PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS

DREAMWORK V. JANIOLA

-DREAMWORK filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC. Later,
Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between
the parties, as well as for damages.
-Respondent, then, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent
claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case.
-Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the
following grounds: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the
bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP
22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that
“the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

Ruling: The elements of a prejudicial question are: (1) The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) The resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by the State
with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficient
funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22. Whereas, in the Civil case, the lack of consideration is
issue, assailing that the contract is void. Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

FIRST PRODUCERS HOLDING CORPORATION V. CO

A criminal complaint for estafa was filed by Armand Luna against Luis Co. by allegedly transferring in his own name
three proprietary with Manila Polo Club shares held by him in behalf of FPHC.

During the pendency of the criminal case, Luis Co filed an action for damages against Armand Luna and First
Producers Holdings (complainant in the criminal case filed). In the said complaint, Luis Co claimed ownership over
questioned Manila Polo Club Proprietary Share.

Ruling: The criminal action for estafa had been filed on March 13, 1997. Yet, respondent filed the civil case only eight
months later, on November 18, 1997. Indeed, as early as 1994, a written demand had already been served on him to
return the said share. He did not contest petitioner’s claim; in fact, he filed the present civil action several months after
the institution of the criminal charge. Verily, it is apparent that the civil action was instituted only as an afterthought
to delay the proceedings in the criminal case.

The dilatory character of the strategy of respondent is apparent from the fact that he could have raised the issue of
ownership in the criminal case. He himself admits that the issue of ownership may be raised in the estafa case.
Furthurmore, ownership is not an element in the crime of estafa.

SAN MIGUEL V. PEREZ

San Miguel filed a complaint in the OCP of Las Piñas charging respondent non-delivery of titles in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 or Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums. At the same time, San
Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release
the 20 TCTs in its favor.
The OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, dismissing San Miguel’s criminal complaint for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on several grounds, one of which was that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the
suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined
by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB.

Ruling: The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the
prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB(admin case) raises a
prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of
Section 25of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an
action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action
was exclusive and original.

PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL

On October 2004, private respondent Maria Pimentel filed a case for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel
before the RTC of Quezon City. On February 2005, petitioner received summons ordering him to attend the pre-trial
and trial of the civil case for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before
the RTC of Antipolo. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings before the RTC of
Quezon City, on the ground that there exists a prejudicial question, and that the outcome of the civil case would have
a bearing, and is material to the resolution of the criminal case.

Ruling: First, the Court ruled that, to constitute a prejudicial question, the civil case must first be instituted before the
criminal action in accordance with Sec. 7 of Rule 111. In the present case, the civil case was filed only after the
criminal case.
Second, the issue of annulment of marriage is not similar or so intimately related to the criminal case. Further, such
relationship is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. It is important to note
that, at the time of the commission of the crime of parricide, petitioner and respondent were still married. The
subsequent dissolution of marriage will have no effect whatsoever on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage.

GADITANO V. SAN MIGUEL CORP.

SMC filed a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against Spouses Gaditano. Subsequently,
the spouses filed an action for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank and its general manager
alleging that AsiaTrust Bank unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts. Petitioners assert that the issues
they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa on the grounds of prejudicial question.

Ruling: No Prejudicial Question

It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

Even if the trial court in the civil case declares AsiaTrust Bank liable for the unlawful garnishment of petitioners’
savings account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to
support the checks is in itself the offense.

REYES V. ROSSI

Rossi, in his capacity as Executive Project Director of Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation
executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a dredging pump.
Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in the RTC in QC. Meanwhile, Rossi charged
Reyes with estafa and violation of BP 22 before the OCP Makati.
Reyes argued that the OCP of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil
action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings. He states that if the
contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such
outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22.

Ruling: Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under
such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the
pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional sale wherein the issue is whether or not the breach in the
fulfilment of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale3

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

SANTOS-CONCIO, ET AL. V. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Wowowee had an anniversary episode at Ultra, which resulted in a stampede claiming 71 lives and injured hundreds.
The DILG investigated the stampede and the DOJ created an evaluating panel to evaluate the report and determine if
there was basis to proceed with the PI. It concluded that there was no sufficient basis to proceed with the P.I., because
there was not enough information submitted. The case was referred to the NBI for further investigation. The NBI
found probable cause, and thereby recommended a P.I. for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
multiple physical injuries. It submitted to the DOJ an investigation report (this is the complaint). Attached to the report
was a letter from one of the victims, and a sworn affidavit by a witness. The petitioners contend that the NBI report
was not a proper complaint since it was not under oath as required by Rule 110.

Ruling: A preliminary investigation can validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person without
the referral document (like the NBI Report) having been sworn to because the law officer (NBI) is the nominal
complainant. Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 is substantially complied with even if only the witnesses execute affidavits before
a competent officer. What is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw
information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the P.I. stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has
been gathered and evaluated which may warrant eventual prosecution.

Extra Issue: A complaint for purposes of conducting a P.I. differs from a complaint for purposes of instituting a
criminal prosecution. The complaint in a P.I. is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is treated
as a component of the complaint.

When the complaint is submitted by the NBI, there is no need for a sworn statement by the complainant if a sworn
affidavit by the witness is also attached, because the NBI is already under oath. Furthermore, the original complainant
is converted into the witness when the NBI files the complaint with the prosecutor.

BORLONGAN V. PENA

Informations of thecrime of Introducing Falsified Documents were filed with the MTCC Bago City against Petitioners.
Thereafter, Judge Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to quash. They insist that they were denied due process because of the non-
observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-
affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-
affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules.
Moreover they claim that the respondent’s affidavit was not based on the latter’s personal knowledge and therefore
should not have been used by the court in determining probable cause

Ruling: The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be
determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing on
the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

ESTRADA V. OMBUDSMAN
The Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada copies of the two criminal complaints for plunder against him. Eighteen of
Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada
filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New
Witnesses and Other Filings”- this was denied by the Ombudsman
Sen. Estrada then, filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend proceedings because the denial of his Request
to be furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents deprived him of his right to procedural due
process.-denied
ombudsman filed information to Sandiganbayan- MR denied-petition to SC is for Certiorari

Ruling: there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. The Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause
merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is
not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a
preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

Futhermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.

RACHO V. MIRO

A letter on behalf of an anonymous complainant was sent to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro,
accusing Racho, an employee of the BIR-Cebu, of having accumulated wealth disproportionate to his income.
Photocopied bank certifications disclosed that Racho had with three banks.
Pio R. Dargantes, the Graft Investigation Officer I assigned to investigate the complaint dismissed the case. He ruled
that the photocopied bank certifications did not constitute substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings.
Then, Ombudsman Director Virginia Palanca-Santiago disapproved GIO Dargantes’s Resolution and held Racho
administratively liable for falsification and dishonesty, and meted on him the penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold office. Palanca-Santiago found probable cause to charge
Racho with falsification of public document under Article 171(4)8 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman. Racho was charged with falsification of public
document.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of Ombudsman Director Palanca-Santiago since she did not
inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. He claims a denial of due process because of the fact that Director Palanca-
Santiago handled the preliminary investigation as well as the reinvestigation of the cases. He insists that respondent
director had lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge when she found probable cause against him on preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner ultimately questions the haste with which the reinvestigation was concluded and the lack of hearing thereon.
In essence, he insists on the dismissal of his cases before the OMB.

Ruling: The Ombudsman is empowered to determine probable cause. Such finding is a finding of fact which is
generally not reviewable by this Court. The only ground upon which a plea for review of the OMB’s resolution may
be entertained is an alleged grave abuse of discretion. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents. As already well-stated, as long as substantial evidence supports
the Ombudsman’s ruling, his decision will not be overturned. Here, the finding of the Ombudsman that there was
probable cause to hold petitioner liable for falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts rests
on substantial evidence

the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. A finding of probable cause merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.

