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Rule 73 (case # 4)

Sanchez vs. C.A. [G.R. No. 108947.  September 29, 1997]

Parties: Petitioners: *Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna are the illegitimate children of Juan Sanchez
Private respondents:* Rosalia Lugod -the only child of Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
* Arturo Lugod, Evelyn Ranises and Roberto Lugod - Legitimate children of Rosalia

Facts: Private respondent Rosalia Lugod, following the death of her mother , filed a petition for letters of administration over the
estate of her mother and father( who was at the time in the state of senility). Before the administration proceedings could formally
be terminated and closed her father died. Petitioners filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of their
father which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Subsequently thereafter, they executed a compromise agreement , wherein
they agreed to divide the properties of their father Juan.
Later, the trial court appointed Rosalia as administratix of their father’s intestate estate. Same parties then entered into a
memorandum of agreement which modified their previous compromise agreement.
Nine years later petitioners filed another motion requiring Rosalia to submit new inventory of properties under her
administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof. Likewise, a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement on
grounds based on fraud.
Trial court ordered Rosalia to submit new inventory and an accounting of the fruits thereof which prompted her to file a
rejoinder. Petioners on the otherhand, filed another motion to change administratix. This was then again opposed by Rosalia.
Both parties were ordered to submit their position papers and on the bases of those the trial court promulgated its
decision against herein private respondent (declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale JUAn sanchez and
Maria Villanueva executed in favour of their daughter and grandchildren and further ordered collation of the properties subject
thereof disregarding the compromise agreement between parties). Rosalia filed motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s order
but such motion was further denied by the trial court and held that the decision was final and executory.
The case was elevated to CA via petition for certiorari . Initially, the petition was denied however, on a motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent, CA granted decision and declared modified CA valid and binding. Hence this appeal.

Issues:
1. Won trial court over stepped its jurisdiction as a probate court when it nullified deed of absolute sale and determined with
finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof.
2. Won trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it renders a decision in disregard of the parties ‘ compromise
agreement merely on the ground that such compromise agreement was not approved by the court.
Held:
1. Yes.
It is hornbook doctrine that “in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality a pronouncement that applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding.
“A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.   All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator.  If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and
the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.”

2. Yes
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in disregard of the parties’ compromise
agreement. Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement “was not approved by the court,” is tantamount to “an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of
law.”
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.”  Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties.  Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.
In the case, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately
assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was
executed only after the fourth draft. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the
parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the
parties entered into it freely and voluntarily.  Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the
law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto.

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