SANTOS VS SANTOS ISSUE:

Alleging that the two deeds

FACTS: of sale were simulated for lack of Whether a sale through a public
((Petitioner Zenaida M. Santos is the widow consideration. instrument is tantamount to delivery of
of Salvador Santos, a brother of private the thing sold
respondents Calixto, Alberto, Antonio, all They were executed to
surnamed Santos and Rosa Santos- accommodate Salvador in generating NO. Nowhere in the Civil Code, however,
Carreon.)) funds for his business ventures and does it provide that execution of a deed of
providing him with greater business sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery
The spouses Jesus and Rosalia Santos flexibility. of possession. The Code merely said that
owned a parcel of land. On it was a four- the execution shall be equivalent to delivery.
door apartment administered by Rosalia who In her Answer, Zenaida denied the material
rented them out. The spouses had five allegations in the complaint and argued that
children, Salvador, Calixto, Alberto, Antonio Salvador was the registered owner of the As found by both the trial and appellate
and Rosa. property. courts, Salvador was never placed in control
RTC: decided in private respondents’ favor. of the property. The original sellers retained
The spouses Santos executed a deed of sale their control and possession. Therefore,
of the properties in favor of their children The trial court reasoned that notwithstanding there was no real transfer of ownership.
Salvador and Rosa. Rosa in turn sold her the deeds of sale transferring the property to
share to Salvador. Despite the transfer of Salvador, the spouses Rosalia and Jesus In the instant case, although the spouses
the property to Salvador, Rosalia continued continued to possess the property and to Jesus and Rosalia executed a deed of sale,
to lease and receive rentals from the exercise rights of ownership not only by they did not deliver the possession and
apartment units. receiving the monthly rentals, but also by ownership of the property to Salvador and
paying the realty taxes. Rosa. They agreed to execute a deed of sale
On November 1, 1979, Jesus died. merely to accommodate Salvador to enable
Further, the spouses had no compelling him to generate funds for his business
Six years after, Salvador died, followed by reason in 1959 to sell the property and venture.
Rosalia who died the following month. Salvador was not financially capable to
purchase it. The deeds of sale were
Shortly after, petitioner Zenaida, claiming to therefore fictitious.
be Salvador’s heir, demanded the rent from
Antonio Hombrebueno, a tenant of Rosalia. CA: affirmed the trial court’s decision.
When the latter refused to pay, Zenaida filed
an ejectment suit which eventually decided It held that in order for the execution of a
in Zenaida’s favor. public instrument to effect tradition, as DY VS CA
provided in Article 1498 of the Civil Code, Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm
On January 5, 1989, private respondents [5] the vendor shall have had control over tractor through LIBRA which was also
instituted an action for reconveyance of the thing sold, at the moment of sale. mortgaged with the latter, as a security to the
property. loan.
Dy expresses his desire to purchased his NO. The mortgagor who gave the property was not determinative of the consummation
brother’s tractor in a letter to LIBRA which as security under a chattel mortgage did not of the sale. The transaction between the
also includes his intention to shoulder its part with the ownership over the same. He brothers is distinct and apart from the
mortgaged. had the right to sell it although he was under
transaction between Libra and the petitioner.
LIBRA approved the request. the obligation to secure the written consent
At the time that Wilfredo Dy executed a of the mortgagee. And even if no consent The contention, therefore, that the
deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner, was obtained from the mortgagee, the consummation of the sale depended upon
the tractor and truck were in the possession validity of the sale would still not be the encashment of the check is untenable.
of LIBRA for his failure to pay the affected.
amortization. Article 1496 of the Civil Code states that the
When petitioner finally fulfilled its ownership of the thing sold is acquired by
obligation to pay the tractor, LIBRA would the vendee from the moment it is delivered ADDISON vs. MARCIANA FELIX and
BALBINO TIOCO
only release the same only if he would also to him in any of the ways specified in
pay for the truck. Articles 1497 to 1501 or in any other Spouses Maciana Felix and Balbino Tioco
In order to fulfill LIBRA’s manner signing an agreement that the purchased from A.A. Addison four parcels
condition, petitioner convinced his possession is transferred from the vendor to of land to which Felix paid (3k).
sister to pay for the remaining truck, the vendee.