TOLENTINO V. PAQUEO

Petitioner, State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino filed an information charging private respondent, Benedict Tecklo
for violation of Sec 22 (a) in relation to Sec 28 (e) of R.A. No. 8282, for failing to remit SSS premiums due to his
employee despite demand.
Accused, private respondent through his counsel filed a motion to quash the information of the ground that Petitioner,
Prosecutor Tolentino has no legal personality and authority to commence such prosecution without the approval of
the City Prosecutor of Naga City, the situs of the crime.
Petitioner contends that he was given authority and designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by the Regional
State Prosecutor to comply with the request for SSS which authority was confirmed by the Chief Sate prosecutor. He
claims, approval of the City Prosecutor in filing the information is no longer necessary by virtue of the Regional order
which designated him as Special Prosecutor.
Judge granted MTQ

Ruling: The Court ruled that the decision of the respondent Judge to grant the motion to quash is proper. Petitioner
alleged that he was designated as a Special Prosecutor by the Regional State Prosecutor in relation with the regional
order, however Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or
dismissal of the Information in compliance with Sec 4, Rule 112. In the case ar bar, Petitioner, did not comply with
such requirement. Conseuqently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the information under Sec 3 (2) of Rule
117.

CRESPO V. MOGUL

Assistant Fiscal de Gala filed an information for estafa against Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment the
accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the approval of the filing of the
information.
Judge Mogul denied the motion. A MR of the order was denied but the arraignment was deferred to afford time for
petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused - A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court,
Judge Mogul denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the motion’s trust being to induce this Court to
resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice,
a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s independence and
integrity.”

Ruling: The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

BALTAZAR V. PEOPLE

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Pulilan, Bulacan two separate criminal complaints against private respondent,
Amando Bautista, one for the Murder.
Acting on the said criminal case, Judge Concepcion issued an Order for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
private respondent: Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan finding probable cause that he committed the murder of Erlinda
Baltazar.
Judge Conception postponed the arraignment upon motion of private respondent who invoked the pendency of his
Petition for Review with the DOJ. Private respondent rescheduled arraignment again did not push through because
he presented before the RTC a copy of the Resolution dated, issued by Acting DOJ Secretary, reversing the findings
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. Judge Concepcion dismissed the case.
Petitioner now insists that Judge Concepcion committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the
Information against private respondent in his Order – after he had already issues a warrant finding probable cause

Ruling: The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him in making the
determination of probable cause for issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s
certification which are material in assisting the Judge in making his determination.

A closer scrutiny of the substance of Judge Concepcion’s Order dated 30 July 2004 would reveal that he reversed his
earlier finding of probable cause in issuing a warrant of arrest and allowed the withdrawal of the Information against
private respondent finding that this was just a simple case of criminal negligence or reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide or less serious physical injury based on the evidence presented.

Judge Concepcion came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for private respondent to commit murder,
by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations, and evidence on record.

CHAN V. DOJ SEC

The Chief of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) referred to the State Prosecutor for
appropriate action the evidence collected by the task force during a buy-bust operation against petitioner Chan. After
preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information against the
petitioner. Petitioner requested a preliminary investigation and waived his rights under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Chan submitted his Counter-Affidavit denying the charges against him. After preliminary investigation,
State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information against the
petitioner. State Prosecutor Formaran filed before the RTC an Information.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of the Department of Justice which denied the petition for
review on the ground that there was no reversible error in the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause.
Petitioner insists that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the State
Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, which was based solely on the Joint Affidavit of Arrest. He claims that the
State Prosecutor ignored certain facts and circumstances which indicate that there was actually no buy-bust operation
but an extortion attempt instead, and capriciously relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
police officers’ duty

Ruling: Crespo dotrine does not bar the Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor
in the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates. The power or authority of the Justice Secretary to review
the prosecutor’s findings subsists even after the Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound by the
Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice
Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

The allegation that the State Prosecutor was not impartial in conducting the preliminary investigation is merely
speculative — a bare allegation unworthy of credence. Such accusation is worthless in light of our finding that there
is, indeed, probable cause against petitioner. Moreover, bias and partiality can never be presumed. Petitioner’s
allegation of frame-up and extortion is evidentiary in nature, and are matters for his defense.

VILLAFLOR V. VIVAR

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of an information or render it defective. Neither
does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. Instead of dismissing
the information, the court should hold the proceedings in abeyance and order the public prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation for slight physical injuries was made by the assistant city prosecutor. Vivar was later
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries.
When the injuries sustained by Villaflor turned out to be more serious than they had appeared at first, the charge of
slight physical injuries was withdrawn and an Information for serious physical injuries was filed. Another Information
for grave threats was also filed against Vivar.
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, Vivar filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats. He contended
that the threat, having been made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries, should have been absorbed
by the latter; hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar was arraigned for grave threats and pleaded not guilty.
RTC reversed the Order, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the charges for failure of the public prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation.

Ruling: (1)The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the
information. The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order
the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
(2)A new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded by Vivar. This is because the change made by the public
prosecutor was only a formal amendment. if the original charge was related to the amended one, such that an inquiry
would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not necessary.
(3) Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the grounds on which an accused can
move to quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the above-mentioned section is there any mention of a lack
of a preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. Furthermore, we stress that the failure of the
accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, either because he had not filed the motion or
had failed to allege the grounds therefor, shall be deemed a waiver of such grounds. In this case, he waived his right
to file such motion when he pleaded not guilty to the charge of grave threats.

SAN AGUSTIN V. PEOPLE

Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same with the NBI charging petitioner Barangay
Chairman Ernesto San Agustin with serious illegal detention alleging that the petitioner detained her husband Vicente
Tan without lawful ground. The investigation of the NBI found that the victim TAN was mistaken as a “snatcher” and
was turned over to petitioner San Agustin where Tan was beaten and locked up. Luz Tan (complainant) went to the
barangay hall and inquired but they denied having seen the victim Tan.
Later on, an inquest investigation was conducted by the State prosecutor. She came out with a Resolution which
was affirmed by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, finding probable cause against the petitioner for serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that he was illegally arrested and subjected to an
inquest investigation; hence, he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. He also prayed that he be
released from detention and that the prosecutor conduct a preliminary investigation.

Ruling: An inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully arrested without a warrant. Although the
procedure does not conform with Section 7 Rule 112, it is not a ground to nullify the arrest.
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court but merely the regularity
of the proceedings. It does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Neither is it a
ground to quash the Information or nullify the order of arrest issued against him or justify the release of the accused
from detention. However, the trial court should suspend proceedings and order a preliminary investigation considering
that the inquest investigation conducted by the State Prosecutor is null and void.
In this case, PI is required since the crime charged in the complaint of the NBI filed in the Department of Justice was
kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death.

LADLAD V. VELASCO

These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners' prosecution for
Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the DOJ and RTC Makati on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners'
cases.
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February
2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February 2006, while
he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran
was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial determination of probable cause. The
trial court affirmed the existence of probable cause.

Ruling: The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of
the affidavits and other documents. The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran
for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed
specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006.
None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP
Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.

The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit
Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based
on the evidence before it.

ARREST

AAA V. CARBONELL

An Information of Rape was filed against Arzadon. AAA, the complainant/victim, however, failed to appear
for the 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Because of this, the Case was dismissed for lack of probable cause. He claims
that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
“to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.

Ruling: Soliven v. Makasiar: The constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally
examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to:1)personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or 2) he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses. What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that
he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
Respondent judge’s finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’
absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her SinumpaangSalaysay. and Complaint-Affidavit. She
attended several clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic notes of
the hearing shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time and place of the
incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support of her contentions, presented
the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the
weakest of all defenses. After a careful examination of the records, the SC found that there is sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause.

PEOPLE V. ALUNDAY

A suspected marijuana plantation was the subject of a raiding operation when the alleged marijuana grower was
caught cutting and gathering marijuana. Further, when taken to a nearby hut, an unlicensed firearm was found.
The Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of the Mountain Province received a report from a confidential
informant that there was an existing marijuana plantation within the vicinity of Mt. Churyon. After a series of
validations, the existence of the subject plantation was finally confirmed. The Police Director ordered a contingent of
policemen to the subject plantation and upon arriving at the area saw Ricardo Alunday cutting and gathering marijuana
leaves. The police took Alunday to the hut where they saw a woman, an M16 riffle and some dried marijuana leaves.
Right then and there, the accused was arrested.
Ruling: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.
Herein, Alunday went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial.
He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed
to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea
during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his arraignment.

