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Plato and Imitation
Plato and Imitation
Author(s): J. Tate
Source: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1932), pp. 161-169
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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PLATO AND ' IMITATION.'
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162 J. TATE
work. He must be a true philos
one able to ' search out the nat
the good upon his works' (4oIb)
That kind of poetry (or other
which copies more or less slavis
gestures, etc.) of its object-tho
perceived by, sense and opinion d
unreal aspect of its object, and
merely ' lays on some colours' o
it represents, knowing and car
externals (60oa). It therefore pr
sqq.). The artist who is imitativ
terized by ignorance. He has n
never been trained by dialectic to
Thus it is clear that Plato's tr
of his doctrine of the oppositio
virtue which is divorced from kn
illusion and a sham, ' slavish an
spurious imitation of genuine v
imitative in the bad sense is sh
bearer,' whereas the genuine poet
(by knowledge of the ideas) and h
Such, then, is Plato's doctrine b
and later discussions in the Re
Favourable comments by distin
this subject encourage me to offe
conclusions.
In the first place, the word ' imitation ' naturally tends to bear a meaning very
much akin to what I call the bad sense of the term in Plato. (I need not encumber
my article with a long list of examples, for the point is obvious enough.) I do not, of
course, claim that this was always the flavour of the word. I do not, for example,
know (though I have my suspicions) whether the Pythagoreans (referred to by
Aristotle' as at least earlier than Plato) meant any particular disrespect for ' things
when they said that ' things exist by imitation of the numbers'; and it is clear tha
Aristotle used the word (e.g. in his definition of tragedy) without any contemptuou
nuance. I merely contend that with the Greeks as with us (' Beware of imitations'
' imitation' could naturally be used to imply (saving the context) a merely external
and sometimes a deceptive, resemblance, and not a real and internal sameness or
similarity. When art was called imitation, it was (at least before Aristotle) ordinaril
so called with reference to the merely outward and apparent resemblance between
work of art and the object represented; in fact, the greater the deception the bette
the art was popularly supposed to be. Hence the surprise of Parrhasius whe
Socrates, according to Xenophon's story, applied the word (with synonyms) to the
expression not of the material but of the invisible: a painting (Socrates said) could
imitate the character of a man's soul and not merely his external appearance. Th
fact that this doctrine was novel shows that the use of the word (as applied to ar
was equally novel. Similarly in the conversation with Cleitophon the sculptor, whic
Xenophon also records, Socrates makes what is evidently a somewhat novel poin
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PLATO AND 'IMITATION' 163
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164 J. TATE
imitation of either kind, i.e., he
inner and essential characteri
however, will not greatly app
form of amusement (cf. Rep.
ingful form of imitation will
the real nature of what he imita
which deals in outward and a
art of imitation may be divide
the imitation practised by th
(though with the reservation
imitation of the literal kind) wi
tion of inward realities) and i
sentation of external appearan
intelligent (or scientific) and un
(which might have made matt
this passage of the Sophist for
(imitation of appearances); wh
knowledge is called ' IETr' E 47r(
further divided according as
who are unconscious of their
in the second of these subdivi
to 38oeopqt1A-tqK ; for it is cle
those who, having no knowled
virtue, imitate their own noti
267c), and so make it appear t
(in the good sense), as is clearl
but justice itself, the idea of jus
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PLATO AND 'IMITATION' 165
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166 J. TATE
is simply the Platonic attitude t
that the art of Homer is imita
regarded it as imitative. Procl
principles he differs from Pl
does not attempt to justify r
writers do not impugn Plato's
form; let us ask not what is tr
but what is true of this partic
there any of these later writers
the Homeric variety meant kn
mere opinion, and that there
not in the bad ?
I can find no trace of any. A typical instance is Strabo.1 Strabo thought
Homer a very wise philosopher. But by philosophy he meant not a way of life or a
science of first principles but the possession of multifarious information. Homer
was a philosopher because he knew a great many useful facts, for example, about
geography; and it was by conveying this kind of knowledge that he aimed at the
moral improvement of his readers. Strabo's only argument against Plato is to the
effect that one who is ignorant of life could not imitate it so well as Homer did;
since, then, Homer imitated life so well, he must have been a very wise man. This
is not a serious criticism for Plato to meet. But where did Strabo get it ? Evidently
from the same source from which come so many criticisms of Plato, namely, Plato
himself. Strabo was drawing upon Rep. 598e, where this argument of his is not
merely put but answered. The fact that Strabo draws on Plato for an 'answer' to
Plato's attack on Homeric imitation is a pretty good indication that the Stoics had
left this subject severely alone. Proclus is also typical. He tries to commit Plato
to an esotericism (in the matter of the interpretation of the myths of the poets)
of which Plato obviously disapproved. He repeats that Homer was 'inspired';
but he has no answer to Plato's attack on the inspiration which is divorced from
knowledge. He does not attempt to prove that Homer's inspiration was of the other
kind, which consists in the vision of the ideas. It is clear that, as I have already
written elsewhere, these later writers made no serious attempt to deal argumenta-
tively with Plato's attack on Homer.2 They do not seem even to have thought
of the answer that not reason but opinion, feeling and imagination are the true
instruments of knowledge. For that view to be seriously advanced in mistaken
defence of poetry the world had to wait till Plato had been temporarily eclipsed by
Kant, and the romantic movement broke loose upon literature.
We find also in Proclus the remark, still common nowadays (it seems to Mr.
Sikes 3 successfully to 'turn the tables on Plato'), that Plato and his dialogues would
have been expelled from the ideal state because they are as highly imitative as
Homer. This may be a neat enough gibe, though it ignores the two senses of the
word ' imitative'; but it has no argumentative value. In the first place Plato was
not writing his dialogues in an ideal state or to be read by the citizens of such a state.
In the second place it is not so clear, as is generally assumed, that Plato would
have been expelled from his own republic for imitating Thrasymachus and suchlike
persons. When Plato in the Refpublic, Phaedrus and Laws laid down principles about
writing, it need not be thought that he entirely exempted his own writings from those
principles. What, then, are his dialogues meant to be according to his own account
of the matter? Not text-books of philosophy (for philosophy cannot be learned
from text-books), but memoranda and a form of amusement.4 But is not all amuse-
ment forbidden to the Guardians ? By no means. They are allowed to imitate (i.e.,
1 I. 2, 2 sqq. 3 P. 238.
2 C.Q., January, 1930, p. 4. 4 Phaedr. 276d.
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PLATO AND ' IMITATION' 167
to represent dramatically) baser men than themselves occ
amusement.' Let us then allow to Plato the same license
dians. As I understand Rep. 369,1 Mr. Sikes is too sweep
Plato's ' Guardians must imitate only the virtuous.'2
This reference to Rep. 396 raises another question. Is
Mr. Sikes that the limitations laid down in Rep. 392-8 '
comedy' ?" Or is such an exclusion necessarily implied b
that only hymns to the gods and eulogies on good men w
ideal state ? I see no reason why these hymns and eulogie
forms of dramatic representation which are allowed to t
poet may imitate good men like himself. There is noth
writing a dialogue between two good men as a part of his
would be drama of a sort. He may also on occasion imp
as I have mentioned above; there, surely, is a chance fo
comic element. (Nor, by the way, is it true that Plato r
altogether 'shorn of the speeches.') Let us suppose,
hymn of some length, interspersed with a good deal of
dialogue, the whole making an organic unity in acco
of the Phaedrus. Is there any reason for refusing t
of tragedy ? At any rate, to say that Plato refused to a
means that he excluded all dramatic representation; wh
what Plato himself wrote in Rep. 396. And it is clear th
to exclude what he meant by tragedy; compare that pass
he confesses to being an imitator (in the good sense), and no
a tragic poet, for in depicting the lineaments of the id
imitation (Laws 817b, t'rqtrs) of the best and noblest li
is, he says, essentially the same thing as this. (It is obv
Plato did not need to be told by anyone that his dialog
unlike his critics he was aware of the fact that he used the word in more than one
sense.)
