78 Phil LJ1
78 Phil LJ1
Citations:
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information
Antonio R. Baudsta*
Despite the fact that the doctrine of "prejudicial question" has been
codified in our jurisdiction, the judicial gloss and the case law applying this doctrine
Work done on this paper was supported by the Quintin Paredes Professorial Chair in Remedial
Law.
LIB. U.P., L.M., J.D., Michigan University; Professorial Lecturer, College of Law, University of
the Philippines, College of Law and Atenco de Manila University, Senior Partner, Antonio IL Bautista &
Partners Law Office.
PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78
have not clearly defined the concept of prejudiciality so that a clear and objective
standard of determining when a question is prejudicial or not can be said to have
been established. There has been a plethora of epithets such as "determinative,"
"pre-emptive," "decisive," "intimately related," "similar," used to describe the issue
which has to be resolved first by the civil court before the criminal action may
proceed. But these epithets do not spell out the basic criteria for distinguishing
when a case is prejudicial and when it is not. There is a need to clarify the case law
by way of extracting a workable and instructive delineation.'
The benefits to the accused of a suspension of the criminal action are self-
evident. The prosecution is stopped dead on its tracks and its attack is thereby
slowed down as to then possibly lose momentum. Meanwhile, the accused can
litigate a critical and decisive issue in the civil case where he may have the advantage
of an offensive posture aided by possibly more advantageous evidentiary rules.
1 Te case law on "prejudicial question" has been incessantly collated. See the following
annotations: 19 SCRA 507 (1967), 44 SCRA 208 (1972), 100 SCRA 131 (1980) and 133 SCRA 608 (1984).
2MerdL Die 109 Phil. 155 (1960).
4Ibi g
Gwpe 40 Phil. 837 at 841 (1920).
asB:/
2003] PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
The elements of a "prejudicial question" and its effects and when it may be
raised are all now statutorily defined. Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are the governing codal provisions:
This result was well illustrated in Carlos vs. Court ofAppeals.7 In Carlos, the
lessee filed an action in the RTC for the enforcement of his right of first refusal
against his lessor. During the pendency of this case, the lessor sued the lessee for
ejectment in the M'TC on the ground of nonpayment of rentals and violation of the
lease agreement. The lessee's motion to dismiss the ejectment case on the ground
that his complaint in the RTC was a prejudicial question was dismissed out of hand
precisely on the ground that there can be no prejudicial question where the two
actions are both civil. Interestingly, however, this case may imply that a civil case
could nonetheless pose a prejudicial question to another civil action.
5
Manalo a Cout ofAppeale, G.R.No. 141297, Oct. 8; 2001, 366 SCRA 752 (1 Div., 2001) at 765.
6Id
7G.R. 109887, February 10, 1997; 268 SCRA 25 (21d Div., 1997).
PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78
This observation may also be deduced from Bito Sy vs. Malate Taxicab &
Garage, Inc.. In that case, plaintiff hired a taxicab to take him to his place of
business. The taxi collided with an army wagon driven by Sgt. Dequito. So,
plaintiff filed an action for damages based on a contract of carriage against the taxi
company which in turn filed a third-party complaint against Dequito. Dequito
could not be served with summons on the third-party complaint and so the case
proceeded to trial against the taxi company only and, the company having been
declared in default, judgment was rendered against it for some of the damages
claimed by the plaintiff. On appeal, defendant taxi company claimed that the third-
party complaint involves a prejudicial question and that therefore the main
complaint cannot be decided until the third-party complaint is decided. The court
rejected this contention by reasoning.
In the same manner, neither is the doctrine applicable where the other case
is administrative. Thus, in Florde/is vs. Castillo,1° the pendency of an administrative
complaint was held not to pose a prejudicial question to a pending perjury charge.
