THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193228. November 27, 2017.]

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., and WILLIAM HERNANDEZ ,

petitioners, vs. EDGARDO D. DEL ROSARIO , respondent.

CHRISTINA G. DEL ROSARIO, PETER DEL ROSARIO, PAUL DEL

ROSARIO, in their personal capacity and as representative of the
ESTATE OF ROSIE GONZALES DEL ROSARIO , respondents-in-
intervention.

DECISION

BERSAMIN , J : p

The two-bidder rule is not applicable during the public auction of the mortgaged
assets foreclosed pursuant to Act No. 3135. 1 But the mortgage itself and the
extrajudicial foreclosure thereof should nonetheless be nulli ed for lack of the written
consent to the mortgage of conjugal assets by the spouse of the mortgagor. HTcADC

The Case

Petitioner Boston Equity Resources, Inc. (Boston Equity), the mortgagee who
was also the highest bidder of the assets under mortgage, hereby seeks the review and
reversal of the adverse decision promulgated on April 28, 2010, 2 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) annulled the real estate mortgage (REM), its amendment and the
foreclosure proceedings taken pursuant to the REM.

Antecedents

The assailed decision of the CA recited the following factual and procedural
antecedents, viz.:
Plaintiff-appellant Edgardo Del Rosario . . . was married to herein
plaintiff-intervenor-appellant Rosie Gonzales Del Rosario on March 9, 1968 and
their marriage has been blessed with three children, herein plaintiffs-intervenors-
appellants, Christina, Peter and Paul, all surnamed Del Rosario.
Defendant-appellee Boston Equity Resources, Inc., . . . is a private
corporation duly registered and operating under the laws of the Philippines with
defendant-appellee William Hernandez as its president.
Defendant Mercedes Gatmaitan is impleaded in her capacity as Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.
On April 12, 1999, Del Rosario and Boston entered into a Real Estate
Mortgage whereby the former, representing himself as single, mortgaged six (6)
parcels of land located at 300 Kanlaon St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 the latter for Seventeen Million Pesos (Php17,000,000.00) at an interest rate of 4
per centum (4%) monthly within a period of six (6) months. Said parcels of land
registered under the name of Del Rosario has a total land area of four thousand
ve hundred thirty three and 60/100 (4,533.60) square meters and are covered
by transfer certi cates of title numbered as follows: RT-71666 (375141), RT-
71665 (375139), RT-71668 (375142), RT-71669 (375140), RT-71667 (375138)
and RT-72517 (129992). The fair market value of the said parcels of land is One
Hundred Thirteen Million and Three Hundred Forty Five Thousand Pesos
(Php113,345,000.00).
However, records indicated that only two certi cates of title were
attached. On May 3, 1968, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No.
RT-72517 (129992) covering Six Hundred Thirty Seven Square Meters and
Eighty Square Decimeters (637.8) to Edgardo del Rosario. Likewise, TCT No. RT-
71665 (375139) was issued to Edgardo del Rosario on February 3, 1988. This
title covered Five Hundred Forty Seven Square Meters and Ninety Square
Decimeters (547.9).
Thereafter, additional loan obligations amounting to Fifteen Million
Pesos (Php15,000,000.00) was obtained by Del Rosario. Thus, on September 8,
1999, the Real Estate Mortgage previously executed was amended to include
the Fifteen Million Pesos additional loan and adopting therein all the terms and
conditions stated in the Real Estate Mortgage.
On various dates, Del Rosario paid a total amount of Three Million One
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Seven Pesos
(Php3,178,667.00) represented by encashed Checks and Twenty Five Million
Pesos (Php25,000,000.00) on December 8, 1999, as evidenced by the O cial
Receipt No. 14019 in favor of Boston to obtain a release from the Thirty Two
Million Pesos (Php32,000,000.00) loan as stated in the Certi cation issued by
Josephine Sha, Finance Manager of Boston.
On December 9, 1999, Boston issued a Cash Voucher to Del Rosario
representing the excess payment by the latter of Seven Million Two Hundred
Fifty Seven Thousand and Two Hundred Pesos (Php7,257,200.00) on the Thirty
Two Million Peso[s] loan.
On various dates in the year 2000, Del Rosario again obtained several
loans totaling Thirty Four Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php34,400,000.00) but because Boston made an advanced deduction of
interest (Php11,660,347.00), he was able to receive only Twenty Two Million
Seven Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand and Six Hundred Fifty Three Pesos
(Php22,739,653.00) from the said loan.
Thereafter, on February 21, 2001, Boston sent a Demand Letter to Del
Rosario for the payment of Fifty Two Million and Nine Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php52,900,000.00), claiming it to be the principal amount Del Rosario
owed to the former excluding penalties and other charges. In response to
Boston's demand letter, Del Rosario sent a Letter dated March 8, 2001 asking
Boston to furnish him an accurate and speci c statement of account, so that he
can properly settle his obligation as the amount alleged in the demand letter
was not accurate since it included the commission of Nelia So.
Instead of heeding Del Rosario's requests for an accurate statement of
account, on March 13, 2001, Boston sent another Demand Letter to Del Rosario
this time seeking the payment for the amount of Fifty One Million Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php51,400,000.00). Through a Letter dated May 31, 2001, Del
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Rosario asked for [an] additional time to settle his obligation. aScITE

