Statcon
Statcon
PASCUAL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-11959, October 31, 1959
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
LAW IN QUESTION:
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him.
FACTS:
This is an appeal to revoke an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija denying
appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual had been elected mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in
November 1951 and reelected in 1955. In October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor of that province
filed with the Provincial Board three administrative charges against the said appellant. Charge III was for
"Mal administrative, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Judicial Functions," committed as follows:
Without legal authority, and with grave abuse of authority, assumed and usurped the judicial
powers of the said justice of the peace by accepting the criminal complaint filed the said court,
conducting the preliminary investigation thereof, fixing the bail bond and issuing the corresponding
warrant of arrest; and after the accused in the said criminal case had been arrested, while the justice of the
peace was in his office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the herein respondent, in defiance of the express refusal
by the justice of the peace to reduce the bail bond of the accused in, acted on the motion to reduce bail
and did reduce the bail bond.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was legally proper for petitioner-appellant to have come to court without first
bringing his case to the Executive Secretary for review.
HELD:
Yes. True it is that, in this jurisdiction, the settled rule is that where the law has delineated the
procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed
before recourse to judicial action can be initiated, but we believe that this rule is not without exceptions,
as in a case like the present, where the only question to be settled in the prohibition proceedings is a
purely legal one — whether or not a municipal mayor may be subjected to an administrative investigation
of a charge based on misconduct allegedly committed by him during his prior term.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby revoked; the writ of prohibition
prayed for is hereby granted and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued made permanent.