1.

Effect of Repeal or Declaration of Unconstitutionality of Repealing law

CASE: JG Summit Holdings v. CA, G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000
(decision); September 24, 2003 (resolution of 1st MR); January 31, 2005 (resolution
of 2nd MR)
2. Only a law can repeal another law
CASES:
Palanca v. CA, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5,
2014
3. No such thing as irrepealable law
CASE: Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

A. In General
1. Definition
 Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning
and intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful
by reason of the ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for the law
 Drawing of warranted conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the
direct expression of the text

2. Importance
 Because of infirmities of language and the limited scope in legislative drafting,
there is a need for construction by the judiciary

B. Construction vs. Interpretation

 They are so alike in practical results and so are used interchangeably;
synonymous
Construction Interpretation
Art of finding the true meaning and sense Process of drawing warranted conclusions
of any form of words not always included in direct expressions,
or determining the application of words to
facts

C. When Construction is Necessary

1. Purpose: to determine spirit of the law/legislative intent in case of ambiguity of the
statute
 Where legislative intent is ascertained:
1) From the statue as a whole and not from isolated or parts of provision
2) From the language employed, when there is no ambiguity
3) From legislative history, when words used are ambiguous
4) From the purpose or reason or the cause which induced the enactment
of the law
2. Effect when the text of the statute utterly fails to express the legislative intent

D. Power to Construe: Judicial Function

 The duty and the power to interpret or construe a statute of the Constitution
belong to the judiciary.
 Court has the final word as to what the law means
 Court refrains to construe when case has become moot and academic and
instead dismiss the case
o Moot/academic: when purpose has become stale or where no practical
relief can be granted or which can have no practical effect

1. Separation of Powers
 Under the doctrine of separation of powers:
a. Legislature – make the law
b. Executive – execute the law
c. Judiciary – construe the law
 Legislative has no power to overrule the interpretation or construction of statute
of the Constitution by the SC.
 Ratio: if the legislature declares what a law means—it will cause
confusion and will be violative of the separation of powers

2. Interrelationship/Overlap of Powers
a. Executive and Legislative Powers
 Executive-rule making power (delegated legislative power)
 Administration supervision of its own departments by each House of Congress
 Quasi-legislative power - it is the authority delegated by the law-making body
to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out
the provisions of a law and implement legislative policy.

b. Executive and Judicial Powers

 Executive agencies with Quasi-Judicial Functions
 Quasi-judicial power - it is the power of administrative authorities to make
determinations of facts in the performance of their official duties and to
apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found. The exercise of this
power is only incidental to the main function of administrative authorities,
which is the enforcement of the law.
 Executive Contemporaneous Construction of Statutes
o principle used in interpretation of statutes
o says that an ambiguous statute made by an administrative agency
or lower court is entitled to great deference if the interpretation has
been used over a long period.
o Under the contemporaneous construction doctrine, a court or
agency decision or practice interpreting an ambiguous statute may
be considered a contemporaneous construction even though the
interpreting act occurs months or even one year or more after the
statute was enacted
 SC admin supervision of all courts and personnel

c. Judicial and Legislative Powers

 Judicial Legislation (Art. 9, NCC)
o Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
o Limitation on Judicial Power to Construe
 Courts may not enlarge the scope of a statute and include
therein situations not provided nor intended by lawmakers
 Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they think the
legislature would have supplied.
 Should not revise nor rewrite the law
CASE: Floresca v. Philex Mining 136 SCRA 506
 Legislative interpretation thru interpretative clause prescribing rules of
Construction
o SC may issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to enlarge or
restrict, but to clearly delineate what the law requires

3. Power of Judicial Review: Requisites

 Power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light
of their conformity with the Constitution
 Not an assertion of superiority of courts over other but an expression of the
supremacy of the Constitution
 This power is inherent in the Judicial Department by virtue of separation of
powers
 Requisites: (ALEL)
1) Actual Case or Controversy; Ripeness of Controversy
o Actual case: a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial determination
o no commitment to adversarial system; the court has no
authority to pass upon issues of constitutionality through
advisory opinions; there should be an actual case or
controversy

2) Legal Standing (Locus Standi)

 o complainant/challenger should have personal or substantial
interest in the case
 real-party-in-interest
o party who stands to be benefited/injured by judgment
in the suit; the party entitled to the avails of the suit
 legal standing (public / constitutional law cases)
o personal and substantial interest; if the person is the
party who suffers or will suffer the injury pursuant to
the application of governmental act

3) Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity
o General Rule: The question must be raised in the pleadings.
o Exceptions:
 In criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at
the discretion of the court;
 In civil cases, the question can be raised at any stage of
the proceedings if necessary, for the determination of the
case itself; &
 In every case, except where there is estoppel, it can be
raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.
o 2 kinds of estoppel:
 A person is barred from questioning a
particular act after where he has benefited
from the same act.
 Where a person is prevented from
exercising a right, after a certain period he
has slept that right.

