CASE

DIGEST IN
REMEDIAL
LAW
REVIEW
SHIELA MARIE T. LLAPITAN
LLB IV

Page 1 of 28
 G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.

FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City Land
Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor of Manchester. Manchester
also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing
damages to Manchester amounting to P78, 750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their
Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of
P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for
specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under
assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what
it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the
PRAYER.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.

HELD:
No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the
proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a
consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding
taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. The Supreme
Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages
and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint.
Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To
stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed
for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire
insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought
although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR
originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees. The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make
way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees.
The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required.
Page 2 of 28
ISSUE:

Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient
docket fees?

RULING:

YES. It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee
due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

[G.R. No. 126361. June 19, 1997]

VICTOR R. MIRANDA, and JOSE M. FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. JESSIE B. CASTILLO,
LORENZO S. GAWARAN, the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. JUDGE LUCENITO
TAGLE, Executive Judge, RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch XX, respondents

FACTS:

In the May 8, 1995 elections, VICTOR MIRANDA and JOSE FRANCISCO were proclaimed as the duly-
elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of Bacoor, Cavite. On May 24, 1995, private respondents JESSIE B.
CASTILLO and LORENZO S. GAWARAN, who also ran for the position of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively,
filed election protests contesting petitioners' election with the RTC of Imus, Cavite. These protests were
consolidated.
On October 27, 1995, petitioners moved to dismiss the protests on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court for failure of protestants to pay the P300.00 filing fee. Private respondents, however, claim that the
amount of P414.00 they paid were for the filing fees.
On January 24, 1996, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the protests. It found that no
payment was made by private respondents. The amount of P414.00, although denominated as filing
fee, corresponded to the docket fee collected pursuant to Section 7(b), Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 31-90, dated October 15, 1990, for actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The
trial court cited the case of Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals, to the effect that it is the payment of the filing fee
that vests jurisdiction on the court over the election protest, not the payment of docket fees for the claim of
damages and attorney's fees.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the COMELEC.
In its September 5, 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC reversed the RTC's order of dismissal and directed the
latter to continue the proceedings. It ruled that private respondents paid only what was demanded by the RTC
Clerk of Court who was duty-bound to assess the correct fees. They were thus in good faith when they relied on
and paid the assessment made by the RTC Clerk of Court. The COMELEC cited the case of Pahilan v.
Tabalba where it was held that incomplete payment of filing fee upon an incorrect assessment by the Clerk of
Court is equivalent to substantial compliance of the rules regarding payment of filing fees. The COMELEC
ruled that protestants may thus be ordered to pay the additional amount.

Page 3 of 28
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over private respondent's election protest despite of incomplete payment of
the filing fees.

RULING:

This ignorance or confusion, however, was not fatal to private respondent's cause. The application by the Clerk
of Court of Section 5 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court substantially vested the RTC with jurisdiction over the
election protest. Although this Court had given its imprimatur to said Section 9 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the failure of the Clerk of Court to take said section into account is a technicality which
cannot be allowed to defeat the viability of the election protest. Procedural technicality should be disregarded
for an immediate and final resolution of these cases.

G.R. No. L-4472 May 8, 1952

ESPIRIDION RONE, CLUADIA AGUZAR, DIONISIA GORDOLAN, GUILLERMO AND
AMABLE, both surnamed VENTURA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. VICTOR CLARO and
SIMEON BAQUIRING, Defendants-Appellees.

FACTS:

Defendant, Victor Claro has obtained a deed of sale from the plaintiff Espiridion Rone over the land in question
in 1929 which the plaintiffs learned in March, 1941 but failed to bring the action thereon on account of poverty,
it is quite evident that they should have instituted an action within four years after the discovery of said fraud
in accordance with Section 44 of Act 190. And since the present action has been instituted on February 2, 1950,
the conclusion is unavoidable that same has already prescribed

Instead of answering the complaint defendants filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
it stated no cause of action and that it was barred by the statute of limitations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action has already prescribed and is barred by statute of limitations.

RULING:

The action herein is to annul the deed of sale by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants on the ground of
fraud and the trial court was correct in applying Section 44, paragraph 3 of Act 190 and in ruling that the action
had prescribed, since more than four years had elapsed since the discovery of the fraud. Section 44 of Act 190,
known as the Code of Civil Procedure, in part, reads as follows:

Other Civil Actions: How Limited - Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be
brought within the following periods after the right of action accrues with four years: ... an action for relief on
the ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery
of the fraud.

An action for the recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought
within ten (10) years after the cause of such action accrues.

The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and the prayer for relief. Here, the complaint clearly and expressly alleges the
supposed fraud and deceit in procuring the execution of the deed of sale of the land in question in favor of the
defendants, and the discovery of the said fraud on a day years after the date of the supposed fraud a and deed.
From this it may be gathered that this allegation and claim was made in order to excuse the apparent neglect or
delay in the filing of the action, a delay involving a period of almost twenty years, from the date of the deed of
sale to the filing of the suit.
Page 4 of 28
 [G.R. Nos. 120435. December 22, 1997]

ESTATE OF THE LATE MERCEDES JACOB represented by MERCEDITA JACOB,

DONATO JACOB JR., ERENEO JACOB and LILIAN JACOB QUINTO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RAMON R. TUGBANG and VIRGINIA S. TUGBANG,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY and CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON
CITY, respondents.

FACTS:

On May 17, 1993 petitioners, Mercedita Jacob, Donato Jacob, Jr., Ereneo Jacob and Lilian Jacob-Quinto, heirs
of the late Mercedes Jacob, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against respondent
spouses Ramon R. Tugbang and Virginia S. Tugbang, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15976, for annulment or
cancellation of the auction sale, the final bill of sale, TCT No. 81860, and for redemption of the property plus
damages. However, the trial court dismissed the petition purportedly for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition.

RULING:

As the petition makes out a case for reconveyance and not a mere annulment of an RTC judgment as viewed
under par. (2), Sec. 9, BP Blg. 129, jurisdiction over the case is clearly vested in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City as provided in par. (2), Sec. 19, BP Blg. 129 -Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts x x x x
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition as it may be considered only as a
continuation of the original proceeding for cancellation of title which in view of its non-litigious character is
summary in nature. Furthermore, under Sec. 2 of PD 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under the former Land Registration Act (Act 496), so that now a Regional Trial Court,
like the RTC of Quezon City which issued a new title to respondent Virginia Tugbang in lieu of the old one, has
the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or
petitions.

G.R. No. L-18692 January 31, 1963

MANUEL B. RUIZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Manuel B. Ruiz brought an action before the Court of Instance of Manila praying (a) that J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. and the sheriff of Quezon City be enjoined from executing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-
3492 against Sixto M. Cacho but which is being enforced against him by ejecting him from the property in
question and demolishing the house erected thereon, and (b) that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., be ordered to
execute a final deed of sale in his favor of a parcel of land with an area of 420 sq. m. upon payment by him of
the purchase price at the rate of P7.00 per sq. m. and to consider the sum of P855.00 already paid by him to
defendant Florencio Deudor as partial payment thereof.

Page 5 of 28
Florencio Deudor, one of the defendants, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the venue of action is
improperly laid, (2) plaintiff has no cause of action against said defendant; and (3) plaintiff's cause of action, if
any, has prescribed. Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., lnc., in turn filed a motion for bill of particulars.

Disregarding plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss and while the motion for bill of particulars was
pending consideration, the court a quo, on March 11, 1961, issued an order dismissing the case on the ground
that, the property in question being situated in Quezon City, and the action being one affecting real property or
involving title thereto, the venue of action is improperly laid. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, plaintiff interposed the present appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the venue is improperly laid.

Held:
It should further be noted that among the reliefs prayed for in the complaint is the prayer that defendants J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and the sheriff of Quezon City be enjoined from executing the writ of execution issued by
court of first instance of said city in Civil Case No. Q-3492 wherein said sheriff is allegedly trying to enforce
against appellant by ejecting him and demolishing the house he has on the land located in Quezon City, which
claim necessarily involves a determination of ownership and possession of said property as a preliminary step
to determining the validity of the writ of execution. The complaint having been filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila it is apparent that venue is improperly laid. This is in accordance with the rule that if an
action necessarily involves a determination of an interest in land, the suit must be brought in the place where
the land is situated. The fact that an injunction is sought as an ancillary to the principal action does not make
the case transitory or personal.

The primary object of a suit for injunction is determinative on the question of venue. If the suit necessarily
involves a determination of an interest in land, the suit must be brought in the country where the land lies....
The fact that an injunction is sought as relief ancillary to the main suit does not make it transitory.

