PAGES 9-10

PROBLEM:

1. X brought seven (7) sacks of palay to the PNR. He paid its freight charges and was issued Way Bill no. 1. The
cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of the train. Without any permission, X boarded the freight wagon
and not the passenger coach. Shortly after the train started, it was derailed. The freight wagon fell on its
side, killing X. There is no evidence that X brought a ticket or paid his fare at the same time that he paid the
freight charges for his cargo. Is X a passenger of PNR?

A: No, X was not a “passenger.” X, who was a “stowaway,” was a mere trespasser. Hence, the carrier
assumes no duty of care in favor of X. (1989)

2. City Railways, Inc. (CRI) provides train service, for a fee, to commuters from Manila to Calamba, Laguna.
Commuters are required to purchase tickets and then proceed to the designated loading and unloading
facilities to board the train. Ricardo Santos purchased a ticket for Calamba and entered the station. While
waiting, he had an altercation with the security guards of CRI leading to a fistfight. Ricardo Santos fell on
the railway just as a train was entering the station. Ricardo Santos was run over by the train. He died. In the
action for damages filed by the heirs of Ricardo Santos, CRI interposed lack of cause of action, contending
that the mishap occurred before Ricardo Santos boarded the train and that it was not guilty of negligence.
Decide.

A: The contention of CRI that the heirs have no cause of action is untenable. There was already a
perfected contract to carry Ricardo Santos and the carrier already owed him extraordinary
diligence. The obligation of the carrier to carry Ricardo Santos to his destination was breached,
hence, CRI is liable for culpa-contractual. (2008)

PAGES 24-27

CASES:

1. AM Trucking, a small company, operates two trucks for hire on selective basis. It caters to only a few
customers, and its trucks do not make regular or scheduled trips. It does not even have a certificate of public
convenience. On one occasion, Reynaldo contracted AM to transport, for a fee, 100 sacks of rice from Manila to
Tarlac. However, AM failed to deliver the cargo, because its truck was hijacked when the driver stopped in
Bulacan to visit his girlfriend. May Reynaldo hold AM as a common carrier?
A: Yes. Reynaldo may be held liable as common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction
between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 does not make any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
This is also consistent with the definition of public service under the Public Service Act. (De Guzman v.
CA, 168 SCRA 612 [1988])

2. Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They used the bus
principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. The couple had a
driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two weeks, His job was to take school
 children to and from the St. Scholastica’s College in Malate, Manila. On November 2, 1984 private respondent
Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33
members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private
respondent paid petitioners the amount of F3,000.00 through the petitioner’s minibus. The group was
scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. However, as several members of the
party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00
o’clock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to Caba, La Union was
through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who
was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of
Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway,
running on a south to east direction, which he described as “siete.” The road was slippery because it was raining,
causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The
bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned
over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the
road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.

Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the bus and
pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her
from this portion. She was in great pain and could not move.

The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not familiar
with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus, because it was
dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30
meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late.

Q: Are the petitioners operating as common carriers during the time of the accident?

A: Yes. It does not matter that the bus carried the passengers based on a special agreement and that the
passengers are limited to a certain group. Article 1732 of the NCC makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as “a sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither
does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
(Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111127, July 26, 1996)

(Note that the driver was considered grossly negligence considering the fact that it was raining and the road was
slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal
speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain. In the same case, petitioners
argued that they were not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made impossible by the congregation’s delayed
meeting) could have averted the mishap and (2) under the contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for the
conduct of the trip. The Court ruled that neither of these contentions holds water because the hour of departure
had not been fixed and that even if it had been, the delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident.)

2. On November 12, 1984, Cebu Salvage Corporation (CSC) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as
charterer) entered into a voyage charter wherein petitioner was to load 800 to 1, 100 metric tons of silica quartz
 on board the M/T Espiritu Santo at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for transport to and discharge at Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc. Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984, petitioner
received and loaded 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo which left Ayungon for
Tagoloan the next day. The shipment never reached its destination, however, because the M/T Espiritu Santo
sank in the afternoon of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol, Misamis Oriental, resulting in the total loss of
the cargo. MCCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer, respondent Philippine Home Assurance
Corporation. Respondent paid the claim in the amount of P211,500 and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII.
Thereafter, it filed a case in the RTC against CSC for reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII. CSC claims that it
is not liable insisting that the agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its
owner, ALS Timber Enterprises (ALS). Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner did not have
control and supervision over the vessel, its master and crew. Thus, it could not allegedly be held liable for the loss
of the shipment caused by the sinking of a ship it did not own. Will the action prosper?

A: Yes, the action will prosper. There is a contract of carriage of goods

between CSC and MCCII; the cargo was loaded on board the vessel; loss or non-delivery of the cargo was
proven; and petitioner failed to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or
that it was due to some casualty or force majeure. The voyage charter here being a contract of
affreightment, the carrier was answerable for the loss of the goods received for transportation.
CSC was the one that contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel
it would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact
that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did not negate its
character and duties as a common carrier. The MCCII (respondent’s subrogor) could not be reasonably
expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a
practical matter, it is very difficult and often impossible for the general public to enforce its rights of
action under a contract of carriage if it should be required to know whom the actual owner of the vessel
is. In fact, in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated the petitioner as the “owner/ operator” of
the vessel.

The bill of lading was merely a receipt issued by ALS to evidence the fact that the goods had been received
for transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as in fact it was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS.
This is consistent with the fact that MCCII did not contract directly with ALS. While it is true that a bill of
lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties, it cannot prevail over the express
provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and petitioner executed.

Finally, petitioner cannot argue that MCCII should be held liable for its own loss since the voyage charter
stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterer’s account. This deserves scant consideration. This
simply meant that the charterer would take care of having the goods insured. It could not exculpate the
carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage. The law, in fact, prohibits it and condemns
it as unjust and contrary to public policy.

The idea proposed by petitioner is not only pre-posterous, it is also dangerous. It says that a carrier that
enters into a contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper if it does not own the vessel it
chooses to use. MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for
reimbursement for its loss. Certainly, to permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the
goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it employed) would
 radically derogate from the carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence. It would also open the door to
collusion between the carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of liability from the
carrier to one without any financial capability to answer for the resulting damages. (Cebu Salvage
Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 150403, January 25, 2007)

PAGES 29-30

PROBLEMS:

1. Tirso Molina charters a vessel owned and operated by Star Shipping Co., a common carrier, for the purpose
of transporting two tractors to his logging concession. The crane operator of the shipping company
somehow negligently puts the tractors in a place where they would tilt each other. During the trip, a strong
wind hits the vessel, causing severe damage to the tractors. Tirso Molina sues the shipping company for
damages. The latter cites a stipulation in the charter agreement exempting the company from liability for
loss or damage arising from the negligence of its agents. Tirso Molina countered by stating that the
aforementioned stipulation is against public policy and therefore, null and void. Is the stipulation valid?
Would you hold the shipping company liable?

A: Yes. The stipulation is valid if there was bareboat charter. A common carrier that undertakes to
carry a special cargo or charter to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private
carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid,
being not against public policy. Hence, Star Shipping Company is not liable.

2. During the elections last May, AB, a congressional candidate in Marinduque, chartered the helicopter
owned by Lobe Mining Corpo¬ration (LMC) for use in the election campaign. AB paid LMC the same rate
normally charged by companies regularly engaged in the plane chartering business. In the charter
agreement between LMC and AB, LMC expressly disclaimed any responsibility for the acts or omissions of
its pilot or for the defective condition of the plane’s engine. The heli¬copter crashed killing AB.
Investigations disclose that the pilot’s error was the cause of the accident. LMC now consults you on its
possible liability for AB’s death in the light of the above findings. How would you reply to LMC’s query?

