Simplicius On The Planets and Their Moti PDF
Simplicius On The Planets and Their Moti PDF
Philosophia Antiqua
A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy
Previous Editors
J.H. Waszink †
W.J. Verdenius†
J.C.M. Van Winden
Edited by
K.A. Algra
F.A.J. de Haas
J. Mansfeld
C.J. Rowe
D.T. Runia
Ch. Wildberg
VOLUME 133
By
Alan C. Bowen
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2013
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Simplicius, of Cilicia.
[Aristotelis De caelo commentaria. English]
Simplicius on the planets and their motions : in defense of a heresy / by Alan C. Bowen.
pages. cm. – (Philosophia antiqua ; volume 133)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-22708-8 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-90-04-24171-8 (e-book)
1. Astronomy–Early works to 1800. 2. Simplicius, of Cilicia. 3. Aristotle. De caelo. I. Bowen, Alan
C. II. Title. III. Series: Philosophia antiqua ; v. 133.
Q151.A8S5713 2013
523.4–dc23
2012035045
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Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
THE ARGUMENT
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Simplicius’ Life and Writings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Commentary on De caelo 2.10–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Place of 2.10–12 in the De caelo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Simplicius’ Predicament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Text and Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Annotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Planetary Retrogradation: A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
TRANSLATION
292b30–293a4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
490.19–491.11 Second Response (or the First Continued) . . . . . 140
293a4–11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
491.15–492.11 Second (or Third) Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
492.12–24 This Response Assumes the Preceding . . . . . . . . . 144
492.25–493.11 A History of Planetary Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
493.11–494.23 The Solar Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
494.23–495.17 The Lunar Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
495.17–497.24 Hypotheses for the Five Planets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
497.24–499.15 Unwinding Spheres Hypothesized. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
499.16–501.21 Theorems on Homocentric Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
501.22–502.19 The Unwinding Spheres Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
502.19–504.3 The Total Number of Spheres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
504.4–15 A Lexical Coda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
504.16–505.19 The Failure of Homocentric Hypotheses . . . . . . . 165
505.19–506.8 The Early Theorists Excused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
506.8–16 The School’s Proper Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
506.16–22 Ptolemy’s Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
506.23–507.8 Simplicius Puzzled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
507.9–508.16 Eccentric and Homocentric Hypotheses . . . . . . . 170
508.17–509.12 The Epicyclic Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
509.13–510.35 Aristotle and the New Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
COMMENTS
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Index of Passages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Passages in I.G. Kidd 1988–1999, vol. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
PREFACE
This book has its genesis in work funded by a very generous three-year grant
from the National Endowment for the Humanities that I began with Bernard
R. Goldstein in 1988. Our project was entitled ‘Early Hellenistic Astronomy
and Its Historical Context’, and its stated aim was
to produce a book about the introduction and use of geometrical models
for predicting celestial phenomena quantitatively, a peculiar contribution of
Greek astronomy in the third and second centuries bc to Western Civilization.
This contribution marks a break with preceding Greek theory, which was
geometrical but qualitative, and contrasts with contemporary Babylonian
theory, which, though quantitative and predictive, was wholly arithmetical.
In light of the debt of Hellenistic Greek astronomers to the Babylonians, we
will determine what views and factors in Greek scientific, philosophic, and
literary culture made the Greeks receptive to Babylonian influence.
The book never materialized and for good reason: as we quickly discov-
ered once we started serious research and then subsequently explained in
our reports, not only were the facts that we had presumed in making our
proposal corrupt to their smallest details, the methods of ‘learned’ analysis
by which these facts had been determined were hopeless if one’s goal was
knowledge rather than a pretty story willfully preferring but one of a num-
ber of conflicting possibilities. Mercifully, our Program Specialist at the NEH,
Elizabeth Arndt, was quite supportive and willing to accept instead a series
of articles in which we explored particular issues in the history of Hellenistic
astronomy by critically evaluating current views and developing strategies
of reading focused rigorously on what actually could be known.
Now, as some readers may recognize, our initial account of the great inno-
vation in Hellenistic astronomy is very much a creature of the scholarly
practice of using Simplicius’ digression in his commentary on Aristotle’s De
caelo 2.12 to explain Aristotle’s report of the homocentric theory of planetary
motion in Meta. Λ.8. (Of course, this is only after Simplicius’ commentary
has been laundered of the numerous defects perceived in it by modern his-
torians.) And so I have returned on several occasions in the intervening years
to Simplicius’ testimony, concentrating mostly on how it has been misread
but more recently on how it should be read. In truth, the account of Simpli-
cius’ discussion of Aristotle’s reports and contribution to the theory of plan-
etary motion to be found in the following pages redresses a misstep taken
xvi preface
Princeton, NJ
June, 2012
CONVENTIONS
1 Cf. Hoffmann 2000, 610 (on the late Platonist view of innovation); Baltussen 2007, 274–
275 and 2008, 1. See Hager 1983 on the coinage of the term ‘Neoplatonism’. See Sedley 1989 on
what the allegiance of a philosophical school to its founder or founders meant for the study
of philosophy itself.
2 For Simplicius’ acknowledged debt to Proclus (ad 410–485), see Diels 1882–1895, 611.11–
12, 795.4–5 and 12–14. On Ammonius, see Heiberg 1894, 271.19, 462.20–21; Diels 1882–1895,
59.23–24 and 30–31, 183.18, 192.14, 198.17, 1363.8–9. On Damascius, see Diels 1882–1895, 601.9,
630.35, 642.17, 644.10, 774.28–29, 778.27, 795.14.
3 See Agathias, Hist. 2.30.3–31.4.
4 They are Priscian of Lydus, Eulamius (perhaps Eulalius: the mss give both names) of
tributed to the closing of the Athenian philosophical schools, see Watts 2004 and Wildberg
2006, 329–333. For an insightful study of this edict and why the schools in Alexandria sur-
vived, see Watts 2006.
4 introduction
gested.
9 See Hadot 1987b, 9–21. Ilsetraut Hadot, following Michel Tardieu, argues that there is
evidence of a school of late Platonic thought in Harrân; but this has been denied recently [cf.
Baltussen 2008, 13, 48–51].
10 See Watts 2005, 290–298.
11 So, e.g., Cameron 1969, 22–25. But see Thiel 1999. Han Baltussen inclines to the view
that Simplicius returned to Athens, where he lived ‘in a kind of virtual exile, because he was
unable to teach’ [2008, 48–51, 112].
12 Watts 2005, 298–315.
13 Golitsis 2008, 21–22, 203.
14 See Hadot 1987b, 22–23. Pantelis Golitsis [2008, 18–19] argues that Simplicius’ commen-
that it is by Simplicius. See Huby et al. 1997, 105–140 for Steel’s restatement and amplification
of his case.
introduction 5
16 See Hadot 1987a, for argument that Simplicius did write a commentary on Aristotle’s
Metaphysica.
17 See Hadot 1987b, 18–19, 27–28; 1996, 8–50. On the references in medieval Latin and
Arabic texts to other lost works by Simplicius, see Hadot 1987b, 28–39.
18 See Watts 2005, 287–290.
19 See Todd 2008, 219–220.
20 So Golitsis 2008, 16–18, 22. But see Baltussen 2008, 22, 122, 205–207 for the thesis that,
though Simplicius’ commentaries did not arise from actual teaching, they constitute instead
a summa philosophiae paganae that was to serve as a resource for teachers as well as for
students.
21 Note, for example, «µηδεὶς ἡµῶν» (‘none of us’) at the close of the comments on De caelo
2.12 [510.33].
22 3.8–12, 5.35–6.4.
6 introduction
of spiritual progress and discipline that one finds in his commentaries, indi-
cates that his commentaries on these treatises were to be read in the same
order and, moreover, that his commentary on the Enchiridion was to be read
first.23
In the same vein, though one can list the numerous works that Simplicius
cites, there is at this stage no sure way to specify the circumstances in which
the materials cited were available to him. The commentaries themselves
would suggest that he had access to a substantial library.24 But the nature
and range of the works collected, the owner, and the location are unknown.25
philosophical corpora in Armenian, Syriac, Arabic, and Hebrew, see the collection of papers
edited by Cristina D’Ancona [2007].
26 See Hadot 1987b, 3.
27 On Philoponus, see Sorabji 1996. It is ironic that for all his pains in challenging the later
Greek Platonists as he struggled to supply a rationale for Christian doctrine in Greek phi-
losophy, John was anathematized in ad 681, roughly a century after his death, for tritheism,
an account of the Trinity born of the effort to settle a dispute using philosophical ideas [see
Wildberg 2008, §§ 4.2–3]. On the late Platonist view of Christians, see Hoffmann 1987, 187–
188. According to Simplicius, Christians are atheists who inconsistently value the heavens as
the dwelling-place and throne of God but nevertheless prefer them to τὰ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότερα
[370.29–371.4].
Incidentally, the phrase «τὰ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότερα» at 371.2 shows the full measure of
Simplicius’ palpable disgust with the Christian veneration of relics [cf. Hoffmann 1987, 201–
203, 208–209]. But the exact nature of his polemic is elusive because we do not know which
practices of personal hygiene and sanitation he is assuming. Ian Mueller’s ‘more worthy to
be thrown out than dung’ [2004a, 15] is possible but raises the questions of whom Simplicius
introduction 7
was writing for and where they lived that it was the practice to throw feces (human or animal)
out. One philological issue is whether κόπρια and κόπρος are in fact the same. If they are,
«ἐκβλητότερα» might better have the attenuated sense of ‘more to be rejected’. (Moerbeke
[1563, 128.col.A: see Bossier 2004, cxvi–cxx] has ‘abiectora’ without translating «κοπρίων»
and so inclines to such attenuation.) Curiously, however, in addition to the present passage,
there are only two others in which Simplicius speaks of feces and in each he uses «κόπρος».
(All three occur in the polemic of the In de caelo.) Further, so far as one can tell from these
instances, ἡ κόπρος is something to which one descends [119.12–13] or something into which
one falls [135.31–136.1]—in each case Simplicius presents himself as Heracles cleaning out the
Augean stables—not something that one throws out. (Moerbeke [see Bossier 2004, 158.70,
180.7] has ‘stercus’ for both occurrences.) So, even if the phrase «τὰ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότερα»
is found in numerous authors—Plutarch, for example, writes at Quaest. conv. 669a that,
according to Heraclitus, corpses are more to be rejected (thrown out?) than κόπρια—it does
not follow that, if κόπρος and κόπρια are the same there, they are the same here as well.
Simplicius may just as well be thinking instead of ‘shitty things’, that is, items used to clean
feces—the mosses, leaves, bits of cloth, and so forth used in ancient personal hygiene instead
of toilet paper, for instance—and thus intend a much more vivid invective.
28 I have found the papers by Han Baltussen [2007: cf. 2008, 172–209], Philippe Hoffmann
30 The related question of whether the Earth rotates is taken up in 2.13–14: in 2.8, Aristotle
apart in shape from bodies capable of progression). Since, then, the heavens
must perform a motion within themselves but the other [bodies] must not go
forward on their own accord, either would reasonably be spherical, since, in
this way, the former will be in motion and the latter, at rest.
[De caelo 290a36–b11]
That is, given the conclusion that the fixed stars do not move on their own
and yet make a daily revolution about the Earth, and that the celestial sphere
carries these bodies round as it rotates about an internal axis, it follows
reasonably that all such bodies are spherical—the celestial sphere because
this shape is best suited for rotation and the fixed stars because sphericity
befits what is by itself immobile.31
Chapter 2.9 takes this up by focusing on a feature of celestial motion
that has not yet been addressed explicitly in the De caelo, the motion of
the wandering, as opposed to the fixed, stars. But it does so obliquely by
attacking immediately (one version of) the Pythagorean contention that
the planetary motions produce a ἁρµονία [290b12–291a6], and then showing
that the absurdity of this contention affords proof by modus tollens that the
heavenly bodies are in fact spherical and do not move on their own accord,
the very point of chapter 2.8.
In chapter 2.10, Aristotle recovers from the ‘false start’ of chapter 2.9.
He breaks new ground by introducing the distinction between fixed and
wandering stars, that is, between the daily motion westwards performed
by all heavenly bodies, but most notably by the celestial sphere, and the
slower motion eastwards performed in addition by seven of these bodies.
The question at issue, though connected to chapter 9, takes him in a new
direction. For, though he rejects the Pythagorean idea of ἁρµονία in the plan-
etary motions, he finds well worth study the related matter of proportion-
ality (ἀναλογία) in the motions by which these seven bodies progress in the
direction opposite to the daily rotation. To determine and explain such pro-
portionality as there may be, however, Aristotle abandons the Pythagoreans
and turns instead to those whom he calls µαθηµατικοί, the scientists who
study the heavens using mathematics.32
31 This conclusion, though established with an eye to the fixed stars, is held to be true of all
heavenly bodies, both fixed and wandering: cf. 290a12–14, 291b17–18. Aristotle never explains
how it is that a fixed star or planet can be immobile per se when it is composed of aether,
a simple body that moves in a circle about the center of the universe by nature. Likewise,
he does not address the question of why we can see the fixed stars and planets but not the
spheres that move them.
32 On this term and its translation, see Comment 10.04, pp. 203–204. It is worth noting
that, for Aristotle, the Pythagorean treatment of the heavens did not count as µαθηµατική.
10 introduction
The next two chapters continue in this vein: both concern the planets and
both take recourse (though not exclusively) to the science of the heavens
for information and arguments. Chapter 2.11 argues on empirical grounds
that the planets are spherical in shape and thus secures the conclusion of
chapter 2.8 about their not moving of their own accord. Chapter 2.12, which
now (and only now) allows that the planets have more than two motions,
undertakes to explain the obvious lack of proportionality in the number of
motions that these bodies have as well as in the number of bodies that these
motions move.
In chapters 13 and 14, the last of book 2, Aristotle takes up the questions of
the position of the Earth in the cosmos, its motion, and its shape. Granted,
the answers given here do connect to preceding claims: the cosmology of
the De caelo is, after all, coherent. Still, these chapters offer nothing about
planetary motion per se and so mark the end of the discussion of planetary
motion.
Simplicius’ Predicament
Simplicius’ primary purpose in writing his commentary on the De caelo is in
part the same as in his other commentaries on Aristotle’s works—to enable
the reader or student to grasp Aristotle’s meaning, thereby turning the eyes
of his soul to the truth and promoting his assimilation to the divine.33 Related
to this is Simplicius’ narrower aim in his In de caelo of repudiating the
impiety and atheism of those who deny the truth as it is found in the De
caelo. Consider the prayer which concludes Simplicius’ commentary:
To you, Lord of the entire cosmos and Craftsman of the simple bodies in it,
for what has come into being through you do I offer in praise these words out
of eagerness to survey the magnitude of your works and to reveal them to the
worthy so that in reckoning nothing petty or human about you, we adore you
for the preeminence which you have in relation to all that is created by you.34
This prayer, which gives voice to the underlying and pervasive religious
motive of the In de caelo,35 highlights the fact that one of Simplicius’ sub-
sidiary aims is to ensure that the worthy, presumably, those with the charac-
33 On the eyes of the soul, see Plato, Resp. 533c7–d4 and Soph. 254a4–b1. In his In de caelo,
Simplicius writes instead of those whose passions and related opinions blind the eyes of the
soul: see 74.4–5, 141.19–21. On assimilation (ὁµοίωσις), see, e.g., 483.15–19 and Chapter 2, esp.
pp. 54–56. On the late Platonic curriculum, see Hoffmann 2000, 611–614; Golitsis 2008, 10–14.
34 731.25–29. Cf. Hoffmann 1987, 203–210; Todd 2008, 220–221.
35 See also the prayers at the close of his In cat. [Kalbfleisch 1907, 438.33–36] and In Epict.
36 1.1–6.27 (esp. 4.25–31, 5.35–37) for the commentary’s prologue and the assumption that
199. As Hoffmann notes, Simplicius never uses the epithet ‘Philoponus’, a term which might
otherwise indicate membership in a group of Christian lay workers [Watts 2006, 213–219],
because it also designates a philosophical virtue and so would, in his view, be most inappro-
priate. Note: «φιλοπόνως» applied to Alexander’s work and «διὰ φιλοπονίαν» to Damascius
[316.3 and Diels 1882–1895, 129.32, 291.21, 795.16: cf. 795.34 (Alexander is φιλοπονώτατος of Aris-
totle’s interpreters)].
12 introduction
Now, Xenarchus’ criticisms were not, it seems, a real problem for Sim-
plicius. At no point does Simplicius even acknowledge that Xenarchus was
in fact a Peripatetic, which means that, for Simplicius, Xenarchus was not
a credible reader of Aristotle.39 Moreover, Simplicius already had in hand
Alexander’s counter-arguments and he is typically content to deploy them
with some refinements.40 But most important, I think, is that Xenarchus’
attack posed no substantial threat to the late Platonic reading of Aristo-
tle: his criticisms were, it seems, focused on particular assumptions in the
arguments that there is a fifth simple body, aether, and came without any
indication that their aim was to deny the eternity and, hence, the divinity of
the heavens.41 In short, Xenarchus posed no certain challenge to any funda-
mental tenets of late Platonic piety.
But Philoponus was a different matter altogether. His aim was to defend
the Christian account of creation in Genesis, not by citing Scripture, but by
attacking on their own terms the arguments in Aristotle’s De caelo for the
eternity of the heavens and, hence, of the cosmos. To Simplicius, this attack
demeaned the heavens by supposing them to be, like the sublunary world,
subject to generation and decay. As he saw it, Philoponus was a blasphe-
mer whose atheism was so entrenched that he likened the divine Craftsman
(∆ηµιουργός), the maker of the visible world, to an ordinary human crafts-
man and held His work, the divine, eternal heavens, to be no better than the
petty, perishable objects that fill human lives.
As Simplicius writes after dealing with the Xenarchan assault on Aristo-
tle’s aether:
These objections Xenarchus has raised against the hypotheses handed down
from Aristotle. But one among us,42 a hunter of fame, so it seems, has emerged,
39 See Wildberg 1999, 115–120 on how the late Platonists read Aristotle. Why Simplicius
omits this detail about Xenarchus’ philosophical affiliation is a good question. It might be
a feature of his own polemic, a way of diminishing the seriousness of Xenarchus’ views.
Alternatively, if Simplicius had access to Xenarchus only through Alexander’s (now lost)
commentary on the De caelo—Alexander is the only authority that Simplicius cites in reject-
ing them—then Alexander may be the one responsible for suppressing this fact. See Falcon
2012, 20–25, 42–47, 167–174 on the nature of Peripatetic readings of Aristotle in the first cen-
tury bc and the treatment of Xenarchus by Alexander and the later commentators.
40 In six of the 10 occasions in which Simplicius cites Xenarchus’ criticisms of Aristotle’s
argument for the fifth simple body, Simplicius cites Alexander’s rebuttal(s) and then adds
some considerations of his own: cf. 13.22–14.29, 21.33–23.10, 23.11–31, 23.31–24.21, 42.6–16,
50.18–52.18. It is unclear whether Xenarchus’ reported description of void (τὸ κενόν) as what is
receptive (τὸ δεκτικόν) of body, rather than as what is capable of receiving (τὸ οἷόν τε δέξασθαι)
it [286.2–13], bears on his arguments against aether [Falcon 2012, 31].
41 See Falcon 2012, 31, 113–119.
42 25.23 τῶν δέ τις ἐφ’ ἡµῶν: Simplicius is, I suspect, not thinking of Philoponus as a mere
introduction 13
a critic of Aristotle, who palms off some of Xenarchus’ objections [as his own]
and collects others like [them], and who sets for himself the objective, his
entire objective, as he says, to demonstrate that the cosmos is perishable, as
though he will get some great prize from the Craftsman if he demonstrates
that He is a craftsman of perishable things alone and of nothing imperishable.
On account of this desire, he proposes to contradict what is said here by
Aristotle through books of many lines not only in the hope of astounding
the witless by quantity but also, I think, of turning the many (and especially,
the more refined) from the study of his gross nonsense, with the result that
his writings, which remain unexamined, have afforded the writer renown
for wisdom from the mere fact that such a great number of lines contradict
Aristotle.
But I know that such brazen acts, which seem to blossom among the witless,
vanish in a few days just as the so-called Gardens of Adonis.43 And for my
part, in proposing to clarify to the extent possible Aristotle’s treatise De caelo,
I thought that I should not overlook the objections of this man, [objections]
which trouble none of the educated but rather those of the uneducated who
always take pleasure in strange things and are weighed down by the good
repute of ancient men and still further think that they revere God if they
believe that the heavens, which exist for the service of men, possess nothing
special in relation to things below the Moon and if they assume that [the
heavens] are perishable in the same way as they. For these men who think
that these objections support their belief about God hold [them] in great
honor, though they know nothing of these [matters] and still less of Aristotle’s
[views] against which they dare to raise them, but chatter to one another
and claim with youthful insolence in response to us that the doctrines of the
philosophers are overturned.
Thus, for the sake of these [philosophers] and of those more disposed to listen,
and in order that Aristotle’s treatise De caelo and its reverent conception of
the universe remain undisputed in their good repute of old, it seemed right to
me both to set forth these objections and to resolve them to the extent of my
ability, since putting both the objections and their solutions together with my
comments on the treatise seemed quite fitting.44
Therefore, it seemed right to me to help those who have been led by his
insolence into scorn of Aristotle’s [views] by showing that his vainglorious
lack of education is to be spat on.45
contemporary but as a (former) student in the same school of late Platonism: cf. 26.19–21.
Moerbeke has ‘modernorum quidem’ [Bossier et al. 2004, 34.41]: cf. Wildberg’s ‘But one of
our contemporaries’ [1987, 39].
43 See Hoffmann 1987, 196–197 on the theme of the Gardens of Adonis in Simplicius’
polemic.
44 25.22–26.17. This attack is reprised in Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle, Phys. 8.10
26.30 κατάπτυστον: or less concretely, ‘despicable’, as Moerbeke [Bossier et al. 2004, 36.82]
has it [cf. Wildberg 1987, 40].
46 Both Simplicius and Philoponus studied under Ammonius in Alexandria: see 26.19–
centric planetary theory developed in Meta. Λ.8, and defend his own convic-
tion that, in matters concerning how the planets move, it is better to follow
planetary hypotheses developed long after Aristotle.
So, the astronomical digression (παρέκβασις) at the close of In de caelo 2.12
is, logically speaking, a part of Simplicius’ attempt to deal with Philoponus.
But placed and cast as it is, this digression turns out in fact to be a delicate
apologia that negotiates the need to depart from Aristotle’s explicit teaching
about the motions of the planets, all the while avoiding Philoponus’ impious
denigration of the heavens. But there is more. This departure from Aristo-
tle involves more than a simple preference for the sort of planetary theory
found in Ptolemy’s works. It is, as I will show, a nuanced argument that this
departure is not a heresy but still in accord with Aristotle’s teaching. Sur-
prisingly, however, this defense against Philoponus’ heresy broaches in turn
another heresy of its own, one far more radical than anything envisaged
by Philoponus—the idea that none of the current astronomical theories or
hypotheses is adequate and that what is yet to be expounded is a physical
theory identifying and explaining the real planetary motions. I will return
to this ‘heresy’ in the following chapters, where I suggest reasons why Sim-
plicius is content to raise it and then to leave it without direct comment.
has seemed a good way to develop the thread of my analysis without losing
it in the numerous interpretative details supporting it—to say nothing of
explaining technical issues to those unfamiliar with Hellenistic astronomy
or addressing alternative accounts.
Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo divides that treatise into
sections or lemmata which are cited in abbreviated form by quoting the
opening and closing words. Thus, for example, the lemma for the first section
of the commentary on De caelo 2.11 reads:
‘The shape of each of the heavenly bodies’ up to ‘clear that they must be spherical
in bulk’. [477.3–4]
The assumption is that the reader will have a copy of Aristotle’s treatise at
hand. And so the problems begin. In the first place, it is hardly certain that a
reader today will have a Greek text of the De caelo in hand and ready for this
exercise or, for that matter, even an English translation. For this reason then,
as Robert Grosseteste and others later, I have decided to expand each of
Simplicius’ lemmata by translating the entire section of the De caelo at issue.
Yet, while this may aid the reader, it exposes another problem: Simplicius’
lemmata do not always agree with the received text used today; and, what is
even more surprising, they are frequently at odds with the quotations and
paraphrases found in his commentary on the text lemmatized.
To address these problems, one might choose, as Mueller [2005] does, for
instance, to homogenize the lemmata and the quotations and paraphrases
by adapting the translation of the sections of the De caelo under commen-
tary. But this will not do. There is no warrant for assuming that the lemmata
from Aristotle’s De caelo in Simplicius’ text come from the same source as
his quotations and paraphrases.49 Indeed, it is unwise to suppose that the
lemmata and the material quoted and paraphrased in the comments them-
selves were even made by the same person.50 Consequently, in rendering the
expanded lemmata, I have relied strictly on modern editions of Aristotle’s
De caelo and have relegated to footnotes my remarks about any differences
49 See Moraux 1965, clxxxiv–clxxxvi: cf. 1954 on the complex relation between the text of
Simplicius’ commentary and the medieval manuscripts of Aristotle’s De caelo. On the history
of the transmission of the Aristotelian corpus, see Moraux 1970, 1–40, 67–94.
50 Paul Moraux concludes that the lemmata were taken from a different text of the De
caelo than the one which Simplicius used in writing his quotations and paraphrases, and that
they were entered at some unknown date after the comments were completed [cf. Moraux
1954, 151–154, 179]. As Heinrich von Staden, however, has suggested in conversation, it would
perhaps be better to imagine that Simplicius’ original lemmata were revised by a later copyist
unconcerned with the quotations and paraphrases in the comments proper.
introduction 17
with Simplicius’ abbreviated lemmata. After all, since we have only Simpli-
cius’ lemmata and not the full text of the De caelo that he used, there seems
little sense when presenting Aristotle’s text in full to combine it with read-
ings from Simplicius’ and thus to imply a text that may not have existed. At
the same time, I have preserved the fact that the text quoted or paraphrased
in the comments proper differs on occasion from the text of the lemmata.
For the modern text of Aristotle’s De caelo, my primary source is Moraux’s
critical edition since it makes extensive use of the indirect tradition.51 I have
also used Heiberg’s edition of 1894 for the text of Simplicius’ commentary.
But caveat lector. Fernand Bossier has made it clear that Heiberg’s edi-
tion needs revision in light of two recent advances in our understanding of
the indirect tradition of the text of the In de caelo.52 First, there is D.J. Allan’s
discovery of a Latin translation by Grosseteste (d. 1253) of Simplicius’ com-
mentary (with fully expanded lemmata) on all of De caelo 2 and the opening
section of the commentary on De caelo 3. This plainly bears on our under-
standing of the Greek text of Simplicius’ commentary because Grosseteste
drew on a manuscript unaffiliated to the earliest ones that have survived to
this day. (The earliest extant Greek manuscript of the commentary derives
from the 13th/14th century.)53 Next, as Bossier argues, at some time in 1264–
1265, William of Moerbeke (d. 1286) prepared a translation of a lengthy
section of the astronomical digression in In de caelo 2.12 [492.25–504.32]
for Thomas Aquinas, a document which Bossier discovered and named the
Fragmentum Toletanum.54 In preparing the Fragmentum, Moerbeke used a
manuscript related to Mutinensis gr. 161; whereas in making his full trans-
lation of the commentary in 1271, he revised this earlier translation using a
better manuscript that enabled him to fill in various gaps in the Fragmen-
tum.55 Heiberg’s edition, however, antedates the discovery of Grosseteste’s
manuscripts in which it appears), xxvii–xxxix (for argument that Moerbeke is the author of
the Fragmentum and that he wrote it ca 1265), xliii–xlix (for the claim that the Fragmentum
was intended for Thomas Aquinas and was used in the latter’s commentary In meta.): cf.
Bossier 1987, 298–308. But, pace Bossier, the facts that Moerbeke translated the text for
someone interested in the homocentric theory of Meta. Λ.8 and that Thomas used it in his In
meta., are only consistent with the inference that the translation was actually prepared for
Thomas; they do not warrant it [cf. Musatti 2006, 527–532].
55 See Bossier et al. 2004, xxxii–xxxviii, xli–xliii: note also lxxxv [with Bossier 1987, 305–
308] on Thomas’ use of the translation of 1271 in preparing his Expositio in libros de celo et
mundo.
18 introduction
56 It is worth noting that no Greek source preserves the end of Simplicius’ commentary
115.
introduction 19
dogma that key words in Greek must have unique renderings in English. Still,
though I trust that the resulting translation is sufficiently reliable to support
fairly close work on the many questions of Simplicius’ meaning and method,
I confess that I will not be disappointed if readers throw up their hands and
turn to the original to see what they can make of it on their own. In fact, I
have included page and line numbers of Heiberg’s edition of the Greek text
in the margin of my translation for this purpose.59 In the same spirit, I have
also put in italics those passages from Aristotle’s writings (mostly the De
caelo) that Simplicius quotes without specific notice, along with a footnote
giving the proper citation.
The Annotation
The annotation, that is, the footnotes to the translation and the comments,
is designed, as I have already indicated, to assist readers by explicating the
many issues that they should understand in order to assess what Simplicius
actually offers in his account of De caelo 2.10–12. Readers may well disagree
with the claims and arguments made. Still, I trust that this annotation will at
least help them to avoid missteps, mine included, and that I have not missed
the mark too often in guessing what might be helpful.
But let me clarify this further. Though some readers might wish other-
wise, what I have not done in the annotation is to engage systematically and
directly the voluminous literature offering reconstructions of the arrange-
ment of homocentric spheres that Simplicius describes in the astronomical
digression concluding his comments on 2.12, a digression that includes an
interpretation of Aristotle’s cosmology in Meta. Λ.8: all I have done on this
score is to note the failings of its tacit assumptions. The reason is that my
overriding aim in this book is to establish a reading of Simplicius e Simplicio.
Thus, in annotating the translation, I have included only such information as
will allow readers to confront Simplicius’ interpretation on their own with-
out having to plumb the many layers of learned speculation that now lie
between the text and them. My hope is that this will encourage readers to
view these reconstructions critically rather than simply acquiescing to them
or rashly setting out directly to tinker with their details or even just turning
tail in the face of their billowing mathematical exegesis.
59 My rule in positioning the numbers was to put them beside the line in English where
the first word of the line in Greek is translated. The outcome is hardly exact so far as the
actual line count goes; but it should be good enough to allow readers to move between my
translation and Heiberg’s edition, if they so wish.
20 introduction
60 See, e.g., Neugebauer 1953; Maula 1974; Heglmeier 1996; Mendell 1998, 2000; and Yavetz
Pontus about the rotatory motion of the Earth and about the motions of Mercury and Venus
around the Sun, see Todd and Bowen 2009 and Bowen and Todd 2009, respectively.
introduction 21
Sun and that the interval between consecutive phases of the same sort is
constant and characteristic of each planet. For an outer or superior planet,
that is, for a planet farther from the Sun than the Earth, there is conjunction
when the Sun and the planet are on the same side of the Earth and, hence,
are observed ‘together’. These same planets are each said to be in opposition
when the Earth intervenes and the observer sees the planet on the side
opposite to the Sun [see Figure 1, p. 22]. Inner or inferior planets, in contrast,
have two conjunctions and no opposition [see Figure 2, p. 22], precisely
because the planet is closer to the Sun than the Earth—which obviously
means that the Earth cannot ever come between the Sun and the planet.
For present purposes, the reader should bear in mind that
– the synodic periods of the planets range from 116 to 687 days,63
– a planet is invisible to the naked eye when it is in conjunction with the
Sun because it is lost in the Sun’s light, and
– retrograde motion is an apparent synodic phenomenon observed
before and after the inferior conjunction of an inner planet, and before
and after the opposition of an outer planet.
Retrogradation itself is quite striking. During the course of its synodic
period, each planet will to a northern observer on Earth making observa-
tions at regular intervals seem to cover less and less (angular) distance in
its direct or prograde motion eastward through the zodiacal constellations
until it actually appears to stop. This stopping is its first station. After an
interval of several days or even of a few weeks, the planet will then seem to
reverse itself and move back westwards covering increasing distances until
once more it appears to slow down and then, again, to stop. This is its second
station and the motion from first to second station is its retrograde motion.
In the days after second station, the planet will seemingly reverse itself once
more and gradually resume its motion eastward.
Retrogradation is an apparent, not a real, motion. Its explanation
depends on whether the planet is inner or outer. If we simplify the config-
urations by supposing that the planetary orbits are circular and that they
move in the same plane as that defined by the course of the Earth about the
Sun (scil. the ecliptic plane), the inner planets will appear to move against
the background of the fixed stars as shown in Figure 3 [p. 23]; and the outer
planets, as shown in Figure 4 [p. 23].
63 For the synodic periods of Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, see Comment
12.20, pp. 271–272. Those of Uranus and Neptune are 369.7 and 367.5 days, respectively.
22 introduction
Figure 1. The conjunction and opposition of an outer planet with the Sun
64 In representing degrees, the semicolon serves to separate units and sixtieths; and
commas, to separate sexagesimal places, that is, the first sixtieths or units of 60-1, the second
sixtieths or units of 60-2, and so on, which are to the right of the semicolon.
introduction 23
THE HERESY OF
NON-HOMOCENTRIC AETHERIAL MOTION
1 Cf. 14.27–29, 14.31–15.2, 15.22–31. See 10.28–11.30 for Simplicius’ comment on De caelo
268b11–13, in which he locates the discussion in physical theory, that is, in philosophical
reflection on the cosmos. See also 286n187.
28 chapter one
Aetherial Rotation
a direct contribution to the argument at hand (as I have construed them) or an aside meant
only to elaborate the attenuation of vision by distance.
8 453.22: Simplicius, unlike Alexander [cf. 453.25–34], would seem to suppose that what
one observes in looking at the Sun as it rises or sets is the same as what one observes in
looking at the fixed stars.
30 chapter one
9 A standard grouping which is based on fact that unlike the Sun and Moon the other
70.16–19, 74.4–7, 87.29–88.2, 90.13–18, 143.9–17, 157.1–12 and 19–21, 164.21–23, 173.23–30, 178.26–
28, 185.23–186.1: cf. 371.1–4 (of Christian criticism). The exceptions are at 65.9, 85.24–31, and
196.23–33.
the heresy of non-homocentric aetherial motion 31
but only alluded to here?’ The answer comes with reflection on Simplicius’
predicament. Philoponus’ other criticisms of Aristotle were dispatched di-
rectly and with some ease. It was, indeed, tactically useful to name him,
thereby making him a clear target for abuse, because these criticisms did
not involve any key elements that were also accepted by Simplicius and
the late Platonists. But the criticisms concerning aetherial rotation and the
homocentric planetary hypotheses were different because the premisses
were in agreement on both sides.
It is interesting, then, that when he does address the difficulties posed
by these two points of agreement, Simplicius addresses his readers, clearly
his fellow Platonists [454.27–28, 510.31–34], thus revealing that these par-
ticular issues cut deeply and that his primary aim is to reassure the faith-
ful.12
That there is an allusion at all to Philoponus at 454.24 is a mark of
Simplicius’ confidence in his subsequent demonstration that the views of
Plato and Aristotle are in accord, and that Aristotle did in fact hold that
the heavenly bodies rotate. But if he could save Aristotle from Philoponus
on this issue of aetherial rotation by a proper reading of what Aristotle has
written, there was no such remedy for Aristotle’s adoption of homocentric
planetary theory. And so there is no mention or comparable allusion to
Philoponus when Simplicius eventually comes to that issue. Indeed, in the
polemical context of the In de caelo, there would be nothing gained by
explicitly accrediting Philoponus, a noisome distraction to the unwary in all
other matters, any standing as a worthy opponent on such a delicate issue as
the preference for non-homocentric planetary hypotheses. It would be hard
enough to show his readers or fellow Platonists that in correcting Aristotle
they do not follow Philoponus into heresy, that Aristotle’s error can be
mitigated, and that their preference for more recent planetary hypotheses
is to be understood in a way that preserves their faith and their way of
life.
of Aristotle’s axiom (ἀξίωµα) or principle (λόγος) that circular motion is by definition motion
about the center of the cosmos. Granted, he does unpack this to give its ‘proper’ meaning.
But he is notably much less defensive here in presenting what Aristotle has written. This
marks, I think, that his focus is on readers who are sympathetic and who, having read what
has preceded, now understand the late Platonic interpretation of Aristotle in these matters.
With them, there is no need to forestall criticism that seizes on surface meaning to show that
Aristotle somehow missed the truth. Indeed, with them, one can even speak as though he
had.
32 chapter one
13 456.22–27. For a German translation of the Arabic version of this text, see Nix 1907,
131.9–15.
the heresy of non-homocentric aetherial motion 33
14 On Philoponus’ aim, see 34.5–7, 35.31–33, 50.15–18 (with 731.25–29), 80.23–26, 81.10–11,
119.7–13.
15 Cf. 25.22–26.17 and 26.28–31 (with pp. 12–13), 35.33–35, 70.17–18, 135.9–10, 731.25–29 (the
17 See 12.16–27 for Simplicius’ contention that Plato posited a fifth simple body which he
called fire meaning light, since he held that light was a form of fire.
18 See 84.11–85.15, where these claims about aether are ‘found’ in Plato’s Timaeus.
19 Cf. Figures 12.13 and 12.14, pp. 196–197.
20 See Comment 10.13, pp. 211–213. See also Figure 7, p. 35.
the heresy of non-homocentric aetherial motion 35
by itself insufficient to explain planetary motion. For that, one must grant
that the direction and speed in which a planet moves are matters of its
choosing what is best for the cosmos [472.8–15, 473.1–6: cf. 488.30–489.4].
What we see in the heavens, then, is the outcome of choices by divine,
rational animals, where each choice is a deliberate blending of the natural
motions in different directions of the rotating spheres constituting each
planet’s body [473.6–474.6].21
The cosmos or, more specifically, the celestial sphere, is a hypostasis or
substantive existence that derives from the Craftsman God. It too is a ratio-
nal animal, one that comprehends within itself undifferentiated all celestial
motions, in particular, the motion eastward and the motion westward.22 Its
‘creation’ is before time and, thus, does not impinge on the fact that the body
of this sphere is immune to generation and corruption and, hence, eternal.
The planets themselves are each hypostases of the celestial sphere [473.8–
474.1]: the blending of the motions in the nature of each planetary animal
shows its kinship to the celestial sphere, a kinship that decreases with dis-
tance from that sphere.
Simplicius’ excuse for following more recent theorists and not Aristotle
in matters concerning the motions of the heavenly bodies comes with a
brief and easily overlooked caveat—namely, that none of the astronom-
ical hypotheses currently in play has any necessity (ἀνάγκη) [488.25–27,
492.25–28, 502.2–3]. In other words, as Simplicius says, though each hypoth-
esis distinguishes appearance and reality and then posits a state of affairs
enabling one to ‘save’ or account for the phenomena, none of the hypothe-
ses is demonstrably true (ἀληθές, κατ’ ἀλήθειαν). Rather, for him, the true
account (ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος) neither admits the apparent planetary motions as
real nor utilizes hypotheses; instead, it reasons on the basis of duly estab-
lished physical theory that the planets move with motions that are simple,
smooth, circular, and ordered [488.10–14], (real) motions which presumably
enable one to account for the motions observed.1
This caveat, with its strong affirmation of a non-hypothetical account
of the celestial motions, seemingly undercuts Simplicius’ apologia in its
entirety and puts into question the very point of commenting on the De
caelo. After all, why settle for the Ptolemaic account when it, like the homo-
centric theory as propounded by Aristotle, lacks proper warrant and cannot
be said to be true? If neither is true, is the choice of one over the other really
defensible? Further, given that the very goal of the De caelo is to demon-
strate the fundamental heavenly motions on the basis of a properly estab-
lished physical theory, why study this cosmological tract if its physical theory
licenses an account of the celestial motions which is inadequate and thus,
contrary to its intention, merely a hypothesis and not a good one at that?
This caveat would thus seem to entail an even more radical heresy. The
puzzle, then, is that Simplicius simply makes this criticism, argues that
adherence to the Ptolemaic hypotheses can accommodate the broad argu-
ment of De caelo 2.12, and closes his digression with the remark:
1 This is in part what lies behind his remark at 32.29–32 that differing about planetary
hypotheses is not a matter of reproach, since each is at best consistent with the phenomena.
See Comment 12.27, pp. 284–288.
38 chapter two
Now, if this is more fitting to chapters about the heavens than to ones about
first philosophy, none of us will criticize the rather lengthy digression from
the [present] chapter, since it has come about at the right time. But we must
return to what comes next in Aristotle’s chapters. [510.31–35]
Granted, Aristotle himself admits that inquiry about the heavens is difficult.
But at no point does he allow that one is therefore permitted to take a
position concerning their motions that is unwarranted by argument. Yet
Simplicius fails to provide an argument of his own or to show that there is
in fact one implicit in the works of Plato and Aristotle.
One might well be tempted to conclude that Simplicius is truly idiotic and
abandon him with dark thoughts about cultures of reading and how they
can thwart that impulse to understand which they are meant to serve. But
patience will, in this instance, vindicate Simplicius. As I will argue, there are
in his commentaries on the Physica and De caelo several considerations that
warrant his leaving unexamined the question of the physical theory required
to make due sense of the planetary motions.
the same passage [Vitelli 1887–1888, 218.19–223.29]. (Philoponus’ commentary was written
around ad 517: see Golitsis 2008, 22–37, which includes criticism of Verrycken’s contention
that it was revised after 529.) It is worth noting that Philoponus does not broach the subject
of astronomical hypothesis.
3 290.3: the definite article here is generic in sense (that is, it refers to any member of the
the heretical rejection of all hypotheses 39
class, or to the class collectively) and will be translated consistently in the plural form. See
43n22 below. On the meaning of «ὁ µαθηµατικός», see Comment 10.04, pp. 203–204.
4 Diels 1882–1895, 290.3–9.
5 290.14 ὁ µαθηµατικός: in context, this ought to be «ἀστρολόγος», since Simplicius has
entist, talks of the matter that physical bodies have in addition to their properties. Moreover,
when the physical theorist discusses these properties, he construes them as properties of
physical bodies, whereas the mathematical scientist treats the properties as though they
existed on their own. That is, unlike the physical theorist, the mathematical scientist sep-
arates these properties in thought from the bodies to which they belong.
40 chapter two
they view them as moving bodies exhibiting configurations and ignore any
intrinsic connection that these configurations might have to the bodies
themselves. Thus, physical theorists argue that the heavenly bodies are
spherical because of all the shapes that bodies may have, this one alone
is primary, simple, complete, uniform and, therefore, appropriate to the
first body. Astronomers, however, argue to the same conclusion from the
fact that the sphere is more capacious than any other solid with the same
perimeter.8
8291.7–20.
9Recall the commentaries written in Alexandria of the fourth century ad by Theon on
Ptolemy’s Almagest and Canones manuales [see Watts 2006, 187–188, 191–192] and by Pappus
on the Almagest, along with book 6 of Pappus’ Collectio and Proclus’ own treatise outlining
the planetary hypotheses developed in the Almagest.
10 While Simplicius’ In phys. was written after the In de caelo, it was in fact meant to
be read before it. Indeed, it would seem a reasonable working hypothesis that Philoponus’
attack on Aristotle and the exigencies of replying to it were factors that figured importantly
in determining the order in which Simplicius wrote his commentaries.
11 Though there may be instances in which Simplicius’ comments on a lemma are moti-
vated by a desire for magisterial completeness [see Baltussen 2008, 22, 122, 205–207], Simpli-
cius continues here, I think, because the distinction made by Aristotle is problematic as it
stands.
the heretical rejection of all hypotheses 41
the center of the cosmos, Aristotle, [De caelo 2.14 297a8–b23] demonstrates that the Earth
is spherical. Cf. Cleomedes’ argument that the cosmos is spherical at Todd 1990, 1.5.126–145
[with Bowen and Todd 2004, 72–73].
18 Aristotle [De caelo 297b23–298a8] argues that the Earth is spherical on the basis of such
perceptual evidence as the appearance of the Moon during a lunar eclipse [see Comment
11.03, pp. 219–220] and the variation of the night sky as one moves north and south. Cf. Todd
1990, 1.5.1–125 [with Bowen and Todd 2004, 63–72; Bowen 2003c, 60–62].
19 F18.26 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.10 ποιητικὴ δύναµις.
20 F18.27 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.11 ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συµβεβηκότων: cf. F18.23–24.
21 See Todd 1990, 2.4.95–107 [with Bowen and Todd 2004, 2.4 nn8, 19] on the Posidonian
physical theory underlying eclipses. Mueller [2004b, 69] claims that the mention of eclipses
shows that a special notion of causation is at issue, since, as he says,
it is hard to imagine that any astronomer or physicist … living after, say 400, would
have discussed solar or lunar eclipses without mentioning as an explanation the
interposition of the moon between the sun and the earth or of the earth between the
the heretical rejection of all hypotheses 43
moon and sun, the latter being a well-known Aristotelian example of scientific causal
explanation.
Mueller suggests that Posidonius/Geminus discounts the astronomer’s geometrical models
as really explanatory because the alleged cause is not better known than the effect. I suspect,
however, that it may be a mistake to assume that, for Posidonius/Geminus, eclipses were to
be explained simply by the interposition of celestial bodies.
The problem is that by the first century bc, this may not have been good enough. Posido-
nius/Geminus may have deemed it important that not only are there species of eclipses (total
and partial) but that eclipses are also periodic [cf. Bowen and Goldstein 1996 on Geminus,
Intro. ast. 18.1 (the exeligmos)]. But giving a proper causal explanation of eclipses so under-
stood would require going beyond Aristotle by accounting for the occurrence of the various
species of lunar and solar eclipse as well as for the periodicity of their occurrences. Further,
such an account would necessarily lie outside astronomy, since it can at best quantify the
periods involved.
Note that Geminus describes when solar and lunar eclipses occur in Intro. ast. cc. 10–11
without using the language of causation except when drawing inferences from his descrip-
tion. Likewise, in 1.31–41, Geminus demonstrates that the Sun’s smooth motion along an
eccentric circle has the necessary consequence that the Sun appears to traverse equal arcs of
the zodiacal circle in unequal times, without saying that this eccentric solar motion is a cause.
22 F18.30–32 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.13–15: the subject is «ὁ ἀστρολόγος». Taking the definite
article as generic and construing the subject as the class of astronomers or ‘any astronomer’
[see 38n3] avoids attributing to Posidonius/Geminus the claim that a given astronomer will
commit to more than one hypothesis at a given time [see below].
23 At Todd 1990, 2.1.310–311 and 332–333 similar language is used in connection with
premises in a calculation of the size of the Sun. There, the hypotheses are assumptions made
within the context of a larger argument; here, they are foundational to the argument itself.
24 Kidd 1988–1999, F18.18–32 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.3–15. F18.31 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.14
τρόπους τινάς.
Evans and Berggren [2006, 254] misconstrue the syntax of this sentence. Moreover, by
adopting too narrow a notion of the intellectual context of this passage, they overlook the
fact that the term «τρόποι» had significance in contemporary philosophy [see 46n29], and
that the passage does indeed make sense if the occurrences of «τρόποι» at lines F18.31, and
38 are translated in the same way, rather than by ‘devices’ and ‘way’, respectively (or by
‘conditions’ and ‘method’ [so Mueller 2004a, 69]). Indeed, a ‘mode or way [of accounting for
the phenomena]’ [cf. ‘supply an account’ («λόγον ἀποδώσειν») at F18.17] is the adaptation of a
single hypothesis to account for the same phenomena in specific sets of circumstances. Thus,
for example, a phenomenon common to several objects, such as the first morning appearance
of an outer planet, might be accounted for on the basis of an epicyclic hypothesis that is
quantified differently for Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.
44 chapter two
25 Cf. Aristotle, An. post. 76a4–13, 78b34–39: the latter passage subordinates accounts
explaining that something is the case (ὅτι) to those explaining why it is the case (διότι).
