De Leon v. Court of Appeals
De Leon v. Court of Appeals
SYNOPSIS
Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig , this Court, in its decision dated
January 22, 2001, ruled that private respondent Jacob F. Montesa's appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel — CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government was temporary
for failure to possess the required Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility for the said
position. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to
security of tenure. Thus, private respondent led the instant motion for reconsideration
by invoking res judicata. He contended that his appointment can no longer be passed
upon and controverted in the present case considering that the said issue had already
been settled in the Minute Resolution of this Court dated March 17, 1992 in Jacob
Montesa v. Santos, et al., when his appointment was rst contested. In that case, the
Court ruled that the Achacoso case was not applicable to him since he was appointed
by virtue of Article III of the Freedom Constitution, and during that period there was no
Career Executive Service Board. The only eligibility required was that of the rst grader,
and private respondent was a rst grader. Therefore, having met all the requirements
for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the
constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process.
The Court was not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying
errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality.
In this case, a reading of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted
and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1 clearly showed
that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. The
foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom
Constitution. A CES eligibility is an existing and operative requirement at the time of
private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel — CESO IV. In fact, the
Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private
respondent, provided they subsequently acquire the needed eligibility. Moreover,
assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of
private respondent, the mobility and exibility concepts in the assignment of personnel
in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other positions of
the same rank or salary, justify his transfer to other CES position without violating his
right to security of tenure.
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his
appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case
considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution
of the Court.
Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on
conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules
of Court, 3 would bar a re-litigation of the nature of private respondent's appointment.
Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid nal judgment of a competent
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court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest. 4
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying
errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the
sacri ce of justice to technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the rst time in
Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle of res judicata has been set
aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and
jurisprudence. 5
In the March 17, 1992 Minute Resolution, we held that private respondent who
was appointed in 1986 pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, though not a CES eligible,
possessed all the requirements for the position of Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of
the Ministry of Local Government, since a CES eligibility was not, at that time, a
requirement for the same position.
A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted
and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September
24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position
embraced in the CES. Thus:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career
Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of career executive
eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the
basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the
incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and o ces
and equivalent positions shall be with the con rmation of the Commission on
Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any
person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such
appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he quali es
in such examination.
In fact, in March 1974, the CES Board issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid down
the requirements for membership in the CES, to wit:
a) Successful completion of CESDP shall constitute one of the
requirements for membership in the CES. Except as otherwise provided by law, no
person shall be admitted into the CES without having satisfactorily completed the
program;
The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom
Constitution. A CES eligibility was an existing and operative requirement at the time of
private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither were
the said law and circular inconsistent with the Freedom Constitution as to render them
modi ed or superseded. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the
appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently
acquire the needed eligibility.
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It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig , the questioned appointment was
made on October 16, 1987, before the CES Board was reconstituted in 1988, and
before the rst CESO examination was given in 1990, as in the present case.
Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility is required for a CES
position, such that an appointment of one who does not possess such eligibility shall
be temporary. Evidently, a CES eligibility has always been one of the requirements for a
position embraced in the CES. The Court nds no reason to make an exception in the
instant controversy.
Moreover, in the recent case of Secretary of Justice v. Jose na Bacal , 6 we ruled
that security of tenure in the CES is acquired with respect to rank and not to position.
Hence, assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the
case of private respondent, the mobility and exibility concepts in the assignment of
personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other
positions of the same rank or salary, 7 justify his transfer to other CES position without
violating his right to security of tenure. ETHaDC
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration
is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez. JJ., concur.
Buena, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes