RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

5. Qui v. People

FACTS:

Cyril Calpito Qui (Qui) was charged with two counts of violation of Sec. 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610
for shouting invectives while pointing her fingers at a child named Christian John Ignacio. The RTC convicted
Qui as charged, and sentenced her to two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of five (5)
years, four (4) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum.

Qui filed her Notice of Appeal. With the perfection of her appeal and the consequent elevation of the
case records to the CA, petitioner filed before the CA an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal
which respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed. The
OSG urged for the denial of the bail application on the ground of Qui’s propensity to evade the law and that she
is a flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the issuance of three
warrants for her arrest.

The CA denied Qui’s application for bail pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5 (d) of Rule 114, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rejected. Hence, the petition
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not was Qui entitled to bail?

HELD:

No. Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the
present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, which is the situation in the case at bar.

The SC said that the CA anchored its denial on several circumstances, pointed out by the OSG, which
showed petitioner's propensity to evade the law, as when she failed to attend the hearings before the RTC, which
compelled said court to issue three warrants for petitioner's arrest. There is no dispute, and petitioner does not
deny the fact, that on various dates, the RTC issued warrants for her arrest.

The SC held that the CA properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's application for bail
pending appeal. The CA's determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight was not without factual
mooring.

According to the SC, Qui’s penchant to disobey court processes may also be deduced from the fact that
she lied in order to wiggle out of, and justify her non-appearance on the March 8, 2010 hearing before the RTC.
Petitioner gave the convenient but false excuse that her father, Cirilo Calpito, was hospitalized on said hearing day
(i.e., March 8, 2010) and that Cirilo died on March 24, 2010. However, the Death Certificate of Calpito clearly
showed that he died on March 24, 2009 or a year before the March 2010 RTC hearing. Also, the CertiCcation
issued by Dr. Aniana Javier stated that Cirilo went to her clinic on March 9, 2009.

Additionally, the RTC notice sent to Qui’s bonding company was returned with the notation "moved
out," while the notice sent to Qui’s given address was returned unclaimed with the notation "RTS no such person
according to Hesita Family" who were the actual occupants in Qui’s given address. The fact of transferring
residences without informing her bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as Qui’s inclination to evade
court appearance, as indicative of flight, and an attempt to place herself beyond the pale of the law.

Therefore, the petition was denied.

6. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles [For Child Abuse]- A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January
31, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP
Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible
to order the immediate suspension of the respondent. The matter was referred to the OCA for comment and
recommendation where they recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended. The Court's Second
Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial
functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the
opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative
Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent
manifested that the two criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet
attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension
clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco filed an Urgent
Appeal/Manifestation manifesting that respondent continuously defied the court’s Resolution. Velasco reiterated
that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is using her
influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of
the judiciary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this
administrative case.

HELD:
No. The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact
of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's
argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has
not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the
lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's
guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. Moreover, it is established that any
administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction
of dismissal or disbarment. 41 As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools
to harass them and may in the long run create adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to
prove that other than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against the respondent,
which is still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension. Based
on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspensionpendente
lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on
preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.
Likewise, we consider respondent's argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the
criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do
anything to influence the CA to render a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been
rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this administrative case.

However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds
to warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's
pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling
involving the respondent, her use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below the standard
expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a magistrate of the law demands temperance,
patience and courtesy both in conduct and in language. Illustrative are the following statements: "CA Lock's
hostile mindset and his superstar complex"; "In a frenzied display of arrogance and power"; "(CA Lock's)
complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial court"; and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his
objectivity and misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for him to
step down." In the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the controversy,
to wit:

It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the
undersigned mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure a position for his son at the
RTC Library of Pasay City which was then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his
son be assigned to the library to enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing for the bar
examination.

Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration
readily discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations about the guilt of the
undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate from the poisonous intentions of attention-seeking
individuals, are no different from garbage that should be rejected outright"; and "His malicious insinuation is no
less than a revelation of his warped mindset that a person's position could cause pressure to bear among
government officials. This brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ to 'cause
pressure to bear' and obtain a favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged against him by the
undersigned? Is he afraid of his own ghost?" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent
should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She must maintain
composure and equanimity. The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a
number of restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted
positions in the administration of justice. One final word. The parties herein have admitted in their various
pleadings that they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to
initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them that
this privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of
truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon,
or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two irresponsible children.

7. People vs Caoili

FACTS:

Caoili, sexually molested AAA at their house. Caoili kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the
fourth finger of his left hand into her vagina, and made a push and pull movement into her vagina with such
finger for 30 minutes. AAA felt excruciating pain during and after the ordeal. Against her father’s harsh warning
not to go out of the house, AAA proceeded to the house of her uncle, BBB, located 20 meters away from their
house. When he learned of this, Caoili fetched AAA and dragged her home. He beat and hit her with a piece of
wood, and boxed her on the stomach.

AAA disclosed to Emelia Loayon (Loayon), the guidance counselor at AAA’s school, the sexual molestation and
physical violence committed against her by her own father. Loayon accompanied AAA to the police station to
report the sexual and physical abuse. AAA also executed a sworn statement regarding the incident before the
Municipal Mayor.
AAA underwent a medical examination conducted by Dr. Ramie Hipe (Dr. Hipe) at the [KKK] Medicare
Community Hospital. Dr. Hipe issued a medical certificate
indicating that AAA’s had lacerations in her genitalia.

AAA sought the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development which facilitated her admission
to a rehabilitation center run by the Missionary Sisters of Mary.

Caoili: I DID NOT MOLEST AAA. I saw AAA with her boyfriend at the cassava plantation. I even greeted them
“good evening” but they did not respond. When she came home, I confronted her and the she admitted that she
was with her boyfriend “Dodong” earlier that evening. Nagalit ako kaya timaan ko yung right thigh nya sa right
thigh niya and sa forehead. Nag sorry ako pero ayaw nya ako patawarin.

RTC found NOEL GO CAOILI guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of rape, defined and
penalized in paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, and after considering the aggravating circumstance of being the parent of the complainant, who
was fourteen (14) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days old at the time of the incident in question

The CA remanded the case to the RTC and held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault,
what the trial court should have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information charging the
proper offense, and after compliance therewith, to dismiss the original Information.

Caoili and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed respective petitions for review before this Court

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CAOILI'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE

CHARGE AGAINST HIM WAS NOT VIOLATED SINCE HE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED DURING
THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND NEVER QUESTIONED THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS SEXUAL ASSAULT AND NOT SIMPLE RAPE.

HELD:

The 1987 Constitution mandates that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[15] From this fundamental law stems the rule that an
accused can only be convicted of a crime charged in the information, and proved beyond reasonable doubt during
trial.[16] To convict the accused of an offense other than that charged in the information would violate the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, unless the crime is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.

For the variance doctrine to apply, it is required that (1) there is a variance between an offense charged and that
proved, and (2) the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved. Under the
variance doctrine, the accused shall either be convicted (1) of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or (2) of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

While there is a variance between the offense charged [rape by sexual intercourse] and that proved [sexual abuse
under R.A. No. 7610 and rape by sexual assault], Caoili should be convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 because it was the offense proved during trial, and it is necessarily included in the
crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled jurisprudence, is necessarily
included in rape.

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter, whereas an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.

. It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was fourteen (14) years, one (1)
month and ten (10) days old. This calls for the application of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.67 (Emphasis ours)

The prosecution’s evidence has sufficiently established the elements of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610.

The evidence confirms that Caoili committed lascivious acts against AAA when he kissed her lips, touched and
mashed her breast, and inserted his finger into her vagina and made a push and pull movement with such finger
for 30 minutes.

AAA likewise confirmed on cross-examination that Caoili molested her. She even recounted that her father
threatened her not to tell anybody about the incident.
Caoili’s acts are clearly covered by the definitions of “sexual abuse” and “lascivious conduct” under Section 2 of
the rules and regulations70 of R.A. No. 7610:
(g) “Sexual abuse” includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) “Lascivious conduct” means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of a person.

