111. SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R.

ROMUALDEZ, Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the
petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents. RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners
G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008 cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the
charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC.
FACTS:  Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to
 Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in
and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with
residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte. Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a
 The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted Memorandum before the said body.
by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information  Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at
against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were
the same. reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise
 Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were
2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given
Renomeron. the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages,
 The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted petitioners actively participated.
by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information
against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of
the same.

ISSUE: WON due process was violated.

HELD: No.
 First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is
couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for
violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
 Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election
offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for
which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the
first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the
Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the
denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section
261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the
COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based
on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit.
 In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature
of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information
nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information.
 Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due
process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based
on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s
112. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy?
G.R. No. 179736 : June 26, 2013
RULING: YES. POLITICAL LAW: RIGHT TO PRIVACY
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as "the right
FACTS:
to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."It is the
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer for right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."Simply
docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."
Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Basak, City of The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the States
Mandaue, Cebu; that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
(Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; that houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only
respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900- under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.
C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125; that in that case, CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices
Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the
where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.
said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners
property; that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for
failure to substantiate its allegations; that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other
Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property; that respondents, through individuals. It states:
their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-
going construction; and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy. Thus, Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and
enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance. neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the video criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioner’s
construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
stockholders.
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."The phrase "prying
into the privacy of anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. The CA Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This does not
explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also
violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.
video surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate
juridical personality. Thus, they are not the proper parties. Thus, an individua’ls right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the
the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his manner as to injure the rights of a third person."
right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences. The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of
POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether there is video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a significant
a violation of the right to privacy. portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see
then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.In Ople v. Torres, we committed by the court.Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence,
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms,
and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of
privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras
be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining
order. The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their
building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot.
The camera does not only focus on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back
(Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the
land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding
in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of
Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building
and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
113. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
Petitioners. vs. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational
JOHN DOES, Respondents. G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014 privacy in online social network activities of its users?)

TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data HELD: NONE

FACTS: Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Angela on her Facebook profile.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among others. being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and 1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne 2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)
black brassieres. Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of
the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
fact, viewable by any Facebook user. Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other disappearances
students involved were barred from joining the commencement exercises.
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds: violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then, the
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of killings and enforced disappearances.
habeas data.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way. Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need
the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline. not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

ISSUE:
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to
is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such
as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC. controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

Right to informational privacy United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one
can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all
agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social Networking environment, privacy is The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share
to privacy protected in OSNs? said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared
Facebook Privacy Tools or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus,
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.
information uploaded by the user.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
LONE ISSUE:
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
by the public at large. information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the
said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the
to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students
students who showed the images to Escudero.
were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration. Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
friends, or (2) by the public at large.
114. MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant,  Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit
vs. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, Respondent. A.C. No. 11394 | 2016- information. To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
12-01 Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the user.
FACTS:  Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking
activity -in this case, Facebook -it is first necessary that said user manifests the
 Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
Group, Inc. (BMGI). prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in
 Respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words,
filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the
on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
in 2009.  The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting
 In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the
online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant. latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features
 Complainant: respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement
medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause and that that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and
respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving
complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof. scant consideration.
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist,  Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts
vulgar, and disrespectful of women. Finally, complainant averred that the attacks were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the
against her were made with the object to extort money from her. same -or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile -
 Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy.
to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics,  Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee
as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to
letter, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent one's circle of friends.
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
 Respondent: (1) claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his 2. NO
constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by
complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be  Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part; (2) absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press
freedom of speech and expression. are among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person
exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give
ISSUE: everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the constitutional
right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths,
1. Whether or not respondent’s right to privacy and freedom of expression was insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.
violated.
2. Whether or not respondent’s right to freedom of expression was violated. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of
Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
RULING: hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
1. NO
acts will be dealt with more severely.
115. MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in  The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM O. life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. The privilege of the writ of habeas data
Norte, Respondents. G.R. No. 193636 | 2012-07-24 must be denied. The issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them
FACTS: permanently.
 Determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary
 At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion
the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
 On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an  Writ of Habeas Data Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: Habeas
administrative order creating an independent commission to address the alleged existence data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
of private armies in the country which was later on referred to as the Zenarosa in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
Commission. It was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and
dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the correspondence of the aggrieved party. It must be emphasized that in order for the
Zenarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy
report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Private Armies' Report to the President".
 This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in
 Gamboa alleged that the PNP-Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations
the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the
against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zenarosa
without the benefit of data verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the information Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in
gathered on her to the Zenarosa Commission, hereby causing her inclusion in the Report's life, liberty or security.
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
 The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with
 On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these
the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. notorious groups. Moreover, the Zenarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to
She averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former's mandate, and thus had the
publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified power to request assistance from the latter.
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zenarosa
 Following the pronouncement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Commission.
Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the Zenarosa Commission without
 Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is
 RTC: inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.
Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, nevertheless dismissed the Petition Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was
on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the
information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure
Zenarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification. that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
ISSUE: WON Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City,
RULING: NO
Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data,
is AFFIRMED.
116. BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN, unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely
Petitioner, versus sally go a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent. to determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any given bank
G.R. No. 168644 | 2010-02-16 account.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No.
FACTS: 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A.
 Petitioner, is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein representative, No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the
Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally subject of the action. Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action in
Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayan's wife, who was employed in the company the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the
as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the payments offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the records.
made by the various customers of the company.
 In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor's Office a complaint for estafa and/or In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain
qualified theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representing the aggregate language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioner’s trust and confidence and
amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company's customers in payment of their stealing cash. The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way
obligation were, instead of being turned over to the company's coffers, indorsed by involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be
respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account maintained at suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention of the supposed bank
Security Bank in Divisoria, Manila Branch. account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly been kept.
 Accordingly, respondent was charged and the prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum against the respective managers or records In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank
custodians of Security Bank and Asian Savings Bank. Respondent opposed and account is the ostensible subject of the prosecution’s inquiry. Without needlessly expanding
meanwhile, prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of one Security Bank the scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this
representative. Petitioner moved to exclude the testimony but was denied by the trial case is the money alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of
court. CA reversed and set aside the order. the checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution
 Petitioner: It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.
to the subject matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one
of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405 It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
 Respondent: (1) claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank account was respondent’s Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of
neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution
suggested that the money therein deposited was the subject matter of the case; (2) at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of
respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence which is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her
pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No. motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance
1405. it was raised before the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony on the particulars of respondent’s account with Security WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004
account, constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405. Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is
AFFIRMED.
RULING: YES SO ORDERED.

The Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate
Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held
that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from 117. ARTURO
COURT OF BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs.
117. ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents. supposition.
G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial
FACTS: that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.
During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988
undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all
organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as
by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his position which included
find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order to generate
FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy interest in the conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of
for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence.
estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various
sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the
delegates or participants. On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, very public character of the conference itself. Generally, malice can be presumed from
private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote defamatory words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of
numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao
Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice
different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous as the true motive of his conduct.
activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 25 March
Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.
1996 and its Resolution of 12 September 1996 denying reconsideration are, REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the complaint for damages against petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners'
ISSUE: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
HELD: SO ORDERED.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.
Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author
has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which
exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications
containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and
true report without any comments or remarks. To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.

The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
118. TULFO VS. PEOPLE furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of
G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2018 responsibility.
 While Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope of qualified privileged
FACTS: communication, the mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or a matter
 Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate informations were of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from liability. Borjal allows
filed on September 8, 1999 with the (RTC) Pasay City. Charging petitioners Erwin that for a discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a false
Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As previously mentioned,
Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing the trial court found that the allegations against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did
House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the not exert effort to verify the information before publishing his articles.
publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May  Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of
12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999. Customs and relied only on this source for his columns, but did no further research on
 The column accused So of corruption, and portrayed him as an extortionist and his story. The records of the case are bereft of any showing that Atty. So was indeed the
smuggler villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfo's articles related no specific details or acts
 RTC: Petitioners guilty of libel committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public official. These columns were
 CA: Affirmed unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as being privileged
simply because the target was a public official. Although wider latitude is given to
ISSUES: defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their
1. WON Borjal case should be applied in this case performance of official duties, or against public officials in relation to matters of public
2. WON the articles are privileged interest involving them, such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the
ambit of constitutionally protected speech.
RULING:  The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof of his allegations against
1. NO. Borjal cannot be applied in this case because borjal stemmed from a civil action for Atty. So, only citing his one unnamed source. It is not demanded of him that he name
damages based on libel and was not based on criminal case; ruling in borjal was that there his source. The confidentiality of sources and their importance to journalists are
was no sufficient identification of the complainant; the subject in borjal was a private citizen, accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are journalists making no efforts to
whereas in the present case, the subject is a public official; it was held in borjal that the verify the information given by a source, and using that unverified information to throw
articles written by borjal were “fair commentaries on matters of public interest. wild accusations and besmirch the name of possibly an innocent person. Journalists
have a responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at least investigate their
2. There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of stories before publication, and be able to back up their stories with proof. The rumors
the Bureau of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino and gossips spread by unnamed sources are not truth. Journalists are not storytellers or
International Airport (NAIA) at the time of the printing of the allegedly libelous articles. novelists who may just spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality.
Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the goings-on at the Bureau of Customs, a government  Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as
agency, are matters of public interest. It is now a matter of establishing whether the articles qualified privileged communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC
of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and written which exempts from the presumption of malice "a fair and true report, made in good
with malice, for which he would be liable. faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or speech
 The exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent with good faith and reasonable delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
care. This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is exercise of their functions." This particular provision has several elements which must
no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his be present in order for the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The
responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be provision can be dissected as follows:
allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered
does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the privileged, the following conditions must exist:
 a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other and that the defense presented no evidence to show that the accusations against Atty. So were
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a was no malice attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the "reckless disregard" test, and
public officer in the exercise of his functions; Tulfo has failed to meet that test.
b)That it is made in good faith; and
c) That it is without any comments or remarks. The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be
considered as further evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo,39 wherein publication
after the commencement of an action was taken as further evidence of a malicious design to
injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty.
provide no details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.
baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking,
as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged communication, Tulfo also argues that the
goes even further to attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace lower court misappreciated the evidence presented as to the identity of the complainant: that
to his religion and the legal profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of Tulfo wrote about Atty. "Ding" So, an official of the Bureau of Customs who worked at the
Art. 354 of the RPC is present in Tulfo's articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are South Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty. Carlos So who worked at the NAIA. He
qualified privileged communications under the RPC. claims that there has arisen a cloud of doubt as to the identity of the real party referred to in
the articles.
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair" and "true," Tulfo's articles
do not meet the standard. "Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and This argument is patently without merit.
honesty"35 "True" is defined as "conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine;
honest"36 Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he did not do research before making The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of two other witnesses who identified
his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are Atty. So from Tulfo's articles. There is the certification that there is only one Atty. So in the
not "fair and true reports," but merely wild accusations. Bureau of Customs. And most damning to Tulfo's case is the last column he wrote on the
matter, referring to the libel suit against him by Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. In this
Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified article, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So, stating that the libel case was due to
privileged communication, this would still not protect Tulfo. the exposés Tulfo had written on the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau of
Customs. This last article is an admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So was in fact the
In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo target of his attacks. He cannot now point to a putative "Atty. Ding So" at South Harbor, or
argues that the presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real subject of his attacks, when he did not
placing upon the prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. He then argues that for investigate the existence or non-existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor, nor investigate the
him to be liable, there should have been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in alleged corrupt acts of Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo cannot say that there is
writing the subject articles. doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So referred to in his articles, when all the evidence points
to one Atty. So, the complainant in the present case.
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,37 and reiterated
in Flor v. People, which should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was made
with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.38