Diogenes Laertius, in his book on the Stoic Zeno of Citium, asserts [Vitae 7.132–133] that
both scientists (οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν µαθηµάτων) and physical theorists study the cosmos but differ in
the particular subjects of their inquiries. After describing this difference in much the same
way as Simplicius reports, he then indicates that there is a similar difference in the sorts
of causal explanation (ὁ αἰτιόλογος λόγος) that they offer. It is interesting that in describing
the explanations offered by the scientists, Diogenes does not cite astronomical explananda
specifically but only vision and images in a mirror, as well as clouds, thunder, rainbows, halos,
and comets; and he maintains that the explanations offered are causal. For the view that
explanations in optics are not causal, a view that acknowledges its dependence on Posidonius
and seems to draw on what Simplicius reports of Posidonius/Geminus, see Seneca, Ep. 88.26
with Bowen 2009.
the heretical rejection of all hypotheses 45
sis does indeed save the phenomena. Thus, while the astronomers being
envisaged may collectively, or even individually, have known a number of
hypotheses by which to account for the same astronomical phenomena, the
assumption in this report appears to be that each astronomer will offer only
one hypothesis in doing this, since, after all, only one of them can be actually
the case.26
One may, of course, debate whether such a realist interpretation of astro-
nomical hypothesizing is credible, and whether it is a decent characteriza-
tion of the typical practice and attitudes of astronomers of the time. Specif-
ically, one may challenge the claim that, when an ancient astronomer says
that a hypothesis saves the phenomena, he is committed to its actually being
the case, though, of course, qua astronomer he cannot demonstrate that.
This claim does have a certain plausibility prima facie, however. For, even
if astronomers were not really interested in offering non-causal accounts
per se, and regardless of their being troubled or untroubled by competing
hypotheses in accounting for given phenomena, each did, so far as we know,
settle on a single hypothesis in devising any given table quantifying these
phenomena.
In any event, this claim is essential to the view expressed subsequently
that the astronomer must take the starting points of his demonstrations
from the physical theorist. For Posidonius/Geminus, the dependence of
astronomy on physical theory is intrinsic to astronomy itself because physi-
cal theory is knowledge of the realia exhibiting the extrinsic properties stud-
ied by astronomers, and because astronomers wish to make claims about
how things are. That is, this dependence is rooted in the fact that, when
astronomers assert that they can save phenomena using a given hypothe-
sis, they mean (or must be understood to mean) that this hypothesis is the
case or true.
At this point, Simplicius’ report begins to show its curious history; and we
have the first of two dislocations marking ellipses that may be the result of
26 See 42n15, 43n22 above. The possibility of competing multiple explanations all of
equal cognitive worth was a philosophical construct, acceptable in qualified form to the
Epicureans [see Asmis 1984, 321–330], but rejected here and easily exploited by a Sceptic
[see 46n29]. But see G.E.R. Lloyd 1991, 267 in which it is claimed that, for Geminus, ‘it is
his (scil. the astronomer’s) business to say in how many ways it is possible to save the
phenomena’ [cf. Mueller 2004b, 74–75]. In Simplicius’ report [cf. Bowen and Todd 2004,
197n8], however, that astronomers produce a number of hypotheses would seem to be an
inevitable consequence of the fact that each astronomer tries to save the phenomena but
lacks the means to demonstrate that his hypothesis is true rather than just consistent with
the relevant phenomena.
46 chapter two
the way in which texts have been excerpted, summarized, expounded, and
quoted. The reader, though initially promised an example of the preceding
account of astronomical procedure, is suddenly confronted with a question
that appears to have very serious consequences.
For example: ‘Why do the Sun, the Moon, and the planets appear to move
[F18.35] unsmoothly?’ Because whether we hypothesize27 that their circuits are eccen-
tric, or that the celestial bodies go round along epicycles, their apparent
unsmoothness [in motion] will be saved.28 And [we] will have to go through
all the modes according to which these phenomena can be caused, so that
our systematic treatment29 of the wandering stars will look like a causal the-
ory [set out] according to each possible mode [of causation].30
27 F18.33–34 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.16 ὅτι εἰ ὑποθώµεθα: the ὅτι-clause indicates why the
question is being asked. The first-person plural subject of this verb is maintained in the rest
of this paragraph [as also by Heath 1913, 276]. For the argument that the ‘we’ involved here are
Stoics, or Posidonius/Geminus and an audience of fellow Stoics, see Todd and Bowen 2009,
175–180. Kidd [1988–1999, 3.80], however, writes ‘their’ before «πραγµατεία», and sees this as
a description of astronomical practice and not as one of the consequences of its malpractice,
as argued at Bowen and Todd 2004, 195–198.
28 F18.33–35 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.16–18: the eccentric and epicyclic hypotheses are
treated here as independent rather than equivalent. No extant Greek or Latin writer of the
first centuries bc and ad mentions this equivalence; those that do consider the planetary
motions choose one hypothesis or the other, not both. On saving the phenomena before
Ptolemy, see Comment 12.09, 251–259.
Theon of Smyrna reports that Adrastus of Aphrodisias (late first or early second century
ad) [T.H. Martin 1849, 74–75] was the first to show that the eccentric hypothesis follows
incidentally (κατὰ συµβεβηκός) from the epicyclic hypothesis, but then claims for himself
the proof that the epicyclic hypothesis follows from the eccentric hypothesis [Hiller 1878,
166.10–13]. On the value of such reports when they cannot be confirmed, see Bowen 2002.
Ptolemy suggests the possible equivalence of the two hypotheses at Alm. 3.3 [cf. Toomer
1984, 144 n32] but does not discuss it until Alm. 12.1. On the strength of the latter text, some
modern scholars [see, e.g., Neugebauer 1955, 1959] suppose that the proof of this equivalence
goes back to Apollonius of Perga (third century bc). But see Comment 12.07, pp. 244–247.
Alexander Jones has kindly pointed out to me that papyrus PSI inv. 515 (= PSI XV 1490)
(very early second century ad, perhaps part of a larger treatise [see Jones 2004]) mentions an
eccentric and an epicyclic model for solar motion and uses the same maximum equation for
both [cf. Jones 2000, 83–86].
29 F18.36 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.18. «τρόπους» (‘modes’) is used here for multiple expla-
nations. This term is used by the Sceptic Aenesidemus (first century bc) to describe causal
explanations. See the second of his arguments against ‘dogmatic causal explanation’ [Sextus
Empiricus, Pyrr. hyp. 1.181], namely, that such explanations should not be offered ‘according to
a single mode’ («καθ’ ἕνα µόνον τρόπον») when ‘explanation in multiple modes’ («πολυτρόπως
αἰτιολογῆσαι») is possible. Exactly the same consequence is being targeted in the present
argument.
F18.39 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.20 πραγµατεία: the term does not mean ‘theory’ [Heath 1913,
276], or ‘study’ [Kidd 1988–1999, 2.133; 3.80] but either an actual treatise or the kind of system-
atic exercise that would be embodied in one: cf., e.g., Alexander’s usage [Bruns 1887, 30.24].
30 Kidd 1988–1999, F18.32–39.
This question about why the planets appear to move as they do was
important in the first century bc, a time when the effort to develop or
adapt different hypotheses in order to account for planetary stations and ret-
rogradations began in earnest. Geminus, for instance, prefers an eccentric
hypothesis for the Sun [Intro. ast. 1.31–41] and a hypothesis for the Moon that
is based on a Babylonian zigzag scheme,31 while Vitruvius [De arch. 9.1.5–
14] adopts an epicyclic model for the inner planets and an eccentric model
(supplemented with a causal component involving the power of the Sun)
for the outer planets.32 But, as Robert Todd and I have argued elsewhere,33
this question is not posed to astronomers: it is asked, instead, of the reader
who is plainly one of ‘us’ and so, presumably, a Stoic philosopher with a keen
interest in physical theory, assuming that these lines ultimately come either
from Posidonius or from Geminus in his summary and exposition of what
Posidonius wrote.34 In short, the question is asked of someone who is aware
of various ways in which astronomers account for the planetary motions,
and its aim is to make him determine for himself why the planets move as
they are observed to.35
That this question is addressed to philosophers or physical theorists is not
surprising, given, as we have noted, that the astronomers’ assertion that the
various hypotheses in use save the phenomena of planetary motion entails
branch of Stoicism, a branch which is evident in Cleomedes’ Caelestia. Not all Stoics were
sympathetic to this kind of inquiry: see Strabo, Geog. 2.3.8. (On Strabo’s Stoicism, see Mueller
2004b, 75.) Seneca [Ep. 88.21–28] ignores it in making the same general point about the rela-
tion between physical theory and astronomy, and indicates why in 88.29–46. On Geminus’
philosophical concerns, see Bowen 2012e.
35 See Mueller 2004b, 69–70. Evans and Berggren [2006, 254] misrepresent Kidd 1989–
1999, F18.31–35 ~Diels 1882, 292.14–18. Further, their supplement in ‘[The astronomer would
answer] that if we assume that their circles are eccentric …,’ is a gross intrusion that goes
back at least to Paul Tannery [Heiberg and Zeuthen 1929, 256] and was rejected by Germaine
Aujac [1975, 112]. At the same time, it makes the implausibility of their view that the ‘we’
are astronomers obvious. (For his part, Tannery obscures the problematic ‘we’ by writing
‘L’astronome dira qu’ en supposant leurs cercles excentriques ….’) For, if the subject is «ὁ
ἀστρολόγος», would one not expect ‘he’ instead of ‘we’? And why would the author reported
by Simplicius confuse his readers by abandoning his account of ὁ ἀστρολόγος and introducing
the plural «οἱ ἀστρολόγοι», and then having these astronomers speak in the first person
rather than in the third? It is perhaps not coincidental that Evans and Berggren [2006,
53–58] conflate Posidonius and Geminus, and treat the latter solely or primarily as an
astronomer. The case of Cleomedes, however, is ample proof of the untenability of this
assumption.
48 chapter two
divergent claims about the underlying realia. But what exactly is the prob-
lem for physical theorists with listing all the possible modes of explanation,
that is, with listing every non-causal account of the phenomena covered by
each applicable hypothesis?
Recall that a hypothesis can save phenomena only if it is the case or true.
But knowing that a hypothesis (which concerns some extrinsic feature of an
object) is indeed the case requires knowing the underlying realia; and this
in turn presupposes having a proper causal account of the phenomena. In
Aristotelian terms, the problem here is that one usually cannot know that a
particular hypothesis is true without knowing why it is true [cf. 44n25]. Thus,
any physical theorist lacking a proper causal account of why the planets
move as they do will be much embarrassed when confronted by the various
hypotheses put forth by astronomers, since he will not be able to determine
which, if any, is in accord with reality. Consequently, when this theorist is
asked to account for such phenomena, he will do no better than list all the
astronomical hypotheses (and their modes) available to him on the ground
that, so far as he knows, each is true or saves the phenomena. And, so, to the
extent that these hypotheses are divergent, he will endorse contradictions
in physical theory—clearly an undesirable outcome.
This first dislocated paragraph thus turns on its head Aenesidemus’ crit-
icism of dogmatism (scil. Stoicism, for instance) that it sometimes holds to
a single account of phenomena when many are possible [cf. Sextus Empiri-
cus, Pyrr. hyp. 1.180–182]. For such sceptics, the existence of many accounts
undermined the search for a single causal explanation; but for the Stoic, a
multiplicity of accounts demanded it.36
Simplicius continues with yet more text that is dislocated. Though his
report initially promises a conclusion based on the preceding lines (note
36 See Bowen and Todd 2004, 197. The point of this paragraph in Simplicius’ report is not
that the astronomer’s hypotheses are false, as Mueller [2004b, 70–71] maintains, but that none
is known to be true.
Epicurus advances a view that falls between the Stoic and Sceptic positions. For Epicurus,
it is possible to get knowledge of matters in the heavens and thus to secure tranquility and
happiness. Such knowledge lies primarily in grasping that they are but the outcome of the
original inclusion of aggregates of atoms in the birth of our world. It does not come from
the study of risings and settings, solstices, eclipses, and so forth, because such study is not
predicated on knowledge of what the heavenly bodies are or of what the most important
causes are, and because we have different explanations of the same phenomena (since they
are at a distance from us). Indeed, so far as such study goes, Epicurus holds that we will
preserve our tranquility and happiness if we are aware of the various ways in which celestial
phenomena may be explained. Cf. Epicurus, Ep. ad Herod. [Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 10.77–80]
and Ep. ad Pyth. [Vitae 10.90–98: cf. 10.113–114] using the text of von der Muehll 1922.
the heretical rejection of all hypotheses 49
37 F18.39 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.21 τις (a certain): on such usage with a proper name in a
derogatory sense, see Liddell, Scott, and Jones 1968, τις II.6 which cites Sophocles, Philoctetes
442.
38 18.40 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.21: the Aldine text of Simplicius supplied «ἔλεγεν» after
«Ποντικός», which would require punctuation that would yield the meaning ‘someone com-
ing along, says (φησίν) Heraclides of Pontus, said that …’. This would, as some have wished,
disassociate Heraclides from the hypothesis reported here. But «ἔλεγεν» was probably orig-
inally a gloss on «φησίν» by someone who was pedantically uneasy at having a ὅτι-clause
depend on «φησίν» (though this was less of a solecism in later Greek); and it was then later
inserted into a text into which it could by sheer accident serve in a syntactically acceptable
way. Also, in the older literature it was thought that «παρελθών» indicated a character enter-
ing the scene in one of Heraclides’ dialogues. On these and other such exegetical issues and
their sponsors, see Heath 1913, 277–282.
κινουµένης πως τῆς γῆς: the genitive absolute describing the Earth and the Sun is obviously
the protasis of a conditional sentence; and in the present context that protasis is a hypothesis,
as defined just above.
πως (somehow): this adverb is surely indefinite and should not be taken in the sense of
‘in a certain way’ (as by Eastwood [1992, 238] and Evans and Berggren [2006, 254]), so as to
suggest an implicit theory with some specificity. What is striking about this indefinite adverb
is that, as far as the Earth is concerned, the doxographical report in Diels 1879, 378.3–19,
seemingly followed by Ptolemy [Heiberg 1898–1903, 1.24.8–10], describes the Earth’s rotation
on its axis from west to east. Perhaps Posidonius/Geminus were aware of this and so the
expression ‘somehow’ is a gesture of dismissive indefiniteness rather than a sign of ignorance.
39 Kidd 1988–1999, F18.39–42 ~Diels 1882–1895, 292.20–23.
The problem raised here is why the Sun’s apparent motion is singled out, whereas other
reports of Heraclides’ view concern mainly the Earth’s diurnal rotation, which bears on the
apparent motion of the fixed stars. But might Posidonius/Geminus have had access to a
source not reflected in the doxography [see Diels 1879, 373.3–18] that actually attributed
to Heraclides an argument specifically focusing on the Sun, and thus requiring a form of
locomotion for the Earth that was incompatible with the theory of its rotation in a single
place reported elsewhere? Or, given the derogatory manner in which Posidonius/Geminus
refers to Heraclides [see previous note] and the vague way in which the relative states of the
Earth and the Sun are characterized, could Posidonius/Geminus just be plucking the Sun
out from the list of planets in the previous paragraph and attributing this example without
much concern for theoretical precision to Heraclides himself? It is impossible to say with
certainty, but the compositional structure (the close similarity between the clauses ‘their
apparent unsmoothness (ἀνωµαλία) [in motion]’ in line 35 [292.16–17] and ‘the apparent
unsmoothness [in motion] of the Sun can be saved’ in lines 41–42 [292.22–23]) inclines to
the second alternative.
50 chapter two
Still, there is Eastwood’s well-reasoned proposal [1992, 237–238] that the ‘unsmooth
motion’ of the Sun here is the motion represented by one of the three Eudoxan spheres,
and that this transference of a solar motion to the Earth is unsystematically related to the
Heraclidean transference of the diurnal motion usually assigned to the fixed stars to the
Earth. All one can say is that Simplicius’ report is in a sufficiently polemical form as to weaken
such speculation at the very least.
Tannery [1899, 307–308] followed by Heath [1913, 282] deleted Heraclides’ name from this
passage in order to remove what they saw as an inconsistency between this report and other
reports of Heraclides’ views on the Earth’s rotation, with Heath [1913, 282] identifying the
«τις» of this passage with Aristarchus, as subsequently have Aujac [1975, 162n7] and Evans
and Berggren [2006, 254n18 with 274nc]. But Heraclides’ name is in all the manuscripts and
treating it as an interpolation on such doctrinal grounds may miss the point.
40 For discussion of these lines about Heraclides and other passages relevant to them, see
[cf. 291a29–32]. The fundamental point is that physical theory must not
only draw on empirical or observational data, it must also be in accord
with them [cf. 291b17–23, 292a3–9]. Such data are sometimes sufficient for
a particular inquiry about the heavens that is taken up by the physical
theorist [cf. 291a32]. For many such inquiries, however, the data are too
sparse, primarily because the celestial objects in question are so remote
[cf. 291b24–28, 292a14–18]. Yet, as 2.12 makes clear, even then, though the
empirical information is insufficient, it may nevertheless be possible for the
physical theorist to give reasonable answers to certain questions by making
up for this deficiency with philosophical or dialectical considerations [see
97n5]. Thus, in 2.12, the problem of proportionality in the planetary motions
is addressed by supposing that the planets are living, rational creatures
[292a18–22].
In the case of the competing planetary hypotheses, there is, for Simpli-
cius, sufficient empirical data to rule out the Eudoxan homocentric hypoth-
esis and its embellishments by Aristotle and Callippus. For, according to
Simplicius, there is its failure to account for a key observational datum,
namely, the putative variation in the size/brightness of certain planetary
bodies during their sidereal periods. As for the eccentric and epicyclic plan-
etary hypotheses such as one finds in Ptolemy’s works, Simplicius neither
mentions any competitors to them nor any phenomenon or phenomena
which would rule them out. But such a ‘nihil obstat’ hardly settles the matter.
say45 that we do not even see the stars themselves, not their sizes, their shapes
or their surpassing beauty, not even at least the motion on account of which
there is [this] sound. Instead, we see of them a kind of brightness, as it were,
that is in fact of the same sort as the light of the Sun around the Earth:
the Sun itself is not seen. It should perhaps not be a source of wonder that
the sense of sight is deemed worthy of the radiance and brightness of the
heavenly [bodies] because it is less material and more for activity than for
being affected and because it exceeds the other [senses] by far; and that the
other senses are not adapted to these. [469.21–30]
Simplicius’ point is not that our observations of celestial bodies are some-
how false but that they are largely matters of inference. That is, as he would
have it, while we can see that the accidents and properties of some terres-
trial object do indeed belong to that object, this is not possible in the case
of celestial objects (except perhaps in the case of the Moon, which Sim-
plicius does not consider). To the contrary, our observations of Saturn, say,
entail, for Simplicius, the inference that a given blob of light seen in the night
sky at one place is the same blob seen many days later at a different place;
and they rest, moreover, on the sometimes plausible but always unverifiable
inference that this blob of light which we see belongs to one and the same
body.
This is a rather negative assessment of our awareness of the heavenly
bodies, especially when coupled with the claim that we do not actually see
their motion. The inference to be made is that Simplicius regards all plane-
tary hypotheses in astronomy either as demonstrably false or as provisional.
Here, ‘provisional’ plainly does not entail any expectation that they will in
fact be proven true, though, to be sure, that possibility is not excluded in
principle; rather, given that astronomy is incapable of proving its hypothe-
ses to be the case, it means that such hypotheses have yet to be falsified and
are the best available until the true, unhypothetical account is established
in the light of physical theory.
But if this scepticism is in part what underwrites Simplicius’ silence and
his apparent tolerance for eccentric and epicyclic hypotheses, then, we can
get to a final consideration by asking why he undertakes a commentary
on the De caelo in the first place. More precisely, the question becomes,
‘What is there in the rationale for writing a commentary on the De caelo
45 469.23 καὶ ῥητέον: several Greek manuscripts add «ἴσως» (‘perhaps’), followed by
Mueller [Mueller 2005, 126 and n538]. Heiberg’s text is, however, supported by Moerbeke’s
‘Et dicendum quod neque’ … [1563, 165.col. A].
54 chapter two
that excuses Simplicius from providing the sort of physical theory which
Aristotle apparently fails to provide and still makes writing the commentary
a sensible thing to do?’
A Question of Priority
To understand Simplicius’ undertaking a commentary on the De caelo given
these circumstances, we must first recall that this scholarly exercise con-
stitutes the practice of philosophy for Simplicius, and that the aim of the
practice was assimilation to God [483.19]. As he writes in commenting on
Phys. 1.9,
since one should call the first separated form divine, good, and an object of
desire (that is, the [form] which he calls Intellect and the First Cause), in
reality, all things constituted according to nature desire this in that, by the
very nature of the divine (that is, by the very being of their cause), they are
so constructed that each thing, in accordance with the power which it has,
desires assimilation to it. Assimilation is for them their proper perfection;
and perfection for composites is rest in respect of form; and for matter,
participation in the form to which it is inclined (that is, to which it is adapted).
[Diels 1882–1895, 250.13–17]
This divinity, to whom one prays,46 is that from whom the cosmos proceeds
and gets its eternal being in an atemporal act of creation.47 This Creator God
or Craftsman,48 as he is also known following Plato,49 bears in himself the
Ideas which are the paradigms of all that we behold in the sensible world.50
For Simplicius, the relation of likeness to paradigm, that is, the relation of the
sensible world of becoming to the purely intelligible world of paradigms, a
relation otherwise characterized as participation (µέθεξις), entails that the
sensible world is inferior or at a lower degree of reality:
As was stated earlier, however, Plato showed in another way that what comes
to be comes from some substrate. For, inasmuch as what comes to be is a like-
ness of being and every likeness assimilates itself to its paradigm, what assim-
ilates itself assimilates itself to [the paradigm] by participation in a process
of becoming similar [that arises] from the paradigm. But what participates
is one thing and what is participated [in], another; and participation is [the
46 731.25–29.
47 107.12–13, 137.17–28, 138.15–22. See also Diels 1882–1895, 622.26–28, 1141.16–19 and 22–30,
1142.21–25, 1143.26–29, 1145.7–1147.9, 1158.4–5.
48 154.12–16, 360.20–29, 372.15, 489.16–17, 491.6.
49 See 304.1, 311.32. See also Diels 1882–1895, 1337.20–33.
50 See 87.1–8. See also Hadot 1996, 38.368–390.
the heretical rejection of all hypotheses 55
process] by which a likeness assimilates itself. Therefore, this thing that par-
ticipates is that in which and from which the likeness comes to be—the very
thing which what comes to be is. (Plato, at any rate, says in the Timaeus,
At present, then, three kinds [of thing] should be kept in mind—what
comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that from which what comes
to be becomes assimilated.)
And since what I said earlier is true, this is the turning aside from being, that is,
the going beyond and descent into non-being,51 by taking which participation
in being takes place as it can and makes a likeness of what really is in the
place of what really is not, the very thing which it would have if it descended
into what is not completely without producing [a likeness of] what really
is.52
Given that the cosmos is a hypostasis of the Craftsman God and the out-
come of procession (otherwise characterized as participation in the Ideas
within him), the cosmos is an inferior and dependent being, a likeness of a
superior reality [138.15–22]. There is, it would seem, a further refinement: the
immediate hypostasis of the Craftsman is the celestial sphere or sphere of
the fixed stars, whereas the planetary spheres are hypostases of the celestial
sphere.53
51 Diels 1882–1895, 255.13–14 ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκτροπὴ καὶ παράλλαξις καὶ εἰς τὸ µὴ ὂν
ὑποφορά.
52 Diels 1882–1895, 255.3–16.
Conclusion
Let us recapitulate. When Philoponus attacked Aristotle for holding that cir-
cular motion is by definition motion about the center of the Earth [32.1–11],
his aim was to overthrow Aristotle’s argument that there was a fifth simple
body that moved by nature in a circle and, with it, the argument that since
this simple body does not suffer any form of change other than a change in
position that has no opposite, the heavens and, ultimately, the universe are
capable of neither generation nor corruption but must be eternal. To Sim-
plicius, then, this attack was especially serious. For present purposes, it is
important to note that in rejecting the notion that circular motion is by def-
inition about the center of a geocentric universe, Philoponus also rejected
any homocentric theory of planetary motion such as one finds in Meta. Λ.8.
But here, and most surely to Simplicius’ great dismay, was a point on which
he actually agreed with Philoponus. And so Simplicius was forced to mount
a complex defense that aimed to save Aristotle as an authority, the De caelo
as a valuable text in the late Platonic program of education, and the late Pla-
tonists themselves. This complex response or apologia comes as the great
digression [492.28–510.35] in the commentary on 2.12, though elements of it
do appear earlier at strategic points.
Philoponus’ polemic certainly puts Aristotle, the De caelo, and the late
Platonists in an awkward position. But Simplicius yields nothing. His de-
fense of Aristotle against Philoponus admits the basic facts but then rein-
terprets them completely. Indeed, in dealing with the question about the
heavenly motions, Simplicius makes explicit that the homocentric hypothe-
ses described in Meta. Λ.8 are flawed [504.16–505.19], and that along with
his fellow Platonists he prefers the hypotheses developed after Aristotle
[506.9–16] and perfected in the treatises by Claudius Ptolemy.1 Yet, so far
as Philoponus is concerned, this defense is oblique and curiously muted: by
the time one gets to the digression/apologia, not only is Philoponus pushed
into oblivion, the apologia itself would seem to stand on its own as a sim-
ple lesson to bring the faithful up to date in matters of technical astronomy,
were it not for a few veiled remarks indicating what has actually provoked it.
This is understandable. There would, after all, be little gained by giving any
credibility to the idea that Philoponus had found a good reason to reject
Aristotle or by drawing attention to a point in which Philoponus and the
late Platonists coincided.2 In any case, in opposing the heretic Philoponus
on an inescapable point about which they agree, Simplicius instead speaks
directly and only to the faithful by veiling the fact that what he has to say is
an apologia, thereby concentrating quite sensibly on the proper interpreta-
tion of this point and not on its misinterpretation.
Saving Aristotle
First in order of duty is that we should be clear about the Aristotle who is to
be saved.
5 See, e.g., 143.9–22, 287.2–12, 297.1–298.26, 353.3–10, 360.20–29, 587.26–588.3. For a list of
in a difference in the evidence that Aristotle and Plato consider and in how each supposedly
accesses this evidence, see Hoffmann 1987, 78–79. For Simplicius, Plato argues from νοῦς and
νοητά and Aristotle, from αἴσθησις and αἰσθητά—a claim presumably made with the Divided
Line of Resp. 6 in mind.
7 See Wildberg 1999, 118–120.
8 See Chapter 2, pp. 37–57.
62 chapter three
Callippus and Aristotle may amount to no more than an inference from Meta. Λ.8 itself.
66 chapter three
his position, that is, an answer to the question of the number of unmoved
movers that opens Meta. Λ.8. Such commitment is plainly heuristic and very
provisional. It is obviously to be distinguished from the astronomer’s blind,
unquestioning presumption that these hypotheses simply are the case when
they enable explanation of the phenomena. This, then, is the context for
interpreting Simplicius’ earlier contention to Philoponus that
in these [lines] Aristotle is only saying this much, that motion in a circle
is [motion] about a center, since this befits every circular motion. But if he
says elsewhere that bodies moving in a circle move about the center of the
universe, one should understand that he is making his case in accordance
with the hypotheses of earlier astronomers. [32.12–16]
Conclusion
To account for Aristotle’s talk of homocentric planetary hypotheses, Sim-
plicius draws attention to the fact that Aristotle, very reasonably it must
be admitted, turns to astronomers and their writings in order to address
questions in physical theory about the planets and their motions. But this is
a strategy with risks. As Simplicius points out, the homocentric hypothe-
ses in Aristotle’s time stood alone: there were no rivals. Moreover, it was
known to Aristotle and to others that these hypotheses were inadequate:
they accounted for only some of the relevant phenomena. Indeed, as Sim-
plicius also indicates, there were efforts to improve upon them (Callippus)
and even to devise new ones that were more capable (Autolycus) [504.20–
25]. The upshot, in Simplicius’ view, is that Aristotle, the physical theorist,
was fully cognizant of this and that his talk of the homocentric hypotheses
did not entail real commitment to them. Rather, it was wittingly provisional
in the sense that what he says is constrained by what his predecessors and
contemporaries understood about the planetary motions. If one wants the
68 chapter three
truth, Simplicius implies, one has to look elsewhere in his writings, bearing
in mind, of course, the fundamental harmony of his views and those of the
divine Plato.
In this way, Simplicius saves Aristotle. As he sees it, Aristotle retains his
standing as an authority in the school of late Platonism and it is Philoponus
who has fallen into blasphemy by misinterpreting the fact that Aristotle
adopts homocentric planetary hypotheses. But what of the De caelo itself?
Should one still bother to read it? Plainly, though it helps, saving Aristotle
does not by itself secure the place of this text in the late Platonic program of
education.
There are several ways in which Simplicius maintains the value of the De
caelo as a text to be read in the long process of assimilating to the Craftsman
God. The first comes in the opening discussion of the De caelo’s σκοπός or
focus.24 This discussion, though perhaps a commonplace in late Platonic
commentary, has an especially salutary purpose in the In de caelo. After
surveying various earlier accounts of the focus of this treatise, Simplicius
concludes:
Thus, I think that in these [books] Aristotle is clearly making his account
about the heavens and the four elements below the Moon. But, in order that
their focus not be drawn out but shown as looking to one thing, one should say
that after the account of the physical principles, that is, whatever principles
there are of natural bodies, he speaks of the simple bodies, the ones which are
constituted from the natural principles and are parts of the whole.25
This conclusion effectively maintains the value of De caelo apart from any
concessions that Aristotle might make in it to homocentric planetary theory.
Another line of defense consists in showing that in 2.12, a chapter under-
stood to allow that the planets make stations and retrogradations, the two
leading problems may also be addressed if one assumes eccentric or epi-
cyclic hypotheses. So far as the first problem is concerned, Simplicius does
not do this explicitly. All he states is the argument that, if the planets are
ensouled and active, a premiss essential to the solution of the first problem,
it would be better to hold that every body moving in a circle moves about
24 1.1–6.27. On the translation of this term, see Hankinson 2002, 19 and n2.
25 4.25–31. This is elaborated in 4.31–5.37.
simplicius, the apologist 69
its own center and not necessarily the center of the Earth. The implication,
I take it, is that if one adopts eccentric or epicyclic hypotheses, it is still
possible to make sense of the first problem of 2.12 and to give an answer
along the lines indicated in the commentary on it.
So far as the second problem goes, however, for Simplicius, its value
becomes murky if one adopts non-homocentric planetary hypotheses
[509.21–22]. As he explains, from the standpoint of such hypotheses, the
talk of equalization at De caelo 292b30–293a4 [cf. 490.19–491.11] makes little
sense [509.22–26]. Nevertheless, he says, this problem still has partial force
if one adopts a system of nested spherical shells, as he in fact does.26
In this way, the De caelo and especially 2.12, though limited by its reliance
on astronomers and their writings, is shown to have value that is indepen-
dent of any of the particular astronomical hypotheses known to the late
Platonists. What is more, as I have suggested, this limitation may be of little
real consequence if the De caelo is understood as a stage in a course of read-
ing and study which will ultimately bring that unhypothetical understand-
ing of the planets and their motions which is lacking in physical theory of
the time. In other words, any concern with such limitations dissipates once
De caelo is construed as a text necessary to the education of that philoso-
pher who will enunciate the physical theory needed to supply those starting
points (ἀρχαί) in terms from which astronomers can derive a proper (un-
hypothetical) quantitative/predictive account of the heavens and how they
move.
The bulk of the work in Simplicius’ redeeming himself and the late Platonist
preference for more recent astronomical hypotheses comes in demonstrat-
ing that Aristotle was not really in error in adopting homocentric hypoth-
eses—or, at least, that his error in this was hardly as grievous or even the
same as that of the astronomers who actually proposed and maintained
them. (One must, surely, distinguish between being forced for the sake of
argument to adopt hypotheses suspected to be flawed or false and thinking
them to be true because they save the phenomena.) Redemption also comes
with making clear that the De caelo retains its value as a text in the late Pla-
tonist program of education.
But what remains is to show that the late Platonists, in preferring epicyclic
and eccentric astronomical hypotheses as expressed authoritatively in Ptol-
emy’s Hypoth. plan., say, are nevertheless not really committed to them.
This last exculpation is an obvious consequence of Simplicius’ contention
that no astronomical hypotheses are demonstrably the case, that the true
account of the heavens and their motions proceeds instead by deduction
from premisses in physical theory, specifically, from the premiss that the
real motions are circular, smooth, and ordered. It is further reinforced by
Simplicius’ insistence that the epicyclic and eccentric hypotheses, not just
the homocentric hypotheses, are flawed [504.16–507.8, 510.24–26].
But why choose among hypotheses if none is demonstrably true and all
are inadequate? Surely, it would make more sense to abstain. The answer
lies in remembering that, for Simplicius and the late Platonists, speculation
in physical theory is a necessary stage in the educational progress from
Aristotle to Plato and, ultimately, to assimilation to the Craftsman God, and
that such speculation has to be in accord with observation and scientific
theory. So, granted that the astronomical hypotheses devised more recently
are superior empirically to those available to Aristotle, in choosing the
former, Simplicius and the late Platonists prove to be following Aristotle
both in his practice and in their sense of his teaching. But Simplicius also
wants to convey a further sense in which they are like him: for, as he makes
clear, just as Aristotle [505.27–506.8], so he and his school are aware of
the inadequacies of the theories that they choose [510.24–31]. The main
difference between Aristotle and the late Platonists turns out to be that they
are in a better position to see the shortcomings of speculation based on
homocentric hypotheses.
Simplicius makes this sufficiently plain in 509.16–26 when he mentions
the limitations to answers based on non-homocentric hypotheses to the
two central problems of De caelo 2.12. As for answers assuming homocentric
hypotheses at 488.25–489.4, he shows that these too have their limitations.
He wonders, for instance, about the need for raising the first problem if all
hypotheses are not proven true. To be sure, this is a valid question27 but one
that is easily answered. After all, as Simplicius himself implies, Aristotle had
to raise the first problem as he did because he was writing on the basis of
contemporary astronomical works with and for people who recognized var-
ious planetary motions and were trying to devise homocentric hypotheses
27 488.25–30. I take this to be a real question arising for Simplicius from his view of all
astronomical hypotheses in general: it is certainly formulated in a way that makes sense only
with the development of astronomical hypotheses after Aristotle.
simplicius, the apologist 71
to account for them. But, for Simplicius and his colleagues, there is no such
need since they are working at a time when better hypotheses are available.
Indeed, as Simplicius goes on to say,
But, since we are obliged to hazard making these sorts of comparisons in
general,28 perhaps it is not necessary for us to define the merits [of the planets]
in regard to the distinction between their places; but [it is necessary for us] to
say that each has been posted in the place where it benefits the universe.
[488.29–489.1]
This remark then opens into a teleological account of where the planets are
(and, presumably, of how they move) befitting a lesson in the late Platonic
school itself.
Thus, since bodies beneath the Moon do not have their own light but are
illuminated from without, ‘the two lights of the cosmos’ have rightly, one
might say, been stationed proximately above them, perhaps because [these
lights] have the simplicity of their motions for what is better than what is
composite. [489.1–4]
It would be wrong, of course, to see this as a repudiation of Aristotle’s first
problem or even of the solution given in the De caelo: coming when it does,
this remark registers instead the fact that the first problem assumes only that
the planets make diverse motions and suggests that this diversity can also
be explained teleologically without presupposing any specific astronomical
hypotheses.
Conclusion
28 488.31: this obligation arises from the central questions raised in De caelo 2.10 and 12.
72 chapter three
the day, and that this science can at best provide hypotheses that are consis-
tent with all the relevant phenomena known at the time. Moreover, unlike
Philoponus, I suspect, Simplicius does not hold that the non-homocentric
hypotheses devised after Aristotle are much better: at least, while they may
account for more of the putative phenomena, in his view, they still promise
only consistency with the realia, not truth, and are, accordingly, likewise
flawed. For Simplicius, then, the path to salvation through Aristotle to Plato
and the Craftsman God remains open and is indeed the only course.
For us, there is still one task left: to review how Simplicius deploys his
sources to construct his history of astronomy and the early Peripatos.
chapter four
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Alexander2 is an important source in Simplicius’ commentary on the De
caelo and Simplicius’ citations of him serve purposes that vary with the con-
text. Generally speaking, the citations in In de caelo 2.10–12 are roundly criti-
cal. No opinion attributed to Alexander save the one at 472.8–15 is accepted:
in the main, the citations of Alexander and their criticism give the impres-
sion that Alexander is an exegete of modest philosophical and technical
acumen. Indeed, even the exception occurs not because Alexander solves
the problem at hand but because his remark facilitates Simplicius’ presen-
tation of Aristotle’s ‘true’ meaning. To see this, let us review these citations
in turn.
On Teleology
After laying out Aristotle’s explanation in 2.10 of why the planetary motions
do not exhibit the expected proportionality, Simplicius wonders whether
it actually helps to suppose that the sphere of the fixed stars dominates
3 As noted previously, Alexander’s In de caelo is not extant today. Still, one may consider
this report in the light of his Quaestiones 1.1 and 1.25 [Bruns 1887, 2.20–4.26 and 39.9–41.19
(translated in Sharples 1992, 16–19, 82–86)] and the Mabādi" , an Arabic translation of his
otherwise unknown Περὶ ἀρχῶν τοῦ κόσµου [Genequand 2001].
76 chapter four
On a Circular Argument
Alexander is cited but once in Simplicius’ commentary on 2.11. The issue
is whether there is a circularity vitiating Aristotle’s argument in De caelo
291b11–17 that the heavenly bodies are spherical because they do not move
of their own accord and his argument in 2.8 that these bodies do not move of
their own accord because they are spherical [477.24–27.] Simplicius reports
that, for Alexander, there is no circularity because the conclusions in both
arguments are demonstrated by means of other considerations too [477.27–
478.3]. Simplicius then demolishes this peculiar contention: as he observes,
the claim that the demonstrations of these two propositions are circular is
independent of the existence of other proofs for each.
This time, however, the citation of Alexander, though unavailing in its
own right, frames Simplicius’ own suggestion that, for Aristotle, the two
propositions—that the heavenly bodies do not move of their own accord
and that these bodies are spherical—are convertible. In this way, Simplicius
defangs the charge of circularity [478.8–14], saves Aristotle, and incidentally
impugns Alexander once more as an interpreter.
On an Ellipsis
The first citation of Alexander in In de caelo 2.12 [481.22–24] is a clear in-
stance in which Simplicius goes out of his way to abuse him. Alexander’s
contention seems to have been that Aristotle’s encouragement at De caelo
292a14–17 that it is good to pursue answers to the two leading problems of
chapter 2.12 is expressed elliptically because the basis on which such inquiry
is reasonable is not given until 292a18–22 and elaborated subsequently to
that.7 So far as the substance of the claim goes, Simplicius would seem to
be in agreement [481.26–30]. What he objects to is the charge that Aristotle
writes elliptically rather than concisely [481.25–26]. But this is in truth a silly
quibble: ellipsis is a pervasive feature of Aristotle’s prose.
[485.12–29] using late Platonic concepts which are presumed relevant be-
cause of a passage purportedly in Aristotle’s On Prayer.9
9 See 130n82.
simplicius, the historian 79
On a Lexical Matter
There was, it seems, a debate among commentators about the logical rela-
tion of De caelo 292b15–30 and 292b30–293a4. Alexander is cited as one
who thought that the passages present independent arguments, putatively
because he thought that the demonstrative «ἥδε» (‘this’: 292b30) has «θέσις»
(‘position’), «τάξις» (‘order’) or «ἀνισότης δοκοῦσα» (‘apparent inequality’) as
its referent [491.1–2]. Simplicius, who for his part (correctly) thinks that the
passages constitute a single argument because «ἥδε» picks up «ὑπεροχήν»
(‘superiority’: see 292b29), notes that if Alexander is right, there is a large
lacuna in the received text. But either way, Simplicius is clear that there is
no real problem for Aristotle’s exposition [491.3–11].
Conclusion
In his commentary on 2.10–12, Simplicius’ citations of Alexander at 472.8–
15 (teleology), 477.27–478.3 (circular argument), and 485.5–10 (first prob-
lem) serve to frame Simplicius’ own interpretations. The first is especially
important because the interpretation framed [473.7–474.6] is essential to
Simplicius’ response to Philoponus. The first two citations, however, come
at some expense to Alexander’s reputation as an interpreter, given that in
the former what is reported is not in itself relevant and that in the latter it
is fallacious. In the third citation (four elements) and with the same result
Eudemus of Rhodes
Eudemus,13 though cited often in Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s
Physica,14 appears only four times in the In de caelo. In general, these cita-
tions allow Simplicius to elaborate a theme that is fundamental to his inter-
pretation of the De caelo and to distinguish Aristotle from other leading
figures in the early history of Greek thought.
On Anaximander
In the first instance [471.4–6], Eudemus is cited for the claim in some
unnamed text that, while Anaximander was the first to come up with an
account of the planetary sizes and distances, the Pythagoreans were in fact
the first to establish the order of these planets. This citation validates Aris-
totle’s turn in 2.10 to a new source of information, texts in astronomy, when
theorizing about the heavens, since, as Simplicius remarks, the order of
the planets (scil. their sizes and distances) has been demonstrated in these
works [471.1–4]. The point, in other words, is not that Anaximander and the
Pythagoreans offer the best account of the planetary sizes and distances—
Simplicius is aware of Ptolemy and his Hypotheses planetarum and even
mentions that Ptolemy perfected what Anaximander and the Pythagoreans
first proposed [471.6–11]—but that this was the sort of thing that Aristotle
had in mind. This citation, incidentally, suggests that, in pondering the pro-
portionality of the planetary sidereal periods, Aristotle was obliged to rely
on work in astronomy that was subsequently rendered obsolete.15
purposes.
16 See 136n118.
82 chapter four
far as the assertion about Plato goes, I regard this formulation of the Platonic
challenge as an anachronism.17 Indeed, I would urge that the assertion about
Plato is better seen as an expression of the effort by later Greek intellectuals
to characterize the massive impact that Plato had on subsequent thought,
perhaps on the basis of isolated passages in his dialogues.18
Such historical issues aside, however, it is very important to understand
the thrust of Simplicius’ citation. At its narrowest, it serves to buttress his
contention that the development of astronomical hypotheses to account for
the planetary motions is the consequence of a common failure to identify
their real motions by connecting these motions to their substantial nature,
and thus to distinguish properly what is real and what is apparent in the
observations of the planets [488.7–18]. As Simplicius would have it, this kind
of astronomical theorizing, although profoundly misguided, had a noble
lineage, its first practitioner being Eudoxus. Moreover, as a form of inquiry,
it was thought to go back to Plato who first formulated a challenge which,
as Simplicius intimates, set the course for subsequent theorizing about the
heavens.
Of course, it does not follow for Simplicius that Plato set such theorizing
in motion for the same reasons that others pursued it. Indeed, as I have
indicated in Chapter 3, Simplicius himself appears to have thought that
Plato’s challenge was actually misunderstood by those who attempted to
meet it by devising planetary hypotheses.
But, in any event, the most that Simplicius has to allow on this score
is that Plato gave voice to a program of research suited to, and welcomed
by, those like Eudoxus who were incapable of addressing the question of
the planetary motions within a proper physical theory. Here, then, we find
implicit a critical evaluation of Eudoxus’ contribution and in fact of any
account of the planetary motions by astronomers.
Moreover, according to Simplicius, such theorizing was the context in
which Aristotle solves the first of the two problems in 2.12, since, as he says,
Aristotle took for granted the plurality of motions which were to be saved or
accounted for by using hypotheses [488.3–9]. But this does not mean that
Simplicius regards Aristotle as one of those who cannot distinguish the real
and the apparent in the motions of the heavenly bodies and so are unable
to grapple with how the observed motions are explained by real motions
deriving from the nature of the heavenly bodies—which is all to the good,
given the De caelo itself.
So viewed, then, this citation of Eudemus and Sosigenes initiates Simpli-
cius’ disengagement of Aristotle from a reading of the De caelo that a polemi-
cist like Philoponus might urge, a disengagement completed in the great
digression at the end of In de caelo 2.12. Given this much, however, we can dis-
cern the outlines of a critical thread in the apologia. If Simplicius sees Aris-
totle as a proponent of the sort of physical theory needed for understanding
the planetary motions, and if he thinks that Aristotle still took for granted
the planetary stations and retrogradations and even adopted homocentric
planetary hypotheses, it would seem to follow that, for Simplicius, chap-
ter 2.12 is a provisional exercise made in an effort to advance physical theory.
Indeed, he would surely be right in this. After all, the two problems
of 2.12 are matters that anyone who has followed the demolition of the
Pythagorean thesis of cosmic ἁρµονία might still raise and as such these
problems should be answered on commonly held terms. In the present
instance, this would entail supposing (but not necessarily accepting) that
the planets do indeed make all the observed motions as well as introducing
as heuristic premisses claims (such as that the celestial bodies are ensouled
and act) which are in fact presented elsewhere as doctrine.19
On Callippus
The third and fourth citations of Eudemus are like the citation of Anaximan-
der in that they each lack mention of a text and concern technical points in
astronomy proper.20 In the third, Simplicius cites Eudemus to clarify why
Callippus added two carrying spheres to the hypotheses for the Sun and the
Moon [497.17–22]. The fourth [497.22–24] concerns Callippus’ addition of
one carrying sphere to the hypotheses for Mercury, Venus, and Mars. Here
Simplicius cites Eudemus either to say that there was a reason which is left
unstated (or missing) or to report that Eudemus did not in fact indicate Cal-
lippus’ reasoning.21
the third is stated concisely (συντόµως); and the fourth, concisely and clearly (συντόµως
καὶ σαφῶς). Though Baltussen [2008, 101] interprets these adverbs in Simplicius’ citations
84 chapter four
The lack of technical detail in these citations is a sign, I take it, that Sim-
plicius is writing with an eye on the divide between Aristotle and those who
cannot distinguish appearance and reality in the motions of the heavenly
bodies and who are thus unable to account for what one observes by way
of motions that are not only smooth, circular, and ordered, but also derive
from the substance of the bodies themselves. What is important here, appar-
ently, is that Callippus and Eudoxus are seen to belong in the latter group:
the details are not required.
Conclusion
Eudemus, though cited but a few times, is still an important player in Sim-
plicius’ roster of sources for his commentary on the De caelo. Simplicius uses
him as an authority in driving a wedge between the homocentric hypothe-
ses of Eudoxus/Callippus and Aristotle’s talk of the planetary motions in De
caelo 2.12 and Meta. Λ.8. As Simplicius has already indicated [see 32.12–29],
Aristotle’s elaboration of these hypotheses is provisional or heuristic and
need entail no commitment.22 The citations from Eudemus contribute to
this segregation of Aristotle.
Claudius Ptolemy
The three citations of Ptolemy in In de caelo 2.12 confirm what is manifest
earlier in the commentary, that Ptolemy is Simplicius’ leading authority in
matters of mathematics and technical astronomy.23 In 471.9–11,
the sizes and distances of these [planets] have been made more precise by
those who come after Aristotle and quite perfectly so by those associated with
Hipparchus, Aristarchus, and Ptolemy
Ptolemy stands as the last of those living after Aristotle who have imp-
roved on the values for the sizes and distances of the Moon, Sun, Mercury,
and Venus. In fact, Ptolemy (along with the Hipparchans24 and Aristarchus)
is said to have made them perfectly precise. The same general point is made
when Simplicius cites Ptolemy again at 474.26–28. Here Ptolemy’s nesting
hypothesis for the planetary spheres of the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the
Moon is adduced in the criticism of Alexander on isodromy.25 At 510.19–23,
by the way, this nesting hypothesis is explicitly embraced.
With Simplicius’ comment at 471.9–11, one should recall his earlier re-
mark that Ptolemy disregarded earlier (homocentric) accounts of how the
heavens move and proposed to save the phenomena by positing a system
of homocentric spheres in which eccentric and epicyclic hypotheses are
embedded, a system of planetary hypotheses that plainly ignored any strict
requirement that the heavenly bodies have circular motions centered on
the Earth.26 In this way, Ptolemy is emphatically placed at a stage in the
development of astronomy which is far beyond what the science was in
Aristotle’s time. This is further reinforced in the third citation [506.16–22]
when Ptolemy attacks the very idea of using unwinding spheres,27 and adds
weight to Simplicius’ own criticism of the homocentric hypotheses.
One should recall as well that Simplicius has already acknowledged in
another context that there has been progress in astronomy since the time of
Aristotle, progress which he rightly connects to Ptolemy:
But inasmuch as Ammonius, our Head,28 observed Arcturus in my presence
in Alexandria through a solid astrolabe29 and found that it had changed in
respect of its position as given by Ptolemy by the amount which was required
in that it moved [in the direction opposite to the daily rotation] one degree
in 100 years,30 it would perhaps be truer to say that the starless sphere, which
contains all [spheres] and of which there was not yet knowledge, so it seems,
in Aristotle’s time, by performing this single, simple motion from the east
brings the other [spheres] round [with it];31 that the [sphere] which is called
this observation as one of stellar precession. Otto Neugebauer [1975, 1037] notes that Ammo-
nius’ observation purportedly confirming Ptolemy’s value for precession was in fact in error
by an observable 2;50°.
