FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 216714. April 4, 2018.]

SPOUSES GODFREY and MA. TERESA TEVES , petitioners, vs.

INTEGRATED CREDIT & CORPORATE SERVICES, CO. (now CAROL
AQUI) , respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO , J : p

This Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari assails the March 28, 2014 Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP. No.
05483, as well as its January 7, 2015 Resolution 3 denying herein petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. 4
Factual Antecedents

Sometime in 1996, Standard Chartered Bank (Standard) extended various loans

to petitioners Godfrey and Ma. Teresa Teves. As security, petitioners mortgaged their
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 107520 5 (the subject property).
Petitioners defaulted in their loan payments. Standard extrajudicially foreclosed
on the mortgage, and the property was sold to Integrated Credit and Corporate
Services Co. (ICCS). A new certi cate of title — Transfer Certi cate of Title No. T-
188758 — was issued in favor of ICCS after petitioners failed to redeem the subject
property upon the expiration of the redemption period on May 23, 2007. 6
ICCS led a petition for the issuance of a wit of possession, docketed as L.R.C.
Rec. No. 9468 Case No. 12 Lot No. 32 Blk. 3 and assigned to Branch 16 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. During the proceedings, or in May, 2010, ICCS was
substituted by respondent Carol Aqui (Aqui), 7 who appears to have acquired the
property from ICCS, and a new certi cate of title — Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 107-
2010001206 — was issued in Aqui's favor. 8 cEaSHC

On September 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Decision 9 in LRC Rec. No. 9468 Case
No. 12 Lot No. 32 Blk. 3 ordering the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject
property in favor of ICCS.
On July 14, 2010, the RTC issued two Orders. The rst (First Order) 10 declared in
part, thus:
To repeat, the duty of the court to grant a writ of possession is
ministerial. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale as well
as the consequent cancellation of the writ is to be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.
In the case of Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court said:
' A n ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory
writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly
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 speaking, a 'judicial process' as contemplated above.'
xxx xxx xxx
'It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition
for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious
proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding pursuant to Act 3135 as amended. Unlike a
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68
of the Rules of Court, any property brought within the
ambit of the act is foreclosed by the ling of a petition,
not with any court of justice, but with the o ce of the
sheriff of the province where sale is to be made.'
This Court having found that the procedural requirements of law anent
t h e ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of possession have been dutifully
complied [with] and the documents in support thereof in order, the writ of
possession was accordingly issued.
WHEREFORE , for lack of merit, the respondents' instant Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court's Decision (should be ORDER) dated 07
September 2009 is hereby DENIED . CTIEac

SO ORDERED . 1 1 (Emphasis in the original)

The second Order 1 2 (Second Order) contained the following pronouncement:
The petitioner through counsel led a MOTION praying that respondents
spouses Godfrey and Teresa Teves be ordered to deliver to petitioner and/or
deposit with the Honorable Court the monthly rentals in the amount of
P50,000.00 covering the period from May 24, 2007 up to the time respondents
surrender the possession of the subject property to herein petitioner.
It is the stand of petitioner that the grant of possession in its favor does
not only cover the physical surrender and/or turn over of the premises of the
subject property but also includes the surrender of whatever fruits and/or
rentals realized or accruing from the subject property reckoned from the time the
redemption period to redeem the same has lapsed; that based on the Sheriff's
Initial Report dated October 22, 2008, the subject property is being leased to Ms.
Sarah Park for monthly rental of P50,000.00 and it is respondent Mr. Godfrey
Teves who collects the monthly rental; that Mr. Teves has no more right to
collect the monthly rental as his right ceased from the time the right of
redemption lapsed relative to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure led
before the proper court of justice consistent with the provision of Art. 544 of the
Civil Code; and that accordingly, respondents should turn over to petitioner
and/or deposit with the Court the monthly rentals in the amount of P50,000.00
they have collected from May 24, 2007 up to the time of respondents' surrender
of possession of the subject property.
By [express] provision of the law, particularly Article 544 of the Civil Code,
petitioner is entitled to the monthly rentals of the subject property which were
collected by the respondents who have no more right over the same after the
lapse of the period for them to redeem the subject property.
Finding impressed with merit the instant motion of petitioner, the same
should be granted.
WHEREFORE , the foregoing considered, Sps. Godfrey Teves and Teresa
Teves are hereby ordered to deliver to petitioner and/or deposit with the Court
the monthly rentals of the subject property in the amount of P50,000.00
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 covering the period from May 24, 2007 up to the time they surrender the
possession thereof to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED . 1 3 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners led a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 1 4 of the Second Order, but
in a September 2, 2010 Order, 1 5 the RTC denied the same, ruling thus:
Respondents/Movants aver that the Notice of Lis Pendens of the case of
Annulment of Contract in Makati, RTC, Br. 149 annotated in the Title of the
subject property binds the subsequent buyer, Ms. Carol Aqui, giving emphasis
on the fact of termination of the Makati case by the execution of the parties, the
Sps. Godfrey and Teresa Teves as plaintiffs and the Standard Chartered Bank
as defendant, of a Compromise Agreement wherein the Standard Chartered
Bank specifically waived its right to claim for deficiency and to settle the case or
anything arising from it; that as a successor in-interest, her right cannot rise
above the rights of Standard Chartered Bank which speci cally waived its right
to claim for deficiency or anything arising from it. SCaITA

