FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33659 June 14, 1990

VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA. FLORDELIZA U. BALUYUT, all
minors, represented by their mother and guardian ad litem, NORMA URBANO, petitioners,
vs.
FELICEDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Note: The family name Baluyut appears as Baluyot is some pleadings.

Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyot, then minors, represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, Norma Urbana which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R entitled
"Felicidad S. Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria U. Baluyut, et al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to this court for
review reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (now Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for
intervention filed by petitioners in the trial court.

In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,' filed
before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, herein petitioners filed on April 29, 1965 a petition
for intervention. The petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the
deceased Enrique M. Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children of the deceased,
begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and petitioners' mother and guardian ad litem Norma
Urbano; that petitioners were conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited with
the deceased while the latter was already married to Felicidad S. Baluyut; that they were in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his lifetime by
direct overt acts of said deceased having supported and maintained them. The petitioners also
alleged that they were deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18,
Record on Appeal).

Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate, opposed the
petition for intervention (p. 20, Record on Appeal). On May 8, 1965 (pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal),
the trial court issued an order allowing the petitioners to intervene.

After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered declaring the intervenors Victoria,
Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the forced heirs of deceased Enrique Baluyut and ordering
administratrix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly support to Norma Urbano,
guardian ad litem for the three minor children. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:

1) FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix to pay P150.00 as monthly

support out of the Estate of Enrique Baluyut to Norma Urbano guardian ad litem for
the three minor children, Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza Baluyut.

2) That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said children are forced heirs of the late
Enrique Baluyut.
 3) That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in said Estate of Enrique Baluyut
under the provisions of the New Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal).

On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's decision. On
February 22, 1966, the intervenors filed their Objection to Appeal and Motion for Execution. The
latter motion was based on the pronouncement in Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823, April 29, 1953, that an
order granting support pendente lite is final and executory.

On May 4,1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal) declaring that it considers
intervenors' motion for execution as a motion for reconsideration and amended the decision to the
effect that it granted the minors Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza monthly support pendente lite in the
amount of P150.00 payable every first day of the month to their guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.

On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-41, Rollo) reversing the decision
of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and the intervenors'

petition in intervention is hereby declared dismissed, without costs. The order
granting alimony pendente lite to the intervenors is hereby set aside. (p. 41, Rollo)

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of Appeals' decision was denied on May
24, 1971 (p. 53, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed on June 19, 1971.

On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On July 1, 1971, We required
the petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo). Respondents, on the other hand, filed their brief on
October 28, 1971 (p. 85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971, the petition was considered submitted for
decision (p. 87, Rollo).

On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a "Motion and Manifestation" praying for the reinstatement of the
order of the trial court to grant the petitioners monthly support during the pendency of the case. The
said order for monthly support granted by the trial court in its decision of May 4, 1966 was
terminated in the early part of 1971 (p. 90, Rollo). When asked to comment on the manifestation and
motion of petitioners, respondents opposed said motion in view of respondent Court of appeals'
finding that petitioners were not the recognized spurious children of deceased Baluyut (p.
113, Rollo).

On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner's motion for continuation of their monthly
support pendente lite effective June 1975 until further orders (p. 141, Rollo). After an exchange of
pleadings by the parties regarding the order of this court on the matter of the continuation of
petitioners' support pendente lite, and after a motion filed by petitioners to cite administratrix for
contempt, private respondents filed a manifestation on January 6,1978, informing this Court that: 1)
the former administratrix Felicidad S. Baluyut was substituted by one of her daughters, Milagros B.
Villar, as Special Administratrix; and that 2) they have complied with the September 13, 1977
resolution of the court requiring them to show cause why they should not be dealt with as in
contempt for failing to obey the order to pay petitioners a monthly support pendente lite. Private
respondents also manifested their compliance by depositing with the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch 1, a Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank check in the amount of
P4,350.00 representing the required support until October, 1977. Another PCIB check in the amount
of P300.00 representing support pendente lite for November and December, 1977 was also
deposited with the trial court (p. 335, Rollo).
On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad litem and private respondent
Administratrix Milagros B. Villar, both parties assisted by their respective counsel, filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss the petition in view of petitioners 'filing of a "Petition for Withdrawal of Intervention"
with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of Enrique
Baluyut. The petition for withdrawal was based on a waiver by petitioners of any right or interest they
may have on the estate of the deceased in consideration of the financial assistance granted them by
the administratrix of the estate (p. 371, Rollo). The petition for withdrawal of intervention was
approved by the intestate court on February 14, 1980 (p. 369, Rollo), while the Joint Motion to
Dismiss the instant petition was noted by this court on April 3, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).