to which she released a check In the instant case, actual delivery of the She likewise bound herself to
amounting to P22,000. subject tractor could not be made. However, the remainder in installments
LIBRA however, insisted that there was constructive delivery already upon
the check must be first cleared before the execution of the public instrument 1. first of P,2000 on July 15, 1914,
it delivers the truck and tractor. pursuant to Article 1498 and upon the 2. second of P5,000 thirty days after
Meanwhile, another case penned “Gelac consent or agreement of the parties when the the issuance to her of a certificate
Trading Inc vs. Wilfredo Dy” was pending thing sold cannot be immediately transferred of title under the Land
in Cebu as a case to recover for a sum of to the possession of the vendee. Registration Act
money (P12,269.80). The payment of the check was actually 3. further, within ten years from the
By a writ of execution the court in Cebu intended to extinguish the mortgage date of such title, P10 for each
ordered to seize and levy the tractor which obligation so that the tractor could be cocoanut tree in bearing and P5
was in the premise of LIBRA, it was sold in for each such tree not in bearing
released to the petitioner. It was never
a public auction to which it was purchased that might be growing on said
by GELAC. The latter then sold the tractor intended nor could it be considered as
payment of the purchase price because the parcels of land on the date of the
to Antonio Gonzales. issuance of title to her, with the
RTC rendered in favor of petitioner. relationship between Libra and the petitioner
condition that the total price
CA dismissed the case, alleging that it still is not one of sale but still a mortgage. The should not exceed P85,000.
belongs to Wilfredo Dy. clearing or encashment of the check which
ISSUE: produced the effect of payment determined It was further stipulated that Felix was to
Whether or not there was a consummated deliver to the Addison 25% of the value of
the full payment of the money obligation
sale between Petitioner and LIBRA? the products that she might obtain from the
HELD: and the release of the chattel mortgage. It
four parcels "from the moment she takes demanded, the rescission of the sale and the
possession of them until the Torrens COURT RULING: return of the price.
certificate of title be issued in her favor,"
and that within 1 year from the date of the The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
certificate of title in her favor, Marciana the lower court, with modification that the
Felix may rescind the contract of purchase interest thereon will be at the rate of 6%
and sale. (instead of 10%) per annum from the date of
the filing of the complaint until payment.
In January 1915, Addison , filed suit in the
CFI of Manila to compel Felix to pay the The thing is considered to be delivered when
first installment of P2,000, demandable, in it is placed "in the hands and possession of
accordance with the terms of the contract of the vendee." It is true that the same article
sale. declares that the execution of a public DANGUILAN VS. IAC
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of FACTS:
The defendants Felix and her the thing which is the object of the contract, A parcel of lot owned by Domingo
husband Tioco contended that but, in order that this symbolic delivery may Melad was being claimed by petitioner Felix
Addison had absolutely failed to produce the effect of tradition, it is Danguilan and respondent Apolonia Melad.
deliver the lands that were the necessary that the vendor shall have had
Apolonia Melad contends that she
subject matter of the sale, such control over the thing sold that, at the acquired the property when Dominggo
notwithstanding the demands they moment of the sale, its material delivery Melad sold it to her when she was just 3
made upon him for this purpose. could have been made. Symbolic delivery years old in which her mother paid the
through the execution of a public instrument consideration. (Evidence: Deed of sale dated
The evidence adduced shows Addison was is sufficient when there is no impediment December 4, 1943 with a sum consideration
able to designate only two of the four whatever to prevent the thing sold passing of P80.00.) Apolonia contended that she
parcels, and more than two-thirds of these into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole just moved out of the farm only in 1946
two were found to be in the possession of will of the vendor. But if, notwithstanding when Felix Danguilan approached her and
asked permission to cultivate the land and
one Juan Villafuerte, who claimed to be the the execution of the instrument, the
to stay therein.
owner of the parts he so occupied. purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use Dangguilan, on the other hand,
RTC: held the contract of sale to be of it himself or through another in his name, presented for his part 2 documents executed
rescinded and ordered Addison to return to because such are opposed by a third person’s in September 14, 1941 and December 18,
Felix the P3,000 paid on account of the will, then the delivery has not been effected. 1943, to prove his claim that the properties
price, together with interest thereon at the In the case at bar, therefore, it is evident, were given to him by Dominggo Melad
rate of 10% per annum. that the mere execution of the instrument through an onerous donation. The onerous
was not a fulfillment of the vendor's part of the donation includes the taking care
of the farm and the arrangement of the
ISSUE: obligation to deliver the thing sold, and that
burial of Dominggo.
from such non-fulfillment arises the
Was there a delivery made and, therefore, a purchaser's right to demand, as she has
transfer of ownership of the thing sold?
