting under color of state law in his
capacity as a law enforcement officer employed by the Thornton Police Department. Defendant
Husk is sued individually.
19. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Dante Carbone was a citizen of the United
States and a resident of the State of Colorado and was acting under color of state law in his
supervisory capacity as a Commander employed by the Thornton Police Department.
20. Defendant City of Thornton, hereinafter “Defendant City” is a Colorado
municipal corporation and is the legal entity responsible for itself and for the Thornton Police
Department. This Defendant is also the employer of the individual Defendants and is a proper
entity to be sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
21. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Randy Nelson was a citizen of the United
States and a resident of the State of Colorado. Defendant Nelson is sued in his official capacity
as the Chief of the Thornton Police Department and final delegated decision maker, employed by
the City of Thornton and/or the Thornton Police Department, and was acting under color of state
law.
22. Defendant Nelson is properly sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his own
and City of Thornton’s delegated deliberately indifferent unconstitutional decisions, policies,
practice, habits, customs, usages, training and derelict supervision, ratification, acquiescence and
intentional failures which were moving forces in the complained of constitutional and statutory
violations and resulting injuries.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
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23. Plaintiff incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs, as if they were fully set
forth again at this point.
24. During the day on August 30, 2013, Quianna Vigil called the Thornton Police
Department for assistance and intervention with her husband and father of their two children,
Jaime Ceballos.
25. Mr. Ceballos was experiencing a mental crisis.
26. He had stopped taking his anti-depressant/anti-anxiety medication, was not in his
right mind, and was refusing to leave their house.
27. The night before, Mr. Ceballos took himself to North Suburban Hospital while he
was having a panic attack. He was then breathing heavily, shaking, and dry heaving.
28. That same night before, Thornton Police, including Officer Snook, picked up Mr.
Ceballos while going home from the hospital as he apparently left with an IV still in his arm and
the hospital called the police to do a welfare check.
29. The next day, Ms. Vigil felt she could not then handle living with her husband’s
current mental illness and substance abuse problem.
30. She did not want to live this way and called the police for help in safely evicting
her husband from their house.
31. Mr. Ceballos left the house before the police arrived.
32. When the police arrived, Ms. Vigil told them that her husband was off his
depression medication and suffering from withdrawal.
33. She also reported that he had a substance abuse problem, was currently on a
‘binge’, not acting right and possibly selling their joint property for money. She wanted to know
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how to force him to leave their house because he was too much for her to handle with their two
small children at that time.
34. Thornton police officers told her that she would need to start a civil eviction
process in order to evict her husband out of their home.
35. They also told her to call 911 again if Mr. Ceballos returned to the residence and
was intoxicated so they could help facilitate and “intervene before things got out of hand.”
36. When he returned later that day, he was obviously intoxicated, not in his right
mind, and making even less sense than earlier.
37. Ms. Vigil called 911 pursuant to their earlier instructions at around 7:30 pm on
August 30, 2013.
38. Ms. Vigil told Dispatch that her husband was agitated, on a “binge”, probably on
drugs (specifically mentioning cocaine), not mentally there and talking to himself, reporting inter
alia that:
• “he is being crazy”;
• “He’s like talking stuff to somebody, like he’s being all crazy, like I don’t
know”;
• “And he also takes depression pills but he hasn’t been taking them for days, so
now he’s telling his friends to leave and they’re leaving right now”;
• he had a bat and was “acting a fool”;
• she had her daughter with her and she “cant go to my own house and I have
nowhere else to go”;
• he was standing in the front yard with a bat and “he’s like talking, like I can
hear him like, I can’t hear him but he’s like talking like putting his hands up in
the air, like making gestures, like yeah, he’s freakin crazy.”
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39. Ms. Vigil also told dispatch that last time he was off his medication and acting
crazy he ended up breaking their TV and was carrying around a knife, although he didn’t
actually do anything physically assaultive either time.
40. During this time, two of Mr. Ceballos’ friends and former co-workers, Andrew
Castillo and Sergio Martinez had come to the house out of concern after being called by Mr.
Ceballos.
41. Mr. Castillo and Mr. Martinez perceived that he was acting strange, engaging in
disjointed and non-linear conversation, and pacing around the house.
42. Ms. Vigil informed dispatch that he had two friends at the house that were
“probably just trying to calm him down. . .”
43. There was no crime reported.
44. Ms. Vigil called the police for help so they could defuse the situation.
45. As she told dispatch, she wanted help getting him out of the house because he was
legally entitled to be there but was not acting right mentally. She wanted to be able to go safely
back inside with her 17 month old daughter and put her to sleep in her own bed without
disturbance.
46. It was clear and the officers were on express notice that Ms. Vigil and her
children were not in the house or near him.
47. Dispatch next broadcasted to police, including these responding officers that: Mr.
Ceballos was “DK [Drunk]” (19:29:00); WAS “BEING CRAZY HAS 2 BATS” (19:29:00); “IS
POSSIBLY ON DRUGS” (19:29:48); “SHOULD BE TAKING HIS DEPRESSION MEDS”
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(19:29:56); “HAS NOT TAKEN THE MEDS” (19:30:02), AND’ “WAS A WALK AWAY
FROM NSMC [North Suburban Medical Center] LAST NIGHT” (19:35:32).
48. Dispatch further informed all these Thornton officers that the suspect was alone in