Boston did not grant Del Rosario's request for time to settle his loan but
proceeded to foreclose Del Rosario's properties by causing the publication of
the Notice of Foreclosure in Maharlika Pilipinas on May 31, June 7 and June 14,
2001.
As a consequence, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City sent a Notice of
Extra-Judicial Sale of Real Property Under Act 3135 (As Amended) dated May
28, 2001 to Del Rosario saying that the parcels of land shall be sold at a public
auction on June 27, 2001 in order to satisfy his Php52.9 Million debt with
Boston. In the said sale, Boston was declared the sole bidder for the properties
in the amount of Seventy Five Million Pesos (Php75,000,000.00). 3
As the offshoot of the foregoing antecedents, Edgardo brought his complaint for
the declaration of the nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and the sheriff's
sale on May 8, 2002 against Boston Equity in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City
(RTC). The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46788, was initially assigned to
Branch 78. 4
On May 14, 2002, the RTC granted Edgardo's prayer for the issuance of the
temporary restraining order (TRO), and enjoined Boston Equity from consolidating title
and from obtaining a writ of possession respecting the mortgaged properties. 5
On May 21, 2002, the late Rosie Gonzales Del Rosario (Rosie), the spouse of
Edgardo, and their children, namely: Christina, Peter and Paul, all surnamed Del Rosario,
led in the RTC their motion to admit their complaint-in-intervention on the basis that
they had a legal interest as the co-owners of the mortgaged properties by reason of the
same forming part of the conjugal partnership of gains of Rosie and Edgardo. They
joined the prayer of Edgardo for the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes,
the REM and its amendment, and the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and the
ensuing sheriff's sale. 6
On August 27, 2007, 7 the RTC dismissed Edgardo's complaint, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Extrajudicial Foreclosure & Sheriff's Sale is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued on June 19, 2002 is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED. 8
Edgardo, Rosie and the Del Rosario children separately appealed to the CA, which
ultimately overturned the RTC's ruling through the assailed decision of April 28, 2010,
decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED . The Decision of RTC Branch 224 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
02-46788 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring the
nullity of the subject Real Estate Mortgage and its Amendment, and all the
proceedings emanating therefrom.
SO ORDERED. 9

The CA opined that the REM, having involved conjugal properties, had required
the written consent of Rosie for its validity; that the REM and its amendment were
consequently null and void; that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was further null and
void for failure to comply with the procedure mandated by A.M. No. 99-10-05-0
(Procedure in Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage) requiring at least two bidders
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 during the public auction; and that Boston Equity could not validly consider Edgardo's
loan account to be in default without first giving him a proper accounting. 1 0
With the CA denying their motion for reconsideration on August 6, 2010, 1 1 the
petitioners appeal.

Issues

The petitioners insist on the following errors:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MORTGAGE EXECUTED
BY EDGARDO IS NULL AND VOID BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED LACK OF
CONSENT OF ROSIE, WIFE OF EDGARDO IN THE MORTGAGE CONTRACT AND
ITS AMENDMENT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE PROPERTIES MORTGAGED WAS NULL AND VOID
FOR ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A.M. NO. 99-10-05-0 WHICH ALLEGEDLY
REQUIRES AT LEAST TWO OR MORE PARTICIPATING BIDDERS IN THE
AUCTION SALE. HEITAD

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED AN ERROR
WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A
"PROPER ACCOUNTING" OF HIS OUTSTANDING OBLIGATION. 1 2

Ruling of the Court

The appeal, albeit meritorious on the non-applicability of the two-bidder rule and
the e cacy of the publication of the public auction, should fail on the ground that the
REM and its amendment were void for lack of the written consent to the mortgage of
Rosie, the spouse.

I.

The CA erred in annulling the extrajudicial

foreclosure sale for failure to have at least
two bidders during the foreclosure sale

That only Boston Equity had participated in the bidding during the foreclosure
sale did not constitute a defect that nulli ed or voided the foreclosure sale considering
that the Court had already dispensed with the two-bidder rule for purposes of the
foreclosure sale of private properties. 1 3
The extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage with the special power of attorney to
sell the security being inserted in or attached to the deed of mortgage is governed by
Act No. 3135, particularly the following provisions:
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four
hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city.
Sec. 4. The sale shall be made at public auction, between the
hours or nine in the morning and four in the afternoon ; and shall be
under the direction of the sheriff of the province, the justice or auxiliary justice
of the peace of the municipality in which such sale has to be made, or a notary
public of said municipality, who shall be entitled to collect a fee of ve pesos
each day of actual work performed, in addition to his expenses.
Sec. 5. At any sale, the creditor, trustee, or other persons authorized
to act for the creditor, may participate in the bidding and purchase under the
same conditions as any other bidder, unless the contrary has been expressly
provided in the mortgage or trust deed under which the sale is made.
Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the
special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or
any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a
lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the
property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year
from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by
the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-
six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
As its aforequoted provisions indicate, Act No. 3135 does not require the
participation of at least two bidders at the public auction. In A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 dated
January 30, 2001 (Re: Procedure in Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage), therefore,
the Court, acting on letters containing observations and proposals about the rules of
procedure to be undertaken in the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages as embodied
in Circular A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 (inclusive of the bidding requirements, and the
publication of notices), expressly resolved:
After due deliberation on the points raised by the parties and considering
the report of the OCA, the Court resolved as follows:
1. Paragraph 5 of the Circular A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 provides:
No auction sale shall be held unless there are at least two
(2) participating bidders, otherwise the sale shall be postponed to
another date. If on the new date set for the sale there shall not be
at least two bidders, the sale shall then proceed. The names of the
bidders shall be reported by the sheriff or the notary public who
conducted the sale to the Clerk of Court before the issuance of the
certificate of sale.
ATICcS

It is contended that this requirement is not found in Act No. 3135 and
that it is impractical and burdensome, considering that not all auction sales are
commercially attractive to prospective bidders.
The observation is well taken. Neither Act No. 3135 nor the
previous circulars issued by the Court governing extrajudicial
foreclosures provide for a similar requirement. The two-bidder rule is
provided under P.D. No. 1594 and its implementing rules with respect
to contracts for government infrastructure projects because of the
public interest involved. Although there is a public interest in the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 regularity of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, the private
interest is predominant. The reason, therefore, for the requirement that
there must be at least two bidders is not as exigent as in the case of
contracts for government infrastructure projects.
On the other hand, the new requirement will necessitate re-
publication of the notice of auction sale in case only one bidder
appears at the scheduled auction sale. This is not only costly but,
more importantly, it would render naught the binding effect of the
publication of the originally scheduled sale. Prior publication of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale in a newspaper of general circulation
operates as constructive notice to the whole world. (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis only)
Conformably with the foregoing, the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
properties at the public auction held on June 27, 2007 could not be invalidated for its
non-compliance with the two-bidder rule.

II.

Publication of the notice of the foreclosure sale

in Maharlika Pilipinas was not void

The respondents submit that the publication of the notice of the foreclosure sale
in the newspaper Maharlika Pilipinas was ineffectual because Maharlika Pilipinas was
not a newspaper of general circulation as required by Section 3 of Act No. 3135, supra.
1 4 In support of their submission, they cite Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc.
v. Peña el , 1 5 where the Court held that Maharlika Pilipinas was not a newspaper of
general circulation. The petitioners counter that the publication had been made in a
newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City.
The submission of the respondents fails to persuade.
The respondents, as the parties alleging the non-compliance with the requisite of
publication in the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135,
had the burden of proving their allegation. They failed in that regard, for a reading of the
ruling in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Peña el only indicates that
Maharlika Pilipinas was not considered a newspaper of general circulation in
Mandaluyong City, the place where the public auction of the property in question took
place. 1 6 With the public auction involved herein having been held in Quezon City, and
there being no showing by the respondents that Maharlika Pilipinas was not a
newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City, the publication undertaken by Boston
Equity was presumed as compliant with Section 3 of Act No. 3135. 1 7

III.