Considerably less than justice is as a rule done to the poetry which Plato would
admit into his ideal state. Professor Saintsbury,4 for example, wrote that Plato's
ideal poet was ' at the very best' ' a sort of Board-Schoolmaster.' Evidently he shared
the common view that the poetry of the ideal state would be uninspired, unpleasing,
mechanical and full of trite moralization-something like most of the formal odes of
poets laureate. I hope to deal elsewhere with Plato's attitude towards the moralizing
or didactic view of poetry. Here I wish merely to point out (without sharing Saints-
bury's evidently low regard for the profession of pedagogue) that Platonic poetry is
not meant to be a text-book of information (for the Platonic theory of education dis-
counts the text-book), nor is his ideal poet meant to be a pedant but a man of genius5
-a philosopher and an enthusiast whose influence would be good for the old as well
as the young. Even his second-best poet (in the Laws) retains his spontaneity and
his natural gifts, and is merely subjected to restrictions in matters which do not affect
the essence of poetry. Such criticisms are founded on an erroneous notion of what
philosophy is or was meant by Plato to be. They assume that philosophy is some-
thing merely dry and abstruse and entirely remote from life, or at least from all that
makes life worth living. They assume that morality is an essentially uninteresting
business, and that Plato's ideal realm is (as perhaps it is-but Plato did not think so)
a colourless blank. But for Plato philosophy meant a life to be lived. Its prin-
1 See my analysis in C.Q., 1928, p. i8. does not mean that I deny the obvious merits of
2 P. 75. his book.
3 Ibid. I should like to add that my disagree- 4 History of Criticism, I., p. 19.
ment with Mr. Sikes on the points indicated 5 Rep. 40IC. Cf. Phaedr. 269-70.
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168 J. TATE
ciples were meant to be not re
They were not to be mere rul
principles informing the who
appropriate them either (at best)
putting them into practice. Th
the ideal world in his own ch
such a requirement seemed to S
The difficulty in dealing with
have not thought out, or at least
implications inherent in their
Platonic theory of imitation con
seeing that the poet's duty . . .
as they are not,' I must confes
criticism a more nearly 'uninte
which Saintsbury apparently fou
understand the Platonic view tha
tion or reflection of the ideal
does not mean that according
Mr. Sikes3 asks why Plato faile
a valuable instrument of know
cannot impart knowledge (Rep. 5
harmoniousness of character and
with right opinions. The ideal
is produced in the light of i
beautiful; but it is not an instr
what one reads but by testing it
The works of the philosopher-
the ideas, can produce poetry w
naturally have an ethically goo
reason, for dwelling on the eth
(even of the merely external v
the qualities which he imita
sympathetically with the hero
There was no reason why Plat
ethical implications. There was
the ethical problem. It was no
opinion' that youths should be sa
was justified (as by Protagoras
boys who had learned from th
would in later life obey those
example, according to Xenopho
heart the poems of Homer in o
Achilles and as wise as Nestor.5
out Homeric heroes, it certain
attacked by Plato in Rep. X. S
largely on ethical grounds, it w
education, to criticize their vi
circumstances of the time, com
his attempt to save his contem
Platonic. Homeric ethics may
1 C.Q., 1928, p. 19. 5 Cf. Laws 81o-i; Prot. 326; Xen. Symp. III.
5, IV. 6-7; Girard, L'P8ducation A thinienne, pp.
2 Op. cit., pp. 18-Ig.
o 0. cit., p. 86. 1514sqq. Phaedr. 277-8 ; Pr
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PLATO AND 'IMITATION' 169
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