The Petitioner through counsel led its OPPOSITION to respondents'

instant Partial Motion for Reconsideration, contending that the Notice of Lis
Pendens annotated on the subject title only involves the civil case led with the
RTC, Makati City, Br. 149, for annulment of contracts and damages, wherein the
herein petitioner is not a party; that the Compromise Agreement entered into by
and between Sps. Teves and the Standard Chartered Bank is limited only to the
subject Makati case and has nothing to do with the petition for issuance of a
writ of possession led by herein petitioner who is not a party to the said
Compromise Agreement; that the issue on possession cannot and can never be
included in the Compromise Agreement inasmuch as the Standard Chartered
Bank not being the highest and winning bidder in the auction sale has no
authority, business or concern over the subject property; that as the highest and
winning bidder, herein petitioner is entitled to the possession of the subject
property including the right to receive the monthly rentals from respondents.
Contending positions of the parties considered, this Court nds the
respondents' instant Partial Motion for Reconsideration to be devoid of merit.
In its Order dated July 14, 2010 which herein respondents seek to be
reconsidered, this Court nds petitioner as entitled to the monthly rentals of the
subject property which were collected by the respondents who are shown to
have no more right over the same after the period for them to redeem the
subject property had already lapsed.
[S]uch nding was based on the respondents' having no more right to
collect the rentals upon the lapse of the period for them to redeem the property
without redeeming the same, which gave way to the auction sale in the
foreclosure proceeding of the subject property wherein the highest and winning
bidder was the herein petitioner Integrated Credit & Corporate Services (ICCS for
brevity). As such highest and winning bidder, the petitioner is entitled to the
possession of the subject property and to collect the subject monthly rentals
from the respondents. The essence of a writ of possession is the right of
petitioner to possess the subject property which has been duly established.
Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that the Compromise Agreement
executed by and between the parties in the Makati case cannot bind the herein
petitioner, now by Ms. Carol Aqui as substituting petitioner, not being a party to
the said case. aTHCSE

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 Finding no cogent reason to reconsider its Order dated July 14, 2010, this
Court has to deny the respondents' instant Partial Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED , the respondents'
PARTIAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of this Court's Order dated July 14,
2010 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED . 1 6 (Emphasis in the original)
Previously, or in 2006, petitioners led a case for annulment of contract against
Standard before the Makati Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-227.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement, after which the Makati trial court
(Branch 149) issued a Judgment (Based on Compromise Agreement) 1 7 on July 23,
2010, declaring among others that petitioners shall drop Civil Case No. 06-227 and
surrender possession of the subject property to Standard, in consideration of the
latter's waiver of a de ciency claim against the former. Thus, in September, 2010,
petitioners surrendered possession over the subject property to Aqui.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners led a Petition for Certiorari 1 8 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 05483, claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
them to turn over the back rentals to ICCS/Aqui in a petition for a writ of possession,
and that the RTC erred in not considering the Judgment (Based on Compromise
Agreement) in Civil Case No. 06-227 before the Makati trial court.
In the assailed March 28, 2014 Decision, the CA dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. It held:
In the instant case, the Petition led under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is clearly an improper remedy. The Orders [sic] subject of the petition partakes
the nature of a judgment or nal order which is appealable under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, which states that:
'Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be
taken from a judgment or nal order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable .
xxx xxx xxx.
To justify the ling of the petition, Sps. Teves alleged that the assailed
orders [were] interlocutory in nature[;] hence, reviewable by certiorari.cAaDHT