[G.R. No. 142523. November 27, 2001]

MARIANO L. GUMABON, JOSEFA GUMABON TOLENTINO, TERESA GUMABON EUGENIO,

MARIO GUEVARRA, FAUSTINO GUMABON ONDEVILLA, WILFREDO GUMABON,
GUILLERMO GUMABON, BRAULIO GUMABON and NOEL DOLOJAN, petitioners,
vs. AQUILINO T. LARIN, respondent.

Facts:
Thirty-nine years later, petitioners filed a complaint against respondent before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Quezon City, seeking the return of the certificate of title from Larin who, it was alleged, refused to
hand over the certificate despite the full payment, nearly seven times the original amount, of their loan. In his
answer with counterclaim, respondent averred that the transaction was not, as petitioners so asserted, an
equitable mortgage but a true sale with a right to repurchase; that no repurchase amount was paid to him; and
that the period for the right of repurchase had already prescribed. Petitioners filed a reply together with a
motion to dismiss the counterclaim which asseverated that the counterclaim contained no certification of non-
forum shopping prescribed by Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On 07 November 1997,
the RTC dismissed the counterclaim on the basis of that technicality. The failure of respondent and his counsel
to submit a pre-trial brief, as well as to attend the pre-trial scheduled on 16 September 1997, enabled
petitioners, upon motion, to present their evidence ex-parte. Demurring to the evidence and contending that
petitioners had no right to the relief sought, respondent moved for the dismissal of the case. The RTC, in its
order of 06 May 1999, after noting the exceptions taken by respondent, admitted the offered exhibits of
petitioners, denied due course to the demurrer of respondent to the evidence, and gave petitioners thirty days
within which to submit their memorandum. On 18 May 1999, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
order asking, at the same time, for the inhibition of Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada from further hearing the
case. The motion was objected to by petitioners. Meanwhile, on 14 June 1999, petitioners filed their
memorandum. On 24 July 1999, Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada voluntarily inhibited herself.

Page 6 of 28
Issue:
Whether or not a trial court judge can motu proprio dismiss an action for its improper venue.

Held:
Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations. Improper venue not being included in the enumeration, it should follow that motu proprio
dismissal on said ground would still not be allowed under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

G.R. No. 77760 December 11, 1987

SPOUSES VIOLETA S. VENTURANZA and ROMY VENTURANZA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE BERNARDO P. PARDO, PRESIDING JUDGE
OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XLIII, HON. JUDGE ERNESTO
MADAMBA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH XVII AND NIEVES SENORAN, respondents.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint against spouses Violeta S. Venturanza
and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with MTC for collection of sums of money for loans evidenced by
promissory notes and due to non-payment became demandable.

2. The summons was served on the petitioners through the father who refused to sign the receipt. Due to
petitioners failure to file an Answer, the court rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay. However, the
said decision could not be served to petitioners address since they were no longer residing there, hence it was
served in the Office of Violeta at ADB.

3. The petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past Proceedings Null and Void for
Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there was no proper and valid service of summons upon them in accordance
with either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and that the court a quonever acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners, since the address where the summons was served is the
residence of Violeta S. Venturanza's father, and not on her address. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners
when the summons was served upon Augusto Soan’s address which is not the residence of petitioners

RULING:

NO.

1. There is no question that the case at bar which is an action for collection of sum of money, an action in
personam thereby requiring personal service of summons on the defendants. It is only when a defendant can
not be personally served with summons within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of.
For a substituted service to be valid, summons served at the defendant's residence must be served at his
residence at the time of such service and not at his former place of residence.

2. It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally serve the summons
and after this has failed, a substituted service may be caused upon the defendant, and the same must be
reflected in the proof of service. Upon examination of the sheriff 's Return in this case, no statement was made
that an effort or attempt was exerted to personally serve the summons on the defendants and that the same had
failed. In fact, said Return did not indicate the address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to
have been served. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not
applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective. CA decision reversed and set aside.

G.R. No. L-51058 January 27, 1992

Page 7 of 28
 ASIA PRODUCTION CO., INC., WANG TA PENG and WINSTON WANG, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAŃO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City, Branch XVIII), LOLITA LEE LE HUA and ALBERTO DY, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondents Lolita Lee Le Hua and Alberto Dy, claiming to be owners of a building constructed on a
leased lot, offered to sell the same to petitioner for P170,000.00. Despite the act of respondents assuring the
petitioners to have the contract of lease furnished tothe latter, the principal agreement was never reduced in
writing. Petitioners, relying on the good faith of respondents, later on issued eight (8) post-dated checks (one
worth P10,000; the restP20,000), and built a weaving factory on the leased area. However, respondents did
not execute the deed of sale, nor did they assign the lease contract in the name of petitioners; they only cashed
in the first two checks amounting toP30, 000. What’s worse, the lot owner refused to have the lease assigned to
petitioners, unless they agree to either continue the lease on a higher rental rate, or to purchase the land to
their loss. Petitioner had no option but to take their equipment and leave the premises. Afterwards, they
proceeded against respondents for refund of partial payment. Respondent Dy refused, claiming that an alleged
purchase of a building which is not evidenced by any writing cannot be proved by parol evidence in the said
situation, since Article 1356 in relation to Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that such sale should be in
writing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Dy’s contention regarding the application of Articles 1356and 1358 is correct.

RULING:

Deciding in favor of petitioners, the Supreme Court held the applicability of Article 1403of the Civil Cove:

xxx xxx xxx(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following
cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore,
of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:(a) An
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;(b) A special promise
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry;(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a
price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or
the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action, or pay at the time some part of the purchase money;
but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale,
of the amount and kind of property

[G.R. No. 116710. June 25, 2001]

DANILO D. MENDOZA, also doing business under the name and style of ATLANTIC
EXCHANGE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, FERNANDO MARAMAG, JR., RICARDO G. DECEPIDA and BAYANI
A. BAUTISTA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner was granted by respondent PNB a credit line for 500H and 1M for LoC/TR line. As security, the
former mortgaged properties. The REM provided for an escalation clause that rate of interest charged on the
obligation secured shall be subject to such increase, during the life of the contract, within the rates allowed by

Page 8 of 28
law. Two PNs were executed for the credit line and stipulated therein : with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
pa, until paid, with interest rate the Bank may, at any tie, without notice, raise within the limits allowed by law
xxx.” Thereafter, PNB advised Mendoza that the bank raised its interest rates to 14% pa, in ine with CBMB
Reso No 2126. Petitioner failed to payand requested for restructuring of loans. Two promissory notes were
signed by Mendoza and his wife. Petitioner testified that respondent allegedly inserted in first promissory note
No. 127/82 an interest rate of 21% instead of 18% covering the principal amount,and on the second promissory
note 128/82 the interest of 18% instead of 12% representing accrued interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the interests provided by respondent is proper.

HELD:

No. it appears that respondent bank increased the interest rates on the 2 promissory notes without prior
consent of the petitioner. The petitioner did not agree to the increase in the stipulated interest. As held in
several cases, the unilateral determination and imposition of increased interest rates by respondent bank is
violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts ordained in Art. 1308 of the CC.

[G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001]

MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. CIRIACO, LEON,

VICTORINA, TOMASA and PABLO, all surnamed DE GUIA, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 11, 1990, plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De Guia, Tomasa De Guia andIrene Manuel filed
with the court below a complaint for partition against defendants Ciriaco,Leon, Victorina and Pablo De Guia.
They alleged that the real properties therein described wereinherited by plaintiffs and defendants from their
predecessors-in-interest, and that the latterunjustly refused to have the properties subdivided among them.
Shortly after defendants filedtheir traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower court, in which
plaintiff TomasaDe Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had become an
unwillingco-plaintiff.on June 11, 1992, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-
trialconference on June 18, 1992 at 8:30 a.m. Copies of said notices were sent by registered mail toparties and
their counsel. It turned out that both defendants and counsel failed to attend thepre-trial conference. Hence,
upon plaintiffs motion, defendants were declared as in default andplaintiffs were allowed to present their
evidence ex-parte.On July 6, 1992, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the June 16, 1992Order
which declared them as in default.In an Order dated August 19, 1992, plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was
denied andon June 11, 1993, judgment was rendered ordering the partition of the controverted parcels
ofland.The CA sustained respondents claim that the trial court had improperly declared them indefault. It held
that the Notice of pretrial received by their counsel a day before the hearing didnot bind the clients, because
the Rules of Court in effect at the time mandated separate serviceof such Notice upon the parties and
their counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not he Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred innot finding private
respondents as in default despite the existence of fraud, for being contrary tolaw, and for being contrary to the
findings of the trial court.

HELD:

No.