There was no need for an accounting

of Edgardo's obligation
before he could be held in default

The CA concluded that the petitioners had hastily considered Edgardo to have
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 been already in default despite the discrepancy in the amount demandable from him;
and that he was entitled to a proper accounting in order to properly inform him of his
outstanding obligation.
The petitioners disagree with the CA's conclusions, and contend that the
discrepancy as to the amount of Edgardo's obligation between the two demand letters
given by Boston Equity to him was reconcilable as ruled by the RTC. They dismiss the
CA's conclusions as predicated on surmises, conjectures, and suppositions to the
effect that he had not really known his total obligations. 1 8
The CA's conclusions were legally and factually unwarranted.
The foreclosure of the REM is proper once the debtor has incurred default or
delay in performing his obligation. Mora solvendi, or debtor's default, is de ned as the
delay in the ful llment of an obligation by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor.
Three requisites are necessary to support a nding of default — rst, the obligation is
already demandable and liquidated; second, the debtor delays his performance; and
third, the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor's performance. 1 9
TIADCc

"A debt is liquidated when the amount is known or is determinable by inspection

of the terms and conditions of the relevant promissory notes and related
documentation." 2 0 Thus, the failure of Boston Equity to furnish the detailed statement
of account to Edgardo did not ipso facto result in his obligation being still unliquidated.
Indeed, the terms and conditions of his obligation were readily ascertainable and
determinable from the REM and its amendment; hence, the petitioners had properly
considered him in default upon his having failed to settle his obligation despite their
demand. For this reason, any discrepancy in the amounts stated in the demand letters
of Boston Equity did not genuinely hinder the legitimate effort to recover on the
obligation.

IV.

The petitioners could not raise for the first time

on appeal the issue of Rosie's consent to the
mortgage contract and its amendment

The petitioners are submitting for the rst time in this appeal that Rosie had
consented to the REM and its amendment by a xing her signature as a witness
thereto, as Edgardo's spouse; and that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Edgardo
had redounded to the bene t of the family, and thus rendered the mortgaged
properties, albeit conjugal in character, liable for the obligation. They argue that
changing the legal theory of one's defense was not altogether prohibited as long as the
factual basis of such theory would not require the presentation of evidence that was
not yet part of the records of the case. 2 1
The respondents posit, however, that the documentary evidence belatedly
submitted by the petitioners to prove the supposed consent of Rosie to the REM and
its amendment was inadmissible for lack of proper authentication; 2 2 that the
petitioners' insistence that Rosie had known of the REM and its amendment was a
factual matter that went beyond the purview of the Court's review in this appeal; that
the petitioners thereby changed their theory for the rst time in this appeal; and that the
REM and its amendment were null and void for lack of the written consent of Rosie as
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 the mortgagor's spouse. 2 3
We uphold the respondents' position.
The submission by the petitioners regarding Rosie's having consented to the
REM and its amendment by virtue of her signature thereon as an instrumental witness
was not among the issues framed and joined by the parties during the trial in the RTC.
For the petitioners to make the submission only now is impermissible. Questions
raised on appeal must be within the issues the parties framed at the start; hence,
issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the rst time on appeal. The
Court will not deal with and resolve issues not properly raised and ventilated in the
lower courts. To allow such new issues on appeal contravenes the basic rule of fair play
and justice, and is violative of the adverse party's constitutional right to due process. 2 4
Verily, points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court are barred by estoppels, and cannot be considered by a reviewing court. 2 5
The petitioners propose that this case falls within the exception, and urge the
Court to allow the change of legal theory on appeal because the factual bases for the
new theory would not require the presentation of further evidence by the adverse party
as to enable it to properly meet the issue raised under the new theory. They argue that
their new theory could be veri ed from documents already forming part of the records
of the case. They cite in support of their urging the ruling in Homeowners Savings &
Loan Bank v. Dailo. 2 6
The petitioners' proposition is unacceptable.
The application of the exception allowing a change of theory on appeal provided
no additional evidence was necessary, has been explained in Philippine Geothermal, Inc.
Employees Union v. Unocal Philippines, Inc. (now known as Chevron Geothermal
Philippines Holdings, Inc.) 2 7 thusly:
Respondent's contention that it falls within the exception to the rule
likewise does not lie. Respondent cites Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law
O ce v. LCN Construction Corp. and claims that it falls within the exception
since it did not present any additional evidence on the matter:
In the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of
the appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal,
only when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order
to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
AIDSTE