A judicious perusal of the challenged orders[,] however[,] [reveal] that they

are nal orders and not interlocutory. In Jose v. Javellana , the Supreme Court
citing Garrido v. Tortogo distinguished between nal and interlocutory orders,
thus:
'The distinction between a nal order and an interlocutory
order is well known. The rst disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the
court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose
of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to
ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or
nal is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in
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 the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.'
In this case, the assailed orders [did] not refer to preliminary matters but
rather they dispose[d of] the subject matter in its entirety, leaving nothing more
to be done except to enforce it by execution. Clearly, it [was a] nal order subject
to appeal under Rule 41. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the
action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.
Apropos thereto, the instant petition is dismissed because it is improperly
brought before this Court.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED . 1 9 (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in a January 7, 2015 Resolution, the CA held
its ground. Hence, the present Petition. HCaDIS

Issues

Petitioners submit —
CAN COLLECTION OF BACK RENTALS BE AWARDED IN AN EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION UNDER ACT 3135?
ARE THE ORDERS DATED JULY 14, 2010 AND SEPTEMBER 2, 2010 FINAL
ORDERS AND NOT INTERLOCUTORY WHICH CAN BE SUBJECTED TO
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65? 2 0
Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners, praying that this Court set aside the July 14 and September 2, 2010
Orders of the RTC, argue that a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is not
an action as contemplated by the Rules of Court (Rules), but a mere motion whose sole
issue to be resolved is whether the movant is entitled to the possession of real or
personal property sought to be possessed; that such a petition is "not an ordinary suit
led in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong"; 2 1 and that to collect
back rentals, Aqui should le an independent action — and not simply seek the same in
her petition for issuance of a writ of possession, since (a) the RTC, sitting as a land
registration court, does not have jurisdiction to award back rentals or grant relief which
should otherwise be sought in an ordinary civil action; and (b) Act No. 3135, 2 2 as
amended by Act No. 4118, 2 3 contains no provision authorizing the award of back
rentals to the purchaser at auction.
Respondent's Arguments

Respondent, in her Comment, 2 4 essentially submits that petitioners are guilty of

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 delaying the proceedings precisely so that they may continue to unlawfully enjoy the
use, fruits, and possession of the subject property; that the Petition for Certiorari
before the CA was an improper remedy; and that what she is collecting from petitioners
are not "back rentals" but rents collected by the latter from tenants of the property,
which she is entitled to as a matter of law — being the owner of the subject property.
Respondent thus prays that the instant Petition be denied for lack of merit.

Our Ruling

The Petition is denied.

When the redemption period expired on May 23, 2007, ICCS became the owner
of the subject property and was, from then on, entitled to the fruits thereof. Petitioners
ceased to be the owners of the subject property, and had no right to the same as well
as to its fruits. Under Section 32, Rule 39 of the Rules, 2 5 on Execution, Satisfaction and
Effect of Judgments, all rents, earnings and income derived from the property pending
redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor, but only until the expiration of his
period of redemption. AHCETa