The accused there was charged of perjury precisely for having filed an
administrative complaint which was allegedly false against a school principal for tax
evasion. Rejecting the claim of prejudicial question, the Supreme Court said:
"In the case at bar, no civil action pends, nor has any been
instituted. The complaint is merely an administrative one. Moreover, neither
success nor failure of the private respondents to prove their tax evasion
charge against the petitioner in the administrative case can attain the
charge against the petitioner in the administrative case can attain the
character of a final determination binding and conclusive upon the court in
the criminal action so as to foreclose the issue of guilt or innocence of the
private respondents upon the perjury indictment." I
The applicability of the doctrine is however not settled where one case is
administrative and the other is civil. In an early case, Forticb-Celdranvs. Ce/dran'2
where the genuineness of the signature on an extra-judicial partition was an issue in
the civil case, this issue was held to be a prejudicial question to an administrative
case inthe Supreme Court. In contrast, in Quiambao vs. Osorio13 what was ordered
suspended was the civil case during the pendency of the administrative case. In
ruling that the civil case should be suspended, the Supreme Court said:
"The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and
administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no
prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate
correlation between said two [2]proceedings, stemming from the fact that
the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion
depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For
while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot
in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of
possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the
cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their
favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their
right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue
involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the
disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell
and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents
would have every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise,
private respondent's right of possession is lost and so would their right to
4
eject petitioner from said portion."'
itId
12G.R No. 22677, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 502 (1967).
13G.R. No. 48157, March 16, 1988; 158 SCRA 674 (31d Div., 1988).
14 Id at 678.
IsG.I. No. 126746, November 29,2000; 346 SCRA 327 (2000)
PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78
that therefore there is no bigamy, was denied. The Court there refused to recognize
any prejudicial question posed by the civil action for annulment of marriage to the
administrative case for revocation of a professional license.
There is a further twist to these rulings on what question in what case may
pose a prejudicial question to another pending case. In Ocampo vs. Buenaventura,16 an
administrative case was held to pose a prejudicial question to a civil case. In that
case a complaint was filed against certain policemen with the Police Commission
('TOLCOM") for serious misconduct and abuse of authority. While this
administrative complaint was pending, the policemen filed a complaint for damages
against the complainant in the administrative case. The Ocampo Court held that
although there is no prejudicial question, the civil case should be held in abeyance
pending the determination of the administrative complaint before the POLCOM.
The final twist is presented by Isp vs. Gonzaes,18 which ruled that an
election case can not pose a prejudicial question to a criminal case. In that case, the
accused was charged -with violation of the Revised Election Code for having used
carbon paper for the purpose of identifying their votes. There was a motion to
suspend the criminal case on the ground of a pending election protest where one of
the grounds of such protest was the use of carbon -paper for the purpose of
identifying votes. The court held that there was no prejudicial question:
The Rules require that the issue presented in the previously instituted civil
action be determinative of "whether or not the criminal action may proceed." Most
of the cases re-phrase this requirement by stating that the issue in the civil case must
be preemptively decisive on the issue of guilt or innocence. The existence of the
condition of pre-emptive decisiveness is not always easy to discern or determine.
To begin with, the mere fact that the civil and criminal cases involve the same issues
does not make the civil case prejudicial to the criminal case. Beniteq vs. Concepcion2°
confirms this where the signature of a mortgagor on a real estate mortgage was
disputed in a civil case. While this civil case was pending, the mortgagor filed a
criminal charge against the accused for falsifying his signature on the deed of
mortgage. The fact that the issue of falsification was ventilated as well in the civil
19Id at 261-264. See Ji'eneZ vs. Ateria, L-22759, March 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1380
20G.R No. 14646, May 30, 1961; 2 SCRA 178 (1961).
8 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78
case did not make the resolution of that issue pre-emptive of the resolution of the
same issue of falsification in the criminal case.
"In Civil Case No. 33251, for annulment of the deed of mortgage,
the issue is that the signatuies of Ong Ho appearing therein are forged. In
the criminal case, O.S. No. 15190, the issue is likewise the falsification of the
deeds in question. It appearing that the principal issues in both cases are the
same, and/or arise from the same facts, it stands to reason that it is not
necessary that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case be determined first before taking up the criminal case. This being the
21
case, the proposition is simply reduced to a matter of preferences."
From the foregoing reasoning, the court in the civil case and the court in
the criminal case are seen to be equally competent to determine in the respective
case before them the issue of whether the mortgagor's signature was false. The
implicit suggestion is that there is no need or reason for the court in one case to
defer to the court in the other. Yet, this kind of thinking seems to collide with the
oft-stated rationale for the principle of prejudicial question which is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.2
That the mere sameness of issue would not automatically make the civil
case as presenting a prejudicial question to the criminal case was affirmed in Pisalbon
21Id at 181.