The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with
reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not, as proven by the prosecution. There
was the finding that Tulfo failed to verify the information on which he based his writings,
 FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659. On the information,
it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for
the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.

ISSUE: WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

RULING: NO.

 On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what
the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.
 Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only
be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not
invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.
 Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
 On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
 Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague
119. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
 Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station,
speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the
statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully
 As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those operate smoothly thereafter.
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity
will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning
indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds
alleged to have committed. that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land
 Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of
the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian
or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to property from agricultural to commercial.
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process. In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the
 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied
of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) Order.
respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of
Government muscle. Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of
 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004
that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the but both courts denied the petition.
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits,
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993.
However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit
“either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was
120. NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING VS. DY, converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan
G.R. No. 170270, April 2, 2009 or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to
commercial land.
FACTS: Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio
broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial.
Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we
commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act
property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents. of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a
commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.
the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is
not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of
to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular. expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a
long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that
ISSUE: WON there is prior restraint against DZNC governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than
governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v.
RATIO: YES. COMELEC: Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression,
and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any
Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
right to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They against its constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing
admit that in 2001, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal
irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
Dy political dynasty. Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of
Isabela from 2001 until he was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
former assistant station manager at petitioners own DZNC Bombo Radyo. A rival AM radio merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place
station in Cauayan City, DWDY, is owned and operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e.,
direct our attention to a 20 February 2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are
where Dy is quoted as intending to file disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNC-AM. generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with
discrimination in the regulation of expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of
The partisan component of this dispute will no doubt sway many observers towards one conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.
opinion or the other, but not us. The comfort offered by the constitutional shelter of free
expression is neutral as to personality, affinity, ideology and popularity. The judges tasked to Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it
enforce constitutional order are expected to rule accordingly from the comfort of that neutral operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as
shelter. content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or
business enterprise within the LGU.
The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are
authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a
years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official content-based restraint.
capacities have taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of
petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from 35.3. The timing of respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is also very telling. The
withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal closure comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage.
authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of government has Such timing emphasizes the ill motives of respondents.
since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school
child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates In their Answer with Comment to the petition for mandamus, respondents admitted that
these cases. petitioners had made such exposes during the 2001 elections, though they denied the nature
and truthfulness of such reports. They conceded that the Philippine Daily Inquirer story are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to
reported that Dy said he planned to file disenfranchisement proceedings against [DZNC]-AM. petitioners
While respondents assert that there are other AM radio stations in Isabela, they do not
specifically refute that station DWDY was owned by the Dy family, or that DZNC and Notes: Whenever the force of government or any of its political subdivisions bears upon to
DWDY are the two only stations that operate out of Cauayan. close down a private broadcasting station, the issue of free speech infringement cannot be
minimized, no matter the legal justifications offered for the closure. In many respects, the
Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local government present petitions offer a textbook example of how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
requirements for the operation of their stations. It was only in the beginning of 2002, after the speech, expression and of the press may be unlawfully compromised. Tragically, the lower
election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local government started to courts involved in this case failed to recognize or assert the fundamental dimensions, and it is
impose these new requirements substantiating the conversion of CDCs property for our duty to reverse, and to affirm the Constitution and the most sacred rights it guarantees.
commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was
aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have
favored Respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.[52] Respondents
efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified immediately before the May 2004
elections, where a former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a
credible and ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who
happened to be the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the requirements
required of petitioners by the Cauayan City government are frankly beyond the pale and not
conventionally adopted by local governments throughout the Philippines.

All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to
ultimately shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based. The United
States Supreme Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view
as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment.[53] The facts confronting us now could
have easily been drawn up by a constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example
on how free speech may be violated.

The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict
scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based
restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.[54] The
immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon
respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon
petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any
compelling reason,[55] the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling
reason to infringe the right to free expression.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents
 PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH
Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark,
or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the
RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
2. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
3. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
4. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
5. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

1. No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they
belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
121. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST case.
REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE 2. Yes.
ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
Respondents. G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law
and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not protection of the laws.
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return  The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public 5. No.
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the  The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not
3. Content-based regulation. religious speech.
 Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter  Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
 The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise
 Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
used the clear and present danger rule as measure. on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
 Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,  Lemon test A regulation is constitutional when:
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the 1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional 2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed 3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
unconstitutionality.”
 Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.

4. Yes.
 The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.
 Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
122. Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC (2001)
G.R. No. 147571 | 2001-05-05

FACTS:

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is social research institution conducting
surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. They brought the action for
prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 or
the Fair Election Act. Such provided that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published 7 days before an election.

Petitioners argued that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constituted
prior restraint on freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such. On
the other hand, the Commission on Elections justified the restrictions as a necessary means to
prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and
erroneous surveys just before the election. Furthermore, it asseverated that the prohibition on
the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bore a rational
connection to the objective of the law and that the impairment of freedom of expression was
minimal as the restriction was limited both in duration.

HELD:

Law Laid a Prior Restraint on Freedom of Speech

1. The SC ruled that the law lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech by prohibiting the
publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods before
a local election.

2. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the
press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.

3. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such restraint.

Limited Power of COMELEC over Media Franchises

4. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises was held to be limited to ensuring
equal opportunity, time, space and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of
charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among candidates.
 123. GMA Network, Inc. vs. Comelec (2014)
O’Brien Test to Determine Constitutionality of Content-Based Regulation of Free Speech G.R. No. 205357 | 2014-09-02
5. In United States vs. O’Brien, the US Supreme Court said that: a government regulation is Facts:
sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the advertisement time of candidates and
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of 120 minutes for TV and
First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to 180 minutes for radio for the May 2013 elections.
the furtherance of that interest.
The controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation provided in Section 6
6. Even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be of Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act).
invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should During the previous elections of May 2007 and May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is implementing and interpreting Section 6 of RA 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean
necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per station.” For the May
2013 elections, however, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 changing the
Law Failed to Meet Criterion (3) of the O’Brien Test interpretation of the airtime limitation from a “per station” basis to a “total aggregate”
7. By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such basis. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of Resolution No. 9615.
publication might undermine the integrity of the election, the law actually suppresses a whole Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence, the
class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject present petitions.
matter by newspaper columnists, radio and the like. In effect, it shows a bias for a particular
subject matter. The petitioners contend that Resolution No. 9615 is unconstitutional because:

8. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that the government has no (i) Section 9 (a) provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,or its content. a proper computation of “aggregate total” airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee;

Prohibition Not Justified (Limited Period) (ii) Section 9 (a) imposes a notice requirement, is vague and infringes on the constitutionally
9. The prohibition imposed by the law cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a protected freedom of speech, of the press and of expression, and on the right of people to be
limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the informed on matters of public concern.
curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total
suppression of a category of speech. (iii) Section 9 (a) is a cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost
impossible burden on broadcast mass media of monitoring a candidate's or political party's
Law Failed to Meet Criterion (4) of the O’Brien Test aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur administrative and criminal liability.
10. Law fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, which is that the restriction be not
greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, the law aims (iv) Section 7 (d) is null and void for unlawfully criminalizing acts not prohibited and
at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, penalized as criminal offenses by RA 9006.
"junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called
"dagdag-bawas." (v) Section 14, providing for a candidate's or political party's “right to reply,” is an improper
exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers; constitutes prior restraint and infringing
11. These goals cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, petitioners' freedom of expression, speech and the press; and violates the equal protection
when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech guarantee.
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
(vi) Petitioner ABC aver that Section 1(4) of the Resolution which defines the term “political
advertisement” or “election propaganda” suffers from overbreadth, thereby producing a issues raised by the petitioners have not been rendered moot and academic by the conclusion
“chilling effect,” constituting prior restraint. of the 2013 elections. Considering that the matters elevated to the Court for resolution are
susceptible to repetition in the conduct of future electoral exercises, these issues will be
(vii) Petitioner GMA further assails Section 35 which states that any violation of said Rules resolved.
shall constitute an election offense.
Court may proceed to resolve certiorari petitions, even though improperly availed of, if
(viii) Petitioner GMA further argues that the Resolution was promulgated without public issues are of public importance
consultations, in violation of petitioners' right to due process.
2. COMELEC claims that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies to question
On the other hand, COMELEC contends that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not the assailed Resolutions. Technically, respondent may have a point. However, thr Court has in
available to petitioners, because the writ of certiorari is only available against the the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions despite their being the subject of an improper
COMELEC's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, while the writ of prohibition only lies remedy, in view of the public importance of the issues raised therein
against the exercise of judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions. Said writs do not lie
against the COMELEC’s administrative or rule-making powers. Locus standi

COMELEC likewise alleges that petitioners do not have locus standi, as the constitutional 3. For petitioner-intervenor Senator Alan Peter Cayetano, he undoubtedly has standing since
rights and freedoms they enumerate are not personal to them, rather, they belong to he is a candidate whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by the assailed
candidates, political parties and the Filipino electorate in general, as the limitations are Resolutions.
imposed on candidates, not on media outlets. It argues that petitioners' alleged risk of exposure
to criminal liability is insufficient to give them legal standing as said “fear of injury” is highly 4. For the broadcast companies, they similarly have the standing in view of the direct injury
speculative and contingent on a future act. they may suffer relative to their ability to carry out their tasks of disseminating information
because of the burdens imposed on them.
COMELEC maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in
accordance with RA 9006 as this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to Third party standing
equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the
playing field between candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without 5. In regard to the broadcast companies invoking the injury that may be caused to their
much. Moreover, the COMELEC’s issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section customers or the public – those who buy advertisements and the people who rely on their
4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests on the COMELEC the power to supervise broadcasts –American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were
and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection
media. claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.

