1 ST
1 ST
Citation:
Anthony N. Cabot; Robert D. Faiss, Sports Gambling in
the Cyberspace Era, 5 Chap. L. Rev. 1 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
this trend. Part III details the challenges that Internet gaming
presents to federal and state governments. Part IV turns to the
specific challenge of obtaining jurisdiction over Internet gaming
operators. Finally, Part V discusses possible government re-
sponses to these challenges, and the reality of sports wagering in
the Internet era.
16 Id.
17 Id.
is Id. at 1391.
19 Id. at 1378.
20 The first such game appeared in Oregon on September 6, 1989. E.g., Oregon Lot-
tery, Game History, Sports Action, at httpJ/www.oregonlottery.org/general/giist.htm (last
updated June 5, 2001); see also North American Association of State and Provincial Lotter-
ies, Lottery History, at http://www.naspl.org/history.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
21 137 CONG. REC. S2256-04 (1991).
22 S. REP. No. 102-248, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553.
23 Sen. Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports ProtectionAct-Policy Con-
cerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 7 (1992).
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
24 Id.
25 Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Throwing The Game, Why CongressIsn't Clos-
ing a Loophole That Fosters Gambling on College Sports-and Corrupts Them, TIME, Sept.
25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25227074.
26 A point spread is the amount of points that one team is favored over another. With
a point spread, a gambler who bets on team X may still win his wager so long as team X
does not lose by more points than the spread.
27 Bradley, supra note 23, at 5.
28 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (2001).
29 A governmental entity means any state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, any Native American tribe, any other U.S. territory, and
any subdivision of these entities. Id. § 3701(2).
30 Id. § 3702. The law creates an unusual anomaly. A person violates federal law if
he operates a sports book pursuant to state law, but not if he violates state law. Moreover,
the Act is ambiguous as to whether it is unlawful for a private person to operate a sports
book or contest that is not authorized by state law, but does not violate any state law. The
most obvious example is sports fantasy leagues, which decide results based on the perform-
ance of athletes. Based on the legislative history, these activities would not appear to vio-
late the Act.
20021 Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era
31 Id. § 3704. Section 3704(1) provides that § 3702 does not apply to: "[A] lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or
other governmental entity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State or
other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and
ending August 31, 1990." Id. As a result, Oregon, Nevada, Delaware, and Montana are
exempt from the federal prohibition against state-sponsored sports wagering.
A special and peculiar exception to the Sports Protection Act was crafted for Atlantic
City, New Jersey. This exception was peculiar because New Jersey law did not authorize
the Atlantic City casinos to offer sports wagering. Dan Caesar, Sports Books in St. Louis?
No Chance, Says a 1992 Law, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, July 12, 2001, at 36, available at
2001 WL 4471413. Nevertheless, to retain the exception, New Jersey had to authorize such
sports wagering within one year after passage of the Sports Protection Act. 28 U.S.C.
§ 3704(a)(3)(A). New Jersey decided not to authorize sports wagering and lost the exemp-
tion. Caesar, supra note 31.
32 Oregon Lottery, Sports Action, at http://www.oregonlottery.org/sports/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2002).
33 The most popular sports on which bets are wagered include football, basketball,
and baseball. Wagers are also accepted on hockey, golf, auto racing, soccer, and other
sports and athletic events. The most popular wagers are straight wagers, futures, and
parlay cards. Straight wagers are bets on the outcome of an individual game, usually ad-
justed according to an established "point spread." Futures wagers are made on various
outcomes of a season so that, for example, a player may bet that his or her favorite team
will win the World Series. Parlay cards allow players to bet on multiple games at one time;
if the players' choices are all correct, they are paid higher odds. See generally ARNE K.
LANG, SPORTS BETTING 101: MAKING SENSE OF THE BOOKIE BUSINESS AND THE BUSINESS OF
BEATING THE BOOKIE (1992).
34 NEV. GAMING CONTROL BD., GAMING REVENUE REPORT 1 (Jan. 4, 2002).
35 Id.
36 See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 3-18 (1999), availableat
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/index.html [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT].
37 Tony Batt, NCAA Works to End to Sports Betting, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Oct. 11, 1999,
at 1D, available at 1999 WL 9295064.
