CRIMPRO RULE 122

Title GR No. 197582

Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corp. Date: June 29, 2015
Ponente: Villarama, JR. , J.
Julie S. Sumbilla, petitioner Matrix Finance Corp. , respondent
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal application of procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed in
the Decision1dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67, in
Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had already attained finality in view of petitioner's failure to
timely file an appeal.
FACTS
1. Sumbilla obtained a cash loan from Matrix Finance Crop. As partial payment for her loan, she issued
six checks with a uniform face value of 6,667 pesos. They were presented upon maturity however all
checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed account
2. Petitioner refused to heed the demand letter of respondnet so she was charged with six counts of
violation o BP 22.
3. MeTC found petitioner guilty criminally and civilly for the issuance of the six worthless checks. For
each count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of 6,667 pesos, the MeTC meted
petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to 80 000 PESOS with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil
liability for the six consolidated cases was computed in the total amount of 40,002 pesos.
4. Instead of filing an appeal, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the MeTC which was denied
being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. She subsequently filed a
Notice of Appeal but was also denied for HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE 15-DAY
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. She filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC which was
dismissed. She elevate dthe case to the CA via petitioner for review under Rule 42. However, the CA
ruled that an ordinary appeal under Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy
under the circumstances because the RTC rendered a decision under Rule 65 in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction.
5. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. She filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari with
the SC.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is
already final and executory, may still be modified -- YES
RATIO
The petition is meritorious.

The Correctness of the Penalty

Section 1 of BP 22 provides that
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, x x x , shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.

Petitioner assailed the penalty for being out of the range of the penalty prescribed. The SC ruled that the
MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of the amount of fine using the total value of the six checks (40,002
pesos). The fine of 80,000 pesos is more than 11 times the amount of the face value of each check that
was dishonored. The maximum penalty which could be imposed is only 13,334 pesos.

The Doctrine of Finality and Immutability of Judgments

The decision of MeTC is ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY after petitioner FAILED TO TIMELY FILE
A NOTICE OF APPEAL. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decicion that has
acquired finality becomes immutable an unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the
cout that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
Exceptions to the Doctrine of Finality and Immutability of Judgments
This doctrine is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules
and to exempt case from their operation if and when justice requires it. Procedural rules were conceived to
aid the attainment of justice. If the stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the
demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the later. Several jurisprudence had reversed final
and executory judgments when the interest of substantial justice is at satke and where special compelling
reasons are called for.
In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, the Court relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering:
a. matters of life, liberty, honor, or property
b. existence of special or compelling circumstances
c. merits of the case
d. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules
e. a lack of any shwoing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory
f. other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

The Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The
penalty imposed in this case is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Sec. 1 of BP 22. Since the term
of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine or one day for each amount equivalent
ot the highest minmum wage rate prevailing in the PH at the time of the rendition of judgment. If petitioner is
insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence. Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted
out on petitioner be accordingly corrected within the maximum limits under BP 22.

Rule of Preference in BP 22 Cases

The clear tenor and intention of AC No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but
to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in BP 22. The pursuit of this
purpose does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of BP 22.

RULING
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.
Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (P13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant
Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of P40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from September 21,
2002 until full payment.

Notes

2-S 2016-17 (SALVACION)

CRIMPRO Rule 122- Appeal; Probation Law- Application for Probation
Title GR No. 110898
PEOPLE v. EVANGELISTA Date: February 20, 1996
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES– Petitioner HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as
Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial
Region, RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro
City, and GRILDO S. TUGONON– Respondent
FACTS
Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental (Branch 21). After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision
correccional in its minimum period and ordered to pay to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical
expense, without subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The RTC appreciated in his favor the privileged
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C. Evangelista of the RTC set the case for re-
promulgation of January 4, 1993.

On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probation. On February 18, 1993, Chief
Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private respondent’s
application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could
have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right to make his application.

The RTC set aside the Valdehueza’s recommendation and granted private respondent’s application
for probation in its April 23, 1993 Order.
ISSUE/S
W/N the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent’s application for
probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court—YES.
RATIO
Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible under P.D. No. 986, otherwise known as
the Probation Law, for the accused to take his chances on appeal by allowing probation to be granted even
after an accused had appealed his sentence and failed to obtain an acquittal, just so long as he had not
yet started to serve the sentence. The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took effect on
January 15, 1986 precisely put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the
sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for probation only if the
accused fails in his bid.

Since private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990
had taken effect, it is covered by the prohibition that no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction and that the filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Having appealed from the judgment of the
trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his
conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious appeals (like
his appeal notwithstanding the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals.
But the law does not make any distinction and so neither should the Court.

The ruling of the RTC that having not perfected an appeal against the Court of Appeals decision, private
respondent is, therefore, not covered by the amendment in P.D. 1990 is an obvious misreading of the law.
The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an application for
probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same after it shall have convicted and
sentenced the defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.
Notes
As amended by P.D. No. 1990, Section 4 of the Probation Law now reads:
Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

CRIMPRO RULE 122
Title G.R. No. 188191
ALMERO VS PEOPLE Date: March 12, 2014
Ponente: SERENO, CJ
ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL
BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS,
ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and ANTONIO P.
MATIAS, Respondents.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects
appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state
of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not
have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. While he did not file an appeal before
applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968,
as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
FACTS
Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by Almero from the Decision and
Resolution of CA.

THE MTC RULING IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 96-6531

Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to institute a separate action for
damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, MTC of Labo, Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and
sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its med and max periods. Petitioner filed an Application for
Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction only upon being served
the warrant for his arrest. The prosecutor opposed his application on the ground that he was known to be
uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected to inform the court of his change of address.
MTC denied his application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with RTC. While his 1st Petition
raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation, he filed a Supplemental Petition, which
assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January 2007 judgment; & impleaded complainants
Bartolome & Clarita, Rosendo and Antonio P. Matias.

THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012

In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he discovered that the judgment
itself was premature and flawed, because the MTC never ruled upon his Formal Offer of Exhibits. The RTC
found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment without first ruling on his
Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that the
promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because petitioner was not
present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Without addressing the issue
of probation, the petition for Certiorari was granted. The judgment promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is
set aside and nullified and the case is remanded to the MTC. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City or any person acting in his behalf was ordered to release immediately petitioner from
detention by virtue of the property bond posted by him for his provisional liberty in criminal case.

THE CA RULING

The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation. Since no appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available against the denial of probation, a
Rule 65 petition is clearly the appropriate remedy. However, the trial court erred in taking cognizance of
supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because an application for probation is a
waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction and effectively renders the same final. The
CA ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to be present at the promulgation of judgment, he had no
one but himself to blame for failing to inform the MTC of his change of address. On the argument that
private respondents possessed no legal personality to represent the State in a criminal case, the CA held
that petitioner himself impleaded them in the certiorari petition before the RTC. The CA also found that
petitioner filed his application for probation only on 7 September 2007, or more than one month after he
received notice of the judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on the
discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered grave abuse, the trial court’s appealed
January 28, 2008 Decision is reversed and set aside. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the
dismissal of petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not private complainants have personality to appeal the 28 January 2008 Decision of
RTC. – YES.
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to probation. – NO.
HELD
The Petition lacks merit.

1. Petitioner argues that in criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and that private complainants’
interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Petitioner's application for probation purportedly did
not involve the civil aspect of the case. In the Comment it filed, the OSG reiterated that what petitioner filed
with the RTC was a petition for certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot be considered an appeal
in a criminal case over which only the State has an interest, but an appeal in a civil action from which
private persons can appeal in the event of an adverse outcome. Private respondents, in their Comment
argued that the CA correctly applied Abueg, which is on all fours with the present case. In Abueg, the
accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for crashing
against and killing Francisco Abueg. Instead of filing an appeal, the accused applied for probation. After
the CA affirmed the grant of probation, the Supreme Court entertained and acted upon the petition for
certiorari filed by the victims’ heirs.

We agree with the submission of the respondents. While the present petition originated from a criminal
proceeding, what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself impleaded
private respondents. He cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private respondents,
who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court
has consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient personality if the facts show that
the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and if the issues in the action could be determined
in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.
While the rule is, as held by the CA, only the OSG may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceeding pending in
this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the
issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by
entertaining the petition at bar. It was held that parties in criminal cases have sufficient personality
as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the rules. ((Narciso
vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, citing People v. Calo, Jr.; Paredes v. Gopengco)

2. Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State, and
may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely
upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society,
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects
appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state
of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must
not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Aside from the goals of
according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation
as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused
applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an
admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was
the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from
judgments of conviction – even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal
and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or
apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an
appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a
petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D.
No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies. The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed positions
taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during
the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he
persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure
for probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent. Petitioner applied for probation
beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed the filing before ultimately denying
it for lack of merit.

The Court concurs with the ruling of CA that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying appellee’s application for probation. Granted that appellee had not received the notice of the
January 8, 2007 decision, it appears from the record that appellee had no one but himself to blame for the
procedural quagmire he subsequently found himself in. In denying appellee’s motion for reconsideration of
the September 18, 2007 denial of the application for probation, public respondent distinctly ruled that
application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion. He blames Atty. Evan D.
Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address but Atty. Dizon himself had
been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal offer of evidence since all notices
sent to the accused’s given address have been returned to this court since 2001. If it is true that he moved
to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned with notations ‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’?

This Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes caused by the negligence and
evasiveness of the parties themselves.
RULING
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May 2009 are
hereby AFFIRMED, respectively.
CRIM PRO RULE 122 - APPEAL
G.R. No. 147678-87
Title
Date: July 7 2004
PEOPLE vs. MATEO
Ponente: VITUG, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES EFREN MATEO - appellant

FACTS

 On 30 October 1996, 10 informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten
different dates - 07 October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29
February 1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 -
were filed against appellant Efren Mateo by the private complainant, his step-daughter, Imelda
Mateo.
 The trial ensued following a plea of “not guilty” entered by appellant to all the charges.
 Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at
home. Narrating each incident, she stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in
invariably the same fashion and were all perpetrated inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, in the
presence of her three sleeping siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she exerted to
fend off the advances. She recalled that in all ten instances, appellant had covered her mouth with
a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting. Subsequently, however, she changed her statement
to say that on two occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July 1996 and 18 July
1996, appellant had only covered her mouth with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that
he had not covered her mouth at all and said she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody
because the accused had threatened to kill her and her mother if she were to disclose the matter
to anyone.
 Appellant denied and dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious “retribution” of a
vengeful stepdaughter.
 Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose to testify in defense of her common-
law husband. Their son, Marlon Mateo and neighbor corroborated to the same.
 At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify the complainant the
sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
 The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of
appellant. Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of private complainant and
her subsequent conduct after the alleged rape.
ISSUE
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express
provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death
RATIO

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice
finds justification in the Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does
not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate
appeal or review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily
factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an
intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in
these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence
must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A
prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
RULING

WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the
discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs. SO ORDERED
Notes
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section
10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed
is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc,
dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death
penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
2-S 2016-17 (SUMANQUI)
CRIMPRO
G.R. No. 173797
People vs. Rocha August 31, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, EMMANUEL ROCHA alias Nopoy and RUEL
Plaintiff-Appellee, RAMOS alias Aweng,
Accused-Appellants.
This is a petition for review1 of the Resolutions dated 10 March 2003 and 9 October 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72315.
FACTS
On 12 May 1994, an Information was filed against herein accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos, along
with Trumpeta, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon Another accused, Cenita , was impleaded in
the Amended Information.

On 6 February 1996, the RTC found them guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Trumpeta, Cenita and accused-appellants appealed to this
Court. Trumpeta and Cenita filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw appeal and were both granted by the RTC
on October 11, 1999 and August 21, 2001, respectively. On 31 March 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with clarification the Decision of the RTC. On 18 April 2006, accused-appellants Rocha and
Ramos, through the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of the Court of Appeals to this
Court.

On 14 November 2006, accused-appellant Rocha, having been detained for more than seventeen years,
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, stating that he intends to apply for parole. He also manifested that his
co-accused on this case, Romeo Trumpeta and Estaquio Cenita, had already withdrawn their appeal.
On 14 February 2007, plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a
Comment opposing accused-appellant Rochas Motion to Withdraw Appeal. On 28 February 2007,
accused-appellant Ramos followed suit and filed his own Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal
(same manifestation with Rocha but applied for executive clemency to avail himself of parole.).

