Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Didipio vs. Gozun
Didipio vs. Gozun
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations
issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the
Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the
laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
On 25 July 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order
No. 279 which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
agreements involving either technical or nancial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of
the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On 3 March 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No.
7942 entitled, "An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration,
Development, Utilization and Conservation," otherwise known as the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995.
On 15 August 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing the implementing
guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. This was soon superseded by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996,
which took effect on 23 January 1997 after due publication.
Previously, however, or speci cally on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed
an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva
Vizcaya.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single
company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation
(CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
On 7 September 2001, counsels for petitioners led a demand letter addressed
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to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for
the primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional. The O ce of the Executive Secretary was also
furnished a copy of the said letter. There being no response to both letters, another
letter of the same content dated 17 June 2002 was sent to President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and eventually referred to the
Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional O ce No.
02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action. IEHScT
On 12 November 2002, counsels for petitioners received a letter from the Panel
of Arbitrators of the MGB requiring the petitioners to comply with the Rules of the
Panel of Arbitrators before the letter may be acted upon.
Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President Arroyo another demand letter
dated 8 November 2002. Said letter was again forwarded to the DENR Secretary who
referred the same to the MGB, Quezon City.
In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected the demand of counsels for
petitioners for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.
Petitioners thus led the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order. They pray that the Court issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents from acting on any application for FTAA;
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID
BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF DETERMINING JUST
COMPENSATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE
CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
IV
Before going to the substantive issues, the procedural question raised by public
respondents shall rst be dealt with. Public respondents are of the view that
petitioners' eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that
CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do they allege that their property rights
have been endangered or are in danger on account of CAMC's FTAA. In effect, public
respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy
which this Court can take cognizance of. EHIcaT
And in the case of National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez , 3 5 despite the NPC's
protestation that the owners were not totally deprived of the use of the land and could
still plant the same crops as long as they did not come into contact with the wires, the
Court nevertheless held that the easement of right-of-way was a taking under the power
of eminent domain. The Court said:
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is de nitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by
NPC against the use of the land for an inde nite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use.
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Section 76 provides:
Entry into private lands and concession areas — Subject to prior
noti cation, holders of mining rights shall not be prevented from entry into private
lands and concession areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires
when conducting mining operations therein.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the
Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy
the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private
lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and
exploiting minerals therein.
The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple right-of-way which is
ordinarily allowed under the provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining
rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as
exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine
infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds, storage
areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems. On top
of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where they may build
warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other infrastructures
necessary for mining operations. All these will de nitely oust the owners or occupants
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of the affected areas the bene cial ownership of their lands. Without a doubt, taking
occurs once mining operations commence.
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 is a Taking Provision
Moreover, it would not be amiss to revisit the history of mining laws of this
country which would help us understand Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942.
This provision is rst found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 which
took effect on 7 November 1936, viz:
Before entering private lands the prospector shall rst apply in writing for
written permission of the private owner, claimant, or holder thereof, and in case of
refusal by such private owner, claimant, or holder to grant such permission, or in
case of disagreement as to the amount of compensation to be paid for such
privilege of prospecting therein, the amount of such compensation shall be xed
by agreement among the prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the
surface owner, and in case of their failure to unanimously agree as to the amount
of compensation, all questions at issue shall be determined by the Court of First
Instance.
Similarly, the pertinent provision of Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known
as "The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974," provides:
SECTION 12. Entry to Public and Private Lands. — A person who
desires to conduct prospecting or other mining operations within public lands
covered by concessions or rights other than mining shall rst obtain the written
permission of the government o cial concerned before entering such lands. In
the case of private lands, the written permission of the owner or possessor of the
land must be obtained before entering such lands. In either case, if said
permission is denied, the Director, at the request of the interested person may
intercede with the owner or possessor of the land. If the intercession fails, the
interested person may bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is situated. If the court nds the request justi ed, it shall issue an
order granting the permission after xing the amount of compensation and/or
rental due the owner or possessor: Provided, That pending nal adjudication of
such amount, the court shall upon recommendation of the Director permit the
interested person to enter, prospect and/or undertake other mining operations on
the disputed land upon posting by such interested person of a bond with the court
which the latter shall consider adequate to answer for any damage to the owner
or possessor of the land resulting from such entry, prospecting or any other
mining operations.