31 462.24–26: the starless sphere is responsible for the daily rotation; the sphere of the
fixed stars makes a full rotation in the opposite direction in 36,000 years.
86 chapter four
fixed by us performs two motions, one which is of the whole from the east
and its proper motion from the west; that the heavenly bodies in [the fixed
sphere perform] these two [motions] as well as their proper rotation; and that
the successive spheres and the [planetary] bodies in them likewise [perform
respectively] the same two and the same three motions. [462.20–31]
Ptolemy, who is presented as the pinnacle in a technical science that had
progressed on several fronts since the time of Aristotle, thus serves as the
leading authority in a discipline ancillary to physical theory. The very fact
that he has authority, that his views are to be noted and embraced, is, how-
ever, tempered by the realization that his expertise will likely be superseded
and, at any rate, does not include giving the true account of the planetary
motions. Thus, at the close of his apologia, when he rescues the second prob-
lem of 2.12 and accepts the planetary nesting hypothesis earlier ascribed to
Ptolemy, Simplicius shows himself to be in the same position as Aristotle: as
he must turn to Ptolemy, so Aristotle turned to Callippus.
Sosigenes
In addition to the citation of Sosigenes in 488.18–24,32 there are 10 other
occasions in which Simplicius explicitly names Sosigenes. The question
of how much to include in these citations is controversial and I will add
nothing here beyond what is proposed in the notes to my translation—in
short, a conservative determination of what one absolutely must ascribe to
Sosigenes, given the Greek itself.
Nevertheless, it will, I presume, be agreed on all sides that these citations
are taken from a single, unnamed work.33 Equally clear is that this work
included explication and criticism of the homocentric hypotheses laid out
in Aristotle’s Meta. Λ.8 as well as criticism of astronomical hypotheses rival
to them [see 509.26–28, 510.24–26].
Now, Sosigenes, though a Peripatetic philosopher and the teacher of
Alexander, was writing at a time when the epithet ‘Peripatetic’ meant only
that one read and respond to Aristotle and not, as Alexander would later
insist, that one accept and defend Aristotle’s views. The aim of the work that
Simplicius draws on was, apparently, to clarify the ancient and more recent
planetary hypotheses by examining critically the claim that they do in fact
save the phenomena [510.26–31].
Coda
In the preceding chapters, I have endeavored to show that one of the guiding
aims in In de caelo 2.10–12 is to vindicate the late Platonists and their faith
in the ultimate value of reading Aristotle. In this Chapter, I have indicated
numerous ways in which Simplicius marshals diverse literary sources to
facilitate this fundamental aim. Moreover, I have in various Comments
indicated that Simplicius’ history of astronomy from the time of Aristotle
to his day (or better, to the time of Ptolemy, when for Simplicius it seems
to end) is not possible on empirical grounds. I have also attacked here and
elsewhere that historiography which presumes to correct Simplicius in the
hope of getting to the historical truth: in my view, what this historiography
offers instead with its judgments of what seems likely and so forth is nothing
more than the unseemly comfort of reading oneself into the past. Further, if
we reflect on how Simplicius actually reads the past, using him to recon-
struct the history of astronomy will seem no less foolish than relying on
him to interpret Aristotle. In short, I do not agree that in their analyses of
Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 2.12 Schiaparelli and his more recent
intellectual epigony reach any valid insight into the history of astronomy in
the fourth and third centuries bc.
As I see it, the question is not, ‘What does Simplicius tell us of the history
of earlier astronomy per se?’ Rather, the question should be, ‘How does
his narrative stand in relation to contemporary and earlier accounts of the
history of astronomy?’ The challenge is to understand each account on its
own terms and to determine its interactions with the others, if there are any.
Now, that there were rivals to Simplicius’ narrative is apparent when Sim-
plicius reports that Nicomachus and Iamblichus attribute the first eccentric
planetary hypotheses to the Pythagoreans [507.12–14].39 Moreover, even a
brief survey of Pliny’s Nat. hist., Theon’s De util. math., and Proclus’ works, for
example, reveals divergent accounts of who did what and why in astronomy.
In addition, it is also evident that elements of Simplicius’ account were
already in place. Thus, for instance, though the elaboration in 504.20–505.19
of the claim that all the heavenly bodies vary in their apparent size (bright-
ness) may well be due to Simplicius, the claim itself underlies Philoponus’
polemic in 32.9–11. Further, the more limited (and yet still false) thesis that
the Sun is visibly larger at perigee is attested in earlier Platonizing litera-
ture.40 Likewise, the values for the synodic and sidereal periods that Sim-
plicius records are taken from some source, not Ptolemy however, perhaps
with an eye to Plato’s Timaeus.
My aim in raising this question of narratives is not, of course, to reinstate
the usual Quellenforschung. In the first place, any talk of rival narratives and
borrowed elements should be limited to texts in hand. Only in this way may
41 See, e.g., 462.20–31 [pp. 85–86]. On the late Platonist engagement with the Almagest,
CONCLUSION
life takes place. For Simplicius and Philoponus, there was no rift between
these sets of values, no conflict of religion and science. For late Platonist and
Christian alike, all these values were fundamentally religious, since they ulti-
mately concerned God and entailed appropriate conduct over the course of
a lifetime. From this perspective, Simplicius’ Platonism is admirable and his
commentary on De caelo 2.10–12 will reward study by any and all who can
put aside the expectation that Simplicius conveys ancient astronomical the-
ory whether wittingly or witlessly.
TRANSLATION
291a29–b101
10.03, p. 203.
4 De caelo 291a31–32 κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀποστήµασι: «κατὰ λόγον» is qualified by a dative of
respect. For both Aristotle and Simplicius, two magnitudes can be in a ratio only if they are
of the same kind: cf. Euclid, Elem. 5 defs 4 and 5.
5 De caelo 291b3 εὔλογον (reasonable): for divergent interpretations of the significance of
this term, see Bolton 2009, Matthen 2009, Leunissen 2009, and Pellegrin 2009. The question is
whether such terms always introduce purely dialectical, a priori arguments or whether they
sometimes indicate teleological arguments that are derived from what is observed perhaps
in another domain.
6 De caelo 291b8–9 κατὰ λόγον τῆς ἀποστάσεως.
7 De caelo 291b9–10 οἱ µαθηµατικοί: on this translation, see Comment 10.04, pp. 203–204.
98 in aristotelis de caelo 2.10
are prior (that is, nearer the fixed [sphere]) and which ones are posterior
(that is, nearer the Earth), and moreover, of course, how they are related
[471.1] to one another in respect of their distances (which are compared in refer-
ence to the Earth) on the basis of which the ratios of their sizes are in fact
known.8 Thus, he says, regarding these matters ‘let us theorize on the basis of
[works] on astronomy’,9 since proof has in fact been given there of the order-
ing of the wandering [stars], that is, [proof] of their sizes and distances—
[5] Anaximander being the first to come up with an account of their sizes and
distances, as Eudemus reports in attributing the ordering of their position
to the Pythagoreans first.10 The sizes and distances of the Sun and Moon
have been known until now by taking the means of their determination
from eclipses11—and it was reasonable12 that Anaximander discovered these
concern about the sizes and distance of the spheres (or circles) on which the fixed stars and
the planets move. Though he does write of the sizes of the Sun and Moon at 471.6, the issue
for him is not what we call the magnitude or apparent size of a given fixed star or planet.
471.1 καταλαµβάνονται: see Comment 10.05, pp. 204–205.
9 471.2: see De caelo 291a31–32. The text set in italics is a quotation of these lines from the
De caelo. I will use this convention whenever Simplicius actually quotes the text of Aristotle.
10 471.4: Anaximander of Miletus (sixth century bc, died after –546).
471.4–5: Hall [1971] suggests that, so far as Anaximander is concerned, the sizes and
distances in question are those of the Sun and Moon only. But this is difficult, even if one
assumes the same for the Pythagoreans, given that, both in what precedes and what follows,
Simplicius is concerned with all seven planetary bodies. For what little they are worth, the
ancient reports about Anaximander’s account suggest that he was thinking of the diameter
of the rotating planetary rings of fire as well as of the diameter of the opening in these rings
through which the fire is visible, Earth’s diameter being the unit of measure: see Kirk, Raven,
and Schofield 1983, 135–136.
471.5: Eudemus of Rhodes (late fourth century bc), a younger contemporary of Aristotle,
who may have been a candidate to succeed Aristotle as head of the Lyceum. On Eudemus’
writings on Aristotle’s Physica and Simplicius’ use of them, see Falcon 2012, 167; Baltussen
2008, 99–104. For discussion of Eudemus’ book on earlier Greek astronomy, see Bowen 2003a,
315–318.
471.5–6: the Greek would seem to mean that, in Simplicius’ view, Eudemus held that,
while Anaximander was the first to raise and address the question of the planetary sizes and
distances, the Pythagoreans were the first to give a correct account of their sequence [cf.
Wehrli 1969, 121 ad fr. 146]. Timpanaro Cardini [1958–1964, 3.202–203], however, maintains
that only the claim about the Pythagoreans comes from Eudemus.
11 471.6–8: as they are determined, for instance, in the third-century treatise De magnitu-
dinibus by Aristarchus. This is not how Ptolemy computes the sizes and distances of the Sun
and Moon in Alm. 5.13–16.
471.7 τὴν ἀφορµὴν τῆς καταλήψεως λαβόντα: «λαβόντα» (‘taking’) seems odd. Note Gros-
seteste’s ‘occasionem assumptionis accipientes’ [Bossier n.d.a, 141.1, reading ‘assumptionis’
for ‘sumptiones’] and Moerbeke’s more literal ‘occasionem comprehensionis sumentes’
[Bossier n.d.b, 448.9].
12 471.8 εἶκος ἦν (it was reasonable): probably not to be read as ‘it is likely’ [so Mueller
in aristotelis de caelo 2.10 99
[sizes and distances] too—and [the sizes and distances] of Mercury and
Venus from their coincidence13 with [the Sun and Moon]. The sizes and dis- [10]
tances of these [planets] have been made more precise by those who come
after Aristotle and quite perfectly so by those associated with Hipparchus,
Aristarchus, and Ptolemy.14
It turns out, he says, that the motions are in proportion to their distances
because [planets] that are nearer the Earth, like the Moon, move faster,
whereas those that are farther move more slowly in the proportion of their
distances.15
Now then, this [claim], which was appropriately introduced in his ac- [15]
count of the ordering, that is, of the distances, justifiably raised a problem:
why the [planets] circling near the Earth move faster and the [ones] that are
higher and come closer to the fixed [sphere] move more slowly, just as the
[star] of Saturn which returns in position after 30 years [moves more slowly]
than the Moon which makes a revolution in a month. In fact, the problem
could be motivated from two [considerations.
First,] from size, since the larger body performs its proper motion faster, [20]
as Aristotle himself said,16 and since the containing body is always larger
2005, 11]. Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘conveniens erat’ [Bossier n.d.a, 141.1] and Moerbeke’s ‘verisimile
erat’ [Bossier n.d.b, 448.9–10].
13 471.9: reading «παραβολῆς» rather than Heiberg’s «µεταπαραβολῆς». See Comment
471.11 τῶν περὶ ῞Ιππαρχον καὶ ᾽Αρίσταρχον καὶ Πτολεµαῖον: on the translation, see Comment
10.07, pp. 206–207.
15 471.12–14: Simplicius confuses Aristotle’s position. For Aristotle, the motions and dis-
tances of the planets are proportional when the distances are taken from the sphere of
the fixed stars. But Simplicius, perhaps out of his desire to speak of planetary distances
and sizes as well, mistakenly assumes that the proportionality which Aristotle mentions
holds when the distances are taken from (the center of) the Earth: see Comment 10.01,
p. 201. Granted, there may be such a proportionality and the three worthies named in
471.11 certainly do construe planetary distances in reference to the Earth; but that is not
what Aristotle meant. Nor does establishing one reckoning of this proportionality entail
the other. Note that Themistius [In de caelo B 10] makes this confusion explicit by suppos-
ing that the proportionality holds with the distance from (the center of) the Earth [Lan-
dauer 1902, 118.8–12] and with the distance from the celestial sphere [Landauer 1902, 118.12–
24].
16 471.20: the claim that the larger body performs its proper motion faster is repeated in
various forms at 474.7–8 (larger spheres are faster by nature), 474.30–32 (the upper spheres
are larger and, therefore, have longer periods), 475.29–30 (the larger sphere is in fact faster),
and 476.5–6 (larger bodies perform their natural motion faster). See Comment 10.08, pp. 207–
208.
100 in aristotelis de caelo 2.10
than the body contained. How, then, are the outer [motions] not performed
faster in the ratio of their size or distance, but to the contrary are performed
more slowly?
Yet [second], the problem must also be raised from proximity or distance
[25] to the fixed [sphere]. For, if the fixed [sphere] performs the fastest motion of
all the spheres, it is a consequence that the [bodies] nearer to it move faster
than those that are farther in the ratio of their distance, I mean, that if the
Earth is immovable by nature, the [planets] that come closer to the Earth
would have to be slower than those at a greater distance and this again in
the ratio of their distance.
Now, in solving these problems handily, he says that, since the fixed
[30] [sphere] performs a single motion that is fastest ( I mean, the motion from
the east), whereas the wandering [stars perform] this motion as well as the
one in the opposite direction, it would be reasonable that the [wandering
star] nearest the fastest revolution17 goes through its revolution opposite
to [the fastest revolution] in the most time because [this wandering star’s
[472.1] revolution] is dominated and resisted by it,18 whereas the [wandering star]
that is farthest19 moves faster than the others because it is dominated least
of all on account of its distance, and that ‘the intermediate [bodies] actually
[move] in the ratio of their distance, just as the mathematical scientists in fact
prove’.20
What then? Do the [spheres] that come closer to the fixed [sphere] move
[5] more slowly because they are overcome by it? And yet, if [they move] by
force, [they do] in fact [move] utterly contrary to [their] nature. Conse-
quently, [the spheres] will perform both their motions, that is, the one
from the east which they perform with the fixed [sphere] and the one
from the west (that is, their proper motion) by force and contrary to [their]
nature.21
Aristotle in supposing that each planet has but one sphere. See Comment 10.09, pp. 208–
209.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.10 101
Alexander22 confronts this problem quite well23 when he says that the very
fast motion of the fixed [sphere] is the cause of the slower return in position [10]
for the sphere of Saturn, yet [that sphere] is by no means itself unwilling.24
Indeed, it should choose and want this, since nothing would be better for
[the spheres] or more worthy of choice than this sort of cosmic arrange-
ment. Thus, both necessary causation and final causation coincide25—since
not only what is by force is necessary26—that is, because it is best that it
be so [the sphere of Saturn moves] willingly; but because [it] is close to the
[sphere] that goes round in the opposite direction,27 [it moves] out of neces- [15]
sity.
Of course, their motions due to their influence on one another28 are not
for the [planetary spheres] contrary to nature, given that, because there is
not an opposite, they do not have any motion that is contrary to nature.29
Since all the motions which [the spheres] perform are according to nature
of Aristotle’s philosophy perhaps in Athens sometime during the period between ad 198
and 209. His commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo has not survived. He was a student of
Sosigenes (second century ad), a Peripatetic philosopher: cf. Hayduck 1899, 143.12–14; Bowen
2008c.
Simplicius is clear that Alexander’s interpretations of Aristotle’s arguments are good and
even better than those of the other Peripatetics; but when it comes to arguments in which
Aristotle criticizes Plato, he regards Alexander’s accounts as dangerously wrong [see 377.20–
34 and translation, p. 60]. Still, typically, Simplicius cites Alexander as a guide in clarifying the
meaning of a passage as well as in rejecting other interpretations. It is worth noting, however,
that in commenting on De caelo 2.10–12, though he cites Alexander often, Simplicius does
this either to reject or to qualify what he takes to be Alexander’s meaning. At no point does
he simply accept what Alexander says [see pp. 74–80]. On Alexander’s role in Simplicius’
commentaries more generally, see Baltussen 2008, 107–134. On Alexander, see also Baltussen
2007, 271–273; Tuominen 2009, 21–24.
472.8–20: see fr. 155a in Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.277–284.
23 472.8 καλῶς δὴ: perhaps ‘in an entirely correct way’.
24 472.10 οὐκ ἀκούσῃ µέντοι οὐδὲ αὐτῇ: cf. Denniston 1966, 196–197.
25 472.12–13: literally, ‘the cause in accordance with what is necessary and the cause in
‘necessarium enim non violentum solum’ [Bossier n.d.a, 142.17], where ‘violentum’ means
‘an act of violence’ and lacks the passive nuance that the Greek has in this instance, and
Moerbeke’s better ‘necessarium enim non quod violentum solum’ [Bossier n.d.b, 453.10–
454.1]. See Comment 10.10, p. 209.
27 472.15 τῆς ἀντιστρεφοµένης: scil. the fixed sphere.
28 472.15–16 αἱ ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων κινήσεις: cf. 100n18. There is no indication in Aristotle’s text thus
far that the lower planetary spheres act on the celestial sphere or, for that matter, that there
might be spheres other than the celestial sphere which act on lower planetary spheres.
29 472.16: this is argued in De caelo 1.4.
102 in aristotelis de caelo 2.10
for them, it must be that some motions arise from [the spheres]30 and others
arise due to [the spheres’] influence on one another. Consequently, even in
the case of the motion which [the planetary spheres] perform because they
are moved with the fixed sphere, one should say the same thing, namely,
[20] that not even this is contrary to nature for them.31
But perhaps the problem still remains.32 For let it be the case that their
motions due to influence on one another are performed neither by force
nor contrary to nature but willingly. Would it not be absolutely necessary33
as well that the spheres have proper motions34 according to nature, since
they are ensouled and share in activity, as he himself will say?35 But, if the
[25] motions which they perform are two in number, the one from the east
and the one from the west, inasmuch as [the planetary spheres] perform
the motion from the east which belongs to the fixed [sphere] (given that
they are carried round in this motion with it) and inasmuch as they also
have the motion from the west which is itself dominated and resisted by
the fixed [sphere], what proper motion can they have according to nature?
Consequently, Aristotle’s account has not solved the problems of how it is
[30] still true that the larger body performs its proper motion faster; and of how
what is close to the fixed [sphere] (which has the fastest motion) and is
plainly more akin to it (since nearness in place has been assigned according
[473.1] to kinship in substance) has a slower motion, whereas what is next to the
immovable Earth has a faster one.
So, [Alexander]36 has not, I think, solved these [problems]; rather, he has
conceived another cause that does not finally get away from what is by force.
That is to say, even if [the planetary spheres] have this derivative motion
30 472.18 ἐξ αὐτῶν: from the spheres, not from the motions as Mueller [2005, 13] would have
it.
31 472.18–20: by arguing that all the planetary motions are natural because there is no
motion contrary to circular motion, Simplicius effectively argues that no planetary motion
is forced, since all forced motion is contrary to nature.
32 472.21 µήποτε (perhaps). As Baltussen remarks [2008, 127, 129], this adverb is typically
a marker for Simplicius’ own views and does not express real doubt: cf. 478.8, 481.24, 485.11,
88.30, 490.30, 510.19. At 480.19 and 491.10, «µήποτε» is better taken to mean ‘never’ or ‘on no
account’.
33 472.22–23: not ‘Would it still really be necessary …’ [see Mueller 2005, 13].
34 472.23 οἰκείας κινήσεις: motions that are inherent or proprietary and, as Simplicius will
life’).
36 Cf. Bossier [n.d.a, 143.15–16] prints the parenthetical remark ‘Alexander videlicet sua
superiori solutione solvit’ in his edition of Grosseteste’s translation, but reports in his appa-
ratus that the phrase is not found in the codices.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.10 103
from the east because they are moved with the fixed [sphere], nothing
prevents them from performing this motion willingly because they also have
their proper motion, that is, their motion according to a proper impulse [5]
which is unimpeded37 and proceeds according to nature, as if they were not
even carried round with the fixed [sphere]. But if their proper [motion] (that
is, [their motion] according to nature) is dominated as it is resisted, how will
it be unforced?
[Forced it will be] unless someone should say that, in so far as they are
akin to it, the [planetary spheres] which are near to the fixed [sphere] do
themselves have as proper the motion from the east,38 and that the larger
[sphere] always moves faster in that its magnitude and speed of motion [10]
are in the same ratio because there is a single union of all the spheres in
a single heavenly body.39 However, in so far as [these spheres] possess a
nature that moves in the opposite direction, the ones that come under a
little way to [the fixed sphere] perform the motion akin to [the motion of the
fixed sphere] faster because they remain more in the peculiar character of
the fixed sphere; whereas [they perform] the [motion] of the nature which [15]
goes in the opposite direction more slowly40 because they are not somehow
constituted purely according to that [eastward moving nature]—just as the
sphere of the Moon, which is farther from the fixed sphere not only in place
but also in substance and nearer the process of becoming, performs the
motion of the fixed [sphere] more slowly (inasmuch as the [Moon’s] sphere
is smaller)41 and the contrary revolution faster.
37 473.4–6 τὴν οἰκεῖαν κίνησιν τὴν κατ’ οἰκεῖαν ὁρµὴν γινοµένην ἀνεµπόδιστον ἔχουσι καὶ κατὰ
φύσιν προϊοῦσαν: or perhaps ‘have unimpeded their proper motion, that is, their motion
which is according to their proper impulse and which proceeds according to nature’: cf.
Moerbeke’s ‘et proprium motum qui secundum proprium impetum fit, non impeditum
habent et secundum naturam procedentem’ [Bossier n.d.b, 457.3–5].
38 473.9 οἰκείαν ἔχειν καὶ αὐτὰς τὴν ἀπ’ ἀνατολῆς κινήσιν: «οἰκείαν» is predicative. It is clear
in what follows that the motion to the east is also a proper motion, that is, a motion that
belongs to each sphere because of its nature [but see Mueller 2005, 13].
39 473.9–12: Simplicius is focusing on the planetary spheres and their diurnal rotation [cf.
Moon is farthest from the fixed stars, it does follow that its sphere will be smaller and, thus,
that its diurnal motion (linear speed) is least. Yet, at issue here is the fact that this westward
motion must be natural to the Moon and not forced. In context, then, this remark subverts
the effort to locate the Moon’s two motions in its very substance; and so it would seem to be
a marginal gloss that has crept into the text at an early stage. See Comment 10.11, pp. 209–
210.
104 in aristotelis de caelo 2.10
opposite.
45 474.2–3 ἥ τε τοῦ µεγέθους πρὸς τὸ τάχος ἀναλογία. This is not the happiest of formulations:
see 97n4.
46 474.4 ὡς πλανωµένων: scil. their simple sidereal (or longitudinal) motion eastward; there
Moon.
54 474.23: note that, whereas Ptolemy assigns greatest and least distances to the Sun in his
Hypoth. plan. [cf. Goldstein 1967, 7 col. 1; Morelon 1993, 64–66], at Alm. 5.15 he indicates only
that it has one distance, 1210 Earth radii. That is, he does not assert that this distance of 1210
Earth radii is a mean distance. So it would seem that Simplicius is indeed drawing on the
Almagest here, as he says. But see Comment 10.13, pp. 211–213.
55 474.26–28: see Comment 10.13, pp. 211–213.
474.28: scil. ἐκκεντρότητος. Mueller [2005, 15 and n16] suggests ‘distance’ (presumably
106 in aristotelis de caelo 2.10
understanding «ἀποστάσεως») [cf. Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.281–282]. Simplicius here calls the
distance of the center of each planet’s circle from the center of the Earth an eccentricity, and
so indicates an alternative usage: see Figure 10.01, p. 181. For the eccentricity of two circles
as the distance between their centers, see, e.g., Geminus, Intro. ast. 1.31–41; Cleomedes, Cael.
1.4.49–71, 2.5.139–141; Theon, De util. math. 3.49 [Hiller 1878, 201.7–13]. For the meaning of
‘eccentricity’ in the Almagest, see Comment 10.13, pp. 211–213.
56 474.29–30: cf. 474.14–16.
57 474.30–32. Given this and what follows, Alexander’s point is that the linear speeds, i.e.,
the linear measures of the arc which each planet travels in a given time, are the same. For,
since Π = 2π/ω (where Π is the planet’s period and ω is its angular speed) and ω = θ/t (where
θ is the angular distance traveled in time t), then Π 1:Π 2 :: ω2:ω1. So, if Π 1:Π 2 :: r1:r2, then r1ω1 =
r2ω2 and r1θ1 = r2θ2, which means that the arcs traveled in time t and, hence, the linear speeds
are the same.
58 475.2–4: the mean sidereal period of the Moon is 27.321661 days. See Comment 10.14, pp.
213–214.
59 475.4–8. By hypothesis, the ratio of the periods (Π) of Saturn (S) and the Moon (M) is
360:1 and so rS:rM :: 360:1, where r is the radius of a planetary sphere. On this assumption, the
arc that Saturn describes in one month is 1/360 of its total path. Moreover, this arc must be the
same length as that arc which the Moon travels in the same month since both planets move
at the same (linear) speed. If, however, ΠS:ΠM :: 360:1 while rS:rM > 360:1, though the angular
distance θS that Saturn travels in a month remains the same, the linear distance traveled (rSθ)
will increase and so become greater than the arc traveled by the Moon. Thus, Saturn will move
faster or have a greater (linear) speed than the Moon, though their periods remain the same.
60 475.9–10: this is not a general thesis about circular motion but a claim about planetary
periods.
61 475.11: cf. Tim. 38e6–39a3.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.10 107
[The beings needed to produce time together] are sent around along the
oblique motion of the Different, which goes round through the motion of the
Same and is dominated [by it]62—one group of them moving on a greater
[circle], the other on a smaller [circle]; those on a smaller [circle] faster, those
on a larger [circle] more slowly.63
And in the Republic,64 when he speaks of the ordering of the [planets] and [15]
puts the fixed [sphere] first, the Moon eighth and the others in between, he
adds:
the eighth [goes] the fastest of these; the seventh, sixth, and fifth are together
with one another, second;65 the fourth goes third in motion;66 while the third
is fourth and the second, fifth.
But Plato could be saying that the lower [planets] move faster while focusing
on the time interval of their return in position alone—because they do [20]
return in position in a shorter [time interval]—but not in fact on the ratio
of their size. For, if, as has been said,67 the ratio of their size exceeds the ratio
of their time interval of motion, it is possible for what returns in position in
a shorter time interval to be slower.68
Yet Aristotle seems to find the solution of the problem on the assumption [25]
that the motion itself of what is nearer the Earth is faster.69 The reason is that,
if being dominated and resisted by the fixed [sphere] hinders motion itself
and makes it slower, it is clear that the motion of [a planet] nearer the Earth
is faster intrinsically and not because of its [faster] return in position. [That
62 475.11–12: διὰ τῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ φορᾶς ἰόντα τε καὶ κρατουµένην. On the text, see Comment
transition to the plurals in 475.13, «θᾶττον µὲν τὰ … τὰ δὲ», [Tim. 39a2–3]. As Taylor [1928,
203–204 ad Tim. 39a2] observes, the construction here is complicated and artificial.
475.14 περιίεται: note that the received text has «περιῄειν» (‘they kept revolving’) [cf.
Burnet 1900–1905, vol. 4 ad Tim. 39a2].
64 475.14: cf. Resp. 617a7–b3.
65 475.16 δεύτερον: Karsten’s edition (Heiberg’s c) has «δευτέρους» as is found in the Pla-
tonic mss.
66 475.17–18: Plato, Resp. 617b1–2 has «τρίτον δὲ φορᾷ ἰέναι, ὡς σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλού-
µενον τὸν τέταρτον» (‘Third in motion, as it appears to them, goes the fourth in circling round
back [to itself]’). Cf. Bowen 2001, 814–816.
67 475.21: cf. 475.2–8.
68 475.22 δύνατον (omitted in Mueller 2005, 16): the ratio of the radii of two spheres is the
same as the ratio of their circumferences; and, if this ratio is greater than the ratio of the
period of the greater sphere to that of the smaller sphere, then it follows that the linear speed
of the greater sphere is greater than that of the smaller sphere [see 106n59].
69 Cf. 471.14–28.
108 in aristotelis de caelo 2.10
is, it is clear] unless one should really say that the predominance of the fixed
[sphere] does not make the larger revolution (which is, as a matter of fact,
faster and can, in so far as it is within its power, return in position together
[30] with the smaller [revolution]) appear that much faster [than the smaller
[476.1] revolution], and that Aristotle would be the one who gives the explanation
for this—not of the fact that the [spheres] close to the fixed [sphere] are
slower without qualification but of the fact that they appear slower than
they are [by nature]. For, though the [larger spheres] are going, so far as
it is within their power, to return together with the smaller spheres—if it
should happen—[these larger spheres] fall short by the amount [that they
do] of returning in position together [with the smaller ones] because of the
[5] predominance of the fixed [sphere].70 Certainly, in this way too the argument
that larger [bodies] perform their natural motion faster and by the amount
that they are larger remains unshaken. In fact, it is not at all illogical that a
particular form have a capacity71 such that, while it is a specific thing because
of itself, it becomes such and such because of the predominance of what is
[10] stronger, just as it has limited capacity because of itself but exists and moves
without limit because of the unmoved cause.
Those who say by way of assumption that all the spheres perform the
same motion from the east so that day by day the Saturnian sphere returns
within a short distance of its position with the fixed [sphere], and the
[sphere] of Jupiter within a greater distance and so forth in this way,72
escape many other problems, since the motion will in fact have the speeds
[15] proportional to the sizes and since things made of the same substance
will make the same motion. But this sort of hypothesis has been proven
70 475.28–476.3 Simplicius suggests that each planet has an intrinsic motion to the east,
that the larger planetary spheres have by nature a greater linear speed than the smaller
ones and almost (note «ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῇ») the same angular speed, and that these larger
spheres appear slower in their eastward motion than they really are because each night the
planets nearer the fixed stars fall short of the fixed stars by less than do the planets farther
away.
476.1–3: see Euclid, Opt. dem. 54 for argument that, of bodies moving at the same linear
speed, the one farther from the observer will appear to move more slowly [cf. Heiberg 1895,
240.14–22].
71 476.7 ἐπιτηδειότητος (capacity): for discussion of this non-Aristotelian piece of jargon
theorists in antiquity who might seem to solve the problem that he has been discussing by
supposing that the planets actually have only one real motion, the one from east to west. For
it follows from this that the planetary motion eastward is an apparent motion, not a real or
independent motion. Cf. Theon, De util. math. 3.18 [Hiller 1878, 147.14–19].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.10 109
impossible.73 The reason is that the revolution of any wandering [star]74 must
be along a circle and this [circle] must always be the same if its motion
has been ordained so that it is in fact knowable.75 So, will they state that
this circle on which they say that each of the wandering [stars] makes its [20]
motion from east to west is one of the parallel [circles] or a [circle] oblique
to them?76 Certainly, if it were [one] of the parallel [circles], [the planetary
circles] would not have to come farther south or farther north, nor would
they have to rise and set at different positions on the horizon.77 But if [they
say] an oblique [circle], each of the wandering [stars] would have to appear
during each day farther south or farther north because they all go round [25]
the oblique circle, as they say, in accordance with each revolution of the
universe except for the degrees which they appear leaving behind.78 Both
these [alternatives] are contrary to the clear [facts].
It is worth knowing that on every hypothesis the problem raised about
[planetary] stars that keep pace [with one another]79—how the containing
73 476.16–17: cf., e.g., Geminus, Intro. ast. 12.14–27 which discusses this account of planetary
speaker views as in agreement with the facts and so may here be rendered by ‘since’ as well
[see Smyth 1971, § 2246].
76 476.20–21: the question is whether each planet makes its westward motion on a circle
that is parallel to a great circle on the celestial sphere or on a great circle that is oblique
to these parallel circles. The alternatives are not as clear as one should like; but given the
criticism that follows, it would seem that Simplicius is asking whether the planets move
westward along circles parallel to the celestial equator or whether they move westward along
the zodiacal circle.
77 476.21–23: thus, the planets would behave like fixed stars in that they would be unchang-
ing in their relation to the celestial pole and would rise and set at the same point on the
horizon. Cf. Geminus, Intro. ast. 12.19–21.
78 476.23–27: in effect, the planets would all be like the Sun (though perhaps on different
circles), that is, there would be no planetary stations and retrogradations. Cf. Geminus, Intro.
ast. 12.22–24.
79 476.28 περὶ τῶν ἰσοδρόµων ἀστέρων. Mercury, Venus, and the Sun are said to keep pace
with one another because they were held to have the same sidereal period: cf. 474.9–12 with
Comment 12.18, pp. 268–269. Plato [Tim. 38d2–4] describes the circuits of Mercury and Venus
110 in aristotelis de caelo 2.10
[30] and the contained spheres (or to say the same thing, how the larger and
smaller [spheres]) return in position in an equal time interval—still remains
a problem. For, whether one says by way of assumption that both the fixed
[sphere] and the wandering [spheres] move in the same direction80 or that
the spheres which come close to the fixed [sphere] move more slowly
because they are dominated by it, in neither way is the proportion of the
[477.1] sizes to the speeds preserved in the case of the [spheres] that keep pace
[with one another], either when [the spheres] closer to the fixed [sphere]
move faster in themselves or when the smaller [spheres] move faster.
as keeping pace with the Sun in speed (τάχει); and he plainly means only that they have the
same period as the Sun, since he adds [Tim. 38d4–6] that Mercury and Venus overtake and
are overtaken by the Sun [see Bowen 2001, 815–816].
80 476.31 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀυτῶν: literally, ‘from the same [parts]’.
IN ARISTOTELIS DE CAELO 2.11
291b11–17
hOne may suppose with especially good reason thati the shape of each of
the heavenly bodies his spherical. For, since it has been proven that they do
not by nature move of their own accord,1 and since nature does nothing
without reason or in vain, it is clear that [nature] has in fact given to these
objects incapable of motion a shape of the sort that is least capable of
motion. But the sphere is least capable of motion because it has no organ
for motion. Consequently,i it is clear that [the heavenly bodies] must be
spherical in bulk.
He has in fact already said that the [fixed and wandering] stars are spher- [477.5]
ical because they are made of the same substance as the heavenly body,2
and he has proven through their being spherical that they are least capa-
ble of performing locomotion.3 But he was taking their being spherical
more as a hypothesis, which is why he has also said the following: ‘Fur-
ther, since4 the heavenly bodies are spherical, just as the others say and it is
agreed by us’.5 And using the connective particle ‘since’ and not simply a
hypothetical,6 he reasonably introduced the rather obvious justification [for [10]
this] through the phrase, ‘since7 for our part we generate [them] from that
1 291b13 (δι’ αὑτῶν): see De caelo 2.8 for Aristotle’s argument that no star (fixed or wan-
dering) moves itself, rather, that each is moved by the heavens as a whole or, more exactly,
by a circle (scil. sphere) which carries it around. Granted, the argument is ostensibly made
in reference to the daily rotation westward of the heavens alone; but it is easily extended to
account for planetary motion eastwards and was so understood. At no point, however, does
Aristotle explicitly reconcile the claims that such aetherial bodies move by nature in a circle
about the center of the cosmos with the claim that this motion is not of their own accord (δι’
αὑτῶν) or intrinsic (καθ’ αὑτό) [cf. 290a9–11].
2 477.6 τῷ οὐρανίῳ σώµατι: scil. aether, which is shown to be spherical in De caelo 2.4.
3 477.6–7 ἀκίνητα … τὴν µεταβατικὴν κίνησιν.
4 477.8 ἐπεὶ: Allan [1955] prints «ἐπειδή» at De caelo 290a7 but the better reading is «ἐπεί»
καθάπερ οἵ τ’ ἄλλοι φασὶ καὶ ἡµῖν ὁµολογούµενον εἰπεῖν, ἐξ ἐκείνου γε τοῦ σώµατος γεννῶσιν
…. [Moraux 1965, 74]
In breaking this text up, Simplicius omits «εἰπεῖν» but still, I presume, takes «γεννῶσιν» as a
dative plural participle in agreement with «ἡµῖν». Mueller [2005, 17: cf. 2004a, 109 and n438]
112 in aristotelis de caelo 2.11
body’.8 Thus, while there he mentions that the heavenly bodies are spherical
on account of their motion, now he proves [this claim] directly by using two
arguments of which the second is double.
[15] First is the [argument] from their not performing motion on their own
accord. (By [motion] on their own accord, he means a locomotion from
place to place: walking is of this sort.) Now, taking once more as an axiom
that nature does nothing without reason, and holding as proved in advance
that the heavenly bodies are immovable with regard to locomotion on their
own accord, he reasons in effect as follows:
The heavenly bodies are incapable of locomotion on their own accord. Bodies
[20] of this sort have no organ for this sort of motion because nature does nothing
without reason. But bodies that have no organ for [loco]motion are spherical
because they have no protuberance. ‘Consequently, it is clear that’ the heavenly
bodies ‘must be spherical in bulk’, that is, in body.9
But, if he proved earlier that [heavenly bodies] do not move by changing
[25] place because they are spherical (by considering the motion that is proper
to spherical [bodies] on the basis of a division),10 and if he now proves that
they are spherical from their not moving [from place to place], how is the
proof not circular?11
Now, they say12 in reply that he neither proved their not moving [by
[478.1] changing place] through their spherical [shape] alone nor their spherical
[shape] through their not moving [from place to place] alone, but that both
the former [conclusion] and the latter are proven through many arguments.
And for this reason, says Alexander, the proof is not circular.
takes it as a finite verb (third person plural present indicative active): note Grosseteste’s
‘siquidem ex illo corpore genus communicant’ [Bossier n.d.a, 149.17–18] and Moerbeke’s ‘si
vere ex illo corpore generant’ [Bossier n.d.b, 472.2–3]. But «ἐξ ἐκείνου γε τοῦ σώµατος» is a
reference to the οὐράνιον σῶµα [477.6], where this σῶµα is aether [cf., e.g., De caelo 289a13–19];
and, though Simplicius may presume to read the doctrine of aether back into Plato’s writings,
we at least should be very clear that it is Aristotle who is the originator of the thesis that the
heavenly bodies are made of aether.
8 477.11–12: see De caelo 290a8–9.
9 477.22–23: cf. De caelo 291b16–17.
that a spherical body can move on its own accord in only two ways—by rolling (κύλισις) or
by rotating (δίνησις).
11 477.26 διάλληλος: a technical term. The concern, according to Themistius [Landauer
1902, 118.32–37], is whether the argument is a demonstration ignoti per ignotum, that is, a
type of demonstratio circularis.
12 477.27 λέγουσιν: it is unclear who ‘they’ are, though they obviously include Alexander
and Themistius [see Landauer 1902, 118.37–119.2 = fr. 156b in Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.285–286].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.11 113
But how does the fact that the same conclusion is drawn from other argu- [5]
ments as well make this demonstration not circular? Certainly, while the
fact that [this conclusion] is demonstrated not only through these circular
[arguments] but also through other [arguments] may be a sign that, and a
reason why, [the conclusion] is not overturned, how can this be a sign that,
or reason why, these proofs are not circular?
Perhaps, then, Aristotle took spherical [shape] and not having an organ
for locomotion (which necessarily implies not moving by changing place) [10]
as convertible and reasonably demonstrated the one from the other, just as
someone might infer having milk from having given birth and having given
birth from having milk or that it is man from being a mortal rational animal
and the definition from man.13 For proofs that are circular in this way are not
to be cast aside.
One should understand from these [remarks] as well what kind of motion [15]
Aristotle denies the heavenly bodies, namely, the motion not proper to
spherical shapes, that is, locomotion by means of organs. For, with regard
to this sort of motion, he says that the spherical shape is least capable
of motion and adds the reason—‘because [it] has no organ for motion’14—
inasmuch as he said that motion within itself 15 is most proper to spherical [20]
[bodies], not only to the heavens but also to the heavenly bodies, when he
wrote the following:
This is in fact why the heavens as a whole and each of the heavenly bodies seem
with good reason to be spherical. For the sphere is the most useful of shapes for
motion within itself,16 since it can move very fast in this way and above all occupy
the same place. But it is least useful for motion forwards, since it is least like [25]
[bodies] that move17 of their own accord because it has nothing hanging loose
or projecting as a rectilinear [shape does].18
In fact, what is said here19 also agrees with these words in that Aristotle
says that the heavenly bodies make this apparent change in position not
13 478.13 ὁρισµόν: man is defined as a mortal rational animal. This definition, which does
not actually appear in Aristotle’s writings, is a stock example in the works of Alexander of
Aphrodisias for instance. Cf. Todd 1976; Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.286.
14 478.18–19: see De caelo 291b16.
15 478.19 τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κίνησιν: scil. rotation.
16 478.22 ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Moraux [1965, 76] prints «ἐν ἑαυτῷ» at De caelo 290b2: cf. Moerbeke’s
‘in se ipso’ [Bossier n.d.b, 476.6]. Others [cf. Allan 1955, ad loc.] have «ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ» (‘in the
same [place]’).
17 478.25 κινουµένοις. Moraux [1965, 76] prints «κινητικοῖς» (‘capable of motion’) at De caelo
290b5–6.
18 478.21–26: see De caelo 290a35–b7.
19 478.27: scil. in De caelo 2.11.
114 in aristotelis de caelo 2.11
on their own accord, and clearly presents their [motion] within themselves
[30] as a proper [motion] of spherical shape. This is why he also says both things
about spherical shape, namely, both that it is least capable of performing
locomotion on its own accord and that the sphere is the most useful of
shapes for motion within itself.
291b17–23
Further, one and all [the heavenly bodies] are alike,20 hand the Moon shows
through visual [evidence] that it is spherical: certainly, [if the Moon were
not spherical,] it would not as it waxes and wanes become for the most
part crescent-shaped or gibbous21 and halved22 only once. And, again, [it is
shown] through astronomical [considerations] that the eclipses of the Sun
would not be crescent-shaped. Consequently, since one [heavenly body] is
like this, it is cleari that the others too must be spherical.
[479.3] As for the second argument, this one is probative of the spherical [shape]
of the heavenly bodies in that it applies the axiom which says that any
[5] one of the heavenly bodies and all are alike in shape since they are all in
fact [made] of the same substance which is simple.23 So, if the Moon is
proven spherical from its observed illuminations, it is clear ‘that the others
too must be spherical’.24 Certainly, if [the Moon] were not spherical but,
perchance, drum-shaped or lentil-shaped,25 its illuminations would not, he
[10] says, become such that as it waxes and wanes it appears ‘for the most part
crescent-shaped or gibbous and dichotomos26 only once’.27
20 479.1: Simplicius’ lemma opens with «῎Ετι δέ, εἰ ὁµοίως µὲν ἅπαντα καὶ ἕν», which entails
sides’.
22 De caelo 291b21 διχότοµος.
23 479.6: scil. aether. Cf. De caelo 1.2 where it is argued that the heavenly bodies are made
of aether.
24 479.7: see De caelo 291b23.
25 479.8 φακοειδής: the lentil resembles a circular lens with two convex sides.
26 479.11 διχότοµον. Usually, this means ‘halved’, as I have already rendered it above. But,
since it is difficult to capture in English the linguistic point Simplicius is making here, I will
simply transliterate the Greek in the next few lines and use footnotes to clarify what is at issue.
Grosseteste’s solution to the problem of conveying Simplicius’ point to readers unfamiliar
with the Greek names of the lunar phases was to interject a brief note explaining the meaning
of the key terms: cf. Bossier n.d.a, 153.25–154.29.
27 479.10: see De caelo 291b20–21.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.11 115
28 479.11 διχόµηµον (bisecting the month). Cf. Aratus, Phaen. 78, 737. Kidd [1997, 427–428]
remarks that Aratus’ «διχόµηνα δὲ παντὶ προσώπῳ» at Phaen. 737 involves a slightly confusing
word-play between the half-moon, which is the first-quarter, and the half-month, which is
the full-moon. Simplicius detects the same ambiguity in Aristotle’s «διχότοµος».
29 479.11 the Full Moon is called διχότοµος because it divides the month into two halves.
Thus, «διχότοµος» is given an active sense and ‘only once’ is taken to mean ‘only once during
the month’.
30 479.12: viz. concerning its being gibbous and διχότοµος.
31 479.12: see Comment 11.01, pp. 217–218.
32 479.16 ἀποκρυβέντα: Moraux [1965, 81] prints «ἀποκρυφθέντα» at De caelo 292a5.
33 479.17 φανερόν: Moraux [1965, 81] prints «φανόν» at De caelo 292a6.
34 479.15–17: see De caelo 292a3–6. On Aristotle’s report of this occultation, see 481.8–15
misconstrues the syntax by understanding «καὶ εἰ ἂν γίνηται» (‘even if it is also’) and has
Simplicius ‘entertaining’ the possibility of dichotomy rather than observing that the waxing
and waning of the Moon will produce dichotomy.
39 479.21–22: thus, being halved does not admit of variations in quantity.
40 479.23: the Moon is here called διχότοµος when it is divided into halves, that is, when it
is at the quarter (either the first or the third). Thus, «διχότοµος» is given its more usual passive
sense of ‘halved’ or ‘bisected’ and ‘only once’ is construed as ‘only for a moment’. It is perhaps
misleading to say, as Leo Elders does [1966, 230], that the Moon is διχότοµος in this sense for
a ‘short while’: Simplicius is skirting the claim that the Moon is halved for an instant.
116 in aristotelis de caelo 2.11
condition of there being lunar phases, not a cause [but see Mueller 2005, 19].
42 480.1 τὸ φωτιζόµεν ἀεὶ ἡµισφαίριον: not ‘what is illuminated is always a hemisphere’, as
the hemisphere that is facing us is equal to the complement of these same two hemispheres.
See Figure 11.01, p. 182.
45 480.3: the direction from the Earth along a radius of the celestial sphere to the fixed
stars is up. Thus, the upper hemisphere is the complement of the hemisphere that is toward
us.
480.4 τετραγωνικὴν διάστασιν. The notion of a quartile distance apparently derives from
astrology and originally pertains to zodiacal signs that are separated by three zodiacal signs
or 90°: cf. Geminus, Intro. ast. 2.16–26; Ptolemy, Tetrabib. 1.13.
480.4 διχότοµος ὁρᾶται (it is seen as halved): that is, as bisected or at the (first) quarter.
46 480.5 µέχρι τῆς διαµέτρου. This term may have an astrological nuance as well: cf. Gemi-
same lines, see Cleomedes, Cael. 2.5 [Bowen and Todd 2004, 145–149].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.11 117
48 480.10–15: see Figures 11.02 and 11.03, pp. 184, 185 with Comment 11.02, pp.218–219.
49 480.16–17: see De caelo 291b21–22.
50 480.17–19: see Comment 11.03, pp. 219–220.
51 480.19–21: see Comment 11.04, pp. 220–221.
52 480.21 εἰ: Simplicius maintains that heavenly bodies rotate [see Comment 11.05 p. 221].
480.23–24 τὰς ἀποτοµάς. Heiberg, followed by Mueller [2005, 20 and n52], suggests «τοιαύ-
τας τὰς ἀποτοµὰς» (‘sections of this kind’). As Figures 11.02 [p. 184], and 11.03 [p. 185] show, both
the drum-shaped and lentil-shaped Moons have full phases, but only the lentil-shaped Moon
has any sections at all (dichotomy and a brief gibbous phase). In either case, if we suppose
Simplicius to understand that the Moon completes one rotation about its axis in the time of
one revolution about the Earth (so that one always sees the ‘Man in the Moon’ [see Comment
11.05, p. 221]), it is plainly true that the Moon would not have sections at every position. So
the text needs no emendation.
IN ARISTOTELIS DE CAELO 2.12
291b24–292a18
Since there are two problems1 habout which anyone might reasonably be
at a loss, we should try to state the apparent [solution], bearing in mind
that eagerness amounts more to respect than to rashness2 if someone
on account of his thirst for philosophy welcomes even small advances in
matters about which we have the greatest problems.
Of such [problems] (which are numerous) not least astounding is why3
the [bodies] which are more distant from the first motion do not always
perform more motions, but why the ones in between [perform] the most
motions. Certainly, it would seem reasonable4 that, since the first body
performs one motion, the body nearest it perform the least number of
motions, for example, two, and the next [body] three, or some other such
ordering [of motions]. But, as it is, the opposite is the case, since the Sun
and Moon perform fewer motions than some of the wandering stars; and
yet [these wandering stars] are farther from the center [of the cosmos]
and nearer the first body than they. (This has become clear in some cases
even to sight.5 That is to say, we have seen the Moon when it was halved6 as
it came under the star of Mars (which was in fact hidden at [the Moon’s]
dark side and came out on the bright, radiant side).7 And the Egyptians
and Babylonians, who have long made observations over a very great
number of years and from whom we have many reports about each of the
heavenly bodies, say similar things about the other [wandering] stars.)8
1 480.24: De caelo 291b24 ∆υοῖν δ’ ἀποριαῖν οὐσαῖν [Moraux 1965, 80]. This is the reading of
the lemma found in one family of mss of Simplicius’ commentary that Heiberg regards highly.
