MOOT PROBLEM - 3

 Karim worked as a system operator at a computer Centre in Jajhhar Dist., Haryana

and lived in the town. His village was at a distance of 12 kms. from his workplace
which he ordinarily visited on Saturdays and Sundays.

 Sher Shah was a farmer who lived with his family consisting of his wife, Sobti, son
Gajendar Shah and a daughter Naina.

 Sher Shah’s brother, Suri Shah, also lived in the same household. He was used to
drinking and gambling and owed a debt of Rs. 20,000 to Karim.

 Whenever Karim demanded his money, Suri Shah showed his helplessness but
never denied to pay off his debt.

 Karim was in love with Naina and used to meet Naina on the weekends when her
father was not at home on the pretext that he had come to collect the money.

 Sher Shah did not like it and told Karim many a times not to visit his home in his
absence. He also scolded his daughter for meeting Karim but Karim did not stop
visiting Naina.

 During the day on Monday, 8th August 2010, Karim received a phone call from Suri
Shah inviting him to come that evening to collect his debt. Karim went to their house
around 8.30P.M.

 The members of Naina’s family had finished their dinner and were preparing to
go to sleep. On hearing some whispering voices coming from the backyard of their
house, Sher Shah with his brother Suri Shah and son Gajendar Shah went there to
investigate.

 They saw Karim talking with Naina. Sher Shah lost his temper and started
abusing Karim. Gajendar Shah brought a lathi from inside and gave a blow to
Karim on the leg. Then Suri Shah grabbed the lathi from Gajendar Shah and
started beating Karim mercilessly giving blows on his head and chest.

 On hearing the hue and cry, other villagers came to the scene.

 They found Suri Shah giving blows to Karim while the other two were shouting
abuses on Karim.
 Karim was bleeding from the head and became unconscious. He was taken to the
hospital by the villagers where he died three days later without regaining
consciousness.

 The post-mortem report confirmed that Karim suffered injuries on the head and
fractures of three ribs. There were many concussions on different parts of his body.

 There was much loss of blood.

 While none of the injuries independently was sufficient to cause death, the
cumulative result was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

 FIR was registered against Suri Shah, Gajendar Shah and Sher Shah under Section
307 read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Three days later when Karim died, it
was changed to Section 302 r/w 34 IPC.

 The session court charged and convicted all the three accused persons under Section
302 r/w 34 of the IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment for the murder of
Karim. The accused persons pleaded grave and sudden provocation in their defence.
They also pleaded that the prosecution had failed to prove existence of common
intention of all the three accused to kill Karim. In the absence of proof of common
intention, they cannot be convicted under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC.

 The three accused have filed separate appeals to the High Court against the order of
conviction and sentence. You may choose to represent any party/ parties in this
appeal keeping in mind that you do not violate the principle of conflict of
interests.

 Memorial is required to be filed only for one party. The date and time for
submission of memorial and oral arguments will be decided by the teacher.

Issues:

1. Whether
Legal Provisions:

34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is
done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for
that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.]

Section 300

Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death
of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—
First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for
killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public
servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of
private defence.
Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from
amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Guest Post: Grave or Sudden Provocation? The SC Decision in Nawaz
v. State
(I am delighted to host a guest post by Mr. Anant Sangal, currently a III
Year student of the B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Program at the National Law
University, Delhi)

The Supreme Court of India (SC) recently expanded its criminal

jurisprudence by handing down a decision in the case of Nawaz v. The
State Represented by the Inspector of Police [Crl. Appeal No. 1941/2010,
decided on 22.01.2019]. A Division Bench headed by Shantanagoudar J.
(writing for himself and Maheshwari J.) modified the conviction from murder
to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The appellants had been
charged for murdering the husband of one of the appellants (Ragila). The
prosecution case was that the deceased suspected that his wife and his
daughter had illicit relations with the other appellant (Nawaz). One morning,
deceased called both the mother and daughter “prostitutes”.