In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or afterthe pretrial scheduled
on the morning of that day. Moreover, although the Notice was also sentto their counsel, it did not contain any
imposition or directive that he inform his clients of thepretrial conference. The Notice merely stated: You are
hereby notified that the above-entitledcase will be heard before this court on the 18th day of June, 1992,
Page 9 of 28
at 8:30 a.m. for pre-trial. Suchbelated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents,
amounted to a lack ofnotice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default and in denying them
theopportunity to fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.

[G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003]

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY,respondents.

FACTS:

Seventeen year-old Gina S. Rey, respondent, was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she
met Jacinto Saguid, petitioner, in Marinduque sometime in July 1987. The two decided to cohabit as husband
and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father. Petitioner made a living as the patron of their
fishing vessel while Gina on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in
Japan. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. Respondent filed a
complaint for partition and recovery of personal property with receivership against the petitioner. She prayed
that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of Php70,000.00,
representing her contribution to the construction of their house be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there are actual contributions from the parties.

HELD:

Yes. It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and a woman who are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required. In the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, it has been ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is
without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegations that they contributed money in the purchase
of the disputed properties. Furthermore, it has also been held that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous

[G.R. No. 127064. August 31, 1999]

FIVE STAR BUS COMPANY INC., and IGNACIO TORRES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE JAIME F. BAUTISTA, RTC-Br. 75, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
SAMUEL KING SAGARAL II, respondents.

FACTS:

One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while driving a bus owned by Five Star Bus
Company collided with a mini-van driven by Samuel King Sagaral II. Sagaral filed a civil action for damages
against Five Star Bus Company and Torres. The civil case dragged for four years by reason of the bus
company’s lawyer’s repeated request to reset the hearing of the case. Until the trial court issued an order which

Page 10 of 28
considered the case submitted for resolution. The bus company’s lawyer filed for a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied.
The bus company’s lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but the latter court
summarily dismissed the petition because said petition’s affidavit of non-forum shopping was not signed by the
plaintiff or any of its representatives but rather it was signed by the lawyer. The lawyer explained that his
signing was an oversight and that he was in a haste to submit the petition at the earliest possible time in order
to protect his client’s interest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company should prosper.

HELD:
No. Circular No. 28-91 issued by the Supreme Court requiring that the affidavit of non-forum shopping should
be executed and signed by the plaintiff is a strict requirement. Circular No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a
party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different tribubals, for such practice
works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure. Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice
that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes
improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described as
deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
But the Supreme Court has relaxed this rule several times prior to this case when there is substantial
compliance, why is it not relaxed in this case?
It is true that said Circular requires that it be strictly complied with but such merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. In the case at bar however,
the reasons provided by Five Star’s lawyer are flimsy and frail. Further, the case has been dragging on for years
and such delay is mostly attributed to Five Star’s lawyer.

RUBEN SAW, DIONISIO SAW, LINA S. CHUA, LUCILA S. RUSTE AND EVELYN
SAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO P. PARDO, Presiding Judge of Branch
43, (Regional Trial Court of Manila), FREEMAN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, FREEMAN INCORPORATED,
SAW CHIAO LIAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY, and DEPUTY
SHERIFF ROSALIO G. SIGUA, respondents.

FACTS:

A collection suit with preliminary attachment was filed by Equitable Banking Corporation against Freeman,
Inc. and Saw Chiao Lian, its President and General Manager. The petitioners moved to intervene, alleging that
(1) the loan transactions between Saw Chiao Lian and Equitable Banking Corp. were not approved by the
stockholders representing at least 2/3 of corporate capital; (2) Saw Chiao Lian had no authority to contract
such loans; and (3) there was collusion between the officials of Freeman, Inc. and Equitable Banking Corp. in
securing the loans. The motion to intervene was denied, and the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, Equitable and Saw Chiao Lian entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to and
was approved by the lower court. But because it was not complied with, Equitable secured a writ of execution,
and two lots owned by Freeman, Inc. were levied upon and sold at public auction to Freeman Management and
Development Corp.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have legal interest on the matter in order for them to intervene in the said action.

RULING:

Viewed in the light of Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court affirms the respondent court's
holding that petitioners herein have no legal interest in the subject matter in litigation so as to entitle them to

Page 11 of 28
intervene in the proceedings below. In the case of Batama Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
v. Rosal, we held: "As clearly stated in Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, to be permitted to intervene
in a pending action, the party must have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties or an interest against both, or he must be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of the property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof."

To allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
otherwise qualified; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second.

The interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties of the action could be allowed to
intervene, proceedings will become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. And this is not the
policy of the law.

The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, and which would
put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of
which plaintiff could not recover.

Here, the interest, if it exists at all, of petitioners-movants is indirect, contingent, remote, conjectural,
consequential and collateral. At the very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a
right in the management of the corporation and to share in the profits thereof and in the properties and assets
thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate debts and obligations.

While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the corporation, it does
not vest the owner thereof with any legal right or title to any of the property, his interest in the corporate
property being equitable or beneficial in nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense the owners of corporate
property, which is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal person.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated as interrogatories to plaintiff as
well as a motion for production and inspection of documents. PCGG claims that the documents sought to be
produced are privileged in character and their use is proscribed by the immunity provisions of E.O.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner can object to the interrogatories served to it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules
of Court.

HELD:

NO. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent.
But it is axiomatic that in filing in action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from
suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant.

Page 12 of 28
 ARCANGEL GUTIB, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:

Gutib and others were charged with qualified theftt before the RTC. After the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution, Gutib and Caballes filed their separate demurrers to the evidence with prior leave of court. The
judge denied Gutib's demurrer for lack of factual and legal basis but granted B's demurrer. Gutib elevated the
matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioners demurrer to evidence.

2. Whether or not petition for certiorari is the proper, appropriate and available remedy to question the
trial courts order denying the demurrer to evidence.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals held that certiorari does not lie to challenge the trial court's interlocutory order denying a
motion to dismiss by way of a demurrer to the evidence. According to respondent appellate court, the proper
remedy was for the accused to present his evidence during the trial after which the court, on its own
assessment of the evidence submitted by both parties, would then render its judgment of acquittal or
conviction. If the verdict is one of acquittal the case ends there. But if it is one of the convictions, then appeal is
the proper recourse.18 But the rule is not absolute and admits of an exception. Thus where, as in the instant
case, the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial on certiorari.

Moreover, it has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice
in certiorari proceedings.19The cases in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so would
be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not
wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
our superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case "as the ends of justice may require." So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

This case presents compelling and exceptional facts which call for this appropriate remedy. As discussed
elsewhere, petitioner satisfactorily demonstrated in his exhaustive demurrer to the evidence that the
prosecution failed to prove the very crime for which he was being held to answer and, hence, there was no
reason to hold him for trial. Indeed, an accused is always presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
Parenthetically, he has the right to be protected against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; to be
secure from and open and public accusation of a crime; and, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial. Similarly situated is the state, which must be shielded at all times from useless and expensive litigations
that only contribute to the clogging of court dockets and lay heavy toll on its limited time and meager
resources. For this reason, it is better on balance that we look beyond procedural requirements and overcome
the ordinary disinclination to exercise our supervisory powers. And this, to the end that the orders issued below
may be controlled "to make them conformable to law and justice.''

[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759. February 27, 2003]

JIMMY T. GO and ATTY. GREGORIO D. CAEDA JR., complainants, vs. JUDGE ZEUS C.
ABROGAR, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 150, Makati City, respondent.
FACTS:

Page 13 of 28
Complainants Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Gregorio D. Caeda Jr., his lawyer of record, question respondent judge’s
order dismissing their appeal from the Decision in the civil case. They allege that respondent Judge did not
possess the authority to do so nor rule that the judgment was ripe for execution, the same being reserved in the
Court of Appeals.
They assert that the judgment against Go was not yet final and executory in view of the filing of a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition assailing the dismissal of their appeal.
Complainants further aver that respondent Judge was so incompetent a judge that he merely relied upon
the opinion of Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora when the former gave the go-signal to proceed with the auction sale
of Gos supposed properties, as they were in fact sold. Finally, they fault respondent Judge for not postponing
the auction sale despite the pendency then of their motion to quash the writ of execution and their third-party
adverse claim.
The record shows that complainant Jimmy T. Go received copy of the Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 on 20
October 1999, and on 5 November 1999 moved for its reconsideration and/or for new trial. Respondent Judge
denied the motion in his Order of 17 December 1999 for lack of merit.
On 3 January 2000, alleging that the fifteen (15) - day reglementary period to perfect appeal had already
expired on 4 November 1999, or a day before the filing of the motion for reconsideration and/or new
trial, International Exchange Bank as plaintiff in the civil case moved for the execution of the judgment against
Go.
On 5 January 2000 complainant Go filed his notice of appeal from the Decision, and at the same time opposed
the motion for execution. In the meantime, Gos co-defendant Alberto T. Looyuko who appealed
the Decision on 4 November 1999, withdrew his notice of appeal on 8 February 2000 prior to the transmittal of
the original record of the civil case to the Court of Appeals and expressed conformity to the execution of the
judgment against his properties.
On 8 February 2000 respondent Judge dismissed the appeal taken by Jimmy T. Go for having been taken out
of time. Respondent Judge found that copy of the Decision was served upon Gos counsel of record on 20
October 1999 and that the period to appeal expired on 4 November 1999 a working day. This fact rendered the
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial filed on 5 November 1999 already a day late.
On 14 February 2000 respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of plaintiff bank to
implement the Decision of 7 October 1999 against the goods and chattels of the defendants and in case of
insufficiency thereof against the real property of the said defendants and to sell the same or so much thereof in
the manner provided for by law for the satisfaction of said judgment.
As a result of the enforcement of the writ, 81,566 shares in China Banking Corporation registered in the name
of Alberto T. Looyuko were levied upon.
On 18 February 2000 complainant Go moved to quash the writ of execution on the ground that
the Decision was not final and executory as to him and that the writ of execution was issued without the benefit
of any hearing.
Not content with the motion to quash, complainants also filed a third-party adverse claim under Sec. 16, Rule
39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureover one-half () of the 81,566 shares of stock that had been calendared for
public sale. On 21 February 1999 the sale on execution took place as scheduled with plaintiff bank buying the
shares of stock for P64,000,000.00.
Atty. Gregorio D. Caeda Jr., as new counsel of record of complainant Go, did not attend the 3 March 2000
hearing of his clients motion to quash. In the interest of justice, respondent Judge reset the hearing to 8 March
2000, although this setting was again aborted by complainants on 7 March 2000 when they filed
a Manifestation requesting the cancellation of the hearing. Complainants argued that their motion had become
moot with the sale of the 81,566 shares of stock.
Meanwhile, while their third-party adverse claim and motion to quash the writ of execution were pending,
complainants filed a complaint for the annulment of the auction sale with damages and injunction based on
Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On 4 March 2000 complainants also filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57572. As in their pending complaint for annulment, they assailed the
writ of execution issued by respondent Judge in favor of plaintiff International Exchange Bank as well as the
formers prior orders denying Gos motion for reconsideration and/or new trial; dismissing his notice of appeal;
and authorizing the issuance of a writ of execution.
On 19 April 2000 respondent Judge issued a second writ of execution directing Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora to
levy on the properties of complainant Jimmy Go and to sell the properties to satisfy the Decision in Civil Case
No. 98-791 in full.
On 15 May 2000 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 denying Gos petition
for lack of merit and affirming in toto the orders of respondent Judge, most notably the declaration of
Page 14 of 28
respondents Decision in the civil case as final and executory, and the validity of the writ of execution. The
motion for reconsideration of this Decision is said to be still pending in the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his Notice of Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shouldbe given due
course despite having been filed late.

HELD:
We are not impressed by complainants allegations.
Firstly, prior to the transmittal of the original record of Civil Case No. 98-791 to the appellate court, Judge
Abrogar possessed the authority under Sec. 13, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an appeal for
having been taken out of time. In the instant case, there is no question that respondent Judge dismissed the
appeal on 8 February 2000 within the period reserved to him by our rules of procedure.
Moreover, the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to
maintain the relevance of Sec. 7, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that the petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

So construed, in Eternal Gardens Memorial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the rule of judicial courtesy would apply
only if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and
moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. Unfortunately for complainants,
this circumstance is not present in the decision of respondent Judge to issue on 19 April 2000 a second writ of
execution.

In any event, the effort of a judge to ask for an advice or opinion upon a non-confidential matter from his own
staff is not a badge of judicial incompetence and infirmity. The information that could be offered, as the
words advice and opinion connote, would only be recommendatory in nature while the final decision on the
subject remains the prerogative of the judge himself.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed ad interim Justice of the Peace of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental, by President Carlos P.
Garcia on December 13, 1961. He took his oath of office on December 29, 1961, and on April 27, 1962 his
appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

From the time he took his oath of office petitioner immediately entered into the discharge of his official
functions, but when the new administration took over in 1962, petitioner was advised by the Department of
Justice that his appointment as such justice of the peace was included among those recalled in Administrative
Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.

Petitioner requested reconsideration contending that his appointment cannot be considered within the ambit
of said administrative order, but his request was denied by the Secretary of Justice, and so on February 21,
1962 Pacifico S. Bulado was appointed in his place by virtue of Administrative Order No. 9. Bulado assumed
office up to September 15, 1964 when respondent took over as Justice of the Peace of Guihulñgan, Negros
Oriental. However, on May 27, 1962, petitioner wrote to Acting Justice of the Peace Bulado requiring him to
turnover to him the office he was holding in view of the Commission on Appointments but the request was
disregarded by Bulado. And on November 4, 1964, petitioner commenced the present petition for quo
warranto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action should be barred by the Statute of limitations.

Page 15 of 28
HELD:

There is merit in the claim of respondent that the instant action is already barred by the statute of limitations
for the reason that more than one year had elapsed since its cause of action arose. Thus, it appears that when
petitioner was informed by the Secretary of Justice that his appointment was one of those recalled by President
Macapagal to his Administrative Order No. 2 he vacated the same on February 21, 1962 on which date Pacifico
S. Bulado was appointed in his place. Since then he ceased to be in office, though he later claimed that his
removal was illegal because it does then more than one year had already elapsed. The following authorities
uphold this view.

In actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one
year. The reason for the rule in limiting the prescriptive period to one year is that it is not proper that the title,
to a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty for the people's interest requires that such right be
determined as speedily as possible

G.R. No. L-32818 June 28, 1974

CRISANTO CORNEJO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

THE AUDITOR GENERAL, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE CITY MAYOR OF
PASAY, THE CITY COUNCIL OF PASAY CITY, THE CITY AUDITOR OF PASAY CITY,
THE CITY TREASURER OF PASAY CITY, and SPECIAL COUNSEL ADELINO A.
SANCHEZ OF PASAY CITY, Respondents.

FACTS:

On April 4, 1960, Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag appointed petitioner to the position of Special Counsel
created by the Municipal Board of Pasay City to assist the City Attorney in the discharge of his duties, with an
annual compensation of P3,600.00, payable by said City.

Sometime in December 1963, a certain Teofilo L. Amante filed an administrative complaint for dishonesty and
willfull failure to pay debts against petitioner with the Department of Justice.

An investigation was conducted by the Department Justice through State Prosecutor Alfredo Laya, who
recommended petitioner's dismissal. On May 19, 1966, the Commissioner of Civil Service, concurring in the
findings and recommendation of the investigator, rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty
and willful failure to pay just debts and considering him resigned from the service effective on his last day of
duty with pay.

On July 1, 1966, respondent Adelino A. Sanchez was appointed by the Secretary of Justice through
Undersecretary Claudio Teehankee to the position of Special Counsel Pasay City, deemed vacated on account of
petitioner's dismissal. The appointment was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service as provisional
under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260, effective upon its approval and Sanchez' assumption of office, but
not earlier than August 23, 1966.

On September 17, 1966, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Commissioner Civil
Service on the grounds that he was denied due process of law and that the decision was not supported by
evidence. On March 7, 1969, the Commissioner rendered a resolution setting aside his decision of May 19,
1966, and ordering a new investigation on the ground that in the original investigation petitioner had been
denied due process. Pending reinvestigation, petitioner sought his reinstatement.

The reinvestigation of the case was assigned by the Department of Justice to State Prosecutor Leonardo B.
Canares, who, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Justice dated February 24, 1970, recommended "favorable
action on the petition for reinstatement to any of the prosecution service under the Department pending
reinvestigation of the case," because petitioner had never been preventively suspended from office, and the
decision considering him resigned had been set aside by the Commissioner of Civil Service

This was followed on March 11, 1970, by Cañares' "Report, Findings and Recommendation," wherein he
recommended "the dismissal of the instant case for insufficiency of evidence," and petitioner's exoneration.
The said report, copy of which was furnished the Civil Service Commissioner, was transmitted to the Secretary
Page 16 of 28
of Justice under a covering letter of even date. The report was not, however, approved by the Secretary of
Justice.