The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining COMELEC from 6. If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a
implementing Resolution No. 9615. constitutional right of their clients [see White Light Corporation v. City of Manila], with more
reason should establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the
Held: constitutional freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public,
not to speak of their own freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners-
Procedural Issues broadcasters on that basis.

A matter is not rendered moot and academic if it is susceptible to repetition Substantive Issues

1. Although the subject of the present petitions are Resolutions promulgated by the Aggregate Time Limits
COMELEC relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local elections, nevertheless the
7. The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair
Election Act (R.A. No. 9006)- - 120 minutes of television advertisement and 180 minutes for (b) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be
radio advertisement. entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes
of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation;
8. For the 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections, the COMELEC implemented the airtime limits by xxx
applying said limitation on a per station basis. But for the 2013 elections, the COMELEC,
through Resolution No. 9615, chose to aggregate the total broadcast time among the different 13. The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime
broadcast media. There was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator
candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the air. Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed – that
it should be on a “per station” basis.
COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis for changing the
interpretation and implementation of the airtime limits 14. The Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed the previous provision, Section
11(b) of RA 6646, which prohibited direct political advertisements – the so-called “political ad
9. The COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election ban.” If under the previous law, no candidate was allowed to directly buy or procure on his
laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations – or reasonable basis. The own his broadcast or print campaign advertisements, and that he must get it through the
COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a COMELEC Time or COMELEC Space, RA 9006 relieved him or her from that restriction and
legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same allowed him or her to broadcast time or print space subject to the limitations set out in the law.
must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
15. Given the foregoing background, it is therefore ineluctable to conclude that Congress
10. Based on the transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC after it had already intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by which the candidates, political
promulgated the Resolution, the respondent did not fully explain or justify the change in parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a
computing the airtime allowed candidates and political parties, except to make reference to the chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for
need to “level the playing field.” If the “per station” basis was deemed enough to comply with the electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates. In
that objective in the past, why should it now be suddenly inadequate? this regard, the media is also given a very important part in that undertaking of providing the
means by which the political exercise becomes an interactive process. All of these would be
11. If an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, it [must] explain undermined and frustrated with the kind of regulation that the respondent came up with.
thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous standards
should no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to 16. The COMELEC justified its interpretation by citing the dropping of the “per day per
sufficiently establish a decision as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking station” language embodied in both versions of the House of Representatives and Senate bills
thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision in favour of the “each candidate” and “not more than” limitations now found in Section 6 of
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. [see Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. NTC] R.A. 9006. The Court does not agree. If anything, the change in language meant that the
computation must not be based on a “per day” basis for each television or radio station. The
The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting same could not therefore lend itself to an understanding that the total allowable time is to be
“aggregate” basis in the determination of allowable airtime done on an aggregate basis for all television or radio stations.

12. The law (RA 9006) , which is the basis of the regulation subject of these petitions, 17. The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the
pertinently provides: enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law
6.2. (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issued for that purpose should always
shall be entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television be in accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the
advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry
purchase or donation. out. [see Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections]
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes against the 23. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press with a public hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain what it had done, particularly on the
aggregate-based air time limits. The new Resolution introduced a radical change in the manner
18. The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and in which the rules on airtime for political advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there is a
disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to need for adequate and effective means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and
access the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press implemented. In this regard, it is not enough that they be published – or explained – after they
and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to reach out would have been adopted.
not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with
substantially reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively 24. While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere administrative
interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the “aggregate- agency under the Executive Department, rules which apply to the latter must also be deemed
based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. to similarly apply to the former, not as a matter of administrative convenience but as a dictate
of due process.
19. Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental
Law. “[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and 25. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.” Accordingly, the same must nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest. itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
20. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest effect of law.
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political
parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, 26. For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said
this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective
measure. and ineffectual.

21. It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits Reporting requirement under Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable
on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many burden on the broadcast industry and does not constitute prior restraint
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, to add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper 27. It is a basic postulate of due process, specifically in relation to its substantive component,
the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech. that any governmental rule or regulation must be reasonable in its operations and its
impositions. Any restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be reasonably related to the purpose
Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people’s right to suffrage or objective of the government in a manner that would not work unnecessary and unjustifiable
burdens on the citizenry.
22. It has been said that “[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.” Candidates and political parties need 28. Contrary to petitioner GMA’s contention, the Reporting Requirement for the
adequate breathing space – including the means to disseminate their ideas. This could not be COMELEC’s monitoring is reasonable. The legal duty of monitoring lies with the Comelec.
reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by which the respondent implemented the Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the Comelec in
time limits in regard to political advertisements in the broadcast media. ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits.

Resolution No. 9615 needs prior hearing before adoption as a matter of due process 29. The constitutionality of such monitoring requirement is likewise assailed as it constitutes
prior restraint. The Court finds otherwise. Such a requirement is a reasonable means adopted [O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
by the COMELEC to ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunities to Amendment protection. xxx although the First Amendment protects newspaper publishers
promote their respective candidacies. Unlike the restrictive aggregate-based airtime limits, from being required to print the replies of those whom they criticize, it affords no such
the directive to give prior notice is not unduly burdensome and unreasonable, much less could protection to broadcasters; on the contrary, they must give free time to the victims of their
it be characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of criticism.
information before broadcast.
The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two have relevance to the present
30. Notably, COMELEC, in amending the Resolution, modified the requirement from “prior case. First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
approval” to “prior notice.” While the former may be suggestive of a censorial tone, thus lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves
inviting a charge of prior restraint, the latter is more in the nature of a content-neutral confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the
regulation designed to assist the poll body to undertake its job of ensuring fair elections individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
without having to undertake any chore of approving or disapproving certain expressions. intruder. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot
completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. xxx One may
The right to reply provision is reasonable and consistent with the constitutional mandate hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional
immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place.
31. Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, as revised by Resolution No. 9631, provides that: “All
registered political parties, party-list groups or coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. xxx
the right to reply to charges published or aired against them. The reply shall be given publicity the government's interest in the “well-being of its youth” and in supporting “parents' claim to
by the newspaper, television, and/or radio station which first printed or aired the charges with authority in their own household” justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.
the same prominence or in the same page or section or in the same time slot as the first
statement.xxx”

32. The attack on the validity of the “right to reply” provision is primarily anchored on the
alleged ground of prior restraint, specifically in so far as such a requirement may have a
chilling effect on speech or of the freedom of the press.

33. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance
by the grantee of some form of public service. [see TELEBAP vs COMELEC]

34. When it comes to election and the exercise of freedom of speech, of expression and of the
press, the latter must be properly viewed in context as being necessarily made to accommodate
the imperatives of fairness by giving teeth and substance to the right to reply requirement.

Broadcasting, as compared to other forms of media, are entitled to more limited

protection

35. The Court cited these passages from an American Supreme Court decision with regard to
broadcasting, right to reply requirements, and the limitations on speech:
124. 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015

FACTS:
 On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which
provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13,
2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which
enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides: SEC. 7.
Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is
unlawful: (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material
outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties
without the consent of the owner thereof; (g) Public places referred to in the previous
subsection (f) include any of the following: xxx 5. Public utility vehicles such as buses,
jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not; 6.
Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports,
seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
 The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation
of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
 Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of
REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals.
The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
 The COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the
implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are constitutional.

HELD:
 The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void
for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior
restraints on speech. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom
of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of
 PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter,
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them. escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive-audience”
 The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided.
and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which
preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they
their franchise or permit to operate. are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the
 The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content- speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either
neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause. A content-neutral regulation, i.e., impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if
time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The
if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
the furtherance of that interest.  Lehman’s case not applicable
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign
since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case
However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which
the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme
to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising space on the buses was not a public
power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is forum, pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses, “although incidental to
absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport the provision of public transportation, is a part of commercial venture.” In the same way that
terminals. other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general
 The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the public, the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising that may be
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. displayed on its vehicles. In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and owned by the city government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right to
regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article decide which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses.
IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city
enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation,” inter alia, of government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In
transportation and other public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the
of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their
terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same. properties. Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by
delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to the city government, impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant
operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid
used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, reason to suppress their political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign
but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the materials on their properties.
PUV or transport terminal. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine.  Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election
campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech 125. INTEGRATED BAR OF PHILIPPINES v. MANILA MAYOR JOSE 'LITO'
clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this ATIENZA, GR No. 175241, Feb 24, 2010
government was founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. FACTS:
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.  On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz
9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit
class. However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30... p.m. to
on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction exists be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral
between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that organizations.
the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a  Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given
franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any  The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with
manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals. P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD)
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public,
remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express ISSUES:
their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their WON partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates
properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.
and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs
and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely RULING:
superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.  Respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave
likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and  Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election campaign materials against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
campaign materials. judicial scrutiny thereof.
 It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
Summary determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of... what may
free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still
power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal the assumption - especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place -
time, space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there.
clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial  Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his
distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles
action.
and other properties.
Principles:
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a 126. KMU VS. ERMITA
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals... or
public health. FACTS:
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)  Several rallies were organized and participated by the petitioners, Bayan, Jess del Prado,
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be KMU, etc on September 26, October 5, and October 6, 2005. According to the
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse petitioners, these rallies were violently dispersed and several participants were injured,
to... accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the arrested and detained by the policemen implementing B.P. 880 and the Calibrated
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. Preemptive Response policy issued by the Malacanang.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil  All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
who must be heard on the matter. violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within recently announced.
twenty-four hours.  Contentions of the Petitioners:
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms 1. BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the signatory.
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, 2. BP 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours... after presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
immediately executory. 3. BP 880 is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours government.
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive 4. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. some cause not espoused by the government.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. 5. The phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
 Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation pass the strict scrutiny test.
and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost 6. B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a... showing, as assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal
that the state has a right to prevent and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere
 The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the regulations but are actually prohibitions.
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both... grave and 7. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent
legitimate public interest. and grave danger) are inconsistent.
 It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present 8. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for
an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the being vague and for lack of publication.
matter.
ISSUE:
1. Whether BP 880 is constitutional;
• B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
RULING: restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of
1. BP 880 is CONSTITUTIONAL. rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger
 The provisions of BP 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. standard.
 BP 880 is a CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION.
It is a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This • in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which
was adverted to in Osmena v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a content-neutral to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no
regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. It refers to all kinds such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and
of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only
would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper
and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any coordination and orderly activities.
subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
 BP 880 is not vague. The law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its
provisions. Public does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Not
every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to rally, demonstration,
march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
place. So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
 BP 880 is not overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly
and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive
evils Congress has the right to prevent.
 No prior restraint. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the
speech is not relevant to the regulation.
 Valid Delegation of power. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law
provides a precise and sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec.
6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c)
substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard.

In Sum:

• The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament
and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people
and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
127. SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA
G.R. NO. 164785 APRIL 29, 2009

FACTS:
 On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC.
 Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints
were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
 Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:
Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse
effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing
in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment.
Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast
media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot
be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

WHEREFORE, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

128. Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996

FACTS:
 Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious
group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB).
 These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other
religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial
biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
 Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board.
 RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its
TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the
 CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and
power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV
of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute
an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision,
petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

RULING
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.
 Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious
programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged,
will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”
 [The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of
its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium
that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the
exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the
clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of 129. Ebralinag vs The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
petitioner’s religious program. G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
 [A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. FACTS
It failed in the case at bar.\  In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
 The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools,
“attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic
evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the pledge.
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the  Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational
from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees,
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not
religion. xxx. participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
 The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner  Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their
but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their
protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of
squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the
even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to
where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however,
of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of  On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus,
duelling ideas. Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of
 In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to
constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’
such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them
that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and
right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.
. . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave  On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.” respective classes until further orders.
 The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent  Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the they do not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no believe in expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony.
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
ISSUE 130. Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Office of the Executive
Secretary and OMA (2003)
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness is valid. G.R. No. 153888 | 2003-07-08
Facts:
RULING
Petitioner IDCP is a non-governmental organization accredited by their international
No. The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are organization to issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers in the
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive Philippines.
free education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). In 1995, IDCP formulated its internal rules and procedures based on the Qu’ran and Sunnah
for the analysis and inspection of food and the issuance of halal certifications. Petitioner
thereafter issued halal certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers for a fee. It
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to even adopted a distinct patented sign for its halal certificates.
disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while
their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic In October 2001, the Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine
pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and Halal Certification Scheme and appointing Respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate oversee its implementation. The EO grants OMA the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform related regulatory activities. OMA, by virtue of EO 46, sent letters to
public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.
food manufacturers asking to secure halal certification only from OMA to avoid any violation
of EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, Petitioner lost revenues.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every
Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag Petitioner filed a petition to annul EO 46 on the ground that it’s unconstitutional and to
and bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark prevent its implementation.
period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
Held:
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby
EO 46 encroaches on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for
annulled and set aside. Filipino Muslims which food products are fit for Muslim consumption.

1. OMA was created in 1981 through EO 697 “to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos
into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions,
and institutions”. It deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the
Muslim community as a “national cultural community” and not as a religious group. Thus,
with the constitutional barrier of Church and State in mind, the latter must make sure
that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters. Otherwise, it violates the non-
establishment clause and the “free exercise of religion” provision found in Article III, Section
5 of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. By taking the task of issuing halal certifications, the
State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah
on halal food.

3. The subject EO violates the Constitutional provision on the separation of Church and
State. The formulation of guidelines and policies on halal certification is a duty that only
religious organizations, entities, or scholars can lawfully perform for Muslims. A food product
becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious rituals and prayers. Hence, only
practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. 131. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Worker?s Union (1974)
G.R. No. L-25246 | 1974-09-12
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
Facts:

4. To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General argues  Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the "Iglesia ni Cristo”, is an employee of the Elizalde
that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. By delegating to Rope Factory, Inc. He is also a member of Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with
OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks to protect and
a Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision.
promote the muslim Filipinos' right to health
 Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), the
5. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. State intrusion of religious require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is
freedom is Constitutionally proscribed, unless the government satisfactorily shows the the representative of the employees." This was amended by R.A. No. 3350 exempting
seriousness and immediacy of the threat. members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization
There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations
of their religious right to classify a product as halal  Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. Thereupon, the Union asked the
Company to terminate the employment of Victoriano in view of his resignation. In turn,
6. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations of the management of the Company notified of Victoriano to arrange with the Union
their religious right to classify a product as halal even on the belief that the OMA can otherwise, it would be constrained to terminate his service. This prompted Victoriano to
effectively protect the health of Muslim Filipinos. Existing laws and regulations already file an action for injunction against the Company and the Union from dismissing him.
ensure the quality and safety of food products released in the market without encroaching on
 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the CBA is not violative
the religious freedom of Muslims.
of the religious freedom. It also assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 3350 for the
7. consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the following reasons: first, it infringes the fundamental right to form lawful associations and
meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption (Section 48(4) consequently, deprives said members of their right to form or join lawful organizations;
of the Administrative Code). Meanwhile, BFD, through RA 7394 (The Consumer Act of Second, it impairs the obligation of contracts since the CBA contained a closed shop
1992), ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality provision; Third, it discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members
standards. Then, through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers are from joining labor unions; Fourth, it violates the prohibition on religious test in the
adequately apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according to
exercise of a civil right; Fifth, it violates the equal protection of laws since it granted the
their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place
by the State to ensure that the Muslim consumers’ right to health is protected. The halal members of INC undue advantages over their fellow workers; Lastly, it violates the
certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice.
religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption.  Victoriano contended that R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional for the following reasons: First,
it does not violate the right to form lawful associations because the right to join
associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization; Second,
it does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was
incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; Third, it does not violate the
establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress merely
accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members
from joining labor unions; Fourth, the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's
religion has primacy and preference over union security measures which are merely
contractual; Fifth, the law does not violate the equal protection clause; Lastly, it does not
violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to
equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their
religious beliefs.
 RTC: The lower court rendered judgment enjoining the Company from dismissing an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement
Victoriano from his employment. of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.
Held:
 The Constitutional right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining It was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No. 3350, and that its
any union purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution.

Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join  A law must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
associations. This right comprehends at least two broad notions: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., advances nor inhibits religion
the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain The government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character
from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held
whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a
up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any (See Aglipay v. Ruiz)
time.
In the instant case, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional
Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. inhibition of the "no-establishment" of religion clause of the Constitution. The purpose of the
It is enacted to provide an exception that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled law was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free
or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
employers. And in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest
be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. The state is enjoined, in the
members of the collective bargaining union. Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital
and industry.
 The free exercise of religious belief is superior to contract rights
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified.  The "establishment clause" of religion does not ban regulation on conduct
Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide with the tenets of some religions
promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end
are reasonable. The exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or
diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the
promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause"
sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their of religion does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
natural, statutory and constitutional right to work. It also provides the protection to members coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the
of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
needs protection: collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by
management. In enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the
constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons,
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. Religious of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed
freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act, and, certainly, Congress could take away
preferred position in the hierarchy of values. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent the same burden.
  A religious objector is not required to do a positive act since he is exempted The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
from the coverage of any closed shop agreement intended to apply as long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a
labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with
Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the constitutional prohibition against labor unions.
requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right. The Act
does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its
membership in any particular religion nor in any religious sect; neither does the Act provision. The Act only restores to them their freedom of association which closed shop
require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are
labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions.
Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No.
3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of  Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people and adoption of
closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a conscientious religious objector need measures calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of
not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — society
he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union
may have entered into. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350
promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their
 The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification religious belief, cannot join labor unions. In determining whether any particular measure is for
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited it is sufficient
the laws upon all citizens of the state. The Constitution does not require that things which are that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is economic stability of all component elements of society. Republic Act No. 3350 insures
to operate. economic stability to the members of a religious sect who are also component elements of
society, for it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is union having a closed shop agreement with the employer.
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.

In the instant case, Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the requirements. The Act substantially
classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up
with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions.
Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their
dogmas and cannons.

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the
law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions,
from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because
of union shop security agreements.
132. MANOSCA VS. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to
have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public
purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to
the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and
constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at
least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation
of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
133. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Comelec (2010)
G.R. No. 190582 | 2010-04-08

Facts:
 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base.
 In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC. However,
the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition on moral grounds, and held that
“the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs.'
 When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, the COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie
and speaking for the majority, upheld the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition for accreditation
as a sectoral party in the party-list system. The reasons given were that (a) it cannot be
said that Ladlad's expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a
whole (b) the LGBT group do not present substantial differentiation, the Ladlad
constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. (c) it would be
against generally accepted public morals (d) the Penal Code (Art 201) makes it
punishable for anyone to “publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals. Likewise, the Civil Code (Article 694) considers a nuisance “any act,
omission..or anything else...which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality”
 Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and
direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for accreditation.
 Ang Ladlad argues that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Moreover, the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines' international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
 The COMELEC argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941 (Party-List System Act).

Held:

 Enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors in the Constitution is

not exclusive and not determinative of eligibility for registration in the party-list
system
1. The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that the for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with
or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious.
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, "the enumeration of marginalized Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms. A law
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses. (see Estrada v. Escritor)
 Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
Respondent argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest
COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated
few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
country." Ang Ladlad's petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Philippines. Instead, it represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines.” Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG  Public morals as a ground to deny Ang Ladlad's petition for registration
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no
presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC's findings are to be believed, Comelec suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual
petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad's principal conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public
place of business. morals. The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for disqualify the petitioner.
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of
non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is Notably, the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. into the realm of law. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral
act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by
 Denial of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration on religious grounds violates the the COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are committing immoral acts."
non-establishment clause and the constitutional policy on government neutrality Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
matters." Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

 Morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious  Mere allegation of violation of the Civil Code or Revised Penal Code is not sufficient
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should to justify denial of registration
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act
 Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. Freedom of
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging
culpability. a disfavored one.

 LGBTs entitled to equal protection This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality and the activity of
a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
some legitimate government end.
In the area of freedom of expression, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech
In our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges have followed doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition
the 'rational basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
the Constitution. (see Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas) always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."

The asserted state interest here - that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority - is not a The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
protection clause. The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, OSG fails to recall that petitioner has established its qualifications to participate in the party-list
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group. system, and the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by
law. To the extent, therefore, that Ang Ladlad has been precluded, because of COMELEC's
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has,
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of indeed, been a transgression of Ang Ladlad's fundamental rights.
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

We disagree with the OSG's position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the  Principle of Non-Discrimination under International Law
purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it
itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case." The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

 Freedom of Expression and Association Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 134. Imbong vs Executive Secretary Ochoa (2014)
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee G.R. Nos. 204819, 2014-04-08
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, FACTS:
property, birth or other status.
The consolidated petitions assail as unconstitutional Republic Act No. 10354 also known as
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application Reproductive Health (RH) Law for violating the following:
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for 1. Right to life of the unborn – insofar as it authorizes the purchase of abortives in violation of
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the
that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements. 2. Right to health – insofar as it provides access to contraceptives which have hazardous health
effects

 Yogyakarta Principles not recognized as obligatory norms 3. Right to religious freedom- insofar as (a) it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of
Petitioners invoke the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of petitioners (b) it compels medical
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) which it declares to reflect health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer
binding principles of international law. patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections; (c) it requires would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on
We are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition, and (d) it provides for
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said mandatory sex education in schools.
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find
basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute Petitioners argue that the RH law does not satisfy the “clear and present danger” test and
of the International Court of Justice. “compelling state interest test” to justify the regulation of the free exercise of religion and free
speech.

4. Prohibition against involuntary servitude- insofar as it compels medical practitioners, under

pain of criminal punishment, to render 48 hours of pro bono service to indigent women, to be
accredited under the Philhealth program

5. Equal protection – insofar as it makes the poor the primary target of the legislation that
promotes contraceptive that will effectively reduce the number of the poor.

6. Due process clause- as the RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” since it punishes “any

violation” of the law yet does not define the type of conduct to be treated as violation.
Moreover, it infringes on the right of the people to manage their own affairs.

7. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)- insofar as it gives absolute authority to the
person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, it impedes the right of spouses to
mutually decide on matter affecting the family.
8. Non-delegation of legislative authority – insofar is it delegates to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) the authority to determine if product is a non-abortifacient and to be II. Substantive Issues
included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL)
Right to Life
9. Local Autonomy – insofar as it imposes duties on the local government.
19. According to petitioners, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
HELD: abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.

Facial Challenge The Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception

9. It is contended that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech 20. The word "conception" means that life begins at fertilization. (The court rejected the
regulating measure. argument that conception only begins at the moment of implantation of the fertilized ovum in
a woman’s uterus, as this theory does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of
10. The Philippine Court has expanded the scope of the facial challenge application to cover the fetus).
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. 21. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
One-Subject, One Title Rule abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization
15. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible

16. It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to 22. The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with legalizing abortion. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion.
if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to The RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and fertilization.
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede 23. The RH Law, in defining and prohibiting “abortifacients”, recognizes that the fertilized
legislation. (citing Cawaling vs Comelec) ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The RH Law, first,
prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which refers to that which
17. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or kind).
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act. IRR of the RH law

18. With respect to the RH law, the court sees it as principally a population control measure. 24. With the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR must be
Nevertheless, the terms "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated struck down for being ultra vires.
and germane to the overriding objective of the statute, i.e., to control the population growth.
Hence, Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the 25. The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as
public as to the contents of the assailed legislation "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn. accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs.
Right to Health
34. In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
26. The right to health is found in various provisions in the Constitution such as Article II (Sec legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Doctrine of Benevolent
15), Article XIII (Sec 11-13) and Article XVI (Sec 9). Neutrality finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
27. These provisions are self-executing and there is no need for legislation to implement them. government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be of an important secular objective.
considered self-executory.
35. The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction
28. The provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine of a conscientious objector. The Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the
devices, injectables by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. The use of free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Accordingly, a
the word "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law.
and approved by the FDA. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective". There must first be a violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient . exercise of religion.

Religious Freedom 36. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive
health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must
29. The constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
30. The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of 37. Furthermore, the provision in the RH-IRR that “skilled health professional ….who by
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the
RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors” is void not only
31. The basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is discriminatory
conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly and violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. The protection accorded to
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.
Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
Family Planning Seminars
32. Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the 38. The requirement of attendance to a family planning seminar as a condition for the issuance
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. The second part however, is limited of a marriage license is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The
and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. Those who receive any information
the rights of others. during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information
given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain
33. The RH law contains a provision mandating a hospital or a medical practitioner to the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
Right to Marital Privacy By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
39. Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy, by their very nature, involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in
should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife. the case of an abused child, the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of
parental authority.
40. The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision making by giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse Academic Freedom
from participating in the decision.
49. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
41. Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age
belongs to the couple, not just one of them. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. appropriate reproductive health education.

42. The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital 50. The legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than
privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
guaranteed by the Constitution.
51. Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right
43. At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
Parental Consent
Due Process (Void for Vagueness)
44. Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who
will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. To insist on a rule 52. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose its application.
of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation
of one's privacy with respect to his family. 53. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
45. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
miscarriage.
54. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not
46. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts
services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
planning methods themselves, on the other. By way of exception, insofar as access to context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
information by the minor even without parental consent.
Equal Protection
47. Moreover, an exception must be made in life-threateningcases that require the performance
of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a 55. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed

48. In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. 56. The equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to Autonomy of Local Governments
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class
63. The RH law vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of
57. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health basic services and facilities
care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section
11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the 64. From the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
development of the people availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that
the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the
58. Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that
the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.

59. With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact
that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand,
substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

Involuntary Servitude

60. The practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged
burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people.

61. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bona service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty
is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.

Delegation of Authority to the FDA

62. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power
to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List.
The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods.
135. Centeno vs Villalon- Pornillos (1994)
G.R. No. 113092 | 1994-09-01
Facts:
The Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay. Martin Centeno together with Vicente Yco approached
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of
P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD.

Based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed complaint against
Centento, Evaristo and Yco for violation of PD No. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law).

Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that Solicitation Permit Law
only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made
for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. It argued that to subject to State
regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the
right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

The MTC rendered judgment finding the accused Yco and Centeno guilty beyond reasonable
doubt but it recommended that the accused be pardoned since they acted in good faith. The
RTC affirmed the judgment but modified the penalty imposed.

Held:
Solicitation for charitable purposes is not prohibited
1. Solicitation Permit Law merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to
show that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes
within its coverage.

It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others ("expressio unius est exclusio alterius").

2. It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the
words "charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Furthermore,
the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or."
Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the
disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings.

Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused

3. The term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for

"religious" purposes in adherence to the fundamental doctrine that penal laws are to be
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be
extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. If
the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions that
which operates in favor of a party accused is to be preferred.

Exercise of religion may be regulated in order that the State may protect its citizens from
injury

4. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion embraces two concepts,
that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must
have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the
power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly
infringe on the protected freedom.

5. Hence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in
order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State under the
exercise of police power may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a
stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to
establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The
State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest
of public interest, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.

The general regulation of solicitation for public interest does not involve any religious
test

6. A law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one

interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a
detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the
public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not
unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional
objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not
constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an
inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.

7. In the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Solicitation Permit Law, Centeno cannot be held criminally liable
therefor.
 contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 (Exhibit B') when she secured a certification... as to the civil status of Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. (ExhibitC') from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November
2003.
 Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino
at the latter's workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first
marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino
allegedly affirmed... and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and
childhood friends
 The defense's claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant.
 He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy
Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that
the... consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim,
there is no necessity to secure her consent the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted
Geraldino.

ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.