 RTC ruled in favor of Danguilan. CA by her own sworn admission, and moved
reversed RTC‘s ruling. It ruled that there out to another lot belonging to her step- Further, petitioner assumed, as part of the purchase
was a donation, which was void for failing to brother. price, the existing mortgage on the land. In full
comply with the formalities. satisfaction thereof, he paid P79,145.77 to respondent
Her claim that the petitioner was her PNB
ISSUE: tenant (later changed to administrator) was
Resp. spouses mortgaged again said land to PNB to
Who has the better right between disbelieved by the trial court, and properly
guarantee a loan of P145,000.00… P80,000.00 of
parties? so, for its inconsistency. In short, she failed which was paid to respondent spouses. Petitioner
to show that she consummated the contract PowerCom agreed to assume payment of the loan.
HELD: of sale by actual delivery of the properties to
Domingo Melad intended to donate the her and her actual possession thereof in The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale With
property to petitioner Danguilan concept of purchaser-owner. Assumption of Mortgage. On the same date, Mrs.
It is our view, considering the C.D. Constantino, then General Manager of
language of the two instruments that PowerCom, submitted to PNB said deed with a
Domingo Melad did intend to donate the formal application for assumption of mortgage
properties to the petitioner Danguilan. We
do not think, however, that the donee was PNB informed respondent spouses that, for
moved by pure liberality. While truly petitioner’s failure to submit the papers necessary for
donations, the conveyances were onerous approval, the application for assumption of mortgage
was considered withdrawn;
donations as the properties were given to
petitioner Danguilan in exchange for his ((that the outstanding balance of P145,000.00 was
obligation to take care of the donee for the deemed fully due and demandable; and that said loan
rest of his life and provide for his burial. was to be paid in full within fifteen (15) days from
notice))
Hence, it was not covered by the rule
in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring Petitioner PowerCom paid PNB P41,880.45 on June
donations of real properties to be effected Power Commercial and Industrial Corp. v. CA, 274 24, 1980 and P20,283.14 on December 23, 1980,
through a public instrument, and the 2 SCRA 597 payments which were to be applied to the outstanding
private documents remain valid. loan.
Petitioner Power Commercial & Industrial
Assuming there was a valid deed of Development Corporation (PowerCom), an industrial Petitioner demanded the return of the payments it
sale, PR Melad failed to show that it was asbestos manufacturer, needed a bigger office space made on the ground that its assumption of mortgage
and warehouse for its products. was never approved
consummated (no actual delivery + no
possession) While the case was pending, the mortgage was
Petitioner PowerCom entered into a contract of sale
with the respondent spouses Reynaldo and Angelita foreclosed. The property was subsequently bought
At any rate, even assuming the R. Quiambao—involving a 612-sq. m. parcel of land by PNB during the public auction
validity of the deed of sale, the record shows in San Antonio Village, Makati City
that Apolonia Melad did not take possession RTC: ruled that the failure of respondent spouses to
of the disputed properties and indeed The parties agreed that petitioner PowerCom would deliver actual possession to petitioner entitled the
waited until 1962 to file this action for pay private respondents spouses Quiambao latter to rescind the sale, and in view of such failure
recovery of the lands from petitioner P108,000.00 as down payment, and the balance of and of the denial of the latter’s assumption of
Danguilan. If she did have possession, she P295,000.00 upon the execution of the deed of mortgage, PNB was obliged to return the payments
transferred the same to Danguilan in 1946, transfer of the title. made by the latter
 the obligation to pay the balance would not arise.