On April 22, 1970, the Commissioner of Civil Service, in a second indorsement on State Prosecutor Cañarez'
Memorandum of February 24, 1970, recommending petitioner's reinstatement, granted petitioner's request for
reinstatement. On May 4, 1970, Mayor Jovito O. Claudio of Pasay City in a third indorsement, addressed to the
City Fiscal, referred the matter for implementation of the Commissioner's reinstatement order.

In an indorsement to the City Auditor dated May 29, 1970, the City Fiscal stated that "as far as this office is
concerned, it is Mr. Adelino A. Sanchez who is officially and actually holding the position [of Special Counsel]
and who renders service up to the present." And in what appears to be a fourth indorsement on Canarez'
memorandum, the said City Fiscal referred the matter to Secretary of Justice Felix V. Makasiar, who, in a fifth
indorsement dated June 16, 1970, stated that "the case of Mr. Crisanto Cornejo is already a closed matter," not
only because his motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner's decision was filed beyond the thirty-day
period prescribed in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 2260, but also because he must "be deemed to have
abandoned his office by his failure to seasonably take the appropriate remedy to secure his reinstatement, first,
when his motion for reconsideration [assuming that it was really filed on time] was not acted upon for years
and, second, when that Commission set aside its May 19, 1966, decision."

On July 3, 1970, the City Fiscal, in an indorsement to the City Mayor, opined that the requested reinstatement
of petitioner "cannot be done and therefore ought to be denied by that Office on the basis of the 5th
indorsement of Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, Secretary of Justice.

Subsequently, on October 12, 1970, the Commissioner of Civil Service wrote a letter to the Secretary of Justice,
explaining in the said letter that ruled that the approval of the appointment of Mr. Adelino A. Sanchez is hereby
revoked effective upon receipt hereof," and "Mr. Cornejo is reinstated as Special Counsel in Mr. Sanchez' stead
without prejudice to the outcome of the reinvestigation of the case against Mr. Cornejo."

On October 29, 1970, petitioner addressed a letter to the Secretary of Justice making a final bid for
reinstatement, otherwise he would be constrained to take the matter to court. On November 23, 1970,
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in an indorsement of the letter of the Commissioner of Civil Service
of October 12, 1970, refused to reinstate petitioner, giving as reasons therefor the finality of the decision
dismissing petitioner from the service; that the appointment of Sanchez had already become irrevocable, and
that petitioner's reinstatement would involve the extension to him of another appointment by the
Commissioner of Civil Service who is without power to appoint a Special Counsel in Pasay City.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service was timely
filed; and

Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process of law in the original investigation of the administrative
complaint filed by Teofilo Amante conducted by state Prosecutor Alfredo Laya;

Whether this action was timely filed by the petitioner.

HELD:

Section 36 of Republic Act No. 2260 [Civil Service Act of 1959] and the Civil Service Rules provide that a
motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered by the Commissioner of Civil Service may be filed within
thirty [30] days after receipt of the decision by the party adversely affected.

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on September 17, 1966. What is debated is the date on which
petitioner received a copy of the Commissioner's decision. Petitioner, on the one hand, contends that he
received it on August 18, 1966, while respondents on the other hand, allege that petitioner received it on June
8, 1966. This Court is inclined to uphold the respondents on this point.

Consequently, the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service considering petitioner resigned from the
service became final on July 8, 1966. Hence, the proceedings on petitioner's case taken after said date,

Page 17 of 28
including those that relate to petitioners motion for reconsideration and the resolution of the Commissioner of
Civil Service setting aside his May 19, 1966 decision, are without any legal effect.

The investigation of the case conducted by Special Prosecutor Cañarez was a mistake that cannot prejudice the
State since it is in violation of an express provision and policy of the law.

(I)n the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous
notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard .

The record does not show that petitioner ever filed an answer to the complaint, much less elected a formal
investigation pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 2260, in spite of the unequivocal language of the first
and third indorsements quoted above. Petitioner himself does not claim that he did. Respondents' assertion
that there was no such answer and/or election, therefore, stands uncontradicted. Consequently, the
investigation could well proceed without notice to petitioner before each hearing and the Constitutional
injunction on due process was not disregarded.

There is in respondents' favor, the presumption that "official duty has been regularly performed" [Rule 131,
Section 5(m)]. That presumption has not been overcome; instead it has been strengthened by the fact admitted
by petitioner that he was present at one of the hearings, i.e., on July 14, 1964.

Consequently, this is a petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, as petitioner
alleges that he is entitled to a public office which is allegedly usurped or unlawfully held and exercised by
another. The action to recover the office of Special Counsel or Fourth Assistant Fiscal of Pasay City should have
been commenced within one (1) year after the ouster of the petitioner from the office and his failure to do so is
fatal to his pretension.

The pendency of the administrative remedies that petitioner sought to exhaust did not operate to suspend the
running of the one-year period within which a petition to recover the office should be filed

METROPOLITAN BANK vs. WONG, 359 SCRA 608

FACTS:

Sometime in 1976, the Mindanao Grains, Inc. (MGI for brevity), through its officers Wenceslao Buenaventura
and Faustino Go, applied for a credit accommodation with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (herein
petitioner) to finance its rice and corn warehousing business. As a security for such credit accommodation,
respondent Francisco Y. Wong, and his wife Betty C. Wong executed in favor of petitioner a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land consisting of 31, 292 square meters located at Campo 7, Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur and registered in respondents name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 11758.
On April 11, 1980, due to MGIs failure to pay the obligation secured by the real estate mortgage, petitioner filed
an application for extra-judicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135. A notice of foreclosure sale was published
in Pagadian Times once, for three consecutive weeks (May 18-25, 1980, May 26-June 2, 1980 and June 2-8,
1980), setting the auction sale of the mortgaged property on June 5, 1980. No notice was posted in the
municipality or city where the mortgaged property was situated.
As a consequence, MGI, through its president, Simeon Chang (Chang), requested petitioner to postpone the
scheduled auction sale from June 5, 1980 to July 7, 1980. Petitioner granted the request.Thereafter, Chang and
petitioner agreed that should MGI pay P20,000.00 on or before the scheduled auction sale, the same would be
postponed for a period of 60 days. Chang paid the amount on November 3, 1981. Despite such payment, Sheriff
Deo Bontia proceeded with the auction sale on November 23, 1981. Petitioner was adjudged the sole and
highest bidder. Thus, a certificate of sale was issued to petitioner. The sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds on the same day. After the expiration of the one (1) year redemption period, ownership over the property
was consolidated and TCT No. T-17853 was correspondingly issued in the name of petitioner.
Respondent, unaware of the foregoing developments, applied for a credit accommodation with the Producers
Bank of the Philippines, Iloilo City, using as security his TCT No. 11758. It was only then when he learned that
his property was already foreclosed by petitioner and no longer in his name.
Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City a complaint for
reconveyance and damages against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur. Respondent, in
his complaint, assailed the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale basically on the ground that petitioner
did not comply with the requirements of Section 3, Act No. 3135 that notice shall be given by posting notices of
the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be
published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality and city.
Page 18 of 28
During the pendency of the case, petitioner sold the disputed property to a certain Betty Ong Yu.
After hearing, the trial court decreed dismissal of defendant banks counterclaim for lack of merit.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with modification in the sense that the
monetary awards

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court of appeals erred in ruling that the foreclosure sale conducted on
November 23, 1981 was legally infirm for noncompliance with the statutory requirements of posting and
publication as provided for in act 3135, as amended.

HELD:

Succinct and unmistakable is the consistent pronouncement of this Court that it is not a trier of facts. And well-
entrenched is the doctrine that pure questions of fact may not be the subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of
law. Corollarily, non-compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in an extra-judicial
foreclosure is a factual issue. The resolution thereof by the lower courts is binding and conclusive upon this
Court.

The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the publication of the
same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary.Nevertheless, the
parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. In this case,
petitioner and respondent in entering into a contract of real estate mortgage, agreed inter alia:

all correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas, or notifications
of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR at 40-42 Aldeguer St. Iloilo City, or at
the address that may hereafter be given in writing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE.

While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagors failure to pay his
obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and every
requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must be
remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused
especially to the prejudice of others.

Anent the award of moral damages, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner acted in
bad faith in extra-judicially foreclosing the real estate mortgage and in selling the mortgaged property during
the pendency of the case in the trial court. To be sure, petitioner banks bad faith caused serious anxiety, mental
anguish and wounded feelings to its client, respondent herein. He is thus entitled to moral damages.
But while the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court, the
same when found excessive, should be reduced to more reasonable amounts considering the attendant facts
and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate
the moral sufferings he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. The award of moral
damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. Taking into consideration the
attending circumstances here, we are convinced that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is
exorbitant. Likewise, we find the exemplary damages and attorneys fees quite excessive.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES vs. CA, 373 SCRA 513

FACTS:

Page 19 of 28
Manila Gas Corporation (petitioner), a government controlled corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land
situated at the eastern side of Sanciangco Street, Paco, Manila with two frontages on the northern side of Paz
M. Guanzon Street containing an area of 12,600 square meters, more or less.

