EN BANC

[G.R. No. 43592. May 17, 1935.]

JUAN L. ALCANTARA, MIGUEL VALDES, ADOLFO ALMEDA and

DIONISIO PANGILINAN , petitioners, vs . THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, and the CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS, BALALA ELECTORAL
BOARD OF INSPECTORS, CULION, PALAWAN , respondents.

Martin Miras and Lucilo Fernandez Lavadia for petitioners.

Solicitor-General Hilado for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ELECTIONS; RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE; QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTORS. — In

the United States the right of suffrage is derived from the states under state
constitutions, subject to the Fifteenth Amendment to the National Constitution which
limits the right of the states to discriminate against persons by reason of their race,
color or previous condition of servitude. This being so it follows that, when a state
constitution enumerates and xes the quali cations of those who may exercise the
right of suffrage, the legislature cannot take from nor add to said quali cations unless
the power to do so is conferred upon it by the constitution itself.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JONES LAW. — At present the nearest approach to a
constitution that we have in the Philippines is our Organic Act, the Jones Law, enacted
August 29, 1916, by the Congress of the United States. "The organic law (or Act) of a
territory takes the place of a constitution as the fundamental law of the local
government." (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 229.) The only provision
contained in that law as to the quali cation of voters provision contained in that law as
to the quali cation of voters appears in section 15 thereof. Under the authority
conferred upon it by said section the Philippine Legislature has prescribed the
quali cations and disquali cations of voters in sections 431 and 432 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE OF ELECTORS. — The only question raised by the
answer of the respondents is whether or not the petitioners have acquired a residence
for voting purposes in the municipality in which they desire to vote. The petitioners
allege that they have and the respondents deny this allegation. There is no hard and fast
rule by which to determine where a person actually resides. "Each case must depend on
its particular facts or circumstances. Three rules are, however, well established: rst,
that a man must have a residence or domicil somewhere; second, that where once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one
domicil at a time." (9 R. C. L., 1031.)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — There are a large number of people con ned in the Culion
Leper Colony. They are not permitted to return to their former homes to vote. They are
not allowed to visit their former homes even though they have been separated from
near and dear relatives who are not a icted as they are. Assuming that the petitioners
intend to return to their former homes if at some future time they are cured, this
intention does not necessarily defeat their residence before they actually do return if
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 they have been residents "of the Philippine Islands for one year and of the municipality
in which they offer to vote for six months next preceding the day of voting." A mere
intention to return to their former homes, a consummation every humane person
desires for them, not realized and which may never be realized should not prevent them,
under the circumstances, from acquiring a residence for voting purposes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Under our liberal law, such of the petitioners as have been
residents of the Philippine Islands for one year and residents for six months in the
municipality in which they desire to vote and have the other quali cations prescribed
for voters in section 431 of the Revised Administrative Code and who have none of the
disquali cations prescribed in section 432 of the same Code were entitled to register
and vote in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS. — Writ of mandamus granted and the
respondents are commanded forthwith to register and inscribe such of the herein
petitioners as had the quali cations prescribed for voters in section 431 and none of
the disquali cations prescribed in section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code in
order that they might vote in the plebiscite on May 14, 1935.