CA: reversed the trial court. it held that the deed of This is not so in the case at bar.
sale between respondent spouses and petitioner did
not obligate the former to eject the lessees from the Absent a stipulation therefor, we cannot say that the
land in question as a condition of the sale, nor was parties intended to make its nonfulfillment a ground
the occupation thereof by said lessees a violation of for rescission. If they did intend this, their contract
the warranty against eviction. Hence, there was no should have expressly stipulated so.
substantial breach to justify the rescission of said
contract or the return of the payments made WON there was a substantial breach of the
contract between the parties warranting rescission
Petitioner contends:
 there was a substantial breach of the contract Requisites of Breach of Warranty Against Eviction: A
between the parties warranting rescission breach of this warranty requires the concurrence of
 CA gravely erred in failing to consider in its the following circumstances:
decision that a breach of implied warranty
under Article 1547 in relation to Article (a) The purchaser has been deprived of the
1545 of the Civil Code applies in the case- whole or part of the thing sold;
at-bar. (b) This eviction is by a final judgment;
(c) The basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior
WON the alleged “failure” of respondent spouses to the sale made by the vendor; and
to eject the lessees from the lot in question and to (d) The vendor has been summoned and made
deliver actual and physical possession can be co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the
considered a substantial breach of condition instance of the vendee.

The alleged “failure” of respondent spouses to eject In the absence of these requisites, a breach of the
the lessees from the lot in question and to deliver warranty against eviction under Article 1547
actual and physical possession thereof cannot be cannot be declared.
considered a substantial breach of a condition for two As correctly pointed out by CA, the presence of
reasons: first, such “failure” was not stipulated as a lessees does not constitute an encumbrance of the
condition -- whether resolutory or suspensive -- in the land, nor does it deprive petitioner of its control
contract; and second, its effects and consequences thereof.
were not specified either. The provision adverted to We note, however, that petitioner’s deprivation of
by petitioner does not impose a condition or an ownership and control finally occurred when it failed
obligation to eject the lessees from the lot and/or discontinued paying the amortizations on the
mortgage, causing the lot to be foreclosed and sold at
If the parties intended to impose on respondent public auction. But this deprivation is due to
spouses the obligation to eject the tenants from the lot petitioner’s fault, and not to any act attributable
sold, it should have included in the contract a to the vendor-spouses.
provision similar to that referred to in Romero vs.
Court of Appeals, where the ejectment of the
occupants of the lot sold by private respondent was
the operative act which set into motion the period of
petitioner’s compliance with his own obligation, i.e.,
to pay the balance of the purchase price. In the case
cited, the contract specifically stipulated that the
ejectment was a condition to be fulfilled; otherwise,
 Valdes-Choy as vendor and Chua as Chua confirmed his stop payment order by
vendee signed two Deeds of Absolute Sale ("Deeds submitting to PBCom an affidavit of loss 15 of the
of Sale"). The first Deed of Sale covered the house PBCom Manager's Check for P480,000.00. PBCom
and lot for the purchase price of P8,000,000.00. 11 The Assistant Vice-President Pe, however, testified that
second Deed of Sale covered the furnishings, fixtures the manager's check was nevertheless honored
and movable properties contained in the house for the because Chua subsequently verbally advised the bank
purchase price of P2,800,000.00.12 The parties also that he was lifting the stop-payment order due to his
TOMAS K. CHUA, petitioner,vs. computed the capital gains tax to amount to "special arrangement" with the bank.16
COURT OF APPEALS and ENCARNACION P485,000.00.
VALDES-CHOY On 15 July 1989, the deadline for the payment of the
The parties met again at the office of Valdes-Choy's balance of the purchase price, Valdes-Choy suggested
Valdes-Choy advertised for sale her paraphernal counsel. Chua handed to Valdes-Choy the PBCom to her counsel that to break the impasse Chua should
manager's check for P485,000.00 so Valdes-Choy deposit in escrow the P10,215,000.00 balance.17
house and lot with an area of 718 square meters.
could pay the capital gains tax as she did not have
sufficient funds to pay the tax. Valdes-Choy issued a Chua filed a complaint for specific performance
The Property is covered by Transfer Certificate of receipt showing that Chua had a remaining balance of against Valdes-Choy which the trial court dismissed
Title No. 162955 ("TCT") issued in the name of P10,215,000.00 after deducting the advances made on 22 November 1989. On 29 November 1989,
Valdes-Choy. by Chua.