Thus, if petitioners leased out the property to third parties after their period for
redemption expired, as was in fact the case here, 2 6 the rentals collected properly
belonged to ICCS or Aqui, as the case may be. Petitioners had no right to collect them.
Aqui acquired the subject property from ICCS only in 2010. Thus, Aqui cannot claim the
subject rental collections from 2007, because she was not yet the owner of the subject
property at the time; they belonged to ICCS. She is entitled to rentals collected only
from the time she became the owner of the property. However, as the substituted party
in these proceedings, this Court will allow her to collect the award of rentals collected
by petitioners but which pertain to ICCS — with the obligation to remit the same to the
latter. After all, she is merely ICCS's successor-in-interest. Procedurally, the RTC should
not have allowed Aqui to substitute for ICCS, but should have simply ordered her to be
impleaded as additional necessary party in the proceedings, since ICCS still had a claim
for unremitted rentals that was pending resolution in the case. On the other hand, it
cannot simply be ignored that petitioners unlawfully collected rentals from the property
that did not belong to there, but to ICCS without doubt; between this substantive issue
and the court and parties' procedural faux pas, the latter should be overlooked so that
the former may be corrected. The parties' substantive rights weigh more than
procedural technicalities. "In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought
to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around." 2 7
In China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada, 2 8 this Court held that —
I n IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera , the Court
reasoned that if under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the RTC has the
power during the period of redemption to issue a writ of possession on the ex
parte application of the purchaser, there is no reason why it should not also
have the same power after the expiration of the redemption period, especially
where a new title has already been issued in the name of the purchaser. Hence,
the procedure under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, may be availed of
by a purchaser seeking possession of the foreclosed property he bought at the
public auction sale after the redemption period has expired without redemption
having been made. ScHADI

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 The Court recognizes the rights acquired by the purchaser of the
foreclosed property at the public auction sale upon the consolidation
of his title when no timely redemption of the property was made , to wit:
It is settled that upon receipt of the de nitive deed in an
execution sale, legal title over the property sold is perfected (33 C.
J. S. 554). And this court has also [said] and that the land bought
by him and described in the deed deemed [sic] within the period
allowed for that purpose, its ownership becomes consolidated in
the purchaser, and the latter, "as absolute owner . . . is
entitled to its possession and to receive the rents and
fruits thereof." (Powell v. Philippine National Bank , 54 Phil., 54,
63.) x x x.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes
the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
during the period of one year after the registration of the sale . As such,
he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
him of a new transfer certi cate of title. The buyer can in fact demand
possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to
post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No
such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not
redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the
purchaser as con rmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
On the contention that the RTC — sitting as a land registration court — does not
have jurisdiction to award back rentals or grant relief which should otherwise be sought
in an ordinary civil action, this is no longer tenable. The distinction between the trial
court acting as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a
trial court acting as an ordinary court exercising general jurisdiction, on the other, has
already been removed with the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the
Property Registration Decree. "The change has simpli ed registration proceedings by
conferring upon the designated trial courts the authority to act not only on applications
for 'original registration' but also 'over all petitions led after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or
petition.'" 2 9
Moreover, under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules, on Powers and Duties of Courts
and Judicial Officers, it is provided that —
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. — When by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial o cer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or o cer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
such jurisdiction is not speci cally pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules. aICcHA

Given the above-cited rule and the pronouncement in China Banking Corporation
v. Spouses Lozada , 3 0 it can be understood why the RTC issued the two separate
Orders of July 14, 2010 — one on the issue covering the propriety of issuing the writ of
possession sought, and another resolving the prayer for the surrender of rentals
unlawfully collected by petitioners, who ceased to be the owners of the subject
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 property and thus had no right to collect rent from the lessee of the property. The First
Order was issued relative to the main remedy sought by ICCS — that is, for the court to
issue a writ of possession. The Second Order was issued pursuant to the court's
authority under Section 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules, to the end that a patent inequity may
be immediately remedied and justice served in accordance with the objective of the
Rules to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. In the eyes of the law, petitioners clearly had no right to collect rent from
the lessee of the subject property; they were no longer the owners thereof, yet they
continued to collect and appropriate for themselves the rentals on the property to
which ICCS was entitled. This is a clear case of unjust enrichment that the courts may
not simply ignore.
Indeed, to deprive a court of power to give substantial justice is to render
the administration thereof impotent and ineffectual. The prevailing precept is
currently embodied in Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which
categorically provides:
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. — When
by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial o cer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or o cer; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
speci cally pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules. 3 1
In a manner of speaking, courts have not only the power to maintain their
life, but they have also the power to make that existence effective for the
purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means,
do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make
the judiciary an effective institution of Government. Courts have therefore
inherent power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure
effectiveness in the administration of justice. 3 2 EHaASD