Plaintiff Contentions:
It is well-settled that in cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, appeal in criminal cases to
this Honorable Court is a matter of right. A review of the trial courts judgment of conviction is automatic
and does not depend on the whims of the convicted felon.It is mandatory and leaves the reviewing court
without any option.

Plaintiff-appellee also claims that accused-appellant Rochas motion is actually a scheme to evade the
supreme penalty of reclusion perpetua and that it is obviously merely an afterthought designed to trifle not
only with our procedural law, but more importantly, our judicial system. Plaintiff-appellee continues that if
indeed, appellant Emmanuel Rocha was acting in good faith, he should have withdrawn his appeal at the
first opportunity. Instead, he waited for the intermediate review of the RTC Decision to be first resolved
and after an unfavorable decision thereon that he now decides to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos should be
granted -- YES
RATIO
The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision of this Court in People v.
Mateo. In Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it was stated that while the Fundamental Law requires
a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. A
closer study of Mateo, however, reveals that the inclusion in the foregoing statement of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment was only for the purpose of including these
cases within the ambit of the intermediate review of the Court of Appeals: [this] Court now deems it wise
and compelling to provide in these cases [cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death] review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped
together with death penalty cases because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to
directly review reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode of review,
however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought before this
Court via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on automatic
review. Thus, the erstwhile Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, provided as follows:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken.

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed fromand by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court
is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall
be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional
Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of
this Rule.

After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004, this Court promptly caused the amendment of the
foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and
life imprisonment cases and automatically reviewing death penalty cases. Thus, Rule 122, Sections 3
and 10, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (which took effect on 15 October 2004), now provides:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken.

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and byserving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the
same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of
appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death
penalty. The Court of Appeals automatically review the Judgment provided in section 10 of this Rule.

Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The constitutional provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this
Court jurisdiction over such cases.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, however, is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.
In the case at bar, however, we see no reason to deny accused-appellants Motions to Withdraw
Appeal. There is no showing that accused-appellants had already applied for parole at the time of the filing
of their Motions to Withdraw Appeal. On the contrary, they stated in their motions that they merely intend
to apply for the same.

Plaintiff-appellee claims that the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal is actually a scheme to evade the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and is meant to trifle with our judicial system. Plaintiff-appellee, however,
does not explain how the withdrawal of appeal can be used by accused-appellants for these purposes. It
seems that plaintiff-appellee is expecting that the granting of the Motions to Withdraw Appeal would nullify
the Court of Appeals Decision, on the understanding that the Court of Appeals cannot enter judgments on
cases remanded to them pursuant to Mateo. Such conclusion, however, is applicable only where the death
penalty is imposed. Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, which was likewise amended in A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC pursuant to Mateo, provides:

Section 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.

(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render
judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire
record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of
death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal should be included in the case certified for review
to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty,
it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

RULING
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respective Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants
Emmanuel Rocha and Ruel Ramos are GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated 31 March
2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01765 is hereby deemed FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2S 2016-17 (TAN)
CRIMPRO Rule 122
Title GR No. 170979
Yu vs. Samson-Tatad Date: February 9, 2011
Ponente: BRION, J.
JUDITH YU, Petitioner HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge Rosa
Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Judith Yu, et al."
FACTS
1. Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa
against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.
2. May 26, 2005 - RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
3. June 9, 2005 - The petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered
new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.
4. October 17, 2005 - Respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack of merit.
5. November 16, 2005 - Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals (civil case), she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18,
2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.
6. Prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes
is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
7. Petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the
prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision.
ISSUE/S
W/N the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases. – YES.
RATIO
The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:
Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court
in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for
appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be
suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance
of the period begins to run.

The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day
period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration;
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since
the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
 While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period"
to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically
states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There
is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal
period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon
receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly
addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did
include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of
Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this
Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
How appeal taken. — x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court
shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and
to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal
from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section
3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period
to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in
a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives
undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double
standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation
where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for
being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
contrary to reason is not allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est
in lege.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad
isDIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution’s motions to
dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due
course to the petitioner’s appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case
to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits.
CRIM PRO Rule 122
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner, GR No. 193217
vs. Date: February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Ponente: PERALTA, J.:
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Regional Trial
Court1(RTC) Decision dated November 25, 2008 convicting petitioner Corazon Macapagal of the crime of
Estafa;2 the Order denying her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial;3 and the Order4 dated June
29, 2010 denying her Notice of Appeal,5 in Criminal Case No. 98-166722.
FACTS
Case timeline for better appreciation:
1. November 25, 2008 - the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for
misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of the
unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.
2. January 13, 2009 - Petitioner received the decision, then she timely moved for reconsideration, but
was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July
31, 2009.
3. August 3, 2009 - filed a Notice of Appeal, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been
filed out of time.
4. Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly before the SC.
ISSUE/S
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE NOTICE
OF APPEAL FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-
APPELLANT
RATIO
1. NO. First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on
where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:

SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows: - (b) To the Court of Appeals or to the
Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.

Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. 10 A
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s
decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice
of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken.11 The Rules of Court
specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal.
Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in
availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of
Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.12
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts.14 Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. 15 Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled
out in the petition, which are not present in this case.16

Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial
court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural
shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order
denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her
motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition
only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order
denying her motion for reconsideration.17 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order
or judgment.18 Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.19

The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the
petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings,
transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the issues
presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
2S 2016-17 (BALLUNGAY)
CRIMPRO RULE 122
Title GR No. 197832
RAMIREZ v PEOPLE Date: Oct. 2, 2013
Ponente: REYES , J.
Anita Ramirez – Petitioner People of the Philippines – Respondent
Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the CA resolutions
dated January 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33099, denying Ramirez’ Most Deferential
Omnibus Motion to Admit Notice of Appeal and Post Bond on Appeal
FACTS
Anita Ramirez and Josephine Barangan were convicted of Estafa. The judgment was promulgated on March
25, 2009 after several re-settings and warrants of arrest were accordingly issued. According to petitioner, she
failed to attend the promulgation of judgment because she had to attend the wake of her father.
On June 6, 2009, three months after the promulgation, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Lift
Warrant of Arrest and to Reinstate Bail Bond. This was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
motion to admit notice of appeal and to post bond with the CA, asking for the reversal of the RTC order.
She subsequently filed her notice of appeal on November 17, 2010.
CA denied the omnibus motion. A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner also did not prosper,
denying her application for provisional liberty in view of the finality of the judgment of conviction against her.
The CA denied the said petition on the ground of failure to file the motion within the reglementary period.