PEOPLE V. DEL ROSARIO

The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction of the
accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the
tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for questioning
and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a
shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the suspects.
After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However,
this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence
of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and
based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

Arrest not valid. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always
be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of
custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial
investigations.
The arrest was not conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The
authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed
the offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one
eyewitness.
Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this
case because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right
to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE V. JAYSON

In March 1991, Wenceslao Jayson was a bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw nightclub in Davao City. He was arrested without
a warrant after being pointed by eyewitnesses as the gunman in the killing of Nelson Jordan. Recovered from him was
a .38 caliber revolver with 4 live bullets and an empty shell.
With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Tenebro testified that while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Racolas were patrolling
in their car, they received a radio message directing them to Ihaw-Ihaw where there had been a shooting. They
proceeded to the place and saw the victim. Bystander’s pointed to Jayson as the gunman. He was apprehended about
10 meters away, attempting to flee.
He was initially charged with murder but was allowed to plead guilty to the les ser offense of homicide after plea-
bargaining. He was subsequently charged with illegal possession of firearm.

Ruling: Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a warrantless arrest shall be lawful
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal know ledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it. In the case at bar there was a shooting.
The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. Jayson was pointed to them as the a ssailant
only moments after the shooting. In fact Jayson had not gone very far. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis
of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that Jayson was the assailant. The search and
seizure were hence incident to a lawful arrest as allowed under Rule 126, §12.

PEOPLE V. EDAÑO
The prosecution charged and convicted the appellant with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under
two separate Informations. Accused-appellant assailed the validity of arrest since it was made without a warrant and
that during the said arrest, accused-appellant and the alleged informant were just talking to each other and there was
no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car- no valid warrantless arrest.. The police, then stated that
appellant attempted to run away when the arresting officer approached him.

Ruling: That the appellant attempted to run away when AO approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. Trying to run away when no crime has been
overtly committed, cannot be evidence of guilt. Considering that the appellant's warrantless arrest was unlawful, the
search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure.

PESTILOS V. GENEROSO

In the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the
Central Police District, Station to report the incident. Police officers arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite"
the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to
Batasan Hills Police Station. The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to
the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation.
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest since the incident happened two (2) hours before the police
officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as
they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

Ruling: The court held that petitioners were validly arrest without warrant.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime, it is reasonable to conclude
that the police officers had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless
arrests. Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest proceeding was likewise appropriate.

BAIL

SAN MIGUEL V. MACEDA

Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and delivery of .50 grams of drugs, punishable
by prision correccional. He jumped bail. Then Judge Alumbres issued a bench warrant and canceled his bail bond
in the amount of P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000.00. Complainant was arrested.
On September 12, 2001, the state prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail on the ground that accused
is considering flight from prosecution. On the same day, or two (2) days before the scheduled hearing, respondent
Judge issued an Order granting the Motion. During the hearing, respondent opted to consider complainant’s
Opposition as a motion for reconsideration and merely ordered the prosecutor to file a reply thereto.
Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due process was gravely violated when
respondent issued the Order without giving him the opportunity to comment on the same. Also, His right to bail is not
a mere privilege but a constitutionally guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order. Clearly, the intendment
of the Order was to deny him of his constitutional right to bail.
In his defense, he stated that the Order canceling the bail does not speak of the cancellation of the P120,000.00 bail,
but the P60,000.00 and the same was reaffirmed in a subsequent Order on November 21, 2001.

Ruling: Complainants right to procedural due process and right to bail denied.
How then can respondent claim that he merely canceled the recommended bail of P60,000.00 when the same had
already been forfeited? The only recommended bail that remains subject of the Motion of the prosecutor is the
increased bail in the amount of P120,000.00. Thus, there remains no other conclusion except that respondent
canceled the recommended bail in the increased amount of P120,000.00. The Order effectively deprived
complainant of his constitutional right to bail when it was issued two days before the scheduled hearing on
September 19, 2001.

It’s a well settled rules that where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from
such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of
probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the
bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such
amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be required.

LAVIDES V. COURT OF APPEALS

10 informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides. No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed
separate applications for bail in all cases. The trial court granted bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a
total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions: 1) the accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of
appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2)
In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants
for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders
in all other respects. APPROVAL ONLY AFTER ARRAIGNMENT
Later, the trial court, in separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and
to suspend arraignment.
Lavides then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the trial court's order denying his motion to quash and
maintaining the conditions set forth in its order, respectively.

Ruling: To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he
has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid
complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the
Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights.

TRILLANES IV V. PIMENTEL

Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won
a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he
be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos
as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction. Distinctions: (1)
political complexion/moral turpitude (2) flight risk

Ruling: The Rules states that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable
amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall
be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.

ANDRES V. BELTRAN
Herein complainant Wilson Andres was charged with the crime of murder. The trial court, then presided by Judge
Abraham Principe, granted bail upon motion of the accused and ordered his release from detention. Court issued a
subpoena to accused Andres informing him that the criminal case is set for initial hearing for reception of evidence
for the accused. Accused appeared at the scheduled hearing but his counsel was not present. Respondent Judge then
issued an order cancelling the bail bond of accused Andres and ordered his detention.
Accused Andres was detained from January 31, 2000 until February 9, 2000 1 when an order for his release was issued
after the trial court found that no subpoena or notice of hearing was sent to counsel of accused. Hence, the instant
administrative case for conduct unbecoming of a judge, serious misconduct, inefficiency and gross ignorance of the
law.

Ruling: The failure of counsel for the accused to appear at the scheduled hearing is not a valid ground for cancellation
of bail. Nowhere in the provisions of Rule 114 does such ground exist. Under Section 2 (Conditions of the bail), the
presence of counsel is not a condition of the bail. Neither is it a reason for an increase or forfeiture of bail under
Sections 20 and 21. Section 22, which states the instances when bail may be cancelled, i.e., surrender of the accused,
proof of his death, acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case or execution of the judgment of conviction is not in
point, aside from the fact that it also requires an application of the bondsmen and due notice to the prosecutor.
In the case at bar, respondent Judge motu proprio cancelled the bail bond in view of the absence of counsel for the
accused during the hearing initially scheduled for the presentation of evidence for the defense. This is censurable.
Accused should not be punished for the absence of his counsel by the cancellation of his bail and his immediate
detention.

LEVISTE V. COURT OF APPEALS

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility
of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in
the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised
“with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of
the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to
an appellant pending appeal.

Ruling: Discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic grant of bail in case
of appeal.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right
to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach.

PEOPLE V. FITZGERALD

An Information filed against Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. RTC
found him guilty. Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied. He appealed to the CA which affirmed his Motion
holding that:
“Be that as it may, while we maintain that, as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, We have taken a second look at
appellant’s plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the fact that appellant is already of old age and is not in
the best of health. Thus, it is this Court’s view that appellant be GRANTED temporary liberty premised not on the
grounds stated in his Motion for Bail but in the higher interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial
granted in this case.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald’s Motion for Bail despite the fact that the latter
was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong. It also questions
the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial

Ruling: Order granting bail reversed

The right to bail emanates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the
law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a
security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions.
In the case at bar, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised
in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114.
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by respondent; it is
worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee
or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.

ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
(PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion
to Fix Bail.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and
burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be
excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age
of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.

Ruling: Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds. The decision whether to detain or
release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his
criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or
for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears
at trial.
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility
in the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.

CHUA V. COURT OF APPEALS

A case of Estafa was filed against Respondent.

After the prosecution and the defense had presented their respective evidence, the trial court set the promulgation of
judgment. However, respondent and his counsel failed to appear on said date despite notice. The trial court reset the
promulgation of judgment, with notice to respondent. Again, respondent failed to appear. The trial court then
promulgated its Decision convicting respondent of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The prosecution filed a motion for
cancellation of bail on the ground that respondent might flee or commit another crime. The trial court issued an
Omnibus Order cancelling his bail. However, On September 20, 1999, after hearing respondent’s application for
injunction, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding that
the latter should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he was
convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is merely
conjectural. Hence, this petition.

Ruling: Firstly, the petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction is not the proper
recourse in assailing the trial court’s Omnibus Order canceling his bail. -appropriate remedy is by filing with the Court
of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same regular appeal proceedings he himself initiated. Such motion
is an incident in his appeal.
Secondly, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the implementation of the trial court’s Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft of any factual
or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be
protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such right.
The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court’s
judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years which justifies the cancellation of his
bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114, quoted above. Moreover, he failed to
appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. His inexcusable non-appearance not
only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the court "whenever required" by the latter or the
Rules, but also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail.