The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial assistance extended to petitioners by

the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo) is in the nature of a
compromise settlement of the instant petition (p. 371, Rollo). Considering, however, that the issue
involved in this case is whether or not petitioners, Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all
surnamed Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious children of the deceased, Enrique M. Baluyut,
the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition cannot be granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it
does the civil status of persons and of future support cannot be the subject of a compromise (pars. 1
and 4, Article 2035 of the Civil Code). (See Advincula v. Advincula, L-19065, January 31, 1964).

The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut.
This finding was shared by respondent Court of Appeals:

... the testimony of Norma Urbana supported by that of Liberata Vasquez on the one
hand as against that of the administratrix who declared that she and her late
husband were always together and that of Cecilia Waters who testified that Norma
had a suitor named Lieut. Alex on the other, leads us to give credence to the proof of
the intervenors specifically the testimony of Norma that the intervenors are in fact her
illegitimate children with the late Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 35, Rollo).

However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M. Baluyut is not sufficient to confer
upon them any hereditary right in the estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be established
by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights under
Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is not the fact of his bare filiation but a filiation acknowledged by
the putative parent. This has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court since the reversal of
the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et al., 102 Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the
case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701, 702. In the Paulino case, it was held:

An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and successional rights from

his putative or presumed parents must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be
established by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious)
child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing." It is compulsory when by court
action the child brings about his recognition. ...

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted
that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural child of the deceased
Marcos Paulino. Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her
alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that her putative father had
acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential and
is the basis other right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment
 the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the
death of the putative father.

This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 121 Phil. 261,
where this Court held that:

... the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to support and successional rights
from his parents, must prove his filiation and this may be done by means of voluntary
or compulsory recognition of the relationship. For this purpose, the provisions
concerning natural children are held applicable. ...

There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary
recognition by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before the court of record,
or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory recognition under
Article 283 of the same law.

Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious
children?

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by
the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in
the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing
presented nor any statement in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were
recognized by the deceased.

With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the cases where the father is obliged
to recognize the child as his, namely: a) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of
the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; b) when the child is in continuous
possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; c)
when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
d) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of Baluyut to recognize them as the
heirs of the deceased were the alleged possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized
illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the time when their mother cohabited
with the deceased. Since the petitioners were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M.
Baluyut, the action for compulsory recognition was correctly filed by petitioners' guardian ad
litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as correctly pointed out by respondent appellate court,
since the recognition sought in the case is compulsory, strictness in the application of the rules
applies. We agree with respondent appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners failed
to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the success of their action for compulsory
recognition. Respondent court held:

The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar
as the issue of recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma was kept by the
late Enrique M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a
house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was not even presented
to testify in support of the claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut rented his house
for Norma. And, according to Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice
a week in the house where she kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the
hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger children of Norma. But, according to
Liberata herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave
the money for the payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he requested her to
pay the money to the hospital. This only shows that Baluyut was hiding his Identity as
the father of the children of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing such
children as his own.