Still, he prefers the «∆υοῖν δ’ ἀποριῶν οὐσῶν» found in A, the primary ms. [1894, v].
2 De caelo 291b25: «ἀξίαν» with genitive (lit. ‘worth as much as’, ‘equal in worth to’).
Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘verecundia dignum esse existimantes desiderium magis quam audacia’
[Bossier n.d.a, 156.3–4].
3 De caelo 291b29 [cf. 292a10–11] διὰ τίνα ποτ’ αἰτίαν: lit. ‘for whatever reason’.
4 De caelo 291b31: see 97n5.
5 De caelo 292a3: scil. that the Sun and Moon are nearest the center of the cosmos, the
Earth.
6 De caelo 292a4 διχότοµον: see 479.10–23.
7 De caelo 292a5, 6: «κατὰ» with accusative (on/at something): cf. 481.11. Mueller [2005,
20–21] has ‘by’ and ‘from’. The Moon is halved at what we call the First and Second Quarters;
it has come ‘beneath’ Mars when it is between Mars and the observer.
8 De caelo 292a7–9 ἀστέρας … ἄστρων: on the translation of these terms, see Comment
One might quite rightly raise this as a problem, as well as [the problem]
why there is so great a multitude of heavenly bodies in the first motion that
their entire ordering seems to be uncountable, whereas each of the other
[heavenly bodies] is one by itself and there are not observed two or more
fixed in the same motion.
About these [matters], then, it is good to seek even greater understanding,
although we have little to start with and are at such a great distance from
what takes place concerning them. Nevertheless,i the problem now raised
should not seem [to us] anything unreasonable9 hif we make our study
from the following sorts of [starting points].i
[480.26] He proposes two remaining problems about the heavenly bodies which
are really quite intractable.10 The first of them is like this: ‘Given that the
fixed [sphere] performs one motion, why does what is closest to it, namely,
the sphere of Saturn, not perform the least number of motions, say, two,
and the one after that three [motions] or [motions determined] according
[30] to some other proportional ordering of numbers, so that the [wandering
stars] which are farther [from the sphere of the fixed stars] always per-
[481.1] form more motions?’ Instead, the opposite occurs. For the Sun and Moon,
which are lower than the others—he too in fact hypothesizes that the Sun
is proximately above the Moon, just as Plato did as well—‘perform fewer
motions than some of the wandering stars’.11 (Actually, among the wander-
[5] ing [stars], the motion of the Sun is the simplest and that of the Moon is
simpler than the rest.)12 And yet the higher [wandering stars], which are
farther from the center and nearer the fixed [sphere]—which he calls first
9 480.24 ἂν ἄλογον εἶναι δόξειε: the better mss of De caelo have «ἄλογον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι» [cf.
is moved to raise them because they follow readily from what precedes. After all, De caelo
2.9, with its critical discussion of the Pythagorean notion of cosmic ἁρµονία, broaches the
more general question of the existence of proportionality in the distances and motions of
the planetary bodies; and 2.10 addresses this more general question in earnest. The novelty
in 2.12 is the allowance that each planet has more than two motions.
11 481.3: cf. Plato, Resp. 616e8–617a1; Tim. 38c7–d2.
Simplicius may simply be supposing that the Sun has a simple direct motion in longitude,
that the Moon has a simple direct motion in longitude, a motion in latitude, as well as a
nodal motion [495.10–13: see Comment 12.16, pp. 265–266], and that the five planets have
in addition to a motion in latitude a more complex motion in longitude that is punctuated
by stations and retrogradations. Alternatively, he may be indicating the sort of modified
Eudoxan homocentric theory that Easterling [1961] describes: see Comment 12.01, pp. 223–
224.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 121
body13—should have motions that are simpler than [those] of the Sun and
the Moon. (He also proves that the Moon is lower than the rest from its
reported occultings,14 of which he says that he personally has seen one,
the occulting of Mars: for he states that, when [the Moon] was halved, it [10]
came under the [star] of Mars and that [Mars] was hidden at [the Moon’s]
dark side and came out at its bright side15—so that [the Moon] was halved
as it waxed.16 But, whereas he personally watched this, the Egyptians and
Babylonians have observed the same thing occurring with the other [wan-
dering] stars as well (that is, with those that are higher), so that many [15]
of their observations of each of the [wandering] stars have been handed
down.17)
Next, he also introduces the second problem18—‘why there is so great
a multitude of stars in the fixed [sphere] that it seems to be uncountable,
whereas in each of the spheres beneath it there is not observed more than one
star present’. And, then, looking to the danger of his inquiry and reckoning [20]
that it is formidable because of the magnitude of the problems, he offers
encouragement by saying,19 ‘It is good, then, to inquire about these matters
and20 to receive or, rather, to seek after, even greater understanding’.21
Jupiter’s occultation of a star in the constellation Gemini). See Comment 12.02, pp. 224–225.
16 481.11: that is, the Moon was at First Quarter.
17 481.14–15 ὡς … παραδεδόσθαι. Simplicius rightly presents the Babylonian observations
as an institutional program, one that was in fact remarkably long-lived. The existence of such
a program of Egyptian observation is substantially less clear, and so one must wonder what
exactly Simplicius has in mind (if anything more than just what Aristotle writes). Mueller
[2005, 21] has ‘as has been conveyed by many of their observations concerning each star’, but
this strains the syntax.
Cf. Aristotle, De caelo 292a7–9 and Meteor. 343b28–30 with [Plato], Epin. 987a1–6. See
Comment 12.03, pp. 225–226.
18 481.16: cf. De caelo 292a10–14.
Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘mitigat’ [Bossier n.d.a, 157.3] and Moerbeke’s ‘consolatur’ [Bossier n.d.b,
487.4].
20 481.21 Heiberg has «περὶ µὲν δὴ …», but notes that «µέν» is omitted in Karsten’s edition:
Moraux 1965, 81 ad 292a14 reports that «µέν» is found in some mss of the De caelo.
21 481.21–22: cf. De caelo 292a14–15. This is a paraphrase, not a proper quotation.
122 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
In fact, Alexander thinks that the thought is rather elliptical at this [point]
because what is added to it [in what follows] seems to be more fitting.22 But
[25] perhaps the thought has not been stated elliptically, since Aristotle was not
used to expressing his meaning in an elliptical fashion, even if he was given
to abbreviated discourse. Rather, he means that those who are especially
intelligent, not just anybody, should investigate matters of this sort and not
shrink back, ‘even if they have little to start with concerning them and stand
apart from what happens concerning them in more than spatial distance’,
as he said elsewhere.23 Nevertheless, even if this is the case, on the basis
[30] of the arguments to be stated, the problem raised now should not seem
unreasonable.
292a18–b10
But we hconceivei [of the heavenly bodies] as [we do] of mere bodies only,24
hthat is, as [we do] of units which have order but are utterly without soul;
whereas we should form our understanding on the assumption that they
share in action and life, since in this way what follows will not seem at all
unreasonable.25
For the good seems to belong without action to what is in the best state;
to what is nearest [this], through a single, slight action; and to things
farther [ from this], through many actions. Likewise, in the case of the
body, one [body] is well, though it does not exercise; another [is well] by
walking short distances; but for another there is in fact a need of running,
wrestling, and exercise in the arena;26 and again for another, however
many things it works at, this good will still not belong to it, but something
else.27 For succeeding either at many things or often is difficult, just as it
is impossible to throw 10,000 ‘Chian’ knucklebones but easier [to throw]
22 481.22–24: Moerbeke has ‘in hoc enim sermonem magis deficere putat Alexander quia
quod superfertur huic magis correspondens esse videtur’ [Bossier n.d.b, 487.7–9]. See Com-
ment 12.04, pp. 226–227.
23 481.28: cf. De caelo 292a15–17. See, e.g., De part. an. 644b22–645a5, where Aristotle
emphasizes our difference in nature from the celestial bodies, and De caelo 286a3–7. Cf.
Falcon 2008, 85–112.
24 482.1 µόνον αὐτῶν: Moraux [1965, 81] prints «αὐτῶν µόνον». These readings as well as
«µόνων αὐτῶν» and «αὐτῶν µόνων» are found in the mss of both Simplicius’ text and the De
caelo.
25 De caelo 292a14–18: this passage has occasioned controversy. See, e.g., Elders 1966, 234–
one or two.28 And again, when one must do [A] for the sake of [B] and
[B] for the sake of [C] and [C] for the sake of [D], it is easy to succeed in
one or two [steps] but more difficult to the degree that it is through more
[steps].
This is why we must hold that the action of the heavenly bodies is in fact
of the same sort as the [action] of animals and plants. Indeed, down here,
the actions of man are greatest in number, since [man] can attain many
goods, so that he does many things ( for the sake of other things too). (What
is as good as possible has no need at all of action, since it is itself its goal;
whereas action always depends on two [ factors] since there is both that
for the sake of which [there is action] and what is for the sake of this.29 )
But, [the actions] of the other animals are fewer in number; whereas there
is perhaps some slight and single [action] of plants, since there is either
some one [good] which they can attain just as man also doesi or there are
in fact many [goods] all conducive to the best.30
His remarks up to now have concerned the two problems. From this point, [482.3]
he sets out for the solution of the former and states first the reason why [5]
the argument seems quite intractable, namely, that [this is] not due to the
object of inquiry but to those making the inquiry. That is to say, we consider
the problem unsolvable because we conceive of the heavenly [bodies] as
[we conceive] ‘of mere bodies’ without souls, that is, as it were, as [we do]
of numerical ‘units’ which have only position in relation to one another
28 De caelo 292a29 ἀστραγάλους. In a note prefacing his translation of this lemma, Gros-
[2005, 22] mistakenly takes «ἐν δυσίν» to mean ‘of two kinds’ rather signifying dependency
on two items, and misconstrues what follows.
30 See De gen. an. 731a24–26, where Aristotle maintains that the only function and action
and are ‘utterly without soul’.31 And, certainly, it would be unsolvable if they
[10] were so, given that from [such bodies] no starting point for a solution is
found. But we must think of [the heavenly bodies] as though living things
possessing a rational soul so that they share in both action and an active
life, since we apply ‘doing’ both in the case of irrational souls and in the
case of bodies without souls but predicate ‘acting’ characteristically32 in
the case of rational souls. Thus, if we think of them as being so, what
[15] follows for the motions of the heavenly [bodies] should not seem contrary
to reason.
Certainly, inasmuch as these [bodies] are active and every action comes
to be through motion for the sake of the good, it is clear that, in the case
of what is in the best state,33 namely, what is either good itself or united
essentially to the good itself like the Prime Mover—the highly esteemed
[20] Intellect34 is of this sort—these things35 are and have the good apart from
action and motion.36 Or, as he himself says, in one [sense, what is in the
best state] has [the good] and, in another, it shares in [the good] proxi-
mately.37
[It is also clear] that the good belongs to what is nearest [what is in
the best state] through a slight, single motion, just as it does to the fixed
[sphere]; and that [the good belongs] to those that are farther away through
a greater number [of motions], as it does to the planets. And [it is clear
too] that some [heavenly bodies] cannot even attain that [good] immedi-
ately but are content to approach those that do attain [the good], just as the
(‘order’) is rendered by ‘position (τάξις) in relation to one another’. Mueller takes the conjunc-
tion «ὡς» to mean ‘as if’: but note Simplicius’ «ὡς γὰρ περὶ σωµάτων … οὕτω περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων
διανοούµενοι» and see Comment 12.05, pp. 227–229.
482.8: «τὸ πάµπαν», instead of just «πάµπαν» at De caelo 292a20 [see Moraux 1965, 81].
32 482.13 ἰδίως: scil. ‘exclusively’.
33 482.17 τῷ ἄριστα ἔχοντι (what is in the best state, what is best): not ‘things which possess
the best’ [Mueller 2005, 23, 24, and n78]: cf. Smyth 1971, §1438.
34 482.19 πολυτίµητος: an epithet used in addressing divinities. Simplicius identifies what
is in the best state (292a22, 292b5–7) with the Intellect which is treated as a divinity or god:
cf. Easterling 1961, 150–152; Leggatt 1995, 250.
35 482.19 «ταῦτα» (not «τοῦτο») produces a mild asyndeton. Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a,
Mueller 2005, 23], but that they both are the good and possess the good without action or
motion.
37 482.20–21: cf. De caelo 292b10 (‘Thus, the one has and shares in the best …’). Simplicius
attempts to read Aristotle in support of the point just made about what is in the best state:
note «ἤ, ὡς αὐτός φησι». Mueller [2005, 23 ‘Or, as he says, one thing has it and another shares
in it directly’] overlooks the connection.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 125
Earth does and is for this reason immobile, or [just as]38 the whole [region] [25]
beneath the Moon too, given that [motion] in a straight line is in fact char-
acteristic of imperfect beings, whereas fire and the upper air have circular
motion in common with the heavens.39
Next, he says, using the body and its health as an example, one body
(which is analogous to what is immobile)40 is well even apart from its having
exercised because of its being structured in the best way. ‘Another’ [body]
(which he compared to the fixed [sphere]) [is well] ‘by walking short dis-
tances’.41 And for another [body], there is need of a greater number of exer- [30]
cises for being healthy, say, running and wrestling, that is, athletic training
in wrestling (‘a workout in the dust’ is like this because wrestling moves are [483.1]
practised in the dust).42 This one is taken as analogous to a wandering [star].
But, to [a body] disposed in an extreme state ([a body] which he has likened
to [the region] beneath the Moon), the unmixed benefit of health does not
belong however many things it works at, since it cannot share in the divine [5]
Goodness immediately and because of this does not move by itself.43
But, perceiving that the argument is still inadequate—in other words,
that he has not stated the reason for the distinction in what wanders,
namely, why the Sun and the Moon perform fewer motions while the upper
wandering [stars perform] more44—he fills in what is missing by saying that [10]
objects more worthy of honor do more things because of their being ‘able to
attain many good things’,45 and that it is more fitting for them to succeed at
38 482.24 ἢ: Heiberg prints «ᾗ». But Moerbeke has ‘aut’ [Bossier n.d.a, 491.9] and Gros-
the nature or the characteristics of the substantive in the genitive case [see Smyth 1971,
§1304].
Simplicius is addressing Aristotle’s assertion at De caelo 292b19–20 that the Earth (ὅλως)
does not move. Cf. De caelo 277b12–24 and 4.4. The assertion [Meteor. 344a8–13] that fire and
the upper air move in a circle in common with the heavens has proven troublesome given
the De caelo’s contention that aether is the only simple body that moves in a circle when it is
in its natural place. [cf. Hoffman 1987, 76–83].
40 482.28 τῷ ἀκινήτῳ: scil. the Prime Mover.
41 482.29–30: cf. De caelo 292a25–26.
42 483.1 κόνισις: cf. De caelo 292a26.
43 483.4–6: in point of fact, Aristotle likens such a body to the Earth [cf. De caelo 292b15–
20].
44 483.8–9: the Latin version of Themistius’ paraphrase [Landauer 1902, 120.8–16: cf.
119.38–120.4] asserts that the planets have their number of motions in proportion to their
distance from the fixed sphere, which is hardly consistent with the terms of the first ἀπορία
[but see 119.12–15].
45 483.10 (De caelo 292b3–4). Note «δύνασθαι» in an articular infinitive construction
instead of «δύναται». Aristotle does not actually say this, but it is a credible inference from
what he does say.
126 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
many things or many times, which is in fact very difficult. (Not only is it hard,
say, for a knucklebone player ‘to throw 10,000 Chian or Coan knucklebones’—
[15] it is written thus, as if knucklebones are large in both islands—it is in fact
impossible; but ‘one or two is rather easy’.)46 But this is in fact fitting for
those who are stronger, I mean, attaining the most complete good through a
greater number [of actions]—for instance, if it were necessary to do [A] for
the sake of [B] and [B] for the sake of [C] and [C] for the sake of [D], as [it
is] necessary to learn one’s letters with a view to being able to engage in the
sciences and [to do] this with a view to practicing philosophy and [to do]
this with a view to assimilating to the divine.47 Certainly, ‘it is easy’ also for
[20] the weaker ‘to succeed in one or two [steps] but more difficult to the degree that
it is through more [steps]’.48 Thus, among living things that are generated,49
as the actions of man are greatest in number because man can attain many
goods (given that, for his part, he does many things, both managing them for
the sake of other things and referring their benefit to himself),50 so one must
46 483.13 (De caelo 292a29) ἢ Κῴους. The better mss for the De caelo have «Χίους» [cf.
Moraux 1965, 82], but «Κῴους» as well as «Χίους ἢ Κῴους» are attested. For an account of
these various readings and Simplicius’ text, see Moraux 1954, 158–159. Grossteste [Bossier
n.d.a, 160.20–21] has ‘Kios … vel Choos’; Moerbeke [Bossier n.d.b, 494.3], ‘Chios … vel Koos’.
483.13 γράφεται … οὕτως: Simplicius signals a textual remark [cf. Rescigno 2004–2008,
1.677].
483.13 (De caelo 292a30). The knucklebones (ἀστράγαλοι) were four in number, each
marked on four of its six surfaces—two opposed surfaces had no value presumably because
neither could support the knucklebone. The flat surface (τὸ χῖον) had the value 1; the concave
surface, 3; the convex surface, 4; and the irregular surface (τὸ κῷον), 6 [cf. Longo 1962, 329–
330; Moraux 1965, 161; Leggatt 1995, 249]. The shape of the knucklebones was such that it was
easier to roll four 1s than four 6s [cf. Elders 1966, 236]—hence, presumably, the difference
in value. Simplicius’ remark about the size of the knucklebones from Chios and Cos is
misleading: Aristotle is surely thinking of the difficulty of attaining a particular outcome a
very great number of times in succession.
47 483.17–19: Simplicius is here describing the program of learning and study in the late
Athenian and Alexandrian Academies, the goal of which was salvation by assimilation to the
divine (ὁµοιώσις πρὸς τὸ θεῖον) [cf. Wildberg 1999, 117].
48 483.20–21: cf. De caelo 292a32–b1.
49 483.21 ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς ζῴοις. Scil. living beings unlike the heavenly bodies which are
great number of possible ends and a thing’s having complex ends, that is, ends that are to be
reached by a series of subsumed ends each of which conduces to the ultimate end. Though
the two need not be the same [cf. Sharples 1976], Simplicius seems to reduce the thesis about
the greater number of actions and goods available to man (and hence, man’s superiority to
the other animals) to a claim about the greater complexity of human action. Whether this
is right depends in part on how one interprets De caelo 292b2–4. Certainly, what is relevant
to Aristotle’s argument in 2.12 is the issue of the complexity of motion [cf. Landauer 1902,
120.16–38].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 127
hold as well that the action of the [wandering] stars (that is, their motion) is [25]
many times more various than the [motion of the] others51 in comparison,
because of their being able to attain a greater number of goods. And man
too is more worthy of honor than other living things by virtue of his doing a
greater number of things.
The argument in its entirety would be as follows: if [bodies] performing a
greater number of motions are worthier of honor, they perform a greater
number of motions because of their succeeding at a greater number of
things; but if [they are] inferior, [they perform a greater number of motions]
because of their being unable to attain the best through a simple motion.52 [30]
Consequently, even if opposites should belong to the same things and the
same things to opposites, we will not be at a loss for a solution but will
assign the reasons fittingly to the things [in question].53 Thus, Aristotle says
these things without reconciling them to the dignity of the gods.54 Certainly,
the argument is insecure; but it is one that provides the starting points of a [484.1]
solution, according to which we shall not be amazed both if what is more
worthy of honor should be less active and if what is inferior should be less
active.55
After saying of man that he does many things, that is, so [very] many
things as he acts for the sake of other things as well,56 lest anyone suppose
that this is the best [Aristotle] supplied ‘what is perhaps in the best state has [5]
no need at all of action’57 and added the reason, rather the entire proof in
fact, when he said that what is in the best state is that for which being this
thing is being that for the sake of which [it is].58 Certainly, the best is the
goal of all things, that is, that for the sake of which all things are; and what
acts is something else besides that for the sake of which [it acts]. In fact, [10]
he supplied the explanation of this premise again when he said, ‘for action
one another in the current sense of these terms. Mueller [2005, 24] takes «διαιτῶν τῇ ἀξίᾳ τῶν
θεῶν» to mean ‘judging the worth of the gods’, thus misconstruing the function of the dative.
Cf. Moerbeke’s ‘non irreverens dignitati deorum’ [Bossier n.d.b, 496.9].
55 484.1–2: e.g., the celestial sphere and the Sun (or Moon), respectively.
56 484.4: see De caelo 292b2–4.
57 484.5 (De caelo 292b4–5): note ἴσως—note Moerbeke’s ‘forte autem optime habenti
nihil opus est …’ [Bossier n.d.b, 497.5]—rather than «ὡς» [see Moraux 1965, 82].
58 484.6–7 (De caelo 292b5–6): Mueller [2005, 24] construes «τὸ εἶναι» as ‘the essence’,
but in both occurrences it is simply a verbal noun meaning ‘being’, which is qualified by a
predicate.
128 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
depends on two [ factors] since there is both that for the sake of which [there is
action] and what is for the sake of this’.59 For, if everything that acts does what
it does on account of a desire of the good, the good would be one thing and
what acts another. Thus, he infers in the second figure60 that what is in the
best state has no need of action, since what is in the best state is that for the
sake of which [there is action] and what acts is not that for the sake of which
[it acts].
[15] And, after stating the [qualities] of the best by way of a middle [term],
he attaches to what has been said before of man ‘and, what is more, [the
actions] of the other animals are fewer in number’61 and what comes next [in
the text].
He calls the action of plants, that is, the action concerning nutriment,
‘slight’ and ‘single, perhaps’62 on the ground that they are not able to succeed
[20] in many [things]. (He has called the activity of the plant an ‘action’ in its
more common sense, since in the strict sense at least action is activity
according to reason.)63 But what comes next, ‘since there is either some one
[good] which they can attain’,64 he would surely say not of plants65 but of
agents in general, because either there is one particular thing set forth for
the agent which it can attain (just as man in fact [can attain] one of the
rather great number of things set forth for him), or, if there is actually not
[25] one thing but [if] the things set forth are greater in number (as in fact they
are for man), then ‘these many things are conducive to the best’66 by virtue of
the fact that all the other things incline to that [best thing] and are chosen
because of it. But ‘there is either some one [good]’ can also be applied in the
case of plants when it is explicated in relation to ‘there is perhaps some slight
and single [action]’67 and means that either a plant does indeed have one
59 484.10–11 (De caelo 292b6–7) ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις ἐν δυσίν: note Moerbeke’s ‘actio enim in
duobus’ [Bossier n.d.b, 498.1]. Moraux [1965, 82] prints «ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις ἀεί ἐστιν ἐν δυσίν» (‘for
action always depends on two [factors]’).
60 484.12–13: see An. pr. 1.5.
61 484.16 (De caelo 292b7) καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν: the mss of the De caelo have only «τῶν δ᾽» [see
292b8–10 actually concern plants. Elders proposes that Aristotle is thinking of the heavenly
bodies again [cf. 292b1].
66 484.26–27 τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον: cf. De caelo 292b9–10. Moraux
[1965, 83] has «τὰ πολλὰ πάντα πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον».
67 484.27–28: see De caelo 292b8.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 129
particular good which it can attain (just as man also [attains] each of the [30]
many goods that are his own), or, if a plant’s goods seem to be many as
well—say, feeding, growing in size, begetting [new plants]—all these are [485.1]
conducive to its single, most complete good, [a good] which is restricted in
relation to the human [good].
292b10–25
Thus, one [body] has or shares in the best,68 hwhereas another arrives at
it69 through a few [actions] and another through more [actions]; another,
however, does not even try but is competent70 to arrive at what is near
the ultimate [good]. For example, if health is the goal, then one [body]
is always healthy; another [is healthy] after it has lost weight;71 another,
after it has run and lost weight; and another after it has done something
else in fact for the sake of running so that its motions are more numerous;
whereas another is unable to arrive at being healthy but only at running
or losing weight and one or other of these is the goal for [these bodies]. Of
course, it is best by far for all things to attain the former goal;72 otherwise, it
is always better [ for them] to the degree that they are nearer what is best.
In fact, for this reason, the Earth does not move at all and the [bod-
ies] nearby73 perform a few motions, since they do not arrive at the ulti-
mate [good] but up to the [degree] which they can attain the most divine
principle. The first heaven attains [this principle] directly through a sin-
gle motion. And the [bodies] between the first [heaven] and the [bodies]
farthest [ from it]i arrive hat [this principle], but do [so]i through more
motions.74
68 De caelo 292b10: the Latin version of Themistius’ paraphrase makes very clear that,
for Aristotle, this best is not absolute but is defined in relation to intentions and aims [cf.
Landauer 1902, 121.6 and 8–9].
69 De caelo 292b11 ἀφικνεῖται: the mss have «ἀφικνεῖται ἐγγύς» (‘arrive near’) [cf. Gros-
seteste’s ‘attingit propinque’ [Bossier n.d.a, 162.27]], but Moraux [1965, 83] deletes «ἐγγύς»,
which attenuates the point and does not appear subsequently in Aristotle’s discussion, and
notes that Simplicius [485.22] has only «ἀφικνεῖται» [cf. Moerbeke’s ‘hoc autem per paucos
motus pertingit ad sui ipsius finem’ [Bossier n.d.b, 503.7–8]]. Stocks has conjectured «ἀφικνεῖ-
ται εὐθύς» (‘arrives directly’), perhaps because of its occurrence at 292b23 and in Simplicius’
commentary [487.4]. Cf., e.g., Allan 1955, ad 292b11.
70 De caelo 292b12 ἱκανόν.
71 De caelo 292b14 ἰσχνανθέν: lit. ‘after it has been reduced’. Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘attenuatum’
De caelo 292b25 κινήσεων [Moraux 1965, 83]. Heiberg [485.4] follows A and prints «τῶν
κινήσεων»; other mss omit «τῶν».
130 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
[485.5] After stating that we should think of the heavenly bodies as [we do] of
living and active [things] rather than as [we do] of things without soul,75
and after supplying the distinctions between agents,76 [Aristotle] reaches
[the goal] set forth by explicating the solution of the problem that has
been raised—as Alexander says, by using what was mentioned first for
explicating the reason [why the planetary motions are distributed as they
are], namely, the fact that, whereas for those things which are best there
[10] is no need of action, for some things [there is need] of a slight [action] in
order to attain the best, and for others [there is need] of a greater [action].
Perhaps [Aristotle] also links up the second distinction, the one bringing
to light [the fact] that a slight motion is not always better but is in fact
sometimes worse than a greater [motion].77 Thus, he says that neither the
first nor the last of the things that are has need of action—the last, because
[15] it does not reach its goal proximately and the first, because it is not distinct
from the good but has [the good] in accordance with its own being, that
is, shares in it.78 (In fact, he could be applying ‘having’79 to the Goodness
that is beyond Being, that is, to the One, and ‘sharing’80 to the Intellect that
is unified proximately with the Good or has a share in it. For a thing that
presents [an attribute] in accordance with its own being is said to have
[that attribute], whereas a thing that takes [the attribute] from another is
[20] said to share [the attribute].81 Certainly, that Aristotle actually has in mind
something beyond Intellect and Being is clear when he says plainly in the
closing parts of his book, On Prayer, that God is either Intellect or in fact
something beyond Intellect.82)
75 485.5–6: scil. ὡς διανοούµεθα περὶ …. Cf. De caelo 292a18–22 and Comment 12.05, pp. 227–
229.
485.5–10: see fr. 158a (Alexander) in Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.290.
76 485.6–7: cf. De caelo 292a22–b10.
77 485.10–12: see Comment 12.06, pp. 229–230.
78 485.12–16: cf. De caelo 292b10–13.
79 485.16: cf. De caelo 292b10.
485.16–22: Simplicius is here interpreting Aristotle through the lens of later Platonic
thought.
80 485.17: cf. De caelo 292b10.
81 485.18–19: the subjects of the two limbs of this sentence are «τὸ … προβεβληµένον» and
«τὸ … λαµβάνον», and not «τὸ ἕν» and «ὁ νοῦς» as Mueller [2005, 26] would have it. Simplicius
is making a lexical point.
82 485.21 τοῦ Περὶ εὐχῆς βιβλίου. There is doubt that there ever was such a work by Aristotle:
see Rist 1985 for a reconstruction of the history of this ‘text’. For a discussion of passages in
which Aristotle mentions prayer (εὐχή), see Mayhew 2007.
485.21–22: see Ross 1955, 57.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 131
One thing arrives through a slight number of motions at its own goal. But
the goal is twofold: in one sense, it is what is the best of all things and the
most complete; in the other, it is more particular.83 Slight motion is also
twofold: in one sense, it is as [a motion] that comprehends the multitude of [25]
motions even in itself and, because of this, attains the goal that is common
and total; in the other, it is [a motion] that is part of the many and, because
of this, is aimed at a particular [good]. It is also clear that the former [kind of
slight motion] is better than many motions, while the latter [kind of slight
motion] is inferior. Consequently, what attains its goal through a greater
number of actions (that is, activities) would be a mean for what [attains its
goal] through a few actions.
And, because of this, the problem is solved, [I mean the problem,] ‘Why, [30]
given that the fixed [sphere] performs a single motion, do the [heavenly
bodies] that are farther from it (the Sun and the Moon) perform fewer
motions than the [bodies] that are higher and nearer the fixed sphere, [486.1]
whereas these [intermediate bodies] perform a greater number [of mo-
tions]?’ [The answer,] he says, [is] that, some of the [heavenly bodies]
which perform a few motions are better than those which perform a greater
number [of motions] and some are inferior. And which [of the two], and in
which way, has been stated. But the last [body]84 does not even try to attain
its goal immediately. This is why it does not even move, but it is enough for [5]
it to come to what is near its goal.85
Next, after clarifying what has been said through the example of health
in which he presents ‘losing weight’ as becoming trim,86 and after saying that
attaining the most complete goal is best, otherwise, [it is attaining] what is
as near as possible to that [goal],87 he finally adapts what has been set out to
what has been said by passing from the last to the first and then including [10]
those in between.88
83 485.24 µερικώτερον: Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 164.8] has ‘particularius’, but Moerbeke
In other words, he says, ‘for this reason the Earth does not move at all’89—
not because it has its immobility for the same reason that the good (that
is, its goal) [has immobility]. For, while [the good] was that for the sake of
which moving objects move and had no need to move to itself,90 the Earth
(being farthest [from the fixed sphere]) does not by nature share in [the
[15] good] immediately; instead, by coming close (as it can) to those which do
share in [the good] proximately, it also shares in [the good].
The [heavenly bodies] near the Earth perform a slight number of motions
because they do not arrive at the ultimate goal (that is, the first and utterly
complete Good) because they are partitioned from it. Rather, they move up
to the point where they can share in the most divine principle. And they can
[do this] partially.
[20] Even if by ‘Earth’91 he means Earth in the strict sense, by ‘ “near”92 it’ he
would mean the sublunary elements above the Earth; whereas, if by ‘Earth’
he means everything beneath the Moon, by ‘near’ he would mean the Moon
and Sun in that they perform few motions. The latter [reading] is in fact
more appropriate to what has been said, since it is about these [bodies]
that the problem has in fact been raised, namely, why, given that the fixed
[sphere] performs a single motion, the [wandering stars] that are farther
[25] from it (the Sun and the Moon) do not always perform more motions,
whereas these perform a slight number of motions and the intermediate
ones more.
Now, if ‘a slight number of motions’93 did not refer to the Sun and Moon,
what is most important for the solution of the problem would be missing.
But if it does refer to the Sun and Moon, ‘they do not arrive at the ultimate
[487.1] [good]’94 seems hard [to interpret], unless then it means that, given that they
come to be as rather particular beings,95 they are not comparable to the utter
perfection of [the ultimate Good], since he has said plainly that they share
in the first principle according to their own due measures.96 In other words,
he says, they share in the most divine principle up to the degree which they
can.97
The first heaven, he says, attains the first principle ‘directly’98 (that is, [5]
immediately) through a motion that is single in kind, because this single
[motion] is inclusive, productive,99 and comprehensive of all motions. That
is to say, after it was first set in motion, the first heaven imitated the com-
pleteness of what is immobile through its complete motion; and it becomes
just what that is through everlasting eternity, Plato would say, with [the
motions] beneath it dividing the sameness of [the immobile] through all [10]
time.100
And if it also pleases anyone to fall back on stories of the gods, let him
bear in mind that in these [stories] too the [wandering star] after the first
heaven, most powerful Saturn, is the beginning of separation and division.101
But these [matters are for discussion] elsewhere.
He mentions, ‘The [bodies] in between the first [heaven] and the last [bod-
ies]’,102 calling the fixed heaven103 ‘first’ and the Sun and Moon ‘last’, since [15]
these are the extremities of the divine body. Thus, he says, the ones in the
middle of these, since they are more encompassing,104 approach the com-
pleteness of the first principle closer than the last, but they approach [it]
erates the planetary motions might seem to work against the view that the planets’ longi-
tudinal motion eastwards is an independent motion, that is, a motion in accordance with
an unimpeded natural impulse [cf. 473.1–6]. But perhaps, for Simplicius, the celestial sphere
‘produces’ the planets in the sense that they derive from it by procession and subordination
that peculiar balance of tendencies to move eastwards and westwards which constitutes the
being of each and accounts for its characteristic motion eastward [473.7–474.6].
100 487.6–10. See Plato, Tim. 36b6–d6, 37c6–d7. Simplicius is here interpreting Plato’s
comparison of the sphere of the fixed stars to a moving image of eternity. He also would
seem to depart from Aristotle in treating the celestial sphere as something that was once set
in motion and not as something always in motion.
487.7 τὸ παντελὲς τοῦ ἀκινήτου: scil. the Craftsman God (∆ηµιουργός).
101 487.10–12: see Mueller 2005, 104n91. The language may also reflect Simplicius’ view of
find in De caelo 292b23–24 an opposition between first and last where I suspect that Aristotle
is only opposing first and farthest.
103 487.14 τὸν ἀπλανῆ οὐρανόν: scil. the sphere of the fixed stars.
104 487.16 ὁλικώτερα (lit. ‘more universal’): scil. ‘encompassing more motions’.
134 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
through the division of motions105 and not through a single motion as the
first heaven [does]. Thus, [they approach it] through a greater number of
motions which divide the single motion [of the first heaven] completely.106
[20] This is why they are also said to approach where the single motion also leads
them back.
It seems even to me107 that, after he investigated all the heavenly motions,
I mean, those extending the all-ness of immobile Unity, Aristotle discov-
ered that the fixed [sphere] in performing its single motion is inclusive of
all [motions], whereas all [the spheres] after it [perform] all [motions] in a
divided sense, and that the Sun and Moon do not [perform] all [motions],
[25] since they are not observed making stations or retrogradations or different
phases, or advances and followings108—this is why astronomers have in fact
been satisfied with simpler hypotheses in explicating the causes of their
phenomena. Thus, after hypothesizing that the motions represent actions109
105 487.17–19 διὰ µερισµοῦ … τελείως: for Simplicius, the motion of the sphere of the fixed
stars is single in the sense that it encompasses all the other celestial motions, even that
motion which it does not itself present to observation, the motion from west to east [see
133n99].
106 487.18–19: for Simplicius, the motion of the celestial sphere is not just communicated
to the lower spheres, it is distributed or divided [cf. 473.7–474.6, 133n99]. In the Timaeus,
however, the motion of the Same, which is the motion of the celestial sphere, is neither
distributed nor divided: only the motion of the Different suffers this.
107 487.20–488.2: Simplicius here reconstructs how Aristotle came to formulate and solve
the first ἀπορία. On his assumption that Aristotle was aware of the planetary stations and
retrogradations, see Comment 12.07, pp. 230–248.
108 487.24 ὑποποδισµούς: in an astronomical context, this term signifies a retrograde motion
(that is, a synodic, as opposed to a daily, motion from east to west) and is not found used
in this way before Proclus [cf., e.g., Hyp. ast. 7.4]. Geminus, Intro. ast. 12.30 seems to be the
earliest extant text to affirm that the Sun and Moon do not undergo retrograde motion.
Moerbeke [Bossier n.d.b, 511.6] has ‘retrogradationes’.
487.24 διαφόρους φάσεις: a phase is a significant configuration of the planet with respect
to the Sun. Thus, the different planetary phases presumably include as well such synodic
phenomena as first and last visibilities in the morning or evening. They would also include
the phenomena which we call phases of the Moon [cf. 547.13], though Simplicius typically
designates these as φωτισµοί (illuminations).
487.25 ἀκολουθήσεις [cf. 488.7]. I have not found any earlier use of this term in connection
with the planets. One possibility is that «καί» in «προηγήσεις καὶ ἀκολουθήσεις» is explanatory
and, thus, that the phrase should be rendered ‘advances (that is, followings)’, where ‘follow-
ings’ are motions that follow the leading signs. But, though this would work well for 487.23–25
(and would entail that the προηγήσεις are retrograde motions), it would strain the syntax at
488.5–7 where «καί» serves mainly to connect elements in a list. In any case, whatever the
ἀκολουθήσεις are, as Simplicius makes clear, they are characteristic only of the five planets and
not of the Sun and Moon. Note that Moerbeke has ‘assequentias’ here and ‘consequentias’ a
few lines later [Bossier n.d.b, 511.7 and 512.10].
109 487.27 πρακτικὰς … τὰς κινήσεις.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 135
and occur because of an assimilation to the Good, he says that the first
heaven attains complete assimilation proximately to the immobile through
one complete motion, whereas the spheres after it arrive at complete assim- [30]
ilation through all the divided motions, and that the Sun and Moon share in
it to the extent that they can, since they do not perform all the [planetary] [488.1]
motions.110
In this way, then, Aristotle has explicated his solution of the problem,
after laying it out and granting that the planets perform motions that are
many in kind not only because of their apparent direct motions,111 but also [5]
[because of] their [apparent] retrogradations, stations, [their] different
phases, advances, followings, and [their] various kinds of unsmoothness.112
In fact, those who hypothesize eccentric and epicyclic [motions] as well
as those who hypothesize homocentric [motions] (the ones called turning
[motions]) admit a greater number of motions [than one] for each [planet]
in order that these [apparent motions] be saved.113 The true account, of [10]
course, which accepts neither the stations [of the planets] or their retrogra-
dations nor the additions or subtractions of the numbers in their motions
(even if they evidently move in this way),114 does not admit hypotheses as
110 487.27–488.2: again, Simplicius offers a late Platonic reading of Aristotle’s argument.
111 488.5 προποδισµούς: this term is common in astronomical contexts from the first cen-
tury ad onwards. It is also found in Proclus [cf., e.g., Hyp. ast. 7.4]. Direct motions are non-
synodic motions from west to east, that is, in the direction opposite to the daily rotation of
the celestial sphere. Moerbeke [Bossier n.d.b, 512.9] has ‘directiones’.
112 488.7 ἀνωµαλίας: on the idea of ‘smooth’ motion, see Bowen 1999, 293–295.
113 488.7 διὰ … τὸ ταύτας σώζεσθαι: lit. ‘for the sake of these [apparent motions’] being saved’.
488.8 πλείονας (a greater number … [than one]): alt., ‘a rather great number’.
488.9: Simplicius uses «ἀνελίττουσαι», Aristotle’s term for the unwinding spheres in Meta.
Λ.8, more generally of homocentric spheres whether winding or unwinding. Henry Mendell
[2000, 91–93] supposes that all of Aristotle’s nested rotating homocentric spheres came to be
called ἀνελίττουσαι by synecdoche. If this is correct, then, in this context, all occurrences of
«ἀνελίττουσαι» should be translated translated by ‘unwinding’. But perhaps instead readers
of Λ.8 were aware of an ambiguity in the verb «ἀνελίττω» itself when applied to rotational
motion, much as there was an ambiguity in their usage of the verb «ἀναστρέφω», for example,
and thus understood that «ἀνελίττουσαι» could mean either ‘wind back or return to the
original position’ (where no direction of rotation is implied) or ‘wind backwards’. In any
case, to avoid confusion, I have, when it is appropriate, translated «ἀνελίττουσαι» and its
variants by ‘turning’ rather than by ‘unwinding’: cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 138n1. Grosseteste
[Bossier n.d.a, 167.9] translates «ἀνελίττουσαι» by ‘regirativos’; elsewhere he uses ‘regirantes’
[Bossier n.d.a, 171.3 et passim]. Moerbeke [Bossier n.d.b, 513.3–4 et passim] translates it by
‘revolventes’.
114 488.11 τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν ἀριθµῶν: the allusion is to tabular numerical data recording
the positions of the planets and the times when they occupy those positions, and, in partic-
ular, to the corrections to the mean values for their daily progress.
136 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
being the case.115 Rather, by drawing inferences from the substance [of the
planets] it demonstrates that the heavenly motions are simple, circular,
smooth, and orderly.116
[15] But, since [people] were not able to grasp precisely how what happens
is an appearance of their conditions only and not reality, they desired to
discover on what hypotheses it would be possible to save the phenomena
of the motions of the [stars] that are said to wander, by means of smooth,
orderly, circular motions.117 Indeed, as Eudemus recorded in the second book
[20] of his Astronomical History and as Sosigenes (who took it from Eudemus)
[also recorded], Eudoxus of Cnidus118 was the first of the Greeks said to lay
hold of hypotheses of this kind, after Plato, as Sosigenes states, proposed
for those who are serious about these matters the following question: ‘By
hypothesizing which smooth and orderly motions will the phenomena of
the motions of the wandering [stars] be saved?’119
[25] Thus, if the motions (which are greater in number in each case than the
rather numerous wandering bodies)120 are hypotheses, and if they are not
proven to be so in truth—as the fact that different [people] hypothesize
them in different ways makes clear—what need is there to seek in this way
[30] the reason why the planets proximate to the fixed [sphere] perform more
115 488.12–13 οὐδὲ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ὡς οὕτως ἐχούσας προσίεται: Mueller’s ‘nor does it admit
hypotheses of this kind’ [2005, 28] mistranslates the Greek and wrongly suggests that there
might be a hypothesis that is accepted in the true account. For Simplicius, what is at issue
here is the very notion of astronomical hypothesis itself. See 136n116.
116 488.12–14: this is a line of argument found in earlier Stoic writers such as Posidonius
and Cleomedes [cf. Bowen and Todd 2004, 193–204; Bowen 2007].
117 488.14–18: note that, as Simplicius sees it, this question is wrong-headed. What is
needed is not an account that saves the phenomena but one that explains them.
488.15–16 πῶς αὐτῶν διακειµένων … τὰ συµβαίνοντα (how what happens … not reality):
Moerbeke [Bossier n.d.b, 514.1–2] has ‘qualiter ipsis dispositis … accidentia’ (‘regarding their
conditions themselves, what happens …’). Grosseteste’s version is similar [cf. Bossier n.d.a,
167.17–18].
118 488.19: on Eudemus of Rhodes, see 98n10.
488.19: Eudoxus (–389 to –336) [cf. De Santillana 1940]. See also Bowen 2012b.
488.19–24 [cf. 422.14–24, 492.31–493.11]: for an analysis of this complicated report, see
Knorr 1990, 319–320. It is worth recalling Simplicius’ point [488.10–18: cf. 492.25–28, 510.2–
3] that this whole line of investigation is misguided. The complexity of this sentence may be
Simplicius’ way of distancing himself from Sosigenes’ report that Plato initiated it. Simplicius
certainly does not buttress Sosigenes’ report by citing any Platonic text. See pp. 61–67, 81–83.
488.20: Sosigenes (second century ad) was a Peripatetic philosopher and teacher of
Alexander of Aphrodisias [cf. Hayduck 1899, 143.12–14, Bowen 2008c]. See Comments 12.08
and 12.25, pp. 248–251 and 278–283.
119 488.21–24: see Comment 12.09, pp. 251–259.
120 488.25–26 τῶν πλανωµένων … σωµάτων (the wandering bodies): scil. the planets them-
selves.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 137
motions than the ones that are last, as though for each of the wandering
stars there are in truth a greater number of bodies [than one] and because
of this a greater number of motions?121
But, since we are obliged to hazard making these sorts of comparisons in
general, perhaps122 it is not necessary for us to define the merits [of the plan-
ets] in regard to the distinction between their places but to say that each [489.1]
has been posted in the place where it benefits the universe. Thus, since bod-
ies beneath the Moon do not have their own light but are illuminated from
without, ‘the two lights of the cosmos’123 have rightly, one might say, been
stationed proximately above them, perhaps because [these lights] have the
simplicity of their motions for what is better than what is composite.
For his part, Plato seems to say in his Laws that, whereas the planets [5]
evidently move thus in a variety of ways, they surely do not move in this
way in truth.124 But, in his Timaeus,125 he concedes that their motion is more
varied on the ground that they are in between things that are ordered
in every respect and things that are disordered in every respect, and that
because of this they have an ordered unsmoothness.126 This is why in his
Laws he also inveighs against those who predicate only wandering of them [10]
and who do not think that this [wandering] both shares in order and is theirs
by nature.127
Inasmuch as Alexander says flatly128 in regard to these [arguments] that
the four elements (that is, the sublunary ones) are without soul and lack
1899–1901, 2.43.25 and 2.300.23] also calls the Sun and the Moon φωστῆρες. Such usage
appears to goes back at least to the first century bc, since it is attested in the Septuagint (3rd
c. bc to early Christian era). It is not found in Plato and Aristotle.
124 489.5–7: see Plato, Leg. 821b3–822d1.
125 489.7–9: see Plato, Tim. 35a1–40d5.
126 Cf. Proclus, In Tim. ad 39d–e [Diehl 1903–1906, 3.95.34–96.32].
127 489.9–11: see Plato, Leg. 822a4–8.
128 489.12 ἀνέδην: lit. ‘without restraint’ or ‘without ado’. Moerbeke [Bossier n.d.b, 517.9]
129 489.12–13: for Alexander, nothing lacking a nutritive faculty can have a soul [Bruns 1887,
hot. What Simplicius calls elements here, Aristotle calls simple bodies (ἁπλᾶ σώµατα): for
him, the opposites are elements [cf. De gen. et corr. 331a20–b4]. For Simplicius, simple
bodies are natural bodies that have a (single) source of natural motion in them—they are
not simple simpliciter—and elements are the ultimate components of other bodies, which
means that aether is not an element strictly speaking [cf. 4.34–5.4, 16.16–26, 17.20–32, 24.17–
20].
134 489.21: for Simplicius, each part of the heavens acts in ways that constitute a regular,
eternally recurrent pattern; and, like the elements, each is by nature never at rest or not
acting.
135 489.26: «ἑστία τοῦ παντός» is found only in reports about those who thought that at the
center of the universe, its hearth, was a fire: cf. [Plutarch], Plac. philos. 895e6–7; Stobaeus,
Anthol. [Wachsmuth and Hense 1884, 1.22 § 1d.2–4]. Simplicius adopts the phrase but follows
Plato [Leg. 955e6–7] in identifying the Earth as the hearth: cf. Galenus Gram., Alleg. in Hesiod.
theog. [Flach 1876, 331.7–9].
136 489.27 ζωτικῶς: lit. ‘in a manner characteristic of life or of what is alive’. Moerbeke
animate activity. That is why the heavenly bodies move, whereas the Earth
stands at rest and particular animals both move and stand at rest. [30]
292b25–30
apparently, does not preserve the hendiadys [see Comment 12.11, pp. 261–262] and lacks the
troublesome «ἑκάστης».
140 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
[10] immediate kinship [of the fixed sphere] to the primary acting and moving
cause141 makes clear the superiority of its power, as do its being inclusive
of all the other [spheres], its carrying round the other [spheres] by itself,
and, still further, its attaining the most complete good entirely through one
simple motion and in almost no time (if one bears in mind its magnitude).
Consequently, perhaps one would wonder more rightly at the opposite,
namely, if [this sphere] which is superior by so much, nevertheless has some
[15] whole-number ratio of power to the other [spheres], [I mean, some ratio]
which the multitude of [heavenly bodies] moved by it [has] to each one of
the [heavenly bodies] fixed in the other [spheres].
292b30–293a4
and this [superiority] would turn out to be reasonable.142 hFor the first
[motion], which is single, causes many of the divine bodies to move; where-
as the [motions of the individual planets], which are many in number, each
[cause] only one body [to move], since any one of the wandering [stars]
performs a greater number of motions [than the fixed stars]. In this way,
then, nature both makes things equal and produces a certain order, that
is, by giving many bodies to one motioni and many motions to one body.