4) Constitutional question must be the very “list mota” of the case

o lis mota - essence of the subject matter of the case; existing
or anticipated litigation
o Determination of the constitutionality of the act is inevitable,
cannot be avoided
o The court should respect the act of the other 2 branches

4. Declaration of unconstitutionality of statutes

 Legislature cannot override a judicial construction and interpretation of the
Constitution. It can however change the law itself, thereby overruling the
construction of that previous law.

a. Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

 If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative, or by the executive branch or entered
into by private persons for private purpose is null and void and without any
force or effect.
 Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
(1) Constitution superior to statutes
(2) Executive issuances cannot prevail over statutory policy
CASE: Petitioner-Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-
37, April 10, 2012

b. Effect
1) Void: if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validity because it is
patently offensive to the Constitution.
o /It produces no effect, creates no office, and imposes no duty.
o If the law has been declared unconstitutional, it is presumed that no
law existed at all
o Orthodox/Traditional view

2) Voidable: if on its face it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality.

o The law becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its
invalidity.
o The declaration produces no retroactive effect.
 o Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence.
o Modern view

c. Partial unconstitutionality: separable provisions/with separability clause

 General rule: that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from
the invalid, may stand and be enforced
 Exception – that when parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest – such as in the case of Tatad
v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC
 Requisites for partial unconstitutionality:
1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually
shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and
2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

CASES:
Lidasan v. COMELEC, supra
Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

d. Doctrine of Relative of Constitutionality

 The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a
mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one
set of facts and invalid in its application to another.
 A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes
arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.
CASE: Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP, 446 SCRA 299

5. Reversal of Judicial Construction

 No court can reverse a judicial construction except the Supreme Court.

6. Promulgation: Operative Act for the Effectivity of a Decision

CASES:
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178831-32, July 30, 2009
See also Araneta v. Dinglasan, supra [Re: effect of the death of a justice J.
Perfecto]

7. Rulings of the SC (in construing a statute)

a. Part of Legal System (See Art. 8, NCC)
 Article 8 NCC: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
b. Judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed
 Legis interpretato legis vim obtinet = the authoritative interpretation of the
Supreme Court of a statute acquires the force of law by becoming a part
thereof as of the date of its enactment since the court merely established the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the statute thus construed intends to
effectuate.
CASES:
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, G.R. No. L-10662, December 14, 1956
Phil. International Trading Corp. v. COA, G.R. No. 205837, November 21, 2017

c. Generally, no retroactive effect

  Judicial ruling of the high tribunal construing a law will not retroactively apply
for it impairs vested rights.
 Judicial ruling overruling a previous one will also not be applied retroactively
because it would nullify a right which arose under the previous ruling.
 Lex prospicit, non respicit = the law looks forward not backward
 Principle: retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional.
 Stare decisis = to stand by things decided. The interpretation of a statute
remains to be part of the legal system until the latter overrules it and the new
doctrine overruling the old is applied prospectively in favor of persons who
have relied thereon in good faith.

CASES:
People v. Santayana, G.R. No. L-22291, November 15, 1976 (in relation to
People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967 and People v.
Macarandang, G.R. No. L-12088, December 23, 1959)
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 110318, August 28, 1996

d. SC ruling cannot be undone by Congress by re-enacting a provision previously

declared unconstitutional
 Congress can only undo a ruling if it changes the exact law or its provisions to
which the ruling was construed on
CASE: Sameer Oversees Placement v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5,
2014