ISSUE/S
(1) w/n the CA erred in denying petitioner’s motion on the ground of lapse of time – NO
(2) w/n the petitioner can rely on the ground of substantial justice in failing to abide by the rules on the
reglementary period of filing an appeal – NO
RATIO
(1) Section 6, Rule 122 provides that an appeal must be taken WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM PROMULGATION OF
THE JUDGMENT OR FROM NOTICE OF THE FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM. In the case at bar, the
judgment convicting Ramirez of the crime of Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a
notice of appeal within 15 days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the petitioner filed with the
RTC a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three months later. It was only in November
2010 or more than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the CA her motion
to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction has already attained finality and cannot be
modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus,
the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the petitioner’s motion inasmuch as by the time it was
filed, the appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The right to appeal is
merely a statutory privilege. It is not a natural right and is not a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, and maybe exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to
avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal
is lost.

(2) The period of perfecting an appeal may be relaxed on the grounds of substantial justice or other special
meritorious circumstances and issues. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to present any exceptional, special,
or meritorious circumstance that will excuse the belated filing of her notice to appeal. Her assertion that her
counsel failed to communicate to her the statues of her case is an implausible excuse. The rule is that the
omission or negligence of counsel binds the client. Lastly, petitioner did not even inform the judge about the
demise of her father. At the very least, she should have filed a motion to reset the promulgation of judgment.
RULING
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
CRIMPRO RULE 122
Title GR No. 197832
RAMIREZ v PEOPLE Date: Oct. 2, 2013
Ponente: REYES , J.
Anita Ramirez – Petitioner People of the Philippines – Respondent
Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the CA resolutions
dated January 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33099, denying Ramirez’ Most Deferential
Omnibus Motion to Admit Notice of Appeal and Post Bond on Appeal
FACTS
Anita Ramirez and Josephine Barangan were convicted of Estafa. The judgment was promulgated on March
25, 2009 after several re-settings and warrants of arrest were accordingly issued. According to petitioner, she
failed to attend the promulgation of judgment because she had to attend the wake of her father.
On June 6, 2009, three months after the promulgation, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Lift
Warrant of Arrest and to Reinstate Bail Bond. This was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
motion to admit notice of appeal and to post bond with the CA, asking for the reversal of the RTC order.
She subsequently filed her notice of appeal on November 17, 2010.
CA denied the omnibus motion. A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner also did not prosper,
denying her application for provisional liberty in view of the finality of the judgment of conviction against her.
The CA denied the said petition on the ground of failure to file the motion within the reglementary period.

ISSUE/S
(3) w/n the CA erred in denying petitioner’s motion on the ground of lapse of time – NO
(4) w/n the petitioner can rely on the ground of substantial justice in failing to abide by the rules on the
reglementary period of filing an appeal – NO
RATIO
(3) Section 6, Rule 122 provides that an appeal must be taken WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM PROMULGATION OF
THE JUDGMENT OR FROM NOTICE OF THE FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM. In the case at bar, the
judgment convicting Ramirez of the crime of Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a
notice of appeal within 15 days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the petitioner filed with the
RTC a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three months later. It was only in November
2010 or more than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the CA her motion
to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction has already attained finality and cannot be
modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus,
the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the petitioner’s motion inasmuch as by the time it was
filed, the appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The right to appeal is
merely a statutory privilege. It is not a natural right and is not a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, and maybe exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to
avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal
is lost.

(4) The period of perfecting an appeal may be relaxed on the grounds of substantial justice or other special
meritorious circumstances and issues. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to present any exceptional, special,
or meritorious circumstance that will excuse the belated filing of her notice to appeal. Her assertion that her
counsel failed to communicate to her the statues of her case is an implausible excuse. The rule is that the
omission or negligence of counsel binds the client. Lastly, petitioner did not even inform the judge about the
demise of her father. At the very least, she should have filed a motion to reset the promulgation of judgment.
RULING
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
CRIMPRO APPEAL, RULE 122
Title GR Nos. 183152-54
JAYLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN Date: 21 Jan 2015
Ponente: Serene, CJ
Reynaldo H Jaylo, Willam V. Alenzona, and Antonio Sandiganbayan (First Division), People of the
G. Habalo, Petitioners. Philippines and Heirs of Col. De guzman, Calanog
and Manguera
Review on certiorari under Rule 45.
FACTS
Case timeline:
1. Petitioners were charged with conspiracy in the murder of De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguerra.
2. Petitioners were officers of the PNP detailed with the NBI. They conducted a by-bust operation
involving the sale of heroin from Arastia, Calanog, and De Guzman.
3. During the scheduled exchange day two versions were shown as to the manner of arrest. According
to the prosecution, after the victims were told to lie face down on the ground they were shot and
waited for them to bleed out before being loaded into the vehicle under the ruse of bringing them
to the hospital. According to the defense there was a shootout.
4. The Sandiganbayan found them guilty of HOMICIDE. During the promulgation, none of the accused
appeared despite notice. Hence it was promulgated in absentia.
5. Petitioner’s counsel filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration within 15 days (no surrender was
made however). The SB denied the motion. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed which was also
denied.
6. Petitioners argue that PD 1606 has no provision for promulgation in absentia, thus the right to file
an MR is a guarantee under the law and cannot be suppressed by the Rules.

ISSUE/S
I. WON the Court may still conduct a review of the case?
RATIO
NO.

Under Rule 120 there must be surrender and motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the
judgment. These were not complied with. Ultimately the judgment became final when none of these
were made before lapse of period for appeal.

For the failure of the petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves of the
remedies against the judgment of conviction, the Decision of SB attained finality 15 days reckoned
from the date of promulgation.