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
joyable and legal pastime. For example, despite the fact that At-
torneys General of several states have declared Fantasy Sports 47
contests unlawful, several major media groups, including ESPN,
conduct national Fantasy Sports contests.4 a Additionally, the
NGISC claimed, albeit somewhat incredibly, that because point
spreads are available in almost every major U.S. newspaper,
many people do not know that sports wagering is illegal. 49 The
fact that newspapers post point spreads is just one additional indi-
cation that the public enjoys wagering on sporting events. As a
result, because most states have laws against sports wagering,
law enforcement is placed in the uncomfortable position of enforc-
ing laws that are unpopular with the public. This situation, com-
bined with limited resources, minor penalties, and recent
technological advances, has led law enforcement to radically de-
crease its enforcement of sports wagering laws. Thus, illegality
has not proved to be a substantial barrier to sports wagering.
technology's ability to evade local laws. Only in this way can the
government effectively implement its policies concerning gam-
bling. But, unlike past technological advances, this task is harder
than it seems. An important question for the future of Internet
gambling is not related to the current state of the law, but rather
what the future holds for both legal and law enforcement efforts.
The attempt to regulate or prohibit Internet gambling ranges from
the simple task of drafting legislation to the more difficult task of
successful implementation.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, being engaged in a gam-
bling business, knowingly uses a communication facility-
(1) for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce, within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or to or from any
place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to any transmission to
or from the United States, of bets or wagers, or information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers; or
(2) for the transmission of a communication in interstate or foreign commerce,
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
to or from any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to any
transmission to or from the United States, which entitles the recipient to re-
ceive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever, being engaged in a gambling
business, knowingly accepts, in connection with the transmission of a communica-
tion in interstate or foreign commerce, within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or to or from any place outside the jurisdiction of
any nation with respect to any transmission to or from the United States of bets or
wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers-
(A) credit, or the proceeds of credit, extended to or on behalf of another (includ-
ing credit extended through the use of a credit card);
(B) an electronic fund transfer or funds transmitted by or through a money
transmitting business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or money
transmitting service, from or on behalf of the other person;
(C) any check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by or on behalf of
the other person and is drawn on or payable through any financial institution;
or
(D) the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction as the Secretary of
the Treasury may prescribe by regulation which involves a financial institu-
tion as a payor or financial intermediary on behalf of or for the benefit of the
other person,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
89 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-02 (2001); see also Mike Roberts, "The Law of the Land:"Tennes-
see ConstitutionalLaw: The Constitutionalityof Gaming in Tennessee, 61 TENN. L. REV.
675, 678 (1994).
90 18 U.S.C. § 1304.
91 Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone on March 10, 1876. Eg., WEBSTER'S
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHIES 84 (Charles Van Doren & Robert McHenry eds., 1974).
92 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.R.I. 1981).
96 United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir. 1979).
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
97 18 U.S.C. § 1081.
98 The majority of consumers use the telephone dial-up method to connect to the In-
ternet. DIGITAL INCLUSION, supra note 50, at 23. Permanent connections, satellite, mobile
phone, and handheld computer access are far less common. Id.
99 See, e.g., About.com Inventors, Modem, at http://inventors.about.com/library/inven
tors/blmodem.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
oo 18 U.S.C. § 1081.
lOiT1 and T3 lines are high-speed lines that can accommodate more users than a stan-
dard telephone line. Judith Gelernter, The Internet: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,
INFO. OUTLOOK, June 2001, at 67-68.
1o2 18 U.S.C. § 1084. There is an argument, based on congressional intent, that the
current § 1084 would prohibit such an enterprise. Courts have broadly defined "transmis-
sion" in other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Pezzino, 535 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Tomeo, 459 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1972); Sagansky v. United States,
358 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1966).
2002] Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era
Supp. 683 (D. Del. 1971). In the cases where conviction occurred, sports betting was the
only contested activity. See, e.g., United States v. Segal, 867 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1989)
(betting related to football games); United States v. Campagnuolo, 556 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.
1977) (betting related to various sports events); United States v. Stonehouse, 452 F.2d 455
(7th Cir. 1971) (betting related to sporting events); Tel. News Sys., Inc. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co.,
220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (betting related to horse racing).
Several months before the Cohen opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana issued an opinion in In re Mastercard, 132 F. Supp. 2d 468. The In re
Mastercard case dealt with a number of plaintiff Internet gamblers who attempted to sue
their credit card companies for illegal involvement with Internet gaming operators. Id. at
473. Their claims were based on alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, violations, which required an analysis of underlying vio-
lations of state laws and the federal Wire Act. In re Mastercard, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
Upon examination of the Wire Act's applicability to the types of wagering engaged in by the
plaintiffs, the court interpreted the Wire Act as inapplicable to non-sports gaming. Id. at
480.