ESTEBAN V. ALHAMBRA

The case came to the SC as a petition for certiorari filed by Anita Esteban, sister in law of the accused, to reverse the
two petitions for the annulment of cash bail of Gerardo Esteban amounting to P20,000 each.
Anita, originally posted the bail for Gerardo, however, he committed another crime while out on bail; she got "fed
up", and moved for the cancellation of the posted money to the court and surrendered the accused to the City Jail
Warden. However this was denied, so was her motion for reconsideration.
Anita now pleas that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and
that the issue is one of "first impression". She cites that under Sec 19, now Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused.

Ruling: Anita misapplies the provision; the cash bail cannot be cancelled because Gerardo was not surrendered for the
four criminal cases he was originally charged with, he was acquired because of the subsequent case filed against him
A cash bond is treated as the money of the accused (even if it was supplied by another person in his behalf). The
money of the accused shall than applied as payment for any fine or cost imposed by the court. It is treated in the nature
of a lien. In the cited case of Esler vs. Ledesma, between the accused and the third party (the one who posted the bond)
the residue of the cash bail is not subject to the claim of a creditor to property.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

PEREZ V. PEOPLE

Zenon Perez is the Municipal Treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol on 1988. In a recent audit made on his office, it was found
that the public funds that he was entrusted to is short of Php72,784.57. A Case was filer and he was found guilty of
Malversation of Funds by the Sandiganbayan, and is imposed a penalty of 10 years and one day for prision mayor
(min), up to 14 years 8 months of reclusion temporal (max).
Upon appeal at the SC level: Peitioner claims that he was violated the right to a speedy trial and due process, as over
13 years had passed, before the case had been filed against him. He claims that the sentenced imposed upon him is
cruel and violates his rights.

Ruling: It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve
years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some overt
acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right.
Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their
rights.

BENARES V. LIM

Petitioner Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness,
it was given 15 days to formally offer its evidence.
However, the prosecution did not make any formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner filed a motion praying that the
prosecution’s submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence.
Despite receipt of notice of petitioner’s motion, respondent and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the motion.
the MeTC issued an Order giving the prosecution another 15 days within which to formally offer its evidence which
petitioner opposed.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing that
there was no failure to prosecute and that double jeopardy did not attach as a result of the dismissal thereof. The Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC’s Resolution. It held that contrary to the findings of the RTC, there was no double
jeopardy because the order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had not become final and executory due to the
timely motion for reconsideration filed by respondent. The appellate court also held that petitioner’s right to speedy
trial was not violated when respondent failed to formally offer her evidence within the period required by the trial
court. The Court of Appeals thus ordered the MeTC to set the case for further trial. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.

Ruling: The following factors must be considered and balanced: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. In the instant case,
the totality of the circumstances excuses the delay occasioned by the late filing of the prosecution’s formal offer of
evidence. Since the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, it follows that petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not
violated, consequently he cannot properly invoke his right against double jeopardy.

PEOPLE V. BALOLOY

On August 3, 1996, the body of Genelyn Camacho was found at the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur. The body was discovered by Juanito Baloloy. Barangay Captain Ceniza testified that during
Genelyn’s wake Juanito voluntarily told her the circumstances surrounding the incident and how he raped Genelyn
which led to the latter’s death.
Ceniza then turned over Juanito to a policeman who brought him to the police station, and took the affidavits of the
witnesses. The following day, a complaint was filed against Juanito.
On August 4, 1996, several people came to the courtroom of Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon to swear to their
affidavits before him. Judge Dicon asked Juanitos everal questions where the latter spontaneously narrated how he
killed Genelyn and dropped her body into the precipice.
During his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, Juanito was never assisted by a lawyer.
Juanito was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. Subsequently, the trial court convicted Juanito of rape with
homicide and imposed on him the penalty of death.

Ruling: It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect
orally admits having committed the crime.
In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza, in a spontaneous answer and freely and voluntarily given in
an ordinary manner, that he raped Genelyn. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.
However, as far as the custodial investigation of Judge Dicon is concerned, the conduct of such was in violation of
the constitutional rights of Juanito- not assisted by counsel.
At any rate, while it is true that Juanito’s extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made without the advice
and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal admission of the
accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the
investigation of the accused.

PEOPLE V. TEVES

Hilarion Teves y Cantor was charged with the crime of parricide

In his brief, the appellant contends, in essence, that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime. He also contends that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and Paula Beato Dia to the effect
that the appellant and his wife had a misunderstanding were basically anchored on mere suspicion. Moreover, the
alleged implied admission by the appellant of his alleged guilt before Maria Alulod, who is an aunt of the victim is
incredible as it contradicts common human experience. Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Edwin Escal suggests that several
malefactors may be responsible for the killing of the victim.

Ruling: The facts of this case clearly show that nobody had actually witnessed the killing of the victim, Teresita Teves,
in the evening of August 25, 1996. To prove its case of parricide against the appellant, the prosecution relied on
circumstantial evidence. In order to convict an accused based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that: 1) there
is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.25 In other words, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where the multiple circumstances are proven and are consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent
as well as incompatible with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the accused
That the pre-trial identification in which the prosecution witness was made to identify the suspect (herein appellant)
in a one-on-one confrontation, was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual
imagination and, all told, subverted the identification of the appellant by the witness. This method of identification is
as tainted as an uncounseled confession and thus, falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched
protection.

PEOPLE V. MUSA,

The prosecution charged the appellants and Roberto Barredo (Barredo) before the RTC with the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide. The appellants argue that the trial court gravely erred in: (a) convicting them of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (b) admitting the
seriously flawed out-of-court identification by the witnesses.

Ruling: The appellants assail the reliability and integrity of their out-of-court identification by the witnesses. They
argue that when these witnesses went to the police station, their minds were ready to accept that the persons they
would identify were the suspects in the June 11, 2001 robbery.
This argument is misplaced.
In People v. Pineda, we laid down the proper procedure on photographic identification: first, a series of photographs
must be shown and not merely that of the suspect; and second, when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their
arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.
In the present case, Nancy, one of the witnesses, significantly testified that "other" pictures, aside from the pictures of
the five appellants and of Barredo, were shown to her and to Harold at the hospital. From these pictures, they were
able to identify the six perpetrators of the crime, including Barredo.
The records are bereft of any evidence showing that Nancy's photographic identification was attended by an
impermissible suggestion that singled out the appellants and Barredo as the robbers. More importantly, if there was
one person among the perpetrators who would have caught her attention, it would have been Barredo because he was
the one who pointed a gun at her and at Harold, who took their bag and watch, and who shot Harold. Thus, we uphold
the integrity and reliability of Nancy's in-court identification of the appellants.

AQUINO V. PAISTE

Respondent alleged that petitioner along with 3 others sold fake gold bars to her. Respondent brought petitioner to the
NBI in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where the parties entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable
settlement, the accused waived her right to counsel despite the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI agent
Ely Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy.
Respondent filed a criminal complaint against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa.
Prosecution presented as documentary evidence three (3) documents, one of which is the amicable settlement signed
in the NBI, while the defense relied solely on its testimonial evidence. Trial court rendered a Decision convicting
petitioner of the crime charged. CA affirmed said conviction Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due
weight and consideration to the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel that she signed in the NBI during
the custodial investigation.
She claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely and voluntarily, in violation of Sec. 12(1) of the
Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule

When petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was
already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in.
Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.
However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the custodial
investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties,
petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel
appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent
Atty. Ely Tolentino.
Petitioner's contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she signed the document under duress falls flat.

PEOPLE v. SERZO

Appellant Mario Serzo, Jr. was convicted for murder of one Alfredo Alcantara (by stabbing him to death). Appellant
contends that he was denied his right to counsel. During his arraignment he appeared without counsel. Thus, the trial
court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that
the arraignment be reset and that he be given time to engage a counsel of his own choice, this was granted.
Subsequently, Appellant again appeared without counsel. He was nonetheless arraigned with the assistance of Counsel
de oficio Lina-ac. He pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was waived and trial was set. On behalf of appellant, Atty. Lina-ac
cross-examined witnesses of the prosecution.
Subsequently, Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de oficio in view of appellant’s manifestation and refusal to
cooperate with said counsel. On the next hearing, Appellant again was without counsel, forcing the trial court to
appoint another counsel de oficio, Bella Antonano. The next hearing was cancelled as appellant was without counsel
again. The next one after that, trial court appointed Atty. Bonifacia Garcia of the PAO as counsel de officio.
Appellant’s thesis is that the trial court did not give him enough time to engage a counsel de parte, effectively
depriving him of the chance to present evidence in his defense.

Ruling: Appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent
appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of
his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying his own presentation
of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the orderly administration of justice.
While the right to be represented by counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte,
however, is not absolute.
Right to counsel de parte is waivable, provided: (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law and (2) the waiver is
unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.

DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE,

The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido claiming that Ariel Escobido (live-in partner
of Corazon and son of Charito) was picked up by police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a
number to the complainants. When they called the number, they were instructed to go to the Gorordo Police Station.
In the police station, they met “James” who demanded 100,000 (later on lowered to 40,000) in exchange for the release
of Ariel. After the said meeting, the complainants went directly to the NBI wherein the NBI formed an entrapment
operation. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz through the use of mark-money. He was brought to the
forensic laboratory of NBI where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded positive for
presence of dangerous drugs. He contended that he refused to the drug examination and requested to call his laywer
but it was denied by the NBI.
The RTC found dela Cruz guilty of violating Sec. 15 of R.A. 9165. The CA affirmed RTC ruling and ruled that
extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation.

Ruling: First, the drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only
for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused
appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
Second, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. In the instant case, we fail to see how
a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.
Lastly, the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is
incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances. Such acts were in violation of Sec 2 and Sec
17 of the 1987 Constitution

ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

PEOPLE V. MAGAT

Magat was charged with raping his daughter on two occasions.

During arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charges, but asked for a lower penalty. The prosecutor did not object and
so the judge imposed a penalty of 10 years for each rape.
Three months after the trial, the victim sought a re-trial on the basis that the penalty imposed was too low. The court
granted the request and the accused was re-arraigned on both information where he entered a plea of guilt. After trial,
he was sentenced to death by lethal injection in both cases.
In this automatic review, the accused contended that his retrial was void because prior the retrial he was already
convicted after a plea of guilt. It has also attained finality so it cannot be modified.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the order of the RTC on accused’s plea of guilt is void because the plea of the
accused was not the plea bargaining contemplated in Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the ROC. In a plea-bargaining, the accused
pleads guilty to a lesser offence which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Hence, the reduction of the penalty
in a plea-bargaining arrangement is the consequence of pleading guilty to a lesser offense.
In the case at bar, the accused did not plead guilty to a lesser offense. Instead, he pleaded guilty to the rape charges
but only bargained for a lesser offense. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused
should also be sentenced to the penalty of that offense which he pleaded guilty to.
As such, the SC affirmed death penalty in one criminal case, and lowered the penalty in another from death to RP
because Ann was already 19 years old when the second incident of rape happened

PEOPLE V. ULIT

The appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the rape of his niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing for the appellant to adduce his evidence.
When the case was called for trial on that date, his counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his
plea from "not guilty" to "guilty.". When told by the court that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges,
the appellant stood pat on his decision to plead guilty in and to no longer present any evidence in his defense in the
other two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned with the assistance of the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty
to the charges.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged.
The appellant now assails, in the automatic review by SC, that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING
THE ACCUSED FELICIANO ULIT WITH A DEATH PENALTY DESPITE HIS ADMISSION OF GUILT.
Ruling: Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital offense. When the appellant informed the trial court
of his decision to change his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty," it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay, this Court enumerated the following
duties of the trial court under the rule (1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea; (2) The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and precise degree of his culpability; and (3) The court must
require the prosecution to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

The reason for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care where the imposable penalty is death,
considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that even innocent persons
have at times pleaded guilty. Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be
averted since by admitting his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without
having fully understood the meaning, significance and the dire consequences of his plea.

While it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity,
regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only taken into
consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the
offender." The relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned. Penalty: RP

DAAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Jose Daan was one of the accused charged with malversation of public fund. The accused were also indicted before
this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee. In the falsification
cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of “not guilty” and substitute the same with a plea of “guilty,”
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in
their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea
of “not guilty” to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of “guilty,”
but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. The prosecution agreed however
despite such recommendation, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion and the subsequent MR by the petitioner. Thus,
this present case.

Ruling: Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer- plea does not
redound to the benefit of the public.. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate
that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, in order to afford equal
justice to petitioner.
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged. Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of
offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.

MOTION TO QUASH

ANTONE V. BERONILLA

The prosecution filed the Information in the RTC for a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense because his 1st marriage was declared null and void.
Leo argues that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first
marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime
of bigamy.
The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second marriage on
1991, for which bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void on
2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari.

Ruling: In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then the
crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado, the first marriage was
actually solemnized, although later declared void ab initio. While in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed
by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a
private act. Thus, there is no need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent
marriage. The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case.

PEOPLE V. ROMUALDEZ

Private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, committed “on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986”.

The Information alleged that from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez, then the Provincial Governor of the Province
of Leyte, using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand Marcos, had himself appointed and/or
assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in
violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position
as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department
of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte to the damage and prejudice of the Government.

Romuladez moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute
an offense because: (a) the cited provision applies only to public officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits,
or other concessions, and the act charged of receiving dual compensation is irrelevant and unrelated to that which
mentions; and (b) there can be no damage and prejudice to the Government considering that he actually rendered
services for the dual positions of Provincial Governor of Leyte and Ambassador to foreign countries

Ruling: The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: (a) That the
facts charged do not constitute an offense; x x x x The determinative test in appreciating a motion to quash under this
rule is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law without considering matters aliunde. As Section
6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires, the information only needs to state the ultimate facts; the
evidentiary and other details can be provided during the trial.

PEREZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon resolved to file charges of violation of R.A. 3019 against petitioners,
Mayor Salvador M. Perez, and Municipal Treasurer Juanita Apostol.

Prior to their arraignment, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation alleging the discovery of new evidence which will change the outcome of the case.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion, as such, the Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation and
after, recommended the withdrawal of the Information.

In a Supplemental Memorandum, Assistant Special Prosecutor III Warlito Galisanao recommended an amendment of
the Information instead of a withdrawal, thus Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio approved the Supplemental
Memorandum and filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Informantion. Petitioner assert denial of procedural due
process when the Special Prosecutor filed the Amended Information sans the authority from or approval of the
Ombudsman
Ruling: Under the present constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders. The
Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the
Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now
deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the
cases he is ordered to investigate.
When the law entails a specific procedure to be followed, unwarranted shortcuts lead to the violation of the sacred
right to due process, which we cannot countenance.

PEOPLE V. LAGGUI

Eliseo Soriano was charged with violation of B.P. 22. Respondent Judge Pedro Laggui promulgated a decision
dismissing the Information for being fatally defective because it failed to allege that the accused knew, when he issued
the check, that he would not have sufficient funds for its payment in full upon its presentment to the drawee bank. In
the opinion of the trial judge, the Information did not charge an offence thus, the accused could not be convicted.

Ruling: Such interpretation is erroneous. The gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere
act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by legislature for being deemed pernicious and
inimical to public welfare.
However, although its decision is erroneous, that decision may not be annulled or set aside because it amounted to a
judgment of acquittal. It became final and executory upon its promulgation. The State may not appeal that decision
for it would place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the offense in violation of his constitutional right
against double jeopardy

PEOPLE V. HONRALES

An information for paricide was filed against respondent before the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued an Order granting
leave to conduct the reinvestigation. Prosecutor Rebagay recommended the withdrawal of the information for parricide
and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. While the Motion to
Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed
against respondent before the MeTC of Manila.
Petitioner heirs filed a petition for review with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense- denied Petitioner
Heirs appealed to the Office of the President- denied
Judge Barrios issued an Order granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of
arrest issued against respondent.
Petitioner Heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the orders issued
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Though it found that Judge Barrios failed to make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case and thus abdicated his judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary
of Justice, it ruled that the remand of the case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result in the
reopening of the parricide case which would violate respondent’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling: Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first.
A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the
criminal case for parricide was still pending before the RTC.
Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge for intentional
parricide pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC
having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts.
The requisite that judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
VILLALON V. CHAN

Amelia who was then living in the US, could not personally file a case for bigamy in the Philippines thus, she requested
Benito Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceeding against Villalon (husband) and Talde(2nd wife).
After which an Information was filed and petitioners pleaded not guilty. Atty. Appolo Atencia appeared in behalf of
Amelia.
Villalon filed a motion seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia and argued that Amelia could not be represented in the
case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit and that she already waived
her right to file the case. The RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. However, the CA reversed the decision of
the RTC.