A quarrel broke out between Ragila and the deceased and as a result,
Ragila slapped the deceased. He fell on the floor and both the appellants,
thereafter, throttled him with the help of a towel and burnt the body in order
to conceal the offence and transported it elsewhere. The appellants were
convicted by the trial Court for murder u/s 302 r/w 34 of the IPC, and the
verdict was upheld by the High Court. However, the SC held that the
appellants were “provoked” by the accused on his usage of the word
“prostitute” for his wife and daughter and hence, were eligible to be covered
by Exception 1 of Section 300 IPC. This made them punishable u/s 304
Part I instead of (earlier) Section 302 IPC.

Out of many factors which leave the judgment prone to attack, the ruling
does not fall in line with the jurisprudence of the Court which has evolved
through a variety of similar judgments. Apart from missing the ‘fit’, the Court
also gravely erred in deciding and upholding what was not argued before it
as well as in misconstruing the facts.

Facts and the Fit: Instilling Realist Traditions

In this judgment, there appear to be two emerging legal flaws, amid a
wrong reading of facts by the SC. They are – (1) provocation not being
grave and sudden; (2) elapsing of time between provocation and crime.

To begin with, I would establish the first flaw in the judgment i.e. the need
for grave and sudden provocation. Neither merely grave, nor only sudden
provocation, attracts the defence of Exception 1. Both these effects must
occur together. Contrary to this, Shantanagoudar J. holds that the
appellants were “provoked” which lead them to committing the crime. He
does not establish the requirements of the provocation being grave as well
as sudden. The application of Exception 1 to Section 300 is, therefore,
wrong and is not justified.

In Nawaz, what appears is that provocation was only sudden but not grave.
This is because in a fit of sudden provocation, the appellant slapped the
deceased owing to which, he fell down. Thereafter, a towel was procured
(as there is no discussion about a towel when they were engaged in a
verbal quarrel) and the same was ‘thereafter’ used to throttle the deceased.
It was held in Kanhaiyalal v. Emperor, that the effect of such grave and
sudden provocation must be the loss of self-control. Had it been for loss of
self-control for the appellant, the appellant would not have looked for a
towel but would have simply proceeded to throttle the deceased using her
bare hands, or whatever would have been the immediate possible
response.

What would qualify as grave and sudden provocation has been defined by
the SC in BD Khunte v. Union of India & Ors. There, it held that the
response to such provocation must be immediate and the cooling-off period
must be absent. If the response to the provocation has been preceded by a
cooling-off period i.e. where the accused received sufficient time to cool
down his anger, the defence of Exception 1 would not be attracted. In this
case (Khunte), a jawan killed his superior in the evening because the
superior had given him beatings earlier that day. The Court ruled that
Exception 1 would not be attracted due to sufficient time as the “cooling-off”
period between the provocation and the killing of the superior. Since the act
of killing took place after almost 7 hours of the incident, the intention
element was present while committing the murder.

As per Exception 1 to Section 300, the offence would not be a murder

when the offender is deprived of the power of self-control by grave and
sudden provocation. Therefore, going back to Khunte, counsel for the
defendant argued that the provocation continued to remain grave for 7 long
hours. The Court rejected this contention, and held that it is impossible for
graveness to continue for seven hours, and hence, this defence was
rejected by the Court. The failure on behalf of the Court in Nawaz to
discuss Khunte is an apparent shortcoming.

Similarly, in Prabhakar Vithal Gholve v. State of Maharashtra the SC

decided that the case fell within the ambit of Exception 1 as opposed to
being an offence under Section 302. The dispute there was very minor, and
in a fit of rage, the accused-appellant attacked the deceased on her head
using a stick, owing to which, she later succumbed to injuries. The injuries
proved fatal subsequently. The Court held that the manner of committing
the crime as well as lack of a motive clearly prove that the offence is one
not under Section 302. Though in this case, there was a break between the
provocation and crime, but the Court’s main holding is on the point that the
mode of attack was not designed to reflect murder. This is the reason why
the defence of Exception 1 was extended to the appellant.