The court held that "a plain reading of the statutory language clearly requires that the
object of the gambling be a sporting event or contest." Id. Although the court held that the
plain language of the statute is clear, rendering a look at legislative history unnecessary, it
nevertheless stated that the legislative history of recent Internet gambling legislation sup-
ports the idea that the statute applies only to sporting contests. Id. Because the plaintiffs
failed to allege they had engaged in sports betting, the court said the Wire Act did not apply
to their claims. Id. at 481. The court concluded, "Since plaintiffs have failed to allege that
they engaged in sports gambling, and internet gambling in connection with activities other
than sports betting is not illegal under federal law, plaintiffs have no cause of action
against the credit card companies or the banks under the Wire Act." Id. As it now stands,
this is the only case law on point with respect to the Wire Act's application to non-sports
betting on the Internet.
116 Eg., Letter from Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, to The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Minority Member, Committee
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June 9, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/s6921tr.htm.
117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
A. Federal Jurisdiction
A country's ability to enforce its laws is based on three differ-
ent principles of jurisdiction: "jurisdiction to prescribe," "jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate," and "jurisdiction to enforce." 2 ° "Jurisdiction to
prescribe" is defined as the ability of the country to adopt laws
that apply to particular persons and circumstances.'2 1 Likewise,
"jurisdiction to adjudicate" means the authority of that state to
subject those persons to its judicial process.'22 Finally, "jurisdic-
tion to enforce" is the authority of that state
12 3
to use its resources to
induce or compel compliance with its law.
1. Jurisdiction To Prescribe
The federal government may only assert extra-territorial ju-
risdiction in limited circumstances. Unlike territorial jurisdiction,
where a country may both apply its laws to certain conduct and
enforce those laws, extra-territorial jurisdiction refers to instances
where a country applies its laws to conduct occurring outside of its
territory.' 24 To enforce those laws, it must wait for the alleged
perpetrator to return to its territory, or have him returned by an-
other nation (such as through extradition).'2 5 Exercises of extra-
territorial jurisdiction must be permissible under international
law, and must be provided for under the law of the country assert-
ing jurisdiction.'2 6
International law recognizes four bases for extra-territorial
jurisdiction: national,where the nationality of the offender serves
as the basis for jurisdiction; protective,where an injury to national
interest serves as the basis for jurisdiction; universal, where phys-
ical custody by any forum of the perpetrator "of certain offenses
considered particularly heinous and harmful to humanity" serves
as the basis for jurisdiction; and passive personal, where the na-
2. Jurisdiction To Adjudicate
A key requirement of "jurisdiction to adjudicate" is the pres-
ence of the accused. Simply put, "no court in the United States
may bring a person to trial without his or her presence."'3 4 Even
127 Id. at 899-900.
128 Id. at 900.
129 Id. at 902.
130 See generally AM. JuR. 2D Int'l Law, supra note 124 (citing United States v. Reeh,
780 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1986)). Nationality can also serve as the basis for federal law
enforcement officials to prosecute individuals involved in the management, operation, and
ownership of Internet gambling sites, including officers, directors, shareholders, and man-
agers of the gambling business. Id.
131 49 U.S.C. § 41311 (1996).
132 See AM. JuR. 2D Int'l Law, supra note 124, § 80.
133 E.g., United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 1995).
134 RESTATEMENT supra, note 117, § 422 cmt. c(iii).
20021 Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era
what then? The casino operator could simply ignore service and
remain insulated from U.S. jurisdiction.
Despite the fact that a foreign government may authorize for-
eign-based Internet casinos, American law enforcement agencies
and courts may still enforce U.S. laws against them. The laws of
foreign countries do not bind American jurisdictions.' 4 ' The ca-
sino, however, would only be subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the United States if it were incorporated here, any of its owners or
operators were U.S. citizens, or any of the owners or operators
43
were physically present and arrested in the United States.'
If those involved in the Internet casino business remain
outside the jurisdiction of the United States, law enforcement offi-
cials have few options. The federal government can demand that
the country in which the Internet casino is based surrender those
involved as fugitives from justice. However, the right of the
United States to request delivery of a fugitive or federal criminal
defendant usually requires a treaty between the two nations.'"
The United States has extradition treaties with only 110 coun-
tries. 4 ' Moreover, criminal suspects can only be extradited for
committing crimes that are enumerated in the specific treaty.'4 6
Therefore, two steps are required to extradite a casino owner or
operator from a foreign country. First, the United States must
have an extradition treaty with the foreign country. Second, the
treaty must make gambling an extraditable offense.