DECISION

GODDARD , J : p

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioners for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents "to register and inscribe the petitioners as
quali ed electors at the electoral precinct at Balala, Culion, Palawan, in order that they
can vote in the plebiscite to be held on May 14, 1935, on the vital question of the
acceptance or rejection of the Constitution for the Commonwealth of the Philippine
Islands."
As the answer of the respondents was not received until May 10, 1935, the
following telegram was sent to the attorney of the petitioners and to the respondents
on May 11, 1935:
"In G. R. No. 43592, mandamus proceeding, the Supreme Court grants the
writ of mandamus prayed for and the respondents are commanded forthwith to
register and inscribe such of the therein petitioners as have the quali cations
prescribed for voters provided in section 431 and none of the disquali cations
prescribed in section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code in order that they
may vote in the plebiscite on May 14, 1935."
The petitioners allege that they are quali ed voters residing at Culion Leper
Colony, Culion, Palawan, having voted in previous elections in the Philippine Islands; that
in a public mass meeting held on April 5, 1935, they adopted a resolution demanding
the right to vote in the plebiscite and requesting that electoral precincts be established
within the radius of the Culion Leper Colony in order that the quali ed voters therein
could register, which resolution was sent to his Excellency, the Governor-General, who
referred it to the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior; that the Department of the
Interior, through its legal division, ruled that no new electoral precincts could be created
at Culion Leper Colony inasmuch as the plebiscite is treated as and considered as a
special election; that in view of this ruling the petitioners requested, by telegram, the
Interior Department to authorize the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors, Culion,
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 Palawan, to register the quali ed voters of Culion Leper Colony; that this request was
refused upon the ground that the petitioners were not bona de residents of Culion,
Palawan; that on April 23, 1935, the petitioners Juan L. Alcantara, Miguel Valdes, Adolfo
Almeda and Dionisio Pañgilinan, accompanied by Attorney Martin Miras, appeared
before the chairman of the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors and requested him to
register and inscribe them in the o cial list of quali ed voters in order that they might
vote on May 14, 1935, and that their request was denied on the ground that no speci c
instructions to register them had been received from the Department of the Interior.
The principal allegation of the respondents, by way of special defense, is "that the
herein petitioners are not qualified voters, because they shall not have been residents of
Culion for six months next preceding the day of voting, for they have not acquired
residence in Culion as they are con ned therein as lepers against their will, and they
have no intention to permanently resident there (sections 430-431 of the
Administrative Code as nally amended by Acts Nos. 3387, sec. 1, and 4112, secs. 1 to
3); and in view thereof, the respondent Secretary of the Interior had ruled that the
petitioners are not qualified voters and therefore cannot be registered under the law."
In the United States the right of suffrage is derived from the states under the
state constitutions, subject to the Fifteenth Amendment to the National Constitution
which limits the right of the states to discriminate against persons by reason of their
race, color or previous condition of servitude. This being so it follows that, when a state
constitution enumerates and xes the quali cations of those who may exercise the
right of suffrage, the legislature cannot take from nor add to said quali cations unless
the power to do so is conferred upon it by the constitution itself.
At present the nearest approach to a constitution that we have in the Philippines
is our Organic Act, the Jones Law, enacted August 29, 1916, by the Congress of the
United States. "The organic law (or Act) of a territory takes the place of a constitution
as the fundamental law of the local government." (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional
Law, p. 229.) The only provision contained in that law as to the quali cation of voters
reads as follows:
"SEC. 15. That at the rst election held pursuant to this Act, the
quali ed electors shall be those having the quali cations of voters under the
present law; thereafter and until otherwise provided by the Philippine Legislature
herein provided for the quali cations of voters for Senators and Representatives
in the Philippines and all officers elected by the people shall be as follows:
"Every male person who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign power
twenty-one years of age or over (except insane and feeble-minded persons and
those convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction of an infamous offense since
the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight), who shall have
been a resident of the Philippines for one year and of the municipality in which he
shall offer to vote for six months next preceding the day of voting, and who is
comprised within one of the following classes:
"(a) Those who under existing law are legal voters and have exercised
the right of suffrage.
"(b) Those who own real property to the value of 500 pesos, or who
annually pay 30 pesos or more of the established taxes.
"(c) Those who are able to read and writ either Spanish, English, or a
native language."
Under the authority conferred upon it by the above quoted section the Philippine
Legislature has prescribed the quali cations and disquali cations of voters in sections
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 431 and 432 of the Revised Administrative Code, which read as follows.