Subsequently, in Chaitu & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where a quarrel

arose between two parties over water sharing, one of the parties injured the
other in the heat of passion, who succumbed to injuries the next day. The
Court extended Exception 1 to cover the case of the appellants and held
them liable only for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. However,
in Nawaz, the manner of committing the crime, i.e. ensuring that the person
dies after being slapped, reflected that the appellant-accused developed
the intention to kill and thus, at that point, the element of suddenness was
lost. This act of the accused clearly shows that they shared common intent
to kill the deceased and they succeeded in doing so. As a result, the Court
erred while adjudicating on the graveness and suddenness element of the
crime.

Secondly, in Nawaz some time had lapsed between the provocation and
the crime committed. This time period is known as the "cooling-off" period.
It is, however, impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule as to when a
person should be said to have had time to cool down and thus to be
deprived of the benefit of Exception 1. It largely depends on the individual
characteristics of the accused as well as on the facts of the particular case.
In this context, while discussing the shortcomings of the judgment
in Nawaz, the most relevant case is that of Yasin Sheik v. Emperor. There,
the appellant got to know his wife's extra-marital affair, hit her, took her to
the river bank, and cut her head off. The act was rightly held to be no
longer merely homicide by reason of the time which had elapsed.

If we look at Nawaz, in paragraph 4, the Court says, “Since the deceased

did not stop, Accused No. 2 slapped the face of the deceased.
Immediately, thereafter, both the accused throttled the deceased with the
help of a towel and burnt the dead body to try to conceal the offence.
Subsequently, they transported the dead body in a Maruti Car owned by
PW 15 and abandoned the body elsewhere.” As per this observation, it
seems that after slapping the deceased and before throttling him using a
towel, there was a short time-span, where the appellants could have
deliberated upon the decision as to what should be done next. However,
they proceeded ahead with throttling and murdering him.

It could also be a case that the deceased did not die immediately upon
being throttled. To make sure that the deceased was dead after he was
slapped, they not only throttled him, but the body was taken to some place
and was thereafter burnt. This clearly establishes that they intended to kill
the deceased after he was initially slapped. The cooling-off period
appeared twice, so to say. For the first time, it was between slapping and
throttling using the towel, and the second time, between throttling and
burning his body. Therefore, the Court neglected the existence of this
cooling-off period as well and decided the case in its absence itself.

Conclusion: The Road Ahead

One problem with the decision in Nawaz is that it could be misused. This is
because the Court does not visit any of the precedents which deal with
identical issue of law and the judgment harps only on the construction of
facts. As an appellate Court of the highest order, the Court has to limit itself
to answering the questions of law. This does not mean that interpretation of
facts is absolutely forbidden but apart from interpreting the facts, the Court
should have limited its role to – (1) interpreting and discussing the law laid
down in previous judgments of the SC itself, and (2) interpreting the
provision of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. However, both elements are
absent from the judgment.

Apart from being legally flawed, Nawaz lays down a dangerous precedent
for future courts to adhere to. This is because the case dilutes the
exception of grave and sudden provocation by loosely reading the facts of
the case, in a manner contrary to existing law. In future, if a similar question
arises before any trial court or even a High Court for that matter, it is bound
to create confusion as the most recent decision in a long-line of cases
stands in opposition to almost all previous milestones.
Common Intention and Common Object
On February 4, 2015 By sinjini

By Raghavendra Pratap Singh, National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi

Editor’s Note: Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code deals with Common Intention. As per this
provision, when a number of persons engaged in a criminal act with a common intention, each
person is made liable as if he alone did the act.

Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code deals with Common Object. According to this provision,
every member of an unlawful assembly is held liable for any criminal act done in furtherance of
a common object.

This paper discusses these two provisions in detail and draws a correlation between them, with
the help of several cases.”

INTRODUCTION

Criminal Intention is the highest form of blameworthiness of mind or mens rea. Intention
occupies a symbolic place in criminal law. As the highest form of the mental element, it applies
to murder and the gravest form of crimes in the criminal justice system. The term ‘intention’ is
not defined in Indian Penal Code but section 34 of IPC deals with common intention. The
intention made among several people to do something wrong and act done in that manner in
which it was formulated comes under the sanction of Section 34 of IPC.