III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RULES

A. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object
1. As expressed in the literal reading of the text
a. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule)
CASES:
Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Bustamante v. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273
(1) Dura lex sed lex
CASES:
Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561
a) Exception: Inapplicability in criminal cases
CASE: People v. Santayana, 74 SCRA 25 in relation to People v. Mapa,
20 SCRA 1164
2. As determined through Construction
a. General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
CASE: Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
b. Specific Rules
(1) Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law
CASES:
Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284
King v. Hernandez, 114 SCRA 730
Bustamante v. NLRC, supra
US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85
Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520
Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, G.R. No.
114087, October 26, 1999
a) Instance when the literal import must yield to spirit/intent: in election-related
cases
CASE:
Villanueva v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-54718, December 4, 1985 (Read the
dissent of Justice Aquino for the caveat on this rule)
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA, 100 Phil 850
b) When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
CASES:
 Comendador v. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991
People v. Almuete, supra
(2) ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statute as a whole
CASE:
Sajonas v. CA, G. R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996
Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, supra
Planters Association v. Ponferrada, supra
Aisporna v. CA, supra
a) Harmonize and give effects to all provisions whenever possible; reconcile
apparently conflicting provisions
CASES:
Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, supra
National Tobacco Admin v. COA, 311 SCRA 755 (1999)
Republic v. CA, 263 SCRA 758 (1996)
Dreamwork Contruction v. Janiola, supra
(3) Redendo singula singulis
CASE:
King v. Hernandez, supra
(4) Construe Statute in Relation to the Constitution and Other Statutes
a) Supremacy of the Constitution
b) When statutes admit of two constructions, one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional, construction in favor of constitutionality should be favoured
CASE: De la Cruz v. Paras, GR No. 42571-72, July 25, 1983
c) Statutes in Pari Materia
CASES:
Vda. de Urbano v. GSIS, GR No. 137904, Oct 19, 2001
Cabada v. Alunan, 260 SCRA 828 (1996)
Declarador v. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006
Naga City v. Agna, GR No. 36049, May 31, 1976
King v. Hernandez, supra
(5) Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of
the law should prevail
CASE: Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, supra
(6) Construe statute in relation to the object for which it was enacted
CASE: US v. Toribio, supra
(7) When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish
CASES:
Ty-Delgado v. HRET, G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016
Republic v. Manalo, supra
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Garvida v. Sales, 271 SCRA 767 (1997)
(8) Meaning of Words and Phrases
a) Statutory definition
CASE: Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission, 114 SCRA 555
(1962)
b) Ordinary sense of the words vs. technical or legal meaning
CASES:
Matuguina Integrated Wood v. CA, 263 SCRA 490 (1996)
Mustang Lumber v. CA, 257 SCRA 430 (1996)
Grego v. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481 (1997)
c) Specific words
1. “May” vs. “Shall”
CASES:
Director of Lands v. CA, 276 SCRA 276 (1997)
Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 799 (1982)
PCFI v. NTC and PLDT, 131 SCRA 200 (1984) (But see dissent of
Abad Santos, J.)
Berces v. Guingona, 241 SCRA 539 (1995)
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, supra
2. “Or” vs. “And”
CASES:
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 190529, April 29, 2010
GMCR v. Bell Telecom, 271 SCRA 790 (1997)
 Hda. Luisita Inc. v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, Resolution, November
22, 2011
Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967
Romulo, Mabanta, et al. v. HDMF, G.R. No. 131082. June 19, 2000
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197
3. “Principally”/”Primarily” vs. “Exclusively”
CASES:
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Alfon v. Republic, 97 SCRA 859 (1980)
Floresca v. Philex Mining, supra
Chavez v. NHA, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
Vda. de Urbano v. GSIS, supra
4. “Term” vs. “Tenure”
CASE: Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 231 (1984)
5. “Every”
CASE: NHC v. Juco, G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985 (Read
however the latter case of NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-69870
November 29, 1988)
6. “foreigner”
CASE: Gatchalian v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 435 1970)
7. “government”
CASE: C & C Commercial v. NAWASA, 21 SCRA 984 (1967)
8. “national government”
CASE: Central Bank v. CA, 63 SCRA 431 (1975)
9. “employer”
CASE: Republic v. Yahon, supra
10. “reinstatement”
CASE: Grego v. COMELEC, supra
d) Specific Phrases/Clauses
1. Provisos
a. Purpose: to limit application of provision; or to except something
therefrom; or to qualify or restrain its general application; or
exceptionally, to enlarge instead of restrict
CASE: U.S. v. Sto. Nino, 13 Phil 141 (1909)
b. What a proviso qualifies: only the phrase immediately preceding it
CASES:
ALU-TUCP v. NLRC, 234 SCRA 678 (1994)
Arenas v. San Carlos City, 82 SCRA 318
2. Exceptions
a. Distinguished from provisos
b. Illustrations
CASES:
Meralco v. PUEA, 79 SCRA 409 (1947)
Samson v. CA, 145 SCRA 654 (1986)
e) Associated Words
1. Noscitur A Sociis (where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous,
consider the company of words in which it is associated to ascertain the
correct construction)
CASES:
Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645 (1993)
Magtajas v. Pryce, supra
Aisporna v. CA, supra
2. Ejusdem Generis (literally: same kind or species; general word or
phrase that follow an enumeration of particular and specific words,
which are of the class or kind, are restricted only to things or cases of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned)
CASES:
NPC v. Angas, supra  NOTE: modified rate of interest
Republic v. Migriño, 189 SCRA 289 (1990)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
Colgate-Palmolive v. Jimenez, 1 Phil 267 (1961)
RC Archbishop of Manila v. SSC, 1 SCRA 10 (1961)
3. Expressio Unios est Exclusio Alterius (opposite of the doctrine of
necessary implication: express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others)
 CASES:
Santos v. Pano, 120 SCRA 8 (1983)
Samson v. CA, supra
Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008
Gomez v. Ventura, 54 Phil 726 (1930)
Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 (1962)
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, supra
Commissioner of Customs v. CTA, 224 SCRA 665 (1993)
4. Cassus Omissus (a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally)
CASES:
People v. Manantan, supra
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA, supra
5. Doctrine of last antecedent (qualifying words restrict or modify only
words or phrases to which they are immediately associated)
CASES:
Pangilinan v. Alvendia, 101 Phil 794 (1957)
Florentino v. PNB, 98 Phil 959 (1956)
Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 (1989)
People v. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153 (1973)
Amadora v. CA, 160 SCRA 315 (1988)
c. Rules on Implications
(1) Doctrine of Necessary Implication (what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed; opposite of the rule of expressio unios
est exclusio alterius)
CASES:
Chua v. CSC, 206 SCRA 65 (1992)
Batungbakal v. National Development Co., 93 Phil 182 (1953)
B. Basic Rules of Construing Specific Statutes
1. Political Laws
a. Election Laws
CASES:
Villanueva v. COMELEC, supra
Rulloda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198, January 20, 2003
b. Local Government Code (See Section 5, RA 7610)
c. Expropriation laws
d. Naturalization laws
2. Labor and Social Legislation
CASES:
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong, supra
Manahan v. ECC, 104 SCRA 198
Villavert v. ECC, 110 SCRA 223
Floresca v. Philex Mining, supra
3. Penal Statutes: strictly against the State; liberally in favor of the accused
CASES:
People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 (1978)
People v. Manantan, supra
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, supra
4. Tax Laws
a) Those imposing taxes and custom duties
b) Those granting exemptions
5. Civil Law
a) Family Law
b) Wills and Succession
c) Obligations and Contracts (Read Art. 1370-1379, NCC)
6. Remedial legislation – liberally construed
CASE: City of Baguio v. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342 (1969)