22Maw/a&v. Cv., fqAppmA G.R. No. 141297, October 8, 2001; 366 SCRA 752 (2001) at 765.
23Sabadaxln Tcffgt G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001; 366 SCRA 567 (2001) at 572.
24Marbtla-Bohisv. Boi, G.R. No. 138509,July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747 (2000) at 755.
' HERRERA, TREATISE ON HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HIGHLIGHTS OF
AMENDMENTS OF RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 50 (2001).
20031 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
vs. Tesoro.26 In that case, a party, who challenged as a forgery a purported affidavit of
hers in the cadastral records in which it was made to appear that she renounced all
her rights and interests in a certain lot, charged the notary public with falsification
of public document. The criminal case could proceed even without awaiting the
resolution of the cadastral case in which the affidavit was presented because to
whomsoever the land may be awarded in the cadastral case will not affect the
alleged crime committed by the notary public.
While the rules on prejudicial question do not express or so state, the case
law is uniform in framing the proposition that the supposed prejudicial question is
exclusively resolvable by the court having jurisdiction over the civil action. This
concept of jurisdiction of the civil court exclusive of the criminal court to adjudicate
on the common issue is not well delineated. It is not well explained for instance
why the criminal court is not as equally competent to resolve the issue as the civil
court. While the objective of avoiding conflicting rulings on the same issue may be
an ideal which may be devoutly wished, it is unclear what untoward or injurious
consequences may ensue from confficting rulings. It may well be sufficient to
explain that one ruling is good for a civil case and another but contradictory ruling
for the criminal case.
It is therefore possible for one and the same court to try both the civil and
the criminal cases and still the doctrine of prejudicial question will apply because in
that case the court, when it is exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action is
considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal
action. 28
The existence of a common issue involved in both the civil and criminal
cases is no assurance that deference will be given to the civil court. The criminal
court may proceed to adjudicate the issue where it may be raised as a defense in the
criminal action so that there is no need to await or defer to the civil court.
Thus, in Sabandal vs. Tongco29 where the accused was charged with B.P. 22
violation, the Court held that his civil case (wherein he allegedly over-paid the
supposed bounced checks) can be used as a defense in the criminal case. The
reasoning in Sabandalwent as follows:
"In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 is whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks.
The issue in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and
damages is whether complainant Sabandal overpaid his obligations to
Philippines Today, Inc.. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is shown to
have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for
the bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself
an offense." '3
A similar result was reached in Dichaves vs. Apalit.31 In that case, the
Supreme Court disciplined an MTC judge for suspending a B.P. 22 case on the
ground of a supposed prejudicial question in the civil case. The civil case posits
issue that the checks subject of the B.P. 22 cases were issued only to guarantee
another person's obligation. The civil case was held to be non-determinative of any
issue in the criminal case. The Court reasoned:
"In the case at bar, even if Navarro prevailed in the civil case filed
by him against Uyboco and GCDC, this result would not be determinative of
his guilt in the criminal prosecution for violation of B.P. Big. 22 for it is now
settled that the mere issuance of worthless checks is punishable under B.P.
BIg. 22, and it is immaterial whether the checks have been issued merely to
guarantee another person's obligation."32
Availability of the civil issue as a defense in the criminal case was critical in
FirstProducersHoldings Corporationvs. LAir Co.33 In this case, a criminal case for estafa
29
G.R. No. 124498, October 5,2001; 366 SCRA 567 (2001).
30Id at 572.
31A.M. No. MTJ-O0:1274, June 8, 2000.
32Id at 57.
3 G.R No. 139655, July 27,2000;.336 SCRA 551 (2000).
2003] PREJUDICIAL QUESTION 11
was filed on 13 March 1997 and the civil case was filed on 18 November 1997. In
the estafa case, accused was charged with having misappropriated a proprietary
membership share in the Manila Polo Club and in the civil case he claims to be the
owner of the share. The Court said that the civil case did not present a prejudicial
question for three (3) reasons:
The court in First Prnducers seems to imply that the civil action was not
preferential as it was impliedly instituted with the criminal action. This is an odd
excuse because the same court can resolve the issue but it must resolve this civil
issue first before it adjudicates the issue of guilt or it may opt to resolve the issue of
guilt without addressing the civil issue separately.