It has been settled that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is
different from what is complained of, or that a third person should act in concert with the accused.

AAA was a child below 18 years old at the time the lascivious conduct was committed against her. Her minority
was both sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved.

“Influence” is the improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another’s objective. On the other hand, “coercion” is the improper use of power to compel another to submit to
the wishes of one who wields it.72

In people v. Leonardo, the court ruled that:

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in
which a child is coerced to engage in lascivious conduct. To repeat, intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of
the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case of young, innocent and immature girls who could
not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to
act like adults under the same circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.

It cannot be denied that AAA, who is only a little over 14 years old at the time the offense was committed, was
vulnerable and would have been easily intimidated by an attacker who is not only a grown man but is also
someone exercising parental authority over her. Even absent such coercion or intimidation, Caoili can still be
convicted of lascivious conduct under section 5(b) of r.a. No. 7610 as he evidently used his moral influence and
ascendancy as a father in perpetrating his lascivious acts against AAA. It is doctrinal that moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.

It bears emphasis, too, that consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. The
mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense because it is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.

Clearly, therefore, all the essential elements of lascivious conduct under section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 have been
proved, making Caoili liable for said offense.

Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the RPC and R.A.
No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a
child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which was the offense proved, because it is
included in rape, the offense charged

8. IN RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE

MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN. A.M. No. 10-11-
5-SC; June 14, 2011.

FACTS:

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way
to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of
journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned
charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v.
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.,et al. Following the transfer of venue and the re-raffling of the cases, the cases are
being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
Cityinside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.

Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various
media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio
coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be
permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings.They
principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of
President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in
the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they
contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and
outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the
gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed.They inform
that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that
under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed
inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.

The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter to Judge Solis-
Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases.Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning media coverage should be brought to
the Courts attention through appropriate motion." Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the
freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the
government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association subject to
regulations to be issued by the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not trial be broadcasted?

HELD:
The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings subject
to the guidelines.

Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly
explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of
circumstance "test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto,]that the right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a
bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment
arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party
may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for
disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise
exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the
impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and
other witnesses inside the courtroom.

Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may observe the proceedings, the
peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds
of families .It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest,
beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants.
It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested
parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands
that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to
satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

October 23, 2012

The SC decision, dated October 23, 2012 and released Monday, November 12, was due to a motion for
reconsideration filed by Andal Ampatuan Jr., one of the main suspects in the case that involved the gruesome
killing of about 58 in Mindanao.

The court ruled that "A camera that broadcasts the proceedings live on television has no place in a criminal trial
because of its prejudicial effects on the rights of the accused individuals,"
The resolution stated that the instead of a live broadcast of the trial, media can still monitor the proceedings via
closed-circuit television. This will also be the method of viewing for some trial courts in Maguindanao and the
cities of Koronadal and General Santos, to help relatives of the victims and of the accused monitor the case.