If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of the intervenors who were born at
the Ortanez hospital, there was no need for him to ask Liberata to pay the hospital
bill of Norma for the delivery of her youngest child as Baluyut could have easily done
this himself. There is not even evidence showing that he visited Norma at the
hospital when she delivered there. Coupled with the circumstance that Enrique tried
to hide his being the father of the intervenors, there is absence of positive and
convincing proof that Enrique treated the intervenors as his children in all relations in
society and in life. Far from treating them in society as his children, he was hiding
Norma and the intervenors from society and visited them only once in a while
evidently only to satisfy his sexual urge with Norma but with no genuine desire to
have and treat the intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous possession of
the status of recognized illegitimate (not natural) children. There is not even any
proof that he had brought out these intervenors to show them publicly as his children.
With the single exception of Liberata Vasquez, not a single neighbor of Norma in the
rather populous area of Project 4, Quezon City, was produced to testify on any act of
Enrique to show his genuine desire to treat the intervenors as his very own in his
actual relations. The foregoing deficiencies in the intervenors' proof is fatal to their
case.

In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural

child, the acts must be of such a nature that they reveal, not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously' (Igar, et al. vs. Vda. de Balingkit, CA, 60 O.G. 7792;
Onos, et al. vs. Vda. de Onos, CA-G.R. No. 24646-R, July 22, 1964).

The birth certificates Exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C' of the intervenors do not help their case
for these are not evidence of recognized filiation by the deceased Enrique Baluyut
because, firstly, they were admitted in evidence by the lower court merely as part of
the of the witnesses who referred to them in the course of said witnesses' testimony
and hence, they are not evidence of the facts stated in them. Secondly, they are
merely evidence of the fact that gave rise to their execution, that is, the fact of birth
and nothing else, much leas of recognition as they are not signed by Enrique
Baluyut.

In an action for compulsory acknowledgment under paragraph 4,

Article 283 of the Civil Code, a birth certificate which, on its face, was
not signed by the supposed natural father is incompetent evidence on
paternity, being in violation of oration 5 of Act 3753 and Article 280 of
the Civil Code' (Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 54 O.G. 4950; Crisolo
va. Macadaong, No. L-7017, April 19, 1964; Bernabe, etc. vs.
Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G. 3178).

If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the presumed father as

required by section 5 of Act No. 3752 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code, are incompetent evidence even to prove paternity alone, with
 more reason are birth certificates incompetent evidence to prove
recognized filiation. (pp. 36-39, Rollo)

Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the application of law regarding compulsory
recognition as first laid down in the Javellana v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They opined that the said
case was in fact the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into the present provisions
of the New Civil Code governing paternity and recognition.

Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court's ruling in the Javellana case. That the case was
the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into our statute books, is true. But, the rule of
liberality enunciated therein applied only to case involving voluntary recognition specifically in a
public document and not to cases of compulsory recognition. Thus,

Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment may be done

incidentally in a public document, a distinction must be made between the two kinds
of acknowledgment: (1) voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former, recognition may
be incidental, but in the latter, it must be direct and express.

In actions to compel the alleged father to acknowledge his natural child, based upon
recognition in an indubitable writing, article 135, par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires
that the father must expressly recognize his paternity. This provision has been strictly
construed by Spanish and Philippine jurisprudence against the alleged natural child.
Thus, in the Sentence of July 5,1906, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain held in an
action to compel acknowledgment under article 135, that a mere allusion, more or
leas clear, by the alleged father to his supposed child, if there is no express
recognition of his paternity, is not sufficient. In the Sentence of April 8,1915, that
same Tribunal declared that there should be an indubitable documentary proof or
uninterrupted on of the status of a natural child, excluding deductions and
conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule has been adhered to in several
decisions by this court. Thus, in Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil., 746, an action
was filed to compel recognition of a natural child, based in part on a letter of
defendant telling the mother of his affection toward her and asking her to take care of
the child. This court held that the letter did not expressly recognize the child, under
article 135. In Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1, the alleged father wrote the child a
letter advising him how to conduct himself. This court held that the letter did not
contain an-express recognition under article 135.

But while in actions to compel recognition the foregoing principle is true with respect
to indubitable writings according to article 135, par. 1 of the Civil Code, however, in
cases of voluntary acknowledgment in a public document under article 131, the law
is more liberal and permits an incidental recognition. ... (Javellana, et al. v.
Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils. 393)

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.