On November 9, 1982, petitioner entered into a contract of lease with Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (private
respondent) whereby it leased to the latter the aforesaid property for a period of ten (10) years
beginning November 15, 1982 up to November 15, 1992.

On November 22, 1982, the parties amended the contract by limiting the area to be covered by the lease to
12,189 square meters only, hereinafter referred to as the leased premises.

On September 17, 1991, private respondent wrote petitioner, advising it of its intention to extend the term of
the lease contract for another ten (10) years after its expiration on November 15, 1992, and reiterating its
previous offer to purchase the leased premises.

On October 28, 1991, petitioner advised private respondent that it could not grant its request for a 10-year
extension as it had already drawn up its final plans to sell the entire parcel which consists of 4 lots covered by 4
titles and containing a total area of 15, 469.50 sq. m. And petitioner invoked its right to pre-terminate the
contract under Clause 2 thereof, advising private respondent, however, to participate, if it wished, in the public
bidding.

On February 10, 1992, three bidders of the property in question including private respondent who made clear
that its participation should not be interpreted as a waiver of its option to purchase under the contract
tendered their respective offers. The law firm of Carag, Caballes, Jamora & Somera who made a bid for an
undisclosed client emerged as the highest bidder at P80,218,000.00 for the property in question.

Private respondent then informed petitioner, by letter of February 17, 1992, that it
was exercising its preferential right to purchase the property in question for the same amount as that tendered
by the highest bidder.

Petitioner returned the cashiers check to private respondent and, by letter of March 16, 1992 sent by its
counsel, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, formally demanded private respondent to vacate the
leased premises within 5 days from receipt thereof, alleging that its continued occupancy beyond February 25,
1992, the expiration of the 120-day grace period from October 29, 1991 given to it in accordance with the
contract had become unlawful.

Private respondent refused to leave the leased premises, however, hence, petitioner filed on April 15, 1992 the
present unlawful detainer case against it with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila.

Private respondent, as defendant, alleged in its Answer with Counterclaim that petitioner, as plaintiff, had
come to court with unclean hands, and had suppressed the true facts of the case in order to disguise it as one
for ejectment when it was not as the lease contract they entered into is coupled with interest; that at the most,
it is deemed to have purchased the leased premises at the terms and conditions of the highest bidder at the
negotiated sale proceedings on February 10, 1992 or, at the least, it is entitled to exercise its right of first
refusal; and that at the very least, it is entitled to a declaration that the lease is deemed renewed for another ten
(10) years beginning November 16, 1992.

On March 2, 1993, petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint averring that as the 10-year lease period had
already expired, the continued occupancy by private respondent of the leased premises had become unlawful
and without bases irrespective of whether or not the contract of lease was preterminated. Private respondent,
in its Supplemental Answer with Counterclaim, countered that petitioner is barred by estoppel and laches from
invoking the automatic expiration of the contract.

During the pendency of the ejectment case before the MTC, a certain Santiago Cua (Cua) filed a case for
injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against petitioner seeking to enjoin petitioner from
proceeding with its bidding of the property in question, claiming that he was the highest bidder in a previous
bidding and, therefore, petitioner should award and sell the same to it. . Private respondent intervened in said

Page 20 of 28
case, invoking its right of first refusal. Cua later moved to dismiss the case which was granted. The dismissal
was appealed by private respondent to this Court and is now pending consideration.

On April 14, 1994, private respondent filed at the RTC of Manila a case against petitioner and Cua, docketed as
Civil Case No. 94-70140, seeking to annul the sale of a 3,198.80 square meter lot covered by TCT 39482
executed by petitioner in favor of Cua, which lot does not form part of the property in question.

In a decision of June 16, 1994, the MTC rejected private respondents position and upheld
petitioners pretermination of the lease contract due to the absence of a mutual agreement by the parties for its
extension. The MTC held that since the parties failed to reach a mutual agreement on the purchase of the
leased premises, there is no basis in concluding that private respondent had purchased the same; and that
the pendency of the two other civil cases was not a bar to the resolution of the ejectment case.

Private respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC of Manila .

On June 2, 1995, respondent court, Branch 34 of the RTC of Manila to which the appeal was raffled, rendered a
decision remanding to the Court a quo with further order to hold the enforcement of the decision in abeyance
pending final decision of the cases.

On August 28, 1995, respondent Manila Gas Corporation filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of
the regional trial court decision.On December 1, 1993, petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. filed an answer
to the petition.
On March 13, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decisionreversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch.
On April 7, 1998, petitioner ESLI filed a motion for reconsiderationof the decision. On October 19, 1998, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. has unlawfully withheld possession of the subject
premises from respondent Manila Gas Corporation.

HELD:

We deny the petition.

An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.

In Co Tiamco v. Diaz,we emphasized that the principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry
and detainer are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which may be restored as
promptly as possible, and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary
delays should be carefully avoided. Such cases are designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved.
In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,independently of any claim of
ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading. As incidents of the main issue of
possession de facto, the inferior court can decide the questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between
the parties is one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is a lease contract between the parties, the
period of such lease contract and whether or not the lease contract has already expired; (c) the just and
reasonable amount of the rentand the date when it will take effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep the
premises against the will of the landlord; and (e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial and
Page 21 of 28
valuable building and there is no dispute between the parties as to the ownership of the land and the building,
their rights according to the Civil Code. Defendants claim of ownership of the property from which plaintiff
seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the action of forcible entry
and detainer.
As heretofore stated, petitioners right of first refusal could be settled in the appropriate court hearing the
case. However, in the ejectment case, it is enough that the lease earlier enteredinto by the parties has expired
and petitioner is unlawfully withholding possession of the premises from its owner, the Manila Gas
Corporation. Hence, petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. may be evicted therefrom.

TIRONA VS. HON. FLORO ALEJO, 367 SCRA 17

FACTS:

On March 25, 1996, herein petitioners sued private respondent Luis Nuez before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Branch 81. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 6633 for ejectment.Petitioners claimed to be
owners of various fishpond lots located at Coloong, Valenzuela.[2] They alleged, among others that: (1) on
January 20, 1996, private respondent Nuez, by means of force, stealth, or strategy, unlawfully entered the said
fishpond lots and occupied the same against their will, thereby depriving them of possession of said fishponds;
(2) Nuez illegally occupied a house owned by and built on the lot of petitioner Deo Dionisio; and (3) Nuez
unlawfully operated and used petitioners fishponds, despite their demands to vacate the same. Petitioners
prayed that the court order Nuez to vacate Dionisios house; surrender possession of the fishponds to them;
remove all milkfish fingerlings at his expense; and pay a monthly compensation of P29,000.00 from January
20, 1996 to the time he surrenders possession, with interest at twelve percent (12%) yearly until fully paid.
Nuez admitted in his answer that petitioners owned the fishponds, but denied the other allegations. He raised
the following affirmative defenses: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, for petitioners failure to
allege prior physical possession in their complaint; (2) petitioners action was premature in view of the
pendency of a complaint he filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
docketed as Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R, where the issue of possession in the concept of tenancy is the same as
that raised by petitioners in Civil Case No. 6633; and (3) petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping since they
were fully aware of the said DARAB case. He moved that the ejectment suit be dismissed.
On October 1, 1996, the MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 81, decided Civil Case No. 6633 rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant and all persons claiming rights under him.
On November 15, 1996, Nuez appealed said decision to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, which docketed
the appeal as Civil Case No. 5093-V-97.
On March 25, 1996, petitioners also instituted Civil Case No. 6632 for ejectment against private respondent
Juanito Ignacio with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 82. The allegations were essentially
the same as those against private respondent Nuez, except it is alleged that Ignacio also illegally occupied the
house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to the plaintiff Spouses Ma. Paz D. Bautista and Cesar Bautista.
Petitioners sought the same relief prayed for in Civil Case No. 6633.
Ignacio raised similar defenses as those offered by Nuez in Civil Case No. 6633. Like Nuez, he also moved for
dismissal of the ejectment suit against him.
On February 11, 1997, the MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 82 issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 6632
against Ignacio.
On May 6, 1997, petitioners filed with the RTC a joint Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint in Civil Cases
Nos. 6632 and 6633 and a Motion for Reconsideration, together with the proposed Amended Complaints. On
May 20, 1997, the RTC denied the aforementioned motions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the lower court erred in giving prime importance to the failure of plaintiffs to aver in their
complaint(s) that they were in possession at the time of the forcible entry made by private respondents.