RULING:
 Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P.
Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did
not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal
intent.
136. ATILANO O. NOLLORA v. PEOPLE  The appellate court rejected Nollora's defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was
GR No. 191425, Sep 07, 2011
in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur'an.
 Nollora's two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
FACTS:
Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora's claim of
 On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino
general welfare.
("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy.
 The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
 (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
legally married to Pinat;[14] (2) Nollora and Pinat's marriage has not been legally
met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah
dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the... existence of
Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got...
his second marriage to Geraldino;[15] and (4) Nollora and Geraldino's marriage has all
married at the [IE] MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan
the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his
(Exhibit `A'). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has
prior marriage.
another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and
returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the  Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage
Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of...
 the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora's religious affiliation is not an Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora's marriages were solemnized according to to legalize their union.
Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption
from... liability for the crime of bigamy ISSUE:
 Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Principles: HELD:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to  No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances. sacred of human rights.
 The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar,
before so doing, shall notify the Shari'a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between
[sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).  The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming
criminal liability for bigamy. arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
137. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:
 Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the
judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
 Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein
for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
 Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly
have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
 Sr. Quiambao informed Leus that, pending the promulgation of a “Support Staff Handbook,”
SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) on the
causes for termination of employments. Section 94(e) cites “disgraceful or immoral conduct”
as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes for termination of employment
provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code. SSCW maintains that pre-marital sexual
relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, even if
they subsequently married, is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious
misconduct, which are grounds for the termination of employment under the 1992 MRPS and
the Labor Code.

Sr. Quiambao informed Leus in a letter that her employment with SSCW is terminated on the
ground of serious misconduct.

Leus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter (LA), in dismissing the complaint, found that there was a valid
ground for the dismissal and that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a “disgraceful
and immoral conduct.” The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic educational
institution, Leus is expected to live up to the Catholic values taught by SSCW to its students.

On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the LA Decision holding that the termination of
the employment of the personnel of private schools is governed by the 1992 MRPS and
pregnancy out of wedlock is a “disgraceful or immoral conduct” within the contemplation of
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Leus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the
petition. The CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code
which governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of
private schools. The CA also held that the dismissal was a valid exercise of SSCW’s
139. Leus vs. St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (2015) management prerogative.
G.R. No. 187226 | 2015-01-28
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45. The issues for resolution are (1) whether it is
Facts: the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code that governs the termination of employment of
teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, and (2) whether pregnancy out of
Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove (SSCW), a wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of
Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel. Sometime in 2003, Leus her employment.
engaged in pre-marital sexual relations with her boyfriend and got pregnant out of wedlock.
Held:
When SSCW learned of the Leus’ pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao, SSCW’s Directress,
advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, Leus informed Sr. The standard of review in a Rule 45 petition from the CA decision in labor cases
Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just because she got pregnant
without the benefit of marriage 1. In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition,
where the CA’s disposition in a labor case is sought to be calibrated, the Court’s review is
quite limited. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court has to view the CA decision in the same Court sees no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. The Court has to thereof.
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of The totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct alleged to be disgraceful or
whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. immoral must be assessed against the prevailing norms of conduct

2. The determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion does not include 7. The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is
an inquiry into the correctness of the evaluation of evidence, which was the basis of the labor “disgraceful and immoral” considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational
agency in reaching its conclusion. Nevertheless, the incorrectness of the [labor tribunal's] institution. In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the
evidentiary evaluation should not result in negating the requirement of substantial evidence. petitioner’s pregnancy vis-à-vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.
Indeed, when there is a showing that the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces
of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be 8. In Chua-Qua vs. Clave, the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances
reviewed by the courts. of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing
norms of conduct and applicable laws. Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the
Section 94 of 1992 MRPS is valid and applicable circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is disgraceful
or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable or moral. If the
3. The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was issued conduct does not conform to what society generally views as respectable or moral, then the
by the Secretary of Education pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (BP 232) or the conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be
“Education Act of 1982.” Petitioner contends that there is no provision in BP 232, which presented, which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing
provides for the grounds for the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.
personnel of private schools. Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which provides for the
causes of terminating an employment, is invalid as it “widened the scope and coverage” of BP 9. Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step
232. process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and
second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e.,
4. Section 57 of BP 232 specifically empowers the Department of Education to promulgate what the society generally considers moral and respectable.
rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the
educational system in accordance with the declared policy of BP 232. Public and secular morality should determine the prevailing norms of conduct, not
religious morality
5. The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as the
causes for the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational 10. The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious. xxx it
system of private schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the teaching and non-teaching personnel refers to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon
of private schools are not only qualified, but competent and efficient as well goes hand in hand which depend the existence and progress of human society xxx [I]f government based its
with the declared objective of BP 232 – establishing and maintaining relevant quality actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also
education. It is thus within the authority of the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy.
provides for the dismissal of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools based on As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even
their incompetence, inefficiency, or some other disqualification. make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion;
6. Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Education to “prescribe and governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
impose such administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in the neutrality. (see Estrada vs. Escritor)
implementing rules and regulations” for the “gross inefficiency of the teaching or non-
teaching personnel” of private schools. Accordingly, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the 11. For a particular conduct to constitute “disgraceful and immoral” behavior under civil
service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It
cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor 16. To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no
should it be grounded on “cultural” values not convincingly demonstrated to have been impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock,
recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or
same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the
majority. (see Anonymous vs. Radam) No substantial evidence to prove that Leus’ pregnancy out of wedlock caused grave
scandal to SSCW
12. In case an unmarried woman gives birth out of wedlock, the father of the child is himself and its students
unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those circumstances by 17. Contrary to the labor tribunals’ declarations, the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce
reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner’s indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to
unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCW’s bare allegation, the records are bereft of any
expressed in the Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems evidence that would convincingly prove that the petitioner’s conduct indeed adversely affected
irrespective of dogmatic origins. (see Anonymous vs. Radam) SSCW’s integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for. The petitioner is only a
non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCW’s students is very limited. It is thus quite
13. It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock caused such a grave scandal as to warrant her
Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause dismissal.
provided under the Labor Code and other relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. As
stated above, when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular 18. Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the
morality and not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against “disgraceful or immoral employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent upon
conduct” under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the
necessarily refer to public and secular morality. Accordingly, in order for a conduct to be employees was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal
considered as disgraceful or immoral, it must be “‘detrimental (or dangerous) to those is not justified and therefore illegal. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society’ and not because evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.” support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.
14. Notably, in Santos v. NLRC, the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had an extra-
marital affair with his co-teacher, who is likewise married, on the ground of disgraceful and Leus’ dismissal is not a valid exercise of SSCW’s management prerogative
immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The Court pointed out that extra-
marital affair is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct is an afront to the sanctity of 19. The Court has held that “management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion
marriage. and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
Leus' pregnancy out of wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral conduct since she and methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers,
the father of her child have no impediment to marry each other working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however,
15. Petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and doctrines of is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of
the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and labor. Management cannot exercise its prerogative in a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner.
taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock,
is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing 20. SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be,
norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; dismiss them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no
such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful or
arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law. immoral. Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the
controversy, does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital
sexual relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a
even in SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
and, thus, not a valid exercise of management prerogative.
27. It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it since
Leus is entitled to Separation pay (in lieu of actual reinstatement), Full backwages and basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to
Attorney’s fees prove the same. Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
21. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right. Aside from the instances provided under Articles 283 and 28. The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that the
284 of the Labor Code, separation pay is, however, granted when reinstatement is no longer respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner.
feasible because of strained relations between the employer and the employee. In cases of That the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may
illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is available in lieu of be contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed
reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best interest of the employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified
parties. solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without cause.

22. In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more prudent to direct
SSCW to pay the petitioner separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement. The continued
employment of the petitioner with SSCW would only serve to intensify the atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay
to the petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at
least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up
to the finality of this judgment, as an alternative to reinstatement.

23. Also, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their
actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their
illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.

24. Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award
pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code. It is settled that where an employee was forced to
litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney’s fees
is legally and morally justifiable.

Leus is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages

25. A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad
faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good
morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.”

26. Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports
 masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants;
that the rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and that
court functions are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the
afternoon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice
violates the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the
constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.

RULING:

The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church
and State. The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be
inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to
flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two
principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship
through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free
exercise of their religion.

It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of
the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation
wherein the government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a
certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their
religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the
140. RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY unconstitutional encroachment.
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The constitution
FACTS: provides that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
City had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious armed forces, or any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
icons and other instrument for religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the
constitutional provisions on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a sect, furtherance of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the
church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that the holding of use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is
merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in 141. Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan and
general. Thus, the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public Violeta J. Josef, Respondents, G.R. No. 165036; 5 July 2010
property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe, Respondent, G.R. No.
incidental consequence of its primary purpose. 175705; 5 July 2010

FACTS:
Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure
Exam she took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the
Board of Accountancy (Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was
shown her answer sheets but since these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to
determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she asked the Board for copies of the
questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an explanation of the grading system
(collectively, the Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two grounds: (1) Section
36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No.
332, series of 1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets, and reconsideration of the result
of her examination can be made only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the
answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2) the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC
Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later informed her that her exam was
investigated and no mechanical error was found in the grading.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction, against the Board and its members before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all documents that would show whether the
Board fairly administered the exam and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to
issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later amended her Petition to clarify that
she only wanted access to the documents requested, not recorrection of her exam, deleting in
the process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of registration as CPA.
Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA.
Consequently, the RTC denied her application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She
amended her Petition a second time to implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the
documents she had requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997
Exam results be made by the Board and the PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and
dismissed the petition. On her motion, however, the RTC reconsidered the dismissal, holding
that her passing of the subsequent CPA examination did not render the petition moot because
the relief “and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as Certified Public
Accountant” was deleted from the original petition. As regards whether she had the
constitutional right to have access to the documents she requested, the RTC resolved to let the
parties first adduce evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered
the PRC to preserve and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the
answer keys for the October 1997 CPA Licensure Exam.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case to the Court
of Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the case
because: (1) the petition was mooted when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2)
Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, constituted a valid
limitation on her right to information and access to government documents; (3) the
Examination Documents were not of public concern, because she merely sought review of her
failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or mandatory function of the respondents to review
and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing examinee; and (5) she failed to
exhaust administrative remedies when she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before
seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner has the constitutionalright to have access to the
Examination Papers.

RULING:
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is limited to
“matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law” (Section 7, Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure
is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The Court has always grappled with 142. BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT. VS. COMELEC
the meanings of “public interest” and “public concern” which “embrace a broad spectrum of G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,” and which FACTS:
are, in the final analysis, up to the courts to determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent
The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested Petition seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile
in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s
qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to
these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April
further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying
petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A.
The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the
preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec
exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
The PRC, however, had not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their
regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Papers confidential. respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the
"Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each
seeks to. In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something
April 3, 2007. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA- Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"
RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited
be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be nondisclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections. 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
do not appear to be qualified. nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups,
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same
guaranteed by the Constitution; and petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.