Besides, the matter of remitting collected rentals to ICCS and Aqui does not
involve the litigation and resolution of a complex legal issue. It proceeds from the
simple fact that after the redemption period expired without petitioners redeeming the
subject property, ICCS became the absolute owner thereof, and petitioners lost all their
rights thereto, including the right to lease out the same and collect rentals on said
lease. And when Aqui acquired the property and became the owner thereof, she as well
became entitled to the said rentals that petitioners unduly collected. Petitioners simply
hold the amounts collected in trust — with the obligation to return the same to their
rightful owners. These amounts and the periods during which they were collected also
appear on record — as shown by the lease agreement presented and the respective
admissions of the parties — and are thus liquidated and determinable, without need of
further litigation or proof.
Contrary to petitioners' stance, the compromise agreement they executed
together with Standard before the Makati trial court in Civil Case No. 06-227 did not
cover the subject rentals collected from leasing the subject property; it referred only to
a waiver of de ciency claims rooted in the original loan transaction between them. 3 3
As owner of the subject property, ICCS is entitled to the fruits thereof — the rentals —
which were wrongly collected by petitioners after losing their ownership; this has
nothing to do with the previous loan transaction between petitioners and Standard, to
which ICCS was a complete stranger.
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 Finally, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the
parties. They are irrelevant in the context of the foregoing disquisition; their resolution
contributes nothing to the validity and integrity of the Court's opinion.
WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED .
SO ORDERED .
Leonardo-de Castro, ** Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes
* On Leave.
** Designated as Acting Chairperson pursuant to Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28,
2018.
1. Rollo, pp. 11-25.

2. Id. at 116-121; penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and concurred in by

Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.
3. Id. at 134-136.

4. Id. at 123-128.
5. Id. at 63-68.
6. Id. at 52.
7. Id. at 52-53; "Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion" for substitution of parties.

8. Id. at 75, 146.

9. Id. at 110-112; penned by Presiding Judge Sylva G. Aguirre-Paderanga.
10. Id. at 48-51.
11. Id. at 50-51.
12. Id. at 43-44.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 56-59.
15. Id. at 45-47; penned by Presiding Judge Sylvia G. Aguirre-Paderanga.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 55; penned by Presiding Judge Caesar O. Untalan.

18. Id. at 26-42.

19. Id. at 119-120.
20. Id. at 15.
21. Citing Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Philippines, 630 Phil. 342, 348 (2010).
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 22. AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER SPECIAL POWERS INSERTED IN
OR ANNEXED TO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, Approved March 6, 1924.

23. AN ACT TO AMEND ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIVE ENTITLED
"AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER SPECIAL POWERS INSERTED
IN OR ANNEXED TO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES" Approved December 7, 1933.
24. Rollo, pp. 146-159.

25. Section 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending redemption. — The purchaser
or a redemptioner shall not be entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income of the
property sold on execution, or the value of the use and occupation thereof when such
property is in the possession of a tenant. All rents, earnings and income derived from the
property pending redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor until the expiration of
his period of redemption.
26. Rollo. pp. 69-73.

27. 7107 Islands Publishing, Inc. v. The House Printers Corporation, 771 Phil. 161, 168 (2015).
28. 579 Phil. 454, 472-473 (2008).
29. Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 604, 615 (2002).
30. Supra note 28.
31. Go Lea Chu v. Gonzales, 130 Phil. 767, 777 (1968).

32. The Province of Bataan v. Hon. Villafuerte, Jr., 419 Phil. 907, 916 (2001), citing People v.
Hon. Gutierrez, 146 Phil. 761 (1970).
33. Rollo, p. 55. The Makati trial court's July 23, 2010 Judgment (Based on Compromise
Agreement) declares, among others:

  Acting, on the Motion (Judgment be rendered based on the Compromise Agreement)

dated July 22, 2010 filed by the defendant through counsel, the following terms and
conditions of the Compromise Agreement are hereunder quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

  3. That the Second party shall absolutely waive its claim for deficiency against First
parties relative to the contracts of loan executed on November 21 & 28, 1996,
respectively.

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