Section 34 deals with a situation, where an offence requires a particular criminal intention or
knowledge and is committed by several persons. Each of them who join the act with such
knowledge or intention is liable in the same way as if it were done by him alone with that
intention or knowledge. The liability of individuals under this circumstance is called Joint
Liability. The principle of Joint Liability defined in section 34 is as follows:

Section 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention – When a
criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

In this article the act is referred, which is defined under article 33 as:

Section 33. ‘Act’, ‘Omission’. – the word ‘act’ denotes as well a series of acts as a single act:
the word ‘omission’ denotes as well a series of omissions as a single omission.

It is clear from s.34 and s.33 that the term criminal act refers to more than a single act and would
cover an entire series of acts.

Section 34 to section 38 in chapter II of IPC dealing with ‘General Explanation’ state the
conditions in which a person may be held constructively liable for the acts committed by the
other members of group.
The chapter VIII of Indian Penal Code refers to ‘Offences against the Public Tranquillity’ from
section 141 to section 160. Offences against public tranquillity also known as ‘Group Offences’
and lead to disturbance of public peace. S.141 defines ‘Unlawful Assembly’ for which there
should be five or more persons, and the object should be common to all. If five or more persons
are doing wrong act with common objective then liability on each person will be same as it is
done by him alone. This liability on each person is called ‘Group Liability’. Section 149 of IPC
imposes group liability on each and every members of assembly and defined as follows:

Section 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in

prosecution of common object —If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful
assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at
the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that
offence.

To impose this section under group liability there should be an unlawful assembly, which is
defined under s.141. And the offence should be committed in prosecution of common object.

COMMON INTENTION

Common intention implies a pre arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan.
Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act, which need not be a
long gap. To bring this section into effect a pre-concert is not necessarily be proved, but it may
well develop on the spot as between a number of persons and could be inferred from facts and
circumstances of each case.

In Amrik Singh’s Case[i] it has been further held that though the common intention may develop
in course of the fight but there must be clear and unimpeachable evidence to justify that
inference. In the case Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad[ii], Supreme court emphasized on this
point that prior concert need not be something always very much prior to the incident, but could
well be something that may develop on the spot, on the spur of the moment. In this case
Ramchander Shelke (deceased) with his wife’s sister went to the field. While Ramchander went
to the river side the five persons including three appellant (Pandurang, Tukia, and Bhilia )
attacked him.

According to eyewitnesses, Pandurang, Tukia, and Bhilia were holding axes and other two
accused Tukaram and Nilia had stuck in their hands. The deceased died on the spot. In this case,
different eyewitnesses told a different story. The trial court convicted each of accused of charge
S.302 with S. 34 and sentenced to death. Appeal lied in High court and conviction of Pandurang,
Tukia, Bhilia was maintained but other two accused person sentence was commuted to
transportation for life. When the matter came up to the Supreme Court, the learned judge said
that each is liable for their own act. The Apex Court set aside the death sentence of Pandurang
and convicted him instead under S.326, and sentenced for 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The
Supreme Court altered the sentence of Tukia and Bhilia to transportation for life. The Supreme
Court elaborated in this case that:
“In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none
would be vicariously convicted for the acts of any of the others; if the prosecution cannot prove
that his separate blow was a fatal one, he cannot be convicted of the murder, however clearly an
intention to kill could be proved in this case….”

The essence of liability to be found in the existence of common intention is that the criminal act
complained against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of common intention
of all, if this is shown, then the liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the persons
in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone.[iii]

In the case of Mahboob Shah v. Emperor[iv], the appellant Mahboob Shah was of age 19 and
was convicted by Session Judge of the charge s.302 with s.34 for the murder of Allah Dad. The
Session court sentenced him for death. The High Court of Judicature also confirmed the death
sentence. On appeal before Lordship, the conviction for murder and sentence of death was
quashed. It was contended before appellant that – “when Allah Dad and Hamidullah tried to run
away, Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah Came in front of them… and fired shots” and so there was
evidence of forming common intention at the spur of the moment. Their Lordship was not
satisfied upon this view and humbly advised His Majesty that the appellant has succeeded in his
appeal, his appeal should be allowed and his conviction for murder and the sentence of death set
aside.