the house, but there were “2 OTHER MALES ON SCENE POSSIBLY TRYING TO CALM
PARTY DOWN.”
49. Ms. Vigil sat outside in her car until the police arrived with her daughter asleep in
the car seat.
50. Officer William Husk and Officer Eric Ward responded to the aired call an
approximately 19:37:45 p.m.
51. Commander Dante Carbone and Officer Michael Snook arrived almost
immediately thereafter.
52. Officer Snook approached from the west side of the street to block off the area.
53. Officer Snook recognized at the time that Mr. Ceballos was the same individual
who he picked up walking away North Suburban Medical Center the night before and thus knew
about his mental health problems from direct experience.
54. Officer Ward and Defendant Husk began walking up from the east side of the
street.
55. After the officers arrived, they saw Mr. Ceballos standing outside in the driveway
holding a baseball bat in his hands.
56. According to Defendant Husk, they first observed Mr. Ceballos carrying a bat
when he was about sixty yards away from them.
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57. The bat was not raised at the police officers and Mr. Ceballos was not charging at
them.
58. Officer Snook reported that he was not charging the officers but rather, pacing
back and forth in the driveway with a bat in his right hand.
59. Thus, at 19:38:20, Mr. Ceballos was reportedly “ARMED WITH BAT
WALKING IN AND OUT OF THE BOX.”
60. As the officers were walking towards his house and getting closer, Mr. Ceballos’
friends, Andrew Castillo and Sergio Martinez, approached the police officers to tell them what
was going on with their friend in an effort to help calm and defuse the situation.
61. Mr. Castillo tried to stop the officers, including Defendant Husk and Commander
Carbone from walking up towards Mr. Ceballos. He kept telling police that “he wasn’t all there”
and that “something is wrong”.
62. Mr. Martinez also told the officers to “Please be careful, he may be on drugs.”
63. Defendant Husk admitted in an interview with the District Attorney that when he
and Officer Ward approached the house, two men approached them, identified themselves as Mr.
Ceballos’ friends and also stated “you know, I think he’s on drugs,” a statement which made him
believe at the time that these friends “didn’t feel that he was acting appropriately.”
64. Officer Ward has also admitted that these two friends approached them and
“started saying something about, I don’t know what’s wrong with this guy, I think he’s on
drugs.”
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65. Defendant Carbone admitted these two friends tried to talk to him about what they
observed, but he also disregarded what they said, commanding them to stay away and that the
police would handle it.
66. Officers refused to allow Mr. Martinez and Mr. Castillo to tell them anything
about his history, their interactions with him, the nature of his mental instability at the time, or
entertain their offers of assistance in dealing with Mr. Ceballos as his friends and familiar faces.
67. The officers, including Commander Carbone, were aware and knew at the time
that Mr. Ceballos had walked away from the hospital just the night before as aired over dispatch.
68. Defendants knew he was drunk and possibly on drugs.
69. They knew he was “acting crazy.”
70. They knew he was not taking his prescribed psychiatric medication for depression
and anxiety.
71. This was an obvious crisis situation with a known mentally ill and agitated
individual.
72. The officers also knew he was alone in the house and not a danger to any other
person as they knew the location of Mr. Ceballos’s wife, children, and friends, who were all
outside of the house at a safe distance away.
73. The individual officers, including Defendant Husk and Defendant Carbone had,
but did not take, the time to come up with an appropriate course of action for this known crisis
situation with a mentally compromised individual.
74. Defendants clearly had time to assess the situation and come up with a plan,
information-gather, and engage in de-escalating tactics.
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75. They had time to make decisions that would accommodate this mentally ill
subject’s needs, such as engaging in non-threatening communications, and use of the passage of
time to defuse the situation.
76. They had time to take steps to calm the situation down rather than amp it up by
deciding to walk quickly towards him with all of their guns and weapons drawn and pointed at
him while all giving multiple loud commands at the same time.
77. They could and should have assumed a non-threatening manner and stayed in
their cars.
78. They could and should have moved slowly and not continue to agitate Mr.
Ceballos.
79. They could and should have continued to information gather from people at the
scene including his wife, friends, Officer Snook, or attempt to communicate with him from a safe
distance.
80. No officer including the Commander at the scene called for backup or decided to
involve people who they knew had more experience in crisis intervention with respect to
mentally ill and highly agitated individuals, such as members from the Crisis Intervention Team.
81. Instead, officers recklessly approached Mr. Ceballos quickly and aggressively
while all yelling commands.
82. Rather than calling or waiting for backup, retreating, or taking reasonable other
actions to maintain the status quo or de-escalate the situation, despite knowing he was alone in
the house, the officers, with their weapons all drawn, recklessly proceeded to keep walking and
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close the significant distance gap between themselves and Mr. Ceballos, a distance that would
have continued to provide them complete physical safety.
83. There was absolutely no pressing need to rush the house in an aggressive and
threatening manner, particularly when these officers had every reason to suspect that doing so
would force a confrontation resulting in death or serious injury, as he was highly agitated,
holding a baseball bat, and unable to think rationally or exercise adequate control over his
behavior and impulses.
84. Mr. Castillo and Mr. Martinez tried their best to intervene in order to de-escalate
this crisis situation with a mentally ill individual, but the officers ignored what the friends were
saying, refused to listen to their repeated warnings, and ordered them to stay away, thereby also