Chua re-filed his complaint for specific performance
Chua responded to the advertisement. After several Valdes-Choy, accompanied by Chua, deposited the with damages. After trial in due course, the trial court
meetings, Chua and Valdes-Choy agreed on a P485,000.00 manager's check to her account with rendered judgment in favor of Chua, the dispositive
purchase price of P10,800,000.00 payable in cash. Traders Royal Bank. portion of which reads:

Valdes-Choy received from Chua a check for She then purchased a Traders Royal Bank manager's RTC: found that the transaction reached an impasse
P100,000.00. check for P480,000.00 payable to the Commissioner when Valdes-Choy wanted to be first paid the full
of Internal Revenue for the capital gains tax. consideration before a new TCT covering the
Chua secured from Philippine Bank of Commerce Property is issued in the name of Chua. On the other
a manager's check for P480,000.00. Valdes-Choy and Chua returned to the office of hand, Chua did not want to pay the consideration in
Valdes-Choy's counsel and handed the Traders Royal full unless a new TCT is first issued in his name. The
Strangely, after securing the manager's check, Bank check to the counsel who undertook to pay the trial court faulted Valdes-Choy for this impasse.
capital gains tax. It was then also that Chua showed
Chua immediately gave PBCom a verbal stop
to Valdes-Choy a PBCom manager's check for The trial court held that the parties entered into
payment order claiming that this manager's check
P10,215,000.00 representing the balance of the a contract to sell on 30 June 1989, as evidenced by
for P480,000.00 "was lost and/or misplaced."8
purchase price. the Receipt for the P100,000.00 earnest money
On the same day, after receipt of Chua's verbal Chua, however, did not give this PBCom manager's
order, PBCom Assistant Vice–President Julie C. Pe CA: reversed the RTC.
check to Valdes-Choy because the TCT was still
notified in writing9 the PBCom Operations Group registered in the name of Valdes-Choy. Chua required
of Chua's stop payment order. ruled that Chua's stance to pay the full consideration
that the Property be registered first in his name before only after the Property is registered in his name was
he would turn over the check to Valdes-Choy. This not the agreement of the parties. The Court of
Chua and Valdes-Choy met with their angered Valdes-Choy who tore up the Deeds of Sale, Appeals noted that there is a whale of difference
respective counsels to execute the necessary claiming that what Chua required was not part of between the phrases "all papers are in proper order"
documents and arrange the payments.10 their agreement.14 as written on the Receipt, and "transfer of title" as
demanded by Chua.
WHETHER THERE IS A PERFECTED covering the Property is registered in 15 July 1989 forfeits the earnest
CONTRACT OF SALE OF IMMOVABLE Chuas name. Or, as the trial court put it, money. This provided that all papers are in
PROPERTY; until there is proof of payment of the proper order.[6]
capital gains tax which is a pre-requisite to CONFORME: ENCARNACION VALDES Seller
There is no dispute that Valdes-Choy is the the issuance of a new certificate of TOMAS K. CHUA Buyer
absolute owner of the Property title.
which is registered in her name under TCT
No.162955, free from all liens and
encumbrances. She was ready, able and
willing to deliver to Chua the owners Short facts
duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed
Deeds of Sale, the tax declarations, and Valdes-Choy advertised for sale her
the latest realty tax receipt. There is also paraphernal house and lot (Property) with
no dispute that on 13 July 1989, an area of 718 square meters located at
Valdes-Choy received PBCom Check No. No. 40 Tampingco Street corner
206011 for P100,000.00 as earnest Hidalgo Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati
money from Chua. Likewise, there is no City. The Property is covered by
controversy that the Receipt for the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162955
P100,000.00 earnest money embodied the (TCT) issued by the Register of Deeds of
terms of the binding contract Makati City in the name of Valdes-Choy.
between Valdes-Choy and Chua. Chua responded to the advertisement.
Further, there is no controversy that as After several meetings, Chua and Valdes-
embodied in the Receipt, Valdes-Choy Choy agreed on a purchase price of
and Chua agreed on the following terms: P10, 800,000.00 payable in cash.
(1) the balance of P10,215,000.00 is On 30 June 1989, Valdes-Choy received
payable on or before 15 July 1989; (2) the from Chua a check for P100,000.00.
capital gains tax is for the account of The receipt (Receipt) evidencing the
Valdes-Choy; and (3) if Chua fails to pay transaction, signed by Valdes-Choy as
the balance of P10,215,000.00 on or seller, and Chua as buyer, reads:
before 15 July 1989, Valdes-Choy has the 30 June 1989
right to forfeit the earnest money, RECEIPT
provided that all papers are in proper RECEIVED from MR. TOMAS K. CHUA
order. On 13 July 1989, Chua gave PBCom Check No. 206011 in the
Valdes-Choy the PBCom managers check amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
for P485,000.00 to pay the capital PESOS ONLY (P100,000.00) as
gains tax. EARNEST MONEY for the sale of the
Both the trial and appellate courts found property located at 40 Tampingco cor.
that the balance of P10,215,000.00 Hidalgo, San Lorenzo Village, Makati,
was not actually paid to Valdes-Choy on Metro Manila (Area : 718 sq. meters).
the agreed date. On 13 July 1989, The balance of TEN MILLION SEVEN
Chua did show to Valdes-Choy the PBCom HUNDRED THOUSAND (P10,700,000.00)
managers check for is payable on or before 15 July 1989.