A: I would reply to LMC that it may not be held liable for the death of AB. A stipulation with private
carrier that would disclaim responsibility for simple negligence of the carrier’s employees is a valid
stipulation. Such stipulation, however, will not hold in case of liability for gross negligence or bad
faith.

3. C Co. shipped 20,000 bags of soy beans through S/S Melon, owned and operated by X Shipping Lines,
consigned to the Toyo Factory and insured by the Surety Insurance Co., against all risks. C Co. hired the
entire vessel, with the option to go north or south, loading, stowing and discharging at its risks and
expense. The owner and the shipper agree on a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agents.

When the cargo as delivered to the consignee, there were shortages amounting to P10,500.00. The
insurance company paid for the damage and sought reimbursement from the X Shipping Lines as carrier. Is
the carrier liable?
A: X Shipping Lines is not liable if there was bareboat charter. X Shipping Lines agreed to carry a
special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. Hence, the New Civil
Code provisions on common carriers cannot be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but
as a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the ship owner from liability for
the negligence of its agents is not against policy and is deemed valid.

PAGE 32

PROBLEM:
1. While at sea, the captain of vessel A received distress signals from vessel B, and vessel A responded and found
vessel B with engine failure and drifting off course. Upon acceptance by vessel B of vessel A’s offer, vessel A
connected two lines to vessel B and towed it safely to port. There was no grave marine peril because the sea was
smooth and vessel B was far from the rocks. In a suit for compensation for towage, who are entitled to recover,
the owner, the crew, or both? Give brief reasons. (1979 Bar)
A: The shipowner of the towing vessel is entitled to compensation. What
is involved in the present case is towage and not salvage. Hence, contract is between the owner of the
towing vessel and the shipowner of the vessel that is being towed. Services are rendered by the towing
vessel for which it is entitled to compensation. It would be different if the case involves salvage where
the members of the crew of the vessel that performed the salvage are entitled to compensation.
However, there is no salvage in the present case but a contract of towage.

PAGE 54-55

PROBLEMS:

1. A is the registered owner of a truck for hire. He sold the truck to B and possession was immediately
delivered to B who operated the same. The truck however, remained registered in the name of A. While
operating the truck, B’s driver ran over a child who died thereafter. The heirs of the child sued A for
damages. A’s defense is that he cannot be held liable as he had already sold the truck to B and it was B’s
driver who was responsible for the accident. Decide with reasons.

A: A is liable to the heirs of the victim. Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains
to be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered
owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle.

2. A was driving a jeepney registered in the name of B. The jeepney, while being driven negligently by A, hit
and injured X, so X sued B for damages. The defense of B was that he sold the jeepney to C and that X should
sue C. Rule on B’s defense, with reasons.

A: The defense of B is untenable and he is liable to X. Under the registered owner rule, the registered
owner remains to be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons,
the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the
vehicle. Hence, B, being the registered owner, continues to be the owner of the vehicle as regards
the public and third persons. (1979)
3. Mr. Villa, a franchise holder and registered owner of a truck for hire, entered into a lease contract with Mrs.
Santos for the lease by the latter of said truck. The lease contract was not brought to the knowledge of the
LFTRB and was therefore not approved by the Land LFTRB. One stormy night, the said truck was speeding
along EDSA, skidded and ran over X who died on the spot. The parents of X brought an action for damages
against Mr. Villa for the death of their son.
a. Will the action against Mr. Villa prosper? Reasons.
b. What recourse, if any, does X have?

A: a) Yes, the action against Mr. Villa will prosper. Under the registered owner rule, the registered
owner remains to be liable to third persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons,
the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the
vehicle. This is especially true in cases involving holders of franchises. The holders of franchises are
liable to the public even if their vehicles are leased to another without

b) An action for quasi-delict can also be maintained by the heirs of X against Mrs. Santos and/or the
driver of the vehicle. The driver may also be charged criminally liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

4. Johnny owns a Sarao jeepney. He asked his neighbor Van if he could operate the said jeep under Van’s
certificate of public convenience. Van agreed and, accordingly, Johnny registered his jeep in Van’s name.