In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review of the findings and
conclusions in the Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer subject to change,
revision, amendment, or reversal.
RULING
DECISION PROMULGATED IS AFFIRMED.
CRIMPRO RULE 122
Title: GR No. 185709
PEOPLE VS. HIPONA Date: February 18, 2010
Ponente: CARPIO- MORALES, J
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee MICHAEL A. HIPONA, Appellant.
FACTS
Michael A. Hipona was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City with Rape with
Homicide (and Robbery). His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The Second Amended Information charged appellant together with Romulo Seva, Jr. and one John Doe
with Robbery with Rape and Homicide.
AAA was found dead on the morning of June 12, 2000 in her house in Isla Copa, Consolation, Cagayan
de Oro City. She was raped, physically manhandled and strangled, which eventually led to her death. Her
furniture and belongings were found strewn on the floor. AAAs necklace with two heart-shaped pendants
bearing her initials and handbag were likewise missing. Upon investigation, the local police discovered a
hole bored into the lawanit wall of the comfort room inside AAAs house, big enough for a person of
medium build to enter. The main electrical switch behind a shower curtain located at the back room was
turned off, drawing the police to infer that the perpetrator is familiar with the layout of AAAs house
SPO1 Bladimir Agbalog of the local police thus called for a meeting of AAAs relatives during which, AAA’s
sister BBB, who is appellant’s mother, declared that her son-appellant had told her that “Mama, I’m sorry,
I did it because I did not have the money”, and he was thus apologizing for AAAs death. BBB executed
an affidavit affirming appellant’s confession.
On the basis of BBB’s information, the police arrested appellant on June 13, 2000 or the day after the
commission of the crime. He was at the time wearing AAA’s missing necklace. When on even date he
was presented to the media and his relatives, appellant apologized but qualified his participation in the
crime, claiming that he only acted as a look-out, and attributed the crime to his co-accused Romulo B.
Seva, Jr. (Seva) alias Gerpacs and a certain Reypacs.
A day after his arrest or on June 14, 2000, appellant in an interview which was broadcasted, when asked
by a radio reporter Why did you do it to your aunt?, answered Because of my friends and peers. When
pressed if he was intoxicated or was on drugs when he did it, appellant answered that he did it because
of his friends and of poverty.
Albeit appellants mother BBB refused to take the witness stand, SPO1 Agbalog and Consuelo Maravilla,
another relative of appellant, testified on BBBs declaration given during the meeting of relatives.
Appellant refused to present evidence on his behalf. By Decision of September 10, 2002, the trial court,
after considering circumstantial evidence, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with
Homicide (and Robbery), viz:
Based on the foregoing circumstances, specially of his failure to explain why he was in possession of
victims stolen necklace with pendants, plus his confession to the media in the presence of his
relatives, and to another radio reporter live-on-the-air about a day after his arrest, sealed his destiny to
perdition and points to a conclusion beyond moral certainty that his hands were soiled and sullied by
blood of his own Aunt.
On elevation of the records of the case, the Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals.
Appellant maintains that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As stated early on, the Court of Appeals sustained appellant’s conviction
 ISSUE/S
Whether or not circumstantial evidence is enough to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt
RATIO
The appeal is bereft of merit.
For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains the appellate courts
affirmance of appellant’s conviction: First, appellant was frequently visiting AAA prior to her death, hence,
his familiarity with the layout of the house; second, appellant admitted to his relatives and the media that
he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a look-out; third, appellant was in
possession of AAAs necklace at the time he was arrested; and fourth, appellant extrajudicially confessed
to the radio reporter that he committed the crime due to his peers and because of poverty.
Appellant argues that he should only be held liable for robbery and not for the complex crime of Rape
with Homicide (and Robbery) [sic]. He cites the testimony of prosecution witness Aida Viloria-Magsipoc,
DNA expert of the National Bureau of Investigation, that she found the vaginal smears taken from AAA
to be negative of appellant’s DNA.
Appellants argument fails. Presence of spermatozoa is not essential in finding that rape was committed,
the important consideration being not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia
by the male organ. As underlined above, the post-mortem examination of AAAs body revealed fresh
hymenal lacerations which are consistent with findings of rape.
Not only does appellants conviction rest on an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. It rests also
on his unbridled admission to the media.
Appellant argues, however, that the questions posed to him by the radio broadcaster were vague for the
latter did not specify what crime was being referred to when he questioned appellant. But, as the
appellate court posited, appellant should have qualified his answer during the interview if indeed there
was a need. Besides, he had the opportunity to clarify his answer to the interview during the trial. But, as
stated earlier, he opted not to take the witness stand.
The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of
appellant, and AAAs death resulted by reason of or on the occasion thereof. Following Article 294(1) and
Article 62(1)1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance instead.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Decision of January 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant, Michael A. Hipona is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. He is
accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. And the award of exemplary damages is reduced
to P25,000. In all other respects, the Decision is affirmed.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/185709.htm

CRIMPRO APPEAL OF ACQUITTAL

Title G.R. No 166995
Villareal vs Aliga Date: January 13, 2014
Ponente: PERALTA, J.:
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL, Petitioner, CONSUELO C. ALIGA, Respondent.

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules) are the April 27, 2004 Decision1 and August 10, 2004 Resolution,2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. R No. 25581entitled People of he Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga which
acquitted respondent Consuelo C. Aliga (Aliga) from the offense charged and, in effect, reversed and set
aside the July 12, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 147, Makati City.
FACTS
An Information was filed against respondent Aliga for the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of
Commercial Document. The accused, being then an accountant of Dentrade Inc., herein represented by
Dennis T. Villareal, and who has access to the company’s checking accounts did then and there take, steal
and carry away from complainant’s office, United Coconut Planters Bank Check No. HOF 681039 dated
October 24, 1996 in the amount of P5,000.00, once in possession of said check, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify the amount by changing it to P65,000.00 and having the same encashed
with the bank, thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the amount
of P60,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, Dentrade Inc., in the
aforementioned amount of P60,000.00.