Hampered by the di culties and delays in securing surface rights for the entry
into private lands for purposes of mining operations, Presidential Decree No. 512 dated
19 July 1974 was passed into law in order to achieve full and accelerated mineral
resources development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new system
of surface rights acquisition by mining prospectors and claimants. Whereas in
Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain may only
b e exercised in order that the mining claimants can build, construct or install roads,
railroads, mills, warehouses and other facilities, this time, the power of eminent domain
may now be invoked by mining operators for the entry, acquisition and use of private
lands, viz:
SECTION 1. Mineral prospecting, location, exploration, development and
exploitation is hereby declared of public use and bene t, and for which the power
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of eminent domain may be invoked and exercised for the entry, acquisition and
use of private lands. . . . .
The evolution of mining laws gives positive indication that mining operators who
are quali ed to own lands were granted the authority to exercise eminent domain for
the entry, acquisition, and use of private lands in areas open for mining operations. This
grant of authority extant in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 is not expressly
repealed by Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942; and neither are the former statutes
impliedly repealed by the former. These two provisions can stand together even if
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 does not spell out the grant of the privilege to exercise
eminent domain which was present in the old law. DAHSaT
It is an established rule in statutory construction that in order that one law may
operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent. 3 9 The former must
be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. Simply because a latter
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of
itself su cient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one. As has been the ruled, repeals by
implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended. 4 0 As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and
with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude
that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former
law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and owing necessarily from the language
used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the
reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. 4 1 Hence, every effort must
be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
reconciled, the latter act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the quali ed
mining operators the authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of
authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision.
While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision, this
does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of private
property without the determination of public use and the payment of just
compensation.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. 4 2 Public use as a requirement for
the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. 4 3 It includes the broader
notion of indirect public bene t or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as
"actual use by the public" has already been abandoned. 4 4
Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country
and is a vital tool in the government's thrust of accelerated recovery. 4 5 The importance
of the mining industry for national development is expressed in Presidential Decree No.
463:
WHEREAS, mineral production is a major support of the national economy,
and therefore the intensi ed discovery, exploration, development and wise
utilization of the country's mineral resources are urgently needed for national
development.
". . . Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by
which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the
means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the
area. Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking from one
businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the means of
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine,
once the public purpose has been established. . . ." 4 7
Petitioners further maintain that the state's discretion to decide when to take
private property is reduced contractually by Section 13.5 of the CAMC FTAA, which
reads:
If the CONTRACTOR so requests at its option, the GOVERNMENT shall use
its o ces and legal powers to assist in the acquisition at reasonable cost of any
surface areas or rights required by the CONTRACTOR at the CONTRACTOR's cost
to carry out the Mineral Exploration and the Mining Operations herein. AHEDaI
All obligations, payments and expenses arising from, or incident to, such
agreements or acquisition of right shall be for the account of the CONTRACTOR
and shall be recoverable as Operating Expense.
Implementing Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, Section 105 of DAO 96-40 states
that holder(s) of mining right(s) shall not be prevented from entry into its/their
contract/mining areas for the purpose of exploration, development, and/or utilization.
That in cases where surface owners of the lands, occupants or concessionaires refuse
to allow the permit holder or contractor entry, the latter shall bring the matter before
the Panel of Arbitrators for proper disposition. Section 106 states that voluntary
agreements between the two parties permitting the mining right holders to enter and
use the surface owners' lands shall be registered with the Regional O ce of the MGB.
In connection with Section 106, Section 107 provides that the compensation for the
damage done to the surface owner, occupant or concessionaire as a consequence of
mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure
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shall be properly and justly compensated and that such compensation shall be based
on the agreement between the holder of mining rights and surface owner, occupant or
concessionaire, or where appropriate, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 512.
In cases where there is disagreement to the compensation or where there is no
agreement, the matter shall be brought before the Panel of Arbitrators. Section 206 of
the implementing rules and regulations provides an aggrieved party the remedy to
appeal the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators to the Mines Adjudication Board, and the
latter's decision may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by ling a petition for review on
certiorari. 5 1
An examination of the foregoing provisions gives no indication that the courts
are excluded from taking cognizance of expropriation cases under the mining law. The
disagreement referred to in Section 107 does not involve the exercise of eminent
domain, rather it contemplates of a situation wherein the permit holders are allowed by
the surface owners entry into the latters' lands and disagreement ensues as regarding
the proper compensation for the allowed entry and use of the private lands. Noticeably,
the provision points to a voluntary sale or transaction, but not to an involuntary sale.
The legislature, in enacting the mining act, is presumed to have deliberated with
full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. Thus, it is but
reasonable to conclude that in passing such statute it was in accord with the existing
laws and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of courts in the determination of just
compensation and that it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law
relating to the same matter. Indeed, there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed
law and its implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts from their
jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings involving
mining operations. Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the
authority to decide cases where surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse
permit holders entry, thus, necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that the
determination of the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board is nal and conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless
accepted by all parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary
jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in
a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or
occupants. 5 2 The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide
determination of just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary
determination made by the administrative agency. As held in Philippine Veterans Bank
v. Court of Appeals 5 3 :
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and
exclusive" because the question is rst passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.
It must be noted that this argument was already raised in La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 5 4 where the Court answered in the following manner:
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining
operations. The following provisions thereof establish the mechanism of
inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations and institute reportorial
requirements in this manner:
1. Sec. 8 which provides for the DENR's power of over-all supervision
and periodic review for "the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the State's mineral resources";
4. Sec. 35, which incorporates into all FTAAs the following terms,
conditions and warranties:
The contractor must comply with the provisions pertaining to mine safety,
health and environmental protection (Chapter XI, RA 7942; Chapters XV
and XVI, DAO 96-40).
For violation of any of its terms and conditions, government may cancel an
FTAA. (Chapter XVII, RA 7942; Chapter XXIV, DAO 96-40).
1. Exploration
2. Drilling
3. Mineral resources and reserves
4. Energy consumption
5. Production DEHaAS
7. Employment
8. Payment of taxes, royalties, fees and other Government
Shares
Once these plans and reports are approved, the contractor is bound to
comply with its commitments therein. Figures for mineral production and sales
are regularly monitored and subjected to government review, in order to ensure
that the products and by-products are disposed of at the best prices possible;
even copies of sales agreements have to be submitted to and registered with
MGB. And the contractor is mandated to open its books of accounts and records
for scrutiny, so as to enable the State to determine if the government share has
been fully paid.
The State may likewise compel the contractor's compliance with
mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and environmental protection,
and the use of anti-pollution technology and facilities. Moreover, the contractor is
also obligated to assist in the development of the mining community and to pay
royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned. IaEASH
Cancellation of the FTAA may be the penalty for violation of any of its
terms and conditions and/or noncompliance with statutes or regulations. This
general, all-around, multipurpose sanction is no tri ing matter, especially to a
contractor who may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars
sunk into a mining project.
Overall, considering the provisions of the statute and the regulations just
discussed, we believe that the State de nitely possesses the means by which it
can have the ultimate word in the operation of the enterprise, set directions and
objectives, and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor; likewise, it
has the capability to enforce compliance and to impose sanctions, should the
occasion therefor arise.
In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases
and get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it
wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in
the government more than a su cient degree of control and supervision over the
conduct of mining operations.
Petitioners maintain that the rst paragraph bars aliens and foreign-owned
corporations from entering into any direct arrangement with the government including
those which involve co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements.