[490.19] There is no need, they say, for us to run his statements together by conjoin-
[20] ing this [argument]143 to the [statements] above, but we should accept it as
a second argument. Certainly, [Aristotle] does say that ‘the first’144 motion
(the motion of the fixed [stars]), though it is one in number, causes many
141 490.9–10 τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν τε καὶ κινοῦν αἴτιον: scil. the Prime Mover, to be identified with
the Craftsman God (∆ηµιουργός) [cf. 487.6–10, 489.12–17], given that the celestial sphere is its
hypostasis [see pp. 54–56].
142 De caelo 292b31 κατὰ λόγον (reasonable) [cf. 97n5]: alternatively, ‘in accordance with
our argument’. See Pellegrin 2004, 261 (‘une supériorité proportionelle’) with 439n13.
143 490.19 τοῦτο: scil. ἐπιχείρηµα. In his division of the text into lemmata, Simplicius would
seem to treat De caelo 292b30–293a4 as offering a separate argument. But note his reserva-
tions at 490.5 (‘in solving this problem in three or two arguments’) and 490.29–491.11. In truth,
these lines in the De caelo simply explicate how the superiority of the first motion to all the
others is reasonable or contributes to the first solution of the problem at hand, depending
on how one reads κατὰ λόγον [cf. 140n142]. In either case, they do not constitute a separate
argument but are part of the first. Cf. Landauer 1902, 123.5–9 quod autem rationi consonum
sit, ut ita res se habeat, hinc profecto ostenditur … (‘But because it is consistent with reason
that the matter [scil. the superiority of the fixed sphere] is so, from this it is in fact pointed
out …’) to present 292b30–293a4; and 123.9–10 et praeterea (‘And furthermore’) to introduce
293a4–11.
490.19–491.3: see fr. 159a in Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.296–301.
144 490.20: cf. De caelo 292b31.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 141
‘of the divine bodies’145 to move in accordance with its own single motion;
whereas the motions of the wandering [stars], since they are many in num-
ber for each star, cause one body belonging to many spheres to perform
many motions. That is to say, each of the wandering stars performs a greater
number of motions [than the fixed sphere] in that it is carried by a greater
number [of spheres] (which are called turning [spheres]). ‘In this way, then’, [25]
he says, ‘nature equalizes’ even this great a superiority ‘and produces a cer-
tain order by giving [the] many bodies’146 of the fixed stars ‘to the one motion’
of the fixed [sphere] ‘and [the] many motions’ of the wandering star ‘to one
body’.147
Indeed, interpreters who put this argument down as distinct on its face
urge not conjoining it to the previous one. But, perhaps, if it is not conjoined [30]
with that one, [his assertion,] ‘and this would turn out to be reasonable’[,]148
is unintelligible. For what is ‘this’, if he did not use [it] with reference to [491.1]
superiority?149 Certainly, saying ‘this’ is the position, order, and apparent
inequality [of the first sphere in relation to the others], as Alexander states,
treats the missing [part] of the explanation as extensive.150
Now, perhaps, in saying that the superiority of the fixed [sphere] is great
in relation to the wandering [stars] and through this solving the problem, [5]
[Aristotle] is thereupon pointing out that this superiority is in fact equal-
ized somehow by divine craftsmanship through proportionality. For as the
n.d.b, 522.3]. The reading in the lemma is unclear: Bossier [n.d.b, 520c] has ‘accidens’ but
notes that both ‘accidens’ and ‘significans’ are attested in the mss.
149 491.1: in De caelo 292b29–30, the antecedent of ‘this’ («ἥδε») has to be «ὑπεροχήν».
150 491.1–3: the Latin version of Themistius’ paraphrase has
hic est litterae intellectus, in hoc autem non videtur Alexander recte sensuisse, siquidem
ficta quaedam, aliunde adsumpta, suae explicationi adiecit.
This is the meaning of the text. But Alexander does not seem to have perceived
[the matter] rightly in this, since he adds certain false(?) [propositions] taken from
elsewhere to his explanation. [Landauer 1902, 123.21–23]
Note, however, that Rescigno’s fr. 159c replaces the last clause with
… siquidem in suae explicationis margine colligit id secundum imaginationem dictum
esse.
… since in the margin of his own explanation he has deduced that this has been stated
in accordance with imagination. [Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.298]
142 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
single motion of the fixed [sphere] stands to the many stars moved by it, so
the single wandering star stands to the many motions that it performs.
Of course, if one does not accept in this way what is said but as a distinct
[10] argument completely on its own, it is in fact on no account capable of over-
turning [the argument] stated before it, since that one alleges superiority as
a cause, whereas this one alleges equalization.151
293a4–11
And further, the other motions have a single body [to move]152 because
hthe motions before the last [motion] (that is, the [motion] which has
the [wandering] star [to move]) cause many bodies to move, given that
the last sphere moves by virtue of being fixed in many spheres and each
sphere is a kind of body.153 Thus, the work of that [last sphere] must be
shared in common: for, whereas each sphere itself has by nature its own
characteristic motion, this [motion] is, as it were, added andi the power of
every limited body is in relation to a limited [body].154
[491.15] This is another argument (either the second or third), which supplies on the
basis of the spheres called turning [spheres], the explanation of the fact that
151 491.10 µήποτε (never, on no account). Mueller [2005, 31] takes «µήποτε» as ‘perhaps’
[cf. Moerbeke’s ‘forte’ [Bossier n.d.b, 523.5] and Grosseteste’s ‘forsitan’ [Bossier n.d.a, 171.22]].
But just how could the argument from superiority ‘refute’ the argument from equaliza-
tion?
152 491.12 καὶ ἔτι διὰ τόδε … φόραι [Moraux 1965, 84]: some mss of In de caelo do have «φοραί»
in the lemma but the better ones read «καὶ ἔτι διὰ τοῦτο … σφαῖραι» (‘And further, the other
spheres have a single body’). Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 171.25] and Moerbeke [Bossier 1975,
ad loc.] have ‘aliae spherae’.
153 De caelo 293a4–8: Aristotle’s point is that each planetary motion qua proper is the
motion of but one body; yet this proper motion may still set other bodies in motion inci-
dentally, that is, by virtue of the nesting of homocentric spheres.
De caelo 293a8 σῶµά τι: on the qualification, see Comment 10.02, pp. 201–202.
De caelo 293a8 τυγχάνει ὄν = ἐστί (is), as often in Aristotle [cf. Liddell, Scott, and Jones 1968,
s.v. τυγχάνω II].
154 De caelo 293a10 πρόσκειται: scil. added to the motions below it. Thus, all the superior
spheres contribute to the motion of the last sphere and the motion that each contributes is,
therefore, shared in common by all lower spheres.
De caelo 293a10–11: cf. 274b33–275b4. There is no mention in Simplicius’ commentary (or
in Moerbeke’s translation) of the last four lines of 2.12:
Concerning the heavenly bodies that perform circular motion, we have stated what sorts
of things they are both with regard to their substance and their shape, and we have spoken
about their motion and order. [De caelo 293a11–14]
Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 172.4–6] supplies them.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 143
the wandering [spheres] each have a single star, whereas the fixed [sphere
has] such a great number [of stars].
Thus, he says that the sphere possessing the single star said to wander
‘moves by virtue of being fixed’155 in many spheres (called turning [spheres]
or, as Theophrastus calls them, starless [spheres]),156 given that it is the last [20]
[sphere] of the entire system157 of spheres—for example, of the [spheres]
which cause Saturn or Jupiter or one of the other [planets] to move.
Of course, simple motion is by nature characteristic to each of these
spheres (the [sphere] possessing the [wandering] star and the ones con-
taining this [sphere]); and the variety (that is, unsmoothness) of the [wan-
dering] star as it seems to move directly and to go retrograde, to add and [25]
subtract in its numbers, and to stand still is added from outside. In fact, [this
variety] is brought about by the turning [spheres] because each of them
moves, as was said, according to its own characteristic motion and because
each one in accordance with its own proper motion causes the [sphere] pos-
sessing the [wandering] star to move differently.
Thus, since each sphere is a body,158 and since in each system [of planetary
spheres] to the outermost (which moves with the fixed [sphere]) is assigned
in addition to its characteristic motion [the further task of] causing all the [30]
other spheres contained by it to perform in common the same motion that [492.1]
it performs, it would be difficult159 for [this outermost sphere] to cause both
so many bodily spheres and the sphere possessing the single star to move, if
[that sphere] no longer possessed one but many [stars], as the fixed [sphere]
indeed does. Aristotle indicated the difficulty through the statement, ‘The
power of every limited body is in relation to a limited [body].’160 To explain— [5]
if what causes motion had unlimited power, it would be no trouble to put
ing since, for him, all heavenly bodies, visible and invisible, rotate: see Comment 10.02, pp.
201–202.
159 492.1 ἐργῶδες (difficult): alternatively, ‘laborious’.
160 492.4–5: cf. De caelo 293a10–11.
144 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
161 492.5–6 οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πρᾶγµα ὁσαοῦν ὑποβάλλεν αὐτῳ πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι: cf. Aujac et al.
1979, 159 ‘point ne serait besoin de rien placer au-dessous pour transmettre le mouvement’;
Mueller 2005, 32 ‘nothing could overcome it with respect to being moved’.
162 492.10 scil. the spheres beneath the outermost sphere in each planetary system [cf.
as ‘goes forward honlyi against’—‘against’ would require «ἐπί» with accusative—and goes
astray in rendering 492.12–20. Cf. 492.25–26.
164 492.12–21: thus, Simplicius implies, if increasing the number of bodies on the innermost
sphere would make the task of all the planetary or turning spheres more difficult, it follows
that the fixed sphere, which moves an almost countless number of stars [cf. 481.16–18] as
well as all the spheres beneath it, must surely be superior in power, even in relation to the
outermost sphere of each planetary system.
165 492.22: cf. De caelo 269b18–270a12.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 145
have also said earlier,166 since different [people] in fact save the phenomena
through different hypotheses. It would be appropriate for our accounts of
the heavens and the heavenly motions to speak briefly about these hypothe- [30]
ses too, given that when they are hypothesized each [of their proponents]
maintains that he saves the phenomena.
It was in fact stated earlier167 also that Plato (who unequivocally assigned
the circular, the smooth, and the ordered to the heavenly motions) put [493.1]
forward a question for mathematical scientists168—Given what hypothe-
ses will it be possible that the phenomena of the wandering [stars] be
saved by means of smooth, circular, and ordered motions?169—and that
Eudoxus of Cnidus was the first to focus on hypotheses by means of spheres [5]
(called turning [spheres]). Callippus of Cyzicus (who was a schoolmate
of Polemarchus, a pupil of Eudoxus) came to Athens after [Eudoxus] and
lived with Aristotle,170 correcting with Aristotle Eudoxus’ discoveries and
sized, […] through smooth … motions’. Mueller’s ‘by making what hypotheses about uniform
… motions’ [2005, 33] gets the question wrong.
170 493.5–8: this passage is the only surviving source from antiquity of biographical infor-
171 493.11: Simplicius appears to be thinking of accounts of the planetary theory in Aristotle,
Meta. Λ.8 that rely on eccentric spheres. See Theon, De util. math. 3.31–32: cf. 3.34 [Hiller
1878, 178.3–184.23: cf. 189.7–18] which includes an account in which the planet is fixed on an
‘epicyclic’ sphere.
172 493.14–15 ἐπὶ τοῦ διὰ µέσων τῶν ζῳδίων (at the [circle] through the middle of the zodiacal
[constellations]). For the distinction of zodiacal signs (which are divisions of the zodiacal
circle and thus have length but not breadth) and zodiacal constellations, see Geminus, Intro.
ast. 1.1–3. There is no reference to the zodiac here. Mueller sometimes misreads «ὁ διὰ µέσων
τῶν ζῳδίων scil. κύκλος» as ‘the middle of the signs of the zodiac’ [2005, 33, 34, et passim].
173 493.15–17: the summer and winter solstices are here the days of the year in which the
daytime is longest and shortest respectively, rather than the points on the eastern horizon at
which the Sun rises on these days. Cf. [Alexander], In meta. 1073b20–21 [Hayduck 1891, 703.23–
28]. Later writers quantify the obliquity of this third sphere [see Heath 1913, 199–200]. See
Comment 12.12, pp. 262–264.
174 493.18 ἔλεγον (they said): not «ἔλεγεν» (‘he said’) as Mueller [2005, 33] has it.
175 493.17–20 = Theophrastus, fr. 165C in Fortenbaugh et al. 1992. My ‘compensating’ is
that for their part neither the Sun nor the Moon nor any of the stars moves by
itself, but all move by virtue of being fixed on a rotating body.176 If, then, [the
Sun] made its revolution in longitude177 and its displacement in latitude178
in one and the same time interval, two spheres would be sufficient—one [25]
[would be] the [sphere] of the fixed [stars] which rotates to the west and
the other, [the sphere] which winds to the east about an axis which is fixed
in the former [sphere] and at right angles to an oblique circle along which
the Sun would be held to make its progress.179 But, since [this] is not the case,
instead, since [the Sun] goes round the [zodiacal] circle in one time interval
and makes its displacement in latitude in some other, it is necessary in fact [30]
to take in addition a third sphere, so that each motion supplies one of the
[Sun’s] apparent [motions].
Thus, given that the spheres were, therefore, three [in number] and all [494.1]
homocentric with one another and the universe, [Eudoxus] hypothesized180
that the one containing the [other] two rotates around the poles of the
cosmos in the same direction as the [sphere] of the fixed [stars], making
its return [to the same position] in the same time interval as this [sphere];
that the one which is smaller than this [outer sphere], but larger than the
one remaining, rotates from west to east about an axis (as has been said)181
which is at right angles to the plane of the [circle] through the middle [5]
of the zodiacal [constellations]; whereas the smallest sphere also rotates
in the same direction as the second, though about a different axis which
should be understood to be at right angles to the plane of some oblique
great circle which the Sun is held to describe with its own center as it is
moved by the smallest sphere on which it is in fact fixed. Then, he posits that
176 493.22–23 ἐνδεδηµένα τῷ κυκλικῷ σώµατι: lit. ‘fixed on a body that moves in a circle’.
177 493.23 κατὰ µῆκος (in longitude): scil. its annual motion eastward along the zodiacal
circle or ecliptic. This technical usage was well established by Simplicius’ time.
178 493.24 εἰς πλάτος (in latitude). Since well before Simplicius, «πλάτος» designated verti-
cal displacement above or below a given reference circle. Moreover, when the reference circle
is the zodiacal circle [cf. Toomer 1984, 21] as it is here, this term is best translated by ‘latitude’.
This certainly suits Simplicius’ usage here and at 495.5 [but see Mueller 2005, 33]. See 148n183
on 495.5–8.
179 493.27–28 λοξῷ … ἥλιος: scil. the zodiacal circle. The author of the commentary on
Aristotle, Meta. E–N notes that Eudoxus designated as fixed the first sphere of each planetary
system as well the celestial sphere [Hayduck 1891, v, 703.12–23 = F123 in Lasserre 1966]. See also
268n129.
180 494.2 ὑπέθετο (he hypothesized): the subject is plainly Eudoxus [cf. Aujac et al. 1979,
162]. Mueller [2005, 34] errs in taking the verb as a passive form: cf. 494.9–12 … τίθεται … ἐκ
τοῦ Περὶ ταχῶν αὐτῷ γεγραµµένου συγγράµµατος.
181 494.4: cf. 493.26–28.
148 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
[10] the direct motion182 of this [third] sphere is slower by far than the [direct
motion] of the [sphere] containing it ([a sphere] which is intermediate
in size and position), as is clear from the treatise On Speeds written by
him.183
Thus, the greatest of the spheres causes both the remaining [spheres] to
rotate in the same direction as the fixed [stars] because it carries in itself the
poles which belong to the [second] and because [the second sphere carries]
[15] the [poles] of the third [sphere] (which carries the Sun); that is, because
[the second sphere], in that it contains the poles (of the third sphere) in
itself, likewise causes both [the third sphere] and together with it the Sun
to rotate (with itself) in the direction that it is made to go around. And,
thus, it results that [the Sun] appears moving from east to west. And if the
two spheres (the intermediate and the smallest) were by themselves in fact
[20] immobile, the revolution of the Sun would occur in the same time interval
as the rotation of the cosmos. But as it is, since these [spheres] rotate in the
opposite direction, the Sun’s return from one rising to the next comes later
than the time interval [just] mentioned.184
These [remarks] apply to the Sun. But, in the case of the Moon, he
arranged some things in the same way and other things differently. That is
[25] to say, [Eudoxus arranged] that the spheres which carry [the Moon] also be
three [in number] because it appeared to have in fact three motions. And
of these [spheres, he arranged] that one be [the] sphere which moves in
the same way as the [sphere] of the fixed [stars]; and that a second be [the
sphere which moves] in a direction opposite to this as it rotates about an axis
at right angles to the plane of the [circle] through the middle of the zodiacal
[constellations]185 (just as in the case of the Sun too). [He also arranged] that
the third be [a sphere which] no longer [moves] just as in the case of the Sun
[495.1] because, though it is alike in position, it is actually not alike in motion, since
it moves instead in a direction opposite to the second [sphere] and in the
same direction as the first while performing a slow motion, as it rotates, in
182 494.10 ὑπόληψιν (direct motion): lit. ‘falling behind’ [cf. 495.10]. The term indicates that
direct motion is here being viewed as a gradual falling behind the fixed stars in their daily
motion westward. On supposing that this falling behind is just apparent, see 476.10–27 [pp.
108–109].
183 494.9–12: see Figure 12.03, p. 188 and Comment 12.13, p. 264.
184 494.20–22 [cf. 501.17–21]: in other words, if the Sun and a fixed star rise together on one
day, the Sun will rise later than the star on the next day: see Figure 12.04, p. 188. See also
Comment 12.14, pp. 264–265.
185 494.28: reading «διὰ µέσου τῶν ζῳδίων» with A and Moerbeke [Bossier 1975, 3.4.14 per
medium animalium] rather than «διὰ µέσων τῶν ζῳδίων» with DEFc [cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 163].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 149
fact, about an axis which is at right angles to the plane of the circle which is
understood to be described by the center of the Moon at an inclination to the
[circle] through the middle of the zodiacal [constellations] by an amount [5]
equal to the greatest displacement in latitude for the Moon. It is evident
that the poles of the third sphere should be separated from the [poles] of the
second by an arc on the great circle understood to be through both [poles],
[where this arc] is as long as half of the breadth [of latitude]186 that the Moon
travels.
Thus, he hypothesized the first sphere because of [the Moon’s] circuit
from east to west; the second because of its apparent direct motion beneath [10]
the zodiacal [constellations]; and the third because it evidently does not
take its place in the same points of the zodiacal [circle]187 when it is farthest
north and farthest south [of this circle], but because these sorts of points
always change position in the direction of the leading zodiacal [signs].188
That is why, then, he also [hypothesized] that this sphere also moves in the
same direction as the [sphere] of the fixed [stars], and that its motion to the
west189 was slow by virtue of the fact that the change in position of the points
[just] mentioned during each month is very small indeed.190 [15]
This, then, is the extent [of the discussion] of the Moon too. But, regarding
the five planets, Aristotle, who sets out [Eudoxus’] view, says that these move
by means of four spheres, of which the first and second are the same in that
they have in fact the same position as the first two spheres for the Sun and [20]
for the Moon. That is to say, the one is a sphere containing all the [spheres]
for each of the [planets] which rotates about the axis of the cosmos from
east to west in the same time interval as the [sphere] of the fixed [stars]; and
the second, which has its poles in the first, makes its rotation contrariwise
from west to east about the axis (or poles) of the [circle] through the [25]
middle of the zodiacal [constellations] in the time interval in which each
of the [planets] is held to traverse the zodiacal circle.191 Accordingly, in the
186 495.8 τοῦ πλάτου (breadth of latitude): cf. 147n178. See also Comment 12.15, p. 265.
187 495.11 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ σηµείοις (in the same points of the zodiacal [circle]):
scil. at the same longitude.
188 495.13 ἐπὶ τὰ προηγούµενα (in the direction of the leading zodiacal [signs]): scil. in the
direction of the daily rotation, that is, westwards. See Comment 12.16, pp. 265–266.
189 495.15: reading «ἐπὶ δυσµάς» with DEFc and Moerbeke [Bossier 1975, 3.5.13 ‘occidentem’]
case of the star of Mercury and of the [star] of Venus, he says192 that the
[rotation] of the second sphere is completed in a year; that in the case
of Mars, in two years; that in the case of Jupiter, in 12 years; and that in
the case of Saturn, which the ancients used to call the star of Helios, 30
years.193
[30] The two remaining spheres are presumably disposed as follows.194 The
third sphere for each [planet] has its poles on the [circle] through the middle
[496.1] of the zodiacal [constellations]—the one understood to be on the second
sphere for each [planet]—and rotates to south from north and from south to
north195 in the time interval in which each [planet] comes from [one] phase
to the next phase [of the same type] as it passes through all configurations
in relation to the Sun. (Scientists, in fact, call this time interval a synodic
[5] period.)196 This [period] is different for each [planet], which is why the
192 495.27 φησι (he says): strictly speaking, the speaker reported should be Aristotle; but
no such remark by Aristotle actually survives. So perhaps Simplicius now means Eudoxus:
cf. 496.6. Note, however, that, while Grosseteste has ‘ait’ [Bossier n.d.a, 177.21], Moerbeke has
‘aiunt’ (‘they say’) [Bossier 1975, 3.6.3].
193 495.25–29: see Comment 12.18, pp. 268–269.
495.28–29: cf. Geminus, Intro. ast. 1.23–30; Cleomedes, Cael. 1.2.20–43 (with Bowen and
Todd 2004, 39n9). As Bouché-Leclercq [1899, 66–70] suspected, such usage goes back to the
Babylonians: on Saturn as the Star of Helios (Helios = the Sun), see MUL.APIN 2.1.39 and 64
with Hunger and Pingree 1989, 147 and the references in Tarán 1975, 89n409.
According to Leonardo Tarán [1975, 308–309], though there are ms. readings which entail
a reference to the star of Helios at [Plato] Epin. 987c4–5, it is more likely that the author wrote
‘star of Saturn’. Thus, the earliest text extant in Greek to mention the star of Helios would be
P. Par. gr. 1. [col. 5 (first half of second century bc: Bowen 2008b). See Tarán 1975, 89 and n410
for further references.
194 495.29 ὧδέ πως ἔχουσιν (are presumably disposed as follows): cf. Mueller’s ‘are arranged
more or less in the following way’ [2005, 35]. See Comment 12.19, pp. 269–271. For the
configuration, see Figure 12.06(a), p. 190.
195 496.1–2 ἀπὸ µεσηµβρίας ἐπὶ τὰς ἄρκτους ἐπιστρέφεται: cf. Moerbeke’s ‘meridie ad ursas
volvitur’ [Bossier 1975, 3.6.8–9]. But Grosseteste’s translation supports the view that the text
should be «hἐπὶ µεσηµβρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων καὶi ἀπὸ µεσηµβρίας ἐπὶ τὰς ἄρκτους στρέφεται»
[Bossier 1987, 297]. Cf. 496.24–25.
196 496.4 οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν µαθηµάτων (lit. ‘those from the sciences’): these are presumably the
µαθηµατικοί (mathematical scientists) at 493.2, for instance. See Comment 10.04, pp. 203–
204.
496.4 διεξόδου χρόνον: lit. ‘time interval of passage or traversal’. I have not found any
instances of the usage that Simplicius reports here. Moerbeke’s text, ‘quod diexiodi, quasi
pertransitionis, tempus mathematici vocant’ [Bossier 1975, 3.6.11] glosses ‘diexiodi’.
Whereas the sidereal period of a planet is the time that it takes to return in longitude to
a fixed star, its synodic period is the time that the planet takes to return to the same synodic
phase, where this phase is defined by the planet’s position in relation to the Sun. Thus, the
synodic period is, for example, the interval between a planet’s successive oppositions or
successive first visibilities in the morning.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 151
rotation of the third sphere is also not in the same time interval for all. But,
just as Eudoxus thought, for the star of Venus [this rotation occurs] in 19
months;197 for the star of Mercury, in 110 days; for the star of Mars, in eight
months and 20 days; and for the star of Jupiter and of Saturn, in very nearly
13 months for each.198
Thus, the third sphere moves in this way and in this great a time interval.199 [10]
The fourth sphere, however, which in fact carries the [wandering] star,
rotates about [the] poles of an oblique circle, poles characteristic to each
[planet]. However, it makes its rotation in the same time interval as the
third [sphere], as it moves from east to west in the direction opposite
to the [motion of the third].200 This oblique circle is said by [Eudoxus]
to be inclined to the greatest of the parallel circles in the third sphere
by an amount that is not equal and not [in] the same [direction] in all [15]
[cases].201
Thus, it is evident that the [first sphere], which rotates in the same way202
as the [sphere] of the fixed [stars], causes all the remaining spheres to
rotate in the same direction because they have their poles in one another,
so that [it causes] both the sphere carrying the [wandering] star and the
[wandering] star itself [to go round in the same way as the sphere of the
fixed stars]. And for this reason then, each of the [planets] will have ris-
ings and settings. The second sphere will afford [the planet]203 its progress [20]
beneath the 12 zodiacal [constellations], since it rotates about the poles of
197 496.6–7: according to Heath [1913, 210–211], assigning a synodic period to Venus that is
more than 1.5 times its zodiacal period makes it impossible to account for the fact that Venus
has retrograde motion.
198 496.7–8: the synodic period assigned to Mars—260 days, assuming 30-day months—
is about one third of what it should be. As Heath [1913, 208–210: cf. Neugebauer 1975, 681]
explains, there is no way to obtain a satisfactory account of Mars’ retrogradations using the
value that Simplicius gives for Mars’ synodic period.
199 496.6–9: see Comment 12.20, pp. 271–272.
200 496.10–12: cf. 496.29–497.2. On the claims that the third and fourth spheres move in
opposite directions and have the same period, see Yavetz 1998, 231–233.
201 496.14 πρὸς τὸν µέγιστον τῶν … παραλλήλων: scil. to the equator of the third sphere. The
the [circle] through the middle of the zodiacal [constellations] and causes
the two remaining spheres and the [wandering] star to rotate with it in
the direction of the following zodiacal [signs],204 in the time interval in
which each is held to complete the zodiacal circle. The third sphere, which
has its poles on the [circle] through the middle of the zodiacal [constella-
[25] tions] in the second [sphere], as it rotates from south to north and from
north to south, will cause the fourth [sphere] (which also bears the [wan-
dering] star on itself) to rotate with it and will, further, be the cause of
[the planet’s] motion in latitude. However, not by itself alone. The reason
is that, [if the third sphere were the sole cause of the planet’s motion in
latitude,] in so far as the [wandering] star is subject to this sphere and
reaches the poles of the [circle] through the middle of the zodiacal [con-
stellations] it would also come to be near the poles of the cosmos.205 But, as
[30] matters stand, the fourth sphere, by rotating about the poles of the oblique
[circle] belonging to a [wandering] star206 in a direction opposite to the
[motion of the] third [sphere] from east to west, and by making their cir-
[497.1] cuit207 in the same time interval [as the third sphere], will deny [the star’s]
passing farther beyond the [circle] through the middle of the zodiacal [con-
stellations];208 and it will allow the [wandering] star to describe about this
same circle [the curve] called a hippopede by Eudoxus.209 Consequently, the
[5] [wandering] star will also seem to be displaced in latitude by an amount
equal to the width of this curve—the very [point] on which they criticize
Eudoxus.210
204 496.19–20 ἐπὶ τὰ ἑπόµενα τῶν ζῳδίων: scil. in the direction opposite to that of the daily
496.27–28: given two spheres, if the inner has its poles in the equator of the outer, then the
poles of the outer sphere are in the plane of the equator of the inner. Simplicius thus makes
explicit that the planet is on the equator of its carrying sphere. See Comment 12.21, p. 272.
496.28–29: this does not happen—of the seven ancient planets, Mercury travels farthest
from the zodiacal circle, its greatest latitude being 7°. Cf. 501.30–502.2.
206 496.29–30: τοὺς τοῦ hτοῦi ἁστέρος λοξοῦ κύκλου … πόλους: scil. the poles of the circle
circle, Simplicius again makes clear what is never stated explicitly, namely, that he takes the
planet to be situated on the equator of the fourth sphere. Cf. 496.27–29. See Comment 12.22,
pp. 272–273.
210 497.4–5: Heath [1913, 202] demonstrates that the width of one loop of the hippopede
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 153
(its length being extended along the zodiacal circle) is the maximum latitude (πλάτος) that
the planet attains. See also Neugebauer 1953, 229.
497.5: it is not clear who ‘they’ are; but their point appears to be that, when the planet
does in fact seem to describe loops in the heavens, the width of these loops does not define
the planet’s maximum latitude: see Figure 6, p. 25. But if this is right, one wonders how they
learned it.
211 497.9–13: Meta. 1073b32–38.
497.10: τουτέστι … τάξιν: this phrase, which appears in [Alexander] In meta. 1073b32–33
[Hayduck 1891, 704.9–10], is usually athetized by modern editors of Aristotle’s treatise. It
seems to be a gloss that assumes a computation of the sort found in Ptolemy’s Hypoth. plan.
All Aristotle does is to posit an ordering of the spheres: in fact, given his project, there was
no reason to cast this as an ordering of the planetary distances from the Earth. Indeed, given
the complexity of his arrangement, this would not have been a trivial project.
497.13: Heiberg has «µέλλοι», and «ἀνὰ µίαν»: the better mss of Aristotle’s Meta. have
«µέλλει» and just «µίαν», respectively [cf., e.g., Ross 1953, ad loc.].
212 497.20: Euctemon and Meton were apparently contemporaries engaged somehow in
astronomical studies in Athens of the fifth century bc. They are not clearly distinguished in
the ancient sources [cf. Rehm 1949, col. 1340; Neugebauer 1975, 623 and n12; Bowen 2012c]. In
P. Par. gr. 1 col. 23, it is reported that Euctemon posited astronomical season lengths of [93],
90, 90, and 92 days starting with the vernal equinox in a year of presumably 365 days. For a
detailed study of the testimony concerning their work, see Bowen and Goldstein 1988.
497.20–21 οὐχ ἱκανὰς … ἑκατέρῳ (not sufficient for either one): scil. for the Sun and the
Moon.
497.21–22: the solstices and equinoxes mark out the astronomical seasons and are defined
154 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
[Callippus] added the one sphere which he added in [the case of] each of
the three planets: Mars, Venus, and Mercury.213
[25] After reporting Callippus’ view about the turning spheres, Aristotle in-
ferred [that]
is necessary, if all [the spheres] when put together are going to account for the
phenomena, that for each of the wandering [stars] there be other spheres fewer
in number by one, the unwinding spheres, that is, [the spheres] which always
restore in position to the same point the first sphere of the [wandering] star
[498.1] stationed below, since only in this way is it possible that every] motion of the
planets be produced.214
Now, since Aristotle had stated these matters concisely in so clear a man-
ner,215 Sosigenes praised his keenness of mind and tried to discover the need
for the spheres added by him. And [Sosigenes] states that [Aristotle] says
[5] that these [spheres], which [Aristotle] calls unwinding [spheres], must be
added to his hypotheses for two reasons:216 in order that the fixed [sphere]
for each [planet] and the [spheres] beneath it have their proper position,
and so that there be the proper speed in all [spheres]. In other words, it was
necessary that, for its part, the [sphere] similar to the [sphere] of the fixed
[stars] hhor to any other sphereii move round the same axis as that [sphere]
by the Sun’s motion alone. So this explanation is at best partial, given that the Moon’s motion
is independent of the Sun’s.
213 497.22–24: Schiaparelli holds that this explanation has dropped out of the received text
and that one should thus show a lacuna after this sentence. Another possibility, however,
is that, though Simplicius is using a source that did report Eudemus’ account of Callippus’
addition of the extra planetary sphere for each of Mars, Venus, and Mercury, he declined to
give it; or that his source reported only the existence of a clear explanation. In any case, if
the text has been disturbed here—note also «συντόµως» at 497.17, «συντόµως καὶ σαφῶς» at
497.24, and «συντόµως οὕτως σαφῶς» at 498.2—yet another possibility, I suppose, is that a
negative particle «οὐ» has been omitted in this last sentence due to some copyist’s error and
that it should be negated. That is, Simplicius’ original point may have been that Eudemus did
not explain why Callippus added the extra spheres for Mars, Venus, and Mercury, at least in
a way that he, Simplicius, could understand. Consistent with this is the hesitation registered
at 504.20–22 in supposing that Callippus saved the phenomena by adding the spheres which
he is said to have added: cf. 165n268.
214 497.26–498.1: Meta. 1073b38–1074a5. Heiberg has «εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀποκαθιστώσας» [497.28],
where the better mss of Aristotle’s treatise read «εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθιστάσας» [cf. Ross 1953,
ad loc.] Moerbeke [Bossier 1975, 3.9.7] has ‘ad idem’. On the following discussion of the
unwinding spheres [497.24–504.3], see Comment 12.23, pp. 273–277.
215 498.2 συντόµως οὕτως σαφῶς: Heiberg follows A which omits «καὶ», though DEF have it.
and complete its rotation in the same time interval, none of which can occur
without the addition of the spheres mentioned by Aristotle.217 [10]
For clarity’s sake, [Sosigenes] says, let us make the argument in the case of the
spheres carrying the [star] of Jupiter. Now, if we should fit the poles of the first
of Jupiter’s [spheres] in the last of the four [spheres] of Saturn ([the sphere] in
which [Saturn] is also fixed), in what way could these [poles] remain on the
axis of the sphere of the fixed [stars] when, for its part, the [sphere] carrying [15]
them rotates around another axis that is oblique? But surely they must at least
remain on the axis [first] mentioned218 in the case of the outermost motion, if
the sphere rotating about them really is going to receive the disposition of the
sphere of the fixed [stars]. Now, moreover, since three of the spheres carrying
the [star] of Saturn are made to rotate together by one another and the first
[sphere]—[these spheres] also possessing, of course, their own particular [20]
proper speed—the motion of the fourth would not be some simple motion
but one sharing in all the [motions] above [it]. Indeed, it will be demonstrated
that, when [spheres] move in the opposite direction, something is subtracted
from the speed belonging to them219 because of the [sphere] which turns
[them] at the same time; and that, when [spheres] rotate together, something
is added by the motion which goes through to them from the sphere above,
because of their characteristic motion.220 Consequently, if the first of the [25]
[spheres] of Jupiter really should be fixed in the sphere carrying the [star]
of Saturn and have its own proper speed for going back to the same position
again in a rotation of the cosmos, the motions of the spheres above [it] will
not permit it to have this speed but there will be some addition, since these
[spheres] in fact move westwards while that one moves by itself in the same [499.1]
direction as well.
The same argument [holds] in the case of the next [spheres of Jupiter] as
well, since their motion will be compounded more and more and their poles
will go beyond their proper position. But, just as we said, neither of these
results should occur.221
secundum hos enim motarum sperarum positio intelligitur’ [Bossier 1975, 3.11.11–12]. How-
ever, Aujac et al. [1979, 170n1] propose bracketing this, claiming that it is an inappropriate
gloss inserted into the text. But perhaps they do not see that the poles in question (κατὰ
τούτους) are those of the fixed (or first carrying) sphere: they have ‘c’est en effet par rapport
aux pôles que l’on définit la position des sphères tournantes puisque ce sont les seuls points
immobiles’, which is true but beside the point. Mueller [2005, 38 and n156] likewise overlooks
«κατὰ τούτους».
226 499.17–500.14: cf. [Alexander] In meta. 1074a3–4 [Hayduck 1891, 704.23–705.6] for an
beke [Bossier 1975, 3.11.15] and Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 181.27–28] have ‘ab alia sive manente
sive circumducente illas’. Aujac et al. [1979, 171.10] read «περιαγοµένης» with DE. F has «εἴτε
κινουµένης εἴτε µενούσης τῆς περιεχούσης» (‘by another containing sphere that is either in
motion or at rest’) [cf. Mueller 2005, 39 and n159].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 157
[then] all the points in the contained [sphere, ZH] will always be at the same
position in relation to the containing [sphere, AB], as if it were in fact at rest.
For, when the [sphere] DE moves as though from A229 to B, if the smaller sphere
ZH only rotated with it230 and did not move in the opposite direction, it would
be seen that, as D is at some time beneath B, so too is Z which moves with [25]
D (that is, in the same time interval). But, since the [spheres] in fact move
together and the [sphere] ZH moves in the opposite direction to the [sphere]
DE, [the sphere ZH] undoes as much when it moves in an opposite direction
as it adds when it moves in the same direction [as DE]. And it results that,
when D is beneath B, Z is beneath A, just as it appeared from the beginning. [500.1]
Consequently, what has been proposed is true.
Thus, if the [sphere] AB is at rest, what has been proven is clear; namely,
that, given the manner in which both [spheres] are laid down,231 the inner
[sphere], which goes round with the outer [(scil. middle) sphere] and moves
in the opposite direction, always has the same position in respect of the same
points,232 and that it does not [have the same relative position] either when
it only goes round with [the middle sphere] or when it only moves in the
opposite direction.233
But then, if the [sphere] AB were also moving either in the opposite direction [5]
or in the same direction as the second sphere DE, the results will be the same
regarding the points of the third [sphere] ZH (which moves with the [sphere]
DE and moves in the opposite direction likewise [as before]).234
229 499.22 ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ A: lit. ‘seemingly in the direction from A’. Cf., e.g., Moerbeke’s ‘ut ab A
(A) may be said to rotate (or move round with) another (B):
– A and B rotate at the same time;
– A and B rotate at the same time and in the same time (i.e., they have the same period);
– A and B rotate at the same time and in the same direction;
– A and B rotate at the same time, in the same time, and in the same direction.
Simplicius’ usage of such συν-compounds tends to the second and fourth meanings [see, e.g.,
499.23 συνεπεστρέφετο, 499.24 συµφερόµενον, 499.25 συµφέρονται, 500.2–3 συµπεριφεροµένην,
500.7 συµφεροµένης, 500.8 συνεπισπώσης, 500.11 συνεπιστρέφειν, 500.19 συµπεριαγωγήν], and
relies on context to convey the precise meaning.
231 500.2 καὶ ὅπως ἀµφοτέρων ὑπαχόντων scil. σφαιρῶν: a reference to the configuration of
spheres under discussion. For «ὑπάρχω» as equivalent to «ὑπόκειµαι», see Liddell, Scott, and
Jones 1968, s.v. ὑπάρχω B.II. Heiberg marks «καὶ ὅπως» as corrupt. Aujac et al. [1979, 172]
replace it with «σφαιρῶν». Mueller [2005, 39 and n161] proposes ‘and it is clear that if both
things hold and the inner sphere …’, thus making one wonder what the two things are.
232 500.3 τοῖς αὐτοῖς … σηµείοις: scil. points on the third and outermost sphere.
233 500.4 µόνον συµφεροµένην … µόνον ἀντιφεροµέµην: «µόνον» signals instances when the
motion of the innermost sphere is not performed in the same time interval as that of the
middle sphere.
234 See Figure 12.08, p. 192.
158 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
For, when the sphere AB has been turned from A as though to B and draws
with it the [sphere] DE so that D comes to E, if the middle sphere DE moves
[10] by itself either in the opposite direction to the [sphere] AB or in the same
direction at any speed whatsoever in regard to the [sphere] AB but in the same
time interval as the [sphere] ZH, it will make point Z go to one or the other
side of A on account of 235 its causing the third [sphere] to rotate with it. But
the third sphere, since it moves in the opposite direction, will again make Z
beneath A. And since this always happens, all the points on the sphere ZH will
be beneath the same points of the sphere AB.
[15] Now, then, what was proposed has been proven on the assumption that the
[three] spheres move about the same axis. But the same argument [applies]
even if they do not move about the same axis.236 The reason is that the
placement of points beneath the same points does not result because of
motion over the same parallel [circles], but because of the co-rotation of the
contained [(scil. innermost) sphere] in regard to the containing [(scil. middle)
sphere] and its counter-rotation, since [this counter-rotation] removes as
[20] much as [the other] adds whether the rotation and counter-rotation are on an
oblique circle or on a [circle] vertical [to the axis of the outermost sphere].237
Again, given two homocentric spheres moving in the same direction, each one
at a particular speed, and given that the smaller [sphere] not only moves with
the greater but also performs its characteristic motion in the same direction,
[25] if the speeds are equal, the compounded motion will show238 a speed that is
double; and if the speed of the second is double, the [speed] of the [motion]
compounded will be triple; and likewise thereafter.
For, if the larger [sphere] causes the smaller to move through a quadrant, and
this [smaller one] being equally swift moves through a quadrant, it will have
[501.1] moved through twice a quadrant. Consequently, the [motion] arising from
both [motions will be] double the second motion.239
We state these [conclusions about the compounding of two motions], [Sosi-
genes] says, if the motions should be about the same poles. But, if [they
235 500.11 «διὰ» with accusative (‘on account of’): see Moerbeke’s ‘propterea quod simul
volvit tertiam’ [Bossier 1975, 3.12.15–16]; and Grosseteste’s ‘et per simul vertere tertiam’ [Bos-
sier n.d.a, 182.20]. If «διά» is deleted [cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 172.12], the meaning is unchanged.
500.12 παραλλάττειν τὸ A (go to one or the other side of A).
236 500.16–17: Simplicius now reports the case in which the outermost sphere has an axis
of rotation that is different than the one shared by the inner two spheres.
237 500.20 ἐπὶ ὀρθοῦ: circles are here defined in relation to their poles and axes; so a vertical
circle, that is, any circle vertical to the axis of the sphere, is in other words a parallel circle. (It
is called a parallel circle because the planes defined by such circles are parallel.) The circles
in question here are presumably equatorial circles [cf. 152n209].
238 500.25 δείξει: Mueller [2005, 40] mistakenly supposes that the subject of this verb is
‘Sosigenes’.
239 501.1 τῆς ἑτέρας κινήσεως (the second motion): scil. the motion proper to the second
sphere.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 159
should] not [be] about the same poles, something else will result because of
the obliquity of the second sphere. The reason is that the speeds will not be
compounded in [the way just described], but as they have customarily been
shown on a parallelogram when the motion on the diagonal is produced from [5]
two motions, one being [the motion] of some point as it moves on the length
of the parallelogram and the other being [the motion] of this very length as it
is drawn down through the width of the parallelogram in the same time inter-
val.240 Certainly, the point and the side of the length241 that is drawn down will
be coincident at the other end of the diagonal; and the diagonal is not equal to
[the sum of] both the [sides] deflected around it but smaller.242 Consequently, [10]
the speed too is smaller than the speed arising from both together, though it
is nevertheless compounded from both.
Now, that [result] too is stated alongside the following.
Given two spheres which are homocentric either around the same poles or
around different [ones] but rotate in a direction opposite to one another,
where the smaller [sphere] moves in the opposite direction at a lesser [speed]
but is carried round at the same time by the larger [sphere], the points on the [15]
smaller [sphere] will arrive at the same point in a greater time interval than
if the smaller sphere happened only to be fixed in the greater [sphere].243
Indeed, it is for this reason that the return from rising to rising of the Sun
itself is slower than the rotation of the cosmos, that is, because it moves in
the opposite direction to the universe [and] more slowly—since, if [the Sun]
did indeed move at the same speed as the fixed sphere while rotating in the [20]
opposite direction, given that [the Sun] always made its return in the same
time interval, it would be bound to rise always at the same point.244
240 501.4–8: see Figure 12.09, p. 192. The underlying idea may be that the compounded
motion of a body subject to motions imposed by two oblique rotating homocentric spheres
may be projected onto the plane and treated as a compounded motion along the diagonal of
a parallelogram.
241 501.9 ἡ τοῦ µήκους πλευρά: scil. the long side of the parallelogram.
242 See Euclid, Elem. 1 dem. 20. See also [Aristotle] Mech. prob. 1 and Heron, Mech. 1.8 [Nix
not, a point on the equator of the inner (slower) sphere will not in one revolution of the outer
sphere return to the same point (on a suitable reference circle), though it will take longer to
reach this circle.
244 501.17–81: it is here imagined that there are but two homocentric spheres for the Sun
[cf. 494.20–22 and Comment 12.14, pp. 264–265], presumably rotating in opposite directions
about different axes, the outer sphere having the shorter period of rotation.
501.18–21: it is now overlooked that, if the spheres had the same period, the Sun would
neither rise nor set but remain in one place.
501.21 τῷ αὐτῷ σηµείῳ (at the same point): scil. on the horizon, a reference circle: cf. Aujac
et al. 1979, 174. Note Mueller’s ‘with the same point’ [2005, 40], presumably understanding ‘on
the celestial sphere’, is possible, though the preceding sentence tends to favor the translation
given above. In either case, the διότι-clause misfires.
160 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
245 A sphere may be said to move along or over a circle if the sphere rotates about poles
reading, which has «τὸν ∆ιά» instead of Heiberg’s «τὴν διά», is evident in Grosseteste’s ‘oportet
igitur intelligere quintam speram aliam ante ferentes Iovem quattuor’ [see Bossier 1987, 296].
Mueller [2005, 109n165] emends Heiberg’s «δεῖ τοίνυν νοῆσαι πέµπτην σφαῖραν ἄλλην πρὸ τῶν
φερουσῶν τὴν διὰ τεττάρων» to «δεῖ τοίνυν νοῆσαι πέµπτην σφαῖραν ἄλλην πρὸ τῶν φερουσῶν τὸν
∆ιά». But «τεττάρων» is well attested and appropriate.
502.3 πρὸ τῶν φερουσῶν: ‘before’ in the sense of ‘between the fourth sphere (or Jupiter
itself) and the observer on Earth’.
249 502.5–6: cf. 499.17–500.21 along with Comment 12.25, pp. 278–283.
250 502.7 κατὰ τὸ φαινόµενον: given the syntax, the point is that it will reduce Jupiter’s speed
so that it has the speed that it actually appears to have. Thus, both Grosseteste and Moerbeke
have ‘secundum apparentem velocitatem’ [Bossier n.d.a, 184.24–25; Moerbeke [Bossier 1975,
3.15.12]: cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 175]. The claim is not that it reduces Jupiter’s apparent speed, as
Mueller has it [2005, 41 and n166].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 161
After the fifth [sphere], one should conceive of another, a sixth, which has
the same poles as the third but unwinds it by moving both in the same time
interval and in the opposite direction so that the phenomena are saved, that is, [10]
so that points on the third [sphere] always appear at the same perpendicular
on the fifth.251
After this [sphere], one should add a seventh, the one that unwinds the
second [sphere] in that it is fitted about the poles of the [circle] through
the middle [of the zodiacal constellations] (poles about which this [second
sphere] also rotates) yet rotates in the opposite direction and in the same
time interval as the second [sphere]. That is, [the seventh sphere unwinds
the second] in that it takes away from the motion and the speed that goes [15]
from it through to the spheres beneath it.252 (For, in fact, the second [sphere],
by moving with the fixed [sphere], contributed253 to the speed from east to
west of the [spheres] beneath it.) Therefore, [the seventh sphere] will rotate
by moving thus in the same way as the fixed [sphere]; yet it will not have the
disposition of the fixed [sphere] in fact, since it rotates about different poles
and not the [poles] of the fixed [sphere] but nevertheless from east to west.254
Finally, after this [seventh sphere], then, one should conceive of the first [20]
[sphere] of Jupiter as an eighth [sphere of Saturn], since Sosigenes has
correctly established that the last of the three unwinding [spheres] is not
the first of the [carrying spheres] of Jupiter. Some have thought this in fact,
namely, that the last of the [spheres] unwinding the upper motions will be
the first of the [spheres] carrying the [wandering] star below,255 so that the
same sphere is seventh and the one that we say is eighth (which is the first of
251 502.10–11 κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τῆς πέµπτης κάθετον. This claim is problematic to say the
least: see Comment 12.25, pp. 278–283. Nevertheless, so far as the perpendicular is concerned,
it is to be dropped from a point on the carrying sphere in question to the plane of its equatorial
circle and the thesis is that all points on the unwinding sphere in question will be fixed on
on these perpendiculars.
252 502.14–15 ἀφαιροῦσαν τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ τάχος τὸ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς διικνούµενον εἰς τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτὴν
σφαίρας: the subject of the participle must be the seventh sphere and the referent in «ἀπ’
αὐτῆς» and «ὑπ’ αὐτήν». See Comment 12.25, pp. 278–283.