Common Intention and Similar Intention

Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common
intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them
and shared by them. This section 34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive
offense. This section only applies with other penal sections which deal with the punishment of
the offense.

In the case of Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar[v], the complainant had sent about 20
labors to his field for transplanting paddy. On midday, the accused party came as a mob of about
200 people armed with various deadly weapons. They asked laborers to stop the work, and when
the complainant objected to this, the two accused directed the mob to kill laborers. The mob
started assaulted the laborers as a result of these two labors died. When the police party reached,
the mob fled from the spot. The death was established to have caused by injuries inflicted by
shock and hemorrhage caused by injuries inflicted with sharp pointed weapons.

The Supreme Court, in this case, held that: “Common intention which developed at the spur of
the moment is different from the similar intention actuated a number of person at the same
time….the distinction between a common intention and similar intention may be fine, but is
nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice….”

The mere presence of accused together is not sufficient to hold that they shared the common
intention to commit the offence in question. It is necessary that the intention of each one of
‘several persons’ be known to each other for constituting common intention.
Inferences

From the various interpretations of Apex Court and guideline given in different cases, some
inferences could be drawn to impose Joint Liability under section 34. These are –

1. To establish common intention premeditation of minds is necessary. There should be prior

meeting of minds which activated common intention and criminal act should have been done in
furtherance of common intention.
2. There may be situation in which premeditation was not present, but intention developed at the
spur of the time, but it should must been shared among one another.
3. To prove common intention is a very hard, because it is the mental thinking of the accused at that
point of time. So it has to be culled out from the facts and circumstances of each case.
4. There is a difference between common intention and similar intention, and s.34 can be invoked
only when the accused shares common intention and not one the similar intention.
5. Unless the common intention is proved, individual will be liable for his own act and not
otherwise. They will be deal as under s.38 of IPC. And if there is any doubt, the benefit of doubt
should be given to the accused.

Cases

One of the earliest cases came before the court under s.34 under the principle of Joint Liability
was Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor[vi]. This case is also known as the ‘Post Master
Case’. In this case, the accused Barendra with other three persons went to Shankaritola post
office at about 3.30 pm on the 3rd August 1923 armed with firearms. The accused stood outside
the post office while the other three entered the post office through the backdoor of office. They
asked post master Amrita Lal Roy to give the money which he was counting. When he refused,
then others three opened fire from the pistol and fled from the place.

As a result of which he died almost immediately. Seeing others running the accused also ran
away by air firing with his pistol. But he was chased and caught by the post office assistant. He
was charged with others under s.302 (murder to post master) and s.394 (causing hurt in doing
robbery) with S.34 in common intention of all. He contended that he was only standing guard
outside the post office and he did not have the intention to kill the post master. Calcutta High
Court confirmed his conviction of murder under S.302 with S.34. In the appeal before the Privy
Council, Lord Sumner dismissed the appeal against the conviction and held that – “criminal acts
means that unity of criminal behaviour which results in something for which an individual would
be responsible, if it were all done by himself alone, that is, in criminal offence.”

The other important case came before the Supreme Court was Rangaswami v. State of Tamil
Nadu[vii]. The occurrence took place at about 11.45 pm on 16.08.1973 in Big Bazar Street, in
which one Jayaram was murdered. In this case, session court convicted A-1 under s. 302 and
sentenced him to death. A-2 and A-3 were charged under S. 307 with S.34, and sentenced
rigorous imprisonment of 8 years by session judge. While the High Court considering the fact
altered the decision of session court and enhanced the sentence of A-2 and A-3 to imprisonment
for life under s. 302 with s.34. And the death sentence of A-1 was modified for imprisonment for
life.
Against this conviction, A-3 appealed in Supreme Court and contended that he was only in
friendly relation with A-1 and A-2 but he did not share common intention with them. It was by
mere chance that he appeared at the spot of occurrence and he did not participate in offense. In
this case, there was a prior enmity between deceased and A-1 and A-2, because the deceased was
accused of murdering the brother of A-1, and he was actually on the bail. Supreme Court held
that even though the presence of A-3 was established but he did not share common intention and
he was unfamiliar with the plan. Therefore he was acquitted all of the charges.