Contrastingly, in Libmdo vs. Cosco/ue/a37 the fact that the same question may
be resolved in the criminal case moved the court to rule that there was no need to
defer to the civil court. In this case, the criminal case was for theft instituted by a
lessee of sugarlands against the accused for allegedly having stolen and carried away
34
Idat 557.
35Id at 559.
3 Id at 560.
37G.R. No. 56995, August 30, 1982 116 SCRA 303 (2d Div., 1982).
12 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78
sugarcane planted by the lessee on these lands. There were three (3) cases which
were contended to have presented a prejudicial question, one was a damage suit by
the lessee against the accused for the sugarcane which was allegedly stolen, second
an intestate proceeding where the right of the accused to the sugarlands was
disputed, and third an ejectment case instituted by the lessor against one of the
accused.
None of the civil cases was held to present a prejudicial question. The
Supreme Court squarely ruled that the matter of who planted the sugarcane may
well be raised as a defense in the criminal case and there is no reason why it should
be pre-emptively resolved in the civil cases. Again there is here the unmistakable
implication that there is nothing special or peculiar about the civil court's
jurisdiction which qualifies it to exclusively adjudicate the issue of who planted the
sugarcane.
The Supreme Court held that an estafa case cannot be suspended on the
ground of pending civil case where the underlying contract made the basis of this
estafa charge was sought to be annulled or rescinded. This is the case of Umali vs.
IntermediateAppellate CourO9 where the accused issued four (4) checks in payment of
installments on their purchase of a parcel of land. When the checks bounced, the
vendors filed a criminal complaint against the vendees for estafa. But before they
could be arraigned, the accused filed a civil complaint for the annulment/rescission
of the contract of sale. The Supreme Court refused to suspend the criminal action
by saying
"[lt will be readily seen that the alleged prejudicial question is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties charged with estafa,
because even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose
annulment they sought in the civil case was vitiated by fraud, duress or
intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing,
to the degree required by law, that they had actually received from the
complainant the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat,
and that, instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused or
otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the
private respondents herein would be tenable had they been charged with
falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action.
40Id at 686.
43G.R. No. 22759, March 29, 1968; 22 SCRA 1380 (1968).
14 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78
raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount
alleged to have been misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a
matter of defense to be interposed by the party charged in the criminal
proceeding." 42
A similar analysis was applied in Baogos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan 43 where the
criminal case was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In that
case, the accused allegedly enforced a writ of execution against a car registered in
the name of one Leticia Ang although she was not the judgment debtor.
Subsequently, the judgment creditor filed a case for rescission of the sale of the car
by the judgment debtor to Leticia Ang for being allegedly in fraud of creditors.
This rescission case was held not to pose a prejudicial question to the anti-graft
case. Even if the sale of the car to Leticia Ang was fraudulent, still the accused
sheriff had to establish that he acted in good faith in executing on the car.
Where the culpability of the accused does not depend on any issue in the
civil case, then the latter cannot possibly pose a prejudicial question to the criminal
case. Thus, in Rojas vs. People" the criminal case was for violation of Artidcle 319 of
the Revised Penal Code by executing a new chattel mortgage of personal property
in favor of another party without the consent of the previous mortgagee and duly
noted in the record of the Register of Deeds. The civil case was for the termination
of a management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of the
accused having executed a chattel mortgage when a prior chattel mortgage was valid
and existing, thus giving lie to his express manifestation that the property was free
of all liens and encumbrances. The civil case was held not to pose a prejudicial
question. The culpability of the accused did not depend on whether he violated the
management contract or not.
But Rjas had made a troubling obiter or aside. It rationalized further that
since the civil action was for fraud it may under Article 33 of the Civil Code
proceed independently of the criminal action. 45 This rationalization is premised on
a misapprehension of Article 33 of the Civil Code which determines when the civil
action may proceed independently of a criminal action based on the same act as
made the basis of the civil action as an exception to the general :ule that the civil
action must defer to the criminal action. The correctly applicable rule in Rjas is
that relating to "prejudicial question" which mandates the deferment of the
crminal, and not of the civil, action. A similar misapprehension was made in Peopk
4 Id at 1382, 1383.
43G.R. No. 85590, August 10, 1989; 176 SCRA 287 (En banc, 1989).