Page 22 of 28
Whether or not the lower court erred in failing to make a finding that plaintiffs were in possession of their
properties at the time of forcible entry thereunto by private respondents, for which reliefs should have
been granted to herein petitioners.
Whether or not the pendency of the suit filed by private respondents in the department of agrarian reform
did not proscribe the institution of the ejectment case(s).
Whether or not there had been no infraction on the affidavit of non-forum shopping requirements.

HELD:

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the rule is no different in
actions for ejectment.Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action is one for forcible entry falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are to be examined.

Petitioners submit that the phrase thereby depriving said owners of the possession of the same in paragraph 4
is tantamount to an averment of prior physical possession since private respondents could not have deprived
them of possession unless the latter had been previously in possession of the subject properties.
We are not persuaded. It cannot be inferred from the aforecited phrase that the possession that petitioners
were supposedly deprived of is a prior physical possession. The question arises, what sort of prior physical
possession is to be averred? The word possession as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, means
nothing more than physical possession, (stress supplied) not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil
law.The allegation must likewise show priority in time. Both requisites are wanting in the phrase relied upon by
petitioners.
A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners action was one for forcible
entry, not unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry,
the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived
thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in
forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes
illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings
filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and
set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical
possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the
means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy,
and stealth. Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior physical
possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their
possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to petitioners actions before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No reversible
error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no
jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession
by petitioners.
At the outset, we must point out that petitioners reliance upon Republic Act No. 7881 is off tangent. It is not
disputed that at the time of the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633, an agrarian relations dispute was
pending before the DARAB. The records show that private respondents as the complainants in Case No. IV-
MM-0099-95R, were asserting tenancy rights, including the right to possession of the disputed fishponds or
parts thereof, under Republic Act Nos. 3844and 1199. Private respondents were thus claiming vested
substantive rights, dating back to 1975 in the case of respondent Ignacio and 1979 in the case of respondent
Nuez, under substantive laws. A substantive law is a law, which creates, defines, or regulates rights concerning
life, liberty, or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public
affairs. Republic Act No. 7881, in exempting prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, is a substantive law. By its very nature and essence, substantive
law operates prospectively[21] and may not be construed retroactively without affecting previous or past
rights. Hence, in view of the absence of a contrary intent in its provisions, Republic Act No. 7881 should be
given a prospective operation and may not affect rights claimed under previous agrarian legislation.
Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, litis pendentia or pendency of another action is a ground for the
dismissal of the second action. Recall that in the motions to dismiss filed by private respondents in Civil Cases
Nos. 6632 and 6633, the pendency of the DARAB case was one of the grounds relied upon in seeking the
dismissal of both actions. For litis pendentia to lie, the following requisites must be satisfied:

Page 23 of 28
 1. Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for;
3. The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis; and

4. Identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under
consideration.

These requisites, in our view, are present in this case. For one, the parties in the DARAB case and in the
forcible entry cases filed with the MeTC are the same. Also, there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for. The action in Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R is for declaration of tenancy, accounting, recovery of
possession, specific performance, recovery of sum of money, plus damages against petitioners. Note that the
properties that private respondents seek to recover possession of in the DARAB case form part of the properties
from which petitioners seek the ejectment of private respondents. The evident and logical conclusion then is
that any decision that may be rendered in the DARAB case regarding the question of possession will also
resolve the question of possession in the forcible entry cases.Undergirding the principle of litis pendentia is the
theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the
same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same matter should not be subject of
controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake
of the stability in the rights and status of persons. The MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 82, recognized this doctrine
when it dismissed Civil Case No. 6632 to avoid the possibility of two contradictory decisions on the question of
possession emanating from the DARAB and the trial court. In turn, the RTC was correct in finding that the
issue of possession was inextricably intertwined with the agrarian dispute, an issue which was beyond the
jurisdiction and competence of the inferior court to settle. In so doing, the RTC deferred to the primary
jurisdiction and administrative expertise of the DARAB to settle agrarian cases. Thus, we are constrained to
conclude that under the concept of litis pendentia, the pendency of DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R served
as a bar to the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633.
That there was a DARAB case pending involving the same parties with the same subject matter at the time
petitioners filed Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 is not contested. Petitioners admit that they assumed that the
issues in the agrarian case and the forcible entry cases were different and hence saw no need to report the
pendency of the former to the trial court in their certification of non-forum shopping.We fail to see the basis for
this assumption. The records disclose that the issue of possession as raised in the forcible entry cases is
necessarily included in the question of agricultural tenancy raised in the DARAB case. Note that petitioners
actively participated in the latter case and thus, could not have been unaware that the possession of the subject
fishponds or parts thereof was in issue before the Board.Petitioners failure to see that paragraph 1(b), 1(c), or
1(d) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 applied to them is simply incomprehensible. We agree with the RTC
in certifying under oath that they have no knowledge of any case pending before any other tribunal or agency
involving the same issue raised in their forcible entry cases, petitioners were less than candid.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. Recall that as earlier discussed, the requisites of litis pendentia barred the filing of Civil Cases Nos.
6632 and 6633 given the pendency of DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R. Based thereon, the Regional Trial
Court correctly dismissed the forcible entry cases on the additional ground of forum shopping.

Page 24 of 28
 VDE de LEGASPI VS AVENDANO, 79 SCRA 135

FACTS:

On June 21, 1971, private respondent Jose O. Legaspi and Pilar O. Legaspi filed with the Municipal Court of San
Pedro, Laguna presided by respondent Judge Herce an action for forcible entry with preliminary injunction
against petitioner to recover a residential lot (Lot 17, Block 56, Poblacion "A", Tunasan Homesite at A. Mabini
Street of said municipality) on which the defendant had a building with a dancing hall and bowling alleys
therein, the plaintiffs being brother and sister and the defendant claiming to be the widow of a brother of said
plaintiffs. After said defendant had unsuccessfully moved for the dismissal of said case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, since the issue of ownership of the premises involved was being raised by her, she was declared in
default for having failed to file answer. Judgment was subsequently rendered against her, which became final,
and so a writ of execution and later an order of demolition were issued, whereupon, said defendant, herein
petitioner, instituted Civil Case No. 927, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 12, 1972, a special
civil action for certiorari to set aside the said proceedings. Petitioner succeeded in securing a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was however questioned by private respondent in an appropriate special civil
action in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01551.

On March 8, 1972, petitioner filed in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna another action, Civil Case No.
929, for quieting of the title over the lot in issue, and as a preliminary remedy therein, prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction likewise to suspend the demolition ordered by the municipal court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied, hence she came to this Court on October 1,
1973 for a review of the Court of Appeals decision, and on October 4, 1973.

In the meanwhile, on March 8, 1972, petitioner filed in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna another
action, Civil Case No. 929, for quieting of the title over the lot in issue, and as a preliminary remedy therein,
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction likewise to suspend the demolition ordered by the
municipal court. The record is not clear as to whether petition in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
01551 did actually involve both Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929

In due course, and after having previously issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the lower court
from further proceeding with Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929, the Court of Appeals rendered the following
judgment on July 9, 1973 in said CA-G.R. No. 01551:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered —

1. Annulling and setting aside the order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. B-927, Annexes GG and LL,
dated April 5, 1972, respectively, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued pursuant to said
orders;

2. Enjoining respondent Judge from hearing and deciding Civil Case No. B-927 which is hereby ordered
dismissed;

3. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case permanent; and

4. Ordering the private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied, hence she came to this Court on October 1,
1973 for a review of the Court of Appeals decision, and on October 4, 1973, the Court Resolved to DENY the
petition, without prejudice to petitioners' seeking injunction in Civil Case No. B-929 for quieting of title to real
property, pending in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, in Biñan.

This resolution eventually became final.

It turned out that as early as July 14, 1973, petitioner had already virtually pressed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 929 by filing a motion to that effect, apparently in reiteration of her
original prayer in the petition in said case of March 8, 1972. The proceedings relative to said motion were

Page 25 of 28
overtaken by Our above resolution of October 8, 1973. But evently misconstruing both Our resolution as well as
the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondent judge not only refused to grant petitioner's motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction but even to proceed with the trial on the merit of Civil Case No. 929, dismissing the
same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the final judgment in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 953 of the San Pedro court, should be
fully executed before the final termination of the action for quieting of title, Civil Case No. 929 in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.