The federal government could also attempt to obtain extradi-
tion of a foreign casino owner or operator through international
comity. The doctrine of "comity" is based on a reciprocal courtesy
that one nation owes to another, based on notions of justice and
regard for what is due other states. 4 ' Under this doctrine, a for-
eign country may voluntarily surrender a fugitive without regard
to the existence or nonexistence of a treaty. The United States
has sought extradition on the basis of comity on only a few occa-
142 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("No law has any effect, of its own force,
beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived."). The "comity"
doctrine permits American courts to recognize the applicability of legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation. However, comity is not mandatory and is not appropriate
when recognition of a foreign law is in direct conflict with a law or policy of the United
States. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S.
522, 541-44 (1987). Thus, any firm operating in a county that has laws permitting Internet
gambling cannot apply the doctrine of comity to their enterprise.
143 See United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d. 961, 967 (9th Cir. 1995).
144 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2000); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933);
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12, 429-30 (1886); United States v. Schultz,
713 F.2d 105, 107-08 (5th Cir. 1983).
145 See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 for a complete list of countries with which the United States
has an extradition treaty.
146 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430.
147 See AM. JuR. 2D Int'l Law, supra note 124, § 7.
2002] Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era
3. Jurisdiction To Enforce
The United States can enforce its laws within its own terri-
tory. 6 It does not, however, have the ability to enforce its laws
outside of the United States without the consent of that nation.' 5 '
Thus, "A person apprehended in a foreign state ... and delivered
to the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States un-
less his apprehension or delivery was carried out in such repre-
hensible manner as to shock the conscience of civilized society."'5 8
Additionally, in most circumstances, the United States can em-
ploy non-criminal enforcement measures against persons located
outside of the United States if it provides reasonable notice of the
claims or charges and an opportunity to be heard. 5 9
163 RESTATEMENT, supra note 117, § 403(1). This standard of reasonableness would
include factors such as: (1) the relationship between the activity and the country asserting
jurisdiction; (2) the relationship between the persons conducting the activity and the coun-
try asserting jurisdiction; (3) the character of the activity and the importance and desirabil-
ity of the regulation; (4) the existence of expectations that may be injured or protected by
the regulation; (5) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system; (6) the consistency of the regulation with international traditions; (7) the
extent of another state's interest in regulating the activity; and (8)the likelihood of conflict
with another state's regulation. Id.
164 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
165 Id.
166 See Memorandum from Hubert Humphrey III, Minnesota Attorney General, to all
Internet users and providers, available at http://www.jmls.edulcyber/docs/minn-ag.html
[hereinafter Minnesota Memorandum] (setting forth the enforcement position of the Min-
nesota Attorney General's Office with respect to certain illegal activities on the Internet).
167 Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *1
(D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996).
168 Id. at *1-2.
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
the state."" 5 The court added that the threshold for sufficient con-
tacts is lower when a state acts in the consumer protection context
than when private litigants attempt 186
to avail themselves of a fo-
rum reached via Internet contacts.
The court found that the fourth factor, the interest of the
State of Minnesota in providing a forum, also weighed in favor of
finding personal jurisdiction.' The court stated that the defend-
ants had intentionally solicited Minnesota residents for their ille-
gal venture, and that if Minnesota lacked jurisdiction, then its
citizens and consumers would be unprotected.'
The final factor in the "minimum contacts" analysis, inconve-
nience in being forced to defend against an action, was an easy
determination for the court because WagerNet's advertisement
told potential customers that WagerNet could sue them in their
home states.189 This statement allowed the court to find that the
defendants could "reasonably anticipate being hailed into court" in
Minnesota. 190 The court called this statement a "coup de grace"
that guaranteed jurisdiction.' 9 '
In September 1997, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected
Rogers's appeal.' 92 The court of appeals expressed its understand-
ing of the implications of any decision involving Internet
jurisdiction:
We are mindful that the Internet is a communication medium
that lacks historical parallel in the potential extent of its reach
and that regulation across jurisdictions may implicate funda-
mental First Amendment concerns. It will undoubtedly take
some time to determine the precise balance between the rights
of those who use the Internet to disseminate information and
the powers of the jurisdictions in which receiving computers are
located to regulate for the general welfare. But our task here is
limited to deciding the question of personal jurisdiction in the
instant case, and on the facts before us, we are satisfied that
established legal principles provide adequate guidance.' 93
185 Id. The court likened WagerNet's online advertising to the advertisements mailed
to Washington residents in State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 501 P.2d 290 (Wash. 1972).
Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 VVL 767431, at *10.
186 Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 WL 767431, at *10.
The court of appeals, however, did not rely upon the lower
court's argument that jurisdiction is established when an inani-
mate server sends an electric transmission into Minnesota.' The
court of appeals also did not adopt the broad approach of the lower
court regarding the quality of Internet-based activities, as op-
posed to other advertising mediums.'9 5 When examining the first
factor of the five-part test, the quantity of contacts with Minne-
sota, the court of appeals focused on the specific evidence that at
least 248 Minnesota computers had accessed the WagerNet site.'9 6
The court also noted that WagerNet, through phone calls and its
mailing list, was aware that Minnesota residents were accessing
its site.'97 The court held that the specific proof of Minnesota con-
tacts and that WagerNet had knowledge of those contacts satis-
fied the first element of the personal jurisdiction test. 9 ' The court
of appeals also deviated from the lower court's reasoning regard-
ing the second factor, the quality of contacts with the forum state.
The court of appeals did not adopt the district court's argument
that Internet advertising creates a greater quality of contact be-
cause it is available twenty-four hours a day.'9 9 According to the
court of appeals, all forms of advertising are quality contacts with
a forum state because they200indicate "a defendant's intent to serve
the market in that state."
Particularly important in the decision was the court's compar-
ison of advertising mediums. The court of appeals cited Minne-
sota court decisions involving television advertising to support its
conclusion that defendants who know their message will be broad-
cast in Minnesota are subject to suit in Minnesota. 20 ' The court
made the following analogy: "Internet advertisements are similar
to broadcast and direct mail solicitation in that advertisers dis-
tribute messages to Internet users, and users 20must
2
take affirma-
tive action to receive the advertised product."
In future Internet jurisdiction cases, analogizing to television
cases may become a popular approach. Just as an individual who
turns on a computer and chooses to view a particular website may
be involuntarily exposed to Internet advertising, television adver-
tising is accessed by an individual who turns on a television, and
chooses a particular channel or program to view. Commentators
208 The telephone conversation alone may have been enough to confer personal juris-
diction. See Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alta., 873 F.2d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir.
1989).
209 See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1996); Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Bensusan Rest.
Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298-300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
210 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citations omitted).
211 Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 29. The Second Circuit noted that "attempting to apply es-
tablished trademark law in the fast-developing world of the [Internet is somewhat like
trying to board a moving bus .... " Id. at 27.
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
operator for violating the state's "Merchandising Practices Act." Id. Missouri customers
had filled out account applications and paid fees to enter online gambling tournaments. Id.
Using contract principles, the Missouri Attorney General successfully argued that this con-
duct constituted an "acceptance" in Missouri of the Internet operator's "offer." Id. The
injunction requires the operator to post a notice on its website stating that it is under court
order not to accept applications from Missouri residents. Id.; see also Martin H. Samson,
Internet Law-Gambling, at www.phillipsnizer.com/int-art77.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2002).
216 See Minnesota Memorandum, supra note 166.
217 Id. (citing State v. Rossbach, 288 N.W.2d 714, 715-16 (Minn. 1980)).
218 Rossbach, 288 N.W.2d at 715.
219 Id. at 715-16.
220 Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1916).
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
221 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.2(c) (3d ed.
2000).
222 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
223 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
224 See 21 Am. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 480 (1998).
225 See generally AM. JUR. 2D Int'l Law, supra note 124, § 80.
2002] Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era
226 E.g., Ray Tennenbaum, It's Time to Consider Legalized Sports Betting, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 22, 1999, at A27, available at 1999 WL 8163324.
227 Id.
228 See, eg., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 5-504(J) (2001).
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:1
229 E.g., Mark Fineman, 'VirtualCasinos' Cash in on Lax Rules in Antigua, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1997, at Al, available at 1997 WL 13982286.
230 Id.
231 Can Gambling Work on the Internet, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT IV: AN EVOLV-
ING CONFLICT BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY, POLICY & LAW 25, 37 (Anthony N. Cabot ed., 2001).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Las Vegas-based casino giant MGM-Mirage applied, and was awarded one of these
licenses. Judy Dehaven, MGM Wins License for an Online Casino, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 21,
2001, at 30, available at 2001 WL 27929976.
236 Steve Pain, E-business: Islands Gambling on a Safe Bet in Casinos, BIRMINGHAM
POST, Aug. 28, 2001, at 22, available at 2001 WL 26526735.
20021 Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era
VI. CONCLUSION