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BELGICA V EXEC SEC
BELGICA V EXEC SEC
FACTS:
In July 2013, NBI began its probe of the allegations that the government has been defrauded of
some 10 billion pesos over the past 10 years by some syndicate using pork barrel funds for ghost
projects. The investigation gathered six sworn affidavits declaring the Janet Lim Napoles swindled
billions of public funds for ghost projects using not less than 20 dummy NGOs.
COA audit report covering 2007-2009 also showed that 8.3 billion in PDAF and 32.66 billion for
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) were released, both exceeded their
respective allocations. In the Presidential Pork Barrel, at least 900 million from royalties in the
implementation of Malampaya gas project was given to NGOs, instead of the agrarian reform
beneficiaries.
Inspired by these findings, petitioners Social Justice System, on 28 August 2013, Belgica et.al.,
on 03 September 2013, and Nepomuceno, on 05 September 2013, in their capacity as taxpayers,
sought the declaration of pork barrel system embodied in GAA 2013 which provided the 2013
PDAF Article unconstitutional. They also prayed for the issuance of TRO against Executive
Secretary, DBM Secretary and the National Treasurer enjoining them from releasing the
remaining funds under PDAF.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Congressional Pork Barrel, 2013 PDAF Article and other similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they are violative of the following principles contained in the
Constitution: separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability, political dynasty and local autonomy.
RULING:
A. Separation of Powers
The Court held that the post-enactment measures which govern project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight. From the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers the Congress to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional. To say that the authority is merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutionality.
B. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
The 2013 PDAF article confers members of the Congress the authority to practice post-enactment
identification of projects and beneficiaries. This clearly violates that non-delegability of legislative
power for by doing so each legislator may now individually exercise the power of appropriation –
which is lodged in the Congress as a collegial body.
Upon receipt of the lump-sum allocations, which occurs after the GAA is passed, the legislator
may then appropriate PDAF funds based on his discretion. Since intermediate appropriations are
made by the legislator after the GAA is passed, therefore outside the law, it means that the actual
items of PDAF appropriations are not written in the General Appropriations Bill and are then
effectuated without the veto consideration of the President.
D. Accountability
The post-enactment authority of the members of Congress dilutes their congressional oversight
function since they are no longer mere fiscalizers but “financially interested party.” It makes it
difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating and
monitoring the implementation of GAA.
E. Political Dynasty
Section 26 of Article II of the Constitution on provides for the prohibition of political dynasty, but
is not self-executory. Since there is no law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasty, the
Court deferred from ruling this issue.
F. Local Autonomy
The Court agrees with the petitioners that through PDAF, members of the Congress can simply
bypass the local development councils, which are mandated by law to assist in setting the
direction of economic and social development of the local government, by initiating his own
projects and taking sole credit for its execution, thereby effectively undermining the policy on local
autonomy.