During her arraignment on December 6, 1996, respondent Aliga pleaded not guilty. The RTC succinctly
opined that the evidence of the prosecution is very clear that respondent Aliga must have been the one
who made the intercalation in the subject check, and that even without her written admission (Exhibit "D"),
the evidence presented constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Respondent Aliga appealed to the CA, which, on April 27, 2004, reversed and set aside the judgment of
the RTC on the grounds that: (1) her admission or confession of guilt before the NBI authorities, which
already qualifies as a custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because she was not informed of
her rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of her own choice;
and (2) the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to overcome
the presumption of innocence of the accused.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA

ISSUE/S
I. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS STANDING TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW
ON CERTIORARI.
II. WHETHER PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY
III. WHETHER THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON
THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY

RATIO
The petition should have been filed
by the State through the OSG

Petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without the representation of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). It is
well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal.

In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the criminal, not the civil, aspect of the CA Decision.
It must even be stressed that petitioner never challenged before the CA, and in this Court, the RTC
judgment which absolved respondent Aliga from civil liability in view of the return of the P60,000.00 subject
matter of the offense. Petitioner lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision
because it is only the OSG which can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal proceedings before
the Supreme Court and the CA.

A judgment of acquittal may be

assailed only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an
ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy would be violated.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review
errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable
ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal.
Section 1 of Rule 45 (see notes) must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused
will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party
envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is
barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its
promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused
in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it
happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment
of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence
of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. x x x It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence,
re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.
The case does not fall within the
exception to rule on double jeopardy

However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been
deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances.31 Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these
exceptions do not exist in this case.

First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make any allegation to
that effect. What the records show is that during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient occasions
to be heard and to present their evidence.
And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be said that its
judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Again, petitioner did not even allege
that the CA gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he asserted was that the CA "gravely erred" in the
evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.

Certainly, what he questioned was the purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of
evidence or errors of law, which, as aforesaid, cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65 petition. To
repeat, a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave
abuse of discretion, not those which call for the evaluation of evidence and factual findings.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The acquittal of herein respondent
Consuelo C. Aliga by the Court of Appeals in its April 27, 2004 Decision and August 10, 2004 Resolution
in CA-G.R. CR No. 25581 entitled People of the Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga is AFFIRMED.
Notes
Section 1 Rule 45

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court, or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Error of Judgment and Error of Jurisdiction

x x x Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to
public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.
CARPIO
DIMAKUTA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom alias Boyet was indicted for Violation of Section 5
Paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discriminatory Act.
After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision which convicted petitioner of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing, among
other things, that even assuming he committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the
same were done without the victim's consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her.

On June 28, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision by modifying the RTC Decision, petitioner was found guilty
of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correctional, as maximum. Likewise, he was ordered to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P30,000.00 as moral damages.
Instead of further appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the CA a manifestation with
motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. Petitioner invoked the
case of Colinares v. People9 which allowed petitioner therein to apply for probation after his sentence was
later reduced on appeal by the Supreme Court.
The CA issued a Resolution on September 3, 2012 denying petitioner's manifestation with
motion.

ISSUE: WON THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DENYING THE APPLICATION OF PROBATION - YES

HELD:
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4 of the
Probation Law establishes a much narrower period during which an application for probation may be filed
with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and - within
the period for perfecting an appeal -." As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the first
paragraph of Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation "if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present
form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an application for probation means "the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal." The deletion is quite logical since an application for probation
can no longer be filed once an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending appeal that would
have to be withdrawn.
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's counsel and the
dissenting opinion. We are unable to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in authorizing the
trial court to grant probation "upon application by [the] defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal"
and in reiterating in the proviso that

"no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction."
 On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:

1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty
imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of
appeal; and

2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in
issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by
the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the
crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.

Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits
granting an application for probation if an appeal from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the
accused.
CRIMPRO

GR No. 177768
PEOPLE vs OLIVO Date: July 27, 2009
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.:
People of the Philippines, Appellee Charmen Olivo, Nelson Danda and Joey Zafra,
Appellants

This is an appeal from the Decision dated November 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 00595 which had affirmed in toto the Decision dated August 24, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, finding accused-appellants Charmen Olivo (Olivo), Nelson
Danda (Danda), and Joey Zafra (Zafra) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide, with no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim, Mariano Constantino,
P65,000 as actual damages, P50,000 for the death of the victim, and P50,000 as moral damages.

FACTS
1. Maricel Permejo was tending the store of the late Mariano Constantino on 21 November
2000 when three (3) armed men barged in at around 6:30 o’clock in the evening and ordered
her to bring out the money. When she refused, accused Nelson Danda kicked her leg while
accused Joey Zafra proceeded to get the money amounting to P35,000.00 from the cash
register;
2. Meanwhile, the owner Mariano Constantino entered his store and shouted. Accused
Charmen Olivo pointed a gun at him. Constantino ran to the back of the house and accused
Olivo chased him. Successive gunshots were subsequently heard. Maricel Permejo looked
for her employer and found him wounded and bloodied along the stairway of the house.
She sought help from a neighbor and the victim was brought to the Fairview Hospital where
he expired;
3. The cadaver was brought for autopsy to Camp Crame and Dr. Winston Tan, after the
procedure, found several gunshot wounds, the fatal among which was the one sustained
on the right chest.
4. SPO2 Joseph Dino, an investigator at Camp Karingal, was designated to handle the case.
He went to the place of the incident and took the statement of Maricel Permejo. Two (2)
days after, their office received information that the Batasan Police Station has three (3)
suspects for violation of Republic Act (RA) 6425. SPO2 Dino borrowed the suspects and
when he presented them to Permejo, the latter identified them as the same persons who
held them up and shot her employer;
5. As their alibi, accused Charmen Olivo and Nelson Danda narrates that at around 6:30
o’clock in the evening of 21 November 2000, the accused were cleaning the house that they
rented from Dominica Bernal on 20 November 2000. While accused Olivo was fetching
water along Barangay Holy Spirit in Payatas, Quezon City on 24 November 2000,
policemen in civilian clothes mauled and arrested him without a warrant. Together with two
(2) others, they were brought to Station 6 allegedly for violation of R.A. 6425. A woman
came and accused Olivo was taken out. The policemen asked her, ito ba? which she
answered in the negative. The same question was repeated twice but the answer was not
changed;
6. After a few days, the accused were imprisoned at Camp Karingal. They were asked their
names. The same woman arrived thereat and at a distance of 1 meters, accused Olivo
heard the policemen telling the woman “ituro mo na.” The woman then mentioned accused
Olivos name. The woman referred to was Maricel Permejo;
7. The then RTC rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of the crime of robbery
with homicide;
8. In a Decision dated November 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt. – NO.
 RATIO

After review, Supreme Court finds that accused-appellants should be acquitted.