The other case before Supreme Court was Muthu Naicker and others v. State of Tamil
Nadu[viii]. The dispute arose among the village community of Karpakkam village when accused
no. A-11 Kuppu Naicker who has a well in land bearing Survey No. 102, wanted to lay a pipe-
line to take water to the field bearing No. 186/2 belonging to his wife, Dhanammal. There was
another well sunk by the local Panchayat in Survey No. 170 for the use of the village community
and when A-11 wanted to take water from his well in Survey No. 102, an apprehension was
entertained by the residents of the village that there would not be enough water in the well in
Survey No. 170 and there would be water shortage.

Gripped by this apprehension, a majority of the village community resisted the attempt of A-11
to take water by laying pipelines. Some villagers approached the collector on March 6, 1967, the
collector suspended the permission granted to A-11 to lay the pipelines. A-11 and his
companions ignored the order of collector and continued the digging of the channel. The matter
arose on 27 November 1968 at around 2.30 pm when deceased Gajarajan brother of P.W. 31 was
returning from Madras by bus, a crowd of 50-60 persons including A-1 to A-23 and A-28
attempted to waylay the deceased. Deceased tried to escape but was chased by them and
encircled by the crowd near a well and was attacked. After completing the investigation police
submitted challan against 28 accused for various offences.

The learned session judge giving the benefit of reasonable doubt rejected the prosecution case
and acquitted all the accused. The state of Tamil Nadu preferred an appeal in High Court of
Madras against A-1 to A-27. While the acquittal of A-28 was considered as final. The High
Court convicted A-1 to A-7 and A-19 for charge under S.302 with S.34 and sentenced them for
life imprisonment. They preferred a criminal appeal in the Supreme Court. The conviction of
accused A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5 under S.302 with S.34 was confirmed and sentenced to life
imprisonment.

While the conviction of A-3, A-6, A-7, A-19 under this charge of S.302 was set aside and were
charged with others under Hurt and Grievous Hurt differently. Supreme Court held that in a local
community when something unusual occurs, a good number of people appear on the scene not
with a view to participating in occurrence but as curious spectators. In such event, mere presence
in the unlawful assembly should not be treated that person concerned was a member of unlawful
assembly.

COMMON OBJECT

The offence dealing with Group Liability or Vicarious Liability of members comes under
Chapter VIII of the Indian Penal Code. This chapter deals with offences against Public
Tranquillity from s.141 to s.160. The first section of this chapter s.141 defines Unlawful
Assembly, for which there should be five or more persons and some common objects for which
they have made that assembly. Section 141 is:

Section 141. Unlawful assembly —

An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly“, if the common

object of the persons composing that assembly is—

First – To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State
Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise
of the lawful power of such public servant; or

Second – To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or

Third – To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or

Fourth – By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain
possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the
use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce
any right or supposed right; or

Fifth – By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what
he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.

Explanation – An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently
become an unlawful assembly.

From this section we can say that, to constitute an unlawful assembly the following ingredients is
necessary –

1. There should be an assembly of five or more persons.

2. There must be a common object for them.
3. Common object must be one of the five ingredients, specified in the above section.

