Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: The Scope of Public Policy
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: The Scope of Public Policy
Policy
In this Paper, the author examines the true meaning of the term “public policy” under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for the purpose of setting aside arbitral
awards. The author surveys the contrasting judicial decisions and brings out the
current legal position after the 2015 amendment of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.
Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Renusagar Case: The Narrow View of Public Policy
3. The ONGC Case: A Broader View of Public Policy
4. What is Patent Illegality – Error of Law Apparent on the Face of the
Award?
5. 246th Law Commission Report
6. The 2015 Amendment
7. Conclusion
1. Introduction
Arbitration is a dispute resolution method where both parties consensually agree to
such a mechanism through an agreement. Arbitration is not entangled with usual
courtroom litigation which is very expensive as well as time consuming. So
arbitration offers an alternative dispute resolution mechanism where both parties
agree to settle the dispute with the help of a mutually decided third party.
India is a party to UNCITRAL and New York Convention, so in-principle India has
accepted the above mentioned purposes of arbitration. Both the model law as well
as the convention discourage excessive judicial intervention in the arbitral awards
and so allow the judicial review of the arbitral award only on procedural grounds
and not on questions of facts and law. However Indian courts had taken an approach
in interpreting the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act which
considerably increased the judicial review of the arbitral awards and defeated the
purposes for which Arbitration was thought of an alternative method for dispute
resolution.
Balco Judgement and subsequently the 2015 amendment in the 1996 Act have
considerably toned down the judicial transgressions.
Of all the grounds judiciary has exploited to increase the scope of the judicial review
of awards ‘public policy’ is probably the most exploited one.
The term ‘public policy’ is capable of being defined in more than one ways and so
it cannot be given a precise definition. The Act does not provide any definition of
‘public policy’. Public Policy has been described as ‘a principle of judicial
legislation or interpretation founded on the current needs of the community’. When
courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. That is however,
a kind of legislation implicitly delegated to them to further the object of the
legislation and to promote the goals of society. A priori it is variable in nature.
However, the rationale for the doctrine of public policy remains that while it is in
general desirable that parties have autonomy to enter into contracts, when that
autonomy is outweighed by public interest, a court will refuse to enforce the contract.
1
1994 Supp (1) S.C.C. 644.
would be contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (ii) the interests
of India; or (iii) justice or morality.”2
Though this statement of law was made in the context of enforcement of a foreign
(New York Convention) award, it has been held to be relevant for setting aside
arbitral awards under section 34(2)(b)(ii) on the ground that the award is in conflict
with the public policy of India as well. The implication of this decision is that an
award with a patent illegality can be enforced, as long as that illegality itself is not
contrary to the public policy of India.
The facts of this case were as follows: the respondent company agreed to supply
casing pipes to the appellant and placed an order for steel plates, i.e. the raw
material required for their manufacture, with the appellant, an Italian supplier,
within a certain time frame. As the flow of the supplies was impeded by a general
strike of steel mill workers all over Europe, the respondent requested the appellant
to extend the time limit for completion of the supplies. The appellant granted the
request, subject to the condition that the amount of liquidated damages stipulated
in the contract for delay in supply of pipes would be recovered from the
2 Renusagar Power Co Ltd v. General Electric Co., 1944 Supp (1) S.C.C. 644.
3
(2003) 5 S.C.C. 705, 709.
respondent. The appellant accordingly deducted amounts towards liquidated
damages as specified in the contract while making payment of the price.
In the arbitration proceedings that followed, the appellant did not prove that it had
suffered any loss or damage because of the delay. The tribunal decided in favor
of the respondent, holding that the amount of liquidated damages was wrongfully
deducted. The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition for setting aside the
award inter alia on the ground that the expression “in conflict with public policy
of India” used in section 34(2)(b)(ii) could not be interpreted to mean that in case
of violation of some provisions of law, without anything more the court could set
aside the award.
On appeal, on a review of the earlier dicta, the Supreme Court held that the phrase
“public policy of India” used in the context of section 34, is required to be given
a wider meaning than in Renusagar, because the concept of public policy connotes
some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for the
public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the
public good or public interest has varied from time to time. An award which, prima
facie violates statutory provisions cannot be said to be in the public interest,
because it is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Accordingly,
in addition to the three heads set forth in Renusagar, an award can as well be
annulled, being in conflict with public policy of India, if it is patently illegal.4 The
court however clarified that the illegality must go to the root of the matter and, if
the illegality is of a trivial nature, it cannot be held that the award is against public
policy. An award could also be set aside if it were so unfair and unreasonable that
it shocked the conscience of the court. Such an award must be adjudged void and
opposed to the public policy of India.
On the facts, the court held that the award on its face was erroneous and in
violation of the terms of the contract and a priori violative of the provisions of
section 28(3) of the Act. In other words, it was patently illegal and “a patently
illegal award is required to be set at naught, otherwise it would promote injustice”.
Hence, if the award is erroneous on the basis of record with regard to the
proposition of law or its application, the court will have jurisdiction to interfere.
4
ONGC v. SAW Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 S.C.C. 705, 727.
Therefore “giving limited jurisdiction to the court for having finality to the award
and resolving the dispute by speedier method would be much more frustrated by
permitting a patently illegal award to operate”. The question then is: What is an
error of law apparent on the face of record that justifies annulment of an award or
refusal to enforce a foreign award?
Some instances of such blatant errors on face of the record or the decision which
would vitiate an arbitral award are: where the award is inconsistent with: a
constitutional provision; an Act of the Parliament or the State Legislature; the law
declared by the Supreme Court of India or the High Court having jurisdiction. Such
an award is vitiated by an error of law apparent on its face. In the context of
5
WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 286 (2000).
6
Prem Singh v. Deputy Custodian General, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 804, 809.
arbitration, an award inconsistent with any provision of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 suffers by a patent error of law apparent on its face. Any
decision or award suffering from such defects is a nullity without existence or effect
in law. It is a nullity as expressed by various epithets as ‘void’, ‘void ab initio’, ‘non
est’ and ‘Coram non judice’. It is an affront to the law and stands self-condemned.
It bears a brand of invalidity on its forehead. It is incapable of being enforced. Even
though there is no ground in section 34(2) authorizing the court to set aside such an
award, its enforcement under section 36 may be resisted by anyone against whom
the award is made.
Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides ‘a decree may be executed
… by the court to which it is sent for execution’. Now, the law is well settled that an
executing court cannot go behind the decree. Nor can it question its legality or
correctness. It must take the decree as it stands. But there is one exception to this
general rule and that is that, where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for
lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an
execution proceedings. If the court which passed the decree had no jurisdiction, the
decree is a nullity incapable of execution and its invalidity can be set up in the
execution proceeding.
7. Conclusion
7
Law Commission of India, 246th Report on Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (August
2014)
8
Ibid.
9
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (No. 3 of 2016).
10
Ibid.
From Renusagar to 2015 Amendment Indian courts have given different
interpretations to the expression ‘public policy’. Often the courts have interpreted it
too widely and thus expanded the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards which
has been criticized by the legal fraternity.
There is near unanimous acceptance that the expression ‘public policy’ should be
narrowly construed. While the 2015 Amendment has narrowed the scope of ‘public
policy’ in context of foreign awards the term ‘patent illegality’ still exist in respect
of domestic arbitral award, which means greater judicial scrutiny of the domestic
arbitral awards.