"G.R. No. 22237, May 31, 1974; 57 SCRA 243 (2nd Div., 1974).
45Id at 246.
20031 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
vs. Consing.4 In Consing, two cases were claimed to pose a prejudicial question to a
criminal case. The civil cases were for injunction and damages whereas the criminal
case was for falsification of public document. The court held that there was no
prejudicial question because however else the civil cases were resolved would not be
determinative of the guilt of the accused. The court, faltering, added another
reason, to wit, tiat there is no prejudicial question because the civil cases may
proceed independently of the criminal cases, citing Rjas. This confusion of the rule
on prejudicial question with the rule on suspension of the civil action pending
prosecution of the criminal action is very serious and can only be attributed to lack
of clarity in thinking and to insufficient analysis.
Tuanda however does not well explain why the issue of validity of the
designation of complainants as sectoral representatives cannot be raised as a
defense as well in the criminal case so that the criminal court can adjudicate this
same issue in the Anti-Graft case. One may well wonder whether the matter of
temporal precedence of the civil over the criminal case has any bearing on the
resolution of the issue of which between the civil and the criminal court may pre-
emptively or exclusively decide the issue of validity of the de.ignation of the
complainants as sectoral representatives. Here, the civil case questioning the
validity of the designation was filed ahead of the anti-graft case.
Consistent with Tuanda is Akria vs. Mendota5' where the civil case was for
unpaid wages due to some laborers and the criminal case was against one of the
employers for protracted delay in payment of wages. Obviously, the matter of
whether any wages are due is a prejudicial question because there can be no delay in
paying wages which are not due. This is an obvious case for allocating to the civil
court the determination of whether any wages are due to begin with as it does seem
inappropriate for a court in a criminal case to determine such an issue which seems
to be peculiarly a labor law issue. Viewed in this light, it would appear that the
matter of which the court seems more suited to adjudicate the common issue may
be the key to the issue of prejudiciality. Only such analysis on the basis of apparent
suitability or appropriateness of the forum adjudicating the common issue can
explain a decision such as Ras vs. Ramk2 where a criminal case of estafa for an
alleged double sale was held to be suspendible pending the resolution of the issue of
the validity of the second sale. According to the court, the accused's defense in the
civil case that the prior deed of sale was a forgery and therefore null is necessarily
determinative of his guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. But such a
conclusion eludes the basic issue of why that defense cannot equally be raised in the
criminal case and why the civil court should be allowed to pre-emptively resolve it.
But where the accused was charged with violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law for depriving the supposed owner of possession of a lot, it was held that the
civil case for co-ownership did pose a prejudicial question. The reasoning was that
the resolution of the issue of ownership could be determinative of the accused's
57
criminal liability for squatting.
Majority of the cases, including the more recent ones, find that the civil
action does not pose a prejudicial question.58 The latest bigamy case is Marbella-
Bobis vs. Bobir.5 9 Here, the accused contracted his first marriage in 1985 and a
second marriage in 1996. Upon complaint by the first wife, accused was charged
with bigamy. Thereafter, accused filed a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial court granted the motion to
suspend, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court explained that the mere
absence of a marriage license will not entitle the accused to enter into a second
marriage absent a declaration of the nullity of the first marriage and so the nullity
case will not be determinative of the issue of bigamy:
S7Ao vsFkrxmwa7a
G.R. No. 112381, March 20,1995; 242 SCRA 509 (21 Div., 1995).
m A similar ruling was made in a concubinage case, B&= v. Peek, G. No. 137567, June 20,
2000, 334 SCRA 106 (2- Div, 200).
9G.. No. 138509, July 31, 2000.336 SCRA 747 (1 Div., 2000).
2003] PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also
be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the
first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time
he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him." 60
This was followed by another bigamy case, Te vs. Court of Appeal 6l where
the same ruling was made that suspension of the bigamy case cannot be grounded
on the pendency of an action for annulment of the first marriage since judicial
declaration of nullity of that marriage is required. The courts are also influenced by
the fact that it is not the accused but his spouse who brings the civil action for
62
annulment of their marriage.
