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78239
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EN BANC

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,

FERNAN, C.J.:

The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.

In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then
assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50
representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former
post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.

Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local
Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said
Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to
her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute
pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had
required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. 1

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should
not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2

The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further review and
action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:

We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out by the records,
petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was accused. In line with the government's crusade
to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v.
Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim.
Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the
only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits
and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.

In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. ...

Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that "a pardon shall in
no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence."
(Sec. 36, par. 2).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an
appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the
civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. 3

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf We
gave due course on October 13, 1987.

Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she
was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no
final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of
office did not attach and the status of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was
issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the
President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same. 4

It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as
minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. 5 Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict
from public office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. 6 Even if the offender
be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly
remitted by the pardon. 7 The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension
from public office. 8

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The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon and its
legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject have not been
wholly consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon.

The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the King's wrath. But Philippine
jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case law.

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It
is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance." 8-a

At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973
Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:

The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. 9

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction,
implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted
even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the
former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not
material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by
the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute pardon in relation
to the decisive question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

In Pelobello v. Palatino, 10 We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts on the various
consequences of pardon: "... we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941,
December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. ... (W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the
constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who,
after an inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of
relieving completely the party ... concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.

The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12 show the unmistakable
application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, 13 whose sweeping generalizations to this day continue to hold
sway in our jurisprudence despite the fact that much of its relevance has been downplayed by later American
decisions.

Consider the following broad statements:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching;
if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. 14

Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. 15 The modern trend of authorities
now rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement
which has been made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon
has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the
crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
16

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the
party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on
the finding of guilt. 17 But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and
"as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the
criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction." 18

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done
or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction
for it can be required." 20 This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay
for lost earnings and benefits.

Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the
crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, 21 we find this strong observation: "To assume
that all or even a major number of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our
judicial system, but requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies
the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by the most complete method known to modern
civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they
cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed. 22

In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit
all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a
presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief
that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were
innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce
such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly
maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.

Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the public
manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their
subsequent dealings with the actor." 23

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost

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reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true
character and purpose of the privilege.

Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the
commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction 25 although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office. 26

The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of
the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to
anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms
part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is
clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this
particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which
was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the
facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence.
The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation. 27

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April
15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result but on grounds different from those relied upon by the majority opinion.
Petitioner Salvacion A Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City. Together with three (3) other accused,
she was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the complex crime of Estafa through falsification of public
documents. After trial, the accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P 3,500.00. They were also ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the
government in the sum of P 4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to this Court which affirmed the same. Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, President Ferdinand E. Marcos extended to her on 17
December 1984 an absolute pardon which she accepted on 21 December 1984.

By reason of said absolute pardon, petitioner in representations before the City Treasurer of Calbayog, the Ministry
of Finance and the Office of the President, asked that she be allowed to re-assume her former office, as of 1 August
1982 (the date of her preventive suspension), that she be paid her back salaries for the entire period of her
suspension, and that she be not required to pay her proportionate share of the amount of P 4,892.50.

Respondent Assistant Executive Secretary denied petitioner's request for automatic reinstatement as well as her
other claims, because of which denial, this petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Court seeking the
setting aside and reversal of the decision of the respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, on the main contention
that, as a public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon by the President, she is entitled to reinstatement
to her former position without need of a new appointment, and to the other reliefs prayed for.

There can be no dispute that the pardon extinguished petitioner's criminal liability. At the same time, Art. 36 of the
Revised Penal Code categorically covers the effects of a pardon on the pardoned's right to hold office, suffrage and
on his civil liability. It states:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code to the case at bar, it is, to my mind, clear that the pardon extended by
the President to the petitioner did not per se entitle her to again hold public office (including therefore the office of
Assistant Treasurer, Calbayog City) or to suffrage; nor did such pardon extinguish her civil liability for the criminal
conviction, subject matter of the pardon.

An examination of the presidential pardon in question shows that, while petitioner was granted "an absolute and
unconditional pardon and restored to full civil and political rights", yet, nothing therein expressly provides that the
right to hold public office was thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express exclusion by Art. 36, RPC of
the right to hold public office, notwithstanding a pardon unless the right is expressly restored by the pardon, it is my
considered opinion that, to the extent that the pardon granted to the petitioner did not expressly restore the right to
hold public office as an effect of such pardon, that right must be kept away from the petitioner.

It is a recognized principle in public law — hopefully to be honored more in its compliance rather than in its breach
— that a "public office is a public trust." The restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost such
right by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter
how intensely arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit, positive and specific language. To require this would
not be asking too much.

I am aware that there are broad statement in Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 341 and Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil.
441 which may be understood to mean that an absolute pardon, without qualification, restores full civil rights which

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have been construed, in turn, to include the right to hold public office (Versoza vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil. 323).