Ruling:
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise
would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office
of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the
Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the
undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence. Also, the petitioner’s posture that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously
determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis, Nowhere in R .A. No. 7941
is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization.

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, Section 28, Article II

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the partylist groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore,
lies.The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec
under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
144. Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
Cases against the Former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases
against the Former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC

Nature: Motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission
to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
Keywords: Live telecast of President Estrada’s Plunder Case, right to information,

MENDOZA, J

Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter
requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional
right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be
recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court
proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also
serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.

However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to
prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information
of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Ratio: The petition is denied.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate
and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in
a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention
and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only
by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses 145. BAYAN MUNA VS. ERMITA
on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not
at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. FACTS:
 Several rallies were organized and participated by the petitioners, Bayan, Jess del Prado,
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than KMU, etc on September 26, October 5, and October 6, 2005. According to the
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to petitioners, these rallies were violently dispersed and several participants were injured,
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are arrested and detained by the policemen implementing B.P. 880 and the Calibrated
not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that Preemptive Response policy issued by the Malacanang.
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct  All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract recently announced.
the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what  Contentions of the Petitioners:
they have observed during the proceedings. 1. BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
Ruling: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada signatory.
before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, 2. BP 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of
119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the 3. BP 880 is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for government.
documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of 4. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the some cause not espoused by the government.
recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against 5. The phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio- pass the strict scrutiny test.
visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the 6. B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal
the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere
and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. regulations but are actually prohibitions.
7. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent
and grave danger) are inconsistent.
8. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for
being vague and for lack of publication.

ISSUE:
1. Whether BP 880 is constitutional;
• B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
RULING: restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of
1. BP 880 is CONSTITUTIONAL. rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger
 The provisions of BP 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. standard.
 BP 880 is a CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION.
It is a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This • in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which
was adverted to in Osmena v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a content-neutral to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no
regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. It refers to all kinds such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and
of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only
would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper
and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any coordination and orderly activities.
subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
 BP 880 is not vague. The law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its
provisions. Public does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Not
every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to rally, demonstration,
march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
place. So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
 BP 880 is not overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly
and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive
evils Congress has the right to prevent.
 No prior restraint. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the
speech is not relevant to the regulation.
 Valid Delegation of power. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law
provides a precise and sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec.
6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) 146. Chavez vs. PEA-AMARI (2002)
substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. G.R. No. 133250 | 2002-07-09

In Sum: Facts:

• The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament In 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract
and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP") to reclaim
and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to Amended JVA , AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. land which will be titled in its name.

In 1977, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating the Public To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint
Estates Authority ("PEA") which was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged
submerged areas" and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of areas in Manila Bay.
lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under In 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA
1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. Petitioner also assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation
7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
"Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. The public domain to private corporations.
Freedom Islands have a total land area of 157.841 hectares.
Issues:
1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA") with AMARI, a private (1) whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA required the reclamation of an negotiations before a final agreement
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the (2) whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project- to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding. The Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. Held:
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, likewise approved
the JVA. Right to information on matters of public concern

In 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and 12. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committees matters of public concern in this manner:
conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusions of the Senate Committee Report No.
560 are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of "Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law."
The JVA underwent renegotiaitions. Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA
the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom 13. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest is
Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling
592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 "Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Under the
 information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the
14. The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government
namely: Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can
demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
(a) official records— refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of
government agencies or officials 18. However, information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right
(b) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions - refers to to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes
or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can
(c) government research data used in formulating policies- refers to research data, whether access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.
raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government
policies. 19. Nevertheless, , a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated,
Right to information does not cover privileged or confidential information and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. The
commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
15. The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
information under the separation of powers.The right does not also apply to information transaction.”
on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information
on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the 20. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract,
accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential. The right may also be subject to which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait
other limitations that Congress may impose by law. accompli. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public
discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill
16. There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged of Rights.
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, 21. The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise several legislations.
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
Limitations on the exercise of the right to information
Right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement, provided the information constitute definite propositions by the government 22. The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes
and should not cover recognized exceptions evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.
17. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records,
the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense.
 to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
23. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial
the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying activity to increase the national wealth.
when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
Re-classification of property of public dominion into private property (requires a
Sixth issue: positive act)

Regalian Doctrine 29. Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public
dominion into private property, to wit:
24. The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public "Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense
domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State."
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The King, as the sovereign ruler
and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the 30. This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive
Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals. department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or
territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.
25. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting,
however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public Before the government could dispose of lands of the public domain, the lands must first
domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land be officially classified as alienable or disposable
ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain." Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now 31. Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA No.141) or the Public Land Act, as amended, remains
Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine. to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands. Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers
Property of public dominion the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or disposable” lands of the
public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of
26. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows: man. Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or
concession only lands that are "officially delimited and classified."
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is -
32. Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character; them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public
or quasi-public uses.
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, Foreshore lands and reclaimed lands are lands of the pubic domain
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private
individuals." 33. Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the
27. Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national
property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of
and open only to those authorized to use the property. 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to
be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing,
28. Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the
public service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But Freedom Islands have been declared as alienable or disposable lands of the public
even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to private domain
parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land remained property
of the State. (see concurring opinion of Justice Puno in Republic Real Estate Corporation v. 38. PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
Court of Appeals) covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and
34. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or
also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
public domain.
Submerged areas, which still form part of the public domain, are inalienable and outside
Private corporations may not acquire, and may only lease, alienable lands of the public the commerce of man.
domain
39. However, the Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
35. The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any
public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law patent or certificate of title. These submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the
of the public domain is still CA No. 14. sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State,"
forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable.
36. The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership
of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This 40. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands,
is removed. (i.e., without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open
maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public
acquire more alienable public lands.) The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the
this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to public domain and within the commerce of man.
individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
For reclaimed foreshore lands and submerged lands to be alienable, there must be be (1)
37. AMARI contends that the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture." Whether the official classification as alienable and disposable by the President, upon recommendation
Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires of the DENR, and (2) formal declaration that these lands are not needed for public
PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land service
Share in the name of AMARI. This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable 41. The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or
lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to
clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain. PEA is
title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private
alienation under CA No. 141, the Government Auditing Code,and Section 3, Article XII of the parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and
1987 Constitution. to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since sell its reclaimed lands, Presidential Decree No. 1084, the charter of PEA expressly tasks PEA
many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services. "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government."
42. Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial
be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into or alienable lands of the public domain.
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed (a) PEA may sell its patrimonial properties to both private individual or private corporations.
by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
43. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 vests in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) the "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public (b) PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all individuals only. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the
lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private
authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
any part of the country. including government reclaimed lands.

44. DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public 49. The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees"would not apply to private corporations
alienable under Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No.
should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed foreshore and submerged
45. The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not lands
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of 50. Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open
the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of
Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting
46. Absent two official acts - (1) a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable PEA from holding a public auction. Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is
and open to disposition and (2) a declaration that these lands are not needed for public issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth
service — lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141
an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and
Title III of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws. manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from
the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with
public auction.
47. A law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the Government. (see Laurel vs.
Garcia) 51. Under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code,
the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. It
48. While there is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case
the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. (see COA Circular No. 89-296 dated 57. Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or
January 27, 1989) developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed
land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not
52. At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's exceeding 12 hectares of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these
are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain. provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a
valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares Registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot
convert public lands into private lands
53. PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10,
1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares 58. PEA and AMARI theorize that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands
of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of to PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." They contend that with
the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. No one, however, submitted a the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84
bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA.
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the
failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991. 59. Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant
private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but
54. However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of
and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the registrant had prior to the registration. The registration of lands of the public domain under the
reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.
involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares,
almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on Alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities
December 10, 1991, more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, remain public lands and they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes
1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening a law authorizing the same
period.
60. Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of
The contractor or developer of a reclamataion project, if a corporate entity, can only be title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply
paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was
made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517
55. A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government issued by then President Aquino.
build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain in view of the constitutional ban. Republic Act No. 6957 (BOT Law) 61. The provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD
recognizes the constitutional ban on private corporations from holding alienable lands of the No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the
public domain except by lease. sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien
56. Section 302 of the Local Government Code (LGC) authorizes local governments in land affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. Alienable
reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141
the reclaimed land. Notwithstanding, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a
automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code. law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional
ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law. cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for
legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming private
62. As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands 67. Also, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public
being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the
disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport
public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport.
private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may
alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private likewise be titled in the name of the municipality. All these properties become properties of
lands. the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain
registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration
63. PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as of land from the Torrens System.
"any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands.
Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are 68. Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529
automatically make such lands private. authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new
certificates of title covering such expropriated lands.
64. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations 69. Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to
as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of existing laws.
these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain among Filipinos.

Lands of the public domain may be registered under the Torrens System without losing
their character as public lands

65. The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496
or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws
authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No.
496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands.

66. Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA
No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529.
Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141
that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still
147. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBANK) v. SENATE IMPEACHMENT
COURT. G.R. No. 200238; November 20, 2013.

FACTS: Petitioners Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Pascual M. Garcia III (Garcia), as
President of PSBank, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullity and set
aside the Resolution of respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, sitting as an
Impeachment Court, which granted the prosecution's requests for subpoena duces tecum ad
testificandum to PSBank and/or its representatives requiring them to testify and produce
before the Impeachment Court documents relative to the foreign currency accounts that were
alleged to belong to then Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

On November 5, 2012, and during the pendency of this petition, PSBank and Garcia filed a
Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition averring that subsequent events have
overtaken the petition and that, with the termination of the impeachment proceedings against
former Chief Justice Corona, they are no longer faced with the dilemma of either violating
Republic Act No. 6426 or being held in contempt of court for refusing to disclose the details
of the subject foreign currency deposits.