On June 10, 1990, one of the passenger jeepneys operated by Van bumped Tomas. Tomas was injured and
in due time, he filed a complaint for damages against Van and his driver for the injuries he suffered. The
court rendered judgment in favor of Tomas and ordered Van and his driver, jointly and severally liable, to
pay Tomas actual and moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

The sheriff levied on the jeepney belonging to Johnny but registered in the name of Van. Johnny filed a
third-party claim with the sheriff alleging ownership of the jeepney levied upon and stating that the
jeepney was registered in the name of Van merely to enable Johnny to make use of Van’s certificate of
public convenience.

May the sheriff proceed with the public auction of Johnny’s jeepney?

A: Yes, the sheriff may proceed with the auction sale of the jeepney. The vehicle remains to be the
property of the registered owner despite the alleged transfer to another. As regards the public and
third persons, the vehicle is considered the property of the registered operator. (Santos v. Sibug,
104 SCRA 520 [1990])

PAGE 66

PROBLEM:
1. A, in Manila, shipped on board a vessel of B, chairs to be used in the movie house of consignee C in Cebu. No date
for delivery or indemnity for delay was stipulated. The chairs, however, were not claimed promptly by C and
were shipped by mistake back to Manila, where it was discovered and re-shipped to Cebu. By the time the
chairs arrived, the date of inauguration of the movie house passed by and it had to be postponed. C brings an
action for damages against B claiming loss of profits during the Christmas season when he expected the movie
house to be opened. Decide the case with reasons.
A: C may sue B for the loss of his profits provided that ample proof
thereof is presented in court. The carrier is obligated to transport the goods without delay. The carrier
is liable if he is guilty of delay in the shipment of cargo, causing damages to the consignee. (1979)
PAGE 70

PROBLEM:
1. If a shipper, without changing the place of delivery changes the consignment of consignee of the goods (after said
goods had been delivered to the carrier), under what condition will the carrier be required to comply with the
new orders of the shipper?
A: Article 360 providesthat, if the shipper should change the consignee of the goods without changing
their destination, the carrier shall comply with the new order provided the shipper returns to the carrier
the bill of lading and a new one is issued showing the novation of the contract. However, the shipper must
pay all expenses for the change. (1975)

PAGE 77

PROBLEMS:

1. Maria boarded a passenger truck owned by Metro Transit and driven by Juan. While the truck was
proceeding to its destination, it fell into a ravine and several passengers, including Maria were killed. The
truck was insured under a Common Carrier’s policy with Island Insurance Company. State the liabilities, if
any, of Metro Transit to the heirs of Maria.

A: Metro Transit is liable to the heirs of Maria for breach of contract of carriage. It is clear that there
was breach of contract of carriage because the passenger died while riding the carrier. The fact that
death or injury was caused gives rise to the presumption of negligence. (1968)

2. A shipped 100 pieces of plywood from Davao City to Manila. He took a marine insurance policy to insure
the shipment against loss or damage due to “perils of the sea, barratry, fire, jettison, pirates and other such
perils.” When the ship left the port of Davao, the shipman in charge forgot to secure one of the portholes,
through which sea water seeped during the voyage, damaging the plywood. A filed a claim against the
insurance company which refused to pay on the ground that the loss or damage was due to a peril of the
sea or any of the risks covered by the policy. It was admitted that the sea was reasonably calm during the
voyage and that no strong winds or waves were encountered by the vessel. How would you decide the
case? Explain.