However, this paragraph states that it is the adverse party that should no
longer be required to present additional evidence to contest the new claim, and
not the party presenting the new theory on appeal. Thus, it does not matter that
respondent no longer presented additional evidence to support its new claim.
The petitioner, as the adverse party, should not have to present further evidence
on the matter before the new issue may be considered. x x x
The exception is still not proper. Although the respondents, who are considered
the adverse party, could belie the petitioners' claim by merely maintaining their position
that Rosie had not consented to the REM and its amendment, the petitioners' new
contention would still entail the presentation of additional evidence by the respondents
to enable them to properly meet and respond to the new theory. As such, allowing the
petitioners to raise the new theory was still not permissible. Moreover, to allow the new
theory to be pursued would also necessarily involve the Court in the consideration and
ascertainment of factual issues, a task that the Court could not discharge through this
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 mode of appeal that is limited to the consideration and determination of questions of
law.
As a consequence, the ndings of the CA on the lack of Rosie's written consent
to the REM and its amendment stand unrefuted. Such ndings warrant the nulli cation
not only of the REM and its amendment, but also of all the proceedings taken to
foreclose the REM. Such invalidity applied to the entire mortgage, even to the portion
corresponding to the share of Edgardo in the conjugal estate. 2 8 Article 124 of the
Family Code clearly so provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within ve years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
The petitioners' assertion that the mortgaged properties could be made liable for
the obligation contracted solely by Eduardo on the basis that the proceeds of the loan
had redounded to the bene t of the family is also unwarranted. The mortgage was but
an accessory agreement, and was distinct from the principal contract of loan. What the
CA declared void was the REM. Since the REM was an encumbrance on the conjugal
properties, the contracting thereof by Edgardo sans the written consent of Rosie
rendered only the REM void and legally inexistent. 2 9 The petitioners could still recover
the loan from the conjugal partnership in a proper case for the purpose. 3 0 Where the
mortgage was not valid, the principal obligation that the mortgage guaranteed was not
thereby rendered null and void. The liability of the debtor under the principal contract of
the loan subsisted despite the illegality of the REM. That obligation matured and
became demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. What was lost
was only the right to foreclose the REM as a special remedy for satisfying or settling
the debt that was the principal obligation. In case of its nullity, the mortgage deed
remained as evidence or proof of the debtor's personal obligation, and the amount due
to the creditor could be enforced in an ordinary action. 3 1
WHEREFORE , the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated on April 28, 2010; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, * J., is on leave.
Footnotes

* On leave.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 1. Entitled An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed
to Real-Estate Mortgages.
2. Rollo, pp. 57-74; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and concurred in by Associate
Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice
Mario V. Lopez.
3. Id. at 58-63.

4. Id.
5. Id. at 63-64.
6. Id. at 64.
7. Id. at 97-104; penned by Judge Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon.
8. Id. at 104.

9. Supra note 1.
10. Id. at 67-73.
11. Rollo, pp. 77-79.
12. Id. at 37-38.

13. Id. at 46-51.

14. Id. at 146-150.
15. G.R. No. 173976, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 352.
16. Id. at 360.
17. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Puzon, G.R. No. 160046, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 51,
62-63.
18. Rollo, pp. 51-53.

19. Selegna Management and Development Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No.
165662, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 125, 138.
20. Id. at 141; citing Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87182, February 17, 1992,
206 SCRA 317, 329.
21. Rollo, pp. 39-46.

22. Id. at 141-145.

23. Id. at 159-176.
24. Union Bank of the Philippines v. Regional Agrarian Reform Officer, et al., G.R. Nos. 200369
& 203330-31, March 1, 2017.
25. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197204, March 26, 2014, 720 SCRA 155, 171.
26. G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 283.
27. G.R. No. 190187, September 28, 2016, 804 SCRA 286, 302-303.

28. See Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, supra note 26, at 289-290; citing Guiang v.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 372.
29. Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016, 805 SCRA 327,
335.

30. Philippine National Bank v. Banatao, G.R. No. 149221, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 95, 108-109.
31. Rural Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. v. Melecio-Yap, G.R. No. 178451, July 30, 2014, 731 SCRA
244, 259-260; citing Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr., G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011, 648
SCRA 772, 780.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com