Ruling: The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines
reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability
from the petitioners.

PEOPLE V. DE GRANO,
An Information for murder was filed with the RTC against Joven, Armando and Estanislao), together with their co-
accused Leonides, Domingo, and Leonardo, who were at-large. Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao
pleaded “not guilty” to the crime as charged; while their co-accused remained at-large. RTC found the accused
guilty of the offenses charged- none appeared in the promulgation of Judgment except Estanislao. Accused filed
Joint MR- an order was issued that modified the previous decision, from murder the case was downgraded to
homicide (Domingo Estanislao) Aquitted (Joven Armando). Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the
prosecution sought reconsideration of the Order
the RTC issued an Order denying the motion and giving due course to Estanislao's notice of appeal.Petitioner, thru
Assistant City Prosecutor Glorioso, with the assistance of private prosecutor, filed a Petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Respondent De Grano (ones aquitted) filed a Motion to Dismiss, (1)arguing that the verification and certification
portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. respondents
also contend that the (2) Petition for Certiorar iquestioning the order of acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to
the principle of double jeopardy

Ruling: (1)As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, a liberal
application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.This requirement is simply a condition affecting the
form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Truly, verification
is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the
verification. -Private complainant out of witness protection program and is at the moment in visayas.

(2)The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect
to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that
was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an
accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in
court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.

Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the
lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.
SUERO V. PEOPLE

Petitioner Suero together with Granad were accused of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents. Accused as
the Administrative Officer and Property Inspector of DECS-Davao allegedly falsified an undated Inspection report
making it appear that the furnitures purchased have all been delivered and inspected, justifying the release of payments.

The City Prosecutor commenced trial but this was suspended upon granting of the court of the Joint Motion to Suspend
filed by the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. Such was granted since the Assistant City Prosecutor interposed no
opposition to the motion and to allow the Sandiganbayan to proceed with the hearing of the charge for violation of
R.A. 3019 arising from the same transaction.

The Judge subsequently dismissed without prejudice the falsification case while the Sandiganbayan case proceeded
and a decision therein acquitted the accused. Thereafter, the Ombudsman expressed their decision to refile the
information, consequently, a new information was filed. Petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging the he would be
subjected to double jeopardy.

Ruling: We hold that the instant case does not constitute double jeopardy , for which the following requisites must
concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

It is undisputed that the two charges stem from the same transaction. However, it has been consistently held that the
same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attaches, as long as there is
a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional right against double jeopardy protects
from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.

The elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the realm of those of falsification of a public
document and vice versa. At most, the two offenses may be considered as two conjoined umbrellas with one or two
common ribs. Clearly, one offense does not include the other.

PEOPLE V. TORRES

At around 10:00 p.m., Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie
suddenly blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag.
Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latter’s brothers, Jay, Rey,
appellant, Bobby, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons,
appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion
held him by the neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelries
and immediately fled.
RTC Ruled that the appellant Bobby could only be liable for murder. CA Modified ruling of RTC and found
the appellant guilty of robbery with homicide, found that the primary intention of appellant and his co- accused was
to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. Appellant insists that the appellate court exceeded
its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction
for murder.

Ruling: We cannot give credence to appellant’s contentions. An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question including one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review
of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable
or unfavorable to the appellant.
TORRES V. AGUINALDO

Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the OCP of Manila, a complaint against petitioner
Torres for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by TCT, were
transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale dated July 21,
1979.
Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidenced
by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale. Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an
information for Falsification of public document against Torres, which was filed before MTC-Manila , on October 3,
2001.
Torres moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the
investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Aguinaldo was denied. A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the MTC granted on June 11, 2003. It
should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned.

1. Whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

An order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation; An order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final
fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality.
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss.

Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed
expressly for that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the
accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended party.

Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus,
the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case.

CO V. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22
against petitioner William Co. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed
on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Uy received
a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On July 2,
2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted. Co filed a petition
challenging the revival of the criminal cases. He argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing the
criminal cases should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists
that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival must be within
the one-year period. Even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when
Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.

1. Whether the provisional dismissal of the criminal case has become permanent. NO.

The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which are conditions sine
qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof are: (1) the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was served on the
private complainant at least 3 days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. Furthermore,
the second paragraph of the new rule should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent
one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived. Correlatively, when a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds
emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the
Rules. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal.
Also, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made
prior to the expiration of the one-year period is not found in the Rules. Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year
is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy's motion to revive the criminal cases. Even if the Court will
consider that 2004 is a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy.

IVLER V. SAN PEDRO

Following a vehicular collision , petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the MTC-Pasig, with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death
of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information
for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner elevated the matter to the
RTC, in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Was there double jeopardy?

Ruing: The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

LOS BAÑOS V. PEDRO

Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization from the COMELEC a day before
the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize.
The RTC granted the quashal.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8 on provisional
dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying that the provision
used applies where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the
prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the
information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set
Pedro’s arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated reopening.
The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument that
a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed.

Ruling: The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal.
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect
apparent on the face of the Information. The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out
in the complaint or information.
Whereas, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case; 3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow
that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that should
not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or
information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other
reasons for seeking the dismissal of the com plaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances
outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.

As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand
trial.

PRE- TRIAL

BAYAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Three informations were filed against Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas charging them with
malversation through falsification in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer. They pleaded not
guilty during the arraignment.

The pre-trial of the case was cancelled twice. First, due to unpreparedness of the counsel of the accused, Atty. Molintas.
Second, due to absence of the counsel owing to a flu. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss
with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Lucero.
Thereafter, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, which had been duly signed by the two
accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero (this was supposedly the day the pre-trial should
resume so they could pass upon all other matters.) On Feb 2000, Atty. Molintas moved to withdraw as counsel for the
accused. This was granted thus, the pre-trial was again rescheduled.
The new counsel (Atty. Cinco) moved to withdraw joint stipulation of facts specifically when they admitted
disbursement of funds. And invoked right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion to withdraw.

1. Whether pre-trial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not
binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them. NO.

Ruling: Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be enforced
especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made before
the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing
of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause
on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly
made lies in the courts sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.
Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel. To all intents
and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the client. The rule extends
even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the counsel.
Conditions for a pre-trial agreement to be binding on the accused.·Based on the foregoing provision, for a pre-trial
agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must
be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court’s approval, mentioned in the
last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval
is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the
proceedings.

TRIAL

VISBAL V. VANILLA,
AM NO. MTJ-06-1651, APRIL 7, 2009

A letter of complaint was sent to the Court Administrator charging respondent Judge Wenceslao Vanilla of
MTCC-Tacloban with grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for ordering Criminal Case No. 2000-08-0d-
01 archived.
Complainant alleged that at the time the Judge ordered the case to be archived, the witnesses for the
Prosecution were able, ready and willing to testify. As such, respondent’s acts seriously violated par. 2, secs. 14 and
16 of Art. III of the Constitution and Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Respondent Judge explained that the case was archived because the return of the subpoena served on the
accused showed that he had not been properly notified; the prosecution did not present another witness or inform the
court of its desire to summon other witnesses; and that the accused changed address sans informing the court thus a
warrant was issued for failure to appear by the accused.
The OCA found that respondent Judge showed gross ignorance of the law when he archived the case
immediately after the warrant of arrest was issued against the accused, in violationof Admin. Circ. No. 7-1-92 (archive
only when accused remains at large for 6 months from delivery of warrant)

1. Whether respondent Judge is liable. YES.

A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it
is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines·he
owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law and he is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence as judges must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders,
but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are
men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in accordance with law.
In this case, considering that no malice or bad faith has been established and that this is the respondent’s first
administrative offense, we deem it just and reasonable to impose upon him a fine of P10,000.00

PEOPLE V. DE GRANO,
G.R. NO. 167710, JUNE 5, 2009

On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder was filed with the RTC against Joven de Grano (Joven),
Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho
(Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large. Duly arraigned,
Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty” to the crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides,
Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong. RTC found the accused guilty of the offenses charged. In 2004 an order was
issued that modified the previous decision, from murder the case was downgraded to homicide. However, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo was not present during promulgation. They maintained that while they were not present
during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the promulgation.
Thus according to them, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao,
the RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion.
 1. Whether the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the absence of
the other accused during the promulgation of judgment? YES.

Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent
at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of
guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless
it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Subsequently
thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined
Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause
the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with
respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration
that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once
an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in
court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.

CABADOR V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 186001, OCTOBER 2, 2009

On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City
of murder. On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC
required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice.
But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written
offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he
claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been
formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the
crime charged.
On August 31, 2006, the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a demurrer
to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to
present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision. Cabador questioned the RTCs
actions before the CA. The latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower courts actions. Petitioner seek the help of
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

1. Whether petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence. NO.

Supreme Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right
to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial
of the accused’s right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays
without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.
It can be said that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out how trial in the case had painfully dragged on
for years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutors absence.
This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions for extension of time to file its
formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and
the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabadors motion as a demurrer to
evidence.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer and the prosecution
was not yet deemed to have rested its case on that date. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented
against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called
demurrer did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Thus, the
petitioner’s motion to dismiss cannot be treated as a demurrer to evidence.
 SALAZAR V. PEOPLE,
G.R. NO. 151931, SEPTEMBER 23, 2003

In 1997, petitioner Anmer Salazar and Nena Jaucian Timario were charged with estafa before the RTC-
Legazpi.
The estafa case allegedly stemmed from the payment of a check worth P214,000 to private respondent J.Y.
Brothers Marketing Corporation (JYBMC) through Jerson Yao for the purchase of 300 bags of rice. The check was
dishonored by drawee Prudential Bank as it is drawn against a closed account. Salazar replaced said check with a new
one, this time drawn against Solid Bank. It is again dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit.
In 2002, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting Salazar, but ordered her to remit to JYBMC P214,000.
The trial court ruled that the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the existence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, Timario. As a mere endorser of the check, Salazar's
breach of warranty was a good one and did not amount to estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
Timario remained at large.
As a result, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea to be
allowed to present evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Because of the denial of the motion, she filed petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court alleging she was denied due process as the trial court did not give
her the opportunity to adduce evidence to controvert her civil liability.

1. Whether Salazar was denied due process. YES.

Salazar should have been given by the trial court the chance to present her evidence as regards the civil aspect
of the case.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court explained the demurrer to evidence partakes of a
motion to dismiss the case for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case
where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence
and submits the case for decision on the basis of the prosecution's evidence he has the right to adduce evidence not
only on the criminal aspect of the demurrer is denied by the court.
In addition, the Court said if the demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused
and acquitting him but also on the civil liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity as it
violates the constitutional right to due process.
The Supreme Court explained that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the civil aspect of the case
and ordering the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could
adduce evidence thereon is patently a denial of her right to due process.

CABARLES V. MACEDA,
G.R. NO. 161330, FEBRUARY 20, 2007

Cabarles was charged with the murder of Antonio Callosa (using a fan knife). He pleaded not guilty. The
trial court scheduled the case for hearing on the following dates:
 Nov 22, 2000 – Pre-trial
 April 18, May 4, 11, 18, 23, 2001 – Presentation of prosecution’s evidence
 June 20, 27, July 4, 18, Aug 1, 2001 – Presentation of defense evidence

The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses:

 Flocerfina Callosa – the mother of the deceased
 Imelda Pedrosa – the alleged eyewitness
 Carlos Callosa – brother of the deceased
 Dr. Romeo T. Salen – Police Senior Inspector of the Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory

Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates.
Instead, trial on the merits began only on May 23, 2001 when the prosecution called Carlos Callosa to the witness
stand. In the June 20, 2001 hearing, the prosecution said it would offer its evidence and rest its case should the People
fail to present a witness at the next scheduled hearing.
When the case was called on June 27, 2001, the prosecution failed to present a witness. Neither Pedrosa nor
Dr. Salen appeared during the said hearing. Records show that four subpoenas were issued to Pedrosa. Three
subpoenas were issued to Dr. Salen which were all returned with the notation "addressee moved." There was no
evidence, however, that subpoenas were issued to these two witnesses requiring their attendance for the June 27, 2001
hearing, which would explain why they were absent. Judge Maceda gave the prosecution a last chance.
With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its
evidence.
Thereafter, Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence but it was denied by Judge Maceda. A
day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued the
questioned order reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates specified in the
subpoena and the hearing dates of when the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence
on the first four of the five hearing dates assigned to it and that the prosecution should have been given a last chance
to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor.
Judge Maceda denied Cabarles’s motion for reconsideration and set the case for hearing on May 8, 2003 to
hear the testimonies of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The prosecution still failed to present a witness. Nonetheless, Judge
Maceda, upon motion, again decided to extend to the prosecution another chance, giving the People June 19 and July
3, 2003 as additional hearing dates.
Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her direct examination. A few days
thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition questioning Judge Maceda’s order, alleging that it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion.

1. Whether Judge Maceda’s act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April 1, 2003 Order
reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses
after both parties had rested their case? YES

The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119
and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before
the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3)
the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5)
the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the
order.
A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and
closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment
and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of
reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires
that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and
without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This failure, to our
mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which requires
notice and opportunity to be heard. The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the
express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the
case was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s objection to the April 1,
2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.

2. Whether the said order violate Cabarles’s right to due process and speedy disposition of his case? YES

Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on
the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or
unreasonably. In this particular case, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it
failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full advantage of the opportunities given does not change the
fact that it was accorded such opportunities.
 Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third requirement of Section
24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and
set aside for having been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.

GO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 185527, JULY 18, 2012

Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC-Manila for Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled
from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However,
trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging
that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with
the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC
denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order dated March 5, 2006, the
prosecution elevated the case to the CA. the CA denied petitioners' motion for Reconsideration.

1. Whether the CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed by the MeTC in applying the ruled on
deposition-taking in civil case to criminal cases. YES.

For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court
where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his
credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the
accused.
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case,
we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The
giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only
an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
AMPATUAN V. DE LIMA,
G.R. NO. 197291, APRIL 3, 2013

Relying on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, the panel of prosecutors charged 196 individuals with
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. Dalandag was thereafter admitted into the witness
protection program of the DOJ. Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr. was then mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay and one
of the principal suspects in the massacre, he wrote to Secretary Leila De Lima requesting the inclusion of Dalandag
in the information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre
through his two sworn declarations. Secretary De Lima denied Ampatuan Jr.’s request, prompting Ampatuan Jr. to
file a petition for mandamus before the RTC, seeking to compel Secretary De Lima to charge Dalandag as another
accused.

1. Whether the Secretary of Justice can be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as a co-
accused in the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission as state witness. NO.

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power
and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. The right to prosecute vests the public
prosecutors with a wide range of discretion―the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.
 Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several
accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before
resting its case.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule
119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case.
Dalandag’s exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the panel of prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that “the complaint or
information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved,” albeit a mandatory
provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime
becomes a state witness.
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in
order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion
is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent
the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the
trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is
obvious – the public prosector should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the
several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also
supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the
availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one,
an the like.
On the other hand, there is no requirement under RA 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court
as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission
as a state witness under RA 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and the said witness cannot subsequently be included
in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by
the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public
prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall
petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said
accused from the information.

JIMENEZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209195, SEPTEMBER 17, 2014

Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda naming Manuel J.
Jimenez and several others as co-conspirators. His statements detailed where the alleged steel casing containing the
body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver near the place which he pointed. Montero filed a
motion for discharge as a state witness for the prosecution, to which Jimenez opposed. The motion to discharge was
granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting the said motion.
Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring that the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to discharge because: (1)the requirements for granting a motion were not properly complied;
(2)there is no absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero; (3)Montero’s testimony do not corroborate with the
prosecution’s evidence; (4) and Montero is favored as a state witness though he appears to be the most guilty.