"SEC. 431. Qualifications prescribed for voters. — Every male or female

person who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign power, twenty-one years of age
or over, who shall have been a resident of the Philippines for one year and of the
municipality in which he shall offer to vote for six months next preceding the day
of voting is entitled to vote in all elections if comprised within either of the
following three classes:
"(a) Those who, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands upon
the twenty-eighth day of August, nineteen hundred and sixteen, were legal voters
and had exercised the right of suffrage.
"(b) Male persons who own real property to the value of ve hundred
pesos, declared in their name for taxation purposes for a period of not less that
one year prior to the date of the election, or who annually pay thirty pesos or more
of the established taxes.
"(c) Those who are able to read and write either Spanish, or English, or
a native language.
"SEC. 432. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be
disqualified from voting:
"(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by nal judgment to suffer not less
than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed
by plenary pardon.
"(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to
the United States.
"(c) Insane or feeble-minded persons.
"(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
"(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next preceding
section who, after failing to make a sworn statement to the satisfaction of the
board of inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that
they are incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical
disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective
of whether such incapacity by real or feigned."
The only question raised by the answer of the respondents is whether or not the
petitioners have acquired a residence for voting purposes in the municipality in which
they desire to vote. The petitioners allege that they have and the respondents deny this
allegation. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually
resides. "Each case must depend on its particular facts or circumstances. Three rules
are, however, well established: rst, that a man must have a residence or domicil
somewhere; second, that were once established it remains until a new one is acquired;
and third, a man can have but one domicil at a time." (9 R. C. L., 1031.).
In order to arrive at a correct solution of the question raised by the respondents
in this case one must not be misled by the decisions of the courts in states where there
are constitutional provisions as to residence for voting purposes, vastly different from
those of the Jones Law and the Revised Administrative Code.
In some of the states there is a constitutional provision to the effect that for the
purpose of voting no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence while a
student at any seminary of learning. Under such a provision it has been held "that a
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 student does not acquire a residence for voting purposes merely by attending such an
institution." ( In re Barry, 164 N. Y., 18; 58 N. E., 12; 52 L. R. A., 831.) In addition to such
provisions as to students, constitutions of some states provide that "For the purpose
of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his
presence or absence while . . . kept at any almshouse or other asylum at public
expense; . . .." (Note, 40 L. R. A. [N. S.], 168.) Under such a provision the rule in some
jurisdictions is "that inmates of soldiers' homes, by going to and residing in such home,
neither lose their old, nor gain a new, residence, though they intend to reside in the
home permanently. Hence they are not entitled to vote except at their place of
residence before becoming such inmates. (Powell vs. Spackman, 7 Idaho, 692; 65 Pac.,
503; 54 L. R. A., 378 [citing and reviewing the cases in con ict on the point and holding
to the rule stated above]; Lawrence vs. Leidigh, 58 Kan., 594; 50 Pac., 600; 62 A. S. R.,
631 [overruled by Cory vs. Spencer, 67 Kan., 648; 73 Pac., 920; 63 L. R. A., 275]; Wolcott
vs. Holcomb, 97 Mich., 361; 56 N. W., 837; 23 L. R. A., 215 [decision by divided court].)
(Notes, 62 A. S. R., 638; 40 L. R. A. [N. S.], 168 et seq.)
"In other jurisdiction, however, a contrary conclusion has been reached,
upon the theory that under such a constitutional provision an inmate of such an
institution may acquire a residence at the home." (Note, 40 L. R. A. [N. S.], 168 et
seq.)
"In the absence of such a constitutional prohibition the rule is that a
permanent member of a soldiers' home has a residence at such home for the
purpose of voting." (Lankford vs. Gebhart, 130 Mo., 621; 32 S. W., 1127; 51 A. S.
R., 585 and note.) (Notes, 23 L. R. A., 215; 40 L. R. A. [N. S.], 168 et seq.)
There being no such provisions or prohibitions in the Jones Law nor in the
sections of the Revised Administrative Code, quoted above, we see no reason for
applying in this jurisdiction the legal doctrine of the courts of the states which have
adopted such, or similar, constitutional provisions.
There are a large number of people con ned in the Culion Leper Colony. They are
not permitted to return to their former homes to vote. They are not allowed to visit their
former homes even though they have been separated from near and dear relatives who
are not a icted as they are. Why split hairs over the meaning of residence for voting
purposes under such circumstances? Assuming that the petitioners intend to return to
their former homes if at some future time they are cured, this intention does not
necessarily defeat their residence before they actually do return if they have been
residents "of the Philippine Islands for one year and of the municipality in which they
offer to vote for six months next preceding the day of voting." Surely a mere intention to
return to their former homes, a consummation every humane person desires for them,
not realized and which may never be realized should not prevent them, under the
circumstances, from acquiring a residence for voting purposes.
This court is of the opinion that, under our liberal law, such of the petitioners as
have been residents of the Philippine Islands for one year and residents for six months
in the municipality in which they desire to vote and have the other quali cations
prescribed for voters in section 431 of the Revised Administrative Code and who have
none of the disquali cations prescribed in section 432 of the same Code were entitled
to register and vote in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935. Having reached this conclusion
and being unable to determine from the record whether the petitioners have the
prescribed quali cations for voters and none of the prescribed disquali cations this
court on May 11, 1935, sent the above mentioned telegram to the parties in this case.
It will be noted that this court had to leave the determination of the facts to the
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 respondent, the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors.
This opinion is promulgated now in order to make known some of the reasons
for granting the writ.
Writ granted without costs.
Malcolm, Abad Santos and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Butte, J., concur in the result.

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