They likewise insist that the fourth paragraph allows foreign-owned corporations to
participate in the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources, but such participation, however, is merely limited to an agreement for either
financial or technical assistance only.
Again, this issue has already been succinctly passed upon by this Court in La
Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos . 5 5 In discrediting such argument, the
Court ratiocinated:
Petitioners claim that the phrase "agreements . . . involving either technical
or nancial assistance " simply means technical assistance or nancial
assistance agreements, nothing more and nothing else. They insist that there is
no ambiguity in the phrase, and that a plain reading of paragraph 4 quoted above
leads to the inescapable conclusion that what a foreign-owned corporation may
enter into with the government is merely an agreement for either nancial or
technical assistance only , for the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils; such a limitation, they
argue, excludes foreign management and operation of a mining enterprise.
This restrictive interpretation, petitioners believe, is in line with the general
policy enunciated by the Constitution reserving to Filipino citizens and
corporations the use and enjoyment of the country's natural resources. They
maintain that this Court's Decision of January 27, 2004 correctly declared the
WMCP FTAA, along with pertinent provisions of RA 7942, void for allowing a
foreign contractor to have direct and exclusive management of a mining
enterprise. Allowing such a privilege not only runs counter to the "full control and
supervision" that the State is constitutionally mandated to exercise over the
exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources; doing
so also vests in the foreign company "bene cial ownership" of our mineral
resources. It will be recalled that the Decision of January 27, 2004 zeroed in on
"management or other forms of assistance" or other activities associated with the
"service contracts" of the martial law regime, since " the management or operation
of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service
contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought
to eradicate."
In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signi es the possibility of the
inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with,
otherwise related to or compatible with nancial or technical assistance. The
word "involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be
differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or
"affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating"; and three,
"including," "containing" or "comprising."
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity.
Moreover, the word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in
including technical or nancial assistance , necessarily implies that there are
activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement
includes technical or nancial assistance, there is apart from such assistance —
something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly
mentioned, could be made part of the agreement. Thus, we are now led to the
conclusion that the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with
foreign corporations are not limited to mere nancial or technical assistance. The
difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for
technical or nancial assistance" against "agreements including technical or
financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
In the voting that led to the approval of Article XII by the ConCom, the
explanations given by Commissioners Gascon, Garcia and Tadeo indicated that
they had voted to reject this provision on account of their objections to the
"constitutionalization" of the "service contract" concept.
Mr. Gascon said, " I felt that if we would constitutionalize any provision on
service contracts , this should always be with the concurrence of Congress and
not guided only by a general law to be promulgated by Congress." Mr. Garcia
explained, "Service contracts are given constitutional legitimization in Sec. 3,
even when they have been proven to be inimical to the interests of the nation,
providing, as they do, the legal loophole for the exploitation of our natural
resources for the bene t of foreign interests ." Likewise, Mr. Tadeo cited inter alia
the fact that service contracts continued to subsist, enabling foreign interests to
bene t from our natural resources. It was hardly likely that these gentlemen
would have objected so strenuously, had the provision called for mere
technical or financial assistance and nothing more .
The deliberations of the ConCom and some commissioners' explanation of
their votes leave no room for doubt that the service contract concept precisely
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underpinned the commissioners' understanding of the "agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance."
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in
fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the
other, the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service
contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-
how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR,
MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore reasonable and unavoidable to make the following
conclusion, based on the above arguments. As written by the framers and rati ed
and adopted by the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations — as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State — sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is
clear: to develop and utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large
scale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the Filipino people. 5 8
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 595-596.
2. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 291.
3. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, Isagani Cruz, p. 23 (1995 ed.).
4. Article VIII, Section 1. . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
5. Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 425 (1998).
6. Board of Optometry v. Hon. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1206 (1996).
7. Intregrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632-633 (2000).
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8. Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392,
402.