A: The insurer validly refused to pay because the proximate cause of the damage to the plywood was
not the perils or risks insured against but rather the negligence of the shipman in charge in
forgetting to secure one of the portholes of the ship. However, A can recover his damages from the
shipowner or ship agent of said vessel, for not having exercised extraordinary diligence on vigilance
over goods. (1983)

PAGES 83-86

PROBLEMS AND CASES:

1. Peter hailed a taxicab owned and operated by Jimmy Cheng and driven by Hemie Cortez. Peter asked Cortez to
take him to his office in Malate. On the way to Malate, the taxicab collided with a passenger jeepney, as a result of
which Peter was injured, i.e., he fractured his left leg. Peter sued Jimmy for damages, based upon a contract of
carriage, and Peter won. Jimmy wanted to challenge the decision before the Supreme Court on the ground that the
 trial court erred in not making an express finding as to whether or not Jimmy was responsible for the collision and,
hence, civilly liable to Peter. He went to see you for advice. What will you tell him? Explain your answer.
A: I will counsel Jimmy to desist from challenging the decision. The
cause of action of Peter is culpa contractual, hence, the carrier’s negligence is presumed. The presumption
arises because there is no question that there was a contract of carriage between Peter and the carrier
and Peter was injured while under the care of the said carrier. Consequently, the burden of proof rests on
Jimmy to establish that despite an exercise of utmost diligence the collision could not have been avoided.
(1990)
2. In an action grounded on the contract of carriage, is there a need for the court to make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it liable for claims in behalf of the injured or deceased
passengers? Explain.
A: No, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in the case of death or
injuries to passengers. The burden is upon the carrier to prove that he observed the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person, with due regard for all circumstances. (1982)

3. In a court case involving claims for damages arising from death and injury of bus passengers, counsel for the bus
operator files a demurrer to evidence arguing that the complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiffs did not
submit any evidence that the operator or its employees were negligent. If you were the judge, would you dismiss
the complaint?
A: No, I will not dismiss the complaint provided that there was proof of the death of and/or injury to
passengers. Negligence on the part of the carrier is presumed the moment the passenger with whom the
carrier had a contract is injured. The burden is on the common carrier to prove that he has a valid defense.
(1997)

4. Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner and consignee of two cases of books, shipped in good order and condition at
New York, U.S.A., on board the defendant’s steamship President Garfield, for transport and delivery to the plaintiff
in the City of Manila, all freight charges paid. The two cases arrived in Manila on September 1, 1927, in bad order
and damaged condition, resulting in the total loss of one case and a partial loss of the other. The loss in one case is
PI,630.00, and the other P700.00, for which he filed his claims, and defendant has refused and neglected to pay,
giving as its reason that the damage in question “was caused by sea water.” Is the defendant liable to the plaintiff?
A: Yes, the defendant is liable. The defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty
was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of
their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes
were under the control and supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The
defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the
burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the
damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were
damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant
and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to
prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the employees
of the defendant’s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover any damage for any
reason. That is not the law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and
when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them
to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove
 that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability;
otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.
And the evidence for the defendant shows that the damage was largely caused by “sea water,” from which
it contends that it is exempt under the provisions of its bill of lading and the provisions of the Article 361
of the Code of Commerce.
In the final analysis, the cases were received by the defendant in New York in good order and condition,
and when they arrived in Manila, they were in bad condition, and one was a total loss. The fact that the
cases were damaged by “sea water,” standing alone and within itself, is not evidence that they were
damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant’s control. The words perils of the sea,” as
stated in defendant’s brief apply to “all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering,
stranding,” and among other things, it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are
within the expression,” and “where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the shipowner is excused.”
“Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words ‘peril’ or ‘accident.’ ”
(Amado Mirasol v. The Robert Dollar Co., G.R. No. L-29721, March 27, 1929)