taking away these friends and lifelines, and recklessly creating the situation that led to Mr.
Ceballos’ death.
85. As the officers continued walking towards him at his house, they yelled
commands to drop the bat.
86. Mr. Ceballos actually turned away from these officers and went back inside his
house in the garage.
87. According to the officers, at this point, Mr. Ceballos was over 50 yards away and
actually retreated back in his house for a short period of time.
88. In addition to knowing that Mr. Ceballos was off his prescribed medication,
intoxicated, agitated, possibly on drugs, and had a baseball bat, Defendant Husk also expressly
admitted that he knew Mr. Ceballos was not mentally there when he went back into his house
and refused to drop the bat, stating: “[Mr. Ceballos] had “no intention of complying with any
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lawful order and especially when he was given them continuously, so either his mindset was
altered or what but you know he didn’t react normally.”
89. Once again, none of the officers, including Defendant Husk and the Defendant
Commander at the scene decided to use that time to de-escalate the situation, stop closing the gap
between themselves and the subject, and come up with a plan to deal with this known mentally
ill and highly agitated individual who was still not a threat to anyone at that time.
90. Mr. Ceballos came back outside still holding a bat.
91. Commander Carbone, Officer Husk, Officer Ward, and Officer Snook recklessly
and deliberately continued to advance towards Mr. Ceballos’ house.
92. They all had their weapons drawn and continued to jointly yell commands to drop
the bat, commands they admit they knew he would likely be unable to follow.
93. The police officers and Mr. Ceballos began yelling things back and forth with
about two houses between them.
94. Mr. Ceballos was obviously highly agitated, paranoid, responding with aggressive
language and swearing, and was not dropping the bat or responding to verbal commands.
95. His judgment was grossly impaired such that he was unable to recognize reality
and lacked the capacity to make reasonable life decisions for his health and safety.
96. At 19:38:26, Officer Snook reported over dispatch that he was going to get a “less
lethal” beanbag shotgun, as he obviously did not believe the situation required deadly force and
could likely see that Mr. Ceballos was not fully functioning mentally and not be able to comply
with verbal commands.
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97. Defendant Husk and the other officers nevertheless did not change their course of
action and continued to yell “Drop the bat or we’ll shoot.”
98. Mr. Ceballos, from around 20 feet away, responded “Fuck you, shoot me then!”
99. Shortly after this announcement, but tragically before Officer Snook could get to
his car and back with a non-lethal gun, Defendant Husk fired six rounds of lethal bullets, hitting
Mr. Ceballos’ chest and body, killing him at the scene.
100. According to the Autopsy Report, Mr. Ceballos died from “Gunshot Wounds to
the Chest,” and had two bullets strike his chest, suffered perforation of bilateral lungs and
vertebrae T6, and a gunshot wound to the right hip.
101. Officer Ward apparently fired his taser as well at some point.
102. Mr. Ceballos was around 20 feet from the officers at the time he was shot and
killed.
103. “Shots fired” was called out at 19:38:35 p.m.
104. This entire sequence, from the moment the police arrived to Mr. Ceballos being
shot and killed by Defendant Husk, took under one minute.
105. The fatal shooting was also premature and objectively unreasonable as Mr.
Ceballos was around 20 feet away and was not quickly charging at them.
106. A kitchen knife was reportedly found on Mr. Ceballos after the shooting --
although no officer aired that he had a knife until after he was shot.
107. No force, or non-deadly and much less force could have reasonably been used to
get the situation under control rather than multiple shots to the heart.
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108. These officers then stood by and did not even try to help him as he lay on the
ground dying. They just kept yelling at Ms. Vigil and his friends to “get the fuck back in the
house”, taking pictures of Mr. Ceballos’ body with their guns drawn rather then helping him as
he died.
109. All of the above-described acts were done pursuant to the preexisting and ongoing
deliberately indifferent policies, training and supervision of the Thornton Police Department.
110. The Thornton Police Department lacks constitutionally adequate policies and
training to guide officers in these circumstances, or training, supervision and accountability
measures necessary to ensure that officers comply with the constitutional rights of people in a
mental health crisis.
111. The Thornton Police Department employs practices that escalate the use of force
where there were clear earlier junctures when the force could have been avoided or minimized,
including but not limited to, using disengagement and de-escalation techniques, gathering
information to potentially defuse the situation, and responding to these types of calls with
specialized crisis intervention units or those trained in such techniques.
112. As a result, persons who have mental illness and are in crisis are subjected to
unnecessary or excessive force by police officers, as Jaime Ceballos was here.
113. Mr. Ceballos was only 31 years old when he was killed. He had gone to school for
criminal justice, was a hard worker and had significant life prospects. He worked to support his
wife and two children and held various jobs in loss prevention until shortly before his death. His
estate has substantial past and future economic damages including past and future lost earnings
and impaired earnings capacity in amounts still being determined.
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114. Mr. Ceballos worked in security and loss prevention and had a great deal of
respect for the police.
115. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Quianna Vigil and their two children,
Naveyah and Jayden Cabellos, have suffered substantial emotional injuries, and other losses,
entitling them to compensatory, non-economic, economic and special damages, in amounts to be
determined at trial. These injuries as set forth with particularity in the claims below variously
include, but are not limited to, wrongful death damages, emotional distress, ongoing earnings