IV. AIDS IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

A. Public Policy sought to be implemented
CASES:
Tinio v. Francis, 98 Phil. 32 (1955)
Cajiuat v. Mathay, 124 SCRA 710 (1983)
Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, supra
B. Presumptions
 1. Of Constitutionality/Validity of Statutes
CASES:
NHA v. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245 (1983)  SUPERSEDED by EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No.
L-59603, April 29, 1987
Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
Rama v. Moises, G.R. No. 197146, December 06, 2016
2. Of the Beneficial Purpose of Statutes
3. Of Prospective Application
CASES:
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 317 (1997)
Grego v. COMELEC, supra
4. In favor of right and justice
CASE: Salvacion v. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997)
5. Against Absurdity
CASE: Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 (1974)
6. Against Injustice and Against Undesirable Consequences
CASES:
Amatan v. Aujero, 248 SCRA 511 (1995)
Ursua v. CA, 256 SCRA 147 (1996)
7. Against Implied Repeals
CASES:
NPC v. Province of Lanao del Sur, 264 SCRA 271 (1996)
Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 (1988)
C. Intrinsic Aids
1. Title
CASES:
City of Baguio v. Marcos, supra  [Compare with Director of Lands v. Abaja,
infra]
Ebarle v. Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 803 (1987)
2. Preamble
CASES:
Pp. v. Purisima, supra
Pp. v. Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980)
3. Body of the statute
a. Context of the whole text
CASES:
Aisporna v. CA, 113 SCRA 459
CIR v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184 (1992)
b. Punctuation marks
CASE: Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil 678 (1926)
4. Head notes and epigraphs of sections
CASES:
Pp. v. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499 (1933)
Fule v. CA, G.R. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976
D. Extrinsic Aids
1. Legislative History
a. President’s message to the Legislature
CASE: Camacho v. CIR, 80 Phil 848 (1948)
b. Explanatory Note of the author/s
CASE: Nepomuceno v. Ocampo, 95 Phil 292 (1954)
c. Committee Reports on the legislative investigations and public hearings
d. Sponsorship Speech
e. Debates and Deliberations
CASES:
Phil. Assn. of Gov’t Retirees, Inc. v. GSIS, 121 Phil 1402 (1965)
Disini v. Secretary, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014 (re provision on
cybersex)
f. Changes in the phraseology before final approval
CASES:
Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 (1920)
Commissioner of Customs v. CTA, supra
g. Amendment by deletion
CASES:
Gloria v. CA, 306 SCRA 287 (1999)
Buenaseda v. Flavier, supra
 RC Archbishop of Manila v. SSC, supra
People v. Manantan, supra
h. Prior laws from which the statute is based
CASES:
Director of Lands v. Abaja, 63 Phil 559 (1936)  [Compare with City of Baguio
v. Marcos]
Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil 364 (1956)
Ursua v. CA, supra
i. Origin of Adopted Statute
(1) Limitations
CASE: Procter & Gamble v. Commissioner of Customs, 23 SCRA 691
(1968)
j. Legislative history to determine intent
CASES:
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
David v. COMELEC, supra
2. Contemporary Construction
a. Executive Construction
CASES:
San Miguel Corp. v. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 (1981)
Maceda v. Macaraeg, 197 SCRA 771 (1991)
(1) Weight: entitled to great weight
CASES:
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. CA, 203 SCRA 504 (1991)
Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil 143
(1927)
(2) erroneous construction: does not bind the courts; does not preclude judicial
correction nor create rights; exception
CASES:
Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Ople, supra
Legaspi v. Executive Secretary, 68 SCRA 253 (1975)
ABS-CBN v. CTA, 108 SCRA 142 (1981)
b. Legislative Interpretation
CASE: Endencia v. David, 93 Phil 696 (1953)
3. Stare decisis
CASES:
Pines City Educational Center v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 655 (1993)
People v. Macadaeg, 91 Phil 410 (1952)
a. Ratio decidendi vs. obiter dictum
CASE: Delta Motors v. CA, 276 SCRA 212 (1997)
b. Limitations of stare decisis
CASE: Koppel (Phils.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil 496 (1946)

V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
A. Primary purpose: to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers
CASES:
JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970)
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)
B. Rules of Constitutional Construction
1. Apply rules of Statutory Construction
CASE: Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)
2. If no ambiguity: Verba legis
a. Give ordinary meaning to the words
CASES:
Saguisag v. Ochoa, January 12, 2016, G.R. No. 212426
Tano v. Socrates, supra
Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1992)
(1) Exception: where technical terms are employed
b. Words are used in a broad sense to cover all possible contingencies
3. If ambiguity exists
a. Rules
(1) Ratio Legis Est Anima: Consider intent of the framers/object to be
accomplished
CASES:
Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 (1982)
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
(2) ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe the constitution as a whole
CASES:
Kida v. Senate, supra
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 (Read also the
discussions in the dissent of J. Leonen)
(3) Self-executing rather than needs an implementing statute
CASE: Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
(4) Mandatory rather than directory
CASE: Marcelino v. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983)
(5) Prospective rather than retroactive
CASES:
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 285 (1945)
Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996)
(6) reddendo singula singulis
CASE: Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003
b. Aids
(1) Intrinsic Aids
a) Language of the constitution itself
b) Interpret Constitution as whole
CASE: Tolentino v. Secretary, 235 SCRA 630 (1994) (construction of
Sec. 24, Art. VI, Constitution)
(2) Extrinsic Aids
a) History or realities at the time of the adoption
b) Object sought to be accomplished
c) Proceedings/debates of the Convention
CASES:
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, 192 SCRA 51 (1990)
Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)
d) Changes in the phraseology
CASE: Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)
e) Previous laws and judicial decisions
f) Consequences of alternative (more than one) constructions
g) Contemporaneous legislative construction
CASE: De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil 289 (1950)
h) Utterances during the proceedings & contemporaneous writings of the
framers
CASE: Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946)