9. Go v People, 667 SCRA 213 (2012)

FACTS:
That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused Harry L. Go, Tonny Ngo,
Jerry Ngo and Jane Go, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following
manner, to wit: all said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made
to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw
materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export
Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of
$464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and Highdone
Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused
well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE
COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less.
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled
from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen
Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia
and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition,7 the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the
directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC
denied,9 prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari10 before the RTC.
On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void.11 The RTC
held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to
the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in not finding that the disposition taking of the complaining witness in
Laos, Cambodia is an infringement of the constitutional right of the petitioners to confront the said witness face
to face
HELD:
In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their constitutional rights to a public trial
and confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent
witness and raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.
There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence
of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the
absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo,21 the Court noted the uniqueness and
significance of a witness testifying in open court, thus:
"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the
adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority,
"demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but
for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions
and obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this – it
enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment
while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness
testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm
or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity
for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character.
These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court”
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a
twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination,
and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.23 The Court explained in People v. Seneris24
that the constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring
lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in
exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness
and assess his credibility."
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by
witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination,"26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony
in criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v. Washington,27 the US Supreme Court had expounded on
the procedural intent of the confrontation requirement, thus:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's
right to confront witness face to face protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any general reliability
exception to the common-law rule.
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be
sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of
reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined."
Even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the MeTC prior to said witness'
becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal
application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the
accused every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid
charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-
taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses
against him face to face.
Petition granted.
10. JAYLO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS
Reynaldo (Jaylo), William (Valenzona) and Antonio (Habalo) were convicted by the Sandiganbayan for Homicide
for the killing of Estella, Franco and Rolando in a drug buy bust operation at the Magallanes Commercial Center
on July 10, 1990. During the promulgation on April 17, 2007, none of the accused despite notice, appeared and
thus the decision was promulgated in absentia and the judgment entered in the criminal docket. Their bail bonds
were cancelled and warrants for their arrest issued.

On April 30, 2007, the accused thru counsel filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, but on
November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the
warrants of arrest, holding that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment had long passed
without any of the accused giving any reason for their non-appearance during the promulgation. Under Section 6
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, the accused have lost the remedies available under the Rules against the
Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Their motion for
reconsideration denied, they filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, holding that
Section 6 Rule 120 cannot diminish, modify or increase substantive rights like the filing of a motion for
reconsideration under P.D. 1606, and the conditions set by Section 6 Rule 120 does not obtain in their case. They
also appealed the merits of their conviction for homicide by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES
1. Whether accused on bail who failed to present themselves during the promulgation of judgment has any
standing in court and has the right to seek relief
2. Whether pursuant to PD 1606, there is no provided situation as to when the right to file an MR is deemed
lost and thus, it is available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot operate
to diminish or modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for reconsideration

HELD

1. NO. Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said judgment.

Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence
of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled
date of promulgation of judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to the accused
personally or through the bondsman or warden and counsel.

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite notice. The promulgation
in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the
accused at their last known address or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the
judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear
on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the
judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal
from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of
conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused
cannot invoke itsjurisdiction to seek relief.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away substantive rights; it merely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented.
2. According to petitioners, Section 7 of P.D. 1606 did not provide for any situation as to when the right to file a
motion for reconsideration may be deemed lost. Thus, it is available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court cannot operate to diminish or modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, they argue, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant, and
not merely a remedy "available in [the] Rules," as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, according to them, their absence at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be
deemed to have resulted in the loss of their rightto file a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners’ argument lacks merit.

Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right,
the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by
law. Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the
Rules of Court.

It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that "[a] petition for
reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of
the final order or judgment." In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated that the term
"may" denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those granted this opportunity may choose to
exercise it or not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached thereto.

It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which the accused
who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the
judgment of conviction. In order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender
and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within 15
days from the date of the promulgation of judgment.

Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment of conviction. Neither did
they ask for leave of court to avail themselves of the remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if we
were to assume that the failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice thereof,
it is not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change of address before the Sandiganbayan.

PRIVELEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

1. MARTINEZ v. MENDOZA

FACTS:

Michael Martinez was allegedly abducted and taken away by 7 persons around 7:30 in the morning of November
19, 2001 while he was walking along Magnolia Street, on his way to his mother's house. The abduction was
reported by Martinez’s wife and mother (Estrelita Martinez et al) to the Barangay, the Parañaque Police and the
Anti-Kidnapping Task Force at Camp Crame. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) presented before the media a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a
statement confessing to his participation in the killing of Dorothy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca and named Michael
Martinez as the alleged mastermind in her killing.