1. Whether Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a
state witness? NO.

Court emphasized that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be
substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points. This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in
resolving a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start
of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with
respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the
formality of a trial. It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a
symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its
prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner.
“Most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the
offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. What the rule avoids is the possibility that
the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized.
Thus, as a rule, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed. The Court
draws attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should
not only “appear to be the most guilty.”

JUDGMENT

PEOPLE V. DE GRANO
G.R. NO. 167710, JUNE 5, 2009

On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder was filed with the RTC against Joven de Grano (Joven),
Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho
(Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large. Duly arraigned,
Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty” to the crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides,
Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong. RTC found the accused guilty of the offenses charged. In 2004 an order was
issued that modified the previous decision, from murder the case was downgraded to homicide. However, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo was not present during promulgation. They maintained that while they were not present
during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the promulgation.
Thus according to them, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao,
the RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion.

1. Whether the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the absence of
the other accused during the promulgation of judgment? YES.

Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent
at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of
guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless
it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Subsequently
thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined
Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause
the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with
respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration
that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once
an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in
court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.

RIMANDO V. ALDABA
G.R. NO. 203583, OCTOBER 13, 2014

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Rimando of the crime of estafa through the use of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations.
According to the prosecution, Rimando enticed the Spouses Aldaba to invest in her business under the
assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest. Convinced, Aldaba gave Rimando a
check in the amount of P500,000.00 as investment in her business. In turn, Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba 3 postdated
checks, one for P500,000.00 and the other two for P40,000.00 each, and made them sign an investment contract with
Multitel International Holding Corporation (Multitel). Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash
the same but were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds.
Meanwhile, Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of BP 22 before the MeTC
of Manila. Rimando was acquitted in the BP 22 cases on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the
act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist.
The RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba in the amount
of P500,000.00. Affirming the RTC’s ruling, the Court of Appeals held that a prosecution for violation of BP 22 is
distinct, separate, and independent from a prosecution for estafa, albeit they may both involve the same parties and
transaction; and as such, Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases does
not automatically absolve her from civil liability in the estafa case.

1. Whether the CA correctly upheld Rimando’s civil liability in the estafa case despite her acquittal and
exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases. YES.

At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her
from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of the accused does
not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there isa finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him." (Dayap v. Sendiong)
In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa as
the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in
Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks she
issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the
latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check. What petitioner failed to mention
in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but
are not required in BP 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence
punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal
and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the
criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects
of a related estafa case, as in this instance.
SUERO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 156408, JANUARY 31, 2005

Petitioner Suero together with Granad were accused of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents.
Accused as the Administrative Officer and Property Inspector of DECS-Davao allegedly falsified an undated
Inspection report making it appear that the furnitures purchased have all been delivered and inspected, justifying the
release of payments.
The City Prosecutor commenced trial but this was suspended upon granting of the court of the Joint Motion
to Suspend filed by the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. Such was granted since the Assistant City Prosecutor
interposed no opposition to the motion and to allow the Sandiganbayan to proceed with the hearing of the charge for
violation of R.A. 3019 arising from the same transaction.
The Judge subsequently dismissed without prejudice the falsification case while the Sandiganbayan case
proceeded and a decision therein acquitted the accused. Thereafter, the Ombudsman expressed their decision to refile
the information, consequently, a new information was filed. Petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging the he would
be subjected to double jeopardy.

1. Whether double jeopardy will set in. NO.

 To constitute double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, (3) second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first. The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an
attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the other, as provided in the Rules of Court.
Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court further provides: Section 5. When an offense includes or is
included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
a part of those constituting the latter.

SEVILLA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 194390, AUGUST 13, 2014

Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public document,
penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, after he stated in his C.S. Form 212 or Personal Data Sheet, both official
documents which were submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council, that he “had no criminal case
pending against him”, when in fact, he knew fully well that he is an accused in a pending criminal case entitled People
vs Sevilla for the crime of assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the “no” answer vis-à-
vis the question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify
his PDS. He claimed that it was a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS. He instructed Mendoza to copy
the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and
delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries
therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza
checked the box corresponding to the “no” answer.
Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under Article
171(4) of the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However,
considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365
of the RPC.

1. Whether Sevilla can be convicted of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence,
notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC. NO.

The proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents, and not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. The designation of “falsification
of public document through reckless imprudence” implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply
a modality of committing it. This is incorrect. Quasi-offenses under Art. 365 are distinct and separate crimes and
not a mere modality in the commission of the crime.

2. Whether Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony
of falsification of public documents, has merit. NONE.

The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is
necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As
such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that
the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

WORLD WIDE WEB CORP. V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 161106-266, JANUARY 13, 2014
 Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office of the PNP filed
applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of Worldwide Web Corporation
and Planet Internet Corporation. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of P.D. No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water,
Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage
and prejudice of the PLDT.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicants Rivera and Gali
of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as
well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be taken. The RTC
granted the application for search warrants. Three warrants were issued against the office premises of petitioners,
authorizing police officers to seize various items in the office premises of WWC and Planet Internet, which includes
various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers,
multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and
other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations. The warrants were implemented on the same
day by NCR-PNP.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and
files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and
areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk,
were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized. Petitioners filed their
respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued
without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of,
was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits
of the poisonous tree." PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general
warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get the
conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. PLDT appealed to the CA and the appellate court reversed and set aside the RTC Resolutions
and declared the search warrants valid and effective.
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. Among the points raised was that PLDT
should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA.
The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.

1. Whether conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary prior filing a motion for reconsideration to question
an order quashing search warrants. NO.

An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, therefore, conformity of the public prosecutor is
not necessary to give PLDT personality to question the motion to quash granted by the RTC.

2. Whether an order quashing a search warrant issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal action is
deemed a final order that can be the subject of an appeal. YES.

An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal
action, is not merely an interlocutory order. It partakes of a final order and can be the proper subject of an
appeal. Therefore, PLDT was correct when they assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition
for certiorari.
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other
hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon
its merits.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal
case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search
warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the
proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
 Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal of a search warrant
is merely interlocutory. There is still something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of
the guilt of the accused therein.
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed,
the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process.
There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that is this case, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal
proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently
quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were
final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

3. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the acts complained
of allegedly do not constitute theft. YES.

The assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause. Trial judges determine probable cause in the
exercise of their judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in
the place sought to be searched.
It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants,
which was reversed by the CA.

4. Whether the assailed search warrants were general warrants. NO.

The assailed search warrants are not general warrants. The requirement of particularity in the description of
things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is sought.
A general warrant is defined as a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested
or the property to be seized. It is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another and gives
the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses.
Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in
place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require
that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of
the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant
as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched
that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
The particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required wherever
and whenever it is feasible. A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.
The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them
with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when
the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and
the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was able to confirm that they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.

PEOPLE V. COGAED
G.R. NO. 200334, JULY 30, 2014

Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint, the driver
of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag;
the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that
he did not know what was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed
subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.

1. Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible as
evidence. NO.

There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons. There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable
cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant.
The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that
Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search
warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of
Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed,
was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers
that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that
time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object
when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.

PEOPLE V. CALANTIAO,
G.R. NO. 203984, JUNE 18, 2014

PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez were on duty; a certain Edwin arrived at their office and
asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing
truck and traversing along EDSA, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow
said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of
said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner
8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted
therefrom, fired their guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were
subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops
and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion a .38
revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to the police investigator at Bagong Barrio
Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with
his initials, “NM”. Thereafter, said specimens were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
The result of the examination revealed that the same was positive for marijuana.
 1. Whether the allegedly seized items are admissible evidence. YES.

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate
control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the
black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the
apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.
The “plain view” doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the prior
justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure.
“The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which
was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

LUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 197788, FEBRUARY 29, 212

PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle
drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza invited Luz to come inside their sub-station since
the place where he flagged down the Luz is almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting something from his
jacket. So alerted, he told the Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon
inside it. Luzo obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about 2-3 inches in size, including 2 cellphones, 1 pair of scissors and 1 Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said
container, he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the former spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned
out to be 4 plastic sachets, the 2 of which were empty while the other 2 contained suspected shabu. Luz was later
charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because
there was no lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs
Decision

1. Whether Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic violation under the city ordinance, and such
arrest lead to a valid search and seizure. NO.

Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission
to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have
been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or
take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the
only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner
into custody.
 This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent
on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation
ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.