5. It appears that sometime in the evening of March 10, 1995, at the Manila Domestic Airport, the late Jose Marcial
K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a passenger vehicle for hire owned and operated by
defendant corporation under the business name “Avis Coupon Taxi” (Avis) and driven by its employee and
authorized driver Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher’s Village, Diliman, Quezon City. At about 11:00
p.m., the taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon
City at high speed. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo
Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the narrow space between the left
side railing of the fly¬over and the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, its
driver (Padilla) was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left
causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below.
The forceful drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two parts. Both driver Padilla and
passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured and rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical Center,
Ochoa was not as lucky as Padilla who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the accident. The death
certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City cited the cause of his death as vehicular
accident. G&S argues that it is not liable because the collision was allegedly unforeseen since its driver had every
right to expect that the delivery van would just overtake him and not hit the side of the taxi. Is G&S liable?
A: Yes, G&S is liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial. What is clear from the records is that there existed a
contract of carriage between G&S, as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose Marcial, as the
passenger of said vehicle. As a common carrier, G&S “is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances.” However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach his destination safely as he
died during the course of the travel. “In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is
at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.

This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence.” Unfortunately, G&S miserably failed to overcome this presumption because it is clear that the
accident which led to Jose Marcial’s death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of G&S’
driver, Padilla, thereby holding G&S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.
 (Heirs of Marcial K. Ochoa v. G&S Transport Corporation, G.R. Nos. 170071 and 170125, March 9, 2011)

PAGES 97-104

PROBLEMS AND CASES:

1. X, an 80-year old epileptic, boarded the S/S Tamaraw in Manila going to Mindoro. To disembark, the
passengers have to walk through a gangplank. While negotiating the gangplank, X slipped and fell into the
waters. X was saved from drowning and was brought to a hospital but after a month died from pneumonia.
Except for X, all passengers were able to walk through the gangplank. What is the liability of the owner of
S/S Tamaraw?

A: The owner of S/S Tamaraw is liable for the death of X. Failure to exercise utmost diligence in the
safety of passengers is presumed the moment the passenger did not reach his destination. In the
present case, X was still a passenger when he fell into the waters because he was only disembarking
from the vessel. Hence, the presumption against the carrier is operative. It is up to the carrier to
prove its exercise of utmost diligence.

Moreover, it is well-settled that if, in the use of a gangplank, a passenger falls off and is injured, the
carrier is liable for the injuries sustained irrespective of the cause of the fall if a sufficient
gangplank would have prevented the injury. (1989)

2. A bus of GL Transit on its way to Davao stopped to enable a passenger to alight. At that moment, Santiago,
who had been waiting for a ride, boarded the bus. However, the bus driver failed to notice Santiago who
was still standing on the bus platform, and stepped on the accelerator. Because of the sudden motion,
Santiago slipped and fell down, suffering serious injuries. May Santiago hold GL Transmit liable for breach
of contract of carriage?

A: Yes. Santiago may hold GL Transit liable for breach of contract. It is well-settled
that, motor vehicles like passenger jeepneys and buses are duty bound to stop their conveyances a
reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they
are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or
jerking of their conveyances while they do so. (Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R. No.
95582, October 7, 1991, 202 SCRA 574) Obviously, the driver of the bus did not exercise utmost
diligence in affording Santiago reasonable opportunity to board the bus. (1996).

3. On October 14, 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk,
entered the EDSA LRT station (operated by LRTA) after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the
fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area (who was an employee of Prudent Security Agency) approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fistfight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow
or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated
by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. The moving train struck Navidad, and he was killed
instantaneously. Are LRTA and Prudent liable?

A: Yes, LRTA is liable but Prudent is NOT liable. The law requires common carriers to
carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
 circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not
only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the
appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

With respect to Prudent, if at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article
2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise,
however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such
fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. Unfortunately, there is nothing to link
Prudent to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee,
Escartin, has not been duly proven. Hence, Prudent cannot be made liable. (Light Railway Transit
Authority v. Marjorie Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003)

4. On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of
Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan,
Benguet. It was alleged that on March 25, 1985, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a
passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due
regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito
Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in
utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo
to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.

The place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both between
Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same. The victim fell
from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear tires of the
vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it
stopped.

The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would
ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same. Is the
argument tenable? Is the carrier liable?