The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals
ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the
same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case

The fact that Permejo was not able to identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime
impinges heavily on the credibility of prosecution’s evidence. For if, indeed, the accused-appellants were
the malefactors of the crime who did not hide their faces during the robbery, the eyewitness, who had such
close, traumatic encounter with them, should automatically have recalled their faces upon seeing them. It
behooves this Court to declare that she was not able to do so positively.

Other circumstances tend to prove that the accused-appellants were not the perpetrators of the crime.
Apparently, the accused-appellants were arrested without a warrant during a buy-bust operation on
November 24, 2000, transferred to Camp Karingal under dubious circumstances, and made to stand in a
police line-up and identified by an eyewitness who failed to identify them three times. These circumstances
were ignored by the trial court who gave too much credence on the positive identification of the accused-
appellants by the same eyewitness during direct examination.

One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other
appellants and who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have
perfected an appeal from the trial courts judgment. The record does not show the reason therefor.

Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to accused
Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of
his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to
appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed

RULING

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00595 and the Decision dated August 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Charmen Olivo and Nelson Danda are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court, their co-accused Joey Zafra is declared entitled also to ACQUITTAL. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Director of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, who is ordered to IMMEDIATELY
RELEASE them from confinement unless held for some other legal cause, and to report to this Court any
action taken by him within ten days from notice.

Rule 122: APPEAL

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused –
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
People vs Dueno Ponente: Perez, J
G.R. No. L-31102 Plaintiff- The People of the Philippines vs
May 5, 1979 Defendants- Felipe Dueno et al.
Facts:
At about five thirty o’clock in the afternoon of January 21, 1963, Roque Dellamos met the three
accused Felipe Dueno, Sofronio Dueno and Andresito Belonio near the house of Federico Dolfo. Upon
seeing Dellamos, the Dueno fired a shot at the former using a caliber .45 pistol he had at that time. Dellamos
immediately ran away to evade the hostility of the above named accused. While traversing, he heard a
second shot from the gun of the accused.
In the evening of that day, at about 9:00 pm, the nephew of Dellamos opened the door of their house
preparatory to going down. At that moment, Dellamos, who was fixing the plates heard a shot from a gun
and at the same time heard his nephew Demontano fall from the stairs of the house. Dellamos immediately
got his flashlight and blew out the light from his lamp. He went towards the door where his nephew fell and
focused his flashlight outside his house while his body was behind a bayong full of palay beside the door and
peeped from a hole on their hole. He saw accused Dueno with a gun and the two accused named, Sofrino
Dueno and Belenio with their respective weapons. On November 27, 1963, the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz
filed an information for murder against the three accused. To support the testimony of Dellamos, the
prosecution presented his neighbor, Federico Dolfo. The testimony of Dolfo narrates the following: On that
same night of January 21, 1963, Federico Dolfo heard two gun shots from the direction of the house of Roque
Dellomos. Having been almost also a victim of the attack by the accused that same afternoon with Roque
Dellomos, he thought that it might be the accused attacking Roque Dellomos, his neighbor, so he got his
flashlight and his bolo and went down his house and hid himself from the banana plantations infront of his
house near the barrio trail, While thus hiding he heard noises of persons passing the trail near him and when
He saw persons running by that trail, which was about five meters from where he was, he lighted his flashlight
and focused it on the persons running and recognized them to be accused Felipe Dueño, Sofronio Dueño
and Andresito Belonio.
On the other hand, the accused in this case presented a common alibi as their defense. The trial
court convicted the three accused with the crime charged, hence appeal was taken before the Court of
Appeals. Considering the nature of the penalty, the Court of Appeals transmitted the case to the Supreme
Court. However, after the case was submitted for decision, appellants Felipe Dueno and Sofronio Dueno
respectively, withdrew their appeals. These withdrawals were allowed in resolutions dated January 2, 1977
and June 28, 1978. As such only the appeal of the Belenio is wider review in this decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in giving full credence with respect to the testimony of Dellamos
and Dolfo
Whether or not there is sufficient motive
Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving credence to the appelants defense of alibi
Held:
The petition has no merit. With respect to the first assignment of error, the testimony of the witnesses
are not contrary to the natural reactions of man as alleged by the appellants. The act of Dellamos of blowing
the light from his lamp in order to conceal his identity and the fact he used a flash light to identify the
perpetrators does not destroy the credibility of the said witness. Base from the transcripts of the trial, the
witness successfully hid himself behind a bayong of palay. It also showed that he used the flash light not
directly towards the perpetrators but only near the door in order to illuminate sufficient light for him to properly
see what was happening thru a small hole.
 With respect to the second assignment of error, there is sufficient motive in this case. The trial court
established the reason for the attacks towards the witnesses was the fact they returned the carabaos stolen
by the accused. The death of the nephew on the other hand was because of mistaken identity. Lastly, the
defense of alibi must also fail. The alibi of the accused are not of great distance as to extinguish the possibility
of committing the crime. As a matter of fact, even if the alibi of the accused is true, the proximity of the two
barrios does not destroy the commission of the crime.
However, there is error with respect to the appreciation that both evident premeditation and treachery
qualified the crime to murder. Treachery alone sufficiently qualifies the killing to murder. In such a case, the
allegation of evident premeditation should only be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance. However,
jurisprudence dictates that in cases of mistaken identity, evident premeditation cannot be applied. With
respect to the aggravating circumstance of night time, the court ruled that it is absorbed by treachery.
Considering the foregoing, the court increased the Civil indemnity from P6000 to P12000. However
considering that the two accused had already withdrawn their appeals, this decision is binding only with
respect to Belonio who pursued his appeal.
CRIMPRO RULE 122
Title GR No. 141443
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE Date: August 30, 2000
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Ponente: DE LEON, JR., J.
OF AZUCENA L. GARCIA
AZUCENA L. GARCIA – Petitioner
Nature of the case: Azucena L. Garcia petitions this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in order "to free,
relieve and exonerate her from the penalty of imprisonment adjudged and imposed upon her, in gross
violation of her constitutional rights to due process of law and other fundamental rights” pursuant to an
allegedly void judgment rendered on April 20, 1995 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
86, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589.
FACTS
On October 27, 1989, accused Azucena Locsin Garcia filed an application for land registration with the
RTC of Quezon City (Branch 80) docketed as LRC Case No. 89-007 covering two parcels of land identified
as Lots Nos. 822-C-1 and 822-C-2 with an area of 32,350 and 28,750 sq. m., respectively. Appended to said
application were the following documents, to wit: (1) Tax Declaration No. 2273 with PIN-21-11773-1 for Lot
822-C-1; (2) Tax Declaration No. 22732 with PIN-21-11773-2 for Lot 822-C-2; Subdivision Plan Psd-19954;
(4) Technical Description of Lot 822-C-1; and Technical Description of Lot 822-C-2.