When the number of the persons reduces from five for trial for the reason that some were
acquitted for the charges then the s. 141 will become inapplicable. But if there is clear indication
that some other unidentified persons are involved in the crime then this section can be applied.
In Ram Bilas Singh v. State of Bihar[ix], Supreme Court held that:

“it is competent to a court to come to the conclusion that there was an unlawful assembly of five
or more persons, even if less than that number have been convicted by it if: (i) the charge states
that apart from the persons named, several other unidentified persons were also members of the
unlawful assembly whose common object was to commit an unlawful act …..(ii) or that the first
information report and evidence shows such to be the case even though the charge does not state
so. (iii) or that though the charge and prosecution witnesses named only the acquitted and the
convicted accused persons there is other evidence which discloses the existence of named or
other persons”
The other ingredient of this section is a common object. Object means the purpose, and it will be
common when it is shared by the members of the unlawful assembly. A common object may be
formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly. The explanation of this section
shows it clearly. However common object is entertained in the human mind so there can be no
evidence to prove directly about this.

It is a question of the fact and can be culled out on the basis of facts and circumstances of each
case. It can be determined from the nature of the assembly, the kinds of arms and their uses by it,
behavior and the language of the members of the assembly used before and after the incident. If
only four out of the five assembled person have a common object and not fifth, then that
assembly is not an unlawful assembly. Simple onlooker or family of the parties cannot become a
member of the unlawful assembly unless they actively participated or encouraged the violence.

In Moti Das v. Bihar[x], the Supreme Court held that pre-concert is not necessary. An assembly
may be lawful in beginning but may turn into unlawful later.

Being a member of Unlawful assembly is itself a crime and s.143 prescribes the punishment of
six months, or fine, or both for being a member of that assembly.

The section which imposes the liability on each person of the offense committed by the members
of the assembly is section 149 of IPC. Section 149 of IPC is:

Section 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in

prosecution of common object — If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful
assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who,at
the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that
offence.

In Bhudeo Mandal v. State of Bihar[xi], the Apex Court held that before convicting any person
with the aid of s.149, the evidence must clearly establish not only the common object, but also
show that the common object was unlawful. In Ram Dhani v. State[xii], there was a dispute over
land and the complainant party resorted to cutting crop grown by the accused party. The latter
were more than five in number and assembled to prevent the cutting. The court held that – the
persons acting in self-defence of the property cannot be members of an unlawful assembly. And
so they could not be said to form an unlawful assembly.

The word ‘knew’ is used in the second part of the S. 149, which implies more than a possibility
but less than might have known. An offence committed in prosecution of common object would
generally be offence which the members of the assembly knew was likely to be committed[xiii].
This phrase means that the offence committed was immediately connected with the common
object of the unlawful assembly, of which the accused were members. The word ‘in prosecution
of common object’ means that the offence committed was immediately connected with the
common object of the assembly or in order to attain a common object.
Cases

In Rambilas Singh and others v. State of Bihar[xiv], the case of the prosecution was that
deceased Kumar Gopal Singh found A-2, A-16 and a female relation of them plucking Khesari
crops from his field. And so he abused them and snatched away the plucked plants and their
baskets. In retaliation for it the 16 accused persons had lay in wait for him on that night and
attacked him at about 9.30 P.M. when he was returning home with his brother PW-22 and two
other witnesses PWs 1 and 18 after attending a barat.

PW-22 stated that 16 persons surrounded Kumar Gopal Singh and then Dinesh Singh inflicted a
stab injury on the neck of Kumar Gopal Singh as a result of which he died. The Session Judge
acquitted all the persons A-1 to A-15 who were charged under s.302 with s.149, but convicted A-
16 (Dinesh Singh) who was charged directly under s.302. In High Court, A-1 and A-9 were
acquitted while A-2 and A-6 died during the pendency of the appeal. The High Court convicted
the rest of the accused A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8, A-10 to A-15.

On appeal, further Supreme Court set aside the conviction of accused by High Court under s.302
with s.149 and held that in order to convict persons vicariously under Section 34 or Section 149
IPC, it is not necessary to prove that each and every one of them had indulged in overt acts. Even
so, there must be material to show that the overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or
were done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused or in the prosecution of the
common object of the members of the unlawful assembly. In this case, such evidence is lacking
and hence the appellants cannot be held liable for the individual act of Dinesh Singh.