253 502.16 προσετίθει: ‘contributed’ rather than ‘added’ because, by moving from west to
east, the second sphere actually diminishes the motion transmitted downwards by the first
sphere. If a positive addition is meant, then Sosigenes/Simplicius [see 278n163] is assuming
hypotheses at odds with Meta. 1073b24–27 [495.17–29]: cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 176n1. Mueller’s
proposed revision of the text [cf. 2005, 41] misses the mark: it [2005, 109n167] neglects the fact
that, because the second sphere is carried round by the fixed sphere, it does indeed contribute
to the east-west motion of the sphere below [cf. 494.20–22, 501.17–21].
254 502.17–19: that is, in unwinding the second sphere, points on the seventh will be fixed
in relation to the first sphere of the planetary system of spheres, and thus move from east
to west as does the sphere of the fixed stars [see Comment 12.25, pp. 278–283]. But this is
possible only because the seventh sphere itself rotates from east to west about the poles of
the zodiacal circle in the same time interval as the second sphere.
255 502.22–23. Points on the seventh sphere are fixed in relation to the first sphere of Saturn
162 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
[25] the [carrying spheres] of Jupiter).256 Certainly, this follows for them because
they are trying to count the same [sphere] twice in order to save the number
of turning [spheres] mentioned by Aristotle.257
Of course, it is necessary that the unwinding [spheres] for each star
be fewer by one than the carrying [spheres]. Consequently, in the cases
of Saturn and of Jupiter, since there are four carrying spheres for either,
[30] the unwinding spheres are three in number, whereas in the cases of the
[503.1] remaining four—Mars, Venus, Mercury, [and the] Sun—since there are five
carrying [spheres] for each, [the unwinding spheres] are four in number
[for each]. Thus, in all, the unwinding [spheres] of Saturn and Jupiter are
twice three, and the unwinding [spheres] of Mars, Venus, Mercury, [and the]
Sun are [altogether] four times four; so there are 22 in all. But the carrying
spheres of Saturn and Jupiter were eight in number and 25 in number for
[5] the remaining five [planets]. Thus, when these 33 [carrying spheres] have
been added to the 22 unwinding [spheres], there are in all 55. (Of course, for
the [spheres] carrying the Moon there is no need of unwinding [spheres]
since it is last, given that Aristotle said also that ‘only [the spheres] in which
the [wandering] star stationed below moves need not be unwound.’)258
and thus, since it therefore has the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars (albeit as a resultant
motion), it will impose this motion on that sphere of Jupiter which has its poles fixed in it.
Accordingly, this seventh sphere of Saturn could double as the first of the carrying spheres
of Jupiter. Simplicius does not report Sosigenes’ argument that the first carrying sphere of
Jupiter must be different from this seventh sphere (the third and innermost unwinding
sphere) of Saturn. Cf. Comment 12.23, pp. 273–277.
256 502.20–25: as Jonathan Beere [2003, 8] rightly notes, Simplicius thinks that this is wrong.
Yet, rather than explaining why, Simplicius cites Sosigenes’ view [503.35–504.1] that it is better
to hold that there has been a scribal error in the statement that there might be 47 spheres in
toto than to try get this number by identifying the last unwinding sphere of the planet above
with the first carrying sphere of the planet below. See 162n257.
257 502.25–27: Aristotle [Meta. 1074a6–14] asserts that there are 55 spheres in all but also
considers the possibility that there are only 47 spheres. This latter number caused commen-
tators no end of trouble, as Simplicius makes clear. Note: if a sphere is counted twice, that is,
if it is counted as a carrying sphere and as an unwinding sphere, the total number of spheres
required is reduced. Thus, if one identifies the first carrying sphere of each planetary system
with the unwinding sphere immediately above it, there will be 55 – 6 = 49 spheres in all.
258 503.8–9 µόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν αἷς φέρεται τὸ κάτω τεταγµένον ἄστρον. Simplicius’
quotation of Meta. 1074a8 makes poor sense. In point of fact, the Aristotelian mss have
«µόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν αἷς τὸ κατωτάτω τεταγµένον φέρεται» (‘only [the spheres] in which
the [wandering star] stationed farthest below moves need not be unwound’) [cf., e.g., Ross
1953, ad loc.]. Mueller [2005, 43] tacitly assumes «κατατάτω» in Simplicius’ text. Grosseteste
[Bossier n.d.a, 186.1] and Moerbeke [Bossier 1975, 3.17.2] have the comparatives ‘inferius’ and
‘subtus’, respectively.
503.9: on Simplicius’ reckoning of the 55 spheres, see [Alexander] In meta. 1074a8–9
[Hayduck 1891, 705.25–39].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 163
Now, it is clear that this is the total number of all [the spheres]. But, when [10]
Aristotle inferred that ‘if one does not add the motions which we mentioned
to the Sun and the Moon, there will be 47 [spheres] in all’,259 this caused
confusion. To explain: if we subtract the two [spheres] of the Sun and the
two [spheres] of the Moon which Callippus added and, clearly, two other
[spheres] from the Sun as well —the ones that unwind these [two carrying [15]
spheres for the Sun], given that, when those [carrying spheres] have been
subtracted, one must also subtract with them the spheres that are going
to unwind them—there will be six [spheres] that have been subtracted,
two which carry the Sun and the two which unwind these [spheres] in
addition to the two added for the Moon by Callippus. But it does not yet
result that, when these [spheres] have been subtracted from the 55, there
are 47 [spheres] left in all; rather, there will be 49. But Aristotle says that 47 [20]
are left behind, either as though he had forgotten that he removed not four
[spheres] from the Moon but only two—unless one should say, therefore,
that he subtracted the four unwinding [spheres] from the Sun which he
himself added and from both [the Sun and Moon] the [spheres] which
Callippus [added]; and, thus, [that], since there are eight spheres that have
been subtracted from the 55, the remaining [spheres] are 47 in number. [25]
This is how the number results. Yet why there are not some [spheres] to
unwind the two spheres of the Sun (the second and the third) we cannot
say, given in fact that he says only this, that the [wandering star] lying below
is not unwound.260 And yet Sosigenes has also established correctly that one
must hypothesize the unwinding [spheres of the Sun] for the Moon, lest [30]
the speed of the upper motions when added to the spheres carrying [the
Moon] no longer make it advance to the west at the same speed as the fixed
propter quid autem a sole duas, secundam scilicet et tertia, auferri, si non sustinent aliqui,
non habebimus dicere
But, if some do not keep [them], we will not be able to say why two [spheres], namely,
the second and the third, are taken from the Sun, [Bossier 1975, 3.17.17–19]
which is more a paraphrase than a translation [cf. Bossier n.d.a, 186.19–20].
503.26–27 διὰ τί … οὐκ ἀνελίξουσί τινες: lit. ‘why some [spheres] will not unwind the two
spheres …’.
503.27–28 ταῦτα εἰπόντος … µὴ ἀνελίττεσθαι: a paraphrase of Meta. 1074a7–8.
164 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
[sphere]. But, thus, even when it is granted that the [Moon] alone does not
have an unwinding [sphere], the number does not follow; and this disturbed
Alexander and Porphyry in their lectures on [book] Λ of the Metaphysics.261
[35] Sosigenes, who understands [the problem], says that it is better to think
[504.1] that there has been an error in the number by scribes than to make the
seventh and eighth spheres the same.262 (Not even if this were the case,
would the number be consonant with the text, given that there will still not
be 55 [spheres] in all, just as [Aristotle] himself says.)
Sosigenes also adds the following when he says that
[5] it is clear from what has been said that Aristotle calls [the spheres] unwinding
in one sense whereas Theophrastus calls them compensating in another.263
Indeed, both [designations] apply to them. That is to say, [these spheres]
unwind the upper motions and compensate264 the poles of the spheres be-
neath [the wandering stars]265 by removing the former [motions] and bring-
ing the latter to what is required.
The reason is that the motions from above should not extend to the diverse
[10] [motions] of the stars lower down and that the poles of the [spheres] below
should fall beneath the same perpendicular as the poles of similar spheres,266
so that the first spheres of the [wandering] stars stationed beneath (and,
clearly, because of them, the spheres after them as well) can be restored to
the same position, just as he says. ‘Certainly, in this way alone’, he rightly
[15] says, ‘is it possible for all [the wandering stars] to make the motion of the
fixed [stars],’ as we have already said.267
261 503.28–504.3: see fr. 160a in Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.301–312. Rescigno’s fr. 160b = [Alexan-
503.35–504.1: Sosigenes apparently held that the number should have been 49.
263 504.4–15 = Theophrastus fr. 165D in Fortenbaugh et al. 1992. See 493.17–20 and 146n175.
(fem. pl.). This reference to items syntactically outside Simplicius’ own text signals that he is
quoting Sosigenes.
266 504.10–11 ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον (beneath the same perpendicular): scil. a perpendicular
drawn from the sphere’s pole to its equatorial plane. In other words, the spheres should have
the same axis.
267 504.9–15: Mueller [2005, 43 and n177] includes these lines in the citation of Sosigenes.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 165
And why should we speak about the rest [of the phenomena], some of which
even Callippus of Cyzicus tried to save when Eudoxus was not successful,
if indeed [Callippus] did save [them]? But, at least this one itself, which
is indeed manifest to the eye, none of them before Autolycus of Pitane
in fact tried to demonstrate by means of hypotheses, although not even
Autolycus himself was successful—his dispute with Aristotherus269 reveals [25]
[this]. What I mean is that the [planets] sometimes make their appearance
nearby and sometimes after they have receded from us.270
This is indeed obvious to the eye in some cases. That is, the star said to
belong to Venus and, moreover, the [star belonging to] Mars appear many
times greater at the middle of their retrogradations,271 with the result that,
on moonless nights, the [star] of Venus for its part causes shadows to fall [30]
from bodies.272
Furthermore, even in our unaided sight,273 the Moon obviously does not
always stand the same [distance] from us because it does not always appear
But, as «καθάπερ φησίν» at 504.12 indicates, in 504.9–14, Simplicius is speaking propria voce.
504.14–15 is another citation.
268 504.17–505.25: Aujac et al. [1979, 179–181] follow Heiberg in supposing that the citation
of Sosigenes extends from 504.17 to 505.27, but there is reason to doubt that this is correct. Pro-
clus, Hyp. ast. 4.98 [see p. 249, for translation] does, I admit, indicate that Sosigenes’ account
of the turning (or unwinding) spheres did include mention of solar eclipses. Moreover, 505.1–
11 is consistent with Proclus’ report. The problem is that such consistency is not a sufficient
basis for ascribing all of 504.17–505.27 to Sosigenes, especially in light of the fact that this pas-
sage introduces argument on other subjects as well, and that its syntax does not require such
an attribution. Note also that 504.20–22 seems more likely to come from Simplicius, given
497.22–24: cf. 154n213.
504.18 τῶν περὶ Εὔδοξον: on the locution, see Comment 10.07, pp. 206–207.
269 504.24–25: on Aristotherus, see Comment 12.26, pp. 283–284.
eye observation and observation with instruments, so «αὐτῇ» is important. But see Mueller
2005, 43.
166 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
to us to have the same size, though the same conditions obtain with refer-
ence to the [medium] through which it is observed.274 Nevertheless, [should
the Moon not appear so to our unaided sight,]275 the same thing seems true
to us also if we make observations more instrumentally, because sometimes
[35] a drum of 11 digits276 and sometimes a drum of 12 digits blocks the observer’s
sight so that it does not fall upon [the Moon], though [the drum] is set at
the same distance from him.277
[505.1] In addition to these [instrumental observations], the events at total
eclipses of the Sun also testify to what has been said [about the Moon], and
are in fact proofs of its truth. That is to say, when the center of [the Sun],
the center of the Moon, and, moreover, our eye happen to be in a straight
[5] line, the results do not always appear the same. Instead, the Sun in fact is
itself sometimes completely enclosed by the cone which encloses the Moon
and has our eye as its vertex (that is, sometimes in fact [the Sun] spends
274 504.32 τῶν αὐτων περὶ τὸ δι’ οὗ θεωρεῖται καθεστώτων: lit. ‘the same things obtain con-
cerning that through which it is observed’. Cf. 505.9–11. Mueller [2005, 44] misses this clear
reference to the medium. On the general claim about the Moon, see Comment 12.30, pp. 290–
291.
275 504.33 οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ [cf. 1.24–2.5, 431.30–32]. This collocation of particles answers to
«µέν» in 504.30 [cf. Denniston 1966, 30; Blomqvist 1969, 57–58], and announces the strongest
case for the thesis that the Moon varies in distance to the Earth. The connection with the
preceding sentence may be spelled out by ‘But, if it is not obvious to the naked eye that
the Moon varies in size and, hence, in distance, nevertheless ….’ Heath’s translation [1913,
222] does not save the contrast between naked eye and instrumental observation at issue
here, a contrast that is also indicated by the comparative adverb «ὀργανικώτερον» (‘more by
means of instruments’) in 504.33. Cf., e.g., Theon, De util. math. 3.22 [Hiller 1878, 150.7–12 and
T.H. Martin 1849, 213].
504.33: see Comment 12.31, p. 291.
276 504.33 ὀργανικώτερον. The instrument that Simplicius alludes to seems to be the Hip-
parchan dioptra first mentioned by Ptolemy in Alm. 5.14 [Heiberg 1898–1907, 1.417.1–3: cf.
Proclus, Hyp. ast. 4.71–72]. One form of this instrument was subsequently described by Pap-
pus [In Ptol. syn. ad 5.14: Rome 1931–1943, 1.90–93] and another, by Proclus [Hyp. ast. 4.87–96:
cf. 4.72]: cf. Price 1957, 591. Though Simplicius does not describe the instrument in any detail,
the fact that he says nothing of any holes in the movable drums suggests that he may have
in mind Pappus’ rather than Proclus’ version. Simplicius’ main departure from all previous
extant accounts of this device lies in his speaking of drums (τύµπανα) rather than small
prisms (πρισµάτια).
504.34 ἑνδεκαδάκτυλον. See Comment 12.32, pp. 291–292.
277 504.34–505.1: according to Levi ben Gerson [Goldstein 1985, 102 sentence [10]], the
apparent size of the Moon only varies a little between quadrature and opposition. Indeed,
Bernard Goldstein informs me that in chapter 75 (unpublished) of his Astronomy, Levi asserts
that he could detect no variation in the Moon’s apparent size between 0° and 180° of anomaly,
that is, he could find no measurable difference between the apparent sizes of the Moon no
matter what the argument of anomaly was. In modern times, the apparent size of the Moon
has been found to vary from 0;29,20° to 0;33,32° [cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 180n1].
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 167
some time interval without being visible to us); and sometimes, again, [the
configuration] is so far [removed] from this that at the mid time interval
of the eclipse, some rim of [the Sun] is in fact left shining round from
outside [the cone].278 Consequently, it must be necessary that the difference [10]
in the sizes [of total solar eclipses] be evident because of the inequality of
the [Moon’s] distances, though the atmospheric [conditions] are about the
same.279
But, in that what happens in these instances [just described] is plain in
fact to sight, it is reasonable that [the same] happens in the others as well
even if it is not manifest to sight. Indeed, not only is it reasonable, it is in
fact true, since the daily motion of the [other planets] appears unsmooth.280
But, concerning their apparent sizes, no difference is noticed because their [15]
variation in altitude and its opposite (which scientists used also to call
motion in depth) is negligible.281 Thus, they did not try at all to save this
[phenomenon] and, consequently, they did not indicate the changing daily
[motion of the planets], although [Plato’s] question requires this.
But yet, it is not admissible to say that the inequality of the distances of
each [planet] in relation to itself really escaped their notice. For, evidently, [20]
Polemarchus of Cyzicus recognizes it but dismisses it as not being percep-
tible, because he prefers more the positioning of the spheres themselves in
the universe about its very center.282
And even Aristotle in his Problemata physica clearly sets forth further
problems for the astronomers’ hypotheses, [deriving] from the fact that [25]
the sizes of the planets do not appear to be the same.283 Thus, he was not
278 505.3–9: the point of this argument is, again, that the Moon varies in distance to the
Earth [cf. 505.1–3]. There is no need to follow Schiaparelli in inferring that this argument also
entails awareness of, or supposes, a variation in the apparent diameter of the Sun: cf. Heath
1913, 223–224.
279 505.9–11: these lines concern the Moon and conclude the argument that began in
504.30; they are not a remark about the planets in general (as Mueller [2005, 44] supposes).
280 505.11–17: on this claim about the motions of planets other than the Moon, see Com-
505.16 κατὰ βάθος: the earliest occurrence of the usage that Simplicius alludes to seems to
be in the Keskintos Inscription (ca –100), though its significance there is admittedly not well
understood [cf. Neugebauer 1975, 698–705; Jones 2006]. Cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. 2.68; Plutarch, De
facie 937f, 939a–b.
505.17 οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν µαθηµάτων: cf. 150n196.
282 505.21–23: see Comment 12.34, pp. 293–294.
283 505.24 τοῖς Φυσικοῖς προβλήµασι. The Physica problemata (= Quaestiones physicae) that
has come down under Aristotle’s name is a compilation of texts written in the Peripatetic
school made perhaps as late as the fifth and sixth centuries ad, though there is modest reason
168 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
completely satisfied with his turning [spheres], even if [the thesis] that they
are homocentric with the universe and move about its center won him
over.284 And, further, from what he says in Metaphysics Λ, he is evidently not
[30] one who thinks that the [features] of the motions of the wandering [stars]
have been stated adequately by the astronomers up to and during his time.
At any rate, he says [this] in the following:285
Thus, to give [some] conception [of the problem], we now state what some of
the mathematical scientists286 say, that is, in order that there be some definite
[506.1] number for thought to grasp. But, as for the rest, as we investigate some things
ourselves and learn other things from those who conduct investigations, if any-
thing is revealed to [us] in engaging with these matters in conflict with what has
been stated now, we must treat both [accounts] kindly but believe the more accu-
rate.287
But, also in the same book, after he has enumerated all the motions together,
he remarks:
to think it may include sections of a book of the same name written by Aristotle himself [cf.
Louis 1991–1994, 1.xi–xxxv]. Precisely which sections these may be is a matter of scholarly
concern that lacks a credible means of resolution. In any case, I will put this issue aside for
now, since no problem in the treatise as it has come down to us raises any difficulties involved
in positing fixed planetary distances. The only one that even remotely seems to suggest the
possibility of variable planetary distance is Prob. 15.4, but it does this counterfactually. So, if
this were the text that Simplicius is alluding to, he has certainly read it against the grain in
order to support his story.
Aujac et al. [1979, 181n2] think that the passage which Simplicius has in mind was a false
report inserted into a version of the Problemata now lost and intended to excuse Aristotle
from his adherence to homocentric theory.
505.24–25 ταῖς τῶν ἀστρολόγων ὑποθέσεσιν.
284 505.26 ταῖς ἀνελιττούσαις: cf. 135n113.
505.27 ἐπηγάγετο αὐτόν: though there is a Greek ms. with «αὐτῷ», «αὐτόν» seems correct:
cf. Grosseteste’s induxit ipsum [Bossier n.d.a, 189.17] and Moerbeke’s ‘placuit sibi’ [1563,
177.col.A].
285 505.29 ἀστρολόγων.
505.30 λέγει γοῦν ὧδέ πως. There is no uncertainty here: the quotation makes Simplicius’
point. See Comment 12.19, pp. 269–271.
286 505.31 τῶν µαθηµατικῶν.
287 505.30–506.3: Meta. 1073b11–17. Simplicius omits a clause [Meta. 1073b10–11] immedi-
ately before the lines that he quotes. This is why he writes «νῦν µὲν οὖν ἡµεῖς» where the
received text has only «νῦν µὲν ἡµεῖς». Heiberg’s text also has «ὑπολαµβάνειν, τῶν ζητούντων»
and «ἐάν» instead of «ὑπολαβεῖν, παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων» and «ἄν», respectively [cf. Ross 1953,
ad loc.].
Heath [1913, 223] rightly follows Schiaparelli in rejecting Simplicius’ imputing to Aristotle
doubts about homocentric theory in this passage as an attempt to excuse later Peripatetics
from abandoning homocentric spheres in favor of epicyclic and eccentric spheres [cf. 506.8–
16]. Indeed, the uncertainty registered here is limited to the count of carrying and unwinding
spheres.
506.2 παρὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρηµένα τοῖς ταῦτα πραγµατευοµένοις. See Comment 12.35, p. 294.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 169
Let the number of the motions be this great, so that it is reasonable to suppose [5]
that the substances, that is, the unmoved and perceptible first principles, are as
numerous. Let what is actually necessary be left for the more vigorous to say.288
His ‘let … be’, ‘reasonable’, and ‘leave for others more vigorous’,289 show his
uncertainty about them.
Thus, while we give credence to Aristotle, we must follow more those who
come later, on the grounds that they save the phenomena more [effectively] [10]
even if they do not save them completely,290 since neither did [the homocen-
trists] know so many phenomena—on account of the fact that the observa-
tions sent by Callisthenes291 from Babylon, when Aristotle required this of
him, had not yet arrived in Greece (Porphyry reports that these [observa-
tions] were preserved for 31,000 years up to the times of Alexander of Mace- [15]
don)292—nor were they able to demonstrate by means of their hypotheses
all [the phenomena] which they did know.
Ptolemy too criticizes them293 on the grounds that they introduce a great
multitude of spheres for the sake of the joint return of the seven planets in
relation to the rotation of the fixed [sphere] alone, as well as for saying that
[the spheres] contained by the containing [spheres], that is, the innermost
[spheres],294 are causes of the joint return for the [spheres] above them, [20]
although nature always makes higher things causes of motion for things that
288 506.4–7: Meta. 1074a14–17. Modern editions of Aristotle’s text have «τὸ µὲν οὖν πλῆθος»
(Simplicius omits «οὖν»); moreover, they follow [Alexander] [Hayduck 1891, 706.16–17, 23–24]
and athetize Simplicius’ «καὶ τὰς αἰσθητάς» (‘and perceptible’) [cf. Ross 1953, ad loc.], though
these words do appear in all the mss of the Meta.
289 506.7–8: Simplicius recalls text that he has just quoted [506.6–7]. Note that his «ἄλλοις
ἰσχυροτέροις» (‘for others more vigorous’) departs from the original. Grosseteste [Bossier
n.d.a, 190.1–4] has:
necessarium enim dimittatur fortioribus dicere. Et hoc igitur sit et rationabile et aliud
fortioribus relinquere, quod circa ipsa dubium ostenditur.
290 506.10 κἂν εἰ µηδὲ οὗτοι τελέως διασώζουσιν: Simplicius thus hints at some technical
tained and last spheres’, thus missing the instrumental dative and the epexegesis.
170 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
are lower. Certainly, even in human beings, it is from on high, that is, from
our ruling part, that the impulses for motion are distributed through the
nerves to all our organs.295
And I do not understand why they ever set the first sphere for each
[wandering] star as moving similarly and at the same speed as the fixed
[25] [sphere], and as making all the spheres after it down to the [sphere] that has
the [wandering] star return jointly with the fixed [sphere].296 To explain: if
the [sphere] above passes on to the [spheres] below the form of its proper
motion, why do we not say that the fixed [sphere], which is the most
powerful and strongest sphere of all, causes all the spheres beneath it to
return jointly to the same position by itself? Of course, it was necessary
that the [spheres] performing the motion in longitude and in latitude be
[30] different, since these were different [motions] for each [wandering] star.
[507.1] But how did the joint return with the fixed [sphere] (which is the same
for all the spheres) not be satisfied by the rotation of the fixed [sphere]?
How instead did it, according to Aristotle, need [spheres] performing this
motion for each [wandering] star as well as for spheres unwinding those
ones?297 They might perhaps say298 that, even if [the spheres] return jointly
[5] with the fixed [sphere] by performing the same motion westwards as it,
since they are instead different in size, they are also utterly different in speed
of motion.299 How, then, was it reasonable that [spheres] which are set free
(that is, not bound together) perform different motions at the agency of a
single [sphere], the fixed [sphere]?300
295 506.22 τοῦ ἡγεµονοῦντος µορίου: scil. from our controlling part or command center.
506.22 διὰ τῶν νευρῶν: see Comment 12.38, pp. 296–297.
296 506.23–25: Mueller [2005, 45] overlooks that «κινουµένην» and «συναποκαθιστῶσαν» are
verbs is Aristotle.
507.3 ἐκείνας (those ones): scil. the spheres producing motion in longitude and latitude. As
Taïeb Farhat has emphasized in correcting an earlier version of my translation, these spheres
must be unwound if the diurnal motion of the planet beneath is to be preserved.
298 507.4 λέγοιεν δὲ ἂν ἴσως: the verb is plural not singular as Mueller [2005, 46] supposes.
for such a diversity among the (linear) motions of the first carrying spheres, when these
spheres are unconnected and thus unlike homocentric circles drawn on a solid, rotating
wheel?
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 171
301 507.10 τὴν ἀνωµαλίαν. This is first use of «ἀνωµαλία» in its technical sense to signify the
mean motion of a planet on its epicycle: see Evans 1998, 337 for the terminology in the case of
a simple epicyclic model [cf. Toomer 1984, 21]. (Epicyclic) anomaly, which is measured from
the apogee of the epicycle, incidentally accounts for what was known as motion ‘in depth’.
Cf. 135n112.
302 507.13 ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων: see Comment 12.39, pp. 297–298.
303 507.13 Νικόµαχος … ᾽Ιάµβλιχος: Nicomachus of Gerasa was a Pythagorean who was
active ca 100 [cf. Tarán 1974; O’Meara 1989, 14–23]. Iamblichus of Chalcis (ca 245 to ca 325)
was a Platonist philosopher who may have studied with Porphyry [cf. O’Meara 1989, 30n1].
507.13–14 ἄλλοι τέ τινες … καὶ … καὶ. On the locution, see 244n56.
304 507.14–16: cf. 492.28–31.
«τὸ τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ κέντρον» is the subject of the subordinate clause «ἵνα … τυγχάνῃ …».
172 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
308 507.35–508.1 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκκέντρου: as Grosseteste’s translation indicates, the text should
chooses instead to athetize «περιγείου». Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 192.25] has only ‘a proximo
terrae’.
311 508.13–15: cf. Euclid, Elem. 1 dem. 32 with dem. 13.
312 508.17 τῷ εἰρηµένῳ σκοπῷ τοῦ µαθηµατικοῦ: cf. 174n319.
313 508.18 ἐξεῦρον: cf. 507.9 οἱ µεταγενέστεροι.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 173
smoothly, they appear to traverse arcs of the circle through the middle of the
zodiacal [constellations] unsmoothly.314
That is to say, once more let the circle ABCD be conceived of as homocen-
tric with the [circle]315 through the middle [of the zodiacal constellations]
about a center E where again our eye is. And let the [wandering] star be
conceived of not as making its motion on [ABCD] but along FGHJ, a small
circle (called an epicycle) which always has its center A on the circumfer- [25]
ence of the circle ABCD, so that the star is likewise farthest from the Earth
at F and nearest at H.316
It is also clear, when the epicycle has smoothly traveled the arc AB and is
at B (the [straight line] EB being brought round with it smoothly in turn too),
when the star by making its progress from the apogee F to G has traveled the [30]
[arc] FG smoothly in turn, and when we join the straight [line] EG from our
eye at E, that the star will in turn have been brought smoothly round the [509.1]
arc AB (that is, the angle AEB) by the epicycle, that [the star] is evidently
[brought round] the [angle] AEG which is greater than the smooth [angle,
AEB], and that the angle BEG is the difference of [the angles].
But, when the [planet] makes its progress from the apogee F not to G but
to J, the angle AEB will once more belong to the smooth progress and the [5]
[angle] AEJ to the apparent [progress], which is smaller than the smooth
one, and [angle] JEB will be their difference.
Consequently, this sort of hypothesis can demonstrate the progress of
the [wandering] stars at [positions] nearer the apogee as both greater and
smaller—clearly greater when the star makes its progress from the epicycle’s [10]
apogee in the same direction as the [deferent] circle, and smaller when
[the star makes its progress] in the opposite direction.317 (The eccentric
[hypothesis] always [makes] the apparent [passage] at a point nearer the
apogee smaller than the smooth [progress], since the apparent [angle] AFB
is in fact always smaller than the smooth [angle] AEB.)318
314 508.18–21: cf. Comment 12.39, pp. 297–298. Note that at this point in this story, the
mathematical equivalence of the epicyclic and eccentric hypotheses is unknown: cf. Bowen
2007, 339n40.
315 508.22 Reading «τῷ» with F instead of «πρὸς τὸ» with A: cf. 493.10, 491.11, 507.30, 510.5;
Aujac et al. 1979, 186. Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 193.7–8] has ‘concentricus ei qui …’.
316 508.22–27: see Figure 12.11, p. 194.
317 509.8–10 µείζονας µὲν δηλονότι … ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία: scil. when the planet has moved less
Either one of these hypotheses will afford the astronomer’s goal319 when
taken by itself, except that in the case of the Moon they need both [hypothe-
[15] ses] compounded. That is to say, they hypothesize that the epicycle carrying
the Moon is brought round on an eccentric circle in order that the phenom-
ena be saved by it.320
These hypotheses are in fact simpler than the earlier ones in that they do
not require fabricating so many heavenly bodies, and they save the rest of
the phenomena and especially the ones concerning depth or anomaly.
[20] But they do not maintain Aristotle’s axiom, the one that wants every body
moving in a circle to move about the center of the universe. Further, not even
the stated solution of [Aristotle’s second] problem, [a problem] because of
which all these arguments were raised, has in the end any standing.321 That
is, it is not the case that equalization still has any standing, since what was
said is no longer true, namely, that the first motion, though one in number,
causes many divine bodies to move; whereas the [motions] which are many
[25] in number each [cause] only one [body to move]. The reason is that the
[motions] before the last (that is, the one that has one star) do not move
many bodies.322
Sosigenes brought these absurdities as well against these hypotheses,
though he was not satisfied by the [hypothesis] of turning [spheres] for the
reasons stated before.
But those who think that the [wandering] stars have their characteristic
motion because they are in fact ensouled must object to the first [of Aristo-
[30] tle’s axioms]: for [the planets] are not only parts of the heavens, each is also
a whole by itself. Thus, a truer axiom would be the one stating that every
body which moves in a circle moves about its own center.323
moving on its characteristic epicycle, is sometimes nearer the Earth and sometimes
farther from it; and the same holds for the remaining wandering [stars].
[= Wildberg 1987, fr. 15: cf. fr. 7]
319 509.13 τὸν ἀστρονοµικὸν σκοπόν: cf. 172n312.
320 509.16: ὑπ’ αὐτῆς: scil. this composite hypothesis. See, e.g., Neugebauer 1975, 84–88.
321 509.21 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ (further, not even): cf. Denniston 1966, 21–22.
system has but one starless sphere in eccentric/epicyclic hypotheses and none in purely
eccentric hypotheses.
323 509.30–32: here and in what follows, Simplicius unpacks the Aristotelian assertion that
the characteristic or natural motion of an aetherial body is a circular motion about the center
of the universe into three claims:
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 175
This is why it is true to say that all the heavenly bodies which have the
center of the universe as a center move about the center of the universe,
whereas all [those bodies] which are outside that center (since they are [510.1]
more particular)324 move about their own center, just as the [wandering]
stars [do] as well as their epicycles and their eccentrics (if there are indeed
such bodies in the heavens).325 These [bodies] do move about the center
of the universe, even if [they are] not [performing] their characteristic
motion [about this center] but the [motion] of the sphere carrying them, [5]
[a sphere] which is homocentric with the universe. And in this way at
least, Aristotle’s principle that every body that moves in a circle moves
about the center of the universe would in fact be true, unless someone
stipulates that it move [in this way] in accordance with its characteristic
motion.326
The solution of [Aristotle’s second] problem will have standing in part
even in the case of these hypotheses, since in these instances too it is in
a sense true to say that ‘nature equalizes and produces a certain order by [10]
assigning many bodies to one motion and many motions to one body’.327 The
reason is that, even if each [body] performs its own motion as a single
[motion], all [the bodies] beneath the fixed [sphere], furthermore,328 per-
form its motion—that is, the epicycles perform this [motion] as well as the
[motion] of the homocentric or eccentric [deferent circles], and the [wan-
dering] star (which he called one body)329 [performs] the [motion] of the
Simplicius is borrowing the term from logic and intends a contrast with the universal. More
likely is that he is referring to the wandering stars viewed as creations of the celestial sphere
[cf. 55n52, 485.23–27, 486.29–487.2].
325 510.1–2: Simplicius accepts the thesis that the stars rotate or spin [454.23–456.27 with
Comment 11.05, p. 221]. For debate about whether motion on eccentric and epicyclic circles
is indeed circular, see Heiberg 1894, 32.1–11 with Comment 12.27, pp. 284–288.
510.2–3: recall Simplicius’ remarks at 488.10–14, 25–30; 492.25–28.
326 510.7 προσθείν: scil. ‘puts it to us’. Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘apponat’ [Bossier n.d.a, 195.7].
510.7–8: I take the stipulation to be that a body’s motion about the center of the universe
must be a proper motion and not one that is incidental or forced.
327 510.9–11: cf. De caelo 293a2–4.
328 510.12 ἀλλὰ καὶ: cf. Denniston 1966, 21.
329 510.13–14: cf. De caelo 293a3–4.
176 in aristotelis de caelo 2.12
[15] epicycle and of the homocentric or eccentric [deferent circle] as well as the
[motion] of the fixed [sphere].
Still,330 the eccentric circles would not be ones moving in a circle, since
they do not move about the center but about what is outside the center:
that is, since, as [these circles] occupy and leave behind a place in rotating
[about the center of the cosmos], they necessitate that there be a void, and
since the shape of these circles331 will be strange in that what is inside always
cuts off a part of what is outside.
[20] We will perhaps escape332 all these [problems] if we fit eccentric spheres
in homocentric ones and say that the homocentric [sphere] by moving
about its own center causes the eccentric [sphere] (which itself also moves
about its own center) to go around.333 And we will call all [these pairs of]
spheres complete without fearing that in those cases ‘body goes through
body’.334
Sosigenes cleverly raises as well no small number of other astronomi-
[25] cal problems for these hypotheses too, problems which would belong to
another lecture to examine. But, as it is, he thinks335 that, by investigating the
arguments about the heavens and the heavenly motions and by confirming
the demonstrations through which [these motions] are proved to be circu-
lar and smooth, that is, ordered (since they appear unsmooth and evidently
have ascents and descents), he has provided a conception of what things
have been hypothesized by the ancient astronomers336 and those who came
[30] after [them] in order to save the phenomena by means of smooth, circular,
and ordered motions.
330 510.15–19: Simplicius now considers what happens to an eccentric circle when it is made
to go round with the daily rotation. He assumes that motion at a fixed distance about a point
is circular only if that point is the center of the universe.
331 510.18 τό τε σχῆµα αὐτῶν: scil. the shape that these eccentric circles describe as they go
physical theory that was first raised by the Stoic doctrine of total mixture: cf. Todd 1976, 29–
88. Here the (tangential) point seems to be that if each of a number of eccentric spheres is
enclosed in a rotating homocentric sphere or, better, a rotating homocentric spherical shell,
there is no longer any danger that they will come into contact [cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 190].
Mueller’s ‘not fearing to say that in their case a body passes through a body’ [2005, 49] misses
the point.
335 510.26 νῦν δὲ ἔδοκει: a philosophical imperfect [cf. Smyth 1971, §1903] not, as Mueller
[2005, 49] has it, the apodosis of a contrary-to-fact conditional (‘But it would seem’).
336 510.31 ἀστρονόµοι.
in aristotelis de caelo 2.12 177
Now, if this is more fitting to chapters337 about the heavens than to ones
about first philosophy, none of us will criticize the rather lengthy digression
from the [present] chapter, since it has come about at the right time.338 But
we must return to what comes next in Aristotle’s chapters. [35]
A Question of Proportionality
Chapter 2.10 of the De caelo opens with a question that is relevant to the two
characteristic motions known to belong to any planet in Aristotle’s time,
its diurnal motion and its motion in longitude along the zodiacal circle;
and it seems to affirm a proposition that is arguably true of both—namely,
that there is a direct proportionality between the motion of a planet and
its distance. Presumably, the diurnal motion would be viewed as a linear
speed, since the diurnal angular speeds of the planets are all the same and
since their diurnal linear speeds do indeed vary directly with the distance
of the planet in question from center of the Earth. As 291a34 ff. make clear,
however, Aristotle is really thinking of the planetary longitudinal or sidereal
motions. In this case, the motion of a planet is faster if the planet completes
its eastward circuit in longitude through the zodiacal constellations and
returns to a given fixed star in a shorter time, that is, if it has a shorter sidereal
period. Moreover, the distance to which this motion is proportional is to be
that from the celestial sphere, not from the center of the Earth.
There are two points worth noting here. First, this proportionality of the
planets’ longitudinal motions and their distances from the fixed stars is sim-
ply not the same as the proportionality of their motions and their distances
from (the center of) the Earth; that is, the existence of a proportionality
established one way does not entail the existence of the other. Second, there
is not enough information given here to decide whether Aristotle has in
mind anything as specific as linear or angular speed when he discusses the
planetary motions in longitude.
τὸ ἄστρον / ὁ ἀστήρ
In general, Aristotle and Simplicius use «τὸ ἄστρον» and «ὁ ἀστήρ» to des-
ignate a star whether it is fixed or wandering (i.e., planetary). Usually, the
context makes clear whether they are thinking of one or the other kind of
202 comments: in de caelo 2.10
star; and when it does, I translate these terms accordingly by ‘[fixed] star’
and ‘[wandering] star’ or ‘[planetary] star’ rather than simply by ‘star’, in
the interest of clarity. There are, however, occasions when they refer to both
kinds of star at once, as Aristotle does at 291a26–28 and here. And, again,
rather than render these occurrences simply by ‘star’, I think it better to use
‘heavenly body’. After all, this is standard English usage.
Nevertheless, the translation does entail a problem. In De caelo 2.8, Aris-
totle argues that τὰ ἄστρα neither rotate on an internal axis nor roll, but are
carried round by their circles (κύκλοι), an argument meant, I think, to stand
for all the heavenly bodies, that is, for the planets as well as for the fixed
stars. But this means that these ἄστρα do not move of their own accord or by
their own nature in a circle about the center of the cosmos. And, so it would
seem, they are not made of aether, though they must be, given that this is
the only simple body available for their constitution. So how can they be
‘heavenly bodies’? They are, of course, ‘bodies’ in the sense that they are vis-
ible. Yet, they are not bodies (σώµατα) in the sense that the circles, or more
precisely, the (invisible) spheres in which they are embedded, are bodies
[cf. 293a4–8]. It is these latter bodies that rotate by nature and of their own
accord about the center of the cosmos, and so would seem to be made of
aether.
Aristotle does not address this difficulty explicitly. Still, his remark in
2.12 that we must stop thinking of the ἄστρα as mere bodies or units with
position but no soul [292a17–22] does suggest a response. After all, one
might argue, whereas the heavenly bodies are, in the first instance, living
animals constituted of aether with one or more rotating spheres as their
internal moving, functioning parts, in the second instance, they are what
we see—the fixed stars and the planets.1 These latter bodies would, then,
neither be animals themselves nor the proper parts of animals, and might
better be compared to the moles or warts on an animal’s skin. But this might
raise in turn the question of how such visible aetherial bodies come about.
The catch here is that, for Aristotle, since they are eternal, that is, without
generation or corruption, there can be no material account of the presence
of such visible aetherial bodies in the invisible aetherial bodies, only one
that is teleological.
conceding to the fact that the bodies with which we are familiar are perceptible.
comments: in de caelo 2.10 203
κινεῖται
Moraux [1965, 79] prints «κινεῖται». But «κεῖται» (‘is placed’) is found in one
ms. and is supported in Moerbeke’s translation (1260) of the De caelo. Yet,
though «κεῖται» would make easier sense and is printed by Pellegrin [2004,
ad loc. with 437n1],2 «κινεῖται» is better attested. Indeed, it is supported
in Grosseteste’s translation [cf. Bossier et al. 2004, x] of De caelo 2 and of
Simplicius’ commentary thereon [see Bossier n.d.a, 140.2 moventur]. The
fact that Simplicius contextualizes 2.10 by referring to an ancient concern
with the sizes of the planetary circuits and their distances from the Earth
does not help with this textual question.
οἱ µαθηµατικοί
2 The occurrence of «κινήσεις» in 291a34 is not relevant since the thought is different: but
applied in this period to any science that uses mathematics, it does not
follow by any means that such a mathematical science was to be viewed
simply as mathematics, as a branch of mathematics such as arithmetic or
geometry, or even as applied (in contradistinction to pure) mathematics. At
least, such an inference needs good argument, given that it does not capture
how the sciences were differentiated in the fourth century bc.3
As for Simplicius, his usage is in accord with Aristotle’s, especially when
he is attending closely to what Aristotle writes [cf. 454.12]. Moreover, notably
in his commentary on 2.10–12, Simplicius follows Aristotle in addressing
the same people as µαθηµατικοί and as ἀστρονόµοι or ἀστρολόγοι (the latter
terms both translated there by ‘astronomers’). Nevertheless, even in these
instances, I will preserve the verbal distinction in continuing to translate
«µαθηµατικοί» by ‘mathematical scientists’ (or ‘scientists’ when warranted),
if only to assist the reader in thinking about the meaning of «µαθηµατικοί»
and its role as a marker in the development and organization of the sciences
in antiquity.
The verb «καταλαµβάνω» has a wide range of meanings; but in this part of
the commentary at least, it generally indicates seizing, taking, or receiving.
When the ‘taking’ is done by the mind, it signifies comprehending, detect-
ing, determining, understanding, accepting, and so forth. It is difficult to
find a single translation that works well in all occurrences of the verb and of
the related substantival and adjectival forms («κατάληψις», «καταληπτικός»,
respectively). Thus, in 471.1, the passive «καταλαµβάνονται» broadly means
‘are understood’, ‘are made known’, or even ‘are ascertained’. But given that
the objects understood are numerical ratios, English usage would naturally
incline here to ‘are known’, given that what is understood is their value. Cf.
«καταληπτή» (‘be knowable’) at 476.18. Yet, in 471.7–8, «ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκλείψεων
τὴν ἀφορµὴν τῆς καταλήψεως λαβόντα», «καταλήψις» indicates a process of
detection or determination by which quantitative values are known and the
aorist participle from «λαµβάνω», a simple taking or receiving (if aspect pre-
dominates) or a having taken or received (if tense is important). In 474.19,
παραβολῆς
4 Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘ab … appositione’ [Bossier n.d.a, 141.3] and Moerbeke’s ‘a compara-
one covers the other (partially or totally). Solar eclipses are an obvious
species of such coincidences and occultations, the interposition of one
body between the observer and another body,9 are another. If Simplicius
is alluding to occultations,10 it would have been clearer and more precise
if he had followed established usage by writing «ἐπιπροσθέσεως» instead,
as Theon of Smyrna and Proclus do.11 (Note, however, that in Iamblichus’
De myst. 9.4.20–25 «παραβολή» means ‘occultation’.) As it is, Simplicius
unhelpfully includes phenomena not visible to the naked eye such as the
transits of the Sun by Mercury and Venus.
Locutions of the type, «οἱ περὶ ῞Ιππαρχον», (literally, ‘those around Hip-
parchus’) are difficult and the translation proposed here is offered with
due diffidence.12 In general, though «οἱ περὶ ῞Ιππαρχον» is often translated
by ‘the school of Hipparchus’, this may suggest too much both about the
organization of the thinkers in question and about their doctrinal coher-
ence. The alternative, ‘the followers of Hipparchus’, would be preferable,
though perhaps not as good as ‘those associated with Hipparchus’ or just ‘the
Hipparchans’. As I have pointed out elsewhere,13 one should bear in mind
that the phrase may mean only those who are perceived to share certain
assumptions or procedures with Hipparchus, whether they are contempo-
rary with him or subsequent to him. In any case, when this sort of translation
is appropriate—as it may be here—we should not take for granted that
what is attributed to the Hipparchans must also hold of Hipparchus: such
an inference should require more evidence than the mere phrase «οἱ περὶ
῞Ιππαρχον», since there are many cases in which the (perceived) followers
interpreted their leader in a way that changes or goes beyond their leader’s
9 See, e.g., Hiller 1878, 120.15–19, 122.24–123.4, 131.4–9. Geminus [Intro ast. 10.1–6] and
προσθήσεις. It is perhaps worth noting that the scholiast on De caelo 293a3–6 uses the term
«ἔκλειψις» in referring to the Moon’s occultation of Mars [see Rescigno 2004–2008, 2.285 (his
fr. 157a)].
12 On the obscurity of such locutions in the Almagest, see Toomer 1984, 137n19.
13 See Bowen and Goldstein 1991, 251.
comments: in de caelo 2.10 207
original meaning. Such is the case with Plato and his late Platonist followers
(οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα), for example.
Still, one cannot rule out the possibility that «ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ ῞Ιππαρχον
καὶ ᾽Αρίσταρχον καὶ Πτολεµαῖον» amounts to no more than ‘by Hipparchus,
Aristarchus, and Ptolemy’, since the «οἱ περὶ» + genitive locution serves on
occasion as a formulaic or urbane way of referring to a single person. And
one may well incline to this translation given the evidence of Aristarchus’ De
mag. and Ptolemy’s Alm. 5.13–16. Nevertheless, it is possible that Simplicius
is referring to specific followers. If he is, the only problematic ones are those
said to follow Aristarchus. Plutarch (ca ad 50–120) might be a candidate
given that he cites Aristarchus and his treatise at De facie 925c, and that
Simplicius names Plutarch in his commentary on the Physica14 (though not
in his commentary on the De caelo).
To make sense of this thesis, Mueller [2005, 12] refers the reader to De caelo
289b7–290a5; but note that De caelo 2.8 concerns the planetary diurnal
motions, not their proper motions; that is, it concerns the (linear) speeds
of bodies moving in circles westwards about a point in the same period.
Consequently, it is not strictly relevant to an account of the planets’ eastward
motions in longitude. Moreover, though 2.8 does allude to a proportionality,
Therefore, since it is neither reasonable that both move nor reasonable that
either one move alone, it remains that the circles move but that the heavenly
bodies are at rest and move in that they are fixed in their circles. In fact, in this
way alone does nothing absurd follow. In other words, that the speed of the
larger circle is faster is reasonable when the circles are fixed about the same
center. For, just as in the other [simple bodies], the larger body performs its
proper motion faster, so too it is in [bodies] that move [by nature] in a circle.
Indeed, of the [arcs] cut off by [lines] from the center, the arc of the greater
circle is greater, with the reasonable result that the greater circle will rotate in
the same time interval [as the smaller circle]. [De caelo 289b30–290a5]
it is one of linear speeds and of distances that are assessed from (the center
of) the Earth and not from the sphere of the fixed stars, as 2.10 requires. Yet,
Mueller may be right: Simplicius’ question at 471.21–23 may register surprise
that what is true of their diurnal motion is not true of their sidereal motion.
Another possibility is that the claims about the proper motions of larger
bodies derive from a creative misreading of 2.10. This misreading (appar-
ently to be found in Alexander’s writings [474.7–8]) starts by assuming that
this passage must harmonize with Plato’s account of the division of the
world soul and the creation of the heavenly bodies [Tim. 34b10–39e2], and
so construes the distances in this proportionality from the (center of) the
Earth. Next, in the same vein, it supposes that Aristotle’s assertion of pro-
portionality in the planetary motions eastward is to be taken quantitatively,
that is, as a thesis to be expressed in numbers. It then reasons that, since
this proportionality plainly does not hold of the planet’s sidereal periods15
or, therefore, of their angular speeds, it must hold of their linear speeds.
And so, if their distances from Earth are sufficiently great, the upshot is that
larger bodies (scil. spheres) may be said to move faster by nature. In this
instance, then, Simplicius’ question registers surprise that the larger bodies
move faster but still take more time to complete one cycle.
There is no good evidence in the De caelo prior to 2.12 that Aristotle views
the planets as having more than two motions, that is, motions in addition to
their diurnal and sidereal motions. S. Leggatt proposes that De caelo 288a13–
17,
Of what has been said about the motion [of the heavens], next would be
to expound that it is smooth and not unsmooth. I mean this about the first
heaven and the first motion, since the numerous motions in the lower regions
are in fact unified.16 [Leggatt 1995, 25–26]
affords such evidence. But Leggatt mistakenly assumes that Aristotle is
referring to the compounding of several motions into a single motion in
the case of each planet. If this were correct, the remark would be quite
illogical and not an integral part of the chapter.17 The remedy lies in seeing
that the passage concerns the daily rotation of the celestial sphere, and that
the only planetary motions which can sensibly be said to come all together
into one thing are their diurnal motions—each planet has its own distinct
diurnal motion precisely because it has its own peculiar linear speed, where
these speeds are such that the planet completes one westward revolution
in the same period as the celestial sphere. Thus, Aristotle quite reasonably
declines in 2.5 to discuss the diurnal motions of the planets, since it will be
sufficient for his purposes to deal with the diurnal motion of the celestial
sphere (which causes these planetary diurnal motions).