Said application was abandoned because on May 8, 1991, accused, who is the applicant in the land
registration case, filed an application this time for administrative reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 308462 with the Land Registration Authority. On June 20, 1991, TCT No. 308462 was ordered
reconstituted, along with other TCTs in the names of other applicants, pursuant to Administrative Order No.
Q-283(91) signed by Benjamin M. Bustos, Reconstituting Officer of the Land Registration Authority.

On September 10, 1991, complainant Antonio de Zuzuarregui wrote the Quezon City Assessor’s Office
requesting for certification as to the authenticity of Declaration of Real Property No. 2273, and Declaration
of Real Property No. 22732 both issued in the name of Domingo R. Locsin and purportedly signed by Jose
C. Gonzales, then acting City Assessor of Quezon City, because the lot embraced by the said declarations
are allegedly within the boundary of said complainant’s property per his TCT No. 181095.

In reply to the above letter, Q.C. City Assessor Constantino P. Rosas wrote Zuzuarregui on September 11,
1991 stating that no such records (Declarations of Real Property Nos. 2273 and 22732) exist in their office
and the same appear to be spurious.

On October 4, 1991, Zuzuarregui wrote another letter this time to Mrs. Brigida Llave, Technical Records
Section of the Bureau of Lands, NCR, Q.C. requesting for certification as to the authenticity of the following
documents:
1) Annex "1" – xerox copy of Plan Psd-19954 of Lot 822-C in the name of Domingo R. Locsin;
2) Annex "2" – xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 822-C-1, Psd-19954, also in the name of
Domingo R. Locsin; and
3) Annex "3" – xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, likewise in the name of
Domingo R. Locsin.

In Llave’s reply of October 7, 1991, she stated that the alleged plan, Psd-19954, is non-existing in their files
and called attention to the fact that she has no signature over her stamped name "Brigida R. Llave" on said
plan. Also, on August 14, 1992, Samuel C. Cleofe, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in his reply to a letter
from herein complainant Zuzuarregui, stated that per verification from their Control Log Book, TCT No.
308462 is not shown as among those filed in their office.

Herein accused was formally charged with three counts of falsification of public documents in three
separate criminal informations filed with the RTC of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 36490-92, the first being for falsification of technical description of land and the other two being
for falsification of Declarations of Real Property.
Meanwhile, Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92 for falsification of public documents filed by the herein
complainant against the herein accused were raffled to Branch 85 of this Court then presided by the
Honorable Benjamin P. Abesamis and subsequently by the Honorable Judge Mariano M. Umali. In a decision
penned by the latter, dated May 17, 1994, the herein accused was acquitted of all the above charges on
reasonable doubt.

Moreover, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 with falsifying the entries in
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308462, forging the signature therein of Vicente N. Coloyan,
and introducing or using said TCT in support of her application for reconstitution of title. Similarly,
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-53590 and Q-94-53591, petitioner was charged with falsifying the entries
in Declaration of Real Property Nos. 22731 and 22732, respectively, forging the signatures therein of
Jose C. Gonzales, and introducing or using the same in support of her application before the Land
Registration Administration (LRA).

In its Decision dated April 20, 1995, the trial court found petitioner guilty of three (3) counts of falsification of
public documents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, and subsequently this
Court, affirmed petitioner’s conviction. Entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999.

Petitioner’s Contentions:
 Petitioner only questions the validity of the judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589.
 She contends that where proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of the
accused, the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal
remedy of habeas corpus. Hence, in her case, the fundamental unfairness of the judgment, when
viewed in light of the record, renders the same subject to attack for being violative of her right to due
process of law.
 Petitioner explains that the disquisition of the trial judge was totally silent on the official findings and
determinations that Coloyan’s signature on the owner’s copy of the TCT No. 308462 was genuine.
Instead, the trial judge merely relied on the testimony of Coloyan that the signature appearing on the
photocopy of TCT No. 308462 is not his.

OSG’s Contentions:
 The writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained
of his liberty. Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the
writ.
 The ground invoked by petitioner pertains to the appreciation of evidence, a matter which falls within
the exclusive discretion and prerogative of the trial court.
 A writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot
function as a writ of error. As such, the writ will not lie to correct alleged mistakes of fact or of law
committed by a court in the exercise of its functions.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the petition for the writ habeas corpus should be granted – NO.
RATIO
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found
illegal, to order the release of the detainee. However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will not issue
where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order. In the case at bar,
therefore, petitioner can no longer seek relief via a petition for habeas corpus having been convicted
by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document and use thereof. Said judgment is
already final and executory.

The writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy for the correction of such errors. Court cannot, in habeas corpus
proceedings, review the record in a criminal case after judgment of conviction has been rendered, and the
defendants have entered on the execution of the sentence imposed, to ascertain whether the facts found by
the trial court were in accordance with the evidence disclosed by the record, or to pass upon the correctness
of conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts thus found. A commitment in due form based on a
final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a criminal case is conclusive evidence of the legality
of his detention under such commitment, unless it appears that the court which pronounced the judgment
was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the penalty. Mere errors of fact or law,
which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause and the
person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on appeal in the form and manner
prescribed by law.
RULING
WHEREFORE, petitioner Azucena L. Garcia, having failed to establish sufficient cause to warrant issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
2-S 2016-17 (ELMIDO)