In another case of Ram Bilas Singh v. State of Bihar[xv], the court held that an accused person
cannot be held liable vicariously for the act of an acquitted person.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMMON INTENTION AND COMMON OBJECT

Both Section 34 and s.149 imposes vicarious liability on each person for acts not necessarily
done by them. However, there is a difference in the scope and nature of operation of the two
offences. The charge of s.149 is substituted by s.34 of IPC, especially when some accused are
acquitted and number of the accused falls below five. In this case the court would have to
carefully examine the evidence to see whether some element of common intention exists for
which he can be made liable under s.34. The main differences between the two sections are as
follows:

 Section 34 does not create any specific offence but only lays down the principle of joint criminal
liability. Whereas s.149 creates specific offence and being a member of an unlawful assembly is
itself a crime, which is punishable under s.143.

 ‘Common intention’ used in S.34 is not defined anywhere in IPC, while ‘common object’ in s.149
must be one of the five ingredients defined in S. 141 of IPC.
 Common intention requires a prior meeting of mind and unity of intention and overt act has been
done in furtherance of the common intention of all. A common object may be formed without a
prior meeting of mind when the common object of the members of the unlawful assembly is one
 but the intention of participants is different. It only requires that criminal act has been done in
furtherance of the common object.

 For invoking S.34 it is sufficient that two or more persons were involved. However, there have to
be a minimum of five persons to impose S.149.
 The crucial factor of S.34 is ‘participation’ while there is no need of active participation in S.149
of IPC.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The Fifth Law Commission of India[xvi] in its report proposed suggestions for reform of s.34 to
clear ambiguity. It proposed that for better understanding the phrase ‘several persons’ be
substituted by ‘two or more persons’.

Fifth Law Commission[xvii]also proposed to substitute the Third object of s.141 ‘to commit any
mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence’ with ‘to commit any offence punishable with
imprisonment’ to clear ambiguity.

CONCLUSION

Fixing vicarious liability under s.34 or s.149 depends on their method adopted to furnish the
crime. There are two sections dealing with ‘common intention’ and ‘common object’ under two
chapters of IPC ‘General Explanation’ and ‘Of Offences Against Public Tranquillity’
respectively. Sometimes there arises difficulty in proving with evidence that whether they shared
common intention or not. And also how many people were the members of Unlawful Assembly
with their common object same. However, these ambiguities were removed by the Supreme
Court in different cases, after determining its facts and situation of each case.

To clear and better understanding, Law Commission of India also gave many suggestions to
Legislature for amendment of some part of the statute.

Even after so much effort, there arise problems of which law will be applicable amongst the two
in some crucial cases, and investigators and charge sheet filers make mistakes in this regard.

Formatted on March 21st, 2019.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 P S A Pillai’s – CRIMINAL LAW – 11th Edition

 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal – THE INDIAN PENAL CODE – 33rd Edition
 Criminal Law: Cases and Materials – Sixth Edition – K D Gaur
 indiankanoon.org – (CASES)

Edited by Sinjini Majumdar

[i] Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab 1972

[ii] AIR 1954 SC 706

[iii] Mahboob Shah v. Emperor (1945) 47 Com LR 941

[iv] ibid

[v] AIR 1998 SC 40

[vi] AIR 1925 PC 1

[vii] AIR 1989 SC 1137 ; 1989 Supp (1) SCC 686

[viii] AIR 1978 SC 1647

[ix] 1964 Cr LJ 673 (SC)

[x] (1954) Cr LJ 1708 (SC)

[xi] AIR 1981 SC 1219

[xii] 1997 Cr LJ 2286

[xiii] Chanda v. State of U.P. AIR 2004 SC 2836 ; the expression ‘in prosecution of common
object’ and the word ‘knew’ used in s. 149 were explained.

[xiv] AIR 1989 SC 1593

[xv] (1964) Cr LJ 673 (SC)

[xvi] Law Commission of India (Forty Second report: Indian Penal Code) 1971

[xvii] ibid