A Lacuna?
Heiberg suspects that there may be a lacuna here and supplies in his appa-
ratus:
αἱ δὲ µᾶλλον ἐξελθοῦσαι τὴν µὲν τῆς ἀντιφεροµένης θᾶττον κινοῦνται, τὴν δὲ τῆς
ἀπλανοῦς βραδύτερον
And the ones that go out more [from the fixed sphere] perform the motion of
[the nature] which moves in the opposite direction faster, but the motion of
the fixed [sphere] more slowly.
Such disturbance in the text, however, which is signaled perhaps by the
unanswered µὲν in 473.14, must have occurred early in the text’s transmis-
sion. Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 144.2–5] has only
illi quidem cognatum motum velocius moventur, eum autem qui contralatae
naturae tardius ceu neque sincere aliqualiter secundum illam stantes quemad-
modum lunae sphaera …
and Moerbeke [Bossier n.d.b, 458.6–9],
eo quidem qui illius congeneo motu citius moventur, eo autem qui contramote
nature tardius, tamquam neque sincere aliqualiter secundam illam existantes,
sicut lune spera ….
In any case, 473.7–12 explain why the planets each complete a revolution
westward in a day and affirm the proportionality sought between the sizes
of the planetary spheres and their (scil. linear) speeds. 473.12–16 focus on
the planetary revolutions eastward. These lines relate the differences in
the periods of these revolutions to differences in the blending of a planet’s
substantial nature: it is supposed that each planet’s eastward motion is the
outcome of a blending of a nature that goes eastward with a nature that
goes westward; and that this blending is in each case determined by the
planet’s proximity to the fixed sphere. What is new is that Simplicius also
characterizes this blending as the outcome of two motions, a vector sum
if you will, thus prefiguring the treatment of motion in the astronomical
digression in the commentary on De caelo 2.12.
For my part, I doubt that there is a lacuna. The mention of the sphere
of the Moon [473.16–19] is meant primarily to illustrate the explanatory
remark that the planets are not constituted only by a substantial nature to
move eastward, and there is no way to do this in a particular case without
acknowledging its separation in distance and substance from the fixed
sphere (or from Saturn).
For Simplicius, while the simple bodies in the sublunary domain change
into one another by temporal processes of coming-to-be that entail the
replacement of opposites, the simple body found in the superlunary domain
comments: in de caelo 2.10 211
Planetary Eccentricity
21 On the elements and sublunary change as treated in the De caelo, see Gill 2009. On
procession (πρόοδος) and reversion (ἐπιστροφή), see A.C. Lloyd 1990, 98–122; Remes 2008, 35–
75 (esp. 45–46, 51–52).
22 See 473.28–474.1 (the planets each have a nature that exists by procession), 487.4–
10 with 487.15–488.1, 490.6–16 (the fixed sphere is productive and comprehensive of all
motions).
23 Cf. Heiberg 1898–1903, 1.233.18–22.
212 comments: in de caelo 2.10
did not have the full text of the Hypoth. plan. before him but had access only
to parts of it and some idea of its general program.
In this regard, Simplicius would be much in the same position as Proclus,
one of the pre-eminent heads of the school of late Platonism in Athens,24 the
respected teacher25 of Simplicius’ teachers [see p. 3], and an authority whom
Simplicius cites 32 times by name in his commentaries.26 Proclus asserts in
his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus that Ptolemy did not really concern him-
self with planetary distances in the Hypoth. plan.27 Still Proclus was aware of
the mathematical details of the nesting of Mercury and Venus between the
Moon and the Sun as presented in the Hypoth. plan. And, in light of what is
proven in the Almagest, he does indicate28 the sort of reasoning that might
have led Ptolemy to this nesting hypothesis. Nevertheless, in Hyp. ast. 7.19–
23, Proclus ascribes the nesting hypothesis to some unnamed astronomers
rather than to Ptolemy. It would appear, then, that Proclus too lacked a com-
plete text of the Hypoth. plan.,29 though he did apparently know that it came
in more than one book.30
So, why does Simplicius ascribe the placement of the hypotheses for
Venus and Mercury between the Sun and the Moon to Ptolemy and the
Almagest? I suggest that Simplicius was aware that
an incredible numerical accident seemed to prove that the models for Mer-
cury and Venus, as constructed in the Almagest, could be fitted into the space
between moon and sun such that the maximum geocentric distance for the
moon coincided with the minimum distance of Mercury, whose maximum
distance would determine the minimum distance of Venus, which at its max-
imum distance would reach the solar orbit. [Neugebauer 1975, 917]
and that this is what moved him to speak of Ptolemy and the Almagest in this
context. Moreover, I would suggest that, on this point at least, Proclus may
have been his source. As I have already indicated, this information is offered
by Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus, and Proclus introduces the
extreme values of the distances of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, and Sun (that
are found coincidentally in the Hypoth. plan.) as results that may be derived
from what is proven in the Almagest.31
In short, Simplicius, who draws on Proclus’ In Plat. Tim. later in his own
commentary on the De caelo,32 may in this passage just be repeating Proclus’
remarks in a compressed way. This would not preclude Simplicius’ having
access to (parts of) book 2 of the Hypoth. plan. either directly or through
other sources.
Simplicius appears to take Alexander’s claim that the planets near the celes-
tial sphere move more slowly to be a consequence of the thesis that the
planetary periods are proportional to the distances of the planetary spheres
from the center of the Earth. In attacking this thesis on the ground that it
requires one to know the planetary distances from the Earth, Simplicius con-
siders the fact that Alexander is effectively supposing that all the planets
revolve with the same linear speed—that is, that they define arcs of equal
lengths in equal times— since their angular speeds are inversely propor-
tional to their distances measured from the Earth.33 For, given that 30 years is
a crude but standard value for the length of Saturn’s sidereal period34 and 30
days another common value for the length of the month, one might certainly
think that the values obtain because both bodies move at the same linear
speed or, equivalently because Saturn is 360 times as far from the Earth as
the Moon. And this certainly makes sense of Simplicius’ remark that Saturn
would move at a faster linear speed than the Moon if its geocentric distance
were more than 30 times the geocentric distance of the Moon and, thus, if
their periods were not proportional to their distances from Earth.
Kepler in his Mysterium cosmographicum35 cites De caelo 2.10 for the view
that the speeds of the planets are proportional to their distances. To explain
this he imputes to Aristotle the thesis that the movers of the planets impart
the same period (angular speed) are said to have different linear speeds. See also Vitruvius,
De arch. 9.1.14–15.
34 Cf., e.g., Geminus, Intro. ast. 1.24; Pliny, Nat. hist. 2.32; Cleomedes, Cael. 1.2.22–24.
35 See Duncan and Aiton 1981, 197.
214 comments: in de caelo 2.10
an equal (linear) motion to each, that is, ‘each particle of Saturn is indeed as
fast-moving as the lowest sphere of the Moon’. But, if the planets share the
same linear speed, as Kepler suggests, it follows that they trace out equal
arcs in equal times and, thus, that their angular speeds vary inversely with
their distance from the Earth. The problem with this is twofold. First, if the
angular speeds of the planets vary inversely with their distance from Earth,
then these angular speeds do not vary directly with the distances of the
planets from the fixed sphere. Hence, it is no longer true that the planet’s
motion, that is, the time it takes for it to go through its circuit, is proportional
to its distance from the fixed sphere, as Aristotle plainly wishes to have it.36 It
is important to realize that in citing Aristotle’s thesis that the motions of the
planets vary as their distances, Kepler omits to define the point from which
the distances are reckoned. Second, as 291a6–10 make clear, for Aristotle, the
proportionality of the periods and distances is to be explained by reference
to the influence of the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars, and there
would thus seem to be little room for this in Kepler’s account. Indeed, Kepler
states that such influence is alien to his scheme.
In sum, we should not suppose that the planets are to have the same
linear speed in De caelo 2.10.
«διὰ τῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ φορᾶς ἰούσης τε καὶ κρατουµένης» is the reading offered
by the best mss of Simplicius’ commentary and it is virtually the same as
that found in the best mss of Plato’s Timaeus. As Taylor rightly points out,37
however, it is a very problematic reading: at 36c4–d1, Timaeus asserts that
the undivided motion of the Same has been given dominance or power
(κράτος) over the motion of the Different; but now, in the very process by
which this power is exerted, the motion of the Same is putatively dominated.
On the basis of the Latin translations of this passage by Cicero and Calcidius,
Taylor suggests that the original text was probably «διὰ τῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ φορᾶς
ἰόντα τε καὶ κρατουµένην» (scil. «φόραν» at Tim. 38e6, i.e., 475.11). The idea
is that the genitives «ἰούσης» and «κρατουµένης» have been obtained as the
result of a false assimilation of the accusatives, «ἰόντα» and «κρατουµένην»,
to the case of «φορᾶς» [Tim. 39a1, i.e., 475.12]. This is the reading found in
Karsten’s edition of Simplicius’ commentary (Heiberg’s c) and translated
here.
IN DE CAELO 2.11
An Emendation
Heiberg’s text
ὡς διχόµηνον αὐτὴν ἐκάλεσεν ῎Αρατος διὰ τὸ διχῇ τέµνειν τὸν µῆνα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
συνεφώνει καὶ τὸ πλεονάκις µηνοειδῆ φαίνεσθαι
as Aratus called it dichomēnos because of its dividing the month into two, and
the fact that [the Moon] often appears crescent-shaped particularly would be
in accord [479.11–13]
will not do as it stands. His conjecture, «συνεφώνει καὶ τὸ» introduces an
idiom of the form «καὶ τὰ ἄλλα … καὶ τὸ Χ» meaning in this instance that ‘X (=
the fact that [the Moon] often appears crescent-shaped) particularly’ would
be in accord.1 But this leaves open what is being accorded with and also
renders problematic the remark at 479.13–14, ‘and likewise gibbous’. After
all, if the preceding sentence is particularly about the Moon’s appearing
crescent-shaped, what is the point of alluding to the Moon’s being gibbous?
There are two possibilities. In his assessment of the relevant mss [see
1894, v], Heiberg affirms that A is primary. So, given that A reads «συνε-
φωνεῖτο», if one takes this as a starting point, the easiest emendation is
«συνεφωνεῖτο hτῷi», as proposed to me by R.B. Todd. The assumption here is
that the final syllable of «συνεφωνεῖτο» was originally iterated in the seman-
tically distinct but aurally identical form «τῷ» which was then subject to
easy omission. Still, Heiberg also states that A is primary especially when it
is supported by Moerbeke’s translation. And, on this occasion, it turns out
that Moerbeke’s ‘et alia consonant, scilicet sepe lunularem apparere’ (‘and
the rest would be in agreement, that is, the fact that the Moon often appears
crescent-shaped’) supports the «συνεφώνει τὸ» which is found in a number
of other mss, including two that Heiberg thinks very important.2 So, if one
starts with this reading, the easy emendation is «συνεφώνει hτῷi». Either way,
then, one avoids the difficulties of Heiberg’s conjecture and the translation
is the same.3
With the text so construed, the point is that taking ‘dichotomos’ to denote
the Full Moon is consistent with Aristotle’s remark that the Moon has a
variety of waxing and waning crescents, presumably for the reason that the
continuous change in the illumination of the lunar disk from waxing to
waning crescents entails a phase of total illumination at mid-month. The
same holds for the transition from its waxing to its waning gibbous phases.
3 For the omission of «ἄν» in the apodosis of a present contrary-to-fact condition, see
Compare De caelo 297b23–30, where the shifting boundary line of light and
dark observed on the Moon during a lunar eclipse is the evidentiary basis
for inferring the shape of the Earth:
Further, [the Earth’s shape is also known] through perceptual phenomena.
For, [if it were not spherical,] eclipses of the Moon would not have the sorts
of sections [that we see]. Certainly, as a matter of fact, [the Moon] receives all
divisions in its monthly configurations, since it becomes straight and convex
and concave. And in eclipses it always has the line delimiting [the shadow]
5 For discussion of Aristotle’s distinction here between syllogism of the fact and syllogism
then it follows that all three bodies will produce boundaries that appear the
same on a given (spherical) object.
Simplicius is either forgetting that eclipses occur only when the Moon is in
conjunction or opposition to the Sun, or that the drum-shaped and lentil-
shaped Moons are oriented with their circular surfaces to the observer
so that they are indistinguishable from the Full Moon when they are in
opposition. In any case, any Moon-sized object placed in conjunction to
the Sun will define an observable boundary of light and dark during a solar
eclipse.
The rotation of the Moon is established Platonic doctrine.6 Simplicius
accepts this and holds more generally that all celestial bodies rotate about
internal axes.7 Aristotle [De caelo 2.8: cf. esp. 290a7–29], however, denies that
the stars (fixed and planetary) either rotate or roll: for him, the Moon always
shows the same face to us because it is fixed to a sphere that revolves about
the Earth as its center.8
There is no precedent, so far as I know, for the hypothesis of a drum-
shaped or of a lentil-shaped Moon. But, given that the Moon appears fully
circular in opposition and that it rotates once in a synodic revolution, there
are three basic classes of figure possible in that the Moon-shapes must have
a circular surface that is either concave, flat, or convex. The drum-shaped
Moon has a flat circular surface; the lentil-shaped Moon, a surface that is
circular and mildly convex. So, if the hypotheses are Simplicius’ own, the
question is why he passes over the case of the Moon that has a concave
circular surface and merely alludes to it in 480.19–21.
6 See Plato, Tim. 40a8: cf. Cleomedes, Cael. 2.4.1–9 (which ascribes recognition of this to
Berossus).
7 See 454.23–456.27: cf. 32.13–33.16 with Comment 12.27, pp. 284–288.
8 Cf. Leggatt 1995, 240–241.
IN DE CAELO 2.12
Commentators have been troubled by the remark that the Sun and Moon
have fewer motions than some planets because it does not seem to be true
in the account of the homocentric spheres found in Meta. Λ.8. W.D. Ross1
follows pseudo-Alexander [see 147n179] in proposing that Aristotle returns
to Eudoxus’ theory that the Sun and the Moon each have three spheres, and
thus understands Aristotle to hold that the Sun and the Moon have fewer
motions than any of the other planets since these each have four spheres.
To explain why Aristotle says that they have fewer motions than some of
the planets, however, Ross argues that Aristotle is limiting himself to what
is strictly sufficient to state the first ἀπορία. Hence, he writes ‘some’ rather
than ‘any’.
H.J. Easterling2 counters that Aristotle really does mean that the Sun and
Moon have fewer motions than some of the planets, and proposes instead
that Aristotle is thinking of a version of the homocentric theory in which
the planetary systems in Eudoxus’ account are supplied with unwinding
spheres. On this view, the Sun and the Moon do indeed perform fewer
motions than some of the planets, since they each have fewer spheres than
Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury but not Saturn. That is, if we follow East-
erling and reckon the unwinding spheres with the planet whose motions
they influence rather than with the planet whose spheres they unwind,3 the
arrangement would be as in Table 12.01 [p. 224]. As Easterling remarks, this
proposal entails that, prior to Callippus’ revision of the Eudoxan theory, Aris-
totle had already applied his unwinding spheres to the Eudoxan planetary
systems; and, thus, that Meta. Λ.8 does not present a historical account of
the development of homocentric theory.4
He concludes that there are but two which fit Aristotle’s report, those of
–360 Mar 20 [see Figure 12.01, p. 186] and –356 May 4 [see Figure 2.02, p.
187]. Moreover, in his view, the first of these fits the report better than the
second. According to Herald’s computations, there was an occultation on
–360 Mar 21 at 20;24 hr U(niversal) T(ime), that is, at 21;58 L(ocal) M(ean)
T(ime), when the Moon was 34% illuminated, which lasted 64 minutes;
and another, on –356 May 4 at 18;24 UT, that is, at 19;58 LMT, when the
Moon was 44% illuminated, which lasted 13 minutes. The greatest source
of uncertainty in these computations derives from the variation in the rate
of the Earth’s rotation, which at these times involves a correction of 5;08,24
hrs (with an uncertainty in the order of half an hour).
In light of these computations and of the fact that Aristotle spent much
of his adult life in Athens, and granted that he actually saw the occultation,
I would say that he may well be reporting one of these two occultations;
and that, if so, I agree with Herald that it is more likely the occultation
of –360 Mar 20 [see Figure 12.01, p. 186]. Clearly, the occultation of –356
is almost a complete miss for an observer at Athens [see Figure 12.02, p.
187]. F.R. Stephenson [2000], however, maintains that only the occultation
of –356 May 4 was visible at Athens (which he locates at 37;58°N, 23;43°E).
See Savoie 2003 for an excellent account of the difficulties in making such
computations.
Mueller [2005, 22 and n61] assumes that Alexander and Simplicius are argu-
ing about the use of «ἀποδέχεσθαι» (‘to receive’, not ‘to attain’) and «ἀπαι-
11 Note that Reports Nos. 100 and 438 concern the occultation anticipated in Letter No. 84:
account of Timocharis’ observation of Venus and η Vir, there is doubt that this should be
read as an observation of an occultation: see Goldstein and Bowen 1991, Comment 1, No. 18
with § 3.
16 See Goldstein and Bowen 1991, Comment 1, Nos. 17 and 27.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 227
τεῖν», but finds this hard to reconcile with Simplicius’ remark at 481.26–
30. If, however, we suppose that both Alexander and Simplicius read De
caelo 292a14–17 as offering encouragement—«παραµυθεῖσθαι» may mean ‘to
exhort’ (so Mueller), but it can also mean ‘to encourage’ or ‘to reassure’ [see
121n19]—then Alexander’s point would be, I take it, that the encouragement
(or reassurance) follows from the claim made at 292a17–18 that the problem
is not beyond reason if one proceeds on the basis of certain starting points or
arguments. In short, he would seem to think that proceeding is reasonable,
but that the encouragement is still incomplete or lacking in that these start-
ing points or arguments (which make proceeding reasonable) are not given
here but in what follows. If this is right, Simplicius’ objection is captious—he
resents the suggestion that Aristotle ever expresses himself ἐλλειπτικῶς—
and when he offers an interpretation that makes clear the flow of Aristotle’s
text, he effectively concedes Alexander’s (very minor) point. Note the Latin
version of the Hebrew translation of Themistius’ paraphrase:
if we nevertheless move in thought from these things [about which we can
get knowledge] to our inquiry by means of the following slight resources or
principles, it will be neither unreasonable nor strange too that whatever [the
facts] are, they should be found out in this way. [Landauer 1902, 119.30–33]
For another reading of these lines, see Rescigno 2004–2008, 289.
᾽Αλλ’ ἡµεῖς ὡς περὶ σωµάτων αὐτῶν µόνον, καὶ µονάδων τάξιν µὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων
δὲ πάµπαν, διανοούµεθα· δεῖ δ’ ὡς µετεχόντων ὑπολαµβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς
[292a18–21]
As Thomas Johansen [2009] has pointed out, there is ample evidence ear-
lier in the De caelo that Aristotle regards the heavenly bodies as ensouled.
Indeed, it would be difficult to explain the difference in the periods and
directions of their motions if they were not, given that their material com-
position is the same and accounts only for the bare fact that their motion is
circular by nature. Accordingly, some have set out to translate this passage in
a way that avoids any indication of doubt about this on Aristotle’s part.17 But
such translations founder on the fact that Aristotle writes «ὡς µετεχόντων …
as purely geometrical units in Meta. Λ.8 [cf. Leggatt, 1995, 248] and thus construes the ‘we’ in
question rather narrowly. As Simplicius’ paraphrase suggests, however, Aristotle may instead
be thinking of a more general tendency to treat the heavenly bodies as though they were unit-
points in figurate number [cf., e.g., Heath 1921, 1.76–84] when talking of the constellations
formed by grouping these bodies into shapes, for example.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 229
address the ἀπορίαι, then we should (or must) treat the heavenly bodies as
living entities.23 Accordingly, it is unnecessary to torture the Greek so that it
reads in a way that is consistent with earlier indications that the heavenly
bodies are living beings.
In sum, even when faithfully rendered, 292a18–21 does not suggest any
real doubt on Aristotle’s part that the heavenly bodies are ensouled.24 It
still remains true, of course, that Aristotle’s discussion in 2.12 is tentative or
provisional25 but the reasons for this lie elsewhere.
23 For his part, Simplicius [482.9–10] affirms that there is no solution to the ἀπορίαι if we
is an easy emendation.
28 Landauer 1902, 122.10–20, cf. 121.28–39.
230 comments: in de caelo 2.12
this good in full measure but can only manage a few motions bringing them
some good that is as near the ultimate good as they can reach.29
29 Cf. 485.22–29, which contrasts the slight action of the celestial sphere and the slight
action of the Sun and Moon, and 486.16–19, 486.26–487.3, 487.31–488.2. But see Mueller 2005,
24 and 26, nn77 and 84.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 231
30 For some preliminary work on this, see Bowen 2012e and 2014.
232 comments: in de caelo 2.12
discipline which is devoted to determining the fate of the native on the basis
of the positions of the seven planetary bodies, and which first appears in the
Greek and Roman worlds in Egypt in the very late second century bc, if not
more recently.31 Thus, it would seem that the Greeks and Romans did not
come to knowledge of the basic apparent motions of the planets through
a formal or informal program of observation that was either inspired by
philosophical concerns or viewed as a useful adjunct to these concerns. To
the contrary, it now appears that their knowledge of these motions came by
acquaintance at some level with the tabular literature used by astrologers to
cast horoscopes.
Granted, this only shows that prior to the late second century bc the
Greeks lacked a technical vocabulary for station and retrogradation, and
that these phenomena were quite marginal to their thinking. It does not
prove that they were utterly unaware of them, only that there is no ascer-
tainable context in which it was important to speak of them clearly.
31 See Bowen 2012e, 2014. The earliest extant horoscopes in Greek, Latin, and Demotic
all derive from the latter parts of the first century bc: there are no references to horoscopic
astrology in any Greco-Latin text dating from before this century.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 233
that of the daily rotation. Further, Mercury and Venus are, unlike the others
planets, described as regularly overtaking and being overtaken by the Sun
in the course of their circuits around this oblique course. So far this seems
harmless enough. The difficulty is that, according to Timaeus, the dialogue’s
chief interlocutor, Mercury and Venus overtake and are overtaken by the Sun
because, though they have been put into circles that have the same period
as the Sun, each has been allotted a power or tendency contrary to the Sun
[38d2–6].
As one might expect, this passage is important to those who hold that
Timaeus’ remarks about the planets show awareness of the fact that they
sometimes exhibit retrograde motion. So, the question is, ‘Need this con-
trary power entail a reference to, or knowledge of, retrogradation?’ A.E. Tay-
lor, for example, holds that the power in question is that exhibited by Mer-
cury and Venus, the two inner planets, when their motion (which includes
retrogradations) is viewed in relation to the Sun—meaning, I presume, that
this power is evident in the observable fact that these planets, which never
stray far from the Sun, rise before the Sun as morning stars and set after the
Sun as evening stars.34 Though Heath is agnostic about the meaning of the
passage, he does maintain that the natural sense of the words is that Mercury
and Venus actually move in the opposite direction to the Sun.35 Though both
scholars assume that Plato must have in mind station and retrogradation, it
should be obvious that this is a non sequitur. The fact that Venus and Mer-
cury appear as Evening and Morning Stars is, I admit, equivalent to the claim
that Venus and Mercury exhibit retrograde motion.36 But it is fallacious to
impute knowledge of the latter to Plato (or to anyone for that matter) given
only that he knows of the former. Indeed, as I shall argue, Plato’s remarks
about Venus and Mercury are easily understood without involving any allu-
sion to planetary retrogradation.
Consider Timaeus’ earlier description of the construction of the world-
soul. The Demiurge begins by compounding soul stuff which he pounds out
flat into a long band [35a1–b3]. Next, after marking the entire length of the
band into sections according to the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27, and after
fact that both Venus and Mercury, though they too have an overall eastward motion, some-
times cross our western horizon following the Sun (Evening Star) and then subsequently
cross our eastern horizon in advance of it means that they have for a time made a westward
motion or retrogradation.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 235
inserting arithmetic and harmonic means and then filling in sections in the
ratio of 4:3 with sections in the ratio of 9:8, he cuts the band lengthwise into
two strips of equal length, lays one strip on the other to form an X, and joins
the ends of each strip to produce two identical circles situated obliquely
to one another and attached at diametrically opposing points [35b4–36c2].
Then,
he embraced (each strip) with a motion that goes round in the same place
with regard to the same things, and made one circle the outer and the other
the inner. Accordingly, the outer motion he declared to be characteristic of
the nature of the Same; and the inner motion, characteristic of the nature of
the Different. Then, he caused the [motion] of the Same to go round to the
right on the side and the [motion] of the Different, to the left on the diagonal.
And he gave supremacy to the revolution of the Same and the Like. For, he
left it as one undivided [revolution]. But after he split the inner [revolution]
six times into seven unequal circles according to each interval of doubles and
triples, there being three of each [sequence], he prescribed that the circles
go in directions opposite to one another, and that in speed three be similar
whereas four be dissimilar to one another and to the three, though they move
according to ratio. [Tim. 36c2–d7]
Timaeus does not explain how the circles taken from the Different can
have motions in directions opposite to one another. Still, it is not difficult
to supply one: all we need suppose is that Timaeus is alluding to the fact
that circles into which the Different is divided have opposing motions, one
due to the motion of the Same and the other due to the motion of the
Different itself. In short, to leap ahead by talking of the bodies to be inserted
in these seven circles, each will have a sidereal and a diurnal motion. The
awkwardness here is due to the fact that, at this stage in Timaeus’ tale,
the world-soul has no body, which means that he is obliged to talk about
motions (revolutions) without referring to what is moved or in motion.
For present purposes, there is a point which should be relatively uncon-
troversial; namely, that, in the logical sequence of Timaeus’ account, the
Demiurge’s division of the motion or revolution of the Different into circular
motions does not by itself produce motions that differ from one another. As
the text makes clear, such differentiation among the motions or circles into
which the Different is divided requires separate acts of prescription on the
Demiurge’s part [36d4–7].37 But, given that the world-soul has as yet no body
and is differentiated only by its motions, this act must effectively involve
But what might Timaeus hope to accomplish in this? Is he allowing for the
fact that Venus and Mercury never stray far from the Sun and are visible only
for a brief while after sunset or before sunrise? Or does he really understand
that Mercury and Venus both exhibit stations and retrogradations? Clearly,
the proposition that Venus and Mercury are both morning and evening stars
and the proposition that they both make periodic stations and retrograda-
tions are as a matter of physical fact equivalent. Equally clear is the fallacy
of supposing that being aware of one of these two equivalent propositions
entails being aware of the other. So, which of them might Timaeus have in
mind? As it turns out, what he actually says offers virtually no support for
the view that he is thinking of the stations and retrogradations that Mercury
and Venus regularly make.
To explain: for better or worse, Timaeus is treating the observable
motions of Venus and Mercury as real motions rather than as apparent
motions to be explained away. The metaphor that he uses in assigning to
each planet a power to vary its motion eastward is that of a circular race.
Mercury and Venus are, in effect, imagined as runners who, though they
keep pace with the Sun overall and complete the eastward circuit in the
same time, occasionally fall behind, then catch up to, and even overtake
the Sun before slowing down and falling back again. It is important to real-
ize that there is nothing in this metaphor involving, requiring, or implying
that Mercury and Venus make stations and retrogradations against the back-
ground of the fixed stars. Such reference to the fixed stars in talking of station
and retrogradation would, of course, be diagnostic. But in its absence, we
must conclude that Timaeus’ imagery no more entails that Mercury and
Venus make stations and retrogradations than, for instance, falling behind
in a race and then catching up and going ahead entails really stopping, going
backwards, stopping, and then racing forwards, or even appearing to do any
of these things against some background of stationary spectators. Indeed, it
is telling that Timaeus does not even require that the exercise of this con-
trary power be regular or periodic like the planet’s sidereal motion. All that
the passage demands is a sense of the overall eastward direction of the race;
and this itself may well have been inferred from the fact that the planets set
close to the Sun, the eastward motion of which is readily inferred from its
observable behavior at the horizon. Accordingly, there is is no warrant here
to suppose that Timaeus is accommodating any knowledge of planetary sta-
tion and retrogradation.
This brings us back to Tim. 40c3–d3 and the problem of deciding what the
ἐπανακυκλήσεις and προχωρήσεις are. If we construe the planetary ἐπανακυ-
κλήσεις as the planetary circlings back or goings round—the full locution,
238 comments: in de caelo 2.12
σις from an ἀνακύκλησις. The participial form of the verb «ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι» and the cognate
«ἀνακύκλησις» each occur once in the Platonic corpus. Plato, Pol. 269e3 mentions an ἀνα-
κύκλησις of the cosmos. In context, this is plainly a rotation in the opposite direction [cf.
269a1–5, c4–d4]. Specifically, it is a (periodic) reversal in direction of the diurnal rotation
(currently from east to west, but earlier, so the story goes, from west to east). The participial
form occurs at Tim. 37a5. Here «αὐτή τε ἀνακυκλουµένη πρὸς αὑτήν», however, can mean at
most ‘it circling back to itself’ without implying any specific direction, since the motion at
issue is that of the world-soul understood as a mixture of the Same and the Different.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 239
Epinomis 986a8–987d2
Though the Epinomis is a dialogue purporting to continue the conversation
represented in Plato’s Leges and was for a long time included in the Platonic
corpus, the consensus now is that it was not in fact written by Plato. There
is an ancient tradition that it was written instead by Philip of Opus (flor. ca
–350), a contemporary of Aristotle, in the period after Plato’s death in –346.
During this conversation, the Athenian Stranger has occasion to empha-
size that there are eight visible gods in the heavens, each equally deserving of
honor and devotion. This requires him to state who these gods are [986a8–
987d2] and, thus, he comes to declare:
But they have in fact taken their nomenclature from gods. For, the Morning
Star, which is also the Evening Star, has itself the credit, I dare say, of belonging
to Aphrodite, which is very fitting for a Syrian Lawgiver; whereas the [planet]
that roughly keeps pace with the Sun and at the same time with this [first one]
belongs to Hermes.
We should mention three further motions of [bodies] that make their way
to the right with the Moon and Sun. And we must say that the eighth is one
which one should call Cosmos in a special sense, and which makes its way
in opposition to all the others as it carries [round] the rest, as it would seem
even to men who know little of these matters. But we must state, and do state,
all that we know sufficiently, since real wisdom appears in this way somehow
to one who has shared even slightly in right and divine thought.
Three [wandering] stars are left then, of which there is one that differs among
them by its slowness, and some speak of it by the name of Saturn; but we must
say that the one after this in slowness belongs to Jupiter; and the [planet] after
this belongs to Mars—it has the reddest color of all.
It is not at all difficult to understand any of this, when someone points it out;
but, as we say, it is necessary that he who has learned take the lead.
[Epin. 987b1–d2]
As this passage makes clear, Epin. 986a8–987d2 concerns only the sidereal
motion of each planet: that motion by which each planet returns to a fixed
star serves by itself to distinguish the seven wandering stars from those that
are fixed.
sky’.46 The basic aim in this discussion is to attain peace of mind and sure
confidence. As Epicurus would have it, this aim is to be realized by noting
that each of these phenomena admits of more than one explanation and by
refusing to make arbitrary choices among the alternatives.47
Thus, near the end of his letter, Epicurus gives two accounts of why some
stars are fixed and others wander. To begin, he entertains the three possible
explanations of why some stars seem fixed:48
– they are in a part of the cosmos that is at rest, or
– they are enveloped in a revolving ring of air that checks their motion,
or
– their fuel supply is not elongated—which means that they are ob-
served only in one place.
Then, he turns to the wandering stars. As he sees it,
it is possible that some of the stars wander—if it happens that they are subject
to motions in this way—and that others may not in fact because, as they move
in a circle, they have been so constrained from the beginning that some move
along the same revolution which is smooth, whereas others (move) at the
same time (along a revolution) which is subject to certain unsmoothnesses.
But it is also possible that in the regions where they travel there are in
some places smooth stretches of air that push them on together in the same
direction successively and kindle them smoothly, whereas in other places the
[stretches] are so unsmooth that the variations observed are produced.
[von der Muehll 1922, 41.20–42.5]
Epicurus begins by registering doubt that there really are stars that wander.
He then explains the distinction between fixed and wandering stars first by
imagining that it has been ordained from the beginning that each star moves
in a circle, and that the revolution in this circle is sometimes smooth and
sometimes unsmooth. Alternatively, he supposes that each star is produced
by kindling air49 and that some stars seem fixed because the airy fuel for
them is configured smoothly whereas other stars appear to wander because
their fuel is configured unsmoothly.
Now, the smooth or regular revolution has to be the diurnal revolution of
the fixed stars. But what makes the other revolutions unsmooth or irregular?
There are many possible answers. After all, revolutions may be unsmooth if
they define unequal arcs in equal times, these arcs being either always in the
2.10 that the revolution of the celestial sphere reduces the eastward motion of the planets.
53 If the direction is westward, this third account collapses into the first.
54 If they had the same angular speed, they would have the same sidereal period, that is,
But this is obviously incorrect: Ptolemy in fact presents the proof that he
gives in Alm. 12.1 as his own and opposes it to the pair of proofs offered by
the earlier theorists.60 So, what is the relation of Ptolemy’s contribution to
that of his predecessors in this matter? There is, of course, no way to dis-
cern how the work of the other µαθηµατικοί figures in Ptolemy’s proof. As
for Apollonius, Neugebauer has pointed out that there are important rela-
tions between Ptolemy’s proof and certain theorems in Apollonius’ Conica
and Plan. loci.61 But none of this tells us about what Apollonius and the
other µαθηµατικοί were doing. Though Ptolemy plainly supposes that the
lemma was proven for the sort of determination that he has in mind,62 the
truth may be that he is in fact adapting arguments propounded originally
in other contexts to his own purposes without recognizing these other con-
texts.
This feature of Ptolemy’s historiography comes into play later when he
introduces a lemma about scalene triangles which he attributes explicitly
to Apollonius:
Let us accept these preliminary results considered thus far. Given that it
remains to prove that, when the straight lines divided in this sort of ratio
have been ascertained for each of the two hypotheses, the points Η and Θ
will encompass the appearances of the stations, and that the arc ΗΦΘ must
be retrograde, while the rest [of the circle] must be direct, Apollonius assumes
in advance a small lemma, namely, that, given the triangle ΑΒΓ which has ΒΓ
longer than ΑΓ, if Γ∆, which is not less than ΑΓ, is taken [from ΓΒ], Γ∆ to Β∆
will have a have ratio greater than the angle subtended by ΑΒΓ to the angle
subtended by ΒΓΑ. [Heiberg 1898–1903, 2.456.3–13]
This lemma itself is purely mathematical and bears no indication of its origi-
nal context or purpose. Granted, for his part, Ptolemy presents the lemma as
intended for the next step in his own proof, a single proof identifying the sta-
tionary points in both astronomical hypotheses. But in doing this, Ptolemy
effectively contradicts his earlier claim that this unified proof is his. Thus,
taking this passage as evidence that Apollonius was in fact aware of sta-
tions and retrogradations would seem unwarranted. Indeed, it makes better
sense to hold that, in borrowing this lemma from Apollonius, Ptolemy has
conflated the reasons why Apollonius proposed it with the reasons why he
60 As Toomer [1984, 556n3] rightly remarks, this weighs against Neugebauer’s view [1975,
purpose here, as Toomer has it [1984, 555: cf. Heiberg 1898–1903, 2.456.3–10].
246 comments: in de caelo 2.12
borrows it. This is not, I hasten to add, a great blunder on Ptolemy’s part: the
Almagest is witness to his active engagement with astronomical problems;
there is no basis for any expectation of concern with their prior history. The
Almagest is a treatise in astronomy and not in the history of astronomy. His
assumption that Apollonius was working on the same problems as he is
perfectly rational and akin to Hipparchus’ tacitly ‘modernizing’ the accounts
of the heavens put forward by Eudoxus and Aratus.63 The problems come
when modern historians fail to see this.
In sum, Ptolemy himself gives reason to doubt that Apollonius himself
undertook a demonstration of planetary stationary points and retrograde
arcs. To this argument from what Ptolemy actually says should be added the
numerous considerations adduced by Goldstein [2009] in his own examina-
tion of Apollonius’ purported contribution to ancient astronomy.
At the same time, it is, I admit, reasonable to ask whether Apollonius did
address the issue of the planetary stations. After all, his skill as a mathemati-
cian is amply evident and the problem is a real one for any theorist disposed
to a kinematic, geometric representation of planetary motion that gives pri-
ority to circular motion. Further, it is well within the realm of possibility
that Apollonius learned of the planetary motions from sources that were
ultimately Babylonian—there was certainly an influx of Babylonian celes-
tial science in the century or so after the fall of Babylon to Alexander in –330,
as P. Hibeh 27 attests, and planetary theory is found in many divisions of this
science. Still, to those who would adopt this line of speculation, it should be
clear that, so far as one can tell in light of the evidence currently available,
any work by Apollonius in planetary theory was marginal to Greco-Latin
interests in celestial science over the next two or three centuries: there is,
after all, no evidence of any further commentary on this problem of station-
ary points in the Greco-Latin astronomical literature extant until the time
of Ptolemy, even in instances in which such commentary or acknowledg-
ment would have been appropriate.64 But, more fundamentally, one must
acknowledge that speculation of this sort, though useful perhaps for gen-
erating hypotheses for research, does not constitute historical knowledge
and has no place among the positive results confirmable by recourse to the
documentary remains. To the contrary, so far as Apollonius is concerned,
the sober claim that he merely supplied some fundamental results in planar
geometry is alone cogent, since this is all that Alm. 12.1 demands.65
Conclusion
Neither the Platonic nor the pseudepigraphic Platonic dialogues provide
good support for the thesis that the Greeks prior to the first century bc were
aware of planetary stations and retrogradations. The same holds true of Epi-
curus’ letters and of what Ptolemy actually reports of his early predecessors,
Apollonius in particular. Indeed, these passages at issue require much less—
in the main, a recognition of the varying sidereal motions that the planets
have.
Given that, excluding the disputed Meta. Λ.8, Aristotle himself does not
betray knowledge of these planetary phenomena, there is no warrant prima
facie for the claim that Aristotle actually had such knowledge or that it
figures in Meta. Λ.8. Accordingly, it follows that Simplicius’ reconstruction of
Aristotle’s formulation of the two ἀπορίαι may well be mistaken. Recognizing
this has important consequences. Notably, it allows us to put aside scholarly
accounts that take for granted that Simplicius is correct. Specifically, it
allows us to disengage the current study of Simplicius’ commentary on In
de caelo 2.10–12 from the corpus of learned speculation that reconstructs the
homocentric theory of planetary motion described in Λ.8 by correcting the
technical details of Simplicius’ account [492.25–499.15]66 and then teasing
out the mathematical implications of this significantly ‘revised’ Simplicius.
In short, we are, for now at least, spared the farrago of mathematical and
historical analysis that has its roots in the work of Giovanni Schiaparelli
[1925–1927] and set free to examine how Simplicius reconstructs the past
in order to meet Philoponus’ attack.
Should one balk at this and wonder whether it is right to sidestep Schi-
aparelli and his intellectual epigony in this way, I will point out that Aris-
totle’s account is so focused on its immediate task, counting the number of
unmoved movers, that it omits:
– naming the planetary motions in question,
– explaining what the third and fourth motions of the five plants are for,
predecessors, that one or both of the references to ᾽Απολλώνιος in 12.1 may be an interpolation,
and that either of these references may derive from an early misreading of «᾽Απολλινάριος».
66 See Comments 12.12, 12.16, pp. 262–264, 265–266.
248 comments: in de caelo 2.12
It is customary to cite Proclus, Hyp. ast. 4.98 in support of the claim that
Sosigenes wrote a treatise entitled On the Unwinding Spheres.67 The same
67 περὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν hσφαιρῶνi: I am assuming that the work which Proclus mentions
here is the same one that Simplicius uses in his commentary. Given that Simplicius’ citations
from this work plainly concern unwinding spheres, I have taken «ἀνελιττουσῶν» to mean
‘unwinding’ rather than ‘turning’. But one might just as well suppose that the title should
be On the Turning Spheres. See 135n113.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 249
passage has also been cited by modern scholars68 as evidence that Sosigenes
observed an annular eclipse, which they then compute to be the annular
eclipse of 164 Sep 4, the only such eclipse visible, they claim, in Greece
during the relevant period. But this is wishful thinking on both counts.
Consider Proclus, Hyp. ast. 4.97–99:
Thus, the diameter of the Sun (since [the Sun] is itself extended), [I mean] [130.9]
its apparent diameter, is always ascertained to be the same by means of
the dioptra whether the Sun is at apogee or at perigee.69 But the apparent
diameter of the Moon is greater and smaller at different distances [from
Earth]; and only when the Moon is in the [points] of its own circle farthest [15]
from the Earth,70 when it is plainly full and in conjunction (as it is in solar
eclipses), is its apparent diameter the same as the Sun’s [apparent] diameter.
It is in fact clear to [Ptolemy]71 that, if this is true, what Sosigenes the Peri-
patetic has recorded in his [discussions] of the unwinding spheres is not true,
[namely], that during eclipses near the Earth,72 the Sun was observed not to be [20]
entirely covered but to extend beyond the disk of the Moon with the extremes
of its own circumference and to cast light unimpeded [by the Moon]. Cer-
tainly, if one accepts this, either the Sun will exhibit different apparent diame-
ters or the Moon, in respect to the [diameter] that is apparent from the dioptra
when [the Moon] is at [points] farthest from the Earth,73 will not be identical [25]
to the [apparent] diameter of the Sun. [Manitius 1909, 130.9–26]
The remark attributed to Sosigenes offers a middle ground between Ptol-
emy’s view that no total solar eclipses are annular and the view found in
P. Par. gr. 1 col. 19.16–1774 (first half of second century bc) and Cleomedes,
Cael. 2.4.108–115 that all such eclipses are annular. The key point for our
purposes is that the remark attributed to Sosigenes stands as a claim about a
whole class of observations that are not necessarily his own—note ‘during
eclipses near the Earth’ and the absence of any indication that Sosigenes
actually observed one himself. Moreover, if Sosigenes is construed to be
reporting real observations, we should still hesitate to follow Proclus in
supposing that these were observations of annular eclipses rather than
varies in his Hypoth. plan. [cf. Goldstein 1967, 7; Morelon 1993, 66].
72 scil. eclipses when both bodies are near the Earth and, hence, when the Moon is
observations of the solar corona during a total eclipse.75 There was, after all,
no theory in antiquity to explain the light that sometimes appears around
the Moon during total solar eclipses and, hence, no way to distinguish such
eclipses from annular eclipses. As R. Grant remarks:
Among the various eclipses of the sun recorded as having happened in
ancient times, some were, in all probability, annular: but in no instance is the
description of the writer sufficiently clear to establish, beyond all doubt, the
actual occurrence of an eclipse of this nature. [Grant 1852, 371]
As for my ‘in his [discussions] of the turning spheres’, the Greek is «ἐν
τοῖς περὶ» with the genitive. This locution is found without any substantive
specified for «τοῖς» 10 times in the corpus of Proclus’ writings. Of these
occurrences, two76 involve what proves to be a reference by title to treatises
or books still extant, Aristotle’s De sensu and Archimedes’ De sph. et cyl. And
four others, which are found in commentaries on particular treatises, either
involve reference to a passage in the treatise being commented on77 or to a
passage in some other work by the author of the treatise.78 The remaining
four occurrences (including the one currently under consideration) are, in
my view, uncertain: given the locution that Proclus uses, they may involve
reference to passages on a certain subject or to treatises by title or by subject.
And so any decision about the specific intent of any of these occurrences
should be based on independent evidence.
Unfortunately, in the case of Sosigenes and his purported treatise, no
such evidence is forthcoming. Accordingly, it is more prudent, I think, to
avoid positing a treatise otherwise unattested and to suppose instead that
he is referring to discussions. Such caution will seem warranted if one con-
siders the 35 instances in which Proclus actually does supply a substan-
tive to go with «τοῖς», since, for him, the substantive of choice (30 occur-
rences) is «λόγοις» and it typically signifies a passage (literally, words), dis-
cussions, accounts, or arguments. Indeed, there is but one occurrence79
which seems to involve the citation of a work by its title—the fact that this
locution is balanced by another construction designating Plato’s Phaedrus
suggests this. Otherwise, in the remaining five instances, Proclus uses «γράµ-
75 Cf. Philostratus, Vita Apoll. 8.23.1–4 and Plutarch, De facie 932b–c with Newton 1972,
There are numerous ways in which the Greeks expressed the idea of saving
the phenomena or appearances. These expressions occur in different con-
texts and indicate different tasks. In some instances, one is to account for
an apparent irregularity and thus to save the phenomena by explaining it
away; in others, the task is to explain a regularity and thus to preserve or
maintain it; and in others still the meaning of the expression is left vague.
With this in mind, let us distinguish the slogan «(δια)σώζειν τὰ φαίνοµενα»
(‘saving the phenomena’) from the project itself, and try to determine what
the project was originally by considering the early occurrences of the slo-
gan.
moves north and south along the horizon during the year, and so forth,
can be saved (that is, explained) on two hypotheses. The first is geocentric:
it locates an immobile Earth at the center of the celestial sphere and has
the Sun as well as this sphere revolving around it, the Sun moving on a
circle that is oblique to the revolution of the celestial sphere. The second
is heliocentric: it places the Sun at the center of a stationary celestial sphere
and has the Earth rotating on its axis as it revolves about the Sun on a circle
that is oblique to the axis of rotation. The choice between these hypotheses
is momentarily cast as a matter of piety.
81 ἀποδειξίας.
82 Heath 1913, 302–303.
254 comments: in de caelo 2.12
motion that would surely help in accounting for these risings and settings
throughout the year.83 Thus, one may well doubt that Seneca is in fact
alluding specifically to Aristarchus, as some have thought.
In fact, Seneca may only have in mind the dispute between Aristotle and
those who agree with him in putting the Earth at the center of the cosmos
but who object to Aristotle’s argument [cf. De caelo 2.13–14, esp. 297a2–6]
that the motions of the constellations seen in the night sky follow from
our being on a motionless Earth at the center of a rotating celestial sphere.
Indeed, Aristotle himself [De caelo 293b30–32] finds in Plato’s Timaeus [cf.
40b8–c3] the thesis that the Earth is at the center of the cosmos but pos-
sessed of an axial rotation. Now, whether Aristotle is right about Plato’s
meaning in this passage is beside the point: for our purposes, it suffices that
the thesis is directly attested in a datable, extant text written prior to Seneca
in a context that differs from the one indicated in Archimedes’ report about
Aristarchus.
Still, even if Seneca means an allusion to Aristarchus, we must note that,
while he does indicate the phenomena to be accounted for, he does not
characterize the argument or demonstration involved.
actually derives from the first in a somewhat different context, comes with
Geminus’ mention of the Pythagoreans. But we should not suppose imme-
diately that when Geminus assigns this project of explaining (or in other ter-
minology, saving) the planetary phenomena to ‘the Pythagoreans,’ he means
the early Pythagoreans.96 There is, after all, no good evidence dating from the
fifth and fourth centuries warranting the claim that the early Pythagoreans
(or any early Greek for that matter) were aware of such characteristic plane-
tary motions as their stations and retrogradations.97 In fact, it would be more
in line with what we actually do know to suppose that, while Geminus might
mean the early Pythagoreans, he could just as well mean the Pythagoreans
of the revived Pythagorean movement that was contemporary with him and
Cicero, since this movement did involve interest in horoscopic astrology and
study of the planetary motions.98 Moreover, if Geminus does mean the early
Pythagoreans, he could be relying on literature ascribed to them but written
in the late second and first centuries bc when the planetary motions became
known in the Greco-Roman world.99
Conclusion
Given the present state of the evidence, the most that we should allow is
that the project of explaining the retrogradations and stations of the five
planets only began to take shape after the late second century bc as Greco-
Latin writers tried to address the problem of planetary motion in greater
detail than ever before. The slogan, ‘save the phenomena’, first appears in
a text written some years after this, however. There is, of course, no way
to determine whether this slogan was coined specially to encapsulate this
new project in astronomy or whether it was borrowed from an analogous
project in a different domain. Nevertheless, I submit that, so far as Greco-
Latin astronomy is concerned, its original scope was precisely this task of
explaining planetary stations and retrogradations away, though, apparently,
it soon was generalized to cover explanations that accounted for other
astronomical phenomena.