If such be the message of said cases, then I submit that a modification is in order, so that an absolute pardon to
work a restoration of the right to hold public office must expressly so state, in order to give substance and meaning
to the sound provisions of Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly in the light of our times and experience.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the important and eloquent opinion of the Chief Justice. I also join in the separate
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla. At the same time, I would add a few brief statements, basically for my own
clarification. Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Article 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the registration of the right to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

It is worthy of note that the rule embodied in Article 36 is reiterated four (4) times by the Revised Penal Code in its
following provisions:

Article 40. Death-Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date of sentence, unless such accessory penalties have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. - Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during
the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 42. Prision mayor - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that
of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 43. Prision correccional - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision correccional shall carry
with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Chief Justice points out that the penalty imposed upon petitioner for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, included the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification from public
office or employment and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The 17 December 1984
pardon extended to petitioner in the instant case was written on a standard printed form which states in printed
words that it was "an absolute and unconditional pardon [which] restored [petitioner] to full civil and political rights." 1
While the right of suffrage and the right to hold public office or employment are commonly regarded as "political
rights," 2 it must be noted that there are other "political rights" 3 and that the pardon given to petitioner did not
expressly and in printer's ink restore to petitioner the particular right to hold public office and the specific right to vote
at elections and plebiscites.

I join in the basic point of Mr. Justice Padilla that because of the nature of a public office as a public trust, Articles 36
and 40-43 appropriately require a very high degree of explicitness if a pardon is to work the restoration of such right
to petitioner. Exactly the same point may, of course, be made in respect of the restoration of the right to vote.

Articles 36 and 40-43 of the Revised Penal Code, quoted above, have been in our statute books since 1930. I
believe that they have been left intact by the constitutional provisions on pardon, whether one refers to the 1935
Constitution or to the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. I do not believe that Articles 36, et al. collided with any provision
or principle embodied in either of our prior constitutions. The Chief Justice appears to agree with this position when
he referred to Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code (Opinion, p. 5). He goes on, however, to say (in page 13) that:
"the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that."

It is submitted, with respect, that Articles 36, et al. of the Revised Penal Code have not been shown to be an
unconstitutional restriction on the pardoning power of the President. The limitation on the President's pardoning
power, if limitation it be, does not appear to be an unreasonably onerous one. Articles 36, et al. merely require the
President to become completely explicit if the pardon he extends is intended to wipe out not merely the principal but
also the accessory penalty of disqualification from holding public office and from voting and to restore the recipient
of the pardon to the exercise of such fundamental political rights. Such requirement of explicitness seems entirely in
line with the fundamental point made by the Chief Justice that a pardon does not blot out the factual guilt of the
recipient of the pardon. In other words, the mere grant of a pardon to a public officer or employee who has been
unfaithful to the public trust and sentenced to disqualification from voting and from holding such office, does not
create the presumption that the recipient of the pardon has thereby suddenly become morally eligible once more to
exercise the right to vote and to hold public office.

In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner was ineffective to restore to her the right to hold public office and on
this ground, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review and to AFFIRM the assailed Resolution of the then Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.

Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result but on grounds different from those relied upon by the majority opinion.

Petitioner Salvacion A Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City. Together with three (3) other accused,
she was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the complex crime of Estafa through falsification of public
documents. After trial, the accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P 3,500.00. They were also ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the

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government in the sum of P 4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to this Court which affirmed the same. Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, President Ferdinand E. Marcos extended to her on 17
December 1984 an absolute pardon which she accepted on 21 December 1984.

By reason of said absolute pardon, petitioner in representations before the City Treasurer of Calbayog, the Ministry
of Finance and the Office of the President, asked that she be allowed to re-assume her former office, as of 1 August
1982 (the date of her preventive suspension), that she be paid her back salaries for the entire period of her
suspension, and that she be not required to pay her proportionate share of the amount of P 4,892.50.

Respondent Assistant Executive Secretary denied petitioner's request for automatic reinstatement as well as her
other claims, because of which denial, this petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Court seeking the
setting aside and reversal of the decision of the respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, on the main contention
that, as a public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon by the President, she is entitled to reinstatement
to her former position without need of a new appointment, and to the other reliefs prayed for.

There can be no dispute that the pardon extinguished petitioner's criminal liability. At the same time, Art. 36 of the
Revised Penal Code categorically covers the effects of a pardon on the pardoned's right to hold office, suffrage and
on his civil liability. It states:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code to the case at bar, it is, to my mind, clear that the pardon extended by
the President to the petitioner did not per se entitle her to again hold public office (including therefore the office of
Assistant Treasurer, Calbayog City) or to suffrage; nor did such pardon extinguish her civil liability for the criminal
conviction, subject matter of the pardon.

An examination of the presidential pardon in question shows that, while petitioner was granted "an absolute and
unconditional pardon and restored to full civil and political rights", yet, nothing therein expressly provides that the
right to hold public office was thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express exclusion by Art. 36, RPC of
the right to hold public office, notwithstanding a pardon unless the right is expressly restored by the pardon, it is my
considered opinion that, to the extent that the pardon granted to the petitioner did not expressly restore the right to
hold public office as an effect of such pardon, that right must be kept away from the petitioner.

It is a recognized principle in public law-hopefully to be honored more in its compliance rather than in its breach that
a "public office is a public trust." The restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by
reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter how
intensely arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit, positive and specific language. To require this would not
be asking too much.