A: The carrier is liable. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no
knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his
intention to board the same is not tenable. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a
person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it
stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
 Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act
that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board
the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.

It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford
passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding
passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are
doing so.

Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot
be considered negligent under the circumstances.

In this case, the bus had “just started” and “was still in slow motion” at the point where the victim
had boarded and was on its platform.

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to board a train or streetcar
which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt to board the
moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and
alight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience and both the driver and
conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a
passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation.
Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to
persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.

Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely
injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible
proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous
indifference. (Dangwa Transportation Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95582, October 7, 1991)

5. On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor
daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the
Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the
defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying
with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal belongings. The conductor of the bus, who
happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the
plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the
height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant’s rules and regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group of the
plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggage, was the first to get down the bus, followed
by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the
road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to
get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him,
unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the
conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since
 said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus
was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs
had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board
without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the
shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather
around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was
none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with
her parents.

Is the carrier liable?

A: Yes, the carrier is liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out
that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the
deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of
passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a
stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can be no
controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which
was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained
subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter,
after alighting from the car, aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the
car. The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to
a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the
contract of carriage also persisted.

It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the
point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting
from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a
passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company’s
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger,
has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve
his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger
entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the
father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the
conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to
jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus,
was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent had
exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautions person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil
Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the
engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go
and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and
family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore,
 to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of
carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner
can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it
was alleged in the complaint that “the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs’ daughter, was caused by
the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of
the defendants and their agent.” This allegation was also proven when it was established during the
trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there
were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The
presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the
defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had
failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged pecuniarily liable for the death of
the child Raquel Beltran. (La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA
739)

6. The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel MTV Antonia, owned by
defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No.
117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. ‘B’). On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor,
Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of
the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which
was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over
the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement
dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. ‘21) between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and
defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.

The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was
placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started
operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana
who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still
loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel
to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the
vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three days
thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the Death Certificate being “hypostatic
pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder.” Is the carrier
liable? Was Viana still a passenger at the time of the accident?

A: Yes, the carrier is liable for the death of the victim. The victim was still a passenger at that time. The
rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at
the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination,
safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance
are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is
to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his
baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated
 merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example,
such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident
occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely
to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage. Even if he had
already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner’s premises was not without cause.
The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since
it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner’s vessels that the unloading
operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the
victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.

There is no showing that petitioner was extra-ordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that
said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of
preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory
acts approximate the “utmost diligence of very cau¬tious persons” to be exercised “as far as human
care and foresight can provide” which is required by law of common carriers with respect to their
passengers. (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84458, November 6, 1989, 179
SCRA 95)

PAGE 117

PROBLEMS:

1. Do syndicated Ores have the right to insist that the vessel may carry the cargo to the U.S. per bill of lading,
or that the ship owner hire a substitute vessel to complete the contracted voyage in accordance with the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in the carriage of goods?

A: It depends. The captain shall be obliged to charter at his expense another one in good
condition to carry the cargo to its destination if the vessel became unseaworthy during the voyage.
Under Article 657 of the Code of Commerce, if the captain should not furnish through indolence or
malice, a vessel to take the cargo to its destination, the shippers may charter one at the expense of
the captain/shipowner. (1982)

2. While in Hong Kong, X shipped on the S/S Burma Maru for Manila 500 cages of fine yellow colored canaries
which he intended to sell in his pet shop here. The shipment is worth P4,000.00. Due to lack of proper
facilities in the hold of the ship, all the birds died during the trip. Under the provisions of the COGSA, what
is the liability of the carrier?

A: The owner of S/S Burma Maru is liable for the damages caused by the death of the birds
during the trip. Section 3 of the COGSA provides that the carrier is obligated to make the holds of the
ship fit for the cargo that it is accepting. Obviously, the carrier failed to comply with such obligation.
(1967)