P10,215,000.00, with Valdes-Choy as Capital Gains Tax for the account of the
payee. However, Chua refused to give this seller. Failure to pay balance on or before
check to Valdes-Choy until a new TCT
Vive Eagle Land, v. CA, 444 SCRA 445 eviction of squatters and occupants in the area Ruling: Under Article 149518 of the New Civil
(2004) in which VELI in return rejected the demand. Code, petitioner VELI, as the vendor, is obliged
to transfer title over the property and deliver the
The respondent then filed a complaint against same to the vendee. While Article 149819 of the
Sps Raul and Rosalie Flores (Spouses Flores) New Civil Code provides that the execution of a
were the owners of 2 parcels of land with an the petitioner to transfer the title in their favor, to
cause the eviction of the squatters in the notarized deed of absolute sale shall be
area of 1,026 and 2963 sqm, respectively. From equivalent to the delivery of the property subject
these lots, there were 3 deed of sales executed. property and to pay the capital gains tax.
Petitioner VELI then alleged that being a juridical of the contract, the same shall not apply if, from
entity as a corporation, they are exempt from the deed, the contrary does not appear or
First, between the Spouses Flores and Tatic paying capital gains tax, that Spouses Flores cannot clearly be inferred. In the present case,
Square International Corporation. They executed and Tobias were the ones liable for the payment the respondent and petitioner VELI agreed that
a MOA that the Spouses Flores obliged of the capital gains tax and that the same shall the latter would cause the eviction of the
themselves to spend for and cause the be responsible for the eviction of the current tenants/occupants and deliver possession of the
registration of the first deed of absolute sale, to settlers. property. It is clear that at the time the petitioner
cause the issuance of the torrens titles over the executed the deed of sale in favor of the
property to and under the name of TATIC, as respondent, there were tenants/occupants in the
vendee, and to pay the capital gains tax on the The trial court then rendered its decision in favor
property. It cannot, thus, be concluded that,
said sales. Tobias (the broker) and Tatic bound of the respondent. It was held that VELI is liable
through the execution of the third deed of sale,
and obliged themselves for the eviction of the for the payment of the capital gains tax as the
the property was thereby delivered to the
tenants of the property, 60 days from the respondents were not even the parties of the
respondent.
execution of the MOA, with the assistance of deed executed by Spouses Flores and Tatic.
Spouses Flores.
The petitioner appealed before CA. The court
On the second deed which was executed affirned trial court’s ruling with modification that it
between TATIC and the Petitioner Vive Eagle is also the petitioner who shall cause for the
Land Inc (VELI), TATIC obliged itself to spend registration of the title and the eviction of the
for the registration of the second deed of squatters.
absolute sale and the issuance of the titles over
the property to and under the name of petitioner The petitioner now appealed before the
VELI, and to cause the eviction of the Supreme Court that CA erred in ruling the the
tenants/occupants from the property within sixty respondent is not bound by the deeds executed
days from April 12, 1988. TATIC did not bind by the Spouses Flores, TATIC and Tobias, and
itself to pay the capital gains tax for the said by TATIC and petitioner VELI simply because
sale. the respondent was not a party to the said
deeds. The petitioners insist that the respondent
And on the third deed executed between VELI acquired the rights and interests of its
and the Respondent, petitioner VELI did not predecessors; and, being the vendee/owner of
oblige itself to spend for the registration of the the property covered by TCT No. 241846, the
said deed, to secure a torrens title over the petitioners had the right to enforce the said
property to and under the name of the contracts against its predecessors.
respondent, or to cause the eviction of the
tenants/occupants on the property. Issue: Whether or not VELI is obliged to transfer
the title to and under the respondent?
The respondent counsel later demands VELI to
pay for the capital gains tax, cause the Held: Yes.
registration of the said deed and cause the