Medel narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame and he even described the clothes
Michael was then wearing, which were the same clothes worn by him when he was abducted. Estrelita et al filed
a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Quezon City against respondents PNP
Director General Leandro Mendoza; Chief Superintendent Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG; Senior
Superintendent Leonardo Espina, Sr. and Senior Superintendent Jesus Versoza of the CIDG and members of
Task Force Marsha, which is investigating the Nida Blanca murder case, for them to produce before said court the
person of Michael Martinez or to justify the continued detention of his liberty. Mendoza et al submitted a return
wherein they vehemently and categorically denied any participation or involvement in th alleged abduction or
disappearance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never confined and detained by them or in thei custody at any
given time. Thus, prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.

Estrelita et al presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw Michael Martinez inside a room at the CIDG
where he was brought before midnight of November 19, 2001 or the wee hours of November 20, 2001, that Sr.
Supts. Verzosa and Espina were also in said room and that the latter even boxed Michael in the stomach. RTC
directed Mendoza et al to produce the body of Michael Martinez. The CA agreed with the OSG that Medel’s
credibility was highly suspect. The CA relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties. It held that, "[a]s aptly pointed out by Mendoza et al, ‘the CIDG itself is equally concerned with the safety
of Michael Martinez relative to the final resolution of the Nida Blanca slay. For he is definitely a vital witness to
his case. The PNP-CIDG has no motive whatsoever to abduct him as it never did.

ISSUE :

Whether or not CA erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the Petition for habeas corpus. – NO, because
there is insufficient evidence to convince that Michael is in the custody of CIDG.

HELD:

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner’s anchor for the present case is
 the disappearance of Michael. The
matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely consequential to his disappearance. Ostensibly, his disappearance
has been established. However, the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the
disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."

This Court has ruled that this remedy has one objective -- to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. If
the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. Habeas corpus may not be used as a
means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically
abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest
and detention -- have been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation
and proceedings. Much as this Court would want to resolve these disappearances speedily -- as in the present case,
when it is interested in determining who are responsible for the disappearance and detention of Michael (if,
indeed, he is being detained) -- it would not want to step beyond its reach and encroach on the duties of other
duly established agencies. (which are the PNP and the NBI)

Unfortunately, Martinez’s evidence is insufficient to convince the Court that they have Michael in their custody.
Considering that Mendoza et al have persistently denied having Michael in their custody, and absent any decisive
proof to rebut their denial, the Court is constrained to affirm the CA’s dismissal of the Petition for habeas corpus.
In view of the established fact of Michael’s suspiciously felonious disappearance, we exhort the NBI and the
National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) to continue their investigation into the matter, so that all
persons responsible can be prosecuted for whatever crime they have committed.

2. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG

SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, vs. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL.
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decision.

FACTS:

Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. He
returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009 On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. Butukan S. Malang was one
of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the Maguindanao Massacre. He had a
pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court. Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu
Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could
not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that
time. Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents"
tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19,
2009.
Police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang
However, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his
departure for Saudi Arabia. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail where he is currently detained. Salibo
filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention
and deprivation of his liberty. CA issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City CA ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to
file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the hearing.

The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. The Return was heard on October 1,
2010. According to Assistant Solicitors, Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was
charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."
Trial Court ruled that Salibo was not "judicially charged" under any resolution, information, or amended
information (name was not under Datukan Salibo). He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of
Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Trial court granted the petition and ordered his
immediate release. The CA ruled that Salibo’s arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest. Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias
Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked. Salibo’s proper remedy was a Motion to
Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

HELD:

Yes. The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the superior court.
When a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent
should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was
being detained or deprived of his or her liberty. However, once the superior court makes the writ returnable to
a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect.

Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court. The trial court then heard
respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits. The trial court "acquired the
power and authority to determine the merits" of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. The decision on the Petition
for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the
Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden
correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." its purpose is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the
efficient remedy of habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the
right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.

The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ.
It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her
liberty. It is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of
liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face
[is] devoid of merit" Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of
invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, the writ itself may not be suspended Writ of
habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court.

If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if
such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Instead of availing
themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful
process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies---e.g.,
motion to quash information or WOA

Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense When petitioner
Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing
nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that
he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers,
therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his
right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.