HELD:

We do not hesitate in holding that respondent judge acted precipitately and the grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the orders complained of. Considering the basic nature of the controversy between petitioner and
private respondent which simply is who between them has the better right to the lot in question, the same
being up to the present a public land with a standing award apparently in favor of petitioner, but impugned by
said respondent, it is quite clear that the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case in the Municipal Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, Civil Case No. 953, is of very little consequence in the resolution of this case. It is
elementary that matters involving dominical rights are beyond the jurisdiction of municipal courts, except
chartered cities, hence the San Pedro court decision just mentioned may not be deemed to have in any manner
foreclosed the right of petitioner to retain possession of the subject lot so long as the appropriate judicial action
to determine petitioner's right thereto has not been finally terminated and the corresponding writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued.

Nowhere in the appellate court's opinion rendered in said case is any reference whatsoever made to the issue of
ownership raised by herein petitioner, much less is any mention at all made therein of Civil Case No. 929.
Rightly or wrongly, despite its having issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining proceedings in both
Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929, in its whole opinion, the Court of Appeals made no validly binding
pronouncement as regards the propriety of the filing by herein petitioner of the action for quieting title in Civil
Case No. 929. The appellate court limited itself exclusively to the issue of whether or not it was in order for the
Court of First Instance of Laguna to restrain in Civil Case No. 927, which involved no more than a petition for
certiorari against the inferior court premised on the sole proposition that said court had acted improvidently in
its Civil Case No. 953, the writ of execution and order of demolition issued by said inferior court.

Whenever the special circumstances obtaining permit it, for the sake of expediency and to save time in
indicating what should be done, the Supreme Court may dismiss petitions filed to correct errors of lower
court's, but without prejudice to such directives and instructions to the private and/or public respondents
delineating the proper course that should be pursued in the premises, almost as if the petition has been found
meritorious, and all courts and parties are expected to act accordingly. to give due course to petitioners,
particularly those involving procedural matter, and thereby be required for further pleadings from the parties
and hearing the case, from the indubitable facts already before it, the matter in issue is already clear and can be
readily resolved, is a procedure not really consistent with the speedy administration of justice and may even be
detrimental to it. Accordingly, the Court has for sometime now resorted to the practice of merely indicating
what should be done, without having to give due course to petitions for review or in special civil actions,
thereby lessening its burden and at the same time disposing of procedural matters with utmost deliberate
dispatch.

It may be added that it was not really Our intention in the resolution of October 4, 1973 to direct respondent
judge therein to issue the writ outright. By said resolution, all that We meant was for petitioner to file the
corresponding motion for preliminary injunction with the trial court and for that court to grant or deny the
same, after hearing both parties, as the facts shown to it by them might warrant, with the understanding
naturally that in determining the propriety of its action, the court should not be bound by what the inferior
court in the ejectment case might have already done or is doing. Indeed, We contemplated in said resolution,
that if circumstances should so require, the proceedings in the ejectment case may be suspended in whatever
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stage it may be found, in which event, the rentals due or whatever income might be derived from the premises
owing to whoever may ultimately be declared rightfully entitled to possession, should be ordered deposited
with the inferior court until the main case before it is finally terminated.

Incidentally, it may be stated that the same procedure as that just discussed should be observed whenever two
different parties are contesting between themselves the right to receive rentals or the income from the
occupants of the same premises, who are not claiming any right adverse thereto, are already litigating in court
in an appropriate proceeding their respective claims, even if a proper special civil action of interpleader under
Rule 63 has not been filed, considering, that in such an eventually, the pending action between the adverse
claimants would already serve the purposes of such interpleading. Of course, no such interpleader may be filed
in an inferior court, because of its limited jurisdiction, hence the inferior court in which any unlawful detainer
suit is filed by any of the adverse claimants against the occupants of the premises concerned must have to await
and make all its actuations subordinate to the developments in and the disposition of the main case in the
Court of First Instance.

ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLER, INC VS. CA, 409 SCRA 529

FACTS:

On 1 August 1984, RMC Garments, Inc. (RMC) leased from Peter Pan Corporation (Peter Pan) its properties
(Leased Premises) located on Ortigas Avenue Extension, Pasig, Metro Manila. The Leased Premises were
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 144376 (7060), 144377 (7061), and 144460 (7062) issued in the
name of Peter Pan by the Rizal Register of Deeds. RMC, a garments manufacturing company, installed
machinery on the Leased Premises and brought in furniture, office equipment and supplies.
On 20 December 1986, Rosario Textile Mills Corp. (Rosario Textile) advised RMC in a letter that it had
acquired the Leased Premises, including the chattels found inside, from GBC Corporation (GBC) through a
Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interests. GBC in turn, bought the Leased Premises at a foreclosure sale by
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on 15 August 1983. Rosario Textile demanded that RMC vacate
the Leased Premises within 10 days and warned that it would avail of its rights of ownership either judicially or
extra-judicially if RMC failed to do so.
Despite this letter, Rosario Textile proceeded to exercise its right of self-help. RMC and Peter Pan filed an
injunction suit in the trial court to remove all the obstructions and the grant of a right of way to the Leased
Premises. Rosario Textile, DBP and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) opposed the injunction on the ground
that RMC had not shown a clear right in esse that the court should protect.
On 20 January 1987, the trial court issued an Ordergranting RMC access to the Leased Premises upon posting
a P50,000 bond. Upon entry, RMC representatives discovered the removal of its chattels from the Leased
Premises. Consequently, RMC filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
the return of the missing chattels.Rosario Textile opposed the motion claiming ownership over the building
and its contents.
The trial court granted RMCs motion in the Order dated 23 February 1987.
Rosario Textile assailed the Order in a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of the Order in a Decision dated 30 June 1987. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Decision, which attained finality with the entry of judgment on 17 August 1988.
On 2 February 1989, the trial court issued an Orderrequiring Rosario Textile to comply with the 20 January
1987 and 23 February 1987 Orders. The trial court reiterated its orders directing defendants to allow entry to
the Leased Premises and to return the various machineries they took. The Sheriffs Report stated that copy of
the Order was served on Rosario Textiles counsel in the presence of its Vice-President for
Operations/Personnel, Mr. Antonio Angco. However, Rosario Textile did not comply. In 1993 and 1994, RMC
filed two motions to cite Rosario Textiles board of directors and officers in contempt of court for refusing to
comply with the trial courts final order. Rosario Textiles board of directors and officers opposed the motion
claiming they had no knowledge of the order requiring them to return the sewing machines since their counsel
did not inform them of the order. On 8 April 1996, the trial court issued another Order requiring the
responsible officers of Rosario Textile (petitioners officers) to return the sewing machines within 5 days from
notice under pain of contempt. Petitioners officers moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on
30 August 1996.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Compliance on 7 January 1997 stating that they could no longer return the
sewing machines since these were gutted by the fire that razed Rosario Textiles warehouse 6 years before on 22
August 1991. Petitioners attached the fire marshals report stating that the fire was accidental.

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On 23 May 1997, the trial court issued the Order ruling that the alleged destruction of the sewing machines did
not extinguish petitioners obligation to return these machines. The trial court held that petitioners were
already in default at the time the fire allegedly destroyed the machines.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the Order dated 4 December 1997.
Petitioners assailed the Orders dated 23 May and 4 December 1997 in a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners contended that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered petitioners to
make a complete restitution of the value of the sewing machines pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 22-95.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit in the assailed Decision dated 31 July 1998. The
appellate court denied the motion to reconsider the same in the Resolution dated 22 January 1999.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the order finding petitioners in contempt of court is valid; and

Whether complete restitution of the value of the sewing machines by petitioners in their personal capacities is
proper

HELD:

Whether petitioners officers had notice or knowledge of the injunction order is patently a question of fact
beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that only questions of law be raised in the
petition. In a petition for review on certiorari, the Courts jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that
the lower courts may have committed.Moreover, prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact
of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this
Court. Hence, the trial courts factual finding affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners had knowledge
of the injunction order is binding on us.

To comply with the procedural requirements of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, there
must be (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order
issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct, and (2) an opportunity for the person
charged to appear and explain his conduct.

In Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:

xxx True it is that generally, contempt proceedings are characterized as criminal in nature, but the more
accurate juridical concept is that contempt proceedings may actually be either civil or criminal, even if the
distinction between one and the other may be so thin as to be almost imperceptible. But it does exist in law. It
is criminal when the purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court and protect its outraged dignity. It is civil
when there is failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party.

An injunction duly issued must be obeyed, however erroneous the action of the court may be, until a higher
court overrules such decision. As affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the trial court properly
issued the injunction order directing petitioners to return the sewing machines.

Under the amendment, in case of violation of writs of injunction or restraining orders, the rule now provides
that the court may order complete restitution through the return of the property or the payment of the amount
alleged and proved.

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