Simple logic support the cases which hold that the civil action for
annulment or nullity poses a prejudicial question to a bigamy charge. The common
rationale for finding a prejudicial question is that a ruling of nullity may undercut
one of the elements - as, say, a valid and subsisting first marriage or an otherwise
valid second marriage - of the crime of bigamy. This is well illustrated by the case
of Merced v. Die_.65 In that case, accused was charged with bigamy in that he
married complainant Elizabeth while he was still married to Eufrocina. But prior to
the filing of the bigamy charge, accused had filed a civil case for the annulment of
his second marriage to Elizabeth on the ground that it was contracted through
force, threats and intimidation. The Court said that the issue in the civil case as to
the validity of the second marriage presented a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case:
The validity of the second marriage was put in issue in Zapanta vs.
Montesa.67 There the accused was charged with bigamy. In that case, the accused
while still being married to Estrella contracted a second marriage with the
complainant. Accused then filed an action for the annulment of his marriage to the
complainant on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. There is a prejudicial
question, said the Court:
6Id
6
atpp. 158, 159.
7 G.R No. 14534, February 28, 1962; 4 SCRA 510 (1962).
2003] PREJUDICIAL QUESTION 21
III. The mere fact that the civil and the criminal cases involve the
same issue does not make the civil case prejudicial to the criminal
case.
VI. There have been contradictory rulings in bigamy cases where the
pendency of a civil action challenging the validity of either the
first or the second marriage is claimed to be prejudicial to a
bigamy charge as the twice-marrying accused.
first, but there are also cases that say that the same issue can be resolved in the
criminal case especially where it can be raised as a defense in such action. Thus, in a
bigamy case, the Supreme Court observed that the accused can raise the issue of the
dissolution of the first marriage before he contracted the second marriage as a
defense in the criminal case. 72
The specter of conflicting rulings, which has often been raised, is not that
fearsome or intimidating. In a bigamy or concubinage case, for instance, there is
nothing wrong if the accused adduces evidence in the criminal case to establish the
invalidity of one of the supposed marriages. 73 There is no special or cogent reason
why such evidence may only be adduced and evaluated by a court sitting in a civil
case or why the bigamy court cannot as competently adjudicate such issue.
On the other hand, there can be solid and valid reasons for disparate
rulings on the same issue rendered by a civil court and a criminal court. Since the
stakes are different in a civil case from those in a criminal action, the incentive to
litigate the common issue may also differ. A different quantum and quality of
evidence may be adduced in a civil case than that which may be adduced in the
74
criminal case and this may well account for different rulings on the common issue.
Even the mere fact that different counsel may have represented the same party in
the two cases may itself lead to a difference in results since the intensity and quality
of presentation of a case may vary from lawyer to lawyer.
2
7 Marte/a-BoUisn Bobi, smpru note 24.
7 See Be/tnm v. Peopk, smpm note 58.
74 For that matter, the issue, tnough common, may have been merely collaterally or remotely
involved in the civil case. See Bartlt v. Kawar C PNblk Senia Ca, 349 MO. 13, 160 S.W. 2d 740, 142 A.C.R.
666 (1942) (reported testimony in a prior civil case may not be admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule
in a subsequent civil case involving the same issue). Cf. The Evergreens v: Nunan, 141 F2d 297 (2"" Cir.
1944) (Ruling that facts established in a first suit whether as "mediate data" or "ultimate data" can
conclusively establish only "ultimate" data in a second suit: "The stake in the first suit may have been too
small to justify great trouble and expense in its prosecution or defense; and the chance that a fact decided in it,
even though necessary to its result, may later become important between the parties may have been extremely
remote:').
75For led-a,,v. CedmU, spm note 12; lo n Goriyks, nom note 18.
24 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise basis for giving the civil court the first
and exclusive crack on a common issue except some vague notion of its suitability
or appropriateness as a forum. There is no sound basis for maintaining this rule of
precedence for the civil action over the criminal. As Benitez vs. Conqpdion76 suggests
"the proposition is simply reduced to a matter of preferences." There may be no
special expertise possessed by the civil court to adjudicate the common issue to the
exclusion of the criminal court. The following observations made in Iso vs.
Gonzaks77 respecting the possible special expertise of the House Electoral Tribunal
on election matters is worthy of relevant consideration:
criminal jurisdiction (and this includes a situation where the civil action is instituted
with the criminal action), in which case it becomes absurd for such court to play
Alphonse and Gaston with itself.