I am aware that there are broad statement in Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 341 and Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil.
441 which may be understood to mean that an absolute pardon, without qualification, restores full civil rights which
have been construed, in turn, to include the right to hold public office (Versoza vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil. 323).

If such be the message of said cases, then I submit that a modification is in order, so that an absolute pardon to
work a restoration of the right to hold public office must expressly so state, in order to give substance and meaning
to the sound provisions of Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly in the light of our times and experience.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the important and eloquent opinion of the Chief Justice. I also join in the separate
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla. At the same time, I would add a few brief statements, basically for my own
clarification. Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Article 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the registration of the right to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

It is worthy of note that the rule embodied in Article 36 is reiterated four (4) times by the Revised Penal Code in its
following provisions:

Article 40. Death-Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date of sentence, unless such accessory penalties have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. - Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during
the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 42. Prision mayor - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that
of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Article 43. Prision correccional - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision correccional shall carry
with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Chief Justice points out that the penalty imposed upon petitioner for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, included the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification from public
office or employment and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The 17 December 1984
pardon extended to petitioner in the instant case was written on a standard printed form which states in printed

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words that it was "an absolute and unconditional pardon [which] restored [petitioner] to full civil and political rights." 1
While the right of suffrage and the right to hold public office or employment are commonly regarded as "political
rights," 2 it must be noted that there are other "political rights" 3 and that the pardon given to petitioner did not
expressly and in printer's ink restore to petitioner the particular right to hold public office and the specific right to vote
at elections and plebiscites.

I join in the basic point of Mr. Justice Padilla that because of the nature of a public office as a public trust, Articles 36
and 40-43 appropriately require a very high degree of explicitness if a pardon is to work the restoration of such right
to petitioner. Exactly the same point may, of course, be made in respect of the restoration of the right to vote.

Articles 36 and 40-43 of the Revised Penal Code, quoted above, have been in our statute books since 1930. I
believe that they have been left intact by the constitutional provisions on pardon, whether one refers to the 1935
Constitution or to the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. I do not believe that Articles 36, et al. collided with any provision
or principle embodied in either of our prior constitutions. The Chief Justice appears to agree with this position when
he referred to Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code (Opinion, p. 5). He goes on, however, to say (in page 13) that:
"the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that."

It is submitted, with respect, that Articles 36, et al. of the Revised Penal Code have not been shown to be an
unconstitutional restriction on the pardoning power of the President. The limitation on the President's pardoning
power, if limitation it be, does not appear to be an unreasonably onerous one. Articles 36, et al. merely require the
President to become completely explicit if the pardon he extends is intended to wipe out not merely the principal but
also the accessory penalty of disqualification from holding public office and from voting and to restore the recipient
of the pardon to the exercise of such fundamental political rights. Such requirement of explicitness seems entirely in
line with the fundamental point made by the Chief Justice that a pardon does not blot out the factual guilt of the
recipient of the pardon. In other words, the mere grant of a pardon to a public officer or employee who has been
unfaithful to the public trust and sentenced to disqualification from voting and from holding such office, does not
create the presumption that the recipient of the pardon has thereby suddenly become morally eligible once more to
exercise the right to vote and to hold public office.

In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner was ineffective to restore to her the right to hold public office and on
this ground, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review and to AFFIRM the assailed Resolution of the then Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.

Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo at 14-15.

2 Rollo at 18-19.

3 Rollo at 21-22.

4 Rollo at 73.

5 Article 42, Revised Penal Code.

6 Article 30, supra.

7 Article 36, supra.

8 Article 43, supra.

8-a United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 160, 160-1, cited in Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes
and Cases, Part I, 1974 Ed., p. 355.

9 Article VII, Section 11.

10 72 Phil. 441.

11 Supra.

12 In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293; Pendon v. Diasnes, 91 Phil. 848 and Mijares v. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507.

13 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366.

14 Ex Parte Garland, supra at 367.

15 67 C. J. S. 576-577.

16 67 C. J. S. 576-577; Page vs, Watson, 192 So. 205, 126 A.L.R. 249, 253.

17 Comm. of Met. Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service, 203 N.E. 2d 95.

18 State v. Cullen, 127 P. 2d 257, cited in 67 C.J.S. 577, note 18.

19 Morris v. Hartsfield, 197 S.E. 251.

20 Illinois C.R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 33 L Ed. 550, 554-555, citing Knote v. United States, 95
U.S. 149.

21 247 p. 957.

22 See also State v. Serfling, 230 P. 847.

23 Comm. of Met. Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service, 203 N.E. 2d 95.

24 Ibid.

25 Illinois C.R Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 33 L.E. 550; Page v. Watson, 192 So. 205, 126 ALR, 249;
State v. Hazzard, 247 P. 957 and In re Stephenson, 10 So. 2d 1.

26 59 Am. Jur. 2d 40.

27 Articles 36, 112-113, Revised Penal Code.

FELICIANO CONCURRING OPINION

1 Rollo, P. 90.

2 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

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3 Malcolm and Laurel, The Constitutional Law of the Philippines, p. 378 (1936).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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