HELD: It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become moot and
academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of.

In Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Court ruled: "It is a rule of universal
application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases.
And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial
relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition." DISMISSED.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic and
the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 9, 2012 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
148. ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES, 496 SCRA 282(2006)

FACTS:
Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the
Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The
case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was
approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto. For
a period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine the records of the case and
secure certified true copies thereof. However, one of Hilado‘s counsels was denied access to
records of the estate by Judge Reyes ratiocinating that only parties or those with authority
from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case as the counsel was not
under that instance. Hilado filed before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel
Judge Reyes to allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents
forming part of the record of the Hilado‘s case contending that these records are public, and
which the public can freely access.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper.

RULING:
 The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment
or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and
pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon,
appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which
are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of
rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper,
letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording,
court reporter’s notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in
physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the
transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has
received in a case.
 Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for
these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon
all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that
all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be
against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these
from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas, this Court found a judge to
have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of
his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants,
the decision being “already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to
scrutinize.”
149. RE: REQUEST OF JUSTICE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, COURT OF
APPEALS, THAT HER SERVICES AS ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
LAGUNA BE CREDITED AS PART OF HER SERVICES IN THE JUDICIARY FOR
PURPOSES OF HER RETIREMENT.
 FACTS:
 In a letter,1 dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of (SALN) of the Justices of
this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the (PDS) or the (CV) of the
Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on
government officials.
 In her Letter, dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the
PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of
Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose.
 The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009. On the
same day, the Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the
policy on requests for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend
appropriate action on such requests.
 On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario submitted its Memorandum5 dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution
dated November 16, 2009, recommending the creation of Committee on Public
Disclosure that would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and
other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
 Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the
Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed.
 In resolving the remaining pending incidents, the Court, on January 17, 2012 required the
CA, the SB, the CTA, the Philippine Judges Association, the Metropolitan and City
Judges Association of the Philippines, the Philippine Trial Judges League, and the
Philippine Women Judges Association (PWJA), to file their respective comments.
 In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the
various judges associations that while the Constitution holds dear the right of the people
to have access to matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the independence
of the Judiciary. Thus, although no direct opposition to the disclosure of SALN and other
personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates
and the various judges’ associations that the disclosure must be made in accord with the
guidelines set by the Court and under such circumstances that would not undermine the
independence of the Judiciary.
 Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is
relevant in the issue of public disclosure of SALN and other documents of public
officials, viz:
 Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
150. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012 limitations as may be provided by law.
ISSUE: Facts: Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston were residents of San Jose Avenue,
WON the requests shall be granted pursuant to Article 3, Section 7. Sta. Clara Subdivision, Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They purchased their lots in the said
subdivision sometime in 1974, and at the time of purchase, there was no mention or
RULING: requirement of membership in any homeowners' association. From that time on, they have
 The Court finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of remained non-members of SCHA. They also stated that an arrangement was made wherein
the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the homeowners who were non-members of the association were issued "non-member" gatepass
limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and stickers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards manning the subdivision's
regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion. entrances and exits. This arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle of
 The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only its
motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and members in good standing were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles. Thereafter, on
their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves three separate incidents, Victor M. Gaston, the son of the spouses Gaston who lives with them,
with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The was required by the guards on duty employed by SCHA to show his driver's license as a
moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s prerequisite to his entrance to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite their
responsibility and lookout. knowing him personally and the exact location of his residence.
 Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers in
the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in On 29 March 1998, Victor Ma. Gaston was himself prevented from entering the subdivision
which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such and proceeding to his residential abode when security guards Roger Capillo and a "John Doe"
discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, lowered the steel bar of the KAMETAL gate of the subdivision and demanded from him his
or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and driver's license for identification. On 1 April 1998, Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M.
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost Gaston filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court in Negros
modest lives. Occidental at Bacolod City against Santa Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA) thru its
Board of Directors, namely: Arneil Chua, Luis Sarrosa, Jocelyn Garcia, Ma. Milagros Vargas,
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the requests Justices of the Supreme Court, the Lorenzo Lacson, Ernesto Piccio, Dindo Ilagan, Danilo Gamboa, Jr., Rizza de la Rama and
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals; Judges of lower courts; Security Guard Capillo and 'John Doe', and Santa Clara Estate, Incorporated (Civil Case 98-
and other members of the Judiciary, are concerned, subject to the limitations and prohibitions 10217, RTC-Branch 49, Bacolod City); alleging that the acts of SCHA, et al., done in the
provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and the guidelines. presence of other subdivision owners had caused the spouses Gaston to suffer moral damage.
On 8 April 1998, SCHA, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute between SCHA and its
members pursuant to Republic Act 580, as amended by Executive Orders 535 and 90, much
less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of the board of directors of SCHA, the
proper forum being the Home insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). To support their
claim of intra-corporate controversy, SCHA, et al. stated that the Articles of Incorporation of
SCHA, which was duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 4
October 1973, provides "that the association shall be a non-stock corporation with all
homeowners of Sta. Clara constituting its membership"; and that its by-laws contains a
provision that "all real estate owners in Sta. Clara Subdivision automatically become members
151. Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association vs. Spouses Gaston Case Digest
of the association"; among others. On 6 July 1998, the lower court resolved to deny SCHA et
Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association vs. Spouses Gaston
al.'s motion to dismiss, finding that there existed no intra-corporate controversy since the
GR 141961, 23 January 2002
Spouses Gaston alleged that they had never joined the association.
On 18 July 1998, SCHA, et al. submitted a Motion for Reconsideration, adding lack of cause G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006
of action as ground for the dismissal of the case. On 17 August 1998, the trial court denied the
said motion without however ruling on the additional ground of lack of cause of action. On 18 FACTS:
August 1998, SCHA, et al. filed a motion to resolve its motion to dismiss on ground of lack of  Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were
cause of action. On 8 September 1998, the trial court issued an order denying the motion. On GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga
24 September 1998, SCHA. et al. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-
Certiorari. On 31 August 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition and ruled that the file employees.
RTC had jurisdiction over the dispute. The appellate court likewise denied SCHA, et al.'s  On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated 11 February 2000. SCHA, et al. filed the memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they
petition for review. should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction,
KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the
Issue: Whether the Spouses Gaston are members of the SCHA. ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in
obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was,
Held: however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative
The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct
The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
of that partnership. Further, the Spouses Gaston cannot be compelled to become members of  KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted
the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By- the petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and
laws without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events.
owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their common welfare, but  CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar
that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court
of the association. True also, memberships in homeowners' associations may be acquired in concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or
various ways — often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of evidence of assisting employees’ organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges
property ownership. Herein, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By- against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding
laws, there is no showing that the Spouses Gaston have agreed to be SCHA members. The the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.
approval by the SEC of the said documents is not an operative act which bestows membership ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid
on the Spouses Gaston because the right to associate partakes of the nature of freedom of HELD: NO
contract which can be exercised by and between the homeowners amongst themselves, the  The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
homeowners' association and a homeowner, and the subdivision owner and a homeowner/lot personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right
buyer. Clearly, there is no privity of contract exists between SCHA and Spouses Gaston. to engage in “peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
When the Spouses Gaston purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer Certificates with law.”. It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987
of Titles T-126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held,
Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was no annotation showing their automatic membership in the citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in
SCHA. Furthermore, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that the strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of
Spouses Gaston intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the implementation of the government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
aforesaid Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not members of the associations, without including the right to strike.
association were issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles; a fact not disputed  Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized
by SCHA. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were subdivision landowners who were not in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise
members thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws. of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable
152. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General Manager, petitioners, vs. considerations of national security.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.
 As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty
provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in
law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and
Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government doubtless within his jurisdiction.
workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which
“enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by
stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
government service shall be observed.
 Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass
actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
 With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what
respondent’s members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or,
what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase
“prohibited concerted activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization, with
the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating
KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or participated
in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office
building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of
the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of
employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m.
to 2 p.m.,leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of
transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707 employees left their
respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A
smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the
fourth day activity.
 In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004,
the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling
activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it
was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS
main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried
to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-
delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against
strikes by government personnel.
 To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and
responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to
remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then,
petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against the
 FACTS:
 BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision (BF Homes Parañaque), with a land area straddling
the cities of Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Muntinlupa, is the largest subdivision in the
country.
 On 11 November 1997, the Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-085 entitled, "An Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land
Use Plan & Zoning of the Municipality of Parañaque Pursuant to the Local Government
Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws." Sections 11.5 and 11.6 of Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08, reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes
Parañaque from residential to commercial areas.
 The United BF Homeowners’ Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI), several homeowners’
associations, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with
an application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioners
questioned the constitutionality of Sections 11.5, 11.6, 15, 17, and 19.6 of Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08.
 Petitioner: alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque
from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it amounts to
impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot
buyers. Petitioners cited the annotation on the lot buyers’ titles which provides that "the
property shall be used for residential purposes only and for no other purpose."
 Respondents: alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid
exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such
ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the
petitioners and the developer.
 CA: valid exercise of police power by the Municipality of Parañaque.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power;
2. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is constitutional considering that it impairs a
contractual obligation annotated in homeowners’ titles and violates the doctrine of separation
of powers.

RULING:
 The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 pursuant
to the provisions of RA 7160 and Executive Order No. 72.
 Contrary to petitioners’ allegations, we find Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 reasonable
and not discriminating or oppressive with respect to BF Homes Parañaque. As held by
the Court of Appeals, the increasing number of homeowners in BF Homes Parañaque
necessitated the addition of commercial areas in the subdivision to service the needs of
the homeowners. In fact, several homeowners along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues
already converted their residences into business establishments. Furthermore, as found
by the Court of Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main thoroughfares in BF
153. UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS'ASSOCIATIONS V. THE MUNICIPAL CITY Homes Parañaque which have long been commercialized.
MAYOR G.R. No. 141010, February 7, 2007
1. YES.
 The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-
impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. Court held that contractual restrictions on the use
of property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power through
zoning regulations.
 While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.