related economic and ongoing special damages for any medically/psychologically related
treatment including liens and expenses caused by the challenged conduct of these Defendants.
116. The Plaintiff children are absolutely devastated and are continuing to exhibit
symptoms of serious grief, anger, and confusion about what happened to their father. Plaintiff
Jayden Ceballos cries all the time and has begun to have resulting behavioral issues at school.
117. Here are pictures of Mr. Ceballos with his loving family:
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V.CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Fourth Amendment Violation - Excessive Force Resulting in Death
(Estate of Jaime Ceballos Against Defendant Husk)
118. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .
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120. Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and Defendant Husk is a
person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
121. Defendant Husk, at all times relevant hereto, was acting under the color of state
law in his capacity as Thornton police officer and his acts and omissions were conducted within
the scope of his official duties or employment.
122. At the time of the complained of events, Plaintiff had a clearly established
constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be secure in his person from unreasonable
seizure and death through excessive force.
123. Any reasonable police officer knew or should have known of this right at the time
of the complained of conduct as it was clearly established at that time.
124. Defendant’s Husk use of deadly force, as described herein, was objectively
unreasonable and excessive in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,
particularly when there were other options that should have been reasonably used to stop any
threat, including a Taser and non-lethal shotgun that Defendant Snook had stated he was going to
use instead of lethal force.
125. Defendant Husk’s own reckless and deliberate actions immediately preceding use
of deadly force precipitated any need to use such force and was immediately connected to any
threat of force by Mr. Ceballos.
126. The entire incident took under one minute.
127. Defendant Husk’s reckless and deliberate actions immediately preceding use of
deadly force was entirely contrary to proper police practices for dealing with mentally ill or
emotionally upset persons that have weapons and provoked the resulting confrontation.
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128. A person’s mental health must be taken into account when considering an
officer’s use of force.
129. The tactics employed against an emotionally distraught individual who is creating
a disturbance are different that those involved in law enforcement efforts to subdue an armed and
dangerous criminal who has recently committed a serious offense, and call for conflict resolution
and de-escalation, rather than aggressive confrontation.
130. Defendant Husk and all the officers knew that they were dealing with a mentally
ill and emotionally disturbed individual, that he was off his prescribed psychiatric medication,
that he was on drugs and “acting crazy”, that he was carrying around a bat and pacing back and
forth, and that he was not likely to respond rationally to police officers commands.
131. Defendants thus knew that their actions would likely result in significant risk to
Mr. Ceballos’ well being.
132. Defendant Husk also knew that he was not a criminal suspect and not a danger to
anyone as he was alone in the house.
133. Mr. Ceballos was in need of a doctor not a jail cell, to Defendant’s knowledge.
134. Under these circumstances, Defendant Husk was required to employ appropriate
tactics to de-escalate rather than escalate the situation, including but not limited to: taking cover
in his car; requesting backup, particularly backup from individuals appropriately trained in crisis
intervention; eliminating unnecessary emergency lights and sirens; gathering information on Mr.
Ceballos from the individuals present at the scene, including Ms. Vigil, Mr. Martinez, and Mr.
Castillo; respecting the person’s comfort zone; using nonthreatening communications when
approaching Mr. Ceballos; avoiding physical contact and maintaining the distance between them;
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retreating when given the opportunity; employing the passage of time to his advantage, and;
using less than lethal force to bring the situation to an end.
135. Defendant disregarded the knowledge of Mr. Ceballos’ mental condition and
recklessly and deliberately provoked a violent confrontation.
136. The acts and omissions of Defendant Husk was engaged in pursuant to the
custom, policy, and practice of the Thornton Police Department, which fails to train and
supervise its officers in how to deal with mentally ill or disturbed individuals, and ratifies the use
of such excessive force by law enforcement officers in the City.
137. The acts and omissions of Defendant Husk was the proximate cause of Mr.
Ceballos’ death.
138. As a proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff Estate has
suffered injuries and losses, including the death of Jaime Ceballos, entitling it to recover his
compensatory and special damages, including loss of constitutional rights, loss of enjoyment of
life, pain and suffering during this event, permanent lost earnings and earnings capacity for the
expected productive working lifetime of Jaime Ceballos under the mortality tables, all in
amounts to be proven at trial.
139. Plaintiff Estate has also incurred special damages in the form of funeral expenses.
140. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
141. In addition to compensatory, economic, consequential and special damages,
Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against Defendant Husk, in that the actions were taken
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maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of
Plaintiff.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Supervisory Liability for Excessive Force Resulting in Death
(Estate of Jaime Ceballos Against Defendant Commander Carbone)
142. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .
144. Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and Defendant to this claim is a person
for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