96 As does van der Waerden [1988, 107–108], for example: cf. Evans and Berggren 2006,
49–50.
97 See Comment 12.07, pp. 230–248.
98 See Bowen 2012d.
99 See Comment 12.39, pp. 297–298.
260 comments: in de caelo 2.12
In De caelo 292b29, I take «τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς» (‘of the living source’) as
a hendiadys.103
De caelo 292b28–30 is difficult. At issue is the antecedent of «ἑκάστης» in
νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκάστης πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τῆς πρώτης
πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας.
Regrettably, neither Grosseteste’s translation
intellegere enim oportet vitae et principii uniuscuiusque multam superexcellen-
tiam esse primae ad alias [Bossier n.d.a, 169.21–23]
nor Moerbeke’s lemma
De dubitatione autem usque illuc multam excellentiam esse primae ad alias
[Bossier n.d.b, 520a]
are any help in this: both translators render «κίνησις» (‘motion’), one possi-
ble referent of «ἑκάστης», by ‘latio’, ‘translatio’ as well as by ‘motus’. More-
over, though these lines from the De caelo would be easier if one followed
some mss and Simplicius [490.7–8] in omitting «ἑκάστης», there is little real
doubt that it belongs in the text.104
So, in De caelo 292b29–30, what exactly is first and greatly superior in «τῆς
ζωῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκάστης … τῆς πρώτης»? As it turns out, translators differ
on whether it is a motion105 or what is described in the phrase «τῆς ζωῆς καὶ
τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκάστης».106
103 So Guthrie 1960, 213 ‘each of these living principles’. But see Leggatt 1995, 149 ‘the life
and the principle of each locomotion’; Pellegrin 2004, 261 ‘pour la vie comme pour chaque
principe’ [but see 439n13 ‘concernant la vie et le principe’]; Mueller 2005, 30 ‘with regard to
each’s life and sovereignty’.
104 Cf. Moraux 1965, 84, Bossier n.d.a, 169.21–23.
105 See, e.g., Leggatt 1995, 149; Pellegrin 2004, 261 and n13.
106 See Moraux 1965, 83–84; Mueller 2005, 30.
262 comments: in de caelo 2.12
This claim about the Sun’s motion is also found in the commentary on Meta.
E–N.108 It first appears in Hipparchus, In Arat. 1.9.1, where it is ascribed to
Attalus, who reportedly argued that one should follow the manuscript vari-
ant for Aratus, Phaen. 467 asserting that the tropic and equinoctial circles
have breadth rather than the one stating that they are without breadth. As
Hipparchus [In Arat. 1.9.2] writes:
[88.15] The reason is that the astronomers109 too, [Attalus] says, hypothesize that the
tropic, equinoctial, and zodiacal circles possess breadth because the Sun does
not always make its solstices on the same circle, but sometimes farther north
and sometimes farther south. [Manitius 1894, 88.13–18]
110 This, I take it, is the force of the particle γοῦν: cf. Smyth 1971, §2820.
111 Mendell 1998, 188–189; 2000, 95–100.
112 Cf. In Arat. 1.1.8, 1.9.9.
264 comments: in de caelo 2.12
have breadth and, therefore, that the Sun’s path was not exactly the zodiacal
circle. That he mentions in this context Aratus, who, he elsewhere says,
followed the µαθηµατικοί, a group which included Eudoxus,113 in versifying
the latter’s Phaenomena, is significant.114
The claim that the westward motion of the second sphere is faster than
that of the third and smallest sphere—which means that the period of the
third sphere’s rotation is longer than that of the second sphere—is not
in Aristotle’s account. As Heath sees it, if the period of the motion of the
second sphere is a year, and if the third sphere is the one with the much
slower motion, the Sun will spend more than half a year above the zodiacal
circle and then more than half a year below.115 Thus, Heath (and others)
propose to correct Simplicius by supposing that, for Eudoxus, the Sun’s slow
motion belongs to the second sphere and its annual motion to the third.
Mendell [1998, 2000] has recently disputed the validity of this criticism and
has offered an alternative reconstruction.116
While Simplicius is right so far as he goes, his allusion to the fact that the
day is longer than one complete revolution of the celestial sphere is, under
the circumstances, unsophisticated. The problem is that he treats the day as
the interval from one setting of the Sun to the next, that is, from one horizon
crossing to the next solar crossing of the same horizon. Such an account does
not isolate the contribution made by the observer’s latitude to the length
of the day. It is for this reason that Ptolemy [Alm. 3.9] defined the day as
the interval from one solar crossing of the meridian (scil. the great circle
through the celestial poles and the observer’s zenith point) to the next solar
crossing of the same limb of the meridian. Ptolemy’s definition of the day
permits quantification of the equation of time, that is, the amount by which
the length of any given day differs from one full revolution of the celestial
sphere. In effect then, Simplicius takes recourse to a crude understanding
of the day that is found in Geminus, Intro. ast. 6.1–4 and Cleomedes, Cael.
1.4.72–89, for example.
On Latitude (πλάτος)
Simplicius’ exposition here is less than careful. Up to this point and after-
wards [see especially 497.4–5], «πλάτος» in phrases such as «κατὰ πλάτος»
and «εἰς πλάτος» is, to use the technical term, ‘latitude’, where latitude is a
vertical distance above (or below) a reference circle, specifically, the zodia-
cal circle. (If the reference circle were the celestial equator, πλάτος would be
declination.) In effect, Simplicius is following usage that had been in place
from at least the first century bc and is clear in the works of Proclus.117 Thus,
in 495.4–5, the distance between the poles of the two spheres is said to be
equal to the Moon’s greatest displacement in latitude, that is, in its motion
above (or below) the zodiacal circle. Yet, in 495.5–8, Simplicius calls the sum
of these maximum displacements above and below the zodiacal circle a
πλάτος and affirms that the distance between the poles of the second and
third lunar spheres is one half of it. Plainly, he is using «πλάτος» in another
sense to designate the distance between two latitudes (hence, my ‘breadth
[of latitude]’). Though such usage in talking of the planetary motions is with
precedent,118 it is awkward in this context.
117See e.g., Hyp. ast. 3.26–28, 4.12. Cf. Hiller 1878, 134.13–135.6; Cleomedes, Cael. 2.4.1–5.
118See, e.g., Aujac 1975, 291 s.v. «πλάτος» on Geminus’ usage; Hiller 1878, 135.12–21; Cleo-
medes, Cael. 1.2.49 and 74, 2.6.9 and 96.
266 comments: in de caelo 2.12
this westward motion of the lunar nodes is essential to the theory of eclipses.
That Simplicius talks of the longitudinal motion of the points of the Moon’s
greatest displacement in latitude rather than of the motion of the lunar
nodes may indicate that he has been influenced by Ptolemy’s practice [Alm.
5.8–9] of computing a planet’s argument of latitude starting from its north-
ern limit (the place on the zodiacal circle that is reached when the Moon
is at its farthest latitude north of this circle), a practice that has several
advantages over taking one of the nodes as a starting point in computing
the occurrences of eclipses [cf. Alm. 6.5]. In any case, in introducing his own
descriptive account of eclipses, Theon of Smyrna writes of the regression of
the lunar nodes,119 except that he has the nodes going in the wrong direction
(εἰς τὰ ἑπόµενα τῶν ζῳδίων); whereas Cleomedes [Cael. 2.5.141–147] does not
mention any motion of the lunar nodes at all.120
For some scholars, the question has been whether one should rely on this
passage and ascribe to Eudoxus knowledge of the regression of the lunar
nodes. Victor Thoren [1971] rightly treats the question as one about eclipses,
but specifies it as one about whether Eudoxus knew that they can occur at
any point of the zodiacal circle and then argues (in support of Ideler and
Schiaparelli) that we should. Dicks, however, maintains quite sensibly that
we should not.121
According to Heath, Simplicius is again in error about the second and third
spheres: if the period of this slow westward motion of the nodes is 223
synodic months, say, it follows in Simplicius’ account that the Moon will
pass through each node once in this period and, thus, that it will spend
half of this period (roughly 9 years) above the zodiacal circle and then half
below.122 Heath’s ‘solution’ is to suppose that, for Eudoxus, the third sphere is
for the Moon’s return to a given node (the draconitic month) along a circle
that is inclined to the zodiacal circle at an angle equal to the Moon’s greatest
latitude, and that the second sphere is for the slow motion of the nodes along
the zodiacal circle from east to west.123
Recently, Mendell124 has proposed that modern critics have erred in
assuming that the motion of the second lunar sphere is for the Moon’s mean
sidereal or zodiacal motion. As he sees it, Simplicius does not in fact go
astray at all in his description of the second and third lunar spheres: for
Mendell, Simplicius’ error, such as it is, lies in not explaining that the east-
ward motion of the second lunar sphere accounts for the Moon’s eastward
motion but not its period, and that the period of the third sphere’s eastward
motion is distinct from the effect of this third sphere in causing the east-
ward motion of the points of the Moon’s greatest latitude. Mendell’s remark
is well taken: Simplicius does not identify the periods of the motions of the
second and third spheres of either the Sun or the Moon.125 But there is a criti-
cal problem with the dependence of Mendell’s reconstruction on his finding
that ‘the hippopede is implicit in any model of celestial motion involving
two or more spheres rotating at some angle to each other’ [1998, 188], and
with his taking for granted that this was known to Simplicius (to say noth-
ing of Eudoxus). It is surely significant that Simplicius himself mentions
the hippopede only in reference to the third and fourth planetary spheres
[496.23–497.5], a very special case in which the two inclined spheres rotate
in opposite directions at the same speed. In short, Mendell’s reconstruction
is liable to the charge of committing the fallacy of implication, that is, the
fallacy of attributing to Simplicius a mathematical consequence of what he
writes.126
Incidentally, I would not concede that, if it is possible to read Simplicius’
words in a way which avoids an error that he seems to make or not to com-
prehend, this better reading of what he says derives from another source [so
Mendell 2000, 60]. This ‘principle’, which Mendell labels ‘lectio indocti doc-
tior potior’, is hardly compelling as a general rule: moreover, in this instance
at least, it is, I think, no more than a pretext for reading a reconstruction into
the past. To put it baldly, even if Simplicius makes an avoidable mistake in
123 Cf. Comment 12.11, pp. 261–262. For objections to such interference with the transmitted
way as the second sphere of the Sun seems limited to the fact that each is for motion along
the zodiacal circle.
126 Cf. Robinson 1966, 3–4. For criticism in other terms of the reconstructions offered by
his account of the second and third solar/lunar spheres, this would hardly
license the claim that someone earlier got it right.
Now, Mendell [2000, 95] does believe that 493.11–498.1127 derives from
Eudemus (or a ‘synthesis of Theophrastus and Eudemus’), though he offers
no good argument in support of this beyond the tendentious claim that
his interpretation of this passage is consistent with this assumption. Note,
however, that this passage does not fit with the explicit citations of Eudemus’
History of Astronomy that we find elsewhere: these other citations indicate a
digest organized by person listing their contributions to astronomy without
explanation or criticism.128 Furthermore, so far as his explanation of Meta.
Λ.8 is concerned, Simplicius explicitly turns to an authority (Sosigenes) for
guidance only with regard to the question of the unwinding spheres: in
493.11–498.1, he is ostensibly speaking propria voce. 129
These are values for the zodiacal or sidereal periods of the five planetary
bodies. Except in the case of Mars, the values which Simplicius reports are
the same as those found in Geminus, Intro. ast. 1.24–30 and Cleomedes, Cael.
1.2.22–36:130
127 Actually, Mendell says that the text at issue runs from 493 to 499 in Heiberg’s edition.
But this overlooks the fact that Simplicius explicitly introduces Sosigenes at 498.2 and cites
him extensively in what follows.
128 Cf. 488.18–24; Bowen 2003a, 315–318.
129 I will pass over the vexed questions of the relation of Simplicius’ remarks on Meta. Λ.8
in his In de caelo 2.12 and the commentary on Aristotle’s Meta. edited by Hayduck [see 1891,
702.36–706.15], and of whose commentary In de caelo it is that the author of the latter refers
to in 703.14–16.
For present purposes, it is important to distinguish those passages in which Simplicius
explicitly mentions or quotes the views of others from those in which he may be drawing
tacitly on previous work. The burden of proof lies heavily on those who suppose that a given
passage is an instance of the latter, especially when the work putatively used in this way is no
longer extant. Still, should one imagine that anyone has made such a case regarding 493.11–
498.1 and its dependence on the commentary on Aristotle’s Meta., this merely pushes back
my criticism of Mendell’s ‘principle’ and reconstruction, since the In meta. seems to treat the
lunar motions as Simplicius does.
130 Both Cicero [De nat. deor. 2.53] and Theon of Smyrna [Hiller 1878, 136.8] assign Mars a
The claim that the sidereal periods of Venus and Mercury are each 1 year
is found as early as Plato, Resp. 617a4–b4 and Tim. 38d2–4. It is interesting
that P. Par. 1 col. 5 reports the same values as Simplicius for the periods
of Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Yet, as Neugebauer [1975, 688] remarks, since
these values for the outer planets are so widely accepted, we should draw
no conclusion about the connection between Simplicius’ commentary and
the papyrus.
Note that the modern values for the sidereal periods are defined for the
planet as seen from the Sun, whereas, for the ancients, the sidereal periods
were those observed by an observer on Earth. When one converts Ptolemy’s
hypotheses for these planets by putting the Sun at the center of the epicycle
(rather than on the line from the Earth through this center), treats the
Sun as the center of a circle on which the Earth revolves (thus producing
a heliocentric hypothesis), and then computes the mean sidereal periods
from the period relations given in Alm. 9.3, one gets modern values.131
The indefiniteness of «πως» (‘somehow’, ‘in some way’) often shades into
uncertainty (‘presumably’, ‘I suppose’). Thus, this particle, when combined
with the demonstrative adverb «ὧδε» serves to indicate varying sorts of
distance between the speaker and what he is going to say. When one looks
at the nine occurrences of «ὧδέ πως» in Simplicius’ authentic writings, it
is apparent that there are some instances in which this distance is wholly
an artifact of urbanity and that it does not signify any real indefiniteness
131 Cf. Goldstein 2002, esp. 230. See Toomer 1984, 669–672 for discussion of Ptolemy’s
132 See 104.5, 505.30: cf. Kalbfleisch 1907, 121.13, 331.27, 394.12.
133 See Diels 1882–1895, 276.7.
134 Cf. Hankinson 2002, 76; Fleet 1997, 30. Mueller’s ‘At least he says the following sort of
thing’ [2005, 45] for «λέγει γοῦν ὧδέ πως» [505.30] is misleading.
135 See Kalbfleisch 1907, 22.15.
136 Cf. «τάχα ἄν ᾧδέ πως ἐπιχειροίη» at Diels 1882–1895, 619.20, where «πως» indicates
uncertainty and means something like ‘I suppose’ or ‘I presume’. This is the only occurrence
of «ᾧδέ πως» in the editions of Simplicius’ writings and one wonders whether it should be
emended to «ὧδέ πως».
137 I am overlooking for the moment those accounts which utilize eccentric circles and
Thus, Simplicius’ position is, I take it, that while what follows is not what
Aristotle actually said, it is nevertheless a good guess at what he understood.
Of course, whether Simplicius is right in this is a critical question.
The preceding comment assumes Heiberg’s text. I should point out, how-
ever, that Grosseteste’s ‘Reliquae autem duae hic qualiter habent?’138 would
seem to translate «πῶς ἔχουσιν;» rather than «ὧδέ πως ἔχουσιν» and that
the Fragmentum Toletanum has ‘Relique autem due sic se habent’,139 which
would seem to translate «ὧδε ἔχουσιν».
The values that Simplicius reports for the five planetary synodic periods are
roughly those reported by Cleomedes at Cael. 2.7.8–10, except in the case of
Mars where the difference is substantial.
which it makes its return to the same star and in which there is a whole number of synodic
events of the same sort. The synodic period is, thus, the result of dividing the Goal Year by
the number of synodic events.
272 comments: in de caelo 2.12
I am not aware, however, of any earlier Greek source that reports or entails
the same synodic periods as the ones reported by Simplicius.141 But, in a
private communication, Montelle has called my attention to a cuneiform
tablet, BM 35402, which puts the synodic period for Mars at 6 months and
20 days (~= 197 days).
Ido Yavetz proposes that Simplicius’ «πρὸς τοὺς πόλους … ἧκεν» could plau-
sibly mean ‘move toward the poles’, and develops a reconstruction in which
the planet is no longer on the equator of the fourth sphere.142 Though the
reconstruction is interesting, the linguistic point is quite unlikely. «ἥκω» is,
as it were, not a verb of motion but a verb of having moved.143 Hence, it means
that the planet has moved to the poles and, therefore, if one considers the
verb’s aspect, is present at the poles. So, in this context, one understands
that it arrives at or reaches the poles. At 501.16, «ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥξει» surely
means ‘will have come to’ or ‘will arrive at’, given «ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ»: ‘will
move towards’ simply ruins the argument. At 506.12, «µήπω … ἥκειν εἰς τὴν
῾Ελλάδα» makes good sense if it means ‘had not yet come to Greece’: ‘had
not yet moved towards Greece’ would be mildly bizarre. There are numer-
ous other occurrence of this verb in Simplicius’ writings and, like those of
«ἥκω» more generally, they do not support Yavetz’ conjecture. Note Gros-
seteste’s ‘ad polos … venit’ and Moerbeke’s ‘ad polos … pertingeret’.144
Curiously enough, the earliest evidence for the use of «ἡ ἱπποπέδη» rather
than «ὁ τοῦ ἵππου πέδος» or just «ὁ πέδος» to designate a horse-fetter seems
to come in the ninth century ad.145 So far as I can determine, the earliest ref-
141 See Neugebauer 1975, 782–785 for a survey of values found in ancient sources for the
Aristotle’s aim in Meta. Λ.6–7 is to show that there are immaterial, non-
sensible, unmoving/unchanging substances; that these substances are
purely active, eternal intellects; and that they are ultimate principles of
motion/change in the world. In Λ.8, he argues that there are as many of these
ultimate causes or unmoved movers as there are motions in the heavens, and
then proposes to determine just how many these are. As Beere rightly points
out, this project is an essential supplement to Aristotle’s account of physi-
cal theory or science of nature,149 and its real novelty lies in the thesis that
this number can be decided in a non-arbitrary, systematic way by consulting
astronomical theory.
Obviously, it is important for this project to distinguish between an intrin-
sic motion, a motion that is forced or imposed, and a resultant motion, since
only the former will have its own unmoved mover. For example, consider
the question of the diurnal revolution of the planets. If one looks to Plato’s
Timaeus, there would be but one unmoved mover for this, since the motion
of the Same (viz. of the celestial sphere) is imposed on all the planetary
motions beneath the celestial sphere. Now, if one were to focus solely on the
interpretation, and also contends [1998, 233–237] that there are numerous other curves that
could count as hippopedes.
149 Beere 2003, 1–3. I pass over for now the question of the epistemological status of the
argument in Meta. Λ.8, and whether it is a boundary argument connecting metaphysics and
physical theory.
274 comments: in de caelo 2.12
language of Meta. 1073b17–32, in which the first sphere of each of the seven
planetary systems is said to be the sphere of the fixed stars and to perform its
motion, one might expect that the same is true for Aristotle, namely, that he
too thinks that the diurnal rotation of the celestial sphere is imposed on the
planets.150 However, in 1073b37–1074a12, when Aristotle comes to forming
a single, complete structure of all the celestial motions, he includes the
first carrying sphere in the system for each of the seven planets, thereby
treating each planet’s diurnal revolution as an intrinsic motion and not as
an imposed or a resultant motion.
This is surprising and it makes one wonder what has happened to the
celestial sphere itself. Moreover, it has the important consequence that the
last unwinding sphere of a given planet cannot serve as the first carrying
sphere of the planet below precisely because the diurnal rotation of the last
unwinding sphere around the celestial axis from east to west is a resultant
motion. For Aristotle, then, each of the seven diurnal planetary revolutions
must have its own unmoved mover,151 and, as Simplicius says, to discount
these motions is to depart significantly from his analysis [cf. 503.35–504.3].
So, when Simplicius [506.23–507.8] asks why the celestial sphere was not
sufficient for Aristotle, the question perhaps ought to have been, ‘Why did
Aristotle suppose that the diurnal revolution of each planet was an intrinsic
motion in the first place?’
When Aristotle assembles the planetary systems into a single structure
of nested rotating homocentric spheres,152 he evidently assumes that a con-
taining sphere can affect a contained sphere (that is, a sphere which has
its poles fixed in/on the containing sphere) only if the axis of the con-
taining sphere’s (resultant) rotation is oblique to the axis of the contained
sphere’s intrinsic rotation.153 Were this not the case, given that the first car-
rying spheres of the planetary systems all share the axis and motion of the
celestial sphere [cf. 494.1–3, 495.20–22], Aristotle would have been obliged
to unwind the first carrying sphere of each planetary system, since it is this
argues interestingly that Aristotle’s aim in assembling the spheres was not to accommodate
new phenomena but to preserve the phenomena already addressed by Eudoxus and Cal-
lippus in a system that used their hypotheses without introducing a void into the cosmos.
Aristotle’s aim, as Bechler sees it, was not to develop a unified mechanism in which motion
is transmitted from the celestial sphere to the spheres beneath it.
153 On the question of friction, see Beere 2003, 9.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 275
156 For discussion of Alexander’s remark in Quaestio 1.25 [see Bruns 1887, 40.23–30: cf.
Sharples 1992, 85] about the diurnal motion of the heavenly bodies below the celestial sphere,
see Bodnár 1997.
157 See Comment 12.12, pp. 262–264.
158 T.H. Martin [1881, 268] agrees that Aristotle certainly could have proposed this and even
comments: in de caelo 2.12 277
It is curious that this solution did not strike Simplicius, given what he
writes at 493.23–31 and 501.12–21. It would hardly have been the first instance
in which he departs from a strict reading of Aristotle’s texts. In any case,
there is ample evidence suggesting that Aristotle himself held that the Sun
actually has but two motions. See:
– Meta. 1072a9–18, where it is argued that the ultimate cause of corrup-
tion and generation must have two motions;
– Meta. 1072a21–24, where it is clear that this cause is not the celestial
sphere but a wandering star; and
– De gen. et corr. 336a15–b24 which identifies these two motions as the
daily rotation and the motion along the oblique circle (κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν
κύκλον: scil. the zodiacal circle), and the wandering star as the Sun.159
An Emendation
asserts that he ought to have proposed it. Dryer [1906, 114n2] regards this as the simplest
explanation, but doubts that Aristotle had this in mind. Heath [1913, 220n1] allows that it
is possible that Aristotle had this in mind, but is persuaded that he lacked the knowledge
needed to make this improvement.
159 Cf. Meteor. 1.9, 2.4; De caelo .289a26–35.
160 Grosseteste [Bossier n.d.a, 180.17–18] has ‘vel alii alicui’ and Moerbeke [Bossier 1975,
a resultant motion but do not have the same axis as the sphere of the fixed
stars.161 In any case, it is gratuitous and I propose that it be deleted.162
where sphere p has an intrinsic motion mp, and saying that sphere q has mp
means that mp is imposed on sphere q. Accordingly, if one adds a fifth sphere
with an intrinsic motion opposite to the intrinsic motion of the fourth, the
situation changes in this way:
a paraphrase, or a report, this still would not be enough to permit a decision about how much
in these citations is due to Simplicius and how much, to Sosigenes. To forestall such concerns
while keeping them in view, I will write of Sosigenes/Simplicius in discussing this passage.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 279
since m5 = –m4. The upshot is that sphere 5, which unwinds the motion of
sphere 4, will have the same resultant motion as sphere 3.
Adding a sixth sphere which has an intrinsic motion opposite to that of
the third sphere will effect the following:
since m6 = –m3. And finally, adding a seventh sphere which has an intrinsic
motion opposite to the intrinsic motion of the second sphere will accom-
plish this:
164 See, e.g., Beere 2003, 6–7 and Bowen 2008d, 68n269: cf. Schiaparelli 1925–1927, 2.106.
280 comments: in de caelo 2.12
165 This will be true, of course, only if, contrary to what is indicated at 500.22–501.1, the
motions of spheres which have the same (intrinsic or resultant) axes as well as the same
(intrinsic or resultant) periods and directions of rotation are not compounded: see Comment
12.23, pp. 273–277.
166 Cf. Moerbeke’s ‘secundum eundum cathetum in quinta’ [Bossier 1975, 3.15.16] and
since m5 = –m4. Thus, adding the fifth sphere, that is, a sphere with an
intrinsic motion opposite to that of the fourth, serves to fix the fourth in
relation to the third. Likewise, since m6 = –m3, inserting the sixth sphere
would have the outcome that:
Again, granted that that the intrinsic motion of the sixth sphere is effective
upwards only, then, the intrinsic motion of the sixth sphere will fix the third
and fifth spheres in relation to the second sphere: as Sosigenes/Simplicius
would have it, perpendiculars dropped from the axis of the second sphere
will always pass through the same points of the other two spheres, if they
pass though them at all. In the same way, since m7 = –m2, the intrinsic motion
of seventh sphere will fix the second and sixth spheres (and with them, of
course, the third, fourth, and fifth spheres) in relation to the first:
The upshot will be that the entire system of carrying and unwinding spheres
moves with one motion, the diurnal rotation of the first sphere, because
each sphere below the first is now fixed in relation to it.
But, though such an account of the unwinding spheres renders 502.10–11
easily intelligible, it too has its challenges. In fact, not only does it have the
adverse consequence that the demonstration alluded to at 502.6–7 is not
included in Simplicius’ report of Sosigenes’ account, it has the catastrophic
282 comments: in de caelo 2.12
169 See Kroll 1899–1901, 2.230.3–15 or Proclus’ report of these criticisms by Ptolemy.
170 Cf. Nix 1907, 118.20–31.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 283
Aristotherus
171 J. Martin 1974, 21.2. On the history of this text, see J. Martin 1956.
284 comments: in de caelo 2.12
172 See, e.g., Mair 1955, 186: cf. Aujac et al. 1979, 9 and n2, for references going back to the
19th century.
173 1913, 222n1: cf. North 1995, 84.
174 Heath 1921, 1.348: cf., e.g., Dreyer 1906, 141–142. See Bowen 2008a.
175 See 25.22–26.31 on p. 12: cf. Wildberg 1987, 39–40.
176 = Wildberg 1987, F7: cf. Rescigno 2004, f8c with 1.178–182.
177 32.1–2 εἰ καλῶς … ἐπέστησεν ὁ ᾽Αλέξανδρος. This and what follows may be either a
quotation or a (close) paraphrase. Given the evidence of Philoponus’ other criticisms [see
Wildberg 1987], the opening «εἰ» would seem to mean ‘since’. The same holds for «εἰ»
understood in 32.5 before «οἱ ἀστέρες»: at least, this provides better grounds for Simplicius’
speculation about how Philoponus came to know that the heavenly bodies rotate.
178 32.1 οὗτος [cf. 32.34]: scil. Philoponus. The use of the demonstrative without the name,
which is typical of the language of the law-courts and may serve to present Philoponus
formally as an opponent, likely indicates strong contempt as well [cf. Wildberg 1991, 107n1],
since, for Simplicius, Philoponus had perverted the proper study of philosophical texts [see
Wildberg 1999, 115–120]. See Hoffmann 1987, 197–199 on Philoponus’ anonymity in Simplicius’
polemic.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 285
which is about the center of the universe, yet if all [motions] which are
not about [the center] of the universe are strictly speaking neither circu-
lar nor simple, and since the [planetary] stars (which perform a motion in [5]
accordance with their spheres, as the astronomers179 think), move about their
own centers, neither the [planetary] stars nor their epicycles nor, clearly,
the spheres called eccentric perform a motion that is circular or simple
strictly speaking, because both downward and upward [motion] are observed. [10]
Indeed, even if these [phenomena] conflict, he says, with Aristotle’s hypothe-
ses, still, the [planetary] stars evidently have perigees and apogees.180
Simplicius begins his response by advancing the idea that circular motion
is simple by virtue of its being about a center rather than by virtue of its
being about the center of the universe, a thesis that requires clarifying Aris-
totle’s commitment to the more restrictive notion of simple circular motion.
He then excuses Aristotle from the charge that he erred in warranting or
expounding a homocentric theory of planetary motion.
I say, then, that in these [lines]181 Aristotle is only saying this much, that [32.12]
motion in a circle is [motion] about a center, since this befits every circular
motion. But if he elsewhere says that bodies moving in a circle move about
the center of the universe, one should understand that he is making his case [15]
in accordance with the hypotheses of earlier astronomers.182 For the Eudox-
ans/Callippans183 (that is, those up to Aristotle who hypothesized turning
spheres homocentric to the universe), tried by those means to save the phe-
nomena, saying that all the spheres are about the center of the universe. But
[they tried] to explain [the phenomena] in accordance with these hypotheses
without mastering the causes of apogees, perigees, apparent direct motions, [20]
and retrogradations,184 that is, [the causes] of the unsmoothnesses apparent
in the motions of [the wandering stars].
For this reason, you know, the Hipparchans (and if there was anyone earlier
than [Hipparchus])185 and, after him, Ptolemy hypothesized eccentric spheres
and epicycles, without taking notice through these [new hypotheses] that
[25] all the heavenly bodies move about the center of the universe, but giving in
accordance with these hypotheses their explanations of the [phenomena]
stated earlier, though they had received explanations [of these phenomena]
by [the earlier astronomers].186
Now, Aristotle says nothing here about these matters; but, in [passages] in
which he does say [something], he is evidently following the hypotheses of
his predecessors.
[30] It is clear that differing about these hypotheses is not a matter of reproach,
since what is set forth is [the question]: ‘By hypothesizing what can the
phenomena be saved?’ So, it is not at all surprising if different people have
tried to save the phenomena on the basis of different hypotheses. If the
[wandering] stars move about their own centers, they also move in that they
are brought round the [center] of the universe by their spheres.187
Philoponus has just raised a critical point on which Simplicius agrees,
namely, the rejection of Aristotle’s homocentric planetary hypotheses. Since
it would serve his case no good to bring this to the reader’s attention and to
explain at this juncture Aristotle’s ‘real’ meaning, Simplicius offers polemic
instead: he attacks Philoponus’ reasons for holding that all stellar bodies
rotate on their own axes. The thrust of his argument is, I presume, that, while
he has good reason (based on a reading of Plato and a proper understand-
ing of Aristotle),188 Philoponus has none. In this way, Simplicius disengages a
more considered response about planetary hypotheses from his direct refu-
tation of Philoponus and allows himself to postpone it until later. In short,
Simplicius refuses even to hint that Philoponus may have hit upon a good
529 [Rabe 1899, 579.14–18]. His pupil, Severus Sebokht, offers a fuller account of this which
indicates that Philoponus used Ptolemy’s Canones manuales [see Neugebauer 1959a].
192 33.1 Κανόσι: the tables in the Almagest were revised with an eye to making them easier
to use and published separately as the Canones manuales. There is, admittedly, the possibility
that Simplicius is referring to the Almagest: but see 287n191; Neugebauer 1975, 838–839 and
note 6.
288 comments: in de caelo 2.12
[5] for the star as it changes place [in longitude],193 whereas its motion about
its center does not occur with its changing place [in longitude]?194 But the
numbers for the center of the epicycle show the motion of the homocentric
or eccentric [circle] on which the epicycle moves, whereas the [numbers]
for the [wandering] star [show] the motion of the epicycle on which the star
moves.195
[10] Yet, it is impossible to ascertain the motion of the star itself about its own cen-
ter [I mean], the length of time in which196 the star makes a complete rotation,
since it does not change from place to place [in longitude] in accordance with
this motion. This is why none of the astronomers tried to deduce the complete
rotation of the star about its own center, that is, the length of time in which
it occurs, since it is not ascertainable. Plato, of course, knew this motion of
[15] the [wandering] stars.197 But what Aristotle believes about the motion of the
[wandering stars], he will say in the second [book] of this treatise.
193 33.5 µεταβαίνοντός … τοῦ ἀστέρος: scil. they are a correction to the motion of the center
the rotational motion makes no contribution to the motion in longitude [cf. 33.9–13].
195 33.6–8 reading «ἀλλ’ οἱ µὲν τοῦ κέντρου … φέρεται ὁ ἀστήρ». I have not followed Heiberg’s
punctuation here; instead, I have treated this sentence as a positive statement in its own right
and not as part of Simplicius’ very rhetorical question [cf. Moerbeke in Bossier et al. 2004,
45.8–10].
196 33.10 ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ.
197 33.13–14: cf. Timaeus 40a2–b8.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 289
distance with the naked eye. Further, Venus has phases which compensate
its varying distance from Earth so that the magnitude of its brightness ranges
only from –3.9 to –4.7, which is equally difficult to detect.198
So, given that, in contrast, Mars is visible at the middle of its retrograde
arc and that it is noticeably brighter at this point,199 it seems that Simplicius’
thesis here may be no more than a misguided inference based on astronom-
ical theory that postdates Aristotle. After all, no one before Ptolemy appears
to have paid any attention to the fact that the stars (both fixed and wander-
ing) differ in size (brightness), if they noticed it at all.200 For his part, in his
Hypotheses planetarum, Ptolemy puts the five planets at varying distances
from the Earth but makes nothing of the variation in size (brightness) that
this might entail. Indeed, at one key point, though it surely follows from his
hypotheses for Venus, he does not even seem to recognize any variation in
its apparent diameter.201 It is difficult, then, to hold that prior to the second
century ad there was any real concern with the apparent size (brightness)
of the five planets, though this claim is essential to Simplicius’ ‘history’.
Still, Ptolemy does treat Venus and Mars as alike in that he assigns to
them very nearly the same ratio of their farthest distance from Earth to
their nearest distance. So, one possibility is that, given that size (brightness)
ought to vary with distance from Earth, Simplicius simply inferred that
such variation would be especially noticeable in the case of Venus and
Mars because their ratios are roughly 7:1. What is amusing is that he would
have been right (albeit accidentally) in the case of Mars and very wrong in
the case of Venus, which is significantly unlike Mars in that it is an inner
planet—this is why Venus (unlike Mars) has phases and is invisible at the
middle of its retrograde arc.
Goldstein and Swerdlow 1970, 148 with ˙ identification of the author in Saliba 1979.
202 See, e.g., Herschell 1849, 272; Steavenson 1956, 264; Moore 1961, 27.
290 comments: in de caelo 2.12
under certain circumstances cast shadows, one should not assume that
Simplicius has himself made such an observation or that he knows anyone
who has. He may, after all, be relying solely on literary sources such as Pliny’s
Nat. hist. 2.37.
In general, modern computations and observations serve only to discon-
firm ancient observational reports and not to verify them: the reason is that
modern science can at best demonstrate that an ancient report is consis-
tent with the natural phenomena. Showing that an ancient report is truly
observational requires study of the context in which the report occurs, the
aim being to get positive evidence that there actually was an observation.
Without such evidence, one should not, for instance, eliminate the possibil-
ity that such reports are but adaptations of literary topoi, some of which may
only be true coincidentally.203
circular.
207 For a very useful discussion of the Moon illusion and of how it has been understood
Moon’s apparent size is in fact discernible by the naked eye. Perhaps, then,
he is either still unclear himself about the nature of the Moon illusion, or
he is supposing, somewhat tentatively (and wrongly), that the very small
variation (putatively) seen with instruments can be seen with the naked eye.
In truth, we may have yet again an instance in which Simplicius formulates
his expectations based on theory as easy observations.208
208 For Bate’s denial of the claim that atmospheric conditions are identical on the different
occasions or in different places, and his rejection of the validity of any claims that a difference
in the size of the heavenly bodies has been observed, see Bossier 1987, 319nn41–42.
292 comments: in de caelo 2.12
eclipsed luminary209 is not at issue here; whereas the digit of arc which is 1/12
of 1° or 1/24 of a cubit (= 2°)210 yields a value for the diameter of the Moon that
is much too large.211
Perhaps Simplicius is assuming that the diameter of the lunar disk is 12
digits when the Moon is at its mean distance from the Earth. This type of
digit is mentioned elsewhere only in the De facie 935d, so far as I know, where
Plutarch writes, ‘The diameter of the moon measures 12 digits in apparent
size at her mean distance.’212 Cleomedes, Cael. 2.3.15–43213 also asserts that
the Moon’s diameter is 12 digits but does not specify any distance.214
Simplicius has thus far proposed that the observable variation in the appar-
ent sizes of the Moon, Venus, and Mars is due to a variation in their distances
from the Earth. He then says that such variation ought by rights to be visi-
ble in the case of the other planets as well; that is, he supposes that each of
the other planets ought to evidence a variation in its apparent size that is
due to a variation in its distance to the Earth. Allowing for the fact that such
variation in apparent size is not perceived, he considers whether the other
planets vary imperceptibly in size. He concludes that they do, and adduces
as proof the fact that these planets vary in their daily motion, that is, in the
number of degrees of longitude that each travels day by day. Though he does
not say how he knows this in each instance—it is a claim most easily estab-
lished for the Sun—such variation in a planet’s daily progress is, Simplicius
assumes, to be explained by positing a variation in its distance from Earth.
Thus, Geminus [Intro. ast. 1.13–41], for example, supposes that the Sun moves
on a circle that is eccentric to the Earth in order to explain the variation in
the length of the seasons and the zodiacal months.215
but I see no reason to suppose that Simplicius thinks that the apparent diameter of the Moon
is even close to 1°.
212 Cherniss 1957, 143.
213 Cf. Bowen and Todd 2004, 131n7.
214 For Bate’s denial of the claim that there are instruments sufficiently precise to allow
the infallible determination of a difference in the apparent size of the heavenly bodies, see
Bossier 1987, 319n43.
215 But see Comment 12.08, pp. 248–251 on the question of the Sun’s distance to Earth.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 293
217 See Comments 12.07, 12.09, 12.28–30,12.32–33 [pp. 230–248, 251–259, 288–291, 291–293].
218 Cf., e.g., Aujac et al. 1979, 182; Mueller 2005, 45.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 295
223 Cf. 9.21 ὁ δὲ θαυµαστὸς Πτολεµαῖος, 456.23 ὁ ἄριστος τῶν ἀστρονόµων, 710.14 ὁ µαθηµατικός.
224 See Heiberg 1894, 774 s.v. Πτολεµαῖος.
225 See, e.g., Heiberg 1894, 773 s.v. Πρόκλος.
226 Cf. Pingree 1994, 89–92 and Comment 10.13, pp. 211–213.
227 Cf. von Staden 1989, 43–50.
228 See von Staden 1989, 155–160, 247–259 with textual evidence at 313–319.
comments: in de caelo 2.12 297
Simplicius is most likely thinking of the Pythagoreans whom Plato and Aris-
totle mention in their works: at least, this would make for a proper distinc-
tion between the Pythagoreans and ‘those who came later’ (than Eudoxus,
Callippus, Polemarchus, Aristotle, and Autolycus) and whom Simplicius and
other late Platonists follow [506.9–10]. At the same time, so understood,
it is curious that Simplicius states the claim without comment: though
Iamblichus ranks highly in the late Platonist pantheon, this claim about
the Pythagoreans runs against Simplicius’ own view that it was Plato, not
the Pythagoreans, who initiated research concerning hypotheses that might
save the planetary phenomena.
As for the claim itself, one possibility is that Nicomachus and with him,
Iamblichus, have preserved a fact about these early Pythagoreans that has
otherwise been lost. This would mean that, in spite of the preceding demon-
stration that there are no extant texts prior to the second century requir-
ing us to hold that their authors were aware of planetary stations and ret-
rogradations, the early Pythagoreans did indeed posses such knowledge and
developed mathematical tools for its analysis. In response to this, let no
one deny that Nicomachus and Iamblichus may well have thought that they
were talking about the early Pythagoreans. What must be addressed is the
assumption that they were right in this and that we should follow them.
In the first place, there was a revival of Pythagoreanism during the time of
Cicero both in Rome and Alexandria, and this movement was characterized
in part by an interest in horoscopic astrology and questions about the
motions of the planets. Nigidius Figulus, a friend of Cicero, was, apparently,
a leading figure in this movement.229 Granted, nothing survives of his work
except citations in contemporary and later writers;230 but this still suffices to
contextualize his contribution. Others in the movement include Eudorus of
Alexandria (active ca 25 bc) and the itinerant holy man, Apollonius of Tyana
(first century ad).
Sketchy as this all may be, it is sufficient to challenge the bare assumption
that Nicomachus’ Pythagoreans were the early Pythagoreans rather than
the contemporaries of Cicero. Further, even if Nicomachus meant the early
Pythagoreans, the warrant for this may not have been access to informa-
tion dating from the fifth and fourth centuries, but to the pseudepigraphic
literature written in the late second and first centuries bc, when planetary
stations first became known to the Greco-Roman world, which purports to
relate the thought of earlier Pythagoreans.231 Indeed, for all we know, Nigid-
ius and his fellow Pythagoreans contributed to this pseudepigraphic litera-
ture.
This particular claim about the Pythagoreans is not found in any extant
work by either Nicomachus or Iamblichus. But Proclus [Hyp. ast. 1.34–35]
suggests, on the basis of some unnamed historical account (ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἱστο-
ρίας παρειλήφαµεν), that the Pythagoreans came up with the eccentric and
epicyclic hypotheses in response to Pythagoras’ requirement that they seek
ways to account for the phenomena using the fewest and simplest hypothe-
ses.
What we would seem to have, then, are competing historical narratives,
neither of which is credible given the evidence deriving from early Antiq-
uity.232 And the differences between them may in fact be due primarily to
Simplicius’ need to respond to Philoponus in defense of the Late Platonist
conviction that the heavens and thus, the cosmos, are uncreated and ever-
lasting.
As for Simplicius’ account, it seems that, neither the eccentric nor the
epicyclic hypotheses were developed in order to explain any variation in
the apparent size (brightness) of the planets. Rather, eccentric hypotheses
appear to have been developed in order to account for the different lengths
of the seasons and the epicyclic hypotheses, in order to account for the fact
that Venus and Mercury are limited in the distance that each travels from
the Sun.
231 Cf. Kahn 2001, 72–85. See also Comment 12.09, pp. 258–259.
232 See Comments 12.07 and 12.09, pp. 230–248 and 251–259.
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INDEX OF PASSAGES
Agathias Archimedes
Hist. Aren.
2.30.3–4 3 1.4–7 252–254
2.30.3–31.4 3
Aristotle
Alexander An. post.
De an. 1.9 76a4–13 44
29.1–4 138 1.13 78a31–b4 219
30.24 46 1.13 78b4–11 219
In meteor. 1.13 78b34–39 44
143.12–14 101, 136 De caelo
Περὶ ἀρχῶν 75 1.1–4 91
Quaest. 1.2 114, 286
1.1 2.20–4.26 75 1.2 268b11–13 27
1.25 276 1.2 268b14–16 27
1.25 39.9–41.19 75 1.2 268b14–269a9 285
1.2 268b17–24 27
[Alexander] 1.4 101, 104
In meta. 1.5 30
702.36–706.15 268 1.7 274b33–275a5 142
702.38–706.15 164 1.8 277b12–24 125
703.10–24 143 2.2 286a3–7 122
703.12–23 147 2.5 209
703.14–16 268 2.6 288a13–17 208
703.23–28 146, 262 2.8 9, 10, 63, 111
704.9–10 153 2.8 289a26–35 277
704.23–705.6 156 2.8 289b1–4 8, 50
705.25–39 162 2.8 289b1–290a7 29
705.39–706.13 163 2.8 289b4–5 8
706.13–15 164 2.8 289b5–290a7 8
706.16–17 169 2.8 289b30–290a5 207
706.23–24 169 2.8 290a7–12 112
2.8 290a7–24 29, 32
Aratus 2.8 290a7–29 8, 221
Phaen. 2.8 290a12–14 9
78 115 2.8 290a17 29
467 262 2.8 290a17–18 29
737 115 2.8 290a18–24 29
2.8 290a22 29
2.8 290a33–b11 32
2.8 290a35–b7 113
314 index of passages
Resp. Pliny
533c7–d4 10 Nat. hist.
616e8–617a1 120 2.32 213
616e8–617a4 105 2.37 289
617a4–b4 239, 269 2.39 289
617a7–b3 107 2.68 167
617b1–2 107
Soph. Plotinus
254a4–b1 10 Enn.
Tim. 3.1.5–4 205
34b10–39e2 208
35a1–b3 234 Plutarch
35a1–40d5 137 De facie
35b4–36c2 235 923a 251–253, 255,
36b6–d6 133 258
36c2–d7 235 925c 207
36c4–d1 214 932b–c 250
37a5 238 935d 292
37c6–d7 133 937f 167
38c3–6 240 939a–b 167
38c7–d1 236 Plat. quaest.
38c7–d2 120 1006b–c 256–257
38d2–4 109, 269 Quaest. conv.
38d2–6 234, 236 669a 7
38d4–6 110
38e3–6 236 [Plutarch]
38e6 214 Plac.
38e6–39a3 106 895e6–7 138
39a1 214
39a2 107 Proclus
39a2–3 107 Hyp. ast.
39d7–e2 240 1.34–35 298
40a2–b8 32 3.26–28 265
40a8 221 4.12 265
40b8–c3 255 4.71–72 166
40c3–d3 232–239 4.72 137, 166
40c4 205, 233 4.87–96 166
40c5 238 4.95 249
41d4–e1 262 4.97 249–251
4.98 165
[Plato] 7.4 134, 135
Epin. 7.13–15 88, 290
986a8–987d2 241 7.18 250
986e3–7 236 7.19–23 212
987a1–6 121 In Euc.
987b2–5 236 71.18–19 250
987c4–5 150 112.4–5 273
318 index of passages
23.31–24.21 12 87.29–88.2 30
24.17–20 138 90.13–18 30
24.21–25.21 213 104.5 270
25.22–26.17 12–13, 33 106.4–6 33
25.23 12 107.12–13 54
26.11–15 33 119.7–13 33
26.17–19 14 119.12–13 7
26.17–21 30 135.9–10 33
26.19–21 13, 14 135.31–136.1 7
26.22–25 33 137.17–28 54
26.28–31 13, 33 138.15–22 54, 55
26.30 13 141.19–21 10
32.1–7 14 143.9–17 30
32.1–11 27, 34, 59, 80 143.9–22 61
32.1–33.16 62 154.12–16 54
32.4–11 28 157.1–12 30
32.9–11 88 157.19–21 30
32.12–16 67, 80 164.21–23 30
32.12–29 65, 84 173.23–30 30
32.12–32 28 178.26–28 30
32.12–33.16 28, 284–288 185.23–186.1 30
32.16 64 196.23–33 30
32.23–28 85 271.19 3
32.24–33.16 62 286.2–13 12
32.29–32 37 287.2–12 61
32.32–34 28 297.1–298.26 61
32.32–33.36 28 304.1 54
32.34–33.13 28 311.32 54
33.13–14 28 316.3 11
33.14–16 28 353.3–10 61
34.5–7 33 360.20–29 54, 61
35.31–33 33 361.5–364.14 18
35.33–35 33 370.29–371.4 6
42.6–16 12 371.1–4 30
50.15–18 33 372.15 54
50.18–52.18 12 377.20–24 30
65.9 30 377.20–34 60
69.11–15 61 377.24–25 80
70.16–19 30 377.29–34 33
70.17–18 33 377.32 60
74.4–5 10 378.20–21 33
74.4–7 30 431.30–32 290
80.23–26 33 444.18–445.7 50
81.10–11 33 452.9–453.21 29
84.11–85.15 34 453.22 29
85.24–31 30 453.22–25 29
87.1–8 54 453.25–34 29
320 index of passages
F14–15 41 F18.31–35 47
F16–17 41 F18.32–39 46
F18 41 F18.33–34 46
F18.1 41 F18.33–35 46
F18.1–18 41 F18.35 49
F18.2 41 F18.36 46
F18.7 41 F18.37–38 46
F18.17 43 F18.38 43
F18.18–30 43 F18.39 46, 49
F18.18–32 42–43 F18.39–42 49
F18.19 42 F18.40 49
F18.21 42 F18.41–42 49
F18.23–24 42 F18.42–52 50
F18.26 42 F18.46 50
F18.27 42 F18.50–53 41
F18.30–32 43, 44 F18.51 50
F18.31 43 T72 41
INDEX OF NAMES
Pre-Modern Names
Iamblichus, 88, 171, 297, 298 Pythagoreans, 63, 65, 66, 81, 88, 98, 171,
Isadore of Gaza, 3 258, 259, 291, 297–298
on cosmic ἁρµονία, 9, 83, 120
Justinian, 3 Pythocles, 241