145. Defendant Carbone controlled and had the right to direct and control the manner
and interactions between the Thornton Police officers and Jaime Ceballos.
146. Defendant Husk violated Mr. Ceballos’ constitutional right to be free from
excessive force resulting in death, as set forth in the First Claim for Relief.
147. Defendant Commander Carbone knew or should have known of these rights at the
time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
148. Defendant Carbone knew that Mr. Ceballos was mentally ill and emotionally
disturbed, as set forth herein.
149. He also described Mr. Ceballos to be “agitated”, “angry”, and “intense.”
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150. Defendant had knowledge of, failed to supervise or intervene, acquiesced in
Defendant Husk actions and ultimate use of deadly force, and exercised unreasonable and
reckless control/direction in the officers’ actions relating to Mr. Ceballos at the scene.
151. Commander Carbone was at the scene and personally participated in the
unreasonable and reckless actions immediately preceding the use of deadly force, including the
reckless creation of any need to use such force, as set forth herein.
152. Under these circumstances, Commander Carbone was required to employ
appropriate tactics to de-escalate rather than escalate the situation, including but not limited to:
taking cover in his car; requesting backup, particularly backup from individuals appropriately
trained in crisis intervention; eliminating unnecessary emergency lights and sirens; gathering
information on Mr. Ceballos from the individuals present at the scene, including Ms. Vigil, Mr.
Martinez, and Mr. Castillo; respecting the person’s comfort zone; using nonthreatening
communications when approaching Mr. Ceballos; avoiding physical contact and maintaining the
distance between them; retreating when given the opportunity, and; employing the passage of
time to his advantage.
153. Defendant Carbone both directly participated in the constitutional violation and
failed to intervene by taking reasonable steps to prevent Defendant Husk from violating those
rights.
154. Defendant Carbone’s actions were a moving force and cause of the series of
events that he knew or reasonably should have known would cause Defendant Husk to deprive
Mr. Ceballos of his constitutional rights.
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compensatory and special damages, including loss of constitutional rights, pain and suffering
during this event, permanent lost earnings and earnings capacity for the expected productive
working lifetime of Jaime Ceballos under the mortality tables, all in amounts to be proven at
trial.
156. Plaintiff Estate has also incurred special damages in the form of medically related
expenses and funeral expenses.
158. In addition to compensatory, economic, consequential and special damages,
Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against Defendant Carbone under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in
that the actions were taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the
constitutional rights of Plaintiff.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Deliberately Indifferent Training and Supervision
(Estate of Jaime Ceballos Against Defendant Nelson)
160. Defendant Husk violated Mr. Ceballos’ constitutional right to be free from
excessive force resulting in death, as set forth in the First Claim for Relief.
161. Defendant Nelson was, at all times relevant, a policymaker or final delegated
decision-maker for the Thornton Police Department, and in that capacity established policies,
procedures, customs, and/or practices for the same.
23
162. At all times relevant hereto, it was known to Defendant that it was highly
probable that Thornton law enforcement officers would encounter citizens suffering from mental
illness or agitated delirium, and that citizens suffering from such disorders are at a highly
elevated risk of death from ordinary law enforcement use of force methods to restrain non-
compliant persons.
163. Defendant was required to implement policies and train their officers with respect
to dealing with persons who are mentally ill or emotionally disturbed, including but not limited
to: requesting backup from people with experience; training not to unreasonably agitate or excite
the person; to contain the person; to respect the person’s comfort zone; to use nonthreatening
communications, and; to employ the passage of time to their advantage.
164. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto, Defendant did not have
specific policies, procedures and training governing law enforcement response to citizens
suffering from such mental conditions and did not train all of their law enforcement officers on
what uses of force with respect to such citizens were reasonable and constitutional and were,
therefore, deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of such medically and/or mentally
impaired citizens.
165. Defendant also knew that absent the adoption of specific policies, procedures and
tactics governing law enforcement response to citizens suffering from mental illness, and absent
training of law enforcement officers in such policies, procedures and tactics, it was highly
predictable that such failures to train would lead to law enforcement officers’ violation of the
Fourth Amendment Rights of citizens, and could likely result in the otherwise avoidable death of
such citizens.
24
166. This deliberately indifferent training and supervision resulted from a conscious or
deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives available to
Defendant.
167. In light of the duties and responsibilities of those police officers that participate in
interactions, arrests, or other dealings with mentally ill or emotionally disturbed individuals, the
need for specialized training and supervision is so obvious, and the inadequacy of training and/or
supervision is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights in these recurring
situations, that the failure to provide such specialized training and supervision is deliberately
indifferent to those rights.
168. Defendant knew or should have known that the police employees would use
unreasonable force when dealing with mentally ill, emotional disturbed individuals, or highly
agitated individuals.
169. Defendant was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of mentally
disturbed individuals in the public, knowing that dangerous and potentially fatal consequences
could be suffered by such individuals (including Mr. Ceballos) by failing to properly train and
supervise his employees. Defendant could have and should have pursued reasonable methods for
the training and supervising of such employees, but failed to do so.
170. The reckless and deliberately indifferent acts and omissions of Defendant in the
training and supervision of its officers, its as described herein, were moving forces in the
predictable deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights. Had the officers been
properly trained in the fundamental principles of maintaining a covered position and trying to
25
communicate with emotionally upset persons with weapons rather than approaching them loudly
with threatening commands, Mr. Ceballos would be alive.
171. Defendant also ratified the conduct of Defendant Husk and all these officers in
concluding that that their conduct was consistent with the policies, procedures, and training of
the Thornton Police Department.
172. As a proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff Estate has
compensatory and special damages, including loss of constitutional rights, pain and suffering
during this event, lost earnings, permanent lost earnings and earnings capacity for the expected
productive working lifetime of Jaime Ceballos under the mortality tables, all in amounts to be
proven at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(Estate of Jaime Ceballos Against Defendant City of Thornton)
176. Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”
26
177. Discrimination includes a failure to reasonably accommodate a person’s
disability.
178. The United States Department of Justice regulations state: “A public entity shall
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity.”
179. Mr. Ceballos was a qualified individual with a disability.
180. At all times relevant hereto, these officers were aware of Mr. Ceballos’ disability
and the symptoms and manifestations of his recognized disability.
181. Defendant City of Thornton excluded Mr. Ceballos from and denied him
participation in the benefits of defendants’ emergency medical response and law enforcement
services, programs, or activities solely by reason of his mental disability by failing to make
reasonable modifications in their policies, practices, or procedures to ensure him and equal
participation in Defendant’s emergency medical response and law enforcement services,
programs, or activities.
182. Under these circumstances, there should have been policies to use appropriate
tactics to de-escalate rather than escalate the situation, including but not limited to: taking cover
in his car; requesting backup, particularly backup from individuals appropriately trained in crisis
intervention; eliminating unnecessary emergency lights and sirens; gathering information on Mr.
Ceballos from the individuals present at the scene, including Ms. Vigil, Mr. Martinez, and Mr.
Castillo; respecting the person’s comfort zone; using nonthreatening communications when
27
approaching Mr. Ceballos; avoiding physical contact and maintaining the distance between them;
retreating when given the opportunity, and; employing the passage of time to the officers’
advantage.
183. Defenant failed to reasonably accommodate Mr. Ceballos disability and failed to
train and employ tactics that would have been likely to resolve the situation without injury to
himself or others, causing him to suffer greater injury in that process than other arrestees or
subjects in his position.
184. There was no emergent countervailing concern to employing these reasonable
accommodations, as Mr. Ceballos was alone in the house and not a danger to others at that time.
185. The exclusion, denial of benefits, and/or discrimination against Mr. Ceballos was
by reason of Mr. Ceballos’ recognized disability.
compensatory and special damages, including loss of statutory rights, pain and suffering, lost
past and future earnings, permanent lost earnings capacity for the expected productive working
lifetime of Jaime Ceballos under the mortality tables, all in amounts to be proven at trial.
188. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest and
costs as allowable by law.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Willful and Wanton Conduct Resulting in Wrongful Death
(Plaintiffs Vigil, Naveyah and Jayden Ceballos, Against Defendant Husk)
28
189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
190. Defendant Husk is a public employee within the meaning of the Colorado
Government Immunity Act, C.R.S. § 24-10-103.
191. Defendant is not entitled to immunity under the Colorado Government Immunity
Act because his acts and omissions were willful and wanton within the meaning of C.R.S. §§ 24-
10-105(1) and 24-10-118.
192. Defendant was acting within the scope of his employment when he committed
such willful and wanton acts that were actual and proximate causes of Plaintiffs’ persisting
emotional injuries.
193. Defendant Husk was consciously aware that his acts and omissions created danger
and risk to the safety and life of Jaime Ceballos, and he acted and failed to act without regard to
the danger or risk.
194. The willful and wanton acts and deadly force outlined herein were the proximate
cause in Jaime Ceballos’ avoidable death.
195. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s willful and wanton conduct
causing wrongful death, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of general compensatory damages for
their resulting ongoing grief, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and impairment of the
quality of life against Defendant in such amounts as are determined at trial.
196. Plaintiffs have also incurred special damages in the form of loss of past,
continuing and future earnings and impaired earnings capacity from Jaime Ceballos’ death
during his likely working life in amounts to be ascertained in trial.
29
197. Plaintiffs may also have ongoing special damages for medically/psychologically
related treatment caused by the conduct of this Defendant.
198. There is no cap under the Governmental Immunity Act on Plaintiffs’ state law
wrongful death claim as Defendant’s acts and omissions in this case were willful and wanton
within the meaning of C.R.S. § 24-10-118.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs pray that this Court enter judgment for the Plaintiffs and against each of the
Defendants and grant:
A. Compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional

distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering on all claims
allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial;
B. Economic losses on all claims allowed by law;
C. Special damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
D. Punitive damages on all federal claims allowed by law against individual

Defendants in amounts to be determined at trial;
E. Attorneys’ fees and the costs associated with this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
F. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate; and,
G. Any other appropriate relief at law and equity that this Court deems just and
proper.
PLAINTIFFS REQUEST A TRIAL BY JURY.
Dated this 18th day of August 2015.
/s/ Erica T. Grossman

Erica T. Grossman
Anna Holland-Edwards
John Holland
30
Case 1:15-cv-01783 Document 1-1 Filed 08/18/15 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
AO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
District
__________ of Colorado
District of __________
ESTATE OF JAIME CEBALLOS; QUIANNA VIGIL;

NAVEYAH CEBALLOS; JAYDEN CEBALLOS
)
)
Plaintiff
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 15CV1783
WILLIAM HUSK, DANTE CARBONE; )
RANDY NELSON; CITY OF THORNTON )
Defendant
)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant’s name and address) Willam Husk, Dante Carbone;

Randy Nelson; City of Thornton
9500 Civic Center Drive
Thornton, CO 80229
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,
whose name and address are: Erica Grossman, Esq.
Anna Holland Edwards, Esq.
John Robert Holland, Esq.
1437 High Street
Denver, CO 80218
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
AO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No. 15CV1783
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)

was received by me on (date) .
’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date) ; or
’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
’ I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is

designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date) ; or
’ I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or
’ Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Server’s signature
Printed name and title
Server’s address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:
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Case 1:15-cv-01783 Document 1 Filed 08/18/15 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Civil Action No. 15-CV-1783

ESTATE OF JAIME CEBALLOS;

WILLIAM HUSK, individually;

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

P.C., complain against Defendants and request trial by jury as follows:

preventable police shooting of a known to be emotionally disturbed individual in a mental health

was highly agitated walking around with a bat.

4. Multiple police officers, including Defendant Officer Husk and Defendant

Commander Carbone arrived on the scene.

shooting and killing him instead, in violation of his constitutional rights.

6. These officers knew they were not responding to a crime or attempting to

and emotionally disturbed individual.

II. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND NOTICE

1331, 1343, 2201.

omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.

12. Supplemental pendent jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §1367 because the

common nucleus of operative facts.

which also violates state law.

State of Colorado and a citizen of the United States of America.

Colorado and a citizen of the United States of America.

Husk is sued individually.

supervisory capacity as a Commander employed by the Thornton Police Department.

20. Defendant City of Thornton, hereinafter “Defendant City” is a Colorado

entity to be sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

and City of Thornton’s delegated deliberately indifferent unconstitutional decisions, policies,

violations and resulting injuries.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

forth again at this point.

25. Mr. Ceballos was experiencing a mental crisis.

right mind, and was refusing to leave their house.

the hospital called the police to do a welfare check.

current mental illness and substance abuse problem.

her husband from their house.

depression medication and suffering from withdrawal.

small children at that time.

process in order to evict her husband out of their home.

mind, and making even less sense than earlier.

August 30, 2013.

• “he is being crazy”;

• he had a bat and was “acting a fool”;

actually do anything physically assaultive either time.

disjointed and non-linear conversation, and pacing around the house.

“probably just trying to calm him down. . .”

43. There was no crime reported.

children were not in the house or near him.

POSSIBLY ON DRUGS” (19:29:48); “SHOULD BE TAKING HIS DEPRESSION MEDS”

FROM NSMC [North Suburban Medical Center] LAST NIGHT” (19:35:32).

the car seat.

approximately 19:37:45 p.m.

about his mental health problems from direct experience.

holding a baseball bat in his hands.

when he was about sixty yards away from them.

WALKING IN AND OUT OF THE BOX